Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns the residence located at 19 Heilwood Avenue, Clearwater Beach, Florida. The property is zoned RM-20 (high density residential). Petitioner requests a front and side setback variance, lot density variance, variance to impermeable lot coverage, and a variance to add 275 square feet of living area to a nonconforming structure. The existing property extends into the setback area on both the front and one side and exceeds the impermeable lot coverage and the house coverage currently allowed by the building code. Petitioner proposes to extend the entire front of the house to the line of the screen porch which now intrudes into the front setback 8.5 feet. This would reduce the front setback across the entire front of the house from the code prescribed 25 feet to 16.5 feet. The west side of the house now encroaches two feet into the code prescribed five feet, leaving only three feet setback on this side. To extend this side towards the front by 8.5 feet, a side variance of two feet is required for this extension. By adding 275 square feet to the area of the house, the lot coverage would be increased to 46.2 percent. The maximum coverage allowed by the code is 42 percent. By adding 275 square feet of impermeable area to the lot, the percent of the lot coverage with impermeable surface would increase to 95 percent. The maximum impermeable lot coverage permitted by the code is 65 percent. Petitioner contends he only wants to "square" up his house and to make the entire front of the house intrude into the setback area by 8.5 feet; that this addition will improve the looks and usability of the house; and that there is no objection by the neighbors.
The Issue Whether Respondents committed discriminatory housing practices against Petitioner as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner.2
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a male of Hispanic origin. Petitioner suffers from a debilitating physical illness and has a history of mental illness. Respondents own and/or operate a large apartment complex in Dade County, Florida. At no time relevant to this proceeding did Respondents or their staff know that Petitioner suffered from a debilitating illness. Petitioner resided in Apartment 1519 of Respondents’ apartment complex between an unspecified date in 1999 and December 2003. In approximately March 2003, Petitioner requested permission of Respondents to transfer to another apartment in Respondents’ apartment complex. This request was made prior to the expiration of Petitioner’s then-current lease. Petitioner testified that the request was made after Apartment 1519 was vandalized. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondents had a policy that permitted a resident to transfer from one apartment to another apartment prior to the end of the tenant’s term only if the tenant’s payment history demonstrated that the tenant had no rent checks dishonored by the tenant’s bank and that he or she had not been late in paying the rent on more than two occasions. Respondents denied Petitioner permission to transfer from one apartment to another only because of Petitioner’s poor payment history. Over the course of his tenure in Respondents’ apartment complex, Petitioner had been late with his rent payment on 12 separate occasions and had rent checks dishonored on two separate occasions because his bank account had insufficient funds to cover the checks. There was no evidence Respondents discriminated against Petitioner by denying his transfer request. In December 2003, Respondents evicted Petitioner from Apartment 1519. This action was taken based on Petitioner’s poor payment history, because he repeatedly caused disturbances at the apartment complex, and because he damaged his apartment and neighboring apartments by intentionally flooding his apartment.3 There was no evidence Respondents discriminated against Petitioner by evicting him from Apartment 1519.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition For Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 2004.
Findings Of Fact The Applicants acquired in 1960 for approximately $40,000 a 38 acre parcel of real property located adjacent to Governors Creek just outside the corporate limits of the City of Green Cove Springs in Clay County, Florida. The applicants created an unrecorded subdivision by subdividing the parcel into lots approximately one-half acre in size in accordance with a map dated July 19, 1961 which shows 50 numbered lots, access roads to these lots, and three parcels designated as not being included in the subdivision. The map of the subdivision was never recorded in the office of the Clerk of the Court of Clay County, but the tract has been referred to variously as the Bradley-Triplett Subdivision and Governor's Creek Subdivision. The Applicants began to develop the tract in 1961 for the purpose of selling the lots therein as single family home sites. Their activities included clearing and grading all the roads shown on the map and installing storm drainage structures. Shortly after the initial work was done, the Applicants approached the County Supervisor of Roads, James Knowles, and the County undertook maintenance of the roads. At the time development began, Clay County had no subdivision regulations, and there was no requirement to record the plat of the subdivision. A map of the subdivision was given to the County at the time it began to maintain the roads in 1961. Sales of lots in the subdivision began in 1961, and several lots were sold in the subdivision over the next few years. However, sales efforts were discontinued in 1965 because of the poor market. At the request of the Applicants, the County ceased to maintain a portion of the roads in 1975 in an effort to prevent dumping of garbage in the area. Initially, the subdivision was zoned agricultural. In June 1976, Mr. Bradley appeared before the Clay County Zoning Commission and requested the zoning of 30 acres of the tract be changed from BB to RB which permitted one single family dwelling per one-half acre. This request was granted. In June 1976, Mr. Bradley wrote Mr. John Bowles, Public Works Director of Clay County, requesting permission to install water lines within the graded road rights-of-way as shown on a map submitted by the Applicants which depicted all the lots which are the subject of the instant Petition for vested rights. This permission was granted by Bowles, and the Applicants paid $8,000 for the installation of water lines and fire hydrants in the subdivision. Water service is provided by the City of Green Cover Springs. In August 1976, the Applicants presented to the County a Warranty Deed for the roads shown in the Map. The County accepted the roads and agreed to continue to maintain the roads if certain improvements were made. Subsequently, the Applicants worked on making the improvements requested by the County, and the County continued to maintain the roads. The subdivision has appeared on maps used by various County departments for many years. In June 1978, Mr. Bradley appeared before the Clay County Planning, Zoning and Building Commission and requested that the remainder of the subdivision be re-zoned from agricultural to RB. This request was granted. In September 1978, the Public Works Department of Clay County requested the Applicants perform additional work on the road network in the subdivision to include creating a 20 foot drainage easement, construction of a drainage ditch, installation of street signs, and other improvements regarding grading and drainage. The drainage easement was granted to the County, and the drainage ditch was apparently constructed together with some of the other requested improvements; however, not all of the requested improvements were completed to the County's satisfaction. In March 1980, Mr. Bradley wrote Mr. Bowles a letter granting the County access to the roads within the subdivision for the purpose of maintaining them. In 1983, the County adopted new standards for the acceptance of roads not located within platted subdivisions. At this time, the Applicants became concerned about the status of the roads, and appeared before the County Commission. In November 1983, they contacted Mr. Bowles regarding their concerns. The status of County-requested improvements was a subject of continuing correspondence between the County and the Applicants. As a result thereof, the Applicants again undertook to satisfy the County regarding the list of requested improvements to the roads, and expended additional money on these improvements. The Applicants have spent over the years $20,000 on the roads, $15,000 on the water system and fire hydrants, and $4,000 on the drainage system within the subdivision. In 1984, the County Commission determined that it would not accept responsibility for maintenance of the roads, but that it would not re-convey title to the roads to the Applicants. The County has not altered its position since that determination. There are 50 numbered lots in the subdivision, and three unnumbered outparcels, some of which have been subsequently subdivided by sales. The unnumbered outparcel located in the northeast corner of the subdivision will be designated in this order as the unnumbered northeast parcel. The remaining unnumbered lots will be designated in this order as Lots A through G, which are located as follows: Lot A, located to the west of Lot 33; Lot B, located to the north of Lot A; Lot C, located to the north of Lot B; Lot C, located to the north of Lot B; Lot D, located to the north of Lot C; Lot E, located to the north of Lot D; Lot F, located to the north of Lot E, and Lot G, located to the north of Lot F. The County concedes there are 19 lots of record in the subdivision: Lots numbered lots 1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42 and 43 plus the lots designated above as Lots A, D and F. The Hearing Officer includes Lot E as one of the recorded lots because it was subdivided from Lots D and F, which the County recognizes as lots of record, after the parcel from which the three lots were created was sold as one lot. Lots 1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, and unnumbered Lots A, D, E, and F meet the Plan's criteria for development, and are not at issue in these proceedings. The Plan requires that over 70 percent of the total number of lots in a subdivision created between 1959 and 1970 be sold for the remaining lots to statutorily vest. The Applicants' subdivision does not meet the criteria in the Plan for statutory vesting because the requisite percentage of lots have not been sold. The lots at issue in the Applicant's request for equitable vesting are the remaining numbered lots ( 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 38, 39, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, and 50), the unnumbered northeasterly parcel, and the lots designated in this order as Lots B, C, and G. On January 23, 1992, the Board of County Commissioners of Clay County formally adopted the 2001 Comprehensive Plan pursuant to and in compliance with Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. On November 23, 1993, the zoning of the subdivision was administratively changed to AR-2 which permits the building of single family residences at a density of one per five acres. None of the lots at issue are five acres in size and qualify for further development. A total of 12 homes have been built in the subdivision, each having an average size of 1,800 square feet and occupying lots approximately 1/2 acre in size. The existing layout of the roads does not permit consolidation of the unsold existing lots into five acre lots. Even if they could be consolidated, the increased costs of a five acre lot would dictate the construction of a house larger than 1,800 square feet. In sum, enforcement of the current plan's provisions will prevent any further development of a valuable piece of property conveniently located adjacent to the City of Green Cove Springs in a subdivision which has been recognized and considered in the County's development plans and maps for thirty years.
Findings Of Fact Background Respondents, John F. and Chere Kuller, were minority partners in a limited partnership which developed and constructed a seventeen unit condominium project known as Bahia East Condominium (project).2 Thee precise location of the project was not disclosed, but it is in the Fort Walton Beach area. Respondents, as developers, are subject to the regulatory requirements of petitioner, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Division). The project was completed in 1979, and its declaration was filed on September 28, 1979. Units immediately went on sale. Financing for these units we" arranged with a Pensacola lending institution, and based upon that institution's commitment, contracts for the sale of all seventeen units were executed by prospective buyers. When the institution experienced financial problems and could not honor its commitment, none of the buyers purchased units. Because of this, the first sale did not occur until October 4, 1980. A developer is required to adhere to a number of Division requirements, including the payment of monthly assess meets on developer-owned units, funding a repair reserve, and furnishing annual financial statements to all unit owners. This proceeding stems from a complaint filed by certain unit owners after the developers relinquished control of the project to the homeowners' association on May 11, 1984. Prior to that time, respondents controlled the board of directors of said association, and were responsible for the keeping of its books and records. Count I - Monthly Assessments As a general rule, a developer is not liable for the payment of monthly assessments on all unsold units until the first calendar date of the fourth month following the sale of the first unit. This ninety day grace period is commonly referred to as the election period. However, the developer may be excused from future payments if the developer guarantees to each purchaser that the monthly assessment will not increase, for a certain period of time, and obligates himself during this period of time to pay all common expenses incurred above the amount of assessments received from unit owners. In the case at bar, there was no written or oral guarantee by respondents to freeze the monthly assessments. This was confirmed through testimony of a unit owner, and evidenced by a monthly assessment increase that took effect in March, 1984, or prior to the turnover date. Between October, 1980 and March, 1984, the cost of the monthly assessment varied with the size of the unit, and ranged from $27.50 for the smallest unit, to $55.00 for a two bedroom, one bath unit, to $82.50 for the largest unit. Since no guarantee was made, respondents were obligated to begin paying assessments on their unsold units in February, 1981. However, they failed to do so. Instead, they calculated their other expenses in maintaining the project, and credited the amount of monthly assessments owed against these other expenses. Since other expenses always exceeded the amount of assessments owed, no funds were ever specifically earmarked into the monthly assessment account. Had such assessments been paid from February, 1981 through May 11, 1984, which is the turnover date, respondents' obligation would have been $15,948.64. This amount was derived from records given by respondents to the association at turnover and was not credibly contradicted. Count II - Reserves The complaint charges that respondents "failed to submit reserves annually nor fund reserves as required." According to Division requirements, a developer is required to establish and fund a reserve to cover future repairs from the date of declaration until the end of the election period. These funds are then turned over to the association. Beginning after the election period, a developer is required to establish and fund a reserve account in an amount prescribed by the project's declaration. In this case, the project's recorded declaration provided that the reserve had to equal 10% of the total annual monthly assessments paid by unit owners. Therefore, respondents were required to establish a reserve no later than February, 1981, and to fund it by setting aside 10% of the total monthly assessments. Such an account was timely established by respon- dents at a Pensacola bank in January, 1981 in the amount of $480. This amount was spent within three or four months on repairs to an air-conditioner generator and the purchase of reserved parking signs. No additional funds were placed in the reserve account after January, 1981. Each year a projected annual budget was prepared by the developers which included an amount for the reserve, but no funds were ever actually set aside for that purpose. Although this requirement can be waived by vote of the association, respondents conceded that the funding requirement was never waived. Respondents justified their course of action on the theory the association account into which the assessments were placed was running a deficit, and the developers had already guaranteed to cover all expenses. However, this procedure is not sanctioned by statute or rule. According to uncontradicted testimony, had appropriate reserves been funded as required, respondents would have funded $4,770.56 from February, 1981 until the turnover. Count III - Annual Financial Statements The final count involves an allegation that respondents "failed to furnish unit owners with an annual financial statement for the years 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1983." According to Division requirements, all non-developer unit owners must be furnished a copy of the project's "annual financial statement" each year. This document must be prepared and distributed by mail or personal delivery. Respondents claimed that this was done. However, petitioner presented the testimony of two unit owners for the purpose of showing that such statements were not distributed as required. One unit owner, William C. Naftel, received the 1982 statement, but could not recall one way or the other whether he received statements in the years 1981, 1983 and 1984. A second unit owner, Max C. Bolton, Jr., testified he "may have" received such a statement in 1982, but did not receive one for the years 1980, 1981 and 1983. Mitigation This project was respondents' first and only development venture in Florida. Respondents' lack of compliance with Division requirements did not appear to the undersigned to be intentional. Rather, it stemmed from a combination of poor outside advice and a failure on their part to make diligent inquiry as to what precise obligations the statutes and Division rules imposed upon them from an accounting and legal standpoint. At hearing, respondents claimed they have lost a considerable amount of money on the project, which amount far outweighs any claims advanced by the agency.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondents be found guilty of violating Subsections 718.115(2), 718.112(2)(k); and 718.111(13), Florida Statutes (1985), and that a $2,500 civil penalty be imposed; to be paid within thirty days from date of final order. DONE and ORDERED this 3rd day of June, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1986.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the condominium association of a portion of a residential condominium complex comprised of 450 units and encompassing approximately 800 acres of land. On April 26, 1982, Respondent's Board of Directors approved the construction of a new parking area containing three parking spaces on a portion of the common-elements lawn and thereafter designated that new parking area as "limited common elements" reserved for use by the owners of the two condominium units for whose benefit it was approved. The parking area was constructed on May 12 and 13, 1982. Two-thirds of the cost of construction was paid by the owners of the two units benefited. One-third of the cost of construction, $450, was paid by Respondent out of funds collected for common expenses through assessments of all unit owners. Prior to construction, the Board's authorization of the construction was not ratified by the affirmative vote of a majority of the unit owners. After Petitioner issued its Notice to Show Cause on May 9, 1983, (a year after the construction of the parking areas) Respondent, for the first time, sought the approval of its unit owners by sending them a newsletter and "Referendum" form on June 3, 1983. The newsletter/referendum, however, did not request the unit owners to approve or ratify the construction of the parking area, the redesignation of common elements into limited common elements, or the expenditure of common funds for the benefit of an individual unit. Rather, it requested a vote on whether the parking area should be removed at the expense of all unit owners. Further, the form provided that disapproval of the expense involved in returning the parking area to common-elements property could be conveyed by simply not bothering to vote. Approximately 75 percent of the unit owners did not vote on the "referendum." The failure to vote (and the votes against the removal and additional expense) may well have been in response to Respondent's explanation of the issue, such as advising the unit owners that a requirement that the Board remove the parking area might mean that concrete slabs under "dumpsters" would be prohibited and that ". . . dog owners will possibly be required to carry a 'pooper scooper' when they walk their pet on common area." Respondent's Declaration of Condominium provides that: There shall be no material alterations, door or color changes, enclosing of balconies, or substantial additions to the common elements, except the same are authorized by the Board of Directors, and ratified by the affirmative vote of a majority of the unit owners or as otherwise authorized herein. No unit owner shall block, hamper, or otherwise interfere with the common elements of the property to the operation thereof. Additionally, the approved parking areas for the development are those shown on diagrams attached to and incorporated in the Declaration of Condominium and are part of the recorded plat. Where the Declaration specifically grants authority over parking areas to the Board of Directors, it grants the Board discretion to assign parking spaces; nowhere does the Declaration authorize the Board to create parking spaces, pay for same with common funds, or convert common elements into personal parking spaces. Up to the time of the formal hearing in this cause, Respondent's authorization of the construction of the new parking area and of the use of common funds and of common elements for that construction have never been approved or ratified by the affirmative vote of a majority of the unit owners, and the Board had made no attempt to obtain that approval. Constructing a parking area where there had been community lawn space is a material alteration to the common elements.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in the Notice to Show Cause; Imposing a civil penalty of $2,500 against Respondent to be paid by a date certain; Ordering Respondent to cease and desist from materially altering or substantially adding to the common elements of the condominium in any manner other than as provided in its Declaration of Condominium; Affording Respondent a reasonable time in which to obtain approval of the subject construction from the unit owners, subject to Petitioner's approval as to compliance with Respondent's Declaration of Condominium and the Condominium Act; and Requiring the immediate removal of the subject parking area and the restoration of that space to its preconstruction appearance and usage if Respondent fails to obtain approval of the construction within a reasonable time from either the unit owners or from Petitioner. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 6th day of January 1984 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: David M. Maloney, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jeffrey M. Feuer, Esquire 20466 South Dixie Highway Miami, Florida 33189 Gary R. Rutledge, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's request for nonconforming status on his property at 1607 and 1607 1/2 Northwest 12th Road, Gainesville, Florida, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, including the stipulation of facts filed by the parties, the following findings of fact are determined: Mr. Mayhew resides in Hawthorne, which is located in the southeastern portion of Alachua County (County). (Some papers filed in this case identify his residence as being in Cross Creek, rather than Hawthorne, but with the same street address.) Since November 1998, he has owned property at 1607 and 1607 1/2 Northwest 12th Road, Gainesville, Florida. More specifically, the property is in an older, single-family residential neighborhood known as Florida Park which is located several blocks west of U.S. Highway 441, which runs in a north-south direction through the City, and approximately one-quarter mile north of Northwest 8th Avenue. In broader geographical terms, the property is located around one mile north of the University of Florida campus. There are two structures (or units) on Petitioner's property. One is a three-bedroom, two-bath dwelling constructed by the original owner (Mr. Gainous) in 1949, who occupied that dwelling with his wife. That unit's address is listed on the County Property Appraiser's records as 1607 Northwest 12th Road. The second structure, a two-bedroom, one-bath dwelling (also referred to as a "cottage"), was built by Mr. Gainous in 1957, and was apparently used primarily as rental property by the owner. The address of the second unit on the Property Appraiser's records is 1607 1/2 Northwest 12th Road. Separate gas meters and a single water line and electric meter serve the two units. (Although the two units are given separate street addresses by the Property Appraiser, only one tax bill is issued by the County Tax Collector.) When these structures were built, the County did not issue building permits. The property was in the unincorporated area of the County until 1961, when the City annexed the property. In 1964, the City adopted its first zoning plan and placed the property in what was then known as the Single-Family Residential (R-1a) zoning district. This category was used since the property was "closely consistent" with that zoning classification. A few years later, the property was rezoned to the Residential Single-Family zoning district (RSF-1), which apparently replaced the R-1a zoning district, and it still remains in that zoning classification. Under current zoning regulations, unless a property has "legal" nonconforming status, two family dwellings are not permitted in the RSF-1 zoning district. However, if a structure and use of land was in existence before the City annexed the property and adopted its zoning code, and was not otherwise shown to have lost that status, the nonconforming use is grandfathered and allowed "to continue until [it is] removed" or otherwise conflicts with conditions pertaining to nonconforming lots, uses, or structures. See § 30-346, Code of Ordinances. (Nonconforming status allows the owner to rent each unit on the parcel to no more than three unrelated persons. Thus, six unrelated persons could legally occupy Mr. Mayhew's two units. However, Mr. Mayhew has always rented to smaller numbers of tenants, and then only to graduate students or "professionals.") One way a property can lose its status is for the owner to not use the property in a nonconforming status for nine consecutive months. In the case of a rental property, this means that the owner has not rented the property for at least nine consecutive months. If this occurs, the owner is presumed to have abandoned the nonconforming status. See § 30-346(5)(d), Code of Ordinances. The precise date on which the City began using the nine-month time period is unknown. According to Mr. Calderon, this time period has been in the Code of Ordinances for "awhile," it was in the Code of Ordinances when "Citywide zoning" was first used in 1982, and he implied that it was in the first zoning code adopted in the 1960s. The City has no formal process by which it monitors properties to ensure that they continue to meet the requirements for legal nonconforming status. Generally, the issue arises after a complaint is filed by a third party or an inspection is made by City officials, who then require that the owner confirm (or prove) that the property still qualifies for that status. In this case, in October 2006, the tenant who occupied the cottage filed a complaint with the City concerning the installation of a new gas stove and other possible code violations. Prior to that time, no other complaints had been lodged against Mr. Mayhew's property. In response to that complaint, a code enforcement officer, Michael Wohl, inspected the property. During the course of that inspection, Mr. Wohl noticed that there were two rental units on one parcel of land. As a routine part of the inspection process, Mr. Wohl made an inquiry to determine if Mr. Mayhew had a landlord permit for each unit. Under the Code of Ordinances, a landlord permit is required for each rental unit. (The specific provision in the Code of Ordinances which imposes this requirement was not given.) According to Mr. Calderon, this requirement has been in the Code of Ordinances since 1989. Mr. Wohl learned that Mr. Mayhew had purchased one landlord permit for the parcel in the year 2000 (and had renewed that permit each year) but did not have a second permit. (When he purchased the property in late 1998, Mr. Mayhew did not know that such permits were even required. He obtained one as soon as this was brought to his attention.) After Mr. Mayhew advised Mr. Wohl that he was unaware that a permit was needed for each unit on his property, Mr. Wohl spoke with Mr. Calderon, who instructed Mr. Wohl to verify if the property was a legal nonconforming use (and therefore could qualify for two landlord permits) since it was located in a single-family zoning classification. Shortly thereafter, a citation was issued to Petitioner. The specific nature of the citation was not disclosed. In any event, by letter dated September 25, 2006, Mr. Calderon requested that Mr. Mayhew provide documentation to support the nonconforming use of the cottage at 1607 1/2 NW 12th Road as an accessory dwelling unit. In response to Mr. Calderon's request, on October 2, 2006, Mr. Mayhew submitted a lengthy letter with supporting documentation, including photographs of the units; copies of rental agreements of tenants who had rented the cottage since he had purchased the property in November 1998; information regarding the date of construction of the two units; and Property Appraiser records showing two units on the parcel. On December 7, 2006, the Department advised Mr. Mayhew by letter that "[b]ased on the physical evidence, property appraiser records and documents provided by you, the property is therefore classified as an existing non-conforming two-family development and is subject to regulations governing non-conforming uses." However, because the City apparently has a policy of notifying residents who live within 300 feet of the subject property of this type of decision, the City also issued on the same date a Notice of Decision to Issue Non-Conforming Status to Petitioner's Property (Notice)." (The record is unclear whether this notice was given pursuant to a policy or a specific Code provision. Other provisions within the Code of Ordinances provide for such notice when the Board conducts hearings on variances, appeals alleging error by an administrative official, and requests for special zoning exceptions. See § 30-354(h)(6)(i)-(k), Code of Ordinances.) In response to the Notice, affidavits were filed by a number of residents who lived adjacent to, or near, the subject property. After reviewing those affidavits, on December 20, 2006, the Department advised Petitioner by letter that based on "new information . . . submitted by affected persons within 300 feet of your property . . . [the] staff [is going to] reconsider the nonconforming status of your property." On January 25, 2007, Mr. Calderon issued a letter denying Mr. Mayhew's request for the following reasons: I have reviewed the information you submitted and those submitted by surrounding property owners. Based on the information and affidavits, there appears to be no consensus or conclusive data establishing emphatically that the subject property has been used consistently as a two-family development since annexation into the city. Evidence from the property owner would suggest that since 1998, the subject property has been used as a two- family dwelling and that no nine-month period has elapsed where the property was not used as a two-family dwelling. However, due to uncertainty for the period around and prior to 1998, staff cannot make a determination about the status of the development around and prior to 1998. Staff cannot determine whether the subject property was illegal, legal non-conforming or lost its non-conforming status at the time of ownership change in 1998. Since the current zoning of the subject property is RSF-1 (Single-family residential, 3.5 dwelling units per acre), the current use as a two-family dwelling is not permitted. Staff is therefore denying the request on the basis that available information cannot demonstrate continued use of the property as a two-family development, since annexation into the [C]ity of Gainesville. On February 8, 2007, Mr. Mayhew filed his appeal of that decision. Because Mr. Mayhew alleged that there were disputed issues of material fact, the appeal was forwarded to DOAH, rather than the Board. In his appeal, Mr. Mayhew alleged that the City had improperly relied on affidavits from neighbors to reconsider its decision, that there was no new evidence submitted to support a change in the City's initial decision, and that he could not get a fair hearing from the Board because several members of the Board live in the affected neighborhood or are members of a neighborhood association that includes the Florida Park area. Section 30-346(5)(d), Code of Ordinances, as amended in November 2006, provides the following restrictions on nonconforming uses: Whenever a nonconforming use of land or a building or other structure or any portion thereof is abandoned or the use is discontinued for a continuous period of nine months or more, such abandonment or discontinuance shall be presumed to constitute an intention to abandon or discontinue such use, and such use shall no longer be permitted. Any subsequent use of such building or structure or land shall be in conformity with the provisions of this chapter. Although this section was amended in November 2006, the amendment did not affect (or otherwise change) the nine- month time period for losing a nonconforming use. Prior to the amendment, the section provided that if a nonconforming use was lost due to abandonment or discontinuation, the reestablishment of the use could be authorized by the Board, after hearing, if the Board found the design, construction, and character of the building not suitable for the uses in the district in which the nonconforming use is situated. Under the new amendment, that option no longer exists. The history note to this provision indicates that the original ordinance (No. 3777) was adopted on June 10, 1992, and was later amended on July 25, 1994.1 (However, Mr. Calderon indicated that the nine-month period dates back many years before the adoption of this particular Ordinance. See Finding of Fact 5, supra.) When an owner is required to demonstrate that his rental property has continuously retained its nonconforming status, he must show that the property has been continuously rented (with no nine-month breaks) not only for the period of time that he has owned the property, but also for the entire time the property has enjoyed nonconforming status, or in this case since the property was annexed by the City. Thus, Mr. Mayhew was obligated to show that the original owners (Mr. and Mrs. Gainous) rented the property continuously from the time the property was annexed in 1961 until it was sold to Mr. Mayhew in late 1998. The City's practice is to determine nonconforming status on a case by case basis but the burden is on the owner to prove that status through records such as building permits, landlord permits, zoning compliance permits, and occupational licenses, and "records from reputable sources." The parties agree that both units were continuously rented by Mr. Mayhew since the time he purchased the property in November 1998. The dispute here is whether the nonconforming use was abandoned for any nine-month period prior to Mr. Mayhew's purchase of the property. The City contends that Mr. Mayhew has presented no evidence to show that the cottage was rented by the prior owner from 1996 until the property was sold in late 1998. Although Mr. Mayhew clearly established (and the City agrees) that the property has been continuously rented since he purchased the parcel in late 1998, he conceded that the cottage was vacant when he purchased the property, that he had made no inquiry to the seller as to how long the cottage had been vacant, and that he had no personal knowledge regarding the rental history of the property during the three years preceding the purchase. He contended, however, that there are always periods of time when a unit remains vacant while the owner is actively seeking a new tenant or when necessary renovations must be made. While this is true, there is no evidence that this occurred during the years 1996, 1997, or 1998. (It is unknown where Mrs. Gainous presently resides, or even if she is still alive. When the property was sold in late 1998, Mrs. Gainous was described as being elderly and in poor health.) Significantly, City records show that Mrs. Gainous had secured landlord permits to rent the cottage from 1989 (when permits were first required) through 1995, but she had failed to obtain any permits for the years 1996, 1997, or 1998, at which time she sold the property to Mr. Mayhew. This raises a logical inference, not overcome by Mr. Mayhew, that she did not rent the cottage during those years. In addition, Dr. Kosch, who has lived across the street from the subject property for the last twenty years, testified that he personally observed several periods of time before the property was sold to Mr. Mayhew when there were no tenants in the cottage. Although Dr. Kosch could not specifically identify the exact time periods when this occurred (due to the passage of time), his testimony adds further support to a finding that there is insufficient evidence that the cottage was rented continuously (without any nine-month breaks) during the years 1996-1998. Mr. Mayhew purchased the property with the understanding that he could legally rent both units. While it may seem unfair for him to now have to prove that the property has been continuously rented (with no breaks exceeding nine consecutive months) since the 1960s, this interpretation of the Code of Ordinances has always been followed by the City without exception. According to Mr. Wohl, this situation has occurred at least 8 or 9 times in the last few years alone, and in each case, the property owner was required to prove a continued nonconforming use since the property was annexed by the City or placed in a more restrictive zoning classification.
The Issue Whether Appellant should be granted a variance of 22 feet from the front setback line of its property at 1601 Gulf to Bay Boulevard, Clearwater, Florida, to permit the replacement of existing canopies.
Findings Of Fact In 1964, a service station was located on the property now known as 1601 Gulf to Bay Boulevard, and the property has been owned by Mobil since 1972. When constructed, the station was in full compliance with all zoning regulations. The site is 142 feet by 128 feet, and the minimum area on which the service station can be erected under the existing code is 10,000 square feet. At the time the station was opened, a concrete block rectangular structure approximately 45 feet by 28 feet was erected near the center of the site, and two dispensing islands with circular canopies over each was installed to provide lighting at night and weather protection for patrons. This station is located on the south side of Gulf to Bay Boulevard at its intersection with Lake Avenue. There are currently two entrances to the station from Lake Avenue, one of which will be closed if this variance is granted. The existing circular canopy nearest Gulf to Bay Boulevard extends into the setback line 22 feet, the same amount the replacement canopies will extend if this variance is granted. The existing sign on the property is nonconforming. This will be corrected to a conforming sign when the canopies are replaced. There is presently no landscaping on the site. If the proposed renovation is approved, landscaping conforming to all code requirements will be installed on all sides of the property as shown on plat plan dated 4-18-90 submitted with Mobil's application. The existing canopies have deteriorated to the stage they can no longer be repaired, but must be replaced. Subsequent to the erection of this facility, code changes have been enacted by the City of Clearwater to now require the 25 foot setback from which this variance is requested. All other changes being made to the station such as replacing storage tanks, landscaping, and realigning of service islands are in compliance with the Code. The proposed layout of the service islands is such that if cars are on the inside of each service island, there is insufficient room for a third car to pass between them. There is sufficient room on the service island nearest Gulf to Bay Boulevard for a motor home to fuel on the street side of this island. It is possible for Mobil Oil to erect a station on this site which would comply with all provisions of the Code, if the existing building is razed and relocated further back on the property from the intersection of Gulf to Bay and Lake Avenue. Assuming construction costs of $80 per square foot (including razing of the existing building) this would represent a cost of approximately $100,000. This is not a reasonable requirement to place upon the applicant.
Findings Of Fact But for the circular drive proposed in front of the Appellants' residence, all of the variances here involved relate to a swimming pool and deck Appellant proposes to construct between their house and the seawall at the rear of the property. With respect to the circular drive proposed to be placed in the front yard for which a variance in required green space is sought, Appellants presented evidence purporting to show the variance requested was calculated incorrectly, and actually a lesser variance, or no variance, was required. This changes the application for variance and, if the correct calculations show some variance is required, this should be presented to the Board which has primary jurisdiction. Since the Board has not had an opportunity to consider the corrected calculations of open space in the front yard, this variance request is remanded to the Board. The proposed swimming pool gives rise to the other variance requests. Because the pool walls extend four feet above the surface of the existing lot, the wall variance becomes applicable which would not be the case if the deck around the pool did not extend more than one foot above the lot level. At the hearing, Appellants' argument was that they only want what all of their neighbors have and to be treated the same as their neighbors have been treated. While photographs were submitted showing walls in the setback area near the seawall of neighbors' property as well as swimming pools constructed in such areas, no credible evidence was presented that these neighbors received variances similar to those which were denied Appellants. The proposed pool is 27 feet by 17 feet with the setback variance requested in line with the 17 feet dimension of the pool width. Section 135.023(5)a.3, of the band Development Code requires a 15 foot setback from the rear property line. The deck around the pool as proposed by Appellants extends within 4 feet of the rear property line. No evidence was presented that a 17 foot-wide pool was the minimum width required or that a 15-foot wide pool, for example, would not provide an adequate width for the swimming pool. Nor was evidence submitted by Appellants that any effort had been made to reduce the variances requested to the minimum needed to provide a swimming pool and deck capable of meeting all of Appellants' needs.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether a certain development order (permit) issued by Monroe County to George and Judy Sands, as owners, and PG Construction, Inc., as contractor, for the construction of a single family dwelling unit is consistent with the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations.
Findings Of Fact The parties Respondents, George and Judy Sands (Sands), are the owners of Lot 15, Tropical Coral Reef Estates, Plantation Key, Monroe County, Florida; a property located within that part of Monroe County designated as an area of critical state concern, and upon which they have received a development order (permit) from Monroe County to construct a single family dwelling unit. Respondent, PG Construction, Inc., is the contractor that applied for the permit on behalf of the Sands. Respondent, Monroe County (Monroe County), is a local government within the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern designated by Section 380.0552, Florida Statutes, and is responsible for the implementation of, and the issuance of development orders that are consistent with, the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations, as approved and adopted in Chapters 9J-14 and 28-20, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner, Department of Community Affairs (Department), is the state land planning agency charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and all rules promulgated there-under. Sections 380.031(18) and 380.032(1), Florida Statutes. Here, the Department has filed a timely appeal to the issuance of the subject permit, and contends that construction of the dwelling unit is inconsistent with the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations since it would exceed allowable density limitations. Background The subject property is approximately .45 acres, and was purchased by the Sands in January 1990. At the time of purchase, the property supported a concrete block residence, two bedrooms and one bath, of approximately 900 square feet and a wood-frame residence, two bedrooms and one bath, of approximately 625 square feet. Both buildings were constructed in 1948 and were, pertinent to this case, used by the Sands' predecessor in title as a principal residence prior to and as of the effective date of the Monroe County land development regulations (September 15, 1986). Following their acquisition of the property, the Sands undertook to upgrade both structures with the intention of offering use of the residences to employees of their business, which was located across the street from the property. 2/ Ultimately, however, the Sands decided to replace, rather than remodel, the wood-frame residence, and employed David de Haas-Grosseck (de Haas), a consultant and designer of residential properties, who was of the opinion that such replacement was permissible under the provisions of Section 9.5-268, Monroe County land development regulations (MCLDR), discussed infra, to attend the necessary details. 3/ On February 5, 1991, de Haas, on behalf of the Sands, filed an application with Monroe County for a building permit to construct a modular single family residence upon the property. Thereafter, the County advised de Haas that since the wood-frame structure was to be removed a demolition permit would also be required. Accordingly, on February 11, 1991, de Haas applied for a demolition permit to remove such structure. The demolition permit (permit number 9130002904) was issued by the County on February 11, 1991, and rendered to the Department on February 13, 1991. The building permit (permit number 9130002861) was issued by the County on February 25, 1991, and rendered to the Department on February 27, 1991. Under existing law, such permits were not effective until expiration of the time within which the Department was authorized to appeal their issuance, to-wit: 45 days after they were rendered to the Department. The Sands, having been expressly so advised by de Haas, were acutely aware of the limitations on their building permit. Consequently, the Sands requested a waiver of the Department's appeal period. By letter of March 21, 1991, the Department denied such request and stated: Dear Mr. Sands: Monroe County issued you permit number 913-2861 on February 25, 1991. The DCA received the permit on February 27, 1991. Therefore, the Department's 45-day appeal period expires on April 13, 1991. Subsequent to the issuance of the permit by the County, you requested a waiver of the DCA's appeal period. At this time, the Department declines to issue you the waiver. Changes or additional information may be needed to meet County Code requirements. Our concerns include that the proposed development exceeds the allowable density in a SS zoning district. DCA staff will continue to review your plans and the permit, which may warrant action by the Department . . . . Notwithstanding the Sands' express knowledge that their building permit was not effective, as well as express advice from the Department that it had concerns regarding the propriety of such development, the Sands, following the expiration of the Department's appeal period on their demolition permit, demolished the wood-frame structure on or about April 4, 1991. Thereafter, by petition filed with the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission on April 12, 1991, the Department timely challenged the propriety of Monroe County's decision to issue the building permit. 4/ The Sands, notwithstanding express knowledge that their building permit was not effective pending the Department's appeal, proceeded to construct the modular unit on the property. Such unit is approximately 650 square feet in size, excluding the two enclosed screen porches which measure 10' X 20' each, and complies with current building code requirements. The Sands' decision to construct such unit pending appeal was voluntary, and they proceeded with such construction at their own risk considering the nature of this proceeding. Consistency of the building permit with the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations The Sands property is located within what the Monroe County land development regulations (MCLDR) define as a sparsely settled residential land use district. The purpose of such district is stated in Section 9.5-209, MCLDR, to be as follows: . . . to establish areas of low density residential development where the predominate character is native or open space lands. Consistent with the purpose of such land use district, the Monroe County land development regulations permit, as of right, only the following uses: Detached residential dwellings; Beekeeping; Home occupations -- Special use permit requiring a public hearing; Accessory uses. Section 9.5-238(a), MCLDR. Moreover, consistent with the purpose of the district, the density or intensity of development is limited by Section 9.5-261, MCLDR. Pertinent to this case, 9.5-261, MCLDR, addresses the issue of land use intensity or density, and provides: No structure or land in Monroe County shall hereafter be developed, used or occupied at an intensity or density greater than the standards set out in this division. . . . And, Section 9.5-262, MCLDR, establishes the maximum residential density in a sparsely settled residential land use district at .5 dwelling units per acre. Accordingly, a minimum of two acres is required under the Monroe County land development regulations to permit, as of right, one detached residential dwelling. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 9.5-262, MCLDR, the Monroe County land development regulations provide an exception to the density limitations otherwise imposed by such section for certain dwelling units existent on the effective date of the regulations. Pertinent to this case, Section 9.5-268, MCLDR, provides: Notwithstanding the provisions of section 9.5-262 . . . the owners of land upon which a dwelling unit . . . used as a principal residence prior to the effective date of the plan was lawful on the effective date of this chapter shall be entitled to a density allocation of one (1) dwelling unit for each such unit in existence on the effective date of this chapter. Here, the Department and Monroe County disagree as to the proper interpretation of the foregoing provision. The Department interprets such provision to apply only to the owner of such residence on the effective date of the plan. Under such interpretation, the density benefits offered by Section 9.5-268, MCLDR, would be lost where, as here, such owner sold the property. In contrast, Monroe County interprets such provision to essentially establish an allowable density on the effective date of the plan, and to accord subsequent owners the benefit of such increased density allocation. 5/ Such interpretation, while not the only possible interpretation, is not inconsistent with the comprehensive plan or clearly erroneous, and therefore permissible. 6/ Accordingly, the subject permit is consistent with the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations. 7/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order affirming Monroe County's decision to issue building permit number 9130002861, and dismissing the appeal filed by the Department of Community Affairs. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of June 1992. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June 1992.
