Findings Of Fact Petitioner contracted with Respondent to provide, inter alia, through appropriate subproviders, mental health services in accordance with the provisions of the Baker Act, Chapter 494 Part I, Florida Statutes and rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto (Exhibit 3). Respondent subcontracted with Apalachee Community Mental Health Services, Inc. (MHS) to provide, as an independent contractor, or through subagreement with qualified providers, services according to the Mental Health Board Plan; and, in carrying out these services, to comply with federal and state statutes and regulations. In carrying out this contract MHS processed and paid, from funds receivec rem Petitioner, provider services in connection with the Baker Act program. During the period covered by this audit, Dr. Robert G. Head and Dr. Cyril Phillips provided psychiatric care to Baker Act patients for which they were reimbursed by MHS. Most of this care was provided at Goodwood Mental Health Facility, a unit operated by Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center (TMRMC). Both Head and Phillips were designated as mental health providers by Petitioner. Head and Phillips shared office space and a secretary but were not a partnership or organized as a professional association. While conducting the audit, the auditors contacted Dr. Head to audit his racords for the Baker Act patients treated. Dr. Head claimed he had no advance notice of this audit and when he was called by his office at his home while suffering from the flu he refused permission for the auditors to examine his records. The audit was completed without benefit of any of Head's or Phillips' records and the discrepancy in failing to account for third party reimbursements formed the basis for the deficiency here claimed. When Dr. Head was told the auditors had the right to inspect Baker Act patient records, he rescinded his refusal and some four months later his office was visited to check these records. Upon the auditor's arrival no Baker Act patient records for the audit period could be located. The secretary for Head and Phillips had absconded and their accountant found she had embezzled a considerable sum ($75,000 - $100,000) from the office by forging endorsements on checks received and depositing in her or her husband's bank account. Apparently patient records were removed or destroyed to conceal the embezzlement. In any event no such records were produced by the doctors and no effort was made by the doctors to obtain from TMRMC records of those patients treated by them who had insurance to cover part or all of their treatment. Such insurers would be third party payers from whom the provider is required to collect and account to Petitioner for such collections. That the doctors provided the treatment is evidenced by the bills they submitted. The only issue is whether the doctors were also paid by third parties for these services, and if so, how much were they paid that should be returned to Petitioner. Neither Head nor Phillips gave sufficient attention to the paperwork involved with the Baker Act patients but left this up to the secretary. The missing records covered two fiscal years so the inadequate supervision of the office continued over a prolonged period. Respondont suggests that Petitioner's auditors could have reconstructed the doctors' records by comparing the Baker act patients for whom they billed MHS with TMRMC records to show which of those patients costs could have been part reimbursed by third parties. Had that been done it would have shown that a majority of those patients had no "third Party" source of funds. No evidence was submitted that Petitioner has such a duty. Exhibit 3 provides the Board and the provider will retain all financial records, supporting documents, statistical records and any other doctments pertinent to this agreement for a period of three years after submission of final report, if an audit has not been initiated during that period, and the findings have not been resolved at the end of three years, the records shall be retained until the resolution of the audit findings. Exhibit 6 consists of records of seven patients treated by Head or Phillips during the audit period. Of these seven, two had insurance available from which third party payments were available. No audits of providers were made by Respondent during the period covered by the audit.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Jean Colden (Colder), was employed full time by Respondent, Department of Corrections (Department), as an Accountant II at Broward Correctional Institution. The evidence establishes that Colden was absent without authorized leave on three consecutive workdays, to wit: October 1-3, 1985. At no time did Colden notify the Department of her intention not to appear for work on those dates, and at hearing she offered no explanation for her absences. By certified letter dated October 4, 1985, return receipt requested, Colden was advised that her absence from work since October 1, 1985, was unauthorized and that, pursuant to Rule 22A-7.10(2), F.A.C., she was deemed to have abandoned her position and resigned from the Career Service. The letter further advised Colden of her right to petition the Department of Administration for a review of the facts, and whether they constitute abandonment. Colden timely petitioned the Department of Administration for review On November 5, 1985, he Department of Administration accepted Colden's petition and requested the assignment of a Hearing Officer from the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the final hearing.
The Issue Whether certain operating procedures or policies at Baker Correctional Institution, a prison operated by respondent, are unpromulgated rules and therefore invalid under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1981)
Findings Of Fact and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. Generally CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this proceeding. $120.56, Fla.Stat. (1981). Petitioners are substantially affected by the specific policies and procedures at issue. The Department concedes that they have standing to bring and maintain this administrative rule challenge proceeding. See, 120.56, Fla.Stat. The parties' proposed findings of fact have been considered in preparing this order. To the extent the proposed findings were not consistent with the weight of credible evidence, they have been either rejected, or, when possible, modified to conform to the evidence. Additionally, proposed findings which were subordinate, cumulative, immaterial, or unnecessary, have been rejected. II. Findings of Fact The parties stipulate that the following written policy is in effect at Baker Correctional Institution: Inmates will be permitted to purchase and receive legal materials, such as law books, and keep them in their personal lockers if space is available. Baker Correctional Institution Operating Procedure (I0P) #78-G-1, Section VI, and 80-G-34, Section IV, pg. 2 of 3. Conclusions of Law This policy is not an unpromulgated rule, but rather is a restatement of Rule 33-3.05(6), Florida Administrative Code, which reads, in relevant part: (6) Inmates shall be allowed to purchase legal materials (such as law books) at their own expense, limited only by the amount of space available to the inmate for the storage of such items. Inmates shall be allowed to keep legal material in their quarters subject to storage limitations. III. Findings of Fact The parties stipulate that the following written policy is in effect at Baker Correctional Institution: If the inmate does not send his property out of the institution within thirty (30) days after proper notification, he shall forfeit ownership of such and it will be disposed of by the institution in accordance with Department of Corrections rules and regulations 33-3.2, 33-3.06, and in accordance with the guidelines on DC Form #4, Authorization for Disposition of Mail and Property. I0P #78-G-3, Section VII p. 2 of 2, and 80-G-32, Section III B. Conclusions of Law Contrary to petitioners' contention, it has not been shown that this policy has the effect of a rule but was not promulgated as such. See, State Department of Administration v. Stevens, 344 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) In effect, the challenged policy simply requires that impounded or unauthorized inmate property be disposed of in accordance with Department rules and DC Form #4, Authorization for Disposition of Mail and Property, an authorization which each inmate must sign as a condition of being allowed to keep personal property within a correctional institution. See, Section 3.025(7), (8), Fla. Admin. Code. DC Form #4, which is not in evidence, has not been shown to contain a Department interpretation of law or policy which is virtually self-executing, intended by its own effect to create rights, require compliance, or otherwise have the direct and consistent effect of law. Stevens, supra at 296; McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). IV. Findings of Fact Petitioners allege that there is an unwritten rule at Baker Correctional Institution which requires that any and all legal material, books, and files be destroyed by the institution after 30 days. There is no written or unwritten policy at Baker Correctional Institution which imposes such a requirement. Conclusions of Law Petitioners' claim is rejected for failure to prove the existence of such a policy at Baker Correctional Institution. V. Findings of Fact The parties stipulate that the following written policy statement is in effect at Baker Correctional Institution: Any radio that is altered in any way, cabinet, case electronically and/or electrically will be confiscated and the inmate will lose possession of the radio and/or disciplinary action will be taken. I0P #78-G-15, Section VIII, pg. 2 of 3. Conclusions of Law This policy is nothing more than a logical restatement of Rule 33- 3.06(1)(b) Any item or article not originally contraband shall be deemed contraband if it is passed from one inmate to another without authorization or if it is altered from its original condition. (Emphasis added) Further, Subsection (7)(d) of this rule allows contraband to be confiscated and Rule 33-3.08, generally, authorizes disciplinary action against inmates who violate Department rules. VI. Findings of Fact The parties stipulate that the following institutional operating procedure is in effect at Baker Correctional Institution: Inmates are prohibited from using typewriters for personal correspondence, filing grievances, or other personal use. Any violation of this operating procedure may constitute a basis for disciplinary action. I0P #78-G-21. This is a Department policy, never promulgated as a rule, which is uniformly applied throughout Baker Correctional Institution, is--by its own terms--virtually self-executing, and intended to require compliance and otherwise have the consistent effect of law. Conclusions of Law This policy has the effect of a rule, as defined by Section 120.52(14), Florida Statutes (1981), and is therefore an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. See, Stevens, supra. The Department, in its post-hearing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, "does not deny that . . . [this policy] is an invalid rule." VII. Findings of Fact Petitioners allege that there is an unwritten policy at Baker Correctional Institution which allows only one legal size envelope, at a time, to be issued an inmate. There is no such policy. Rather the number of legal size envelopes issued to inmates depends on the availability of envelopes and the reasonableness of the requests. Within these guidelines, the exact number of envelopes issued is left to the discretion of the correctional officer involved. Conclusions of Law Since this policy has been shown to operate as no more than a guideline, subject in application to the discretion of the enforcing officer, it is not a rule within the meaning of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes (1981), and need not be promulgated as such. See, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Police Benevolent Association, 400 So.2d 1302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). VIII. Findings of Fact The parties stipulate that the following written policy is in effect at Baker Correctional Institution: Visitors or regular visitors will either be Saturday or Sunday, but not both days. I0P #78-6-7. This policy, never promulgated as a rule, is uniformly applied, virtually self-executing, and intended by its own effect to create rights or require compliance, or otherwise have the direct and consistent effect of law. Conclusions of Law This policy is, in effect, a rule, but was not promulgated as such. It is therefore an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. See, Stevens, supra; Sumner v. Department of Corrections, (DOAH 82-676R), 4 FALR 1198-A (1982), where a memorandum, issued by the Superintendent of Polk Correctional Institution, restricting prisoners' visitation rights to one weekend day, was declared invalid. IX. Findings of Fact The parties stipulate that the following written policy is in effect at Baker Correctional Institution: We will discontinue receiving funds for inmates from visitors. Interoffice Memo 4-1-83. This policy, never promulgated as a rule, is applied uniformly, virtually self-executing, and intended by its own effect to create rights or require compliance, or otherwise have the direct and consistent effect of law. Conclusions of Law This policy has the effect of a rule, but was not promulgated as one. Thus it is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. See, Stevens, supra; Sumner, supra. Contrary to the Department's contention, this policy is not a mere restatement of Rule 33-3.06(5) which, at least by implication, allows visitors to bring money to inmates of a correctional institution. Findings of Fact The parties stipulate that the following written policy is in effect at Baker Correctional Institution: Only one dollar bills will be spent by visitors in the visiting park. This policy, too, is uniformly applied, virtually self-executing, and intended by its own effect to create rights or require compliance, or otherwise have the direct and consistent effect of law. Conclusions of Law This policy, which has the effect of a rule but was not adopted as such, is therefore an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. See, Stevens, supra; Sumner, supra. Further, the Department's post-hearing proposed findings of fact state at page 5: The . . . [Department] does not deny that the above written policy is an invalid rule. For these reasons, it is ORDERED: That the Department procedures or policies described in Sections VI, VIII, IX, and X, are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority; and That, in all other respects, petitioners Petition to Determine the Invalidity of a Rule, filed October 11, 1983, is denied. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Randall A. Holland, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Room 1601, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Douglas L. Adams, Joe Lewis Holland Union Correctional Institution Post Office Box 221 Raiford, Florida 32083 Liz Cloud, Chief Department of State Bureau of Administrative Code Room 1802, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carroll Webb, Executive Director Administrative Procedures Committee Room 120, Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Curtis Head and Melvin Davis Baker Correctional Institution Post Office Box 500 Olustee, Florida 32072
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to a prehearing stipulation executed by the parties on July 22, 1982, the facts in this case are essentially not in dispute. The prehearing stipulation establishes the following facts concerning the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint: Respondent Novoa is a certified air conditioning contractor having been issued license number CAC010132 and CAC010132. Respondent's address is 30 S. W. 67th Court, Miami, Florida 33144. At all times material hereto, Respondent was associated with and was the qualifying licensee for Baker Service Company, Inc., d/b/a Dade Air Conditioning and Appliance Service, 11651 N.W. 7th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33168. Respondent's responsibilities in said company were to pull permits and supervise installation of air conditioning systems in return for a salary of $100.00 per week. Petitioner has no evidence that Respondent did not fulfill that particular function for the company he qualified. However, Petitioner asserted and Respondent admitted that the company was also involved in soliciting service contracts for which it maintained a fleet of trucks and personnel to sell and solicit said contracts and to perform the obligations requested under the contracts. Petitioner asserted and Respondent admitted that it was not his function in the company to take any part in the business concerned with the service contracts. The Respondent completed a "Certification Change of Status Application" on or about December 14, 1978, and submitted it to the Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. The Respondent signed an affidavit which is part of the application, certifying as true and accurate his answers on the application. Respondent asserted that the Certification Change of Status Application was prepared for his signature by personnel within Baker Service Company, Inc., who represented to him the truth of the contents thereof. Petitioner has no information contrary to Respondent's assertion. The Certification Change of Status Application contained false information in that it listed only Frank Baker as President of the company without listing the company's Secretary, Frank Baker III, and Albert Crooke, Vice President of the company. Respondent alleged and Petitioner has no evidence to the contrary, that he did not know of the involvement of Frank Baker III and Albert Crooke as officers of the corporation and only inadvertently filed false information with the Department. Baker Service Company, Inc. entered into many service contracts with certain named parties who are listed in and made a part of the Administrative Complaint by the attachment of Exhibit A thereto, all of whom had service contracts similar to Petitioner's Exhibit 3. Baker Service Company, Inc. was to provide air conditioning and other major appliance service pursuant to said contracts and did not perform its obligations thereunder, even though the company was paid and received funds to perform such service. The Respondent admitted that he did not take any active part in supervising the operation of Baker Service Company, Inc., with regard to their maintenance and service contract business and therefore used his registration to evade the contracting license law in violation of Section 489.129(1)(f) Florida Statutes. However, Petitioner admitted that this violation is of a technical nature. Respondent admitted that he obtained his registration by the filing of a false application, but asserted that he was not aware of its misrepresentation at the time of filing. Petitioner admitted it had no information with which to prove the Respondent knew the application was false when filed. Respondent admitted that his qualification of Baker Service Company, Inc., the execution of the numerous service contracts, and abandonment of the same by Baker Service Company, Inc., constitutes violations of Section 489.129(1)(k), Florida Statutes, and Chapter 10 , Code of Metropolitan Dade County, Section 10-22G, by failing to fulfill contractual obligations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Construction Industry Licensing Board finding that the Respondent Novoa committed technical violations of Sections 489.129(1)(f) and (k), Florida Statutes, and imposing a $500.00 administrative fine and a private reprimand. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of September, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Suite 101 2715 E. Oakland Park Boulevard Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Rodolfo Sorondo, Jr., Esquire Suite 1101 Peninsula Federal Building Miami, Florida 33131 James Linnan, Executive Director Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION/CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD, Petitioner, vs. DPR Case No. 0012267 DOAH Case No. 81-2477 JOSE E. NOVOA 30 SW 67th Court Miami, Florida 33144 C & S Air, Inc. CA C010132 Post Office Box 43-2094 Miami, Florida 33144 Baker Service Company CA CA10132(deleted) Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact At the time of the formal hearing in this proceeding, Petitioners were inmates incarcerated at Union Correctional Institution. Union Correctional Institution Policy Memorandum No. 65, issued June 7, 1976 and revised and effective since October 23, 1980, provides in pertinent part that: Inmates are prohibited from using typewriters for personal correspondence or for matters other than "official state business." Violation of that Policy Memorandum may constitute a basis for disciplinary action. Petitioners have had mail returned to them because it was typewritten. (Petitioners' Exhibits 3, 4, and 5) Based on the returned mail to Petitioners, all of them have been substantially affected by the operation of the subject Policy Memorandum. As example, Petitioner Adams had several cards returned as being prohibited and was advised that if he questioned the return of those cards, he would be confined as a disciplinary action for questioning the operation of the rule as it relates to the returned cards. Additionally, Petitioner Adams lost a Clerk's job in the Law Library because he typed letters. Adams' dismissal resulted in lost "gain time" since he was dismissed for typing letters violation of Policy Memorandum No. 65. Petitioner Holland filed an application for a grant to a community college which was returned because it was typed in violation of Policy Memorandum No. 65. Finally, Petitioner Cribbs was unable to attend a favorite aunt's funeral because his request was typewritten and it was returned as being in violation of Policy Memorandum No. 65. The employees at Union Correctional Institution adhere to Policy Memorandum No. 65 strictly and employees who are derelict in their responsibilities covered in implementing that policy are subject to disciplinary action. UCIPM 65.5. (Petitioners' Exhibit 1) UCIPM 65 is a department policy, never promulgated as a rule, uniformly applied throughout Union Correctional Institution. It is, by its own terms, virtually self-executing and intended to require compliance. It therefore has the consistent effect of law.
The Issue This case arises out of a challenge by the Petitioners to the validity of Rule 33-3.02(6), Florida Administrative Code; Policy and Procedure Directive 2.02.13, and Union Correctional Institution Operating Procedure No. 81-82. The Petitioners specifically challenge the validity of those portions of the above- provisions relating to the issue of clothing to the inmates. At the final hearing, Petitioners, Joseph Redman, Nyadzi D. Rufu and Jimmy L. Rogers, testified on their own behalf and also called as witnesses Charles Connors and Paul Gunning. Petitioners offered and had admitted into evidence five exhibits. Respondents called no witnesses and offered no exhibits into evidence. The Petitioner S. B. Ridley, did not appear at the formal hearing. The Hearing Officer was informed by one of the other Petitioners at the formal hearing that Mr. Ridley had been transferred to Polk Correctional Institution. Mr. Ridley was given due notice of the hearing held on February 17, 1984, and has filed no pleading or motion with the undersigned Hearing Officer seeking either a continuance or other relief. The Petitioners and counsel for the Respondent submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that those proposed findings and conclusions are inconsistent with this order, they were rejected as unsupported by the evidence or as unnecessary to a resolution of this cause.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners, Joseph Redman, Nyadzi D. Rufu and Jimmy L. Rogers are inmates incarcerated at Union Correctional Institution, Raiford, Florida. On November 5, 1982, as Petitioner Rogers was being released from disciplinary confinement, he entered the laundry to obtain another pair of state issued pants, socks and underwear. The name tag was coming off of his jacket and because of this it was confiscated. He asked for another jacket and was told he could not be issued one. He was eventually issued another jacket which was also confiscated. For a period of time, Petitioner Rogers had no jacket for those times when he was required to walk and be outside in the cold. The laundry manager at Union Correctional Institution is responsible for the issue of all clothing to the prisoners. The manager follows Union Correctional Institution Operating Procedure 81-82 in issuing clothing an Union Correctional Institution. That operating procedure provides in relevant part: 81-82.1 Purpose This memorandum is published as a guide in the issuance of inmate clothing, and the providing of laundry facilities for the inmate population. 81-82.2 Authority Florida Statutes 945.21, 944.09 section 20.315 Department of Corrections Administrative Rules, Chapter 33-3.02(6). 81-82.3 Clothing Issue Each inmate shall be issued the following clothing items: 3 each Blue Shirts 3 pairs Blue Trousers 1 each Web Belt 1 pair Boxer Shorts 1 pair Socks 1 pair Shoes, High Top. Inmates assigned to the Food Service Departments and Canteens shall be issued one additional suit of clothing because of their having to work on Sundays, enabling them to change clothing daily. 81-82.6 Special Issue Inmate Jackets are issued in October of each year and picked up for storage in April. An inmate may have his jacket laundered on any Friday. Hats, caps, and other special clothing items are issued to the Department Supervisor for distribution to the work squad. The Supervisor is responsible for those items of issue. 81-82.7 Miscellaneous Information The Laundry Manager/Clothing Officer shall maintain a record of the various clothing items issued to each inmate. If clothing issue is abused, either through neglect or by intent, the officer will initiate appropriate action. The official inmate uniform throughout the institution is issue blue shirt and trousers. Inmates assigned to the following areas are issued white shirts and trousers in lieu of the regular blue uniform: Food Service Administration Building Workers Main Gate Workers Utility Man on each Close Supervision Squad (For Identification) Canteen Workers. Each inmate who turns in a jacket (at the end of winter) shall be issued a pair of hemmed walking shorts for wearing on the athletic field or after hours in the housing area. The manager was not aware of and has not utilized Policy and Procedure Directive 2.02.13, in issuing clothing at Union Correctional Institution. That policy and procedure directive provides in relevant part: AUTHORITY: Section 20.315, 944.09 and 945.21, Florida Statutes Department of Corrections, Administrative Rules, Chapter 33-3.02(6) PURPOSE: The purpose of this Directive is to establish a uniform procedure for issuing inmate clothing and linens. This will enable the Department to control the costs of clothing and linens in a more economical manner. GENERAL: Appropriate internal measures will be taken by each operating location to implement the provisions of this Directive. It is the Department's expressed intent that all inmate clothing be appropriately fitted and suited for the environment and that Departmental facilities provide sufficient laundering facilities to ensure that appropriate health standards are maintained. The clothing and linen will be exchanged on a one for one basis after the initial issue. Should an inmate intentionally damage or destroy his/her uniforms, appropriate action should be taken by the Superintendent to reimburse the State, if possible. It is imperative that the custodial staff be well informed of the provisions of this Directive and any exceptions or deviations from this Policy set forth will have to be approved by the Regional Director. STANDARD CLOTHING ISSUE (MALE): Each male inmate may be issued the items of clothing and linen specified below. The phrase "Maximum Clothing Issue" is used in this Directive to permit the substitution of personal clothing or to permit the issuance of less than maximum quantities where appropriate. Unless otherwise designated, the inmate will not have excess clothing and linens in his possession. Each inmate will be responsible for the clothing and linen issued to him. Maximum Clothing Issue - Blues and Whites Items Quantity Shirts 3 for 5 day post 5 for 7 day post 3 for 5 day post 5 for 7 day post Maximum Clothing Issue - Other Items Items Quantity Undershorts 3 pairs Undershirts/T shirts 3 Socks 2 pairs (changed daily) Belt with Buckle 1 Shoes 1 pair Jacket (winter only) 1 Long underwear (winter only for outside detail) 2 Regions III, IV and V may substitute two sweatshirts for two pairs of long underwear for winter use. E. Clothing - Special Items such as food service linens, coverall's aprons, cooks' caps, gloves, rubber boots, raincoats, athletic uniforms, barber and butcher jackets, straw hats and safety helmets shall be considered tools of the trade and will be issued directly to the department requiring them. The superintendent will, on recommendation and justification by department head, determine what items are to be purchased and issued to inmate. All items issued on a departmental basis that can be appropriately marked shall have the standardized department initials stenciled on the item. It will be the responsibility of the superintendent to establish a laundry schedule for these items. Only those inmates who work outside for eight hours each day are issued long underwear during the winter months. The inmates do not go outside when the temperature is below 40 degrees. The laundry does not issue raincoats to the inmates. The raincoats are under industry inventory and each department can draw raincoats out of that inventory. The raincoats are paid for by the department drawing them out and the work supervisor from that department issues them to the inmates. Raincoats are sold in the canteen at Union Correctional Institution. The laundry stocks long underwear but no longer stocks T-shirts. The laundry does not stock sweatshirts. There are two types of blue uniforms. The laundry issues coveralls to special jobs but no coveralls are issued to inmates personally. It is within the laundry manager's discretion as to when he issues new clothing as opposed to used clothing. It is the laundry manager's responsibility to remain within his budget for the year. T-shirts are not included in the list of clothing issue items in Union Correctional Institution Operating Procedure 81-82. This may be due in part to budget restrictions. T-shirts are included in the "maximum clothing issue" list in Policy and Procedure Directive 2.02.13. Practically every inmate in Union Correctional Institution is required to go outside in order to go to work or to school. The inmates must also go outside in order to go to the chow hall or the clinic. The west unit is approximately a 4 or 5 minute walk from the chow hall. Union Correctional Institution Operating Procedure No. 81-82 is signed and issued by the Superintendent of UCI and cites as its authority Florida Statutes 945.21, 944.09, Section 20.315, and Rule 3303.02(6), Florida Administrative Code. The Respondent has not contested the fact that the operating procedure was not promulgated in accordance with the requirements of Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. There was no evidence presented as to the procedures followed in adopting the Policy and Procedure Directive 2.02.13.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, William F. Reid, is currently and has been at all times pertinent to the issues herein, an inmate at UCI, having been committed to the custody of the DOC for an offense committed prior to July 1, 1978. At the time of filing of the Petition, he was in administrative confinement at UCI but, at the time of the hearing, had been released and was not in that status. Petitioner concedes that even during the period of his administrative confinement, he was awarded basic gain time as provided for since he was committed prior to July 1, 1978. However, due to the fact that he was unable to work while in administrative confinement, he did not receive any incentive gain time during that period. Work opportunities for inmates in administrative confinement status are extremely limited. This is because of the security and manpower problems involved in providing adequate supervision of this category of inmate during a work detail. Rule 33-3.081, Florida Administrative Code, allows the placing of an inmate in administrative confinement then disciplinary or criminal charges are pending against him and his presence in the general prison population would present a danger to himself, to others, or to the security and order of the institution. It is also authorized when an investigation is pending and the inmate's presence in the prison population might tend to interfere with that investigation. If, for medical reasons, an inmate's remaining in the prison population would create a health or safety risk, administrative confinement is also authorized. Another reason justifying administrative confinement is when the inmate is alleged to have committed misconduct and there is concern that because of that, his safety is at risk. The rule does not provide any maximum length of time for administrative confinement and the reason for this is that the investigations supporting it are of varying complexity and take differing lengths of time. Petitioner and the other inmates who testified on his behalf all of whom have been in administrative confinement in the past, all denied that they had received the required informal hearing called for under the rule. At best, they were told by the officer placing them in administrative confinement generally why this action was being taken. However, they contend they were never given any opportunity to submit anything to a senior official or a classification officer and they are of the opinion that at no time was there an emergency situation involved. The impression that the inmates have is that a corrections officer can have an inmate confined or released for any reason whether there is adequate justification or basis for the action. Clifford Towbridge has been an inmate at UCI since December, 1983. When he was placed in administrative confinement he was advised of this fact by a corrections officer who told him to pack his things and who put him in administrative confinement status without telling him why. He contends he got no hearing but was ultimately told he was being confined because a confidential informant advised that his life was in danger. Approximately two to three weeks later, he was released when he signed a paper indicating that his life was not in danger. At no time was he told who had made the allegation against him and he was not given a hearing either before confinement or before release. Curtis Mangram had an experience with administrative confinement at his prior incarceration at Belle Glade Correctional Institution. At that time he was given no hearing nor was he brought before a review board. When he left administrative confinement at Belle Glade he was assigned to UCI and remained clean until August 4, 1984 when he was placed in administrative confinement there. It appears that his name was mentioned in connection with the rape of a prisoner and he was placed in administrative confinement for several weeks pending investigation of that incident. One day after his release he was again placed in administrative confinement for possession of contraband wine. He was given no hearing prior to being placed into administrative confinement nor was he initially given a reason for this action. However, he wrote several letters to officials within the DOC to determine why this action was taken. The first response he got indicated he was being placed in for evaluation but regardless of the reason, he is sure he was not given a hearing. On neither occasion of his being placed in administrative confinement, in his opinion, was there any emergency reason for precipitous action. From first hand and from what he has seen and heard, it is his opinion that prisoners are placed in administrative confinement solely on the uncorroborated allegations of other prisoners and when this happens, there is no hearing prior to she placement nor within a timely period thereafter. As was stated previously, the witness was placed in administrative confinement on August 4 and was released on August 28. At that time he was told the reason for him having been placed in administrative confinement (the alleged rape) was resolved. The following day, August 29, he was placed back in administrative confinement and was told by a corrections officer that the action was being taken because Lt. Dixon, an investigator, wanted him back in. Later on, Officer Ward, Dixon's assistant, read him his rights and asked him some questions after which the witness was returned to administrative confinement. The witness admits that he had the wine which he subsequently found out was the basis for his second administrative confinement but he was never punished for the wine nor was he ever charged with the rape. He was in administrative confinement for a total of four months at UCI and had he been punished for the unlawful possession of the wine, it is his opinion he would have been placed in disciplinary confinement for fifteen or thirty days, a period much shorter than the entire period of his administrative confinement. Inmate Edwin Paul has been placed in administrative confinement for investigative reasons twelve or thirteen times during the two and a half years he has been an inmate at UCI. He relates that when he is placed there, the corrections officer comes up to him and tells him to pack his things but never gives him a reason for this action. The response to his inquiry is always that someone will tell him. It is his experience that at UCI, regardless of what the rule requires, no review is done and the inmate is not told anything until he files a grievance. That generally takes approximately ninety days to resolve and during this time, the inmate is in administrative confinement earning no incentive gain time. According to Paul, his requests for information as to the reason for his status are met with various answers such as "you're a menace," "none of your business," or "I don't know." It is his opinion that administrative confinement can be imposed on an inmate at the whim of a correctional officer. He contends that in all of his periods of administrative confinement either no charges were preferred against him, or he was found not guilty of the allegation that was laid, but during all that period, he has not received any gain time that he would have earned had he not been placed in administrative confinement. This has affected his status in that had he not been placed in administrative confinement, his sentence would have been up after forty months confinement. Because of his inability to earn gain time, he is not serving the fiftieth month of his period of confinement. Petitioner was placed in administrative confinement on March 17, 1985. He was not then nor has he since that time been given an informal hearing by a correctional officer, he states. He claims he was placed in administrative confinement by a corrections officer - and was not given an opportunity to sign anything regarding this action. On this occasion he was in for two and a half months. In a prior period of administrative confinement, he claims he was not told why he was there officially. Only through the information given him by a friendly corrections officer two weeks after the fact was he advised why he was incarcerated. Never has a senior corrections officer ever held a hearing with him, he states, nor has he ever been told how long the investigation on which his administrative confinement status is based will take. He has not seen any investigative report nor has he even been given any assistance in finding out the reason for his status. Even a personal interview with the superintendent of UCI has not changed this process, he says. Reid and the other inmates who testified on his behalf all contend that the implementation of the rule regarding administrative confinement creates great stress for them because of, (1) the loss of incentive gain time, (2) the inability to get appropriate exercise, and (3) the impact that the status has on the ability to receive visitors, and all agree that being afforded a hearing or being told why the administrative confinement action was being taken would tend to reduce that stress. Petitioner admitted that he does not have much of a problem with the rule except for the fact that it does not put any time limit on the length of the investigation. His complaint is primarily with the way the rule is followed by UCI. Mr. Tabah, the classification specialist at UCI, related that there is no formal board hearing when inmates are placed in administrative confinement. The inmates' case is reviewed by the chief correctional officer and this review is termed a hearing. This action, however, is itself reviewed by the classification team within 72 hours of the hearing. At the inmates' hearing, a form DC4-318 is prepared by the chief correctional officer on which the reason for the administrative confinement action is listed. The bottom half of this form is subsequently filled out by the classification team during its review as to its concurrence or non-concurrence and the team's recommendation for action. The inmate is given a copy of this review and has an opportunity to make comment thereon. Both the recommendation of the team and the comments of the inmate, if any, are referred to the superintendent. Every inmate in administrative confinement is reviewed weekly. Each inmate is usually advised of the reason for his being placed in administrative confinement either at the time or immediately thereafter. Only in emergency cases can the inmate be placed in administrative confinement without review/hearing by the chief correctional officer. In that case, the hearing is held within forty-eight hours. Review of the files on both Mangram and Towbridge reveal that, as to Towbridge, the inmate was advised by the corrections officer placing him in administrative confinement on February 13, 1985 as to the reason therefor. The chief corrections officer approved the actions of the corrections officer thereafter and the following day, the classification team reviewed the action and furnished the inmate with a copy of their recommendation. As to Mangram, the records reflect that he was placed in administrative confinement on August 18, 1984. An informal hearing was held that same day and the action was reviewed by senior corrections officer Bryant at 4:00 P.M. the same day. Mr. Mangram was retained in administrative confinement because of the belief that the safety of the institution required it. It was felt that Mangram was a potentially violent inmate who posed a clear danger to others. As to Mr. Paul, the file reflects that the two times he was in administrative confinement he was advised of the reasons and given a hearing. As to Petitioner, the record reflects that on January 24, 1985 he was placed in administrative confinement and given the reasons therefor by corrections officer Brown. The reviewing corrections officer supervisor Bryant concurred.
Findings Of Fact Douglas L. Adams is an inmate at Union Correctional Institution. On August 26, 1985, he was awakened early in the morning and brought before a disciplinary hearing for an alleged violation of institutional rules and regulations. Prior to the hearing, he was advised by a correctional officer to pack up all his personal property and to bring it with him to the hearing. Mr. Adams took with him as much as he could which included his clothing and other personal effects, but he was unable to carry all he owned with him at one time. He did not ask for either help in carrying his property or a cart to carry it in prior to leaving his cell area to go to the hearing. When he arrived at the movement center where the hearing was to be held, he advised the authorities there that he did not have all his property with him. At that point, he asked for help or the use of a cart to go get the rest of his property but he was refused because no cart was there. As a result, he went to the hearing leaving some of his property in his cell area and while in the hearing, contends he was required to leave his property in the control center. This property was secured in a storage room behind the control center which, while not locked, was not available for access to other inmates unless they were accompanied by a corrections officer. When the hearing was over and Mr. Adams, who had been directed to administrative confinement requested to go back to his former cell area to get the rest of his property, his request was refused. His property was inventoried by UCI personnel at that time, but because in his opinion the inventory was not complete, Mr. Adams refused to sign the form. When he was released from administrative confinement he claims he did not get all his property back. He relates that he was told he had forfeited whatever property he had not brought to the hearing. As a result, he filed a complaint on September 16, 1985, which was subsequently denied. Petitioner has been incarcerated in 7 or 8 institutions within the Department of Corrections including Florida State Prison, River Junction Correctional Institution, Baker Correctional Institution, Polk Correctional Institution, Old Unit, the Reception and Medical Center, and DeSoto Correctional Institution. At each one of these institutions a rule similar to this one was in existence. At Baker Correctional Institution, the inmate was required to bring his mattress as well. Robert Craig has been in prison for a total of 27 years and has been incarcerated in almost every major penal institution in the State of Florida that was built prior to the last five years. At Avon Park Correctional Institution he underwent a disciplinary hearing and was told at the time to bring all his personal property with him to the hearing. While in the hearing, he was required to leave all his property outside in the hall. At Cross City Correctional Institution the guards took him to the hearing without his property, bringing his property along afterwards. In essence, at all the institutions where he was incarcerated, there was some variation of the same procedure regarding his personal property. He either had to bring it to the hearing or it was packed up prior to the hearing. At no institution was his property inventoried prior to the hearing. As a result, he has lost personal property including a calculator for which he was subsequently reimbursed by the institution. According to Mr. Craig, if the inmate does not bring his personal property with him he either is given a deficiency report or is precluded from going back to get it when the hearing is over. Sgt. Denmark has worked for approximately 8 1/2 years with the Department of Corrections, all at UCI, where he formerly worked at the movement center. One of the functions he performed there was to handle prisoners coming for a disciplinary hearing. The rule as explained to him regarding the inmates' personal property is that the inmate is required to bring all of it with him to the hearing. Once the property is brought with the inmate to the hearing, the inmate is free to either take it into the hearing with him or to leave it in the storage room in back of the movement center during the hearing. If the inmate is sentenced to disciplinary confinement as a result of the hearing, in that case, and at that point, the inmate's property is inventoried. If the inmate is not sentenced to disciplinary confinement, the property is returned to the prisoner who is returned to his area. In the instant case, Mr. Denmark heard the Petitioner tell Sgt. Howe, when he arrived at the movement center, that he had left some of his property in his cell. However, when Adams went into his hearing, he neither took his property with him nor requested that it be secured. According to Mr. Cunningham, the Chief Classification Supervisor, the Union Correctional Institution Policy, (85-52.9 B1) requires inmates to bring all their property to disciplinary hearings. It is an old policy, and the reason for it is to protect the property from theft. In a disciplinary hearing, there is a chance that an inmate might not get back to his old cell to retrieve his property after the hearing. For security reasons, institution officials prefer not to take a prisoner back to his old cell after a hearing because, at that point, he is often angry as a result of the hearing and disruptive. All Department of Corrections' institutions in the region incorporating UCI, except Florida State Prison, have a similar policy. Inquiry of corrections personnel at the agency headquarters in Tallahassee reveals that most major DOC facilities have a similar policy. There are a total of 33 other facilities which hold less than 100 inmates each. These smaller institutions do not, generally, have a similar policy and Florida State Prison has a different situation because of the different security problems. It is the needs of the institution, however, which determine the use of the policy. Mr. Cunnningham is aware of Mr. Adams' hearing and the complaint filed as a result thereof. Upon inquiry it was determined that Mr. Adams had failed to establish a loss and the complaint was denied. Mr. Cunningham does not know whether there was an investigation into the loss of the property left in the cell. It is Mr. Cunningham's understanding that if the witness cannot carry all his property at one time, normally, if the inmate asks for permission to do so, he will be allowed to go back and get the balance before the hearing. This is not in the procedure approved by DOC, however, nor in the IOP at UCI. Corrections Officer Howe is also aware of the fact that Mr. Adams had a hearing on August 26, 1985. He, in fact, was called to the movement center to escort several prisoners, including Adams, to the confinement barracks after the hearings. A part of this duty involves inventorying the prisoners property. Howe told Adams to get his property and bring it in for inventory. At this point, after the hearing Adams said he did not have all his property with him and asked to be taken back to his old cell to get the rest. Howe declined to do this and explained the security reasons for his decision to Adams. He did advise Adams, however, that he would call down to Adams' old cell area and have his property packed which, in fact, he did. It is standard practice at UCI, according to Howe, that if an inmate has a large amount of property, he can request the use of a cart or wheelbarrow which is assigned to each housing area for carrying this excess property. This cart will be returned by a runner who can also help carry the excess. To his knowledge, inmates are not denied the use of these carts. Howe declined to return Adams to his old cell area after the hearing because, at the time, Adams was belligerent and unstable and presented a security risk in his opinion and also, because Adams had previously been advised to bring all his property with him and had failed to do this even though there was a way for him to accomplish it.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in one or more of the following ways: by discriminating against Petitioner based on her race and/or gender; (b) by subjecting Petitioner to a hostile work environment; and (c) by retaliating against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Respondent hired Petitioner, a black female, as a correctional officer on or about February 25, 2002. Petitioner was initially assigned to the Hernando County Jail. After a series of transfers at Petitioner's request, Respondent assigned Petitioner to the Lake City Correctional Facility in July 2005. Petitioner continued to serve at that facility until she was terminated. On multiple occasions during her employment, Petitioner received copies of Respondent's Harassment/Sexual Harassment policy and Respondent's Code of Ethics policy. Petitioner received formal training relative to the substance of these policies when she was hired and annually thereafter. In October 2007, Petitioner filed two grievances against Captain Michael Register and Chief Daniel Devers. The grievance against Chief Devers alleged a "hostile" work environment. Specifically, Petitioner asserted that Chief Devers created a divide-and-conquer environment by telling new staff that "several dirty officers work for Respondent and that the new staff are to tell on them and replace all the old staff members." The grievance against Captain Register alleged race and gender harassment. Specifically, Petitioner claimed that Captain Register did not relieve Petitioner on time "for three weeks straight." Petitioner believed that Captain Register's alleged conduct was due to his dislike for her and favoritism toward other staff members. Petitioner did not allege that Captain Register or Chief Devers ever said anything to Petitioner or anyone else regarding her race or gender. In response to Petitioner's grievances, Respondent performed an in-house investigation. Subsequently, Petitioner's grievances against Captain Register and Chief Devers were denied as unfounded. Petitioner alleges that she was sexually harassed by Officer/Correctional Counselor Roderick Polite. As a Correctional Counselor, Officer Polite did not have authority to change the terms and conditions of Petitioner's employment except that it was possible for Petitioner to receive work orders from a Correctional Counselor. Petitioner went on two consensual dates with Officer Polite prior to his alleged harassment. The first date was in late November 2007. The second date was in early December 2007. At the time that Petitioner went on these dates, she was temporarily broken up with Correctional Officer Darian Blue. In late November and early December 2007, Petitioner worked the 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. shift. Officer Polite was assigned to the 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. shift. Petitioner refused to go to Respondent's December 14, 2007, Christmas party with Officer Polite. Thereafter, Officer Polite called Petitioner's house continuously for three days. In a telephone conversation on December 17, 2007, Officer Polite allegedly told Petitioner that he "just had sex with a girl." Officer Polite also allegedly stated that his fascination with her would be over if she would just give him oral sex. Petitioner told Officer Polite "no" and ended the conversation. Petitioner claims that Officer Polite began to harass her at work after the December 17, 2007, telephone conversation. According to Petitioner, the harassment continued until January 10, 2008. Specifically, Petitioner claims that Officer Polite was critical of her work performance and changed the procedures she was to follow regarding mail distribution and the cleaning of pods by inmates. Officer Polite allegedly also accused Petitioner of improperly counseling an inmate. Petitioner alleges that Officer Polite "wrote her up" on one occasion. However, Petitioner admits that she never saw the alleged write-up. Petitioner also admits that she never suffered any adverse action as a result of the alleged write-up. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Officer Polite never filed a disciplinary action against Petitioner. Petitioner did not complain about Officer Polite's conduct until January 9, 2008. On that date, Petitioner spoke with Captain Joseph Ruby about Officer Polite's alleged conduct. Respondent’s sexual harassment policy prohibits physical and verbal harassment, including inappropriate threats and requests. The policy also set forth the procedure by which employees should utilize to complain about harassment and states that complaints will be promptly and thoroughly investigated. Accordingly, on January 10, 2008, Petitioner was interviewed by Respondent's in-house investigator. Petitioner told the investigator about Officer Polite's alleged harassment but stated that she did not want to file a formal grievance against him. Petitioner simply requested that she be allowed to return to work and that she not have to work with Officer Polite. Officer Polite subsequently resigned his position as a Correctional Counselor and stepped down to a Correctional Officer position. Additionally, Respondent changed Officer Polite to the 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. shift. If there were occasions when Petitioner's and Officer Polite's shifts overlapped, Respondent granted Officer Polite's requests not to work around Petitioner. In March 2008, Petitioner applied for one of three open positions as a Correctional Counselor. Based on the interview panel's recommendation, Warden Jason Medlin selected a white female and two black females for the positions. Petitioner was not selected for one of the positions because of her personnel and disciplinary record, including a prior allegation of excessive force against inmates. Moreover, there is no evidence regarding the personnel and disciplinary records of the three females selected for the positions. On March 30, 2008, Petitioner was assigned to the control room in the South 2 Unit. Her primary duty was to maintain the log and to open doors for other officers. At some point during her shift, Petitioner removed an inmate from his cell, took him to master control, and left him there. A Lieutenant requested another Correctional Officer, Amanda Sanders, to escort the inmate back to his cell and assist Petitioner with a search of the inmate's cell. When Officer Sanders and Petitioner arrived at the cell, the inmate's cellmate, Jose Sandoval, was sitting on his bunk bed. Officer Sanders told Inmate Sandoval to leave the cell. When Inmate Sandoval did not comply, Petitioner ordered him to stand up to be handcuffed. Inmate Sandoval continued to sit on his bunk bed. Petitioner then told Officer Sanders to call a "code red," a request for assistance from other officers. Officer Sanders did not comply immediately with Petitioner's request because Officer Sanders did not believe there was a need for assistance or a reason to handcuff Inmate Sandoval. Next, Petitioner grabbed Inmate Sandoval by his arm, physically removed him from his bed, and placed him face first into the wall. Officer Sanders did not have any contact with Inmate Sandoval when Petitioner removed him from his bed. Inmate Sandoval somehow turned to face Petitioner who had her back to Officer Sanders. Officer Sanders heard a "smack" and concluded that Petitioner had struck Inmate Sandoval. Officer Sanders then saw Inmate Sandoval spit at Petitioner. Officer Sanders immediately called a "code red" and assisted Petitioner in placing Inmate Sandoval on the floor and handcuffing him. Other officers arrived and removed Inmate Sandoval from his cell and the unit. As recorded on the facility's video cameras, the officers carried Inmate Sandoval by his neck, two or three feet off the floor. The officers choked him and slammed him onto the floor. The cameras recorded Inmate Sandoval in the medical department, so incoherent that he had to be held up to prevent him from falling over. When force is used against an inmate, the incident report must be sent to the Florida Department of Corrections' Inspector General (IG). In this case, the IG performed an investigation, concluding that Inmate Sandoval was assaulted by the facility's officers and that blood was cleaned off the walls to hide the assault. Respondent subsequently received a copy of the IG's report. On April 11, 2008, Respondent terminated all officers involved, including Petitioner, for violation of Respondent's Code of Ethics. Specifically, Respondent terminated Petitioner for physically abusing the inmate, for failing to report the extent of abuse on the inmate in written reports and during the IG's investigation, and for failing to call into the facility as directed while on administrative leave after the incident. Other officers that were terminated included the following: (a) Correctional Officer Darian Blue (black male) for use of excessive force; (b) Lieutenant Phillip Mobley (white male) for failure to accurately report the extent of abuse; (c) Captain/Shift Supervisor Joseph Ruby (white male) for failure to accurately report the extent of abuse; (d) Correctional Officer Grace Davie (white female) for failure to accurately report the extent of abuse; (e) Correctional Officer Melissa Fontaine (white female) for failure to accurately report the extent of abuse; and (f) Correctional Officer Eunice Cline (white female) for failure to accurately report the extent of abuse. Respondent did not terminate Officer Sanders. The IG's report did not show that she violated any of Respondent's policies during the incident.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR dismiss the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Chelsie J. Roberts, Esquire Ford & Harrison LLP 300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1300 Orlando, Florida 32801 Dafney Cook 2445 Dunn Avenue, Apt 610 Jacksonville, Florida 32218 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway. Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
