Findings Of Fact The following facts are stipulated by the parties and are incorporated herein: The Respondent has been the clerk of court for Collier County since June of 1986. The Respondent was the clerk of court at all times material to this complaint. In July of 1990, the Respondent's wife was issued a citation for having glass bottles on the beach, a violation of municipal ordinance No. 16.30, City of Naples. On August 21, 1990, upon failure to timely pay the fine for the violation of the above-described ordinance or to appear in court on this date, an arrest warrant for Theresa Giles was issued. On August 30, 1990, on or about 4:30 p.m., police officers arrived at the Respondent's residence to arrest Ms. Giles for her failure to appear or to pay fine. The officers allowed Ms. Giles to make a telephone call to her husband at the clerk's office. The Respondent went to one of his deputy clerks, Lorraine Stoll and discussed the situation with her. As a result, Ms. Stoll called the officers at the Respondent's home and informed them that the bench warrant for Ms. Giles was recalled. Ms. Giles was not taken into custody as a result of Ms. Stoll's action. These facts are derived from the evidence presented, weighed and credited: Respondent, James Giles was the Collier County finance director, performing the pre-audit function for the county, when he was appointed county clerk to finish a two year term in 1986. He was then elected to a four year term ending in January 1993, and was not reelected. His prior employment experience was as a private certified public accountant, an employee of St. Johns County, and an auditor for the State of Florida. On August 30, 1990, when Theresa Giles called her husband, she was very upset. He had promised to pay the fine, but had forgotten. She was home alone with her young child and her elderly mother when the deputies came to serve the warrant and arrest her. The ticket, or "Notice to Appear" issued to Ms. Giles for her infraction plainly provides notice that if the fine is not paid or the person fails to appear in court at the appointed time, an arrest warrant shall be issued. (Advocate Exhibit No. 2) James Giles immediately called his misdemeanor division and Kathleen Heck answered the phone. After he briefly explained the situation, she went to find the supervisor, Lorraine Stoll. As the two women were at Ms. Stoll's desk, bringing Ms. Giles' case up on the computer, Mr. Giles appeared in person. This was a very unusual situation because the clerk rarely came back to the misdemeanor office. He was Lorraine Stoll's immediate supervisor. He asked if there was anything that could be done and Ms. Stoll responded that the warrant could be recalled. Before she could explain any further, he handed her a paper with his home phone and asked her to make the call. Ms. Giles answered the phone and put the deputy on; Ms. Stoll told him the warrant was recalled, and Ms. Giles was not arrested. Ms. Stoll then told Mr. Giles that the fine and court costs had to be paid. He said the whole thing was ridiculous, that he could not believe a warrant could be issued for such a minor offense. By this time it was after 5:00 p.m. and the cashier's office was closed. Giles paid the $36.50 fine the next day and paid the $100.00 court costs on September 13, some two weeks later. (Respondent's exhibits nos. 1 and 2). James Giles admits being upset at the time that the phone call was made, but was trying to calm down because he knew Lorraine Stoll to be excitable. He was flabbergasted that someone could be arrested for having bottles on the beach. He denies that he pressured Ms. Stoll, but claims he was trying to be rational and get sound advice. He wanted her to make the call because he felt it would "look bad" if he did. James Giles did not raise his voice but both Ms. Stoll and Ms. Heck perceived he was upset and in a pressure situation. Ms. Stoll had never been involved in a circumstance where the warrant was recalled while the deputies were getting ready to make an arrest. She has worked in the misdemeanor section of the clerk's office for eleven and a half years, as deputy clerk. No ordinary citizen could have received the advantage that the clerk and his wife received. Judge Ellis, a Collier County judge, has a written policy providing that a bench warrant may be set aside after payment of costs and fine. Another county judge, Judge Trettis, requires that his office or the State's Attorney be called, and does not have a written policy. Ms. Stoll does not have the authority to recall a warrant without following the proper procedure. This situation was out of the ordinary. She made the telephone call because her boss told her to, and their main concern was that the warrant needed to be recalled so Ms. Giles would not go to jail. On the other hand, Ms. Stoll did not tell Mr. Giles that he was pressuring her, nor did she have the opportunity to tell him the proper procedure before making the telephone call. James Giles' explanation that he was simply seeking advice of his staff and then acting on it without wrongful intent is disingenuous. Whatever his actual knowledge of proper procedures for recalling a warrant, he knew or should have known that what he was doing was not an opportunity available to other citizens. His experience in the clerk's office and in prior public service should have clued him that no one else could simply get a deputy clerk to intercept an arrest with a telephone call.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Commission on Ethics enter its final order finding that James Giles violated Section 112.313(6), F.S., and recommending a civil penalty of $250.00. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 27th day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-4942EC The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Advocate's Proposed Findings 1. Adopted as stipulated facts in paragraphs 1-5. Adopted in substance in paragraph 9. Adopted in substance in paragraph 12. 8.-10. Adopted in substance in paragraph 10. 11. Adopted in substance in paragraph 13. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1. A.-E. Adopted as stipulated facts in paragraphs 1-5. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 8 and 12. Rejected as the sequence suggested is contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as misleading. The evidence shows the process was incorrect and both staff knew it was incorrect. The clerk was informed about the correct procedure after the phone call. The procedure is set out in paragraph 13. The evidence is not clear that the fine and costs could not have been paid the same day. By the time Mr. Giles finished complaining, it was after 5:00. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence, considering the totality of Ms. Stoll's testimony as well as Ms. Heck's. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Rejected as immaterial. 3. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. More specifically, this proposed finding suggests that the culpability was Ms. Stoll's rather than Respondent's. That suggestion is supported only by Ms. Stoll's timid admissions that she should not have made the phone call without having received the payment from her boss. Ms. Stoll's acceptance of blame does not relieve the Respondent of his responsibility. COPIES FURNISHED: Craig B. Willis Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 1502 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Raymond Bass, Jr., Esquire Bass & Chernoff 849 7th Avenue, South - Suite 200 Naples, Florida 33940-6715 Bonnie Williams, Executive Director Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Marcel C. Johnson, is a certified law enforcement officer having been issued certification number 0235217 on March 2, 1982 by petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. Until 1985 or early 1986, he was employed as a police office by the City of Miami. On or about April 15, 1986 Johnson pled nolo contendere to possession of a controlled substance - cocaine, a third degree felony. Adjudication of guilt was withheld and Johnson was placed on three years' probation and required to perform 150 hours of community service.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent's law enforcement certification number 0235217 be REVOKED. DONE AND ORDERED this 14th day of August, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of August, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mr. Marcel C. Johnson 2105 Northwest 56th Street Miami, Florida 33142 Mr. Rod Caswell, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mr. Robert R. Dempsey Executive Director Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Jose Iglesias (Petitioner or Iglesias) is entitled to attorney's fees and costs from the Complainant/Respondent, Robert Nieman (Respondent or Nieman), pursuant to Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact On August 14, 2003, the Respondent executed a Complaint that was filed with the Ethics Commission against the Petitioner. The Complaint alleged: Vice Mayor Iglesias is constantly interfering with Police Department’s day-to- day operations, and spreading false rumors about Police Department personnel. (Document #1) Vice Mayor Iglesias is causing a hostile work environment with constant complaints about officers. Vice Mayor Iglesias is constantly encouraging racism, pitting hispanics against white and black officers of the Department. Vice Mayor Iglesias filed false police reports (verbally) constantly for his own gain and benefits. Vice Mayor Iglesias’s 16-year-old son works part time in Town Hall. (Nepotism) Vice Mayor Iglesias improper use of his title by instructing the Town Manager to take actions on the police department, and even retaliation against the Police Chief and myself. Vice Mayor Iglesias ordered public records about himself not to be released, and then when they were released he insisted the secretary releasing the records be fired. (Document #1) Mr. Iglesias is falsely using the title of M.D. and in fact used this title to gain his seat on the council and then becoming Vice Mayor. When Mr. Iglesias has been questioned on this matter by residents in the past he has stated he was a brain surgeon, a foot doctor, and a chiropractor, and could not list a hospital where he did his residency to become M.D. (Document #2) At all times material to this case the Petitioner was Vice Mayor serving on the Town’s governing council. As such, the Petitioner was subject to the ethics provisions governed by the Ethics Commission. The Respondent is a town employee and serves as a police sergeant within the police department. Mr. Nieman has been so employed for over 20 years. After an investigation of three of the allegations set forth in the Complaint (only three were deemed legally sufficient to warrant investigation) and consideration of the Advocate’s recommendation, the Ethics Commission entered a Public Report on March 16, 2004. The Public Report dismissed the Complaint and closed the matter. On April 14, 2004, the Petitioner filed the instant Fee Petition pursuant to Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes (2004). The Fee Petition alleged that the Complaint “is based on eight allegations, all of which are false and were known to be false by Complainant when he filed the Complaint.” Additionally, the Fee Petition stated the Complaint “was filed by the Complainant with the knowledge the Complaint contained one or more false allegations, or with reckless disregard as to whether the Complaint contained false allegations. ” At hearing, the Petitioner presented evidence as to the three allegations of the Complaint that were investigated and deemed legally sufficient to require an ethics investigation. Those allegations were: whether the Petitioner had filed false police reports for his personal benefit; whether the Petitioner had attempted to prevent the release of a public record or insisted on the firing of the person who had released the record; and whether the Petitioner had caused his son to be employed by the Town. The false police reports allegation stemmed from the Petitioner’s use of public roads for rollerblading. The Petitioner is an avid rollerblader and likes to rollerblade for exercise. The Petitioner opined that rollerblading puts less stress on his back and has less impact than jogging. The Petitioner frequently rollerblades on the public road within the Town. Automobile traffic on the road must go around the Petitioner in order to pass. It is the Petitioner’s position that since there is no sidewalk or shoulder suitable to rollerblade, he is entitled to use the road surface just as a pedestrian might use the road surface. The Petitioner skates toward the middle of the lane and not on the edge of the road surface because the roadway is better there for the rollerblades. The record in this case does not clarify whether the Petitioner skates with or against the traffic. In connection with the rollerblading, the Respondent believes that the Petitioner is not entitled to use the road as he does and that if the Petitioner did not use his position as a councilman for influence, he would be cited for rollerblading down the road as he does. Further, the Respondent maintains that the Petitioner has made verbal complaints against motorists who passed too close to him. The Respondent maintains that the verbal complaints are false in that the Petitioner is not entitled to use the roadway as he does and therefore cannot complain against motorists as he does. The Petitioner does not deny the activity. The Respondent has observed the Petitioner rollerblading down the road. The Respondent has not issued a citation to the Petitioner because he is assigned an administrative position within the police department and he believes he is not allowed to issue such citations. The Respondent based the allegation regarding this claim upon statements he has heard from police officers within the Town’s police department. The Respondent did not subpoena the officers to the hearing because he did not want to involve other Town employees in the matter. The Respondent does not have any evidence to support the allegation other than what he believed he had been told in his experience as a police officer for the Town. The record does not demonstrate any written record of either the Petitioner being cited for improper rollerblading or making a report against a vehicle. As to the second allegation that was investigated, a memo purportedly from the chief of police was released to a member of the public by accident. It was included within a stack of documents that had been requested by a private citizen. The document stated in part: SUBJECT: Ethics violations and continual interference of day-to-day police operations by the Vice Mayor Iglesias This memorandum is to inform you [Mayor Michael Addicott] of constant harassment of police personnel and interference in daily operations by the new vice mayor. The Petitioner admitted that he was concerned that the document had been released in error and that the person who wrongly released a document should be disciplined. The Petitioner did not know about the document before it was released. He did not attempt to prevent the release of the document. Instead, the Petitioner sought to, after-the-fact find out why the document had been released, if the document was in fact a public record subject to release, and if the employee should be disciplined for the release. The document in question was a public record, was subject to public release, and the employee was not disciplined for its release. Nevertheless, the Petitioner did require a second (and arguably third opinion) regarding whether the document constituted a public record. In the meanwhile, the controversy within the Town over whether the document should have been released was widely discussed among Town employees. The Respondent filed his claim based upon several reports that the Petitioner wanted the secretary who released the report fired. One of the Respondent’s sources was the Chief of Police. The Respondent did not question the veracity of the police chief. At hearing, the Petitioner did not deny that discipline would have been appropriate if the release of the document were shown to be erroneous. The Petitioner acknowledged that the Town pursued a full review of the matter and that he was among those who called for the review. As to the third allegation (that the Petitioner caused his son to be hired by the Town), the Respondent believed that once the Petitioner was elected as a councilman that the son was not eligible to work for the Town. The Respondent thought that rules prohibiting nepotism applied to the Petitioner’s son and that as such the son could not continue to work for the Town. The Respondent based this interpretation on a general but un- researched idea about nepotism. He also discussed this matter with another Town employee who also thought the son was not eligible to work for the Town. In fact, the Petitioner’s son, Joseph, started working for the Town in a part-time position prior to the Petitioner being elected to office. After the Petitioner became Vice Mayor, the son continued with his duties but was moved from an independent contractor status to part-time employee status. The son then received a raise in his hourly rate of pay when the Town employees also received a raise. The Petitioner did not supervise the son’s employment and did not direct the son’s work. The record is unclear as to whether the Petitioner voted on the pay raise or not. At hearing the Respondent maintained that he had had numerous conversations with persons at the Ethics Commission who recommended that he add the information regarding the nepotism claim to his allegations. He admitted that he did not independently check any laws or rules that might pertain to nepotism before filing the claim. Much of the Respondent’s attitude and comments in connection with the Petitioner must be viewed in the context of the happenings within the Town. For unknown reasons, the Town, its employees, and the governing council were in a state of change and confrontation. The Respondent and the Petitioner apparently do not relate well to one another personally. The Respondent is suspicious of the Petitioner’s medical credentials and is uncertain as to why the Petitioner holds himself out as an “M.D.”, when he is not licensed nor is he eligible to be licensed as a medical doctor. The Petitioner believes the Respondent holds some animosity toward him for unknown reasons. Further, because the Respondent admitted he believes the Petitioner is arrogant, that belief somehow that demonstrates malice toward the Petitioner. The questions of whether the Petitioner is credentialed to be a medical doctor, whether the Petitioner attempted to interfere with the police department, or whether the Petitioner spread false rumors regarding the police department were not investigated and do not support, if true, an ethics violation. If attorney's fees and costs are entered in this cause the beneficiary of an award will be the Town. The Petitioner has incurred no expenses or costs associated with the defense of the Complaint. The Town agreed to pay and has paid all attorney's fees and costs associated with this case. The Petitioner presented several invoices from the Law Offices of Stuart R. Michelson that were alleged to pertain to the instant case. The Petitioner also presented testimony from an expert witness who was to be paid by the Town. That witness, an attorney, was to be paid $200.00 per hour for his efforts in this matter. Although the Petitioner’s expert testified that the hourly rates for fees applied in this cause were reasonable, there was no evidence that the time was actually expended in connection with the instant case. There is no way to know if the services were performed for the defense against the Respondent’s Complaint. The expert merely opined that the invoices he reviewed were reasonable. He maintained that the Petitioner should recover $27,455.53 in this matter.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Fee Petition in this case. S DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Kaye Starling, Agency Clerk Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phillip C. Claypool, General Counsel Commission on Ethics 3600 Mclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Bonnie J. Williams, Executive Director Commission on Ethics 3600 Mclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 James J. Birch, Esquire Law Office of Stuart R. Michelson 200 Southeast 13th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Robert Nieman 9731 Southwest 12th Street Pembroke Pines, Florida 33026
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate sales associate should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Martha L. Socarras is a Hispanic female born in 1970. In March 2006 Petitioner filed with the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, an application for licensure as a real estate sales associate. On that application, she answered in the affirmative question numbered 1 in the Background Information portion of the application. That question asked if she had ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty. In support of her application she submitted a certified copy of the Judgment in a Criminal Case entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on December 8, 1999. That Judgment recites that Petitioner pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to file false claims against Health and Human Services, mail fraud, and paying kickbacks. Counts 2 through 27 were dismissed by the prosecution. Petitioner was sentenced to two years in prison followed by three years of supervised probation. The Judgment also recites that the actual monetary loss was $700,000 and assessed the total amount of restitution to be paid by Petitioner as $1,114,676.04. The Judgment then provides that the amount of restitution was reduced to partial restitution in the amount of $500,000 due to Petitioner's inability to pay the full amount. The Judgment further provides that restitution to the Palmetto Government Benefits Administration was to be paid through the federal court. Petitioner was released from the Federal Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut, on January 4, 2002, but was detained by the United States Immigration & Naturalization Service. At the time of her release, she still owed $499,500 in restitution. In March 2002 an Immigration Judge granted Petitioner permanent resident status at the conclusion of the immigration removal proceeding. On January 3, 2005, Petitioner completed her probation and was discharged from supervision. Petitioner filed her application for licensure only a year later. Petitioner also provided to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation an unexecuted consent agreement between herself and the federal government providing that she would pay the $500,000 in restitution at the rate of $200 per month commencing February 1, 2005. Petitioner attributes her criminal conduct to ignorance of the Medicare laws. She was employed for three years by her brother's medical equipment business. Although Medicare performed several audits of that business during Petitioner's employment there, the last audit revealed that Petitioner and her brother were paying "commissions" to persons for referring patients to her brother's business. Petitioner asserts that she did not know that what they were doing was illegal. At the final hearing Petitioner testified that she had offered to the federal government property she owns which is sufficient in value to pay the required restitution but did not know if the federal government would accept her offer. The several letters of recommendation which Petitioner submitted to the Department are from persons who have known her as long as 18 years. None appear to know about her criminal conviction or to have noticed that she was missing for two years. One alleges the author has known Petitioner for five years, which must mean she met Petitioner while Petitioner was in prison. Similarly, the persons who testified on her behalf at the final hearing did not appear to know that she had a conviction or that she was in prison for two years. One witness testified she has known Petitioner for ten years and that she saw Petitioner three or four times a week. Another witness testified both that he has had no business dealings with Petitioner and that he transacts business with her. As evidence of rehabilitation, Petitioner offered evidence that she is a very religious person and active in ministry. However, that aspect of her life appears to have pre- existed her criminal conduct, existed during her criminal conduct, and continues to exist. It, therefore, fails to prove rehabilitation. Petitioner offered no evidence concerning her employment since her release from prison. Her witnesses offered vague testimony indicating she works in the title insurance industry, but no evidence was offered as to her role therein.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of November, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th of November, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Barnhart, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Daniel Villazon, Esquire Daniel Villazon, P.A. 1020 Verona Street Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Michael E. Murphy, Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Suite 802, North Orlando, Florida 32801 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was a member of the United State Army stationed in Korea from the Fall, 1983 until early 1984, having achieved the rank of E-5. In December, 1983 Petitioner overpurchased certain rationed items. Specifically, he purchased three months of rationed items, having accumulated allocations from prior months, although he was only authorized to utilize the ration allocation for the current month. Petitioner testified he did not know, and was not told, that unused allocations for rationed items could not be accumulated and utilized later. Petitioner plead guilty to the misdemeanor charge resulting from this overpurchase. He spent two months in confinement, was reduced in grade from E-5 to E-1, and forfeited $150 in pay for four months. As a result of his loss in grade, Petitioner understood that his pay would be reduced to that of E-1. However, upon receipt of his pay following his reduction in grade, he realized his pay had only been reduced the $150 per month he was to forfeit for four months, but had not been reduced to that of E-1. He allowed another month to go by, and when the adjustment still was not made he reported this to his commanding officer. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner was reassigned to duty within the United States, and he testified he reported the continued overpayment to his new commanding officer. A total of eight months elapsed after he was reduced in grade when he continued to receive E-5 pay. Thereafter, Petitioner was charged in December, 1984 with the misappropriation of government funds, a felony, and on February 26, 1985 he plead guilty to this charge. He was confined for six months, without pay, and given a misconduct discharge. On or about May 29, 1986 Petitioner applied for licensure as a real estate salesman in the State of Florida, and in response to Question 6 he fully disclosed his guilty pleas to the two offenses described above, the sentences imposed, and the fact that he had received a misconduct discharge. On or about September 11, 1986 Petitioner was notified on behalf of Respondent that his application for licensure would be denied based upon his answer to Question 6 and the offenses noted therein. Petitioner timely requested a hearing. Petitioner honestly disclosed his prior offenses occurring in 1983 and 1984 on his application for licensure. He offered the testimony of Andrew Carl Atkison, a friend and former business associate, in mitigation and to establish his honesty since his misconduct discharge.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to the facts alleged in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Count I of the Administrative Complaint, and to the facts alleged in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Count II, and the fact of the arrests as set forth in paragraphs 5 of Count I and Count II. The evidence indicates that Respondent applied for a Florida Real Estate Salesman's License on January 20, 1973, and thereon replied in answer to question 9, "Yes. Arrested for speeding by State Road Patrol. Do not have records. Occurrence over five years ago." On his January 15, 1975 application, Page responded to question 6, "Yes, traffic offenses." With regard to the application dated January 20, 1973, which is the subject of Count I, the evidence of arrest for traffic offenses reveals Page was arrested on April 6, 1969; October 8, 1970; and October 30, 1971. Obviously, Page could not report his arrest in January 2, 1973 on his application filed six months prior. Although Page indicated his arrest had been five years previous to his 1973 application, while in fact the last arrest had been 14 months before, the fact he reported these traffic offenses indicates that he did not seek to conceal these arrests or violate the statute. With regard to January 15, 1975 application, Page again referenced traffic offenses in response to question 6 but did not provide any information regarding any other arrests or charges. Clearly, the record of arrests for passing worthless bank checks, assault, and a family offense were not reported on either application. Page explained that these checks were issued by him during the period of a divorce and domestic turmoil and that this had resulted in the overdrafts. Each of these charges were dismissed upon restitution and payment of cost. Page did not explain the nature of the assault and battery charge, however, the record indicates it was dismissed upon nonappearance of the complaining witness. The Hearing Officer further notes that the record presented is not of an arrest but rather of an Information filed by the County Regarding the family offense, the only records introduced relative to this charge are an Information dated June 15, 1974 and the accompanying order of dismissal which indicates that the Information was improperly filed because the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the offense. The Hearing Officer finds, based on the facts relating to the traffic offenses, that the Respondent, Page, did not conceal or misrepresent these arrests. Clearly, he referred to traffic arrest or offenses on both his 1973 and 1975 applications. While his references nay have been less complete than one would desire, they evidence no intent to misrepresent or conceal the arrest and were apparently sufficient from the record presented at hearing for the Commission's staff to develop the details relevant to them. The charges relating to passing worthless bank checks were not reported on the application. Page explained the reason for these arrests at hearing, but offered no explanation of why they were not reported. The information charging Page with criminal non-support was improper from the outset as indicated in the Order of Dismissal because the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject. It is questionable whether there was an arrest, and the charge was a nullity. This "offense" was obviously related to the domestic problem which Page had had, not a criminal matter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Commission exercise its discretion and approve Pace's applications for registrant as a salesman and broker-salesman, as it were, nune pro tunc, and take no action against his registrations. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of April, 1976. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Felix, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Gordon I. Page c/o Glenn D. Gerke 513 West Central Avenue Winter Haven, Florida 33880
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, a certified law enforcement officer, failed to maintain good moral character by knowingly making a false statement in writing with the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official duties, a failure that, if proved, would warrant the imposition of discipline upon Respondent's certificate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Pablo Barrios ("Barrios") is a Florida- certified law enforcement officer and, as such, falls under the regulatory and disciplinary jurisdiction of Petitioner Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission ("Commission"). At the time of the final hearing, and at all times relevant to this case, Barrios was employed as a police officer by Florida International University ("FIU"). The events giving rise to this proceeding took place on July 17, 2003. That morning, Barrios attended an in-service training class taught by Sgt. Alfonso. There were about a dozen other FIU police officers in the class. Shortly after the class began, Barrios and Sgt. Alfonso got into an argument over Barrios's use of a digital recorder. (Sgt. Alfonso was apparently offended that Barrios would record the lecture; Barrios claimed that he was merely using the device to keep track of the time.) Sgt. Alfonso asked Barrios to leave the classroom. Barrios did leave, remarking on his way out that if he (Barrios) had intended to turn on the recording device, he would first have told everyone in the "fucking room." Barrios later returned to the classroom and sat in the back. The lesson proceeded to conclusion uneventfully. When the class ended, Capt. Wright entered the room. Someone had reported the verbal altercation between Barrios and Sgt. Alfonso, and Capt. Wright was there to find out what had happened. To that end, Capt. Wright asked each of the officers present to prepare a statement describing the incident and stating specifically whether "improper language" had been used. In response to Capt. Wright's request, Barrios wrote the following statement: I was single[d] out by Sergeant Alfonso for taking out [sic] a personal recorder out of my laptop bag. Capt. Wright considered Barrios's statement to be incomplete. He therefore wrote the following question beneath Barrios's description of the event: Lt. Barrios, was improper language ever used during the incident. Barrios answered the captain's query, in writing, with one word: "No."1 Ultimate Factual Determinations The undersigned infers (and is convinced) that Barrios knew, when presented with Capt. Wright's imprecisely drafted question regarding the use of "improper language," that this interrogatory, though ambiguous and open to interpretation, was meant to require Barrios to either admit or deny using the "f" word during the incident. The undersigned further infers (but is not convinced) that Barrios was likely aware that Capt. Wright would misinterpret Barrios's negative answer as an affirmation that no one (including Barrios) had uttered the word "fuck" or any of its cognates. The undersigned is not clearly convinced, however, that Barrios intended to mislead Capt. Wright.2 Rather, since admitting that his language had been "improper" would have been tantamount to confessing misbehavior,3 Barrios likely intended to deny having engaged in inappropriate behavior. The undersigned is also not clearly convinced that Barrios's statement was false, for two reasons. First, the undersigned is not convinced that Barrios believed his language to have been improper.4 To the contrary, the evidence persuades the undersigned that Barrios subjectively believed his words were justified. It is likely, in other words, that Barrios made what was, for him, a true statement. Second, Barrios's statement has not been clearly and convincingly falsified——that is, shown via ordinary evidence to be objectively untrue. Because the adjective "improper" reflects an opinion or judgment about something, such an opinion could be falsified only if5 (among other things) there were a clear objective standard against which to measure or judge the thing in question.6 The Commission offered no evidence regarding such an objective standard for determining that Barrios's language was improper and hence failed objectively to falsify Barrios's denial that improper language had been used.7 In sum, the Commission failed clearly and convincingly to prove, as was its burden, that Barrios made a "false statement" with the intent to mislead Capt. Wright.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Barrios not guilty of failing to maintain good moral character by knowingly making a false statement in writing with the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official duties. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 2005.
The Issue Whether the Respondent should be suspended and dismissed from her employment with the school district.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is charged by Florida law with the operation, control, and supervision of all School District employees. Respondent has been employed by the Petitioner since 1993 as a full-time school bus driver. Accordingly Respondent is classified as non-instructional school personnel. On February 1, 1991, Respondent completed an employment application with the Petitioner. Such application included a security check form. This form required Respondent to answer three specific questions regarding her criminal history. Such questions were: Have you ever received a penalty from a judge or a law enforcement agency or do you currently have charges pending as the result of an arrest? Has a penalty or conviction ever been withheld, delayed or turned over to another agency or has probation been required as the result of your being arrested? Have you ever applied for and received an expungment of an arrest? If your answer to question 1, 2, or 3 is yes, complete the following. If more space is needed, attach an additional sheet. As to each question posed, Respondent answered by checking the box "No." For the area to be completed if any answer were "Yes," Respondent wrote "N/A." Subsequent to the submittal of the application noted above, Respondent was employed part-time by the School Board. On January 4, 1993, Respondent completed a second application for employment with the School Board and again submitted a Security Check form. This second form contained the following questions: Have you ever been convicted or received a penalty (imprisonment, probation, fines, court costs, etc.) from a judge or a law enforcement agency for a crime other than minor traffic infractions? Has a penalty or conviction ever been withheld (adjudication withheld) or delayed or has probation been required as the result of your being arrested? Do you currently have charges pending as the result of an arrest? Have you ever received an expungement (charges erased) of an arrest or a pardon of a conviction? (Any sealed record should be included.) If you responded YES to any of the above questions, give details below. If more space is needed, attach an additional sheet. On the Security Check form executed in 1993, Respondent checked "Yes" and "No" for the first question; "No" to questions 2, 3, and 4; and inserted "N/A" to the portion to be completed if any answer were "YES." Shortly after completing the application, Respondent began her full-time work with the School District. On or about September 30, 1997, Chief Kelly's office received a request for investigation regarding the alleged current arrest of a school employee, Respondent. While conducting this investigation, it was verified that Respondent had a current arrest but that she also had had a previous arrest for aggravated battery. According to court records, the accuracy of which Respondent does not dispute, Respondent was arrested in 1988 for aggravated battery, pled guilty to the lesser offense of battery, and was adjudicated guilty. As a result of the plea, Respondent was placed on probation for six (6) months, was directed to pay probation costs, and was ordered to make restitution for the victim's medical bills. The investigation was completed and the foregoing findings were presented to the Respondent who was offered, by way of a disciplinary conference, an opportunity to respond to the allegations. Respondent was asked to share any mitigating or exculpatory evidence with regard to the alleged falsification of the Security Check forms. Such disciplinary conference occurred on November 10, 1997. Respondent did not deny the prior history nor offer any information to enlighten school officials as to why she had failed to disclose the criminal matter from 1988. At hearing Respondent maintained that a Public Defender had advised her at the time of the plea that the incident would not affect her employment. Respondent admitted that she recalled being on probation for the incident from 1988. Respondent did not request assistance nor seek advice regarding the forms for employment. Respondent completed high school and did not, prior to completing the Security Check form and submitting it to the Petitioner for employment purposes, indicate that she did not understand the questions posed or the information sought from Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida enter a Final Order sustaining the suspension and dismissal of the Respondent from her employment with the School District. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Joan Kowal Superintendent School District of Palm Beach County 3340 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Frank T. Brogan Commissioner of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Virginia Tanner-Otts, Esquire School District of Palm Beach County 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-302 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Lee Rosenberg, Esquire School District of Palm Beach County 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-302 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Mamie Washington Kendall, Esquire 141 South Main Street, Suite 211 Belle Glade, Florida 33430
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for certification as a certified nursing assistant (CNA) should be approved or denied.
Findings Of Fact On or about October 15, 2013, Ms. Warren submitted to Respondent an application for certification as a CNA. On or about August 15, 2014, Respondent informed Ms. Warren that her Application was being denied for two reasons. The first reason offered for denial is that Ms. Warren violated sections 464.018(1)(a) and 456.072(1)(h), Florida Statutes (2014),1/ by checking the "no" box, instead of the "yes" box, when asked about her criminal history on the Application. The second reason offered for denial is that Ms. Warren is not eligible for licensure because she did not pass the criminal background screening required by section 400.215, Florida Statutes.2/ Criminal Background Screening On March 5, 2012, Ms. Warren entered a plea of nolo contendere to a single count of "resisting an officer with violence" in violation of section 843.01, Florida Statutes. The offense occurred during calendar year 2010. Section 843.01 provides, in part, that any person found to be in violation of this section "is guilty of a felony of the third degree." According to the Order of Probation for this charge, the court withheld adjudication, and Ms. Warren was placed on probation for a period of 30 days. On April 4, 2012, the Florida Department of Corrections sent Ms. Warren a notice of "Termination of Supervision" and noted therein that "[y]ou are hereby notified that you completed your term(s) of supervision on 4/4/12 . . . and are no longer under the supervision of the Department of Corrections." Section 464.203 provides, in part, that "[t]he board shall issue a certificate to practice as a CNA to any person who demonstrates a minimum competency to read and write and successfully passes the required background screening pursuant to s. 400.215." Section 400.215 provides, in part, that "[t]he agency shall require level 2 background screening for personnel as required in s. 408.809(1)(e)," Florida Statutes. Section 408.809(1)(e) provides, in part, that individuals, like Ms. Warren, shall be subject to a level 2 background screening pursuant to chapter 435. Section 435.04(2), Florida Statutes, provides, in part, that "security background investigations under this section must ensure that no persons subject to the provisions of this section have . . . entered a plea of nolo contendere" to "[s]ection 843.01, relating to resisting arrest with violence." The preponderance of the evidence establishes that Ms. Warren failed her background screening test as a result of her plea of nolo contendere to the offense of resisting arrest with violence. Alleged Application Misrepresentation The Notice of Intent to Deny provides, in part, as follows: This matter came before the Board of Nursing at a duly-noticed public meeting on August 8, 2014, in Orlando, Florida. The applicant has applied for certification as a certified nursing assistant by examination. The applicant entered a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of resisting an officer with violence in 2012. The application includes the following question: Have you EVER been convicted of, or entered a plea of guilty, nolo contendere or no contest to, a crime in any jurisdiction other than a minor traffic offense? You must include all misdemeanors and felonies, even if adjudication was withheld. The applicant answered the question NO. It is undisputed that Ms. Warren checked the "no" box in response to the question. It is also undisputed that Ms. Warren should have checked the "yes" box in response to the question given that on March 5, 2012, she entered a plea of nolo contendere to the felony charge of resisting an officer with violence. By correspondence dated August 15, 2014, the Board informed Ms. Warren that it was the Board's intent to deny her Application because she did not truthfully answer the question about her criminal background. In response to the Notice of Intent to Deny, Ms. Warren, by correspondence dated August 21, 2014, informed Respondent of the following: To the State of Florida Board of Nursing, I Ashley Warren made a mistake and checked off the wrong box. I was reading so fast and I was not aware of what I checked off in the box. I had checked off the wrong question. If possible, can I do another application because I would love to become a CNA, and I really hate I made [a] mistake in checking the wrong box. One of the sections of the Application submitted by Ms. Warren is titled, "Initial Licensure - Individual." This section asks multiple questions with subparts. Question 1 of this section directs that if the applicant "responded 'no,' skip to #2." Even though Ms. Warren answered "no" to the question, she, nevertheless, proceeded to answer questions 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., and 1.d. Question 3 of this section directs that if the applicant responds "[n]o, do not answer 3.a." Even though Ms. Warren answered "no" to question 3, she, nevertheless, proceeded to answer question 3.a. The same pattern was repeated with respect to question 4 wherein Ms. Warren answered "no" and then disregarded the directive not to answer questions 4.a. and 4.b. The multiple errors made by Ms. Warren when completing the Application support her contention that she was rushing while completing the Application. During the formal hearing, Ms. Warren testified as follows: Q: Okay. Now, you were arrested again in 2010? A: Yes. * * * Q: And you were charged with resisting an officer with violence? A: Yes. * * * Q: Did they put you in jail? A: Yes. Q: And you went to court on that charge? A: Yes. Q: Okay. I'm looking at page 20 of the exhibit, your Honor. You had an order withholding adjudication; is that correct? A: Yes. Q: And you pled nolo contendere or no contest to that charge? A: Yes. Q: Were you put on probation? A: I was put on PYT. Q: All right. What is PYT? A: It's something like a probation that you complete and it will be off your record. * * * Q: Okay. Now, on the application the question concerning criminal history says "have you ever been convicted of or entered a plea of guilty, nolo contendere or no contest to a crime in any jurisdiction other than a minor traffic offense." What about that don't you understand? A: I really don't understand none of it. * * * Q: Yes. You testified earlier that in your 2010 charge you pled nolo contendere or no contest to resisting an officer with violence. You said that was correct. Is that correct? A: Yes. Q: So did you understand what a nolo contendere plea was in 2010? A: No. Q: Did your lawyer advise you to plead nolo contendere? A: Yes. Q: Did your lawyer explain to you what that kind of plea meant? A: No. Q: Did the judge explain to you what that kind of plea meant? A: Yes. Q: Once it was explained to you, you decided to plea nolo contendere? A: I didn't understand the question when I was reading over it. Formal hearing Transcript, pp. 17–21. Additionally, Ms. Warren also testified as follows: Q: In responding to the criminal history question, if you didn't understand it, why didn't you just leave it blank? A: Because I didn't know if I would have sent it off and leave it blank if I would have got my license, but, at the same time, when I had went through the probation office and everything, they told me that everything was going to be off my record, that I completed all my terms and everything because it was my first time on having adult charge. So I really didn't understand none of that. So I'm going by their word. So I'm thinking if I don't have it on my record, I completed it, I can put "no" on the answer. It's not on my record. Formal hearing Transcript, pp. 24-25. Ms. Warren's testimony that she believed it was proper to answer "no" to the criminal background question on the Application is credible. The fact that Ms. Warren made multiple mistakes on her Application, coupled with her genuine belief that the charge of resisting an officer with violence was no longer on her record, indicates that Ms. Warren acted honestly and did not intend to misrepresent her criminal history when completing her Application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Board of Nursing, enter a final order denying Petitioner, Ashley Q. Warren's, Application for certification as a CNA due to her failure to pass the level 2 background screening. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of February, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 2015.
The Issue Whether Respondent is guilty of having obtained a real estate license by fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2004). Whether Respondent is guilty of failure to comply with Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-2.027(2), and, therefore, is in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes (2004). At all times material, Respondent was a licensed Florida real estate sales associate, issued license number 3019284 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes (2004). Petitioner has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings for the Florida Real Estate Commission (Commission). Petitioner is authorized to prosecute administrative complaints against licensees within the Commission's jurisdiction. On or about August 6, 2001, Respondent submitted to Petitioner an application for licensure as a real estate salesperson. Respondent signed a sworn affidavit on the application which indicated that Respondent carefully read the application, answers, and the attached statements, if any, and that all such answers and statements were true, correct, and complete to his knowledge without any evasions or mental reservations. Question 9 on the application asks: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no Contest), even if adjudication was withheld: This question applies to a violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled, or pardoned. If you intend to answer "NO" because you believe those records have been expunged or sealed by court order pursuant to Section 943.058, Florida Statutes, or applicable law of another state, you are responsible for verifying the expungement or sealing to answering "NO." If you answered "Yes," attach the details including dates and outcome, including any sentence and conditions imposed, in full on a separate sheet of paper. Your answer to this question will be checked against local, state and federal records. Failure to answer this question accurately could cause denial of licensure. If you do not fully understand this question, consult with an attorney or the Division of Real Estate. Respondent marked the "Yes" box on the application in response to this question and provided insufficient or no explanation for the incidents in his criminal history. Respondent signed the "Affidavit of Applicant." Respondent's signature was duly notarized, and the application was submitted. Relying on Respondent's incomplete representations, Petitioner issued Respondent a Florida real estate salesperson's license. Petitioner subsequently performed a background check and discovered the following: In 1998, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of DUI. In 1987, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of possession of a controlled substance. In 1986, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of driving under the influence of liquor. In 1985, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of driving a motor vehicle while his license was suspended. In 1985, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of simple assault and battery. Respondent failed to include the above-mentioned adjudications on his application for licensure. Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are copies of court documents demonstrating that Respondent was adjudicated guilty in each unreported offense. Respondent testified that he failed to report the adjudications until August 20, 2003. However, Respondent's reporting of the adjudications occurred after Petitioner discovered them and prompted Respondent to explain.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order declaring Respondent has been found guilty of violating Subsection 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes (2004), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-2.027(2), and, therefore, Subsection 475.25(1)(c), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint, and suspending Respondent's license until June 30, 2005, and requiring that Respondent pay a $1,000 fine. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: James P. Harwood, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Hurston Building North Tower Suite 801N 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Michael G. Nichola, Esquire 800 North Ferncreek Avenue Orlando, Florida 32803 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Juana Watkins, Acting Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 802, North Orlando, Florida 32801
