Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent repay Petitioner in accordance with the Final Determination issued on January 26, 1983. DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of June, 1983 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Chad J. Motes, Esquire Suite 131 - Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mary M. McDaniel, Esquire 101 East Maud Street Tavares, Florida 32778 Honorable Wallace E. Orr Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 206 Berkley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues raised by the petition filed in this proceeding, as amended, is whether the Respondent's Memorandum No. 82-73 is a rule and an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. To reach those issues, it must be determined whether Petitioner has standing to bring this action.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an employee of Broward County, Florida. Broward County is an employer in the Florida Retirement System. As a result of his employment with Broward County, Petitioner is a member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS). The Division of Retirement is the administrative agency for the FRS. The FRS is a trust that is qualified under Section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code as a defined benefit plan. The FRS is noncontributory for individual members. Contributions are made by participating FRS employers. Respondent's Bureau of Enrollment and Contributions receives reports of contributions and service credit from the various participating FRS employers. The Bureau of Enrollment and Contributions reviews the information reported to determine if the reporting employer is paying the correct amount of contributions and reporting the correct service credit for the individual members of the FRS. The information provided to the Bureau of Enrollment and Contributions does not include the day-to-day employment responsibilities of the individual members of the FRS. The leave status of an individual member of the FRS is irrelevant to the actuarial soundness of the FRS Trust Fund if the employing agency reports the individual member as one of its employees and the employing agency pays its contributions into the FRS Trust Fund for the individual. On February 18, 1981, Respondent issued Memorandum No. 81-40, on the subject of "Membership in the Florida Retirement System for Employees on Leaves of Absence", which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Recently, a question arose as to the Florida Retirement System (FRS) status of employees who are granted leaves of absence to work with the employers who are not members of the Florida Retirement System. The specific inquiry was whether an FRS employer may continue to report such an employee on its payroll with the current employer reimbursing the FRS employer for all expenses including retirement contributions. The answer to this question may be found in Section 121.021(10) and (11), Florida Statutes. As stated in Section 121.021(11), Florida Statutes, "officer or employee" for retirement purposes is defined as "... any person receiving salary payments for work performed in a regularly established position and, if employed by a city or special district, employed in a covered group." Section 121.021(10) defines "employer" as, "... any agency, branch, department, institution, university, institution of higher education, or board of the state, or any county agency, branch department, board, district school board, or special district of the state, or any city of the state which participates in the system for the benefit of its employees." Unless the employer with whom the employee is working during the leave of absence from the FRS employer satisfies the definition of "employer" in Section 121.021(10), Florida Statutes, and unless the employee is performing work in a regularly established position as specified in Section 121.021(11), Florida Statutes, it would be improper (not lawful) for the FRS employer to continue to report the employee on the monthly payroll submitted to the Division of Retirement. Nothwithstanding the foregoing, such employee may still receive retirement credit for the period of the leave of absence. Under the provisions of Section 121.121, Florida Statutes, ("Future Service to Include Leaves of Absence") and FRS Rule 22B-2.06 ("Credit for Leaves of Absence after November 30, 1970"), the employee may purchase retirement credit for the period of the leave of absence, provided the conditions stated in the retirement law are satisfied. Also, nothing in the retirement law would prohibit or in any way prevent the non-FRS employer with whom the employee is working while on leave of absence from his job with the FRS employer from compensating or reimbursing the employee for the cost of purchasing as creditable service the period of the leave of absence upon his or her return to covered employment with the FRS employer. . . . On October 13, 1982, Memorandum No. 82-73, addressed to all Florida District School Boards, was issued by Respondent as an "Addendum to Memorandum No. 81-40 Regarding Florida Retirement System (FRS) Membership for Employees During Leaves-of-Absences". Memorandum No. 82-73 contains the alleged unpromulgated rule1 that is being challenged by Petitioner, and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Memorandum No. 81-40 dated February 18, 1981 was issued in response to an inquiry as to whether an FRS employer may continue to report an employee for retirement who is granted a leave-of-absence to work for a non-FRS employer. In that case, the FRS employer was being reimbursed for the employee's salary expenses by the non-FRS employer. Our advice was that it would be improper to continue reporting such person for retirement credit since the employee was not performing work in a regularly established position. However, we did point out that such leave-of-absence could be claimed later as creditable service by the employee under certain conditions. Upon reflection, it appears that our earlier advice was not entirely correct. Therefore, the following new instructions are issued to supersede those contained in Memorandum No. 81-40: Anytime an employee of an FRS agency is granted a leave-or-absence and is continued in pay status by the FRS agency and is reported by that agency for wages on the IRS W-2 Form, the employee shall continue to be reported for retirement credit while on the leave-of- absence with pay, even if the employee's salary expenses are reimbursed to the FRS agency by the non- FRS entity. See FRS Rule 22B-2.06(2), F.A.C. . . . Rule 22B-2.06(2), Florida Administrative Code, now numbered Rule 60S- 2.006(2), Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (2) If a member (an individual member of FRS) is granted a leave of absence with full pay at the rate he was being paid prior to the leave of absence, and the compensation received during such period is paid in accordance with 60S-1.004(a) or (b), the member shall not be considered on leave of absence for retirement purposes and the contributions required by Section (sic) 60S-3.003 shall continue to be made and he shall continue to receive full retirement credit for the period he is on leave of absence pay. Rule 60S-2.006(2), Florida Administrative Code, is not being challenged in this proceeding. Petitioner is a vested member of the FRS with over 17 years of creditable service. Petitioner paid to the FRS the sum of $2,746.57, on February 27, 1990, in order to purchase credit for four years of military service. Petitioner failed to establish that the policy reflected by Memorandum 82-73 will affect any recognizable interest that he might have. There will be no actuarial impact on the FRS and no diminution in value of the FRS as a result of this policy. Although Petitioner asserts that the policy may result in a disqualification of the FRS plan by the Internal Revenue Service, he presented no evidence, other than his speculation, in support of that assertion. The policy statement contained in Memorandum 82-73 was addressed to all Florida District School Boards and it is not specifically incorporated in the FRS Handbook that is made available to members of the FRS. From those facts, Petitioner concludes that the FRS breached a fiduciary duty it had to its members by failing to notify all members of the policy. Even if Petitioner's conclusion is accepted, Petitioner failed to establish that this alleged breach of a fiduciary duty affected any recognizable interest that he might have.
The Issue Whether or not existing Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C. is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. See, Sections 120.52(8) and 120.56 F.S.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Silvia S. Ibanez is a practicing attorney and a member of the Florida Bar, and holds active Florida CPA License No. 10842, currently in good standing. She is also a Registered Investment Advisor with the Florida Division of Securities and a certified financial planner (CFP). She has been charged with violating Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C. in DOAH Case No. 91-4100 which is currently pending before the Division of Administrative Hearings. As a licensee with the federal Securities and Exchange Commission, Petitioner is required to, and does, disclose the fact that she is a CPA. Petitioner Ibanez is listed in the yellow pages under the heading "Attorneys" as "Ibanez, Silvia, S., CPA, CFP." On its face, there is nothing false or fraudulent about this listing. As an attorney, Petitioner also places CPA after her name on her business cards and on her letterhead. Respondent contends that because Petitioner "holds out" to the public as a CPA, uses accounting skills, and provides one or more types of management, advisory, or consulting services, she is currently "practicing public accounting." Intervenor James R. Brewster is also a practicing attorney, a Board- certified tax lawyer, and a member of the Florida Bar, and holds an active Florida CPA license. Mr. Brewster has been charged with violating Rule 21A- 20.012 F.A.C. in DOAH Case No. 90-3278 which is currently pending before the Division of Administrative Hearings. The administrative complaint therein charges violations of Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C. and Sections 473.323(1)(a), (g), and (h) F.S. on the basis that Brewster's law firm letterhead designates him as a "CPA" and the law firm is not licensed by the Board of Accountancy as a public accounting firm. Intervenor American Association of Attorney Public Accountants (AAA- CPA) is a not-for-profit corporation with its principal place of business in Mission Viejo, California. Founded in 1964, the AAA-CPA is an active professional organization of persons dually qualified as both attorneys and CPAs. Its membership is comprised of practitioners in public accounting, law, government, education, and other activities. One of the functions of the AAA- CPA is to engage in the analysis and discussion of ethical and other issues related to practitioners who are dually licensed in the accounting and law professions. This includes monitoring and commenting upon legislation affecting the practice of law and public accountancy and participating in the development of ethical standards of lawyers and CPAs. AAA-CPA's substantial interests are affected by this proceeding in that its members are CPAs who are directly affected by the definition, scope, and regulation of the practice of public accounting by Florida statutes and rules. Respondent Board of Accountancy is an agency of the State of Florida established pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 473 F.S. Pursuant to Section 473.301 F.S., the Board is authorized in the following language to regulate the "practice of public accounting": Purpose.--The Legislature recognizes that there is a public need for independent and objective public accountants and that it is necessary to regulate the practice of public accounting to assure the minimum competence of practitioners and the accuracy of audit statements upon which the public relies and to protect the public from dishonest practitioners and, therefore, deems it necessary in the interest of public welfare to regulate the practice of public accountancy in this state. Respondent Department of Professional Regulation is an umbrella agency for the Board of Accountancy, established under the provisions of Section 20.16 and Chapter 455 F.S. Intervenor Florida Institute of Certified Public Accountants (FICPA) is a Florida not-for-profit corporation with its principal place of business in Tallahassee. Founded in 1905, the FICPA is an active professional organization with approximately 17,800 members. Its membership is comprised of practitioners in public accounting, industry, government, education, law, and other activities. One of the functions of the FICPA is to engage in the analysis and discussion of issues related to the accounting profession. This includes monitoring the scope of services provided by certified public accountants in Florida and throughout the United States, monitoring legislation affecting the practice of public accountancy, and participating in the development of auditing, accounting, and ethical standards of CPAs. Intervenor FICPA's substantial interests are affected by this proceeding in that its members are CPAs who are directly affected by the definition, scope, and regulation of the practice of public accounting by Florida statutes and rules. It is even recognized in the statute. See, Section 473.302 F.S., infra. Challenged existing Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C., also referred to as the "holding out" rule, provides as follows: 21A-20.012 Holding Out. "Holding himself or itself out" as used in Section 473.302(4), F.S. is defined as publicizing that the licensee is a certified public accountant when providing, or offering to provide services or products to the public, in such a manner that an uninformed person may not be able to differentiate whether or not the licensee may also be in the practice of public accounting. The display of the CPA certificate and license issued by the Department of Professional Regulation shall not constitute holding out under the terms of this rule. All other publication of the fact that a licensee is a CPA constitutes holding oneself out. The specific statutory authorities currently cited by the agency for the rule are Sections 473.302, 473.304 and 473.307 F.S. and the law implemented is cited as Section 473.302 F.S. Section 473.307, dealing with "experience," does not impinge on these proceedings. The remaining authorities provide as follows: Definitions.--As used in this act: "Board" means the Board of Accountancy. "Department" means the Department of Professional Regulation. "Certified public accountant" means a person who holds a license to practice public accounting in this state under the authority of this act. "Practice of," "practicing public accountancy," or "public accounting" means: Offering to perform or performing for the public one or more types of services involving the use of accounting skills or one or more types of management advisory consulting services, by a certified public accountant or firm of certified public accountants, of this state, including the performance of such services in the employ of another person; or Offering to perform or performing for the public one or more types of services involving the use of accounting skills or one or more types of management advisory or consulting services, by any other person holding himself or itself out as a certified public accountant or firm of certified public accountants, including the performance of such services by a certified public accountant in the employ of a person so holding himself or itself out. However, these terms shall not include services provided by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the Florida Institute of Certified Public Accountants, or any full service association of certified public accounting firms whose plans of administration have been approved by the board, to their members or services performed by these entities in reviewing the services provided to the public by members of these entities. [Emphasis supplied] 473.304 Rules of board.--The board shall adopt all rules necessary to administer this act. Every licensee shall be governed and controlled by this act and the rules adopted by the Board. Also relevant to these proceedings is Section 473.322 F.S. which provides as follows: 473.322 Prohibitions; penalties.-- No person shall knowingly: Practice public accounting unless the person is a certified public accountant or a public accountant; Assume or use the titles or designations "certified public accountant" or "public accountant" or the abbreviations "C.P.A." or any other title, designation, words, letters, abbreviations, sign, card, or device tending to indicate that such person holds an active license under this act, unless such person holds an active license under this act; Attest as an expert in accountancy to the reliability or fairness of presentation of financial information or utilize any form of disclaimer of opinion which is intended or conventionally understood to convey an assurance of reliability as to matters not specifically disclaimed unless such person holds an active license under this act. This subsection shall not prevent the performance by persons other than certified public accountants of other services involving the use of accounting skills including the preparation of tax returns and the preparation of financial statements without expression of opinion thereon. Present as his own the license of another; Give false or forged evidence to the board or a member thereof for the purpose of obtaining a license; Use or attempt to use a public accounting license which has been suspended, revoked, or placed on inactive status; Employ unlicensed persons to practice public accounting; or Conceal information relative to violations of this act. Any person who violates any provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. [Emphasis supplied] Although it has not been challenged, Rule 21A-21.009 F.A.C., the "other business activity rule," is relevant to these proceedings. That existing rule currently provides as follows: 21A-21.009 Other Business Activities. A licensee engaged in the practice of public accounting may concurrently engage in another business, occupation, or profession if: The licensee does not hold himself out as a certified public accountant in that activity, The activity is conducted under a name which the public will not associate with licensee's practice of public accounting, The other business, occupation, or profession is not used to promote the practice of public accounting in any manner prohibited by Chapter 473, F.S., Facilities used by the licensee in his public accounting practice and other activity conform to the requirements of 21A-26.001(3), The entity's dealings with the licensee's public accounting clients shall not violate the provisions of Chapter 473, F.S., and 21A, Florida Administrative Code, relating to integrity and objectivity, The entity does not interpret financial statements, forecasts or projections audited, reviewed, compiled or prepared by others. [Emphasis supplied] Although it has not been challenged, Rule 21A-20.011 F.A.C. is relevant to these proceedings. That existing rule currently provides as follows: 21A-20.011 Practice of, or Practicing Public Accountancy. "Practice of, or practicing public accountancy" as defined by Section 473.302(4), F.S., shall exclude any of the following: Services rendered by a licensee as an employee of a governmental unit or an employee rendering accounting services only to his employer as long as that employer is not required to be licensed under F.S. 473, or Activities of licensees who do not hold themselves out as CPAs and who are not associated with financial statements, or Activities of licensees who do not hold themselves out as certified public accountants. [Emphasis supplied] Petitioner's and Intervenor Brewster's CPA certificates (like all Florida CPA certificates) authorize them to display their CPA credentials. The CPA certificate represents that the recipient . . . has passed all examinations and has met all other requirements prescribed by law and by rule of this board for certification as an expert public accountant, and is therefore entitled to append the letters CPA after this registrant's name to evidence registration by this board as a Certified Public Accountant. [Emphasis supplied] The Board's only classifications of CPA licenses/licensees are "active" or "inactive." "Active" and "inactive" refer to the status of the CPA license and do not refer to or imply that the licensee is actively practicing public accounting. One can be an actively licensed CPA and not be practicing public accounting. Attainment of the CPA credential is an accomplishment that is recognized in the business community. The CPA credential of a Florida-licensed CPA connotes high competency and achievement levels in the discipline of accounting. Truthful communication of the CPA credential by actively licensed CPAs for identification purposes constitutes valuable disclosure to the public. The use of the term "CPA" implies a specific competency to the public. The fact that Petitioner Ibanez or Intervenor Brewster is a CPA is valuable to their respective legal clients. CPA status is a valuable property right to each CPA, and the ability of a practicing attorney to publicize the fact that s/he also holds an active CPA license is a valuable asset to that individual. It is conceded by all parties that it is possible to practice law and public accounting in the same business activity. There are firms that simultaneously hold themselves out as law firms and public accounting firms. The activities of other regulated professionals, such as members of the Florida Bar, which overlap those of practicing CPAs are subject to the regulatory standards of their principal regulated professions and applicable judicial and administrative remedies for malpractice and negligence. It is conceded by all parties that many activities conducted by professionals and nonprofessionals, other than by CPAs and other than by attorneys, are identical to activities performed by CPAs engaged in public accounting. For instance, anyone can legally prepare a tax return. Bookkeepers and free-lance tax assistors of all sorts are unregulated in any way. The only activity among public accounting activities that is a unique activity of CPAs is the "attest" function. See, Section 473.322(1)(c) F.S. Truthful use, communication, or disclosure of the CPA credential by an actively licensed CPA does not per se constitute false, misleading, or deceptive advertising. The evidence does not support a finding that withholding truthful disclosure that one has earned the CPA credential benefits the public welfare or effects the purposes of the enabling legislation, or indeed, how such nondisclosure could promote them, particularly since it has been shown that persons of considerably lesser competency and achievement levels in the discipline of accounting may legally offer to the public almost all the services provided by CPAs. Prior to 1984, when the "holding out" rule was adopted, a Florida- licensed CPA who offered one or more types of accounting services to the public or who offered one or more types of management advisory or consulting services to the public was considered to be "practicing public accountancy," whether or not that person appended the initials "CPA" after his or her name. The "holding out" rule became effective on September 17, 1984. Chapter 89-87 Laws of Florida amended Section 473.302(4) F.S. (i.e., the definition of public accountancy) but the amendment did not change the previously existing "holding out" language therein. The "holding out" rule was adopted more than one year before the initiation of this rule challenge. There is no dispute among the parties that the definition within the challenged Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C. is circular. In attempting to define the term "holding out" so that the use of that term in Section 473.302(4) F.S. may be clarified, the rule incorporates the statutory phrase "practice of public accounting," and the term "practice of public accountancy/accounting" in Section 473.302(4)(b) F.S. incorporates the term "holding out," 1/ as does Rule 21A- F.A.C., 2/ which creates exemptions to the statute. At least one purpose of the second sentence of the existing rule seems to have been to allow all CPAs to display their CPA certificates on their inner office walls without fear of disciplinary action by the Board. The Board's expressed rationale for excluding "display of a CPA certificate" from its "holding out" rule is premised on the fact that during an office visit, a CPA can immediately disabuse any individual of the fact that s/he is practicing public accounting once that individual is inside the CPA's office. However, Petitioner demonstrated, and the Board conceded, that an individual may have the opportunity to disabuse members of the public that s/he is engaged in the activity of the practice of public accounting or that s/he is offering all the services normally associated with a CPA, as opposed to law or some other profession, at least where there is direct contact by letter or telephone. Clearly, there are many ways a nonattesting, actively licensed CPA who is dually licensed can clarify to those seeking his or her services which profession, function, or service s/he is willing to perform for that client. On the other hand, the challenged rule does not deal with all members of the public, or members of the public specifically seeking CPA services, or members of the public seeking some other service. The rule deals with "uninformed persons." As used in the rule, the term "uninformed person" is undefined and has been subject to differing speculative interpretations by the Board and by non-Board witnesses, some of which interpretations address such broad categories as anyone using a telephone book. The Board also suggested that only display of the original CPA certificate on an inside office wall would be exempt from prosecution for publication, but a reasonable person could interpret the rule on its face to permit posting the CPA certificate or an exact facsimile of the certificate on a sign outside an office building or circulating as business cards exact reduced- size copies of the certificate even though these types of "publication" or "display" would not provide the same opportunity as an office visit would provide for the CPA to disclose to individuals the actual services the CPA was offering to perform. Accordingly, there has been no rational basis for the "holding out" rule's distinction between "display" of the licensee's CPA certificate and other forms of truthful, nonmisleading publication of the CPA licensure/status. The agency's expressed rationale behind its adoption of the "holding out" rule was to define the meaning of the statutory term "holding out," as used in Section 473.302(4) F.S., a term which has also been adopted into a number of other rules (see, supra), so as to provide guidance on when a person who has been licensed as a CPA is engaged in the "practice of public accounting." Specifically, the Board maintained that the "holding out rule" and the "other business activity rule" give licensees two options. Under the first option, the "holding out" rule permits licensees to retain their CPA certificates when not in compliance with all of the provisions of Chapter 473 F.S. and the rules promulgated thereunder, as long as they do not publicize themselves as CPAs. Alternatively, the Board perceives that under the second option, if licensees do publicize themselves as CPAs when performing services for the public, licensees become subject to regulation by the Board and are held to the standards of competency and conduct which are applicable to all CPAs who use their accounting skills for the public while trading on the fact of their licensure as a Florida CPA. However, the words "publicizing" and "publication" as used in the "holding out" rule are also undefined. Although Respondents submitted that the "common usage" of these words is sufficient to embrace listings in the yellow pages, it is also quite possible to give these words a far broader reading to encompass the "assumption" and "use" of the designation "CPA" and the "assumption" and "use" of the CPA credential, which "assumption" and "use" are specifically reserved to all actively licensed CPAs and which designation is permitted to be inserted after their names on signs, cards, or devices by Section 473.322(1)(b) F.S. [see Finding of Fact No. 11] and by the CPA certificate itself which permits them to "append" CPA after their names [see Finding of Fact No. 14]. The rule has actually subjected CPAs, and specifically has subjected Petitioner and Intervenor Brewster, to DPR disciplinary proceedings independent of any other act or wrongdoing merely for any "publication" of the CPA credential in a form other than display of the original CPA certificate on an inner office wall. The rule may automatically subject attorney-CPA licensees to DPR disciplinary proceedings independent of any other act or wrongdoing merely on the basis of passive, truthful communications which are otherwise in full compliance with the standards of the Florida Supreme Court and Florida Bar. The rule has the potential for being interpreted so as to prohibit CPAs such as Petitioner and Intervenor Brewster from making disclosures of their earned status as CPAs to various regulatory bodies to which they are required by law to disclose that information. See, Findings of Fact 1 and 2, supra. The rule can be invoked to limit their income by chilling their appearances as expert CPA witnesses for a fee even if they never work for an uninformed layman at all. Applicants for certain state employments and candidates for public office may run afoul of the rule due to the disclosure requirements of public office. Even at risk is the CPA called as a factual witness who is then sworn to tell the truth and asked innocuous biographical information. One's desire to attain a CPA credential may be chilled by the hazard of using it. Chapter 473 F.S. contains limitations on competitive negotiation, prohibits accepting contingent fees, prohibits the payment of certain commissions, and establishes other prohibitions to which persons who are deemed to be "practicing public accountancy" must adhere. Some of these prohibitions are contrary to normal, ethical practice of other professions, i.e., acceptance of contingent fees by lawyers. If the rule remains intact, the Board and DPR under Chapters 473 and 455 F.S. have the potential of breaching the confidentiality of CPA-attorneys' legal clients' files. See, Section 473.316(5) and 473.318 F.S. Since attorneys are exclusively overseen by the Florida Supreme Court, the rule potentially violates the doctrine of "separation of powers" among the three branches of state government. Therefore, the definitional rule creates a wedge whereby the Board may insinuate its discipline into other professions and confuses dually licensed CPAs from knowing how they may behave in each profession without running afoul of discipline in the other. In application with other rules, the "holding out" rule sets confusing and varying standards for agency decisions involving attorneys, bankers, CPAs employed by private corporate employers, and CPAs with their own financial consultant firms. The Board of Accountancy has issued a series of letter opinions based on the "holding out rule" or based on that rule read in conjunction with Rule 21A-21.009 F.A.C., the "other business activity rule," which indicate that a Florida CPA who does not "hold out" to the public as a CPA and who is not associated with financial statements is permitted by the Board to engage in other business activities without complying with the provisions of Chapter 473 F.S., that is, not being subject to DPR discipline, because the Board does not view that CPA in those activities as "practicing public accountancy." Also, the Board of Accountancy has issued a series of opinions to the effect that, by virtue of Section 473.302(4) F.S. and the "holding out rule," a CPA who "holds out" (publicizes his or her status as a CPA) is automatically, by definition, "practicing public accounting," regardless of what actual business activity s/he is performing. These opinions also indirectly insinuate the Board of Accountancy into many other professions, including the practice of law, which the Board has no statutory mandate to regulate pursuant to Section 473.301 F.S. The plethora of opinions issued by the Board dramatize the confusion experienced by CPAs who have sought to have the Board interpret the rule in question on a case-by-case basis. Testimony of the Chairman of the Board was offered to establish that absent the challenged rule, the Board cannot reasonably regulate negligence in the profession and that absent the rule, only fraud could be prosecuted by the Board. He testified that, in his opinion, the challenged rule means that a CPA performing tax services for a client is not doing "public accounting" if "CPA" is not appended after the CPA's name in advertising and that that CPA cannot be disciplined by the Board for negligence, any more than he could be disciplined if he were a non-CPA doing tax services. The Chairman further opined that a CPA doing tax services is doing public accounting only if he appends CPA after his name, and in that instance, the Board can and will discipline that CPA for negligence, should he commit any. Further, the Chairman indicated that if Rules 21A-21.009, 21A-20.011, and 21A-20.012 F.A.C. were not simultaneously in place, the actively licensed CPA who places CPA after his name could not be disciplined by the Board for negligence, but only for fraud. Precisely how this would occur was not made clear, but upon the foregoing, together with the Board opinions admitted in evidence, it is concluded that the Board has utilized what purports to be purely a definitional rule to establish disciplinary jurisdiction and that in certain instances the rule puts DPR in the precarious position of only being able to prosecute CPAs with "CPA" appended after their names, but not CPAs who perform the same services and who do not append "CPA" after their names. Such a result is nonsensical. The Board does not seriously suggest that if Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C. is invalidated, Rule 21A-20.011 would provide a blanket exclusion from all provisions of Chapter 473 F.S. for CPAs "using" or "assuming" or "publicizing" their status. At a minimum, such CPAs would have to maintain their credential as would any other CPA for good character, payment of fees, and recertification for competency based on continuing education. What has actually occurred here is that the Board has consciously utilized Rules 21A-20.011 and 21A-20.012 F.A.C. so as to not enforce Section 473.302(4)(a) as written and so as to selectively enforce only Section 473.302(4)(b) F.S. Then, by its selective enforcement of Rule 21A-20.012, the Board has gone a step further. The Board has "interpreted" Section 473.302(4)(b) to include within Board jurisdiction not those functions, activities, or skills a CPA practices or holds out to the public for a fee as constituting "practicing public accountancy" but has made the definition of "practicing public accountancy" encompass any disclosure of CPA status or skill attainment, regardless of the disclosure's truth and regardless of whether or not the CPA is utilizing any of the functions, activities, or skills of a CPA. By so doing, the Board has exceeded its statutory mandate and legislative purpose as set forth in Section 473.301 F.S. On its face, Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C. consists of three sentences, which, in relationship to each other, are inconsistent and contradictory. Specifically, sentence ONE seems to be based on the overall representation made by a CPA to "uninformed persons." It simultaneously presumes fraud in the communication of what otherwise would be truthful, passive information. 3/ Sentence THREE subjects the CPA to discipline absent any fraud and totally without consideration to the impression formed by "uninformed persons" from the use of the CPA designation in any manner other than display of the certificate. 4/ Because there are two incompatible definitions in the challenged rule as now drafted, the Board is at liberty to selectively enforce the statute. One CPA could be prosecuted for simple disclosure of credential status or neutral biographical information (Ibanez). Another CPA might be prosecuted only after examination of the totality of his circumstances to determine if the circumstances mislead "uninformed persons" into believing he abides by all the regulations promulgated under Chapter 473 F.S., and still another CPA would never be prosecuted unless he performs the attest function. This is nonsensical and clearly unfair.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is seeking licensure as a certified public accountant in Florida. Petitioner is licensed as a certified public accountant in the State of Pennsylvania. He is seeking licensure in Florida by endorsement based upon his Pennsylvania licensure without the necessity for taking an examination. Petitioner was initially licensed in Pennsylvania in 1961. The Board of Accountancy reviewed Petitioner's application and determined that he met all Florida requirements for education and experience, and that he was administered the same examination in Pennsylvania in 1961 that was administered in Florida in 1961. In a non-final order, however, the Board determined that Petitioner did not receive grades on the examination administered in Pennsylvania that would have constituted passing grades in Florida, and denied his application. The non-final order is the subject of a formal administrative proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings in Case No. 80-2332. The Board's rules require that an applicant for licensure as a certified public accountant receive a grade of 75 or above on all parts of an examination administered by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Rule 21A-28.05(2), (3), Florida Administrative Code. Rules in effect in 1961 also required that a grade of 75 or above would be required in all four subjects of the examination. Rules of the State Board of Accountancy Relative to Examinations and the Issuance and Revocation of Certificates, Rule 1(f).
The Issue Whether petitioner should recover $735 allegedly disbursed by respondent under Contract 3-14.073-051 to one Kenneth L. Jenks?
Findings Of Fact Kenneth L. Jenks of Franklin County was enrolled in a CETA program administered by the Bay County School Board at some point during 1983.
Recommendation It is, accordingly RECOMMENDED: That petitioner abandon its efforts to recover from respondent any monies claimed under Contract No. 3-14.073-051. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of June, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Lizanne Batey, Chief Bureau of Job Training Department of Labor & Employment Security Division of Labor, Employment & Training Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Hiram J. Spurling, Director Job Training Partnership Act Program Department of Education Division of Vocational Education Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to certain facts in Case No. 76-2002 and they are adopted for the purposes of this proceeding, as follow: That the Certificate Holder received an undergraduate degree in accounting from the University of Cincinnati in August of 1968. That the Certificate Holder was employed by major CPA firms from August of 1968 to September of 1970 as an accountant; That the Certificate Holder passed the uniform CPA exam in California in 1969, and was granted CPA license by California upon completion of the necessary experience requirements in May of 1971; That the Certificate Holder attended law school at the Ohio State University from September, 1970 through December 1972. In December, 1972, he was awarded a Juris Doctor Degree from that institution; That prior to graduating from law school, the Certificate Holder made application to secure a position in accounting. He secured a Position with the certified public accounting firm of Arthur Young and Co. in Cincinnati, Ohio, which position commenced on January 1, 1973; That while employed as a certified public accountant by Arthur Young and Co., the Certificate Holder, in the summer of 1973, was offered a position with a certified public accounting firm in Miami, Florida; That in July, 1973, the Certificate Holder accepted that position with McClain and Co., CPA's, of Miami, Florida, which position was to begin in August, 1973; That during the summer of 1973, the Certificate Holder requested the Florida State Board of Accountancy to forward him an application to apply for a reciprocal CPA certificate and the Board responded that an application would not be sent to anyone who was not a resident of the State of Florida; That during the summer of 1973, the Certificate Holder made an application with the Florida Bar to become a member of the Florida Bar; That the Certificate Holder moved his family from Cincinnati, Ohio to Fort Lauderdale, Florida, in July, 1973, and began working on a full-time basis for the Florida CPA firm of McClain and Co. in August of 1973. At that time he again requested an application for a reciprocal CPA certificate; said application being received by the Certificate Holder in late September of 1973; That the Certificate Holder completed the application for a reciprocal CPA certificate and Submitted the same to the Florida State Board of Accountancy in October, 1973; That in November, 1973, the Certificate Holder took the Florida Bar examination in Tampa, Florida; That the Certificate Holder was admitted to the Florida Bar In December, 1973, and was granted a reciprocal CPA certificate by the Florida State Board of Accountancy in January, 1974; That the Certificate Holder was discharged by the Florida certified public accounting firm of McClain and Co. in May, 1974. That the Certificate Holder taught part-time in the Accounting Department of Florida International University beginning in January, 1974 thru 1976. After his discharge from the public accounting firm of McClain and Co., he continued at Florida International University on a substantially full-time basis thru the summer of 1974 and into the fall of 1974; That in August, 1974, the Certificate Holder opened an office for the practice of law in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, but this office was staffed only on a part-time basis as the Certificate Holder was devoting the great bulk of his time to his teaching activities at Florida International University in Miami, Florida; That in February, 1975, the Certificate Holder opened an office for the practice of law in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, (200 SE 6th Street, Suite 100- B), which office was from that time staffed on a full-time basis by the Certificate Holder; That since February, 1975, the Certificate Holder has been actively engaged in the full-time practice of law in the city of Fort Lauderdale, Florida; and That the Certificate Holder has been a resident of and domiciled in the State of Florida from August, 1973 thru and including the date of this Stipulation.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Ana Caos, M.D., is a applicant for a restricted license to practice Medicine in the State of Florida pursuant to the provisions of Section 458.311(8), Florida Statutes. Successful completion of the Florida Board Examination is a prerequisite to licensure under Section 458.311(8), Florida Statutes. In an effort to meet that prerequisite, the Petitioner has already taken the Florida Board Examination six times since October 1, 1966. The Petitioner has passed portions of the licensure examination, but thus far she has not received a passing grade on the Basic Sciences portion of that examination. The Petitioner seeks to continue taking the licensure examination until she achieves a passing grade on all portions of the examination. On January 19, 1993, the Board of Medicine filed and served an order regarding the Petitioner's licensure application. The order reads as follows, in pertinent part: You are hereby notified pursuant to Section 120.60(3), Florida Statutes, that the Board of Medicine voted to DENY your application for licensure as a physician by examination. The Board of Medicine reviewed and considered your application for licensure by examination on November 19, 1992, in a telephone conference call originating in Tallahassee, Florida and has determined that said licensure by examination be denied, stating as grounds therefore: That you have failed to pass the FLEX examination six times since October 1986. Subsection 458.311(2), Florida Statutes, prohibits licensure of any individual who has failed the FLEX examination five times after October 1, 1986. Although the Board previously permitted you to sit for the FLEX examination for a sixth time in 1992, it has since that time determined that this provision applies to all applicants for licensure. The Board of Medicine has never adopted a rule to the effect that Section 458.311(2), Florida Statutes, applies to applicants for a restricted license under Section 458.311(8), Florida Statutes. The Board of Medicine has an existing rule that interprets several provisions of Section 458.311(8), Florida Statutes (1991). (See Rule 21M-22.020 (1)(a)-(c), Florida Administrative Code.) At the Board meeting on July 11 and 12, 1992, the Board of Medicine discussed proposed amendments to the existing rule and voted to initiate rulemaking to amend Rule 21M- 22.020(1), Florida Administrative Code, by adding to it a new subsection (d) reading as follows: (d) The phrase "successfully completes the Florida Board Examination" is interpreted as requiring obtaining a passing score as defined by Rule 21M-29.001(2) within the time frame set forth in Section 458.311(2), Florida Statutes. Specifically, if the applicant has failed the examination five times after October 1, 1986, the applicant is no longer eligible for licensure. At its meeting on July 11 and 12, 1992, the Board of Medicine instructed its legal counsel to initiate rulemaking to adopt the rule amendment quoted above. For reasons unknown to the Board's Executive Director, the Board's legal counsel had not yet filed the proposed rule amendment for adoption as of the date of the formal hearing in this case. On March 12, 1993, eleven days after the formal hearing in this case, notice of proposed rulemaking was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly. The proposed rulemaking noticed on March 12, 1993, is the same as, or substantially the same as, the proposed language described in Paragraph 5, above. The proposed rulemaking noticed on March 12, 1993, is presently the subject of a rule challenge petition filed by the Petitioner in this case. See Case No. 93-2166RP. The Petitioner in this case is also the Petitioner in Case No. 93-1801, which involves a petition filed pursuant to section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, to challenge the proposed denial of the Petitioner's application for a license.
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner's employment as a substitute teacher is creditable service under the Florida Retirement System, entitling her to retirement benefits and whether she may purchase retirement credit for out-of-state and federal service prior to vesting.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, aged 53, applied for retirement benefits from the Florida Retirement System (FRS) on October 20, 2003. Petitioner has 4.53 years of creditable service with the FRS due to her employment as a full-time teacher with the Alachua County School Board (School Board). She worked for the School Board from sometime in the early 1970s through May 1977. In May 1977, Petitioner terminated her employment with the School Board. She then joined the military, serving four years of active duty. After completing her military service in 1981, Petitioner worked out of state as a civil service employee with the Federal government. She also worked for a period of time in the private sector. In the 1990s, Petitioner returned to Alachua County, Florida. She worked as a substitute teacher for the School Board for approximately four years, from November 21, 1999 through February 14, 2002. Before beginning her employment as a substitute teacher/temporary employee in 1999, Petitioner signed a document entitled "Acknowledgement of FRS Status and Alternative Plan." This document clearly advised Petitioner that her employment as a substitute teacher was not covered under FRS. Petitioner was not employed by a participating employer in a regularly established position on July 1, 2001. She needs an additional 1.47 years of credible service in order to vest in FRS with six years of credible service.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not entitled to FRS benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert R. Button, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Carolyn Johnson-Rollins Apartment N118 2701 Northwest 23rd Boulevard Gainesville, Florida 32605 Sarabeth Snuggs, Interim Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Petitioner was properly enrolled in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) Hybrid Option Plan (Hybrid Option) in 2002, and whether he should be retroactively re-enrolled in the Florida 1 All statutory references are to the 2019 version of the Florida Statutes, except where indicated otherwise. Retirement System Pension Plan (Pension Plan) without having to pay a “buy-in” amount.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Marinak began employment with the Marion County Public School System, an FRS-participating employer, in 1989. At that time, the Pension Plan was the only retirement program available for eligible employees, and, thus, Petitioner was enrolled in the Pension Plan. The Pension Plan is administered by the Florida Division of Retirement (Division of Retirement), which is housed within the Department of Management Services. The Pension Plan is a defined benefit plan; the benefit is formula-based. The formula used for calculating a pension plan benefit is based on total years of service at the time of retirement, membership class, and average final compensation. Mr. Marinak has been continuously employed by an FRS-participating employer from 1989 to present. In 2002, the FRS Investment Plan (Investment Plan) became available to employees participating in FRS. The Investment Plan is administered by Respondent. The Investment Plan is a defined contribution plan; the benefit is based on gains and losses due to market performance. Mr. Marinak was provided a choice window of September 1, 2002, through November 30, 2002, to remain in the Pension Plan or switch to the Investment Plan. The parties stipulate that the Plan Choice Administrator at the time, now doing business as Voya, has records indicating Mr. Marinak elected the Hybrid Option by means of a telephone call on November 27, 2002. Voya no longer has a recording of the call. SBA does not have a recording of the telephone call either. The Hybrid Option is as its name indicates—it is a hybrid of the Pension Plan and the Investment Plan. When the Investment Plan was introduced in 2002, Pension Plan participants, with at least five years of service, could elect to enroll in the Investment Plan with a zero balance. With the election of the Hybrid Option, retirement funds from all years of service prior to the election remain in the Pension Plan; everything from the election forward is administered under the Investment Plan. Hybrid Option participants will receive the resulting defined benefit from the Pension Plan (earned prior to the election) upon retirement, plus the benefits from the investments in the Investment Plan after the election. The Pension Plan portion of the Hybrid Option remains with, and continues to be administered by, the Division of Retirement. The Investment Plan portion is administered by Respondent. Mr. Marinak disputes electing to enter the Hybrid Option. He credibly testified that he did not desire to transfer to the Investment Plan and has no recollection of authorizing such a transfer. Beginning at least as early as 2005, Respondent sent or otherwise made available to Mr. Marinak quarterly “FRS Investment Plan” statements. Mr. Marinak testified that he received these statements, but did not know what they meant. The earliest FRS Investment Plan statement documented by Respondent as having been sent to Mr. Marinak covered the period of January 1, 2005, to March 31, 2005. Mr. Marinak did not inquire about the statement or file a complaint with Respondent after receiving this statement. Beginning at least as early as 2008, the Department of Management Services sent or otherwise made available to Mr. Marinak annual “FRS Pension Plan – Hybrid Option” statements. These statements were sent to Mr. Marinak’s address of record at the time the statements were mailed. Mr. Marinak testified that the addresses where the statements were sent were, indeed, his addresses. Since the transfer in 2002, Mr. Marinak has updated his beneficiary designations for both the Pension Plan and Investment Plan portions of his Hybrid Option. In November 2008, Mr. Marinak communicated by e-mail with personnel at the Division of Retirement about the status of the Pension Plan and the years of service used to calculate his benefits. In December 2008, in response to his inquiry, the Division of Retirement prepared and provided to Mr. Marinak an Estimate of Retirement Benefit. The “Comments” section of the Estimate of Retirement Benefit stated as follows: This estimate is based on retirement at 30 years of service. It represents your 13.40 years of service in the Florida Retirement Pension Plan (8/1989 through 11/2002). You will have to terminate all employment with FRS employer to receive this benefit. You have an additional 6.00 years in the Hybrid Investment Plan through 11/2008; the years in the Hybrid Option are not used in calculating your monthly retirement benefit from the pension plan, which is why they are not reflected in your Member Annual Statement. Mr. Marinak did not inquire about the comment or file a complaint after receiving the Estimate of Retirement Benefit.2 Mr. Marinak testified that he saw the comment, but not being an expert in retirement financing, he did not comprehend what it meant. Mr. Marinak did not present documentary evidence or an audio recording demonstrating that he did not elect to transfer from the Pension Plan to the Hybrid Option. In early 2019, Mr. Marinak, nearing retirement, reviewed his retirement account and recognized that he was enrolled in the Hybrid Option. He contacted the Division of Retirement for guidance on how to switch back into the Pension Plan. The Division of Retirement informed Mr. Marinak that he may utilize a one-time “second election” to move back into the Pension Plan, but must pay a sum of approximately $160,000 as a “buy-in” amount to do so. This sum is derived from an actuarial calculation conducted by the Division of Retirement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Florida Retirement System Investment Plan Petition for Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of July, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JODI-ANN V. LIVINGSTONE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Ruth E. Vafek, Esquire Ausley McMullen 123 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Herbert M. Hill Law Office of Herbert M. Hill, P.A. Post Office Box 2431 Orlando, Florida 32802 (eServed) Robert John Marinak 16531 Swan View Circle Odessa, Florida 33556 (eServed) Ash Williams, Executive Director and Chief Investment Officer State Board of Administration 1801 Hermitage Boulevard, Suite 100 Post Office Box 13300 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-3300
The Issue Whether Petitioner transferred to the Florida Retirement System (FRS) Investment Plan from the FRS Pension Plan, pursuant to section 121.4501, Florida Statutes (2012).1/
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 32-year-old former employee of the Florida Department of Corrections. Petitioner was employed as a correctional officer at the Northwest Florida Reception Center in Washington County, Florida from June 14, 2004, until he resigned on July 23, 2012. Petitioner is a fully vested member of the State of Florida Retirement System (FRS). Respondent, State Board of Administration, is the agency with the duty and responsibility to administer the State of Florida Retirement System Investment Plan. See § 121.4501(8), Fla. Stat. In mid-2011, Petitioner decided to look for other employment and began researching his retirement options. Petitioner discovered he needed to be employed by the State for six years to be fully vested in the FRS and have the option to transfer from the FRS Pension Plan (a defined benefit plan) to the FRS Investment Plan (a defined contribution plan). Sometime between May 1 and 10, 2012, Petitioner accessed the FRS website, either downloaded or printed the FRS “second election form” –- the paperwork required to transfer his retirement account to the Investment Plan -- and completed the form. Although Petitioner does not remember the exact date, Petitioner approached Ms. Charity Pleas, Secretary Specialist for the Chief of Security, and asked her to file his second election form for him by facsimile transmission (fax). Ms. Pleas testified she faxed the document to the number on the form. Petitioner observed Ms. Pleas place the paperwork into the fax machine, dial a fax number, complete the fax transmission, and retrieve a fax transmission confirmation report. Ms. Pleas handed the confirmation report to Petitioner. Petitioner cannot be certain what became of the confirmation report or his original second election form. Petitioner did not contact anyone with the Florida Retirement System to confirm receipt of his second election form. Ms. Pleas often sends faxes on behalf of employees at the Reception Center where she has been employed since 2007. Ms. Pleas occasionally receives complaints from employees that a fax she has sent on their behalf was not received by the other party. Sometimes this happens despite the fact that she has received a fax confirmation report. Petitioner began employment in the private sector with Power South on July 30, 2012. In early August 2012, Petitioner contacted the FRS to find out if the retirement funds were available to move into a 401K account with his new employer. He spoke with someone named “Jason” who said there was no record of a second election having been made by Petitioner. An investigation ensued. Aon Hewitt is the Plan Choice Administrator for the FRS Investment Plan. Aon Hewitt provides services to the SBA in connection with the Investment Plan, including processing enrollments and second elections. Lynette Murphy is Benefits Operations Manager for Hewitt Associates, LLC, a division of Aon Hewitt. Ms. Murphy researched the issue of whether Petitioner’s second election form was received by Aon Hewitt. She conducted several searches of the company’s files, including a search by Petitioner’s name (both first and last names) and social security number. In case the second election form had been received without a member name or social security number, Ms. Murphy also conducted a search on the numbers “99” and “90,” the codes assigned to forms received which are unidentifiable. Ms. Murphy’s search included not only forms received between April 1, 2012 and July 30, 2012, but also all dates covering the life of Petitioner’s eligibility and enrollment in the FRS. Ms. Murphy was unable to find any record of a second election form filed by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration enter a final order denying the relief requested in Petitioner’s Petition for Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this <day> day of <month>, <year>, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this <day> day of <month>, <year>.
