Findings Of Fact Respondents hold license 23-3237 COP and at all times here relevant were so licensed. On 7 November, 1977, Respondent, Juan Rodriguez, sold less than five grams of marijuana to Rocco Delio, an undercover policeman, on the licensed premises. Delio paid Rodriguez $11 for the marijuana and two beers. When arrested in December 1977 on a warrant charging him with the sale of marijuana, Rodriguez had an old lottery ticket in his possession as well as a list of numbers which the arresting officers thought to be lottery numbers. Rodriguez testified that the lottery ticket was an old one he bad obtained in Puerto Rico and that he had forgotten the ticket was in his wallet. He further identified the list of numbers as measurements he had taken for a building. Rodriguez denied ever selling any lottery tickets. At his trial on the charge of possession and sale of marijuana and possession of lottery paraphernalia Rodriguez pleaded guilty, upon the advice of counsel, to unlawful sale of marijuana, and adjudication of guilt was withheld. (Exhibit 1). Rodriguez testified that he paid a $300 fine and was told by his attorney that the plea and subsequent withholding adjudication of guilt would not affect his business. At this hearing Rodriguez denied selling marijuana to the policeman who had testified to the contrary. The Petitioner's witness is deemed a much more credible witness and it was this testimony, plus the guilty plea entered in Circuit Court that resulted in the finding that Respondent possessed and sold marijuana on the licensed premises. No evidence was submitted with respect to Counts 3, 4 and 7 of the Notice to Show Cause. The admissions of Respondent with respect to the facts alleged in Counts 5 and 6 were rebutted by Respondent's testimony, which was not contradicted by Petitioner's witness, that the lottery ticket was old and that the list of numbers found on Rodriguez' person was not a list of lottery numbers.
The Issue The issue in this case concerns the application of Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes, to a claim for payment of a $5,000.00 lottery prize where the winning lottery ticket was purchased by two individuals, one of whom has a substantial court-ordered child support arrearage, one of whom does not, and the prize claim form is submitted by the individual who owes child support. The Petitioners contend that only half of the prize should be subject to the outstanding child support debt. The Respondents contend that the entire prize should be subject to the outstanding child support debt. Shortly after the filing of the request for hearing in this case, the Office of the Comptroller filed a Motion To Join Indispensable Parties, by means of which it sought to join the Department of the Lottery and the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services as parties to this case. Both of the last mentioned agencies agreed to being joined as parties and neither Petitioner objected to the joinder. Accordingly, the Department of the Lottery and the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services were joined as parties respondent. At the hearing both Petitioners testified and also offered exhibits. The Respondents presented the testimony of several witnesses and also offered several exhibits. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties were allowed ten days within which to submit proposed recommended orders. All parties filed post-hearing submissions containing proposed findings of fact. All proposed findings of fact are specifically addressed in the appendix to this recommended order.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits received in evidence at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact. Shortly after the Florida Department of the Lottery began selling lottery tickets, the two Petitioners, Lawrence R. Lindbom and Donald Johnston, began the regular practice of buying lottery tickets together. They agreed that they would make equal contributions to the cost of the lottery tickets and that they would share equally in the proceeds of any lottery prizes resulting from their co-purchased lottery tickets. On January 26, 1988, consistent with the foregoing agreement, Petitioner Lindbom purchased four instant game lottery tickets. Petitioner Johnston had contributed funds to pay half of the cost of the four tickets. Lindbom retained two of the tickets and gave the other two tickets to Johnston. At Johnston's place of employment, Lindbom scratched the two lottery tickets he had retained. One of the two was a $5,000.00 winning ticket. At the suggestion of some third party, Lindbom wrote his name on the winning ticket. He then showed the ticket to Johnston, and the other people present congratulated the two of them on their good fortune. The two Petitioners agreed that Lindbom would submit the ticket for payment in both of their names. On January 27, 1988, Lindbom traveled to the Jacksonville District Office of the Department of the Lottery, where he inquired about filling out a claim form in two names. He also inquired as to whether any money would be deducted from the prize. Upon being advised that only one name could be placed on the claim form and that no money would be deducted from the prize, Petitioner Lindbom called Petitioner Johnston to advise him of what he had been told at the Jacksonville District Office. Johnston told Lindbom to go ahead and file the claim in Lindbom's name and they would split the prize when it was received. Thereupon, Petitioner Lindbom filled out a Florida Lottery Winner Claim Form. The information he placed on the claim form included information about the lottery ticket and Lindbom's name, address, telephone number, and social security number. At the bottom of the claim form, Lindbom signed a printed statement reading as follows, in pertinent part. "Under penalty of law, I swear that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the name, address, and social security number correctly identify me as the recipient of this payment." The claim form and winning ticket were submitted to the Tallahassee office of the Department of the Lottery for validation and payment in accordance with that Department's procedures. The Department of the Lottery provided the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services a list of $5,000.00 winners which contained the name of Lawrence Lindbom. DHRS determined from its records that there was an arrearage in child support payments by Lawrence Lindbom in the amount of $12,014.65. On February 1, 1988, DHRS certified the child support arrearage to the Department of the Lottery in accordance with Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes (1987). On February 5, 1988, the Department of the Lottery forwarded the entire $5,000.00 claimed by Lindbom to the Office of the Comptroller of the State of Florida. On February 8, 1988, the Office of the Comptroller notified Lindbom by certified mail of its intention to apply the entire $5,000.00 prize toward Lindbom's unpaid court-ordered child support, with the result that no payment would be made to Lindbom. Following receipt of the letter from the Office of the Comptroller, Lindbom and Johnston jointly wrote a letter to the Comptroller protesting the proposed disposition of the prize and requesting a hearing. At all times material to this case, the Department of the Lottery had in effect Rule No. 53ER87-43, F.A.C., titled "Procedure for awarding prizes." That rule reads as follows, in pertinent part: (6) Until such time as a name is imprinted or placed upon the back portion of the lottery ticket in the designated area a lottery ticket shall be owned by the physical possessor of such ticket. When a name is placed on the rear of the ticket in the designated place, the person whose name appears in that area shall be the owner of the ticket and shall be entitled to any prize attributable thereto.
Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Office of the Comptroller issue a final order in this case providing for payment to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services of the entire $5,000.00 prize originally claimed by Petitioner Lindbom. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of June, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1176 The following are my specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Findings proposed by the Petitioners The Petitioners' proposal consisted of a letter in which they assert three specific reasons that entitle them to the relief sought. The factual aspects of those three reasons are addressed below. The legal aspects have been addressed in the conclusions of law. Reason 1. Accepted as finding of fact. Reason 2. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Reason 3. Rejected as constituting argument rather than facts. Findings proposed by the Respondents The Respondents filed a joint proposed recommended order. The paragraph references which follow are to the paragraphs of the Findings of Fact section of the Respondents' proposed recommended order. Paragraphs 1 and 2) Accepted in substance, with the exception of the implication that the Petitioners were not co- purchasers of the lottery tickets. Paragraph 3: First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as inconsistent with the evidence. Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7: Accepted. Paragraph 8: Omitted as unnecessary procedural details covered by introduction. Paragraph 9: Accepted. Paragraph 10: Accepted in substance. First unnumbered paragraph following Paragraph 10: Rejected as constituting subordinate and unnecessary details. Second unnumbered paragraph following Paragraph 10: Accepted. Third unnumbered paragraph following Paragraph 10: Rejected as irrelevant. Fourth unnumbered paragraph following Paragraph 10: Rejected as irrelevant or subordinate and unnecessary details. Fifth unnumbered paragraph following Paragraph 10: First sentence accepted. The reminder is rejected as argument rather than proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Lawrence R. Lindbom 3542 Tiara Way, West Jacksonville, Florida 32217 Mr. Donald Johnston 12888 Beaubien Road Jacksonville, Florida 32225 Jo Ann Levin, Esquire Senior Attorney Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Chriss Walker, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Thomas A. Bell, Esquire Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations herein, Respondent, Leslie G. Hessings, held Florida Alcoholic Beverage License Series Number 2-COP, License Number 60-351, for the Twilight Inn located at 121 Southwest Fifth Street, Belle Glade, Florida. The Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department, based on information received from street sources indicating the presence of narcotics on the Respondent's premises, on January 25, 1983, undertook an investigation of Respondent's operation through the use of a confidential informant subsequently identified as Samuel Colman. During the early part of the day on January 25, 1983, Sergeant Richard Browning of the Belle Glade office of the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department, conducted a formal briefing of the confidential informant, Mr. Colman, as to his duties in the impending investigation. Mr. Colman was a professional informant who had worked for the Sheriff's Department before. Consequently their briefing was primarily to tell him where to go as he was already familiar with the procedures. His person and his vehicle were thoroughly searched for drugs and found to be completely clean. He then was furnished a hidden transmitter that would permit everything he said and did to be heard by Sheriff's Department agents who would be posted nearby with a receiver. Robinson and Hallar gave Colman $20.00 in money belonging to the police department and sent him to attempt to make a purchase of a controlled narcotic in the Respondent's establishment. At all times from the instant Mr. Colman was searched and wired until such time as he entered the establishment approximately 400 or 500 feet down the street from where Robinson and Hallar were parked in their car, Colman was in their sight. They saw Colman enter the bar; heard him carry on small talk with some other individuals; and order a beer. After ordering the beer he engaged in conversation with some individual about buying reefers. It appeared to Hallar and Robinson that this individual with whom Colman spoke regarding buying marijuana was the same individual from whom he purchased the beer, the bartender but neither knew who the voice belonged to. In fact he did make a purchase in the bar and after finishing his beer, left. From the time Colman left the bar until he arrived at the car where Browning and Hallar were sitting, he again was constantly in sight. When he got to the car, he pulled from his pocket two (2) bags of what was subsequently identified by the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department Crime Lab as marijuana, and gave them to Sergeant Browning. Browning and Hallar, accompanied by Mr. Colman went back to the bar area later in the afternoon just about dusk and sent Colman back to the bar to try and buy from the owner/manager whom they knew to be Shirley Hessings. Before going in the second time, the informant was again thoroughly searched, as was his vehicle, and he was provided with police money. From the time he left the two officers until he entered the bar he was constantly in their sight. Colman was again wearing the radio transmitter and when he entered the bar the officers heard the juke box and heard Colman speak to several unidentified individuals. They also heard him speak to someone identified to them as Shirley and heard him say after leaving the bar that he bought a $8.00 bag from a black female who was identified to him as Shirley. The officers were unable to hear any of the conversation between Colman and the individual identified as Shirley because of the background noise on the tape caused by the juke box. However, when he arrived at the car where the officers were located, after being in constant sight after he left the bar until arriving at the car, he turned over to them an $8.00 bag of what was subsequently identified by the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department Crime Lab as marijuana. Samuel Colman is dead and therefore did not testify at the hearing. The testimony of both Sergeant Browning and Detective Hallar concerning what Colman told them as to the identity of the individuals from whom he purchased the marijuana is hearsay and, as such cannot, without corroboration, serve as the basis for a finding of fact. It must be concluded therefore that while there is no doubt that Colman purchased marijuana while he was in the Twilight bar on January 25, it cannot be established who he purchased it from. Based on the two (2) buys, however, the police obtained a search warrant for the premises that was used as the basis for a search conducted on January 26 or 27, 1983. When they entered the Twilight bar pursuant to the warrant, the only individual present at the time was a black female identified as Beverly Hessings. Beverly Hessings is Respondent's sister. Detective Hallar was involved in the search of the Twilight Inn on January 26. When he entered the bar he found nineteen (19) $8.00 bags of a substance, subsequently identified as marijuana, packaged for sale in the store room. The little bags were hidden from plain view and were located in a candy box lid. They were identical with those previously given him by Samuel Colman after his two (2) controlled buys. Officer Hallar left the little baggies where they were and called the evidence custodian, Sergeant Braido, who took custody of them. Officer Dowdell of the Belle Glade Police Department was also a participant in the search on January 26 or 27. During the search he found a brown paper bag containing twenty-one (21) small manila envelopes which was under a hole in the cushion on a bench which was located on the north side of the dance floor. Dowdell took the paper bag to Detective Simons who in turn immediately released it to Detective Braido. These twenty-one (21) bags, each contained a substance which was subsequently identified as marijuana. When Dowdell entered the bar he observed between ten (10) and twenty (20) patrons. The officers had the patrons stand up against the wall while the search was going on. The bar is dark even during the day time, but it is lighted on the inside, though dimly, and it is possible to see. While the search was going on a policeman was stationed at each exit and it is unlikely any of the patrons or staff were able to exit the bar from the time the search was commenced. Another participant in the search was DABT Investigator Clark Raby, who was present because of a request from the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department due to the fact the premises were licensed by Petitioner. Raby's area to search was the kitchen and laid out on a table in the kitchen he found what appeared to be several lottery tickets which he confiscated and maintained until he was able to relinquish them to the evidence custodian. These tickets, which appeared to be yellow sales slips bearing no proprietory identification - the kind of check one might get in a hardware store - had numbers printed on the bottom, but also had a series of numbers written on the check along with amounts of money written thereon. These tickets were in plain view on the table in the kitchen and Raby identifies them as bolita lottery tickets by virtue of his experience with such kinds of tickets in the past. At the close of Petitioner's case, respondent moved to dismiss the Notice To Show Cause on the basis that Petitioner had failed to establish that Respondent had a license on the dates alleged on the Notice To Show Cause. He contended that the actual license or a copy thereof was not admitted into evidence, which is true, and that the testimony of Lieutenant Smith indicated only that Respondent had a license in January, 1983. This testimony was adequate, absent a showing that Respondent held a license for less than an entire month, to establish jurisdiction and the motion was denied. Respondent also moved to dismiss on the basis that the testimony of the investigating officers as well as the sheets upon which the chemist's analysis of the substances was recorded reflected dates other than those alleged in the Notice To Show Cause as being the dates on which the offenses took place. It was obvious from an examination of the analysis sheets that they reflected, as to the individual buys, the correct date. As to the substance discovered during the search, the analysis sheet reflected January 27, which is one day later than the date listed in the Notice To Show Cause. The Notice to Show Cause reflected that the substance was on the license premises on or about January 26, which is sufficiently related in time to the evidence to support a denial of the motion to dismiss.
The Issue The ultimate issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to apply for a new quota liquor license in Hillsborough County. This requires a determination of whether Petitioner waived his right to apply for the license when he failed to do so within forty-five (45) days of a notice sent by the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, but returned undelivered.
Findings Of Fact On July 5, 1988, John Wilson Brown (Brown) filed a preliminary application for a new quota liquor license in Hillsborough County, Florida. This application entitled him to be considered in a double random selection public drawing held by the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (DABT) for the purpose of awarding licenses which have become available through population growth in a county permitting the sale of alcoholic beverages. On the application form, Brown gave his "correct mailing address" as 3327 Holly Hock Court, Orlando, Florida 32812. This is his residence, and is the only address supplied on the form. The drawing was held for Hillsborough County applicants on October 28, 1988. The Division advertises the drawings in the Florida Administrative Weekly and gives notice to the news media to run stories. Brown received a priority number in the October 28, 1988 drawing which entitled him to be one of the initial applicants for award of a liquor license. "Winners" of the drawing, like Brown, must apply for the license. Those applications are reviewed and an investigation is conducted to determine whether they qualify under the beverage law. If not, the next applicant in line is considered. In a letter dated November 8, 1988, sent certified mail, to Brown's Holly Hock Court address, DABT attempted to notify Brown that he was one of the preliminary applicants selected in the Hillsborough County drawing. The letter cited the applicable statute and rule and stated that a full and complete application must be filed within forty-five (45) days of the date on the letter, in this case, December 23, 1988. The letter further provided that failure to file within the deadline would be deemed a waiver of the right to file for the new quota license. Brown never received that letter. During the period, July 1988 through January 1989, he was working twelve to fourteen hours a day, seven days a week at two restaurant-lounges he owns in the Orange County area. He did not review his mail for weeks at a time and relied on his live-in girlfriend to pick it up. He looked at the mail at the end of the month in order to pay the bills. The postal-service attempted to deliver the certified letter on November 10, 1988, November 16, 1988 and November 23, 1988. Brown never picked up the letter from the post office and it was returned unclaimed to the DABT, on or about November 28, 1988. Brown vaguely remembers seeing the certified letter slip from the post office, but did not attempt to pick up the letter until late November or early December. By then, the letter had been returned. Brown had no idea at that time who had attempted to send him a certified letter. No further contact was attempted by the DABT until January 23, 1989, when Brown was sent, by regular mail, a notice that the Division intended to deny his entitlement to apply for the license because he failed to apply within the prescribed time period. Brown received this notice and immediately sent a response, dated January 27, 1989, that he had not been aware of the certified mail and requesting reconsideration. Brown also spoke by telephone with Barry Schoenfeld, Chief of Licensing for the Division. Brown explained that he had been extraordinarily busy and had not attempted to pick up the certified letter until it was too late. On February 10, 1989, DABT sent, by certified mail, the notice of disapproval which gave rise to this proceeding. Brown received that notice, sent also to his Holly Hock Court residence. The value of a new quota liquor license varies from county to county. In Hillsborough County it is worth $50,000.00 to $75,000.00, or more. The agency utilizes certified mail for its notice of drawing results to help assure that the applicant actually gets the notice. Only one application extension has been granted in the seven years since the drawing procedure was initiated. That case involved an individual who was in the military and presented a hardship based on that service. The individual was given an additional forty-five (45) days to apply.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco issue its final order finding that Petitioner has waived his entitlement to file for a new quota liquor license. DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: HAROLD F. X. PURNELL, ESQUIRE OERTEL, HOFFMAN, FERNANDEZ & COLE, P.A. 2700 BLAIR STONE ROAD POST OFFICE BOX 6507 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32314-6507 JOHN B. FRETWELL, ESQUIRE ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION THE JOHNS BUILDING 725 SOUTH BRONOUGH STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-1000 LEONARD IVEY, DIRECTOR DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION THE JOHNS BUILDING 725 SOUTH BRONOUGH STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-1000 JOSEPH A. SOLE, ESQUIRE GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION THE JOHNS BUILDING 725 SOUTH BRONOUGH STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-1000 STEPHEN R. MACNAMARA, SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION THE JOHNS BUILDING 725 SOUTH BRONOUGH STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-1000
The Issue The issue in this case in whether Petitioner, Italian Club Canteen ("Petitioner" or "Italian Club Canteen"), remains eligible to apply for a new quota liquor license in Hillsborough County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Italian Club Canteen, formerly was incorporated under the name, Italian Club Canteen, Inc. That corporation was established in 1976 and was administratively dissolved in 1997. Even though Petitioner's corporation was dissolved, it still could have been eligible to apply for the quota license it seeks.1 The parties stipulated that Petitioner has standing in this case. The Division is the agency vested with general regulatory authority over the alcoholic beverage industry within the state, including the issuance of quota licenses through double random selection drawing. See § 561.19(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). On March 15, 1990, the Division held a double random quota lottery drawing for new quota liquor licenses in Hillsborough County, Florida. Petitioner filed a preliminary application for a quota license with the Division on December 12, 1989. This application entitled Petitioner to be considered in the 1990 random selection public drawing held by the Division. The preliminary application filed by Petitioner listed the applicant as "The Italian Club Canteen, Inc." Petitioner was not the initial successful applicant in the 1990 quota drawing but was an alternate applicant. Alternate applicants become eligible to apply for a new quota license in the event one or more of the prior successful applicants in the drawing fail to qualify for a new quota liquor license. The Division notified the original winners in the 1990 quota drawing within a few days of the drawing. However, not all of the original winners ultimately were issued licenses, due to their failure to submit applications or the Division's disapproving the applications. After original winners in the drawing were deemed disapproved for licenses, the Division subsequently began notifying alternate applicants of their entitlement to apply for the new quota licensed. However, there was a significant delay in such notification being provided.2 On August 8, 2005, the Division sent to the Petitioner, by certified mail, a Notice of Selection letter ("Notice of Selection"), attempting to notify Petitioner of its standing as an alternate applicant. The Notice of Selection stated that, pursuant to Subsection 561.19(2), Florida Statutes (2004), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61A-5.0105, Petitioner "must file a full and complete application for issuance of the license within 45 days of this letter." The Notice of Selection also provided that failure to file a complete application within the 45-day period would be deemed as a waiver of Petitioner's right to file for a new quota license. The Notice of Selection, dated August 8, 2005, was mailed to the same address, a post office box, that was on Petitioner’s preliminary application. The address listed by Petitioner on its preliminary application form is shared with several other businesses, including the Italian Club of Tampa. Arnold Vaske signed the certification card for the Notice of Selection, dated August 8, 2005, and, presumably, received the notice. Mr. Vaske is not nor has he ever been an employee, officer, or otherwise connected with Petitioner. Mr. Vaske picked up the mail from the post office box at the request of Sal Guagiardo, president of the Italian Club of Tampa. It is unclear what happened to the Notice of Selection sent to Italian Club Canteen, Inc., after Mr. Vaske signed for and picked up the notice. However, typically, the mail is put on Mr. Guagiardo's desk and is sorted by Mr. Guagiardo or his secretary. Prior to the dissolution of the Italian Canteen Club, Inc., an officer of the Italian Club Canteen or the club administrator picked up the mail for the corporation. However, there is no indication that any officer, director, or anyone else associated with Petitioner made any arrangements as to how mail addressed to "Italian Club Canteen, Inc.," and sent to the post office box was to be handled. After the corporation was dissolved, mail addressed to "Italian Club Canteen, Inc.," and sent to the post office box was usually considered "solicitation" or "junk mail" and "probably" stayed on Mr. Guagiardo's desk longer than other mail. Petitioner never received the Notice of Selection letter that was mailed by the Division on August 8, 2005. Therefore, Petitioner did not respond within the 45-day statutory deadline. After Petitioner failed to file an application within the 45-day deadline, on October 31, 2005, the Division sent Petitioner, by certified mail, a Final Warning Notice (Final Warning). The Final Warning provided that the Division intended to deny Petitioner's entitlement to apply for a new quota license in Hillsborough County. The Final Warning also advised Petitioner that it had until November 10, 2005, to respond with additional information as to why the Division should not deny Petitioner's entitlement to a new quota license. The Final Warning was sent to the address listed in Petitioner's initial application. Mr. Vaske signed the certification card, indicating that he picked up the Final Warning. Petitioner received and timely responded to the Division's Final Warning. By letter dated November 10, 2005, Petitioner requested an extension of time in which to file an application for a quota license. According to the letter, Petitioner did not receive the notice of its entitlement to apply for the new quota license for more than 15 years. The letter further provided that during this time period, "personnel changes have naturally occurred with the original applicant" and "the person who signed for the Division's Notice of Selection . . . is not an officer of the applicant who was wholly unaware of the matter, including the application filed more than 15 years previously." The Division is authorized to grant an extension of time, if it finds there is "good cause" and "no negligence" on the part of the person or entity seeking the extension. The Division reviewed Petitioner's request for an extension of time to apply for the new quota license, but found that there was not good cause to grant the request. The Division denied Petitioner's request for an extension of time to apply for a quota license after it determined (1) that the Notice of Selection was mailed to the address listed on Petitioner's preliminary application and (2) that someone signed the certification card, thereby indicating that someone at that address had picked up the letter. Based on the foregoing, the Division reasonably concluded that Petitioner received the Notice of Selection and simply neglected to file the application. Petitioner makes three assertions as to why it should be granted an extension of time in which to file its application. First, it claims that it never received the Notice of Selection. Second, Petitioner asserts in August 2005, when the Notice of Selection was mailed, none of the current officers of the Italian Club of Tampa, the entity which shared the post office box with Petitioner, knew Petitioner was an applicant in the 1990 drawing. Thus, even though the Division's envelope in which the Notice of Selection was sent had the word, "quota," written on it, this information would not put any officer of the Italian Club of Tampa on notice of the content of the information in the envelope. Third, Petitioner asserts that at the time Petitioner's corporation dissolved in 1997, it had no reason to expect that a new quota license from the 1990 drawing was still available for issuance. Petitioner's assertions, even if true, do not constitute good cause for granting an extension. Petitioner took no action when it dissolved the corporation to determine if a new quota license from the 1990 drawing was still available. Rather, because seven years had lapsed between the drawing and the time the corporation dissolved, it merely assumed that no license from that drawing was available. Based on that erroneous assumption, in 1997 when Petitioner's corporation was dissolved, none of the officers or any one associated with Italian Club Canteen checked with the Division to determine if there were licenses from the 1990 quota drawing still available for issuance. Petitioner's corporate representative testified that if the Division had addressed the Notice of Selection to the attention of a specific individual associated with the corporation, and not simply to "Italian Club Canteen, Inc.," it would have been more likely that Petitioner would have received the notice. Notwithstanding this claim, Petitioner never notified the Division that the corporation was dissolved or that the Division should address any correspondence to the "Italian Club Canteen, Inc.," to the attention of a specifically named individual associated with the corporation. Petitioner failed to show that it had good cause and no negligence for failing to timely submit the application for the quota license. Therefore, the Division properly denied Petitioner's request for an extension.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, issue a final order denying Petitioner’s request for an extension of time to file an application for a quota liquor license. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 2006.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent set up, promoted or conducted a lottery for money or other thing of value in violation of Section 849.09, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On August 26, 1998, the Respondent, Personal Investments, Inc., d/b/a Personal Investments (Respondent) held license no. 77-00008, Series 2-COP, authorizing it to sell alcoholic beverages. On that date Mr. Stockton Hess was a corporate officer (Vice President). Mr. Hess was also a corporate officer of the Washington County Kennel Club, Inc. (WCKC) on the above date (President). The Respondent is a business regulated by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (Division) because it sells alcohol. The Washington County Kennel Club (Club) is regulated by the same Department's Division of Pari-mutuel Wagering, because it operates a pari-mutuel wagering facility at the Ebro Greyhound Park Dog Track. The Ebro Greyhound Park is owned and operated by the Club. The Club is in the business of selling pari-mutuel tickets, programs and tip sheets. Personal Investments, Inc., sold alcohol at its concession stands and in the lounge and restaurant at Ebro Greyhound Park, located in Ebro, Washington County, Florida. The Respondent served as concessionaire for food and beverage services through its contract with the Club. The Club has held its pari-mutuel wagering permit and annual pari-mutuel licenses continuously for some forty years. They authorize greyhound racing operations at the Ebro track facility. On August 26, 1998, the Club conducted a game promotion at its greyhound track in which any person entering the facility, regardless of whether he or she paid an admission fee, was provided a split-ticket free of charge. One half of the ticket went into a drum located by the entrance way and the other half of the ticket was retained by the patron. Located next to the drum, and on the Club premises, was a wheel which contained representations of prizes such as t-shirts, magnets, key chains and so forth. Subsequent to the tenth race a Club employee, the front gate hostess, would draw a ticket and another employee, the track announcer, would announce the number drawn. The patron holding the other half of the selected ticket would then present himself to the front gate hostess to verify the number. The patron would then spin the wheel and win whatever prize was reflected at the point where the wheel stopped. The Club bought the wheel, paid for the prizes and its employees operated the game in question. Mr. Hess, an officer of both the Club and the Respondent corporation had knowledge of and intentionally participated in the running of the above-described game. On August 26, 1998, a drawing was conducted after the tenth, twelfth and thirteenth races. No patron responded to the number called out following the tenth race, but patrons responded after their announced numbers were called after the twelfth and thirteenth races. Each of those patrons presented a ticket, spun the wheel, and each won a T-shirt. The Division offered no evidence and was unaware, on August 26, 1998, or thereafter, including at hearing, whether those patrons entered the dog track premises by paying an admission ticket price. On August 26, 1998, three hundred ninety-one patrons attended the track. Two hundred eighty-eight of those patrons or approximately 75% attended the track for free, utilizing free passes made widely available by the Club throughout its market area. On a typical racing day or night in excess of 60% to 70% of the patrons entering the Ebro Greyhound Track facility enter utilizing such free passes, the availability of which is a matter of fairly common knowledge in the track's market area. In accordance with the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering requirements, the Club maintains a separate turnstile for patrons entering daily with free passes from those paying an admission fee. Respondent's Exhibit B in evidence is a daily report, submitted to the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, of patrons entering for free as opposed to those who paid an admission fee, including the report for August 26, 1998. It was further the Club's policy that any patron who asks for a free pass at the cashier's window is given one and permitted to enter the track premises free. On August 26, 1998, Division Agent Lee went to the Ebro Greyhound Track, paid a $2.00 admission fee, and used his split- ticket to enter the game promotion. He observed the two patrons who had each won a T-shirt following the twelfth and thirteenth races. He made no attempt to obtain a free admission nor did he inquire as to whether the two patrons who won T-shirts had entered for free. Agent Lee testified that he was unaware at the time he visited the greyhound track on that date that the Club owned the track and conducted the Pari-Mutuel Wagering permit and license, despite the fact that the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, a part of the same department, as the Division, was the source of the request to review the game promotion. Agent Lee thought that the Respondent, Personal Investments, Inc., was conducting the game promotion. In fact, that was not the case, the game promotion was conducted solely by the Club and its employees. Agent Lee testified that on August 26, 1998, as well as on the date of hearing, he had no knowledge or evidence that any agent, servant or employee of the Respondent had set up, promoted or conducted the game promotion or a lottery for money or "other thing of value." Agent Lee also testified that on August 26, 1998, and on the date of the hearing, he had no knowledge or evidence to offer to the effect that Personal Investments, Inc., or its agents, servants or employees attempted to operate, conduct or advertise any lottery scheme or device. Agent Lee was unaware of Division Training Bulletin 93-18 concerning game promotions. This was a memorandum to all District Supervisors of each district office of the Division noting that Section 849.094, Florida Statutes, authorizes game promotions in which the patron must be present to win, provided that the game promotion does not require an entry fee, payment or proof of purchase as a condition for entering the game promotion. Tickets to enter the game promotion are given away without charge by the Club to any patron attending the facility. It is the Division's apparent position that, since Agent Lee paid a $2.00 admission fee to the track and thereafter received his game promotion ticket, that such admission fee constitutes a fee, payment or proof of purchase required as a condition precedent to entering into the subject game promotion. Since almost 75% of the patrons attending the track on the date in question entered free, and since every person entering the track on that date received, without charge, a game promotion ticket, the game promotion ticket cannot be determined to have, as a condition precedent, any fee, payment or proof of purchase as a condition for entry into the game promotion. The "Bud Bowl '99 Sweepstakes" is a common type of game promotion used as an exemplar by the Respondent, the rules of which are depicted in Respondent's Exhibit C, in evidence. That game promotion is approved by the Florida Department of State pursuant to its authority in Section 849.094, Florida Statutes. It is a game promotion in which some but not all participants in fact pay a purchase price and, as part of the purchase, receive a game promotion ticket or piece. The rules of the game contained in Respondent's Exhibit C, reflect that of the 4,429,350, entry forms made available, approximately half are contained within specially marked packages of Anheuser-Busch beer products, which can only be obtained through purchases at stores holding alcoholic beverage licenses. However, one may also enter the "Bud Bowl '99" contest without a purchase and thus in accordance with Section 849.094(2)(e), Florida Statutes, the game promotion does not require, as a condition of entry into it, a fee, payment or proof of purchase. The Ebro game promotion did not award prizes greater than $5,000.00. Thus, unlike the "Bud Bowl '99" game promotion, it did not have to meet applicable requirements for a game promotion offering prizes in excess of such value, including registration with the Florida Secretary of State. It did, however, share the same common requirements as the "Bud Bowl '99" promotion, which is that any entry fee, payment or proof of purchase as a condition of entering the game promotion was not required. Mr. Hess, who testified at hearing for the Respondent, paid $7.48 for a twelve-pack of Anheuser-Busch beer, which contained a "Bud Bowl '99" sweepstakes game promotion ticket therein. He did so without that game promotion being in violation of Section 849.094, Florida Statutes, as determined by the Secretary of State in registration of that promotion. Similarly, Agenct Lee paid $2.00 to enter the Ebro Greyhound Track, and in doing so acquired no more or no less right and opportunity to participate in the Ebro game promotion than did the majority of patrons who entered without having to pay an admission fee. The rules of the "Bud Bowl '99" sweepstakes game promotion submitted to or approved by the Department of State clearly reflect that approximately 50% of entry fees would be contained within Anheuser-Busch product packages which can only be obtained by purchase. The remaining 50% of the entries were made available without a purchase requirement.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the pleadings and argument of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco enter a final order dismissing the amended administrative action against Personal Investments, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire 210 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Bart Schneider, Esquire Department of Business and Profession Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Deborah R. Miller, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages And Tobacco Department of Business and Profession Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Lynda Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Profession Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that respondent, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, enter a final order in this case denying the application of Petitioner, Lee County Liquors, Inc. for a quota alcoholic beverage license. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of August, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 1985.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner should revoke or suspend the Respondent's pari-mutuel occupational license for allegedly gambling out of his teller box in violation of F.A.C. Rules 61D-1.031(6) and 61D-1.002(18).
Findings Of Fact On or about July 6, 1994, the Respondent, Edward J. Tomczak, applied for a pari-mutuel occupational license as a teller at Tampa Jai Alai. According to the evidence, a one-year Unrestricted "M2" General license, number 0208239-1084, was issued to the Respondent, and the license is scheduled to expire on June 30, 1995. In the course of working as a teller at Tampa Jai Alai on the evening of August 29, 1994, the Respondent issued himself at least $1,427 of tickets for which he made no payment. In effect, he "borrowed" and used the fronton's money, against fronton policy, to gamble on his own account. As a result of his gambling, the Respondent was $1,427 "short" at the end of the evening. After closing out for the evening, the Respondent reported the $1,427 "short" to his supervisor. The Respondent explained that he was trying to win enough money to pay the claim of a woman whose winning December, 1992, Twin Trifecta ticket was cashed by the Respondent on August 11, 1993, after allegedly being found in the ladies room at Tampa Jai Alai by the Respondent's girlfriend. Notwithstanding the Respondent's attempt to explain his conduct of the previous evening, it was clearly understood between him and his supervisor that the Respondent's conduct on August 29, 1994, was a firing offense and that the Respondent no longer would be permitted to work as a teller at Tampa Jai Alai. (It was not the first time the Respondent reported a substantial "short" that summer. A previous "short" was in the neighborhood of $600-$700.) The next day, the Respondent cashed out his retirement account, repaid Tampa Jai Alai the $1,427 owed, and left. Whether he quit or was fired is unimportant to the issues in this case. A small "short" by a teller is not a firing offense at Tampa Jai Alai. There are many ways in which honest errors in the course of an evening can result in minor (less than $100) "shorts." Tampa Jai Alai's policy is that tellers must repay "shorts" and that "shorts" over $100 must be repaid before the teller can work again at the fronton. But "shorts" of the magnitude of $600-$700, much less $1,427, are considered highly unusual and are cause for concern that they are not the result of honest mistakes but rather of prohibited gambling "out of the box," as the Respondent was doing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, enter a final order: (1) imposing a $500 fine on the Respondent, Edward J. Tomczak; (2) revoking his license; and (3) declaring him ineligible for relicensure for a period of one year, with relicensure conditioned upon certification by a Florida licensed mental health practitioner that he has been evaluated for possible gambling addiction and either has been found not to be addicted or is being treated for such an addiction. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph M. Helton, Jr. Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Edward J. Tomczak 6401 S. Westshore Blvd., Apt. 716 Tampa, Florida 33616 Royal H. Logan Acting Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
