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BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL LAND SURVEYORS vs JOHN WILLIAM RENNER, 96-000391 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Jan. 22, 1996 Number: 96-000391 Latest Update: Jun. 30, 1997

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the administrative complaint, and, if so, what action should be taken.

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, John William Renner (Respondent) was licensed as a land surveyor in the State of Florida, having been issued license number LS 0004739. Respondent has been a licensed land surveyor since July 13, 1989. The minimum technical standards for surveys are set forth in Rule 21HH- 6, Florida Administrative Code, (Rule) of the Board of Professional Surveyors and Mappers (Petitioner). The Rule sets forth minimum standards which are expected and required of all surveyors. No deviation from the required minimum standards are permitted. A surveyor must first satisfy the minimum technical standards before applying community standards of local custom to a survey. On or about March 30, 1992, Respondent performed a survey of a lot described as: Lot 13, Block 1, Plat I of Sky Lake, according to the plat recorded in Plat Book 39, Pages 133-134, as recorded in the public records of Palm Beach County, Florida. Different surveyors, examining Respondent's survey, would have differing opinions regarding his survey. However, no deviation from the required minimum technical standards is permitted. As part of Petitioner's investigation of Respondent's alleged violations of the Rule, Petitioner requested a copy of the original survey. Respondent had misplaced the original and never complied with Petitioner's request. Petitioner obtained the original survey from the title company. The survey was certified by Respondent with his signature and seal. It is undisputed that Respondent's product is a boundary survey. However, he failed to state on the survey the type of survey that the certified drawing represents. The subdivision in which the Lot is located is platted. The boundary survey plats the Lot. Since the filing of the administrative complaint against him, Respondent has become aware that his surveys must identify the type of survey that his certified drawings represent. Respondent made field notes during the preparation of the survey. Field notes are records of observations and measurements made in the field and support the survey. Also, as part of its investigation, Petitioner requested a copy of Respondent's field notes which contained the measurements that he had made in the field. Respondent could not locate his field notes and was, therefore, unable to produce them; but agreed to produce the field notes when he located them. Respondent failed to maintain his field notes. Prior to hearing, through discovery, Respondent informed Petitioner that he had located his field notes but again failed to produce them to Petitioner. Finally, at hearing, approximately two years after Petitioner's investigative request, Respondent produced his field notes. Respondent's boundary survey provides, among other things, that the "Bearings Are Based On Plat." The plat is not a line; it is a document. Respondent failed to provide the well-established line upon which the bearings are based. Groups of lots within a platted subdivision are controlled by permanent control points (PCP) and permanent reference markers (PRM). The PRMs define the boundaries of a subdivision. The distance between the PCPs is referred to as a record distance which is shown on the subdivision plat of record. After a surveyor locates the PCPs and the PRMs, the surveyor measures the distance from PCP to PCP and from PRM to PRM. The measured distance in the field is compared with the recorded distance. Rarely are the recorded distance and the measured distance the same. In a discrepancy, with the acceptable margin of error, each lot between the PCPs receives its proportionate share of the measurement. Respondent's field notes indicate that he measured from PCP to PCP. However, there is no indication on the survey that he made the measurement. Respondent failed to show on the survey drawing the discrepancy between the recorded distance and the measured distance in the field. The discrepancy is four-hundreths of a foot, which is not significant in and of itself, but is important because the discrepancy adds more that 600 feet to the PCP. The plat of the subdivision indicates a 180 foot wide canal right of way along the west property line of the Lot. It is undisputed that Respondent failed to show the canal right of way on his survey drawing. Respondent's survey drawing indicates a fence along the north property line of the Lot. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that Respondent's dimensions are inadequate and insufficient to show the distance from the fence to the property line, i.e., the proximity of the fence to the property line. Also, Respondent's survey drawing shows three squares drawn along the south side of the residence on the Lot, showing concrete improvements. Even though Respondent's field notes indicate measurements for the squares, his survey drawing fails to identify the squares, as to what they represent, and fails to show their dimensions. As a result, no determination can be made as to whether the concrete improvements may affect property value. A surveyor is given some latitude as to whether a concrete improvement is fixed and pertinent to the survey, and, therefore, deference is given to the surveyor's judgment. Respondent's survey drawing indicates that the concrete improvements are not fixed and not pertinent to the survey. Appearing on Respondent's survey drawing are the three abbreviations BM, C. B. S., and CL, with the C and L intersecting. These abbreviations are not generally used by the public. BM and C. B. S. are not shown in the legend. Even though the abbreviation CL is in the legend, the C and L are not intersecting. A finding is made that the abbreviation CL, with the C and L intersecting, is not included in the survey's legend. Respondent's survey indicates the basis for elevations, referencing that "Elevations Based on County BM CL Old Boynton", with the C and L intersecting. BM is the abbreviation for benchmark. The survey did not describe the benchmark, identify the county or provide the published elevation. Referenced elevations must be based on an established benchmark. If a benchmark is referenced, its description should be sufficient to locate the benchmark and use it. Respondent's benchmark description fails to provide a basis for locating the benchmark or determining its elevation. In June 1992, after attending a minimum technical standards seminar, Respondent responded to allegations made by a Mr. Dennis Painter regarding the survey. 1/ In his response, Respondent agreed with some of the allegations, and, as a result, Respondent indicated that he made the appropriate revisions to the survey. No evidence was presented at hearing regarding the nature of Mr. Painter's allegations, so there was no opportunity to examine Respondent's responses as they relate to the allegations made.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Professional Surveyors and Mappers enter a final order: Reprimanding Respondent; Imposing a $500 administrative fine; and Placing Respondent on probation for one (1) year under terms and conditions deemed appropriate by the Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 1997.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57472.033
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MICHAEL RICHARDS vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD, 01-000791 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Feb. 27, 2001 Number: 01-000791 Latest Update: Nov. 05, 2019

The Issue Whether Petitioner's challenge to the failing grade he received on the contract administration portion of the October 2000 General Contractor Examination should be sustained.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner sat for the contract administration portion of the Florida certification examination for general contractors administered in October 2000 (Contract Administration Examination). The Contract Administration Examination consisted of 60 multiple-choice questions of equal value, worth a total of 100 points. To attain a passing score on the Contract Administration Examination, candidates needed to receive a total of 70 points. Of the 378 candidates who took the Contract Administration Examination, 156 received passing scores. Petitioner was not among this group of successful candidates. He received a failing score of 66.67 on the examination. Question 2 of the Contract Administration Examination was a clear and unambiguous multiple-choice question that required the candidate to determine, based upon the information given, on what workday (not calendar day) the pouring of concrete footings for a residential construction project would begin. There was only one correct answer to this question. Approximately 50 percent of the candidates chose this correct response. Petitioner chose another answer that was clearly incorrect because it represented the calendar day (not the workday) on which the pouring would begin. He therefore appropriately received no credit for his answer. Question 9 of the Contract Administration Examination was a clear and unambiguous multiple-choice question that fairly tested the candidate's knowledge of the requirements of Section 489.113(3), Florida Statutes, which provides as follows: A contractor shall subcontract all electrical, mechanical, plumbing, roofing, sheet metal, swimming pool, and air- conditioning work, unless such contractor holds a state certificate or registration in the respective trade category, however: A general, building, or residential contractor, except as otherwise provided in this part, shall be responsible for any construction or alteration of a structural component of a building or structure, and any certified general contractor or certified underground utility and excavation contractor may perform clearing and grubbing, grading, excavation, and other site work for any construction project in the state. Any certified building contractor or certified residential contractor may perform clearing and grubbing, grading, excavation, and other site work for any construction project in this state, limited to the lot on which any specific building is located. A general, building, or residential contractor shall not be required to subcontract the installation, or repair made under warranty, of wood shingles, wood shakes, or asphalt or fiberglass shingle roofing materials on a new building of his or her own construction. A general contractor shall not be required to subcontract structural swimming pool work. A general contractor, on new site development work, site redevelopment work, mobile home parks, and commercial properties, shall not be required to subcontract the construction of the main sanitary sewer collection system, the storm collection system, and the water distribution system, not including the continuation of utility lines from the mains to the buildings. A general contractor shall not be required to subcontract the continuation of utility lines from the mains in mobile home parks, and such continuations are to be considered a part of the main sewer collection and main water distribution systems. A solar contractor shall not be required to subcontract minor, as defined by board rule, electrical, mechanical, plumbing, or roofing work so long as that work is within the scope of the license held by the solar contractor and where such work exclusively pertains to the installation of residential solar energy equipment as defined by rules of the board adopted in conjunction with the Electrical Contracting Licensing Board. No general, building, or residential contractor certified after 1973 shall act as, hold himself or herself out to be, or advertise himself or herself to be a roofing contractor unless he or she is certified or registered as a roofing contractor. There was only one correct answer to this question. Approximately 65 percent of the candidates chose this correct response. Petitioner chose another answer that was clearly incorrect inasmuch as a newly licensed general contractor is not free, pursuant to Section 489.113(3)(b), Florida Statutes, to install or repair wood shake roofs on existing buildings constructed by other contractors. Petitioner therefore appropriately received no credit for his answer. Question 29 of the Contract Administration Examination was a clear and unambiguous multiple-choice question that fairly tested the candidate's ability to calculate, based upon the information given, the cost of delivering 28,000 lineal feet of #5 bars of reinforcing steel. There was only one correct answer to this question . Approximately 67 percent of the candidates chose this correct response. Petitioner chose another answer that was clearly incorrect. He therefore appropriately received no credit for his answer. Question 38 of the Contract Administration Examination was a clear and unambiguous multiple-choice question that fairly tested the candidate's ability to distinguish between unit price contracts and other types of contracts, including lump sum contracts. Approximately 82 percent of the candidates chose this correct response. Petitioner chose another answer that was clearly incorrect. He therefore appropriately received no credit for his answer.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered rejecting Petitioner's challenge to the failing score he received on the contract administration portion of the October 2000 certification examination for general contractors. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Richards 3802 Lakewood Road Lake Worth, Florida 33461 Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Kathleen O'Dowd, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 7960 Arlington Expressway, Suite 300 Jacksonville, Florida 32211-7467 Hardy L. Roberts III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.68455.217489.111489.113 Florida Administrative Code (3) 61-11.01261-11.01761G4-16.001
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BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL LAND SURVEYORS vs. WALTER L. MOYER, 87-002539 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-002539 Latest Update: Dec. 03, 1987

The Issue The issues for determination are whether, as alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, Walter L. Moyer, violated Section 472.033(1)(g) and (h) F.S. and Rule 21 HH-2.01(3) by performing a land survey in a negligent or incompetent manner, without due care and without due regard for acceptable professional standards, and violated Section 472.033(1)(e), (g) and (h) F.S., and Rule 21HH- 2.01(3) and (5) FAC, by providing a false or deliberately inaccurate survey sketch to a client on two separate occasions.

Findings Of Fact Walter L. Moyer has been licensed by the State of Florida as a registered surveyor from approximately August 1977 until present, and holds license number LS 0002828. His address for license purposes is Palm Bay, Florida, in Brevard County. His practice as a surveyor has been primarily in construction-related surveys and lot surveys, with very few parcel surveys. THE CHILCOTT SURVEY (COUNT I) In June 1984, Charles and Robin Chilcott purchased property on Grant Road, in Brevard County, consisting of approximately 1.44 acres of undeveloped land. The Chilcotts acquired the parcel with the intent to construct a home and keep their horses. Shortly after purchase, the Chilcotts retained Moyer to prepare a boundary survey of the parcel. The cost of the survey was $315.00 including $7.50 extra cost for two concrete monuments, rather than iron rods, at the front corners, as requested by the Chilcotts. The survey was performed on July 27, 1984, and Moyer was paid. He furnished the Chilcotts several sketches of survey which he had signed and sealed. In 1985, the Chilcotts hired a contractor, Casey Jones, and commenced building their house. At the request of Casey Jones, Moyer prepared both the foundation and final surveys. These two surveys were added to the boundary survey on September 26, 1985, and November 23, 1985, respectively. At the time that the field work on the foundation and final survey was done, Moyer detected no problems with the monumentation he had initially set in the boundary survey. He did not see any evidence that the monuments had been disturbed. The final survey shows the house to be 17.35 feet inside the east lot line. The Chilcotts wanted at least that distance because the area is zoned agricultural and they did not want the neighbor's livestock close to the house. They also understood that the county required a minimum 10-foot set-back. In connection with the construction of their home, and in reliance upon Moyer's survey identifying their property's boundary, the Chilcotts installed a well and a fence and had approximately 800 feet of sod planted along the east boundary. The Chilcotts have since learned that those improvements are not on their property and that their house is, in fact, only 7.25 feet from the lot line. In May, 1986, David Rothery, a Florida licensed land surveyor, performed a boundary survey of the Donald Waterbury parcel adjacent to and just east of Chilcott's land on Grant Road. Rothery checked and double-checked his field measurements and still found a ten foot discrepancy in the placement of the monuments on the eastern corners of the Chilcott parcel. Those monuments were ten feet too far to the east and were, therefore, placed ten feet within the Waterbury boundaries. He did not observe any indication that the monuments had been moved, and when he placed his corners for the proper boundaries, he found no evidence that monuments had ever been there before. As required, the monuments placed by Moyer had his identification on them. Rothery put a dotted line on his survey with the notation, "Apparent survey error on adjoining property by Walter Moyer Land Surveying". Rothery also called Moyer and told him about the discrepancy. On the morning of May 10, 1986, Moyer went back out to the Chilcott property and discovered that his monuments were ten feet too far to the east. He was in the process of moving them when he was confronted by Charles Chilcott. He told Chilcott that an error was made, that he "dropped ten feet". There was some discussion about possible remedies such as paying for the well and fence to be moved or buying the ten feet from Waterbury. Chilcott did not let Moyer finish moving the monuments. That night, Chilcott, who had never met Moyer before, but had only communicated by phone or in writing, called Moyer's house and confirmed that it was the same person he had seen moving the monuments. That was the last time Chilcott spoke with Moyer. Chilcott called Moyer's house several times over the following months, but always reached Mrs. Moyer and his phone calls were not returned. Moyer did contact Waterbury about purchasing the ten foot strip. Waterbury was concerned about how this would affect his eventual ability to build on his lot and refused to sell. Waterbury is not pressing the Chilcotts about their encroachments; he simply expects to have the matter resolved sometime in the future. By a letter dated 8/18/86, the Chilcotts requested damages of $2,500.00 from Moyer, including an estimate of costs to move the well, fence and a power pole and to replace sod. On September 13, 1986, another letter from Chilcott to Moyer listed the same plus additional damages, for a total demand of $4,025.00. In a letter to Chilcott dated August 27, 1987, Moyer offered to pay the application fee to seek a variance from the setback requirement and offered to provide a final survey and half the cost of moving the well. The letter denied that the problem was Moyer's fault and said that Moyer believes that the markers were moved between the date the survey was completed and the date of the foundation. The Chilcotts rejected that offer. No evidence in this proceeding supports Moyer's contention that the Chilcotts or someone else moved the monuments he originally set in 1984. The evidence does establish a strong circumstantial basis for finding that the monuments were not moved, but were incorrectly placed by Moyer at the time that the boundary survey was completed. Setting the monuments properly is an essential component of conducting a boundary survey. Moreover, when a subsequent final survey is done, it is the duty of the surveyor to assure that the original monuments have not been disturbed during construction and site work by a contractor. Assuming that Moyer is correct in his contention that the monuments were moved after they were set by him, but before the foundation was placed, it was his duty to discover that fact. He did not, since his final survey shows that the house is 17.35 feet from the boundary, whereas the house is, in fact, approximately seven feet from the adjoining property. Except when witness monuments are used, as when a tree or other obstruction sits on a boundary corner, it is a violation of standard surveying practice to place a monument other than where it is shown on the survey drawing. In this instance, the drawing is accurate; as described in the Chilcott deed, the northeast corner of their property is 600 feet from the section corner. There was no need for witness monuments here; yet the east boundary monuments are ten feet off and are 590 feet from the section corner. There is no overlap in the legal descriptions of the Waterbury and Chilcott properties to account for the overlap in monuments discovered by David Rothery, the Waterbury surveyor. Surveying is a system of checking measurements. Both human and equipment errors in the profession are neither rare nor entirely common. Even the most up-to-date electronic equipment is subject to discrepancies. Checking and rechecking field measurements helps alleviate errors. The minimum technical standards developed by and for the profession are intended to reduce errors, although it is not clear that slavish adherence to those principles will absolutely prevent any possibility of error. When errors do occur, the standard of the profession is to work with the client to resolve the problem. In some cases, this may mean the purchase of the client's property or adjoining property if the party is willing to sell. Moyer's limited offers do not meet the established standards of the profession. THE BURGOON-BERGER SURVEYS COUNTS II AND III On August 21, 1986, Moyer signed and sealed a survey sketch of Lot 22, Block 2245, Port Malabar, Unit 44, in Brevard County Florida for Burgoon-Berger Construction Co. The survey of Lot 22 showed the drawing of an improvement within the boundaries of the lot with a notation, "FOUNDATION FF ELEV 25.86." Next to the date on the survey is the abbreviation, "FND". The survey was submitted to the Palm Bay Building Department on August 26, 1986, the day before the pre-slab inspection. A pre-slab inspection is done before the slab is poured; therefore, at the time the survey was signed and sealed, the concrete slab had not yet been poured. On October 20, 1986, Moyer prepared a sketch of survey of Lot 7, Block 1054, Port Malabar Unit 20, in Brevard County, Florida for Burgoon-Berger Construction Co. The survey sketch indicated an improvement within the boundaries of the lot, with the notation, "FOUNDATION FF ELEV 26.87". Next to the date on the survey is the notation "FND". The survey was submitted to the City of Palm Bay on October 28, 1986. The pre-slab inspection was done by the City on October 22, 1986. Again, the survey was signed and sealed before the slab was actually poured. The notation, "FOUNDATION FF ELEV", is commonly understood to mean "foundation, finished floor elevation". "FND" is commonly understood to mean "foundation". Moyer, himself, has used both notations to signify those common usages. Foundation is generally accepted in the land surveying profession to mean something permanent and constructed, like a concrete slab, not bust the ground or wooden form boards used to guide the pouring of the slab. A survey which depicts an improvement with the note, "FOUNDATION FF ELEV", when the floor has not been finished misrepresents the status of the construction of that project. Reviewing personnel at the Palm Bay Building Department rejected the surveys and alerted the City's Flood Plain Administrator. That individual, Maria Parkhurst, reported the incidents to the Department of Professional Regulation. Lots 22 and 7 are both in the flood plain and slab elevation is significant, as the City must assure that federal maximum elevation requirements are met. The City requires the submission of surveys containing slab elevation data. Banks also rely on foundation surveys submitted by contractors in order to determine the state of construction before the release of a foundation draw. That is, before the contractor is entitled to partial payment for his work, the bank needs to know if the work has been done. Both Moyer and his client, Bergoon-Berger, intended the notation in these cases to mean "finished form", not "finished floor". Burgoon-Berger had Moyer perform a survey after the wooden form boards were constructed, but before the concrete slab was poured, in order to assure that the house was placed properly on the lot. The survey was somehow submitted prematurely to the city, whereas because Moyer and his client intended that the poured slab be re-surveyed before the sketch was submitted. When the survey for Lot 7 was resubmitted to the City on October 31, 1986, the slab had been poured and, while the elevation remained the same, the size of the fireplace foundation was slightly smaller. The notation, "FOUNDATION FF ELEV" remained the same, with nothing on the face of the survey sketch to indicate that this later version was the finished floor, rather than the finished form. Moyer no longer uses these abbreviations. A survey is not valid until it is signed and sealed, but once it is signed and sealed, it signifies to the client and to the public at large that the information provided therein is true and accurate. The standard of professional land survey practice dictates that abbreviations which are not commonly accepted should be explained on the face of the drawing. The professional standards also dictate that even if a client asks for certain information on a survey, in anticipation that other third parties might rely on the survey the professional should either refuse to indicate improvements that do not exist yet or indicate unambiguously that the improvements are intended, but still under construction. Notwithstanding Bergoon-Berger's and Moyer's intentions with regard to the two surveys at issue, Moyer failed to meet professional standards when he signed and sealed those surveys and released them to his client.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final Order be issued finding Respondent guilty of Counts I, II and III of the Amended Administrative Complaint and placing him on probation for a period of two years, under such conditions as the Board may deem appropriate, including, but not limited to the participation in continuing professional education courses and the pursuit of a reasonable resolution to the Chilcott's boundary problems arising from the Respondent's negligence in performing their survey. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of December, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 1987. APPENDIX The following constitute my specific rulings on the parties' proposed findings of fact. Petitioner (Count I) Adopted in Paragraph 1. Adopted in Paragraph 2. 3-4. Adopted in Paragraph 3. Incorporated in Part in Paragraph 1., as to the limitation of experience, otherwise rejected as immaterial. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in Paragraph 3. Adopted in part in Paragraph 3, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 9-10. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 4. 14-18. Adopted in Paragraph 3 and 4. Adopted in Paragraph 11. Adopted in Paragraph 4. Adopted in Paragraph 5. Adopted in Paragraph 11. 23-28. Adopted in Paragraph 7. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 7. Adopted in part in Paragraph 8, however the accurate date is May 10, 1986, and the evidence is inconclusive as to whether Moyer spoke to either of the Chilcotts before coming back. This fact is not material. 32-33. Adopted in Paragraph 8. 34. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 35-37. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 8. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 9. Adopted in part in Paragraph 9, otherwise rejected as unsubstantiated by competent evidence and immaterial. Adopted in Paragraph 6. 42-43. Rejected as cumulative. 44. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 10. 45-47. Rejected as cumulative. 48-49. Adopted in Paragraph 12. 50-51. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 13. Rejected as cumulative. 54-55. Adopted in Paragraph 14. (Counts II and III) Adopted in Paragraph 1. Adopted in Paragraph 15. Adopted in Paragraph 16. 4-6. Adopted in Paragraph 17. Adopted in Paragraph 20. Adopted in Paragraph 21. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 18. Adopted in Paragraph 25. Adopted in Paragraph 18. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 25. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 23. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 25. Respondent Adopted in Paragraph 1. 2-5. Addressed in Background. Adopted in Paragraph 2. Adopted in Paragraph 3. 8-11. Rejected as immaterial. 12-13. Adopted in Paragraph 4. Adopted in Paragraph 5. Adopted in Paragraph 7. Adopted in part in Paragraph 7. Adopted in Paragraph 7. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence, except for the fact that the Chilcott house is 7 feet from the boundary. That fact is adopted in Paragraph 6. 19-20. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 8. Adopted in Paragraphs 9, 10, and 14. Adopted in Paragraph 10. Rejected, except as adopted in Paragraph 10. 24-25. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 11. Adopted in part in Paragraph 14, otherwise rejected as unsupported by the weight of evidence. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 13. Rejected as immaterial. While the boundary depiction is accurate, the placement of the house is in error on the final and foundation surveys and, of course, the markers are erroneously set. 30-33. Addressed in Background. 34. Adopted in Paragraphs 15 and 17. 35-36. Adopted in part in Paragraph 22, otherwise rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 37-38. Rejected as immaterial. 39. Adopted in Paragraphs 19 and 22. 40-44. Rejected as immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: DAVID R. TERRY, ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 JAMES P. BEADLE, ESQUIRE 5205 BABCOCK STREET N. E. PALM BAY, FLORIDA 32905 ALLEN R. SMITH, JR., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL LAND SURVEYORS DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 TOM GALLAGHER, SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 WILLIAM O'NEIL, ESQUIRE GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750

Florida Laws (5) 120.572.01455.225472.0337.25
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DAN GILBERTSON vs CITY OF TALLAHASSEE AND TALLAHASSEE-LEON COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION, 02-004236 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 24, 2002 Number: 02-004236 Latest Update: Jun. 16, 2003

The Issue The issue in this matter is whether Petitioner's application for a Type-A site plan should be approved.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Dan Gilbertson, has owned and operated Potbelly's restaurant, a student-oriented eating/drinking establishment, located at 459 West College Avenue, since 1994. Petitioner also operates a similar establishment known as The Painted Lady located directly adjacent and to the east of Potbelly's. Potbelly's and The Painted Lady are within the Institutional, Cultural, and University Transitional (DI) Zoning District. Surrounding uses to Petitioner's property include a Florida State University parking lot across Macomb Street to the west of the site, a privately owned parking lot across College Avenue to the north, a fraternity house to the east, and an apartment complex to the south. The existing Potbelly's and Painted Lady structures were constructed prior to the adoption of a 25-foot minimum building setback from Macomb Street codified in Section 10.3.O.2.d.3, Tallahassee Code. The Potbelly's building is partially within the 25-foot setback and is considered a pre- existing, nonconforming structure. Potbelly's is licensed to operate a full service kitchen while The Painted Lady is authorized to serve previously prepared food. Both parties agree that Potbelly's and The Painted Lady are licensed to serve alcohol within the premises identified in Respondent's supplemental exhibit. Respondent, The Tallahassee-Leon Planning Commission, is the legal entity responsible for reviewing and approving or denying applications for site plans. In September 2002, Petitioner submitted a site-plan application seeking to add a deck, handicap ramp, and bathrooms in the southwest area of the Potbelly's property and a deck behind The Painted Lady. The site plan application for the additional deck, restrooms, and handicap ramp behind Potbelly's seeks a deviation from the 25-foot setback requirement. In its application, Petitioner included architectural drawings of the premises but did not attach engineering drawings. Petitioner also enclosed a copy of a previously issued order dated June 14, 2001, from the Tallahassee-Leon County Board of Adjustment and Appeals granting a variance to the setback requirement for an existing deck on the west side of Potbelly's. Pursuant to Section 23.1, Tallahassee Code, Respondent may grant the deviation request to development standards only if it is consistent with the comprehensive plan and creates no adverse impact on the general health, safety, and welfare of the public. Petitioner's site plan application addresses less than 60,000 square feet and is subject to Type-A site plan review. Accordingly, Petitioner's application was reviewed by City staff including members from the Growth Management Department, Planning Department, Fire Department, Police Department, Utilities Department, and Public Works Department including Solid Waste and Traffic Engineering. Upon review, in October 2002, the Department advised Petitioner that his application had been denied. Petitioner timely appealed the decision. Code Deviation Criteria Pursuant to Section 23.3, Tallahassee Code, a request for deviation from the existing development standards is generally not favored and may only be granted upon a showing by the applicant that seven specific criteria have been met by a preponderance of the evidence. First, the applicant must demonstrate that the deviation will not be detrimental to the public good or to the surrounding properties. The evidence in this case demonstrated that, although the Tallahassee Police Department (TPD) reported that it received approximately 17 complaints over a two-year period for noise, physical disturbances, underage alcohol consumption, and other offenses, approximately 1 every 50 days, the frequency and severity of complaints has significantly declined. Further, Petitioner employs significant private security to curtail adverse incidents and has routinely attempted to hire off-duty TPD officers, but to no avail. There has been inadequate showing that a reasonable increase in the size and occupancy of Petitioner's premises will be detrimental to the public good or to the surrounding properties. Second, Petitioner must demonstrate that the requested deviation is consistent with the intent and purpose of the Zoning Code and the Comprehensive Plan. Respondent admits that "the intent of the DI zoning district is to provide a transition between downtown and the two universities, and to encourage pedestrian friendly or pedestrian oriented activities and development." Respondent further acknowledges that the intent of the 25-foot setback from Macomb Street and the 35-foot setback from College Avenue is to provide a transition for pedestrian activities along the roadways, a reduced scale of buildings along the pedestrian accesses and room for landscaping for enhancement of pedestrian activities. The evidence demonstrated that Petitioner's adjacent restaurant/bars primarily target and attract college students in the area and are pedestrian friendly. While the structures preceded the setback requirements, Petitioner has comported with the intent of the Tallahassee Code and Comprehensive Plan by enhancing vehicular and pedestrian access to the premises and improving their visual aesthetics. Third, Petitioner must demonstrate that the requested deviation is the minimum deviation that will make possible the reasonable use of the land, building, or structure. While the restaurant/bars maintain consistent business, additional patrons and/or a diversified, multi-use eating/drinking establishment, given the area, is a reasonable use of the land. Petitioner's deviation request is the minimum deviation necessary to garner the additional and diversified business. Fourth, Petitioner must demonstrate that strict application of the zoning requirements would constitute a substantial hardship that is not self-created or imposed. Strict application and unreasonable adherence to the 25-foot setback requirement, given the minimal external expansion requested and the fact that the existing structures currently extend into the setback, create a substantial and unnecessary hardship upon Petitioner's expanding business. Fifth, Petitioner must demonstrate whether there are any exceptional topographic, soil, or other environmental conditions unique to the property. The parties stipulate that there are no such environmental features on the site and the criterion is not relevant to Petitioner's application. Sixth, Petitioner must demonstrate that the requested deviation would provide a creative or innovative design alternative to substantive standards and criteria. Petitioner has shown that he intends to moderately expand the student- oriented, pedestrian friendly, eating/drinking establishment in the college campus area utilizing a consistent, creative, and attractive design alternative to the setback requirement. Finally, Petitioner must demonstrate that the impacts associated with the deviation will be adequately mitigated through alternative measures. Any impacts associated with the deviation are de minimus, however, Petitioner has agreed to adequately mitigate such impacts. First, Petitioner has constructed noise insulators on the south fence of the property to filter out excess sound to the apartment dwellers. Petitioner has also agreed to provide additional security when necessary and plans to significantly improve the visual aesthetics on the southwest side of the building. Respondent argues that Section 14.6 of the Zoning Code requires one loading berth for any site up to 8,000 square feet receiving goods and merchandise via motorized vehicle. The evidence demonstrates that Petitioner's property contains two parking spaces, identified as a loading berth, located directly in front of Potbelly's. Respondent, however, persuasively argues that the existing dumpster on the Potbelly's site does not comply with the City's Solid Waste requirements. Solid Waste and the Tallahassee Code require each site to provide sufficient space for a dump truck to enter the site, collect the refuse, and exit the site without backing into traffic. Although Waste Management empties the refuse at approximately 3:00 a.m., the current location of the dumpster presents a significant safety hazard which Petitioner must eliminate. Respondent argues that it cannot determine whether Petitioner's proposal meets the Floor Area Ratio requirements for the DI zoning district. The evidence presented during the hearing demonstrates that Petitioner's proposal satisfies the requirements. While the Tallahassee-Leon County Board of Adjustments and Appeals of Petitioner's previous approval of the existing deck variance is interesting, it is not relevant to this case. The formal proceeding before the Administrative Law Judge was properly noticed in the Tallahassee Democrat on November 24, 2002.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission enter a final order approving Petitioner's Type-A site plan and requested deviation contingent upon Petitioner's safe and acceptable relocation of the dumpster. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Sylvia Morell Alderman, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Bryant & Yon, P.A. Post Office Box 1877 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Dan Gilbertson 459 West College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Linda R. Hurst, Esquire City Attorney's Office 300 South Adams Street City Hall, Box A-5 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1731 Jean Gregory, Clerk Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission City Hall 300 South Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1731

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PRO TECH MONITORING, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 11-005794BID (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 10, 2011 Number: 11-005794BID Latest Update: May 10, 2012

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's intended award of a contract to Intervenor pursuant to Request for Proposals No. 10-DC-8200 is contrary to Respondent's governing statutes, Respondent's rules and policies, and the specifications of the Request for Proposals.

Findings Of Fact The State of Florida has, by legislative enactment, developed programs to electronically supervise offenders sentenced under a community control alternative to prison, and to supervise, register, and monitor designated sexual offenders and predators under the Jessica Lunsford Act. The Department of Corrections is the agency charged with the implementation of the electronic monitoring program, and to ensure that probation officers and other community supervision personnel have access to offender monitoring data. Pro Tech and BI are both well-recognized and established providers of electronic monitoring devices and monitoring and reporting services to federal, state, and local law enforcement and correctional agencies in Florida and across the United States. Pro-Tech is the incumbent vendor to the Department for electronic monitoring services. RFP 10-DC-8200 On August 30, 2010, the Department issued RFP 10-DC- 8200, the purpose of which was to select a contractor to provide active Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) electronic monitoring services for supervision of offenders sentenced under a community control alternative to prison, and to monitor designated sexual offenders and predators under the Jessica Lunsford Act. As of June 30, 2010, the Department was utilizing approximately 2,538 active GPS units to monitor offenders. The Department projected that within three years, as many as 3,015 offenders would be on active GPS monitoring. The scope of work for the contract was detailed in section 3 of the RFP. Briefly, the winning vendor is expected to ?provide active [GPS] services 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, which shall include a monitoring system that is capable of being accessed through a secure internet connection and fully supported by a secure database for transactional records.? Provisions of the RFP that are material to this proceeding include, by section number, the following (all emphasis is in the original): 1.13 Mandatory Responsiveness Requirements: Terms, conditions or requirements that must be met by the proposer to be responsive to this RFP. The responsiveness requirements are mandatory. Failure to meet the responsiveness requirements will cause rejection of a proposal. Any proposal rejected for failure to meet mandatory responsiveness requirements will not be evaluated. Material Deviations: The Department has established certain requirements with respect to proposals to be submitted by Proposers. The use of shall, must or will (except to indicate simple futurity) in this RFP indicates a requirement or condition which may not be waived by the Department except where any deviation therefore is not material. A deviation is material if, in the Department's sole discretion, the deficient response is not in substantial accord with this RFP's requirements, provides an advantage to one Proposer over other Proposers, or has a potentially significant effect on the quantity or quality of items or services proposed, or on the cost to the Department. Material deviations cannot be waived and shall be the basis for rejection of a response. Because this is an RFP, the Department will apply this definition liberally in reviewing responses in regard to service delivery. Minor Irregularity: A variation from the RFP terms and conditions which does not affect the price proposed or gives the proposer an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by the other proposers or does not adversely impact the interests of the Department. 5.2.9 The Proposer shall provide for both the Contractor and Contractor‘s personnel, copies of any and all documents regarding complaints filed, investigations made, warning letters or inspection reports issued, or any disciplinary action imposed by Federal or State oversight agencies within the past five (5) years. Narrative/Record of Past Experience As indicated in Section 2.2 and Attachment 1, it is a mandatory responsiveness requirement that the Proposer has at least three (3) years of business/corporate experience within the last five (5) years relevant to providing electronic monitoring services and equipment similar to the services described in this RFP, to correctional, criminal justice or law enforcement agencies. Details of the Proposer‘s experience that meet this requirement shall be provided in narrative form and in sufficient detail so that the Department is able to judge its complexity and relevance. Specifically include: provide a description of past years‘ experience providing electronic monitoring equipment and services. provide a description of past experience and the specific length of time providing Active GPS services (as identified in this RFP). identify all current and/or past (or within three (3) years) federal, state or government contracts for the provision of electronic monitoring services, and the number of active GPS units utilized for each. provide a narrative summary of contract performance in the above-identified contracts, including any major adverse findings. provide the name and telephone number and address for the specified federal, state, or government contract manager. provide a summary of any exemplary or qualitative findings, recommendations, or other validations, demonstrating operational experience. (i.e., specialized accreditation, grant awards, etc.). The proposer shall provide a detailed description of the General Equipment specifications that meets or exceeds all requirements in Section 3.7.2 and specifically: provide manufacturer‘s specifications and literature on all equipment proposed, including equipment which is acquired from any other source than the proposer; describe the process utilized to notify the Department and/or the offender when a low battery condition exists in any component of the equipment (transmitter or receiver dialer); describe and list the tools necessary for installation of any of the monitoring unit equipment; and provide copies of required licensing by the Federal Communications Commission for the equipment proposed. The proposer shall provide a detailed description of the Contractor‘s method and approach for meeting or exceeding all Monitoring Center requirements in Section 3.13, and specifically: provide a copy of the staffing plan for monitoring services twenty four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, including holidays; and provide a copy of the Disaster Recovery plan. The proposer shall provide a detailed description of the approach to meeting or exceeding all Training requirements in Section 3.16, and specifically: provide a description of the method(s) for securely sizing and installing the transmitter securely to offenders; provide a copy of the training curriculum; and provide a copy of proposed course/instructor evaluation form. Please note - final evaluation form to be approved by Contract Manager and/or designee. As part of the RFP process, each interested vendor was allowed to submit questions regarding the terms of the RFP, and the services being sought. The Department responded to each of the 72 questions submitted. On November 2, 2010, the responses, along with revised RFP pages resulting therefrom, were provided to each prospective vendor as RFP #10-DC-8200 Addendum #1. Among the questions for which the Department provided answers were the following: Question #11: Sections 5.3.2.3 & 5.3.2.4 on Page 38 requires that we: ?identify all current and/or past (or within (3) years) federal, state or government contracts for the provisions of electronic monitoring services, . . . .? And that we ?provide a narrative summary of contract performance in the above identified contracts,. . .? In the case of Pro Tech, this would amount to more than a hundred contracts resulting in a voluminous response. Perhaps a more reasonable requirement would be to provide the information for our 10 largest or 10 most similar contracts. Answer #11: These requirements remain as stated in the RFP. Question #16:5.3.2. Narrative/Record of Past Experience identify all current and/or past (or within three (3) years) federal, state or government contracts for the provision of electronic monitoring services, and the number of active GPS units utilized for each. Question: Since it is feasible that Proposers could have several hundred current/past contracts, will Florida Department of Corrections consider revising the requirement to be “Provide the total number of current and/or past (or within 3 years) federal, state or government contracts?” Answer #16: This requirement remains as stated in the RFP. Question #17: provide a narrative summary of contract performance in the above-identified contracts, including any major adverse findings. Question: Since it is feasible that Proposers could have several hundred current/past contracts, will Florida Department of Corrections consider revising the requirement to be “Provide a performance summary of all contracts past/present?” Answer #17: This requirement remains as stated in the RFP. Question #28: Should respondents view ?shall? and ?must? language as mandatory requirements? Answer #28: This question is confusing different terms. See Section 1.13 that defines ?Mandatory Responsiveness Requirements?. See Section 1.15 that defines ?Material Deviations? which explains the terms ?shall and must?, and should not be confused with Section 5.1 Mandatory Responsive Requirements/ Fatal Criteria. Each proposed vendor signed an Addendum Acknowledgement Form for RFP #10-DC-8200 Addendum #1, and included it as part of its proposal. By signing and submitting the Addendum Acknowledgement Form, the vendors understood that the changes reflected in the Addendum ?are applicable to the original specifications of the above-referenced RFP? and that ?this addendum now becomes a part of the original RFP.? No prospective vendor filed a protest of any of the terms, conditions, or specifications of the RFP or Addendum #1. Proposals in Response to the RFP Proposals were submitted on November 22, 2010, by Pro Tech and BI, as well as five other electronic monitoring vendors, G4S Justice Services, LLC, iSecureTrac Corporation, Satellite Tracking of People, LLC, SecureAlert, and SOS International. BI proposed using its ExacuTrack One monitoring device to monitor offenders in Florida. The ExacuTrack One is a single piece device that is affixed to the offender‘s ankle. The unit contains a GPS signal receiver, a transmitter, cellular capability to transmit data to the monitoring center, a speaker for transmitting warnings, a device for the offender to transmit acknowledgement signals, and a rechargeable battery. The ExacuTrack One device meets the specifications of the RFP. When offenders go into prohibited areas, or when tracking capabilities are interrupted, either through shielding of the GPS signal or unauthorized tampering with the device, an alert is transmitted to the monitoring center. Each customer has a time interval set by contract by which a notification is sent to the customer, which may vary based on the nature of the alert. For example, if an offender strays into a prohibited area, an alert is transmitted to the monitoring center. If the offender exits the area before the contractual time interval is exceeded, a violation report is not required. The ExacuTrack One device has the ability to transmit an audible alert to the offender when the offender enters into an exclusion zone or otherwise violates the terms of his or her release. When an audible alert is given, the offender is required to acknowledge receipt of the alert, and to exit the area. The ExacuTrack One units are fully capable of meeting the requirements of the RFP operating on their own. However, in order to provide an option to conserve battery life of the ankle device, BI proposed to use a radio frequency ?Beacon.? When an offender is in range of his or her Beacon, generally being within the perimeter of the offender‘s home, the GPS feature goes into a low power state, and data is transmitted through the Beacon, thus extending the battery charge. BI considered the Beacon to be an optional device that exceeded the requirements of the RFP, and that could be provided at no additional cost at the discretion of the Department. Monitoring of the ExacuTrack One device may be accomplished in one of two ways. The monitoring system and devices can be sold to an agency which then provides its own monitoring, referred to as a ?local host? facility. The more commonly used system and that proposed for Florida, is one in which the monitoring devices are provided to the agency, with the resulting data sent to the BI monitoring center. The data is then stored and made available through the TotalAccess case management system. Department staff, correctional and probation officers, and other authorized users can access the system to perform a number of tasks, and are notified according to contract when monitoring alerts are transmitted to the monitoring center. The BI monitoring center has fully redundant capabilities, with all data being replicated both at the primary monitoring center in Boulder, Colorado, and at the backup center in Anderson, Indiana. Review of the Proposals Mandatory Responsiveness Requirements Review The Department initially reviewed each of the proposals to determine if Mandatory Responsiveness Requirements were met. Pursuant to section 5.1 of the RFP, the only Mandatory Responsiveness Requirements/Fatal Criteria were: a) that the complete proposal be submitted on time; and b) that the certification and cover sheet be signed. No prospective vendor was determined to be non-responsive for either of the Mandatory Responsiveness Requirements. Material Deviations/Minor Irregularities Review The procedure by which the Department was to begin the process of review of those proposals that survived the Mandatory Responsiveness Requirements/Fatal Criteria review was for procurement staff to review the proposals ?for compliance with the items required in the . . . Proposal Submissions outlined in Section 5 of the RFP.? The purpose of the compliance review was to determine whether the proposals contained any deviations from the terms, conditions, and specifications of the RFP, and whether such deviations were material deviations requiring rejection of a response, or whether they were waivable minor irregularities. If a deviation was determined to be a minor irregularity, the Department reserved the right to require additional information prior to the contract award. Kelly Wright was the Department staff person who was directly, and almost exclusively, responsible for the RFP. Ms. Wright was, in consultation with the Department‘s subject matter experts, the primary drafter of the RFP. She was responsible for vendor questions and for preparing the Addendum #1 in which those questions were answered. She prepared the evaluation manual, trained the evaluators, and compiled their scores. She performed the review of the proposals for compliance with the mandatory requirements/fatal criteria, and reviewed the executive summaries and transmittal letters. It was also Ms. Wright‘s responsibility to identify deviations from the RFP requirements and initiate the process by which such deviations were resolved. Gail Hillhouse, who is Ms. Wright‘s supervisor, and is an active participant in the decision-making process for other procurements, was not materially involved in Request for Proposals No. 10-DC-8200. She did not assist Ms. Wright in the review of responses, nor was she involved in the process of resolving deviations of the proposals from the terms of the RFP. Ms. Hillhouse never reviewed the BI proposal at any time prior to the posting of the award. If during the course of the pre-evaluation review of the proposals, or otherwise during the selection process, a deviation from the terms, conditions, and specifications was discovered, Ms. Wright was to take it directly to her bureau chief, Robert Staney. Mr. Staney‘s practice was to consult with the Department‘s legal staff, and then make a determination as to whether the deviation was a non-waivable material deviation under section 1.15 of the RFP, or a waivable minor irregularity under section 1.16 of the RFP. The Department appointed an Evaluation Committee to evaluate the proposals. The evaluators were charged with scoring the proposals as they were provided to them. The evaluators were not asked to determine whether any provision of the responses constituted a material deviation from the terms, conditions, or specifications of the RFP, and none did so. The evaluators were provided with scoring sheets that established the factors, referred to as ?considers,? that were to go into each individual score by section. Most sections contained multiple ?considers? that were to be evaluated to determine the overall score for that section. In the event a proposal was ?completely utterly unresponsive? as to the ?considers? listed for a particular section, a score of zero could be assigned. A zero would generally be an indication that some item had been omitted, thus triggering a ?material deviation? review. The scoring was to be performed as a composite, and the ?considers? within a section were not to be scored individually. Therefore, even if an element of a section was omitted in its entirety, a score of greater than zero would be required as long as there was information provided regarding the other ?considers.? That was so even if the omitted ?consider? would -- standing alone -- constitute a material deviation from the terms, conditions and specifications of the RFP. Only if an evaluator assigned an overall section score of zero would a review be undertaken to determine whether that section of the proposal materially deviated from the requirements of the RFP. Neither Pro Tech nor BI scored a zero for any section. Since there were no zeros, no ?material deviation? review was made. Ms. Wright did not review the BI proposal from beginning to end until the evaluation and scoring was completed, and the award to BI was ready to be posted. The evidence in this case demonstrates that, except as related to the financial documentation discussed herein, no one in the Department reviewed the proposals to determine if they contained deviations, material or not, from the terms, conditions or specifications of the RFP, nor was any such determination made prior to the posting of the intended award. Financial Documentation Review Each prospective vendor was required to submit financial documentation of its ability to perform the contract pursuant to section 5.4 of the RFP. The financial documentation was not a Mandatory Responsiveness Requirement/Fatal Criteria pursuant to section 1.13. Rather, section 5.4.4 provided that the ?proposer shall provide financial documentation that is sufficient to demonstrate its financial viability,? and listed the items to be included in the proposal. The RFP further provided that ?[f]ailure to provide any of the aforementioned financial information may result in proposal disqualification.? The financial documentation for each proposal was reviewed by an independent Certified Public Accountant, who determined its sufficiency under section 5.4 of the RFP. Three of the responses, those of iSecureTrac Corporation, SecureAlert, and SOS International, failed to pass the Financial Documentation review, and were disqualified from further review and consideration. The CPA determined that the G4S Justice Services, LLC financial statement had several deficiencies, including the omission of items required by section 5.4.1 of the RFP. The information was provided by the CPA to the Department‘s procurement office. After consultation with legal staff, the Department determined the deficiency to be a minor irregularity, and it was therefore waived. Evaluation Each member of the evaluation committee had experience in the field of electronic monitoring. There are no disputed issues of fact regarding the qualifications or training of the evaluation team, the procedures by which the RFP scoring was performed, or of any individual score. Therefore, further findings or conclusions regarding the evaluators or the scoring of the proposals are unnecessary. Proposed Award As a result of the process of evaluating and scoring the proposals, the Department determined that BI was the highest scoring proposer. Pro Tech was the second highest scoring responsive proposer. Satellite Tracking of People, LLC and G4S Justice Services, LLC were ranked third and fourth, respectively. The final scores were calculated, and the proposers were ranked as follows: Proposers Actual points received by Proposers (X) Highest points received by any Proposal (N) Awarded Points (Z) CATEGORY 1 - Business/Corporate Experience - Maximum 300 Points - (X/N x 300 = Z) BI 209.64 253.39 248.20 G4S 186.07 253.39 220.30 Pro Tech 253.39 253.39 300 STOP 196.43 253.39 232.56 CATEGORY 2 - Technical Specs & Service Delivery Approach - Maximum 400 Points - (X/N x 400 = Z) BI 241.96 285.54 338.95 G4S 246.96 285.54 345.96 Pro Tech 285.54 285.54 400 STOP 248.57 285.54 348.21 Proposers Proposed Per Diem Unit Price (X) Lowest Verified Per Diem Unit Price of All Proposals (N) Awarded Points (Z) CATEGORY 3 - Cost Proposal - Maximum 300 Points - (N/X x 300 = Z) BI $3.00 $3.00 300 G4S $6.88 $3.00 130.81 Pro Tech $5.20 $3.00 173.08 STOP $4.15 $3.00 216.87 Total Proposal Points and Ranking Proposers Total Proposal Points Ranking BI 887.15 1 G4S 697.07 2 Pro Tech 873.08 3 STOP 797.64 4 On December 17, 2010, the Department posted its intent to award the contract to BI. The ?October 5, 2010 Incident? BI has contracts with the Department of Homeland Security, several states, and numerous political subdivisions under which persons are monitored with BI-supplied equipment. The data from the monitoring devices is transmitted to a centralized monitoring location. All of the BI GPS devices, as well as a number of radio frequency and alcohol monitoring devices, were monitored through BI‘s ?TotalAccess? system. On October 5, 2010, at approximately 7:30 a.m. MDT, the number of records contained in the ?identity column? field in the TotalAccess database, which operated on a 32-bit platform, exceeded the capacity of that field. As a result, the monitoring center could no longer receive data from any of the 16,000 devices using the TotalAccess system, which included all of BI‘s almost 9,000 GPS devices. The ?outage? lasted approximately 12 hours. Although the monitoring devices continued to collect and store data on the whereabouts of the offenders during that period, the data could not be sent to the monitoring center or accessed by officers. Offenders had no direct way of knowing that the monitoring devices were not transmitting data. When the system came back on-line at approximately 7:25 p.m. MDT, the data was transmitted from the affected devices to the monitoring center. No data was permanently lost as a result of the outage. Officers were notified of any activities that would have triggered an alert during the period of the outage. If any questions arose as to the movements of an offender during the outage, that data could be retrieved and examined after the fact. During the outage, BI customers were alerted, either by e-mail or by telephone, and advised of the problem. The customers were updated throughout the outage period. The resolution of the issue was achieved by rewriting the ?identity column? data file from 32-bit, with a capacity of 2.1 billion records, to a 64-bit file, with a capacity of 9 quintillion records. In addition, a customized monitor was developed and installed so that a warning will be provided in the future if the system nears capacity. Thus, it is unlikely that this particular problem will recur. The October 5, 2010, incident was, by BI‘s own admission, the single worst event in BI‘s operational history. Protest Issues Petitioner, Pro Tech, timely filed a protest of the award of the contract to BI. The January 3, 2011, protest petition identified the issues that formed the basis for its protest of the award of the contract to BI.1/ The issues alleged by Petitioner are: Whether BI failed to comply with section 5.3.2 of the RFP by failing to: identify all of its federal, state or government contracts under which it provided electronic monitoring services and the number of active GPS units utilized for each; and provide a narrative summary of contract performance for each contract so identified, including major adverse findings; Whether BI failed to comply with section 5.2.9 of the RFP by failing to disclose ?complaints filed, investigations made, warning letters or inspection reports issued, or any disciplinary action? by governmental entities, specifically related to the outage of service that occurred on October 5, 2010; Whether BI failed to comply with section 5.5.13 of the RFP by refusing to provide a copy of its Disaster Recovery Plan. Whether BI failed to comply with section 5.5.15 of the RFP by failing to provide a copy of its training curriculum; and Whether BI failed to comply with section 5.5.5 of the RFP by failing to provide a copy of the FCC Grant of Authorization for the ?Beacon? device identified in its proposal. Pro Tech alleged that each of the deficiencies identified in its protest petition constituted a Material Deviation from the terms, conditions, and specifications of the RFP that, pursuant to section 1.15 of the RFP, could not be waived and that warranted rejection of the BI response. On November 15, 2011, BI filed its Petition for Leave to Intervene, in which it raised, as a disputed issue of fact and law, ?[w]hether Pro Tech‘s RFP reply met all of the requirements of the RFP and/or was materially non-responsive.? The responsiveness of Pro Tech‘s proposal was not preserved as an issue remaining for disposition in the Joint Pre-Hearing Stipulation.2/ Issue 1: Failure to comply with past experience requirements Section 5.3.2. requires that details of the proposed vendors‘ experience ?shall be provided in narrative form and in sufficient detail so that the Department is able to judge its complexity and relevance,? and as part of that directive, the proposed vendor was required, in part, to ?identify all current and/or past (or within three (3) years) federal, state or government contracts for the provision of electronic monitoring services, and the number of active GPS units utilized for each,? and to ?provide a narrative summary of contract performance in the above-identified contracts, including any major adverse findings.? (emphasis added). The subsections directing the vendors to provide supportive information, including 5.3.2.3. and 5.3.2.4., can be reasonably read in no way other than to be inclusive of the requirement that such information ?shall be provided in narrative form and in sufficient detail . . .? As part of the scheduled process of refining and clarifying the terms, conditions, and specifications of the RFP, potential responding vendors were allowed to submit questions to the Department. The requirement that prospective vendors provide information regarding all government contracts was worrisome to two vendors, including Pro Tech, due to the fact that such a requirement would involve at least a hundred, and up to ?several hundred? contracts. As a result of its concern with the extent of the work necessary to identify all of its electronic monitoring contracts, Pro Tech made the specific inquiry as to whether it would be allowed to ?provide the information for our 10 largest or 10 most similar contracts.? Similarly, another vendor sought to limit the scope of the specification by requesting to ?provide the total number of current and/or past (or within 3 years) federal, state or government contracts,? rather than identifying them individually, and to provide an aggregated, rather than an individual, narrative summary of contract performance. To each question, the Department responded that ?[t]hese requirements remain as stated in the RFP.? The answers were posted by the Department, and became part of the RFP‘s terms, conditions, and specifications. The only reasonable construction of the Department‘s response is that it remained ?a requirement or condition? of the RFP for vendors to identify all electronic monitoring contracts, specify the number of GPS units utilized in each contract, and provide a narrative summary of contract performance. While that requirement may appear to be burdensome, it nonetheless is the requirement. If a proposed vendor believed the requirement to be overly broad or unnecessary, it was obligated to challenge the specification. The specification was not challenged. Failure to identify all contracts In response to section 5.3.2.3, BI responded as follows: ?While BI currently has contracts for EM equipment and services with approximately 1,000 customers, as directed by the requirements in Section 5.3.2 we are providing contracts that are similar in size and scope to those specified in this RFP only.? BI thereupon listed seven contracts, the largest of which used approximately 3,500 ExacuTrack One GPS units, and the smallest of which used 100 ExacuTrack One GPS units. BI believed that listing all of its contracts was not necessary for it to show that it had the requisite experience to perform the Florida contract. Mr. Murnock testified that ?[i]t was clear we did not respond with all one thousand contracts,? and that BI‘s deficient response was made with ?[t]he risk of being scored lower, yes, is one of the risks.? The decision to limit the information to be provided in response to what is an objectively clear requirement was made with considerable forethought and calculation. With regard to the decision to identify seven of its approximately 1,000 customers, Mr. Murnock testified that ?there's certain things that we did not put in this response. We provided our answers to that because we knew, at the risk of getting a lower score, it was a risk-risk situation, you know, where do I expose contracts, do I expose my customer list that could -- while being protected by confidentiality we don't trust, we have seen that breached in other jurisdictions, we've seen that breached here in Florida, I was not going to expose information that we feel to be protected. I answered the specification as I defined it.? (emphasis added). Mr. Murnock stated that BI‘s decision to limit contract disclosure was, in part, the result of a desire to avoid the risk of exposing its customer list because ?[t]here are some customers that don‘t like their information being disseminated.? The suggestion that BI‘s decision was driven by an altruistic concern for the interests of its customers is unconvincing. The Department requested only ?federal, state or government contracts.? No explanation was offered as to why the existence of a government contract would be confidential, or a narrative of BI‘s performance under that contract would be a problem. Regardless of the purported reasons for non-compliance, the options when faced with a clear, direct, and unambiguous requirement of a public procurement to disclose ?sensitive? information are to: a) protest the specification; b) submit the information under the procurement‘s confidential information provisions; or c) choose not to submit a proposal. Picking and choosing what required information to provide, and what not to provide, is not among the acceptable or competitive options. Section 5.2.3 of the RFP is clear and unambiguous. BI‘s response was not in substantial accord with the RFP's requirements. The suggestion that vendors are free to unreasonably ?define? terms so as to meet their subjective desires is contrary to a fair and even-handed procurement process. All vendors are expected to comply with the terms, conditions, and specifications in the same way so as to present an equal playing field. BI‘s decision to provide only a tiny percentage of its government contracts tilted the field in its favor by allowing it to devote the time saved by not compiling the required information -- time spent by the other complying vendors -- to other sections of its proposal, a result that is contrary to competition. BI‘s representation that it provided contracts ?similar in size and scope? is itself questionable. The contract with the Wisconsin DOC was described as an Electronic Home Detention Program. Wisconsin uses the BI 9000, the HomeGuard 200, and the Sobrietor systems. Those systems were not described in the proposal. There was no indication of whether they are active GPS units or whether they are comparable to the ExacuTrack One system proposed for Florida. In short, the proposal failed to provide any information that would allow the reader to conclude that the Wisconsin DOC contract is similar in scope to the services being sought by the Florida DOC. The contract with the Delaware DOC does not include monitoring of the field units, as is called for in the Florida contract. The lack of a monitoring component makes the Delaware contract dissimilar in scope from the proposed Florida contract. The information provided with regard to the Broward County, Florida contract failed to indicate whether that contract utilizes BI monitoring services. Furthermore, the Broward County narrative indicated that the Broward Pretrial Services Division ?uses BI ExacuTrack AT, HomeGuard 200, GroupGuard Plus, and BI VoiceID,? but failed to describe those units or indicate their comparability to units proposed for the Florida contract. The undersigned will presume that the ?ExacuTrack AT? is a version of the ExacuTrack One. However, the narrative failed to list the ?number of active GPS units? as required by the specification, so it is unknown how many are in service. There was little information provided that would allow a determination that the Pennsylvania contract is ?similar in size and scope? to the proposed Florida contract. The RFP proposal states that ?the Pennsylvania Office of Probation and Parole Services have been operating its own offender monitoring center . . . .? Mr. Murnock confirmed that Pennsylvania was not affected by the October 5, 2010, incident because it used its own local host monitoring system. The lack of a monitoring component makes the Pennsylvania contract dissimilar in scope from the proposed Florida contract. The proposal also indicated that Pennsylvania ?has 450 HomeGuard units and 649 BI 9000‘s units, operating through a GuardServer 750 system.? None of those units, or the GuardServer 750 system, are described in the proposal, and they are not the devices or services proposed for the Florida contract. As such, the proposal fails to provide any information that would allow the reader to conclude that the Pennsylvania contract is similar in scope to the services being sought by Florida. In addition to the fact that Wisconsin, Delaware, Broward County, and Pennsylvania contracts are not, based on the information provided in the RFP, of the same scope as the Florida proposal, the Delaware DOC contract (175 ExacuTrack One units), the Broward County, Florida contract (an unknown number of ExacuTrack AT units), the Fayette County Adult Probation contract (120 ExacuTrack One units), and the City and County of Denver contract (100 ExacuTrack One units, along with 300 radio frequency and 70 alcohol monitoring units) do not approach the size of the Florida contract. As a result of BI‘s decision to forego its duty to identify all of its contracts, as required by the RFP, the Department was left with precious few contracts ?similar in size and scope? to that proposed for Florida with which to compare. BI was a party to other contracts that included BI monitoring and the use of the GPS device proposed for Florida that it elected not to disclose. BI has a contract with the state of Missouri that includes BI monitoring services and, in part, the ExacuTrack One field device. BI failed to list its contract with the state of Missouri in its response to section 5.3.2, purportedly because it consisted predominantly of alcohol and radio frequency monitoring, with ?a few GPS, but I couldn‘t tell you the count.? However, at section 5.5.19 of its proposal, BI noted that the Missouri Department of Corrections ?awarded BI with a contract for GPS, alcohol monitoring and radio frequency? that included the use of the same ExacuTrack One unit proposed for Florida. BI touted the Missouri contract as an example of its ability to rapidly implement the Florida contract. By tucking away information regarding the Missouri contract (along with contracts with agencies in California and Illinois) in section 5.5.19, BI was not obligated to provide a narrative summary of contract performance, or contact information that would allow the Department to follow up if it so chose. The reasoning for excluding the Missouri contract is disingenuous, considering that BI listed its contract with the City and County of Denver, in which GPS monitoring is a small percentage of the total monitoring devices in that contract. Because of BI‘s failure to disclose, it is not known how many other contracts among the 1,000 include features proposed for Florida, and which may have been of value to the evaluators. BI made a calculated decision not to disclose all of its contracts. Petitioner‘s allegations that BI ?cherry-picked? the contracts it chose to disclose is a harsh assessment, but it is an assessment that is supported by the evidence of this proceeding. BI made similar decisions to limit disclosure of its contracts in past procurements, with other agencies, without the consequence of disqualification. Therefore, BI decided to stay with its practice, in the words of Mr. Murnock, to ?disseminate it as we see fit? and chose not to disclose all government electronic monitoring contracts ?at the risk of being scored low.? The fact that BI was ?allowed?3/ to proceed, despite the fact that its response was not in substantial accord with the RFP's requirements, provided a competitive advantage to BI over other proposers. The first advantage is the immeasurable advantage conferred by withholding information on its contracts, and possible problems related thereto. The more direct advantage is the time saved by BI as a result of its decision to forego the work necessary to compile the contracts, and provide a narrative summary of their performance. The competitive advantage conferred on BI was, in this case, significant. Petitioner‘s President, Mr. Chapin, testified that Pro Tech devoted two full- time employees for approximately two weeks to collect the data necessary to fully respond to section 5.2.3, in addition to the time devoted by contract account managers in verifying contract performance matters. That was time not expended by BI –- and was time that BI could use to bolster and enhance other sections of its proposal. In addition to the direct competitive advantage conferred on BI, the Department‘s failure to enforce the clear and unambiguous requirements, especially when its ?decision? was made after the preliminary results of the evaluation were known, and when the deviation benefitted the vendor proposing a lower price, fosters an appearance and opportunity for preferential treatment that compromises the integrity of the competitive process.4/ The response to section 5.2.3.3. of the RFP provided by BI is clearly deficient, is not in substantial accord with the RFP's requirements, and is a material deviation from the terms, conditions, and specifications of the RFP. The Department‘s failure to enforce the requirement in accordance with the terms of section 1.15 was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, and capricious. Failure to provide a narrative summary of contract performance Section 5.3.2.4 of the RFP required proposed vendors to provide a narrative summary of their contract performance, including major adverse findings. The summaries were not limited to major adverse findings. Rather, contract performance goes beyond adverse findings, and includes the manner and efficiency in which the contract services are accomplished, whether good or bad. BI provided narrative summaries of the few contracts it chose to identify, but little information as to contract performance. The evidence in this case demonstrates that the October 5, 2010, incident was, without question, the worst single operational event in BI‘s history, and among the two or three most significant failures in the history of the electronic monitoring industry. It affected at least one of the contracts identified by BI, that being with the state of Wisconsin. It occurred while the RFP proposal was being prepared, and approximately six weeks prior to its submission. It is absurd to believe that the October 5, 2010, incident was not a significant element that should have been disclosed in any discussion of contract performance. It may well be, as asserted by BI, that its customers were satisfied with its response to the October 5, 2010, incident. If so, it would have been a simple matter to provide an assessment of the satisfaction of BI‘s customers with its response, and with a description of the remedial measures taken to ensure that it would never recur. BI did not. Although several customers, including the state of Wisconsin, expressed their concern with the situation in writing, and BI offered credits to its customers, there do not appear to have been any ?major adverse findings? as that term may be narrowly construed. As a measure of ?contract performance,? Mr. Murnock testified that the October 5, 2010, incident ?is certainly not a good incident to occur. But when you look at the specifications, we interpreted them exactly the way they were listed.? That is not the case. Rather, the decision to withhold any mention of the incident came about by a careful and measured parsing of words. BI witnesses testified that the October 5, 2011, incident was no secret, and that it had put out media coverage and press releases because it ?wanted to be an open book? regarding the incident. However, as to the ?threshold? of the items that would have to be disclosed as a significant issue of contract performance, Mr. Murnock testified that ?that would be a very long list of performance items, whether it be from a billing issue that may have been raised, to this October 5th issue.? The equation of a simple ?billing issue? with the October 5, 2010, incident -- the single worst event in BI‘s history -- serves to highlight the attitude that allowed BI to willingly avoid disclosure of a direct, material, and significant element of contract performance that affected the very goods and services being proposed for Florida. The incident was enough of a secret that no evaluator was aware of it. The evaluators acknowledged that the event was significant, and could have affected their scores on the performance section of the RFP, though none could state whether the effect would have been positive or negative. It may well be that the explanation of the prompt remedial measures would have been well received by the evaluators, and that no reduction in scores would have resulted. It may also be that the event, given its severity, would have negatively affected their scores.5/ The testimony of Department witnesses that the October 5, 2010, incident was not necessarily something that it would have wanted to know about rings hollow. There is absolutely no reason why that information would not be pertinent and material to this RFP. The suggestion that the October 5 incident was something the Department viewed with ambivalence goes more to its desire to support the contract award than it does to the sufficiency of the BI narrative of contract performance.6/ Despite what is clearly a designed and calculated effort on the part of BI to withhold information regarding the incident from the Department -- and the Department‘s inexplicable lack of concern regarding the withholding of material information regarding subject matter of the RFP -- the fact is that BI‘s proposal included ?narrative summaries,? thereby meeting the minimal requirement established in section 5.3.2.4. Despite a lack of candor on the part of BI that raises significant concern, the undersigned cannot conclude that the deficiencies in the narrative summaries constituted an issue of basic responsiveness. Therefore, the undersigned cannot find that BI‘s omission of information regarding the goods and services proposed for Florida is a material deviation from section 5.3.2.4. of the RFP. Issue 2: Failure to disclose ?complaints? related to the October 5, 2010 event Section 5.2.9. of the RFP requires proposed vendors to provide ?any and all documents regarding complaints filed, investigations made, warning letters or inspection reports issued, or any disciplinary action imposed by Federal or State oversight agencies within the past five (5) years.? Pro Tech asserts that an October 7, 2010, ?deficiency notice? from the Missouri Department of Corrections regarding the October 5, 2010, incident, and follow-up correspondence through December 23, 2010, fell within the class of governmental action that should have been disclosed, but was not. The October 7, 2011, letter from the Missouri DOC identifies itself as a ?letter of notification to BI of a deficiency notice,? and requested of BI ?a written response within 7 calendar days identifying the problem area(s) which led to the failure and what steps BI intends to initiate to ensure that the system failure is not repeated.? BI witnesses testified that a ?deficiency notice? was not one of the specific items listed in section 5.2.9 of the RFP, and that it was therefore not obligated to disclose the Missouri letter under its very narrow reading of the items requested. BI‘s candor with regard to the October 5, 2010, incident as expressed in its response to section 5.2.9. is roughly approximate to that evident from its response to section 5.3.2.4.7/ Section 5.2.9. uses very specific terms. It is doubtful that the Department intended potential vendors to disclose only those documents with the words ?complaint,? ?investigation,? ?warning letter,? ?inspection report,? or ?disciplinary action? splashed prominently across the document. Rather, a fair reading of the requirement, coupled with an interest in being open and forthright regarding performance -- an ?open book? as stated by Mr. Murnock -- would clearly include a ?deficiency notice? to be within the class of items being requested. However, since the specific RFP language listed specific items, without a more inclusive descriptor, such as ?including but not limited to,? or ?in the nature of,? the undersigned will not broaden the specific RFP requirement. Since the Missouri letter did not include the words ?complaint,? ?investigation,? ?warning letter,? ?inspection report,? or ?disciplinary action? within the body of the correspondence, despite its being plainly within the general class of those documents, the response provided by BI to section 5.2.9. was not a material deviation from that requirement of the RFP. Issue 3: Failure to provide a copy of the Disaster Recovery Plan The RFP, at section 5.5.13., provides that ?[t]he proposer shall provide a detailed description of the Contractor‘s method and approach for meeting or exceeding all Monitoring Center requirements in section 3.13, and specifically . . . provide a copy of the Disaster Recovery plan.? The requirement is clear, direct, and unambiguous. BI did not file a protest of the specification, nor did it question the submission of its Disaster Recovery Plan during the process that resulted in the issuance of Addendum #1. In response to section 5.5.13. of the RFP, BI responded as follows: ?Because of security reasons, the Disaster Recovery Plan is not included with this response. For an outline of the Disaster Recovery Plan, see „3.13.4? beginning on page 148.? BI‘s refusal to provide the Disaster Recovery Plan is reiterated in its response to section 3.13.10. There is no industry standard as to what constitutes a Disaster Recovery Plan. However, BI clearly understood what constituted its Disaster Recovery Plan, and made the calculated decision that it was not going to submit it. The response provided by BI is clearly deficient, and is not in substantial accord with the RFP's requirements. BI decided that it would not provide its Disaster Recovery Plan to the Department ?because it has always been a practice that we not provide that unless it is outside of the production of the RFP, upon request.? The decision to ignore the requirement was made with calculated and matter-of-fact intent, relying on the assumption that it would entail at most a scoring reduction. In lieu of providing the Disaster Recovery Plan as required, Ms. White testified that elements of the plan were ?listed within the RFP itself in several different sections, about 30 different pages.? Thus, according to BI, various elements of what one might expect to find in a Disaster Recovery Plan lay flung about in unrelated sections of its RFP proposal, awaiting the efforts of the intrepid evaluators to uncover their existence and significance. BI‘s assertion that it intended those far-flung elements to meet the RFP‘s requirement that it provide its Disaster Recovery Plan is belied by its express statement that, with knowledge of its action, it elected to omit the Disaster Recovery Plan. The evaluation of a procurement proposal is not akin to a game of hide-and-seek. It is unreasonable to expect evaluators to scour each proposal to glean information scattered throughout, when there is a clear, unmistakable, and mandatory direction to provide the Disaster Recovery Plan as a single, stand-alone document. Compliance with a mandatory item of a public procurement, particularly one designed to ensure that the proposing vendor can adequately reply to a disaster scenario when its services are arguably most needed, cannot be left to the chance that an evaluator might be able to sift through the proposal, and to thereby piece together an understanding of what disaster preparedness measures are proposed. The fact that the Disaster Recovery Plan contains confidential and proprietary information does not lessen the obligation to provide that information. Section 4.3.20. of the RFP provides the procedure by which confidential, proprietary, or trade secret material may be subject to protection under the Constitution and laws of Florida. If a proposed vendor believes the protections to be insufficient, it has a hard decision to make as to whether to submit or not submit a proposal. That decision does not include whether to ignore a mandatory requirement of the RFP on the chance that the consequence would be insignificant. It is clear that the Department never determined whether BI‘s admitted failure to disregard the Disaster Recovery Plan requirement was a material deviation from the terms, conditions, and specifications of the RFP. When Ms. Wright finally reviewed the BI proposal immediately before the posting of the award of the contract, she noted that BI had not submitted a copy of its Disaster Recovery Plan as required by the RFP. Ms. Wright did not follow the established procedure of discussing the issue with Mr. Staney, nor was legal staff consulted. Rather, Ms. Wright called Douglas Smith, who was an evaluator. Ms. Wright indicated that, despite BI‘s express statement that it was not submitting a copy of its Disaster Recovery Plan as required, she wanted ?to check with Mr. Smith on if he felt comfortable with what they had shared about the Disaster Recovery Plan, and was it sufficient.? Mr. Smith recalled his conversation with Ms. Wright, and indicated that ?it wasn‘t so much the Disaster Recovery Plan specifically, she was asking about the elements we reviewed. Are you comfortable with the score that was given? Are they adequate, satisfactory to be able to perform the services based on the contract?? Based on her discussion with Mr. Jones, Ms. Wright unilaterally determined that she did not need to take the issue of the omission of the Disaster Recovery Plan to Mr. Staney or to legal staff. Notably, Ms. Wright admitted that she did not make a determination of whether BI‘s admitted failure to provide a copy of its Disaster Recovery Plan, as required by the RFP, was a material deviation or a minor irregularity. Vendors with an interest in the Florida contract may have been discouraged from submitting proposals because of similar concerns with the security of their Disaster Recovery Plans, or because they did not have a stand-alone Disaster Recovery Plan. It generally cannot be known how many, if any, potential proposers may have been dissuaded from submitting a proposal because of one project specification or another. However, although the effect of an agency choosing to ignore a clear and unambiguous requirement for one proposer that is applicable to all other proposers confers a competitive advantage that is difficult to calculate, it is nonetheless real. Furthermore, withholding its Disaster Recovery Plan until after the posting of the award gave BI the opportunity to review the other proposals. If it then determined that its proposal was less than advantageous, it could effectively pull itself from the procurement by maintaining its refusal to submit its Disaster Recovery Plan when requested by the Department. Thus, the failure to submit the Disaster Recovery Plan when required was a material deviation that conferred a competitive advantage on BI that was not enjoyed by the other compliant proposers. In addition to the foregoing, the refusal to enforce the clear and unambiguous requirement that BI submit a copy of its Disaster Recovery Plan, particularly when such a waiver has occurred outside of the Department‘s normal practice of evaluating deviations from the requirements of the RFP, and after the preliminary outcome of the evaluation was known, raises the distinct appearance of favoritism and preferential treatment towards BI. BI‘s failure to provide a copy of its Disaster Recovery plan is not in substantial accord with the RFP‘s requirements, and is a material deviation from the terms, conditions, and specifications of the RFP. The Department‘s failure to enforce the requirement in accordance with the terms of section 1.15 was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, and capricious. Issue 4: Failure to provide a training curriculum The RFP, at section 5.5.13, provides that ?[t]he proposer shall provide a detailed description of the approach to meeting or exceeding all Training requirements in section 3.16, and specifically: . . . provide a copy of the training curriculum.? In response to section 5.5.15 of the RFP, BI provided a summary of the topics to be covered in its course for training officers and other employees in the use of the monitoring system. The summary described the outline for the training to be provided, but did not go into detail as to manner in which the training would be provided. The RFP does not define the term ?curriculum.? In general, a curriculum is defined as ?the courses offered by an educational institution? or ?a set of courses constituting an area of specialization.? MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, at http://www.merriam-webster.com. In this case, there is a single training course. The information provided by BI described the basic course that it intended to provide. What appears to be the subject of Pro Tech‘s complaint is that BI did not provide a complete syllabus, or the complete set of materials, for the training course that was to be provided. A syllabus or training materials were not required. The RFP, at section 3.16, provided that: [t]he training curriculum . . . [is] hereby adopted as the approved curriculum . . . to be utilized for all training purposes under this Contract. Said curriculum . . . [is] incorporated herein as if fully stated. Any changes to these documents shall be approved in writing by the Department‘s Contract Manager. Based on that provision of the RFP, a credible argument can be made that the intent of the provision was for the proposer to submit a document far more comprehensive than provided by BI. The Department‘s proffered explanation that the ?curriculum? provided by BI was what was intended by the RFP is not convincing, and generally runs contrary to the requirements of section 3.16. However, the description of what was to constitute a curriculum was imprecise and ambiguous. The information provided by BI describes the training course offering, and may reasonably be construed -- in a broad sense of the term -- to be a curriculum. The response provided by BI to section 5.5.15 is in substantial accord with the RFP's requirements as stated, and was not a material deviation from those requirements. Issue 5: Failure to provide the FCC license for the ?Beacon? Section 5.5.5 of the RFP requires the proposed vendors to provide the Department with ?a detailed description of the General Equipment specifications that meets or exceeds all requirements in section 3.7.2,? and ?provide copies of required licensing by the Federal Communications Commission for the equipment proposed.? The equipment proposed by BI as responsive to the general equipment specifications of section 3.7.2 consists of the ExacuTrack One single piece GPS tracking unit. The ExacuTrack One meets or exceeds all requirements established in section 3.7.2. The FCC grant of equipment authorization was provided for the ExacuTrack One unit. The ?Beacon? was identified in section 5.5.21 of the RFP as a value-added service that was above and beyond the RFP‘s minimum service delivery requirements and specifications. The Beacon is not a necessary component of the equipment for tracking offenders as established in section 3.7.2, but serves as a home-base unit to transmit location and data, and conserve battery power. Section 5.5.5, is reasonably construed to require that the FCC ?license? be provided only for the general equipment proposed pursuant to section 3.7.2 of the RFP. BI complied with that requirement. Based on the terms, conditions and specifications of the RFP, the response provided by BI to section 5.5.5 is in substantial accord with the RFP's requirements, and was not a material deviation from those requirements. Ultimate Findings of Fact Based on the foregoing, the BI response to Request for Proposals, Solicitation Number 10-DC-8200, materially deviated from the mandatory terms, conditions, and specifications of sections 5.3.2.3. of the RFP, as supplemented by Addendum #1, and section 5.5.13 of the RFP. The items that rendered the BI proposal non-responsive, and that materially deviated from the terms, conditions, and specifications of the RFP, gave BI an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by the other proposers, were not minor irregularities, and could not be waived under the terms of the RFP. Based on the foregoing, Pro Tech demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the award of the contract to BI was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, and capricious. The undersigned is not unmindful of the fact that BI proposed the lowest cost, and that the rejection of the BI proposal will result in a higher overall cost for offender monitoring services to the state. Perhaps the fact that Pro Tech proposed a system that was scored higher based on its business experience and technical merits will offset any concerns. Regardless, the decision as to whether BI met the clear and unambiguous requirements of RFP 10-DC-8200 cannot, in the interests of fair and open competition, be the result of preferential treatment afforded to BI based on one element of a multi-factored RFP.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Corrections, enter a final order that adopts the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein. It is further recommended that the contract issued in response to Request for Proposals, Solicitation Number 10-DC-8200, entitled "Global Positioning Satellite Electronic Monitoring Services" be awarded to Petitioner, Pro Tech Monitoring, Inc. as the highest scoring responsive vendor. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of April, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 2012. 1/ The protest petition initially alleged that the evaluation team members did not meet the experience and knowledge requirements of section 287.057(16)(a), and that the price proposed by BI was unrealistically low, thereby jeopardizing the ability of BI to provide service under the contract. Both of those issues were withdrawn prior to the final hearing. 2/ If the issue of the responsiveness of the Pro Tech proposal had not been waived, the undersigned would have found and concluded that BI failed to demonstrate that the Pro Tech proposal was not responsive to the terms, conditions, and specifications of the RFP. The responsiveness issue was related solely to whether Pro Tech identified its contracts, provided narrative summaries, and disclosed complaints related thereto, in violation of sections 5.3.2. and 5.2.9. of the RFP. The only evidence of such non-responsiveness was related to a contract between G4S Justice Services, LLC, and the state of Connecticut, for which Pro Tech was a subcontractor. The RFP contained no requirement that a proposer disclose or discuss its subcontracts with other vendors, but rather required only the disclosure of ?all current and/or past (or within three (3) years) federal, state or government contracts.? Therefore, Pro Tech‘s failure to disclose its subcontract with G4S -- despite its disclosure of a different subcontract to which it was a party in Missouri - - was not a deviation from the terms, conditions, and specifications of the RFP. 3/ The suggestion that the Department ?allowed? the BI proposal to pass through the review process, or that the Department made such a decision, is a bit inaccurate. The evidence clearly demonstrates that the Department made no decision as to whether BI‘s proposal contained material deviations until faced with the issue in the context of litigation. However, for ease of reference, the terms ?allowed? and ?decision? will be used when describing the effect of BI‘s decisions to submit less information than required under the terms, conditions, and specifications of the RFP, and the Department‘s after-the-fact litigation strategy to support its determination to award the contract to BI. 4/ In Syslogic Technology Servs., Inc. v. So. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., Case No. 01-4385BID, at 61, n.19, (Fla. DOAH Jan. 18, 2002; SFWMD Mar. 6, 2002), Judge Van Laningham was similarly faced with a situation in which the agency failed to make a determination as to whether a deviation from the procurement specifications was material until after the proposals were scored and ranked, and the preliminary outcome known. His analysis is instructive and well-written, and is adopted, with full attribution, by the undersigned. The reason for this should be clear: If the decision on materiality were made from a post facto perspective based on extrinsic factors, then the temptation would be great to base the determination on reasons that should not bear on the issue. In particular, the materiality of a deviation should not depend on whether the deficient proposal happens to be highest ranked. To see this point, imagine a close football game in which, at the start of the fourth quarter, one team scores a go-ahead touchdown -- if the receiver came down in bounds. Would anyone think it fair if the referees awarded the points provisionally and reserved ruling on whether the touchdown should count until after the end of the game? Of course not. In a contest, potentially determinative decisions involving a competitor's compliance with the rules need to be made when the outcome is in doubt, when the effect of the decision is yet unknown; otherwise, the outcome may be manipulated. 5/ The Department would treat the failure to disclose the October 5, 2010, incident as a minor irregularity, thus allowing it to be treated as a scoring issue. However, the October 5, 2010, incident cannot be treated as a scoring issue due to BI‘s failure to disclose. Captain Yossarian would have made an appropriate evaluator of Request for Proposals No. 10-DC-8200. 6/ Again, with a tip of the hat to Judge Van Laningham: When an agency asserts for the first time as a party litigant in a bid protest that an irregularity was immaterial, the contention must be treated, not with deference as a presumptively neutral finding of ultimate fact, but with fair impartiality as a legal argument; in other words, the agency is entitled to nothing more or less than to be heard on an equal footing with the protester. Phil‘s Expert Tree Service v. Broward Co. Sch. Bd., Case No. 06- 4499BID at 42, n.13, (Fla. DOAH Mar. 19, 2007; BCSB June 11, 2007). 7/ To BI‘s credit, it did disclose an investigation by the state of New Jersey into its billing practices which, not surprisingly, ?concluded that BI was not at fault,? and for which BI included 23 pages of supportive information. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Stephen Menton, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, and Purnell, P.A. 119 South Monroe Street, Suite 202 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 smenton@reuphlaw.com Christopher Ryan Maloney, Esquire Foley and Lardner Suite 1300 1 Independent Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32202 cmaloney@foley.com Benjamin J. Grossman, Esquire Foley and Lardner, LLP Suite 900 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 bjgrossman@foley.com Jonathan P. Sanford, Esquire Florida Department of Corrections 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 sanford.jonathan@mail.dc.state.fl.us Ken Tucker, Secretary Department of Corrections 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Jennifer Parker, General Counsel Department of Corrections 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57173.08253.39287.001287.012287.057697.07
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BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL LAND SURVEYORS vs. GUSTAV A FIMMEL, 84-004494 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-004494 Latest Update: Aug. 23, 1985

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, respondent held a license to practice land surveying in the State of Florida. In March 1984, Joseph L. Abrams a land developer, hired the respondent to perform certain professional services in connection with a proposed development known as Doug's Unit Number One. Mr. Abrams hired the respondent because he had previously performed land surveying services for Mr. Abrams and had done a good job. Doug's Unit Number One involved six acres of land which had been preliminarily subdivided by an engineer into 14 separate lots. The preliminary drawing by the engineer, showing set backs, easements, and other matters, had been approved by the City of Winter Springs, but Mr. Abrams needed a sealed drawing to record. He therefore hired the respondent as a professional surveyor, to describe the lots in surveying terms and prepare a sealed set of drawings. On March 27, 1984, the respondent prepared a bill for the services and itemized the total cost of $756 as follows: drafting of S/D on linen, $250; cost of linen $6; engineering, calculations telephone calls specifications, Winter Springs conference, etc., $500. Mr. Abrams paid the bill the same day. Mr. Abrams was informed that respondent had paid Burl (Mike) Drennen to do the drafting, and, as soon as the drafting was done, either respondent or Mr. Drennen would deliver the drawings, properly sealed, to Mr. Abrams. The drawings were to be delivered in two to three weeks. Respondent also informed Mr. Abrams that respondent was leaving for New Jersey and would be gone for a few weeks. Respondent gave Mr. Abrams his phone number in New Jersey and Mr. Drennen's phone number. After two weeks elapsed and the drawings had not been delivered, Mr. Abrams began calling the respondent and Mr. Drennen. Sometime in April or May, Mr. Abrams was able to contact respondent in New Jersey and the respondent explained that he would be unable to return to Florida for another two to three weeks due to his wife's serious illness. Mr. Abrams also contacted Mr. Drennen, who informed him that he would not deliver the drawings because he had not been fully paid for his drafting services and because he would have to receive authorization from the respondent before the drawings were released since the respondent had hired him. Mr. Drennen told Mr. Abrams that he would try to contact respondent to get the authorization to release the drawings, but Mr. Drennen was unable to contact the respondent. However after several more conversations with Mr. Abrams, Mr. Drennen agreed to deliver the drawings if Mr. Abrams paid him the remaining money he was owed. 1/ On June 6, 1984, Mr. Drennen delivered the drawings and was paid $180 by Mr. Abrams. However, when Mr. Abrams looked over the sheet, he realized that the sheet had not been sealed. He tried to contact the respondent, and when he was unable to do so, he decided to go to another surveyor. The new surveyor could not simply take the drawing and seal it; he had to do the entire project over again. Mr. Mims, the new surveyor, charged $1,250 which was paid in October or November of 1984 and the sealed drawings were delivered and recorded on December 20, 1984. By letter dated June 7, 1984, Mr. Abrams filed a complaint with the Department of Professional Regulation, and on August 15, 1984, Mr. Alvin Lewis Smith, an investigator with the Department, contacted respondent by telephone in New Jersey to inquire about the matter. The respondent admitted that he had not completed the project, but he stated that he had his seal in New Jersey and, if Mr. Abrams had sent the drawings to him, he could have signed and sealed the drawings and sent them back to Mr. Abrams. However, when asked if he had done any field work for the project, respondent said that he had not and that he couldn't seal the drawings because he hadn't done the field work. Nevertheless, on August 16, 1984, respondent wrote to Mr. Abrams stating that he had taken his seal to New Jersey and that he could sign and seal the linen and have it back to Mr. Abrams in two days if Mr. Abrams would send the drawings to him by Federal Express. At the hearing the respondent testified that the $756 payment was for drawing up the plat and performing calculations and engineering work on the project, but it was not for doing the field work. However respondent acknowledged that the field work had to be done before the plat could be sealed and recorded. All the other evidence and testimony presented at the hearing indicates that the respondent agreed to deliver drawings to Mr. Abrams that were properly prepared and sealed for recording. It is therefore apparent that the $756 paid by Mr. Abrams to respondent was to cover all the work necessary, including the field work, for the plat to be recorded. Without being sealed, the drawings were useless. During the time of this incident the respondent had personal problems which required him to stay in New Jersey. His wife was quite ill and his wife's parents' estate had to be settled. Respondent has been a registered surveyor for over 30 years and, until the instant action, had never had a complaint filed against him.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon due consideration of respondent's personal circumstances at the time of this incident and respondent's previously unblemished record, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding respondent guilty of those acts set forth in Sections 472.033(1)(g) and 472.033(1)(h), Florida Statutes, reprimanding the respondent, and placing him on probation for a period of one year with such terms and conditions as may be deemed necessary by the Board of Professional Land Surveyors. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee Leon County Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of August, 1985.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68455.227472.033
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DELOITTE AND TOUCHE, L.L.P. vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 95-000727BID (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 21, 1995 Number: 95-000727BID Latest Update: Aug. 23, 1995

The Issue Whether Respondent Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), acted illegally, dishonestly, fraudulently, arbitrarily or/and capriciously in determining to award the contract for RFP 95-142CM-FAP to Unisys Corporation (Unisys).

Findings Of Fact On November 14, 1994, HRS's Office of Information Systems distributed the RFP, entitled "FLORIDA System --Applications Programming Services." The RFP was designed to procure the programming services required by HRS to complete the software programming of, among other things, the state's federally mandated Child Support Enforcement System, and to maintain and enhance the system upon its completion. Upon selection of the winning proposal, HRS intended to enter into the contract for thirty-six months, renewable upon agreement of the parties for an additional 12 months. The cost proposal rates for the initial three-year term would be binding for any subsequent work on the project. HRS also reserved the right to acquire additional consulting services from the contractor for related activities for up to one year after the termination of the Contract. HRS began developing this RFP in the late spring or early summer of 1994 in anticipation of the expiration of the current contract with Deloitte for provision of applications programming services. Before release to prospective proposers, the RFP was approved by HRS' Office of Contract Services and the Information Technology Resources Procurement Advisory Commission (ITRPAC), a body consisting of various state officials including the head of the Division of Purchasing, which ensures that the RFP complies with state rules. In addition, various federal agencies approved the RFP before its release to prospective proposers. The RFP provided that 60 percent of the proposal scoring would be based on the technical proposals contained in the responses to the RFP, and that the remaining 40 percent of the score would be assigned to the costs as submitted in the proposals. After scoring and weighting of the scores, the weighted scores were to be combined to determine the winning proposal. The breakdown of scoring between technical and cost components is based upon HRS' standard practice and its experience with the format required by other state and federal agencies with whom HRS works. The division of the scores was also intended to ensure that an unqualified vendor did not secure the bid solely on the basis of low cost. The selection of the evaluation criteria and weighting of evaluation points for this RFP were subject to the discretion of the Department at the time the RFP was prepared. On December 12, 1994, HRS held a bidders' conference at which representatives of Deloitte and Unisys were in attendance. EVALUATION OF RESPONSES On January 6, 1995, Deloitte and Unisys submitted the only two proposals in response to the RFP. Both proposals were deemed responsive to the requirements of the RFP. HRS appointed a five member Evaluation Committee to review and evaluate the proposals. HRS provided training to the Evaluation Committee members specifically directed to the proper method for reviewing and scoring proposals submitted in response to the RFP. Each member of the Evaluation Committee was qualified by training, education and experience to review and evaluate the technical merits of each proposal. The RFP defined the criteria by which the proposals would be reviewed, scored and ranked by the Evaluation Committee, and the contract awarded. Included in the RFP were blank cost proposal forms which the proposers were to complete. Those forms did not include any blank spaces to be filled in referencing costs associated with any "renewal" periods or otherwise provide for including information about proposed costs for any renewal periods. The Evaluation Committee members each independently reviewed the technical proposals submitted in response to the RFP over a period of approximately two weeks. Committee members submitted the raw scores from their technical evaluations to Karin Morris, the HRS System Program Administrator. The cost proposals were opened and scored on January 20, 1995 by Ms. Morris. The RFP provided, in Section 6.0, that a comprehensive, fair, and impartial evaluation would be conducted of all proposals received. The RFP also provided for the grouping of evaluation criteria into six categories with points assigned as follows: - Mandatory Requirements 0 points - Management Summary 0 points - Corporate Capabilities 200 points - Project Staff 200 points - Technical Approach 100 points - Project Workplan 100 points - Cost 400 points Section 6.0 of the RFP also contained the following language: Selection of the successful proposer will be based on the proposal that is determined to be in the best interest of the department, taking into consideration cost and other criteria set forth in the RFP. Further, the RFP provided, in Section 6.1, that: An Evaluation Committee will be established to assist the department in selection of the winning contractor(s). All proposals not meeting the mandatory requirements will be rejected. The committee will evaluate the technical approach, corporate capabilities and project staff of all responsive proposals. The committee will rank proposers by the resulting scores and make a recommended award. The committee will summarize their findings and prepare an evaluation report to the Deputy Secretary for Administration. The report will then be presented to the Secretary of HRS. The Secretary will review the final report, pertinent supporting materials and make the determination of the final award, taking into consideration cost and other evaluation criteria set forth in the RFP. The Secretary reserves the right to take any additional administrative steps deemed necessary in determining the final award. (Emphasis added). Most importantly, Section 6.3(D) of the RFP dealing with the evaluation of the cost proposals stated: The points awarded for the three cost evaluation categories will be totaled and added to the points awarded for technical evaluation cate- gories 3 through 6 to determine the winning proposer. (Emphasis added). After reviewing and comparing the weighted scores of both proposals, the Evaluation Committee issued a "Final Report," with recommendations, on January 30, 1995. The weighted technical scores reflected in the Evaluation Committee's Final Report are as follows: DELOITTE UNISYS Corporate Capabilities 200 186.36 Project Staff 200 159.07 Technical Approach 100 76.62 Project Workplan 100 76.73 TOTAL 600 499 The weighted cost scores were: DELOITTE UNISYS Fixed Price Tasks 10.0 2.27 Monthly Price 357.90 380.0 Hourly Price 7.77 10.0 TOTAL 375.67 392.2 Totaling all categories as required by paragraph 6.3(D) of the RFP, the Department's Evaluation Committee arrived at the following final ranking: DELOITTE UNISYS Technical Proposal 600 499 Business Proposal 376 392 TOTAL 976 891 Based upon the Evaluation Committee's scores, Deloitte's demonstrated technical capability is 20 percent higher than that of Unisys. Under the terms of the RFP, there was no discretion involved in scoring the cost portion of the proposals, including the weight to be accorded costs in the final overall scoring to determine the winning bidder. Based upon HRS' inclusion of the specific criteria in the RFP, the cost portion scoring was merely a mechanical calculation. Both of the proposers' cost proposals fall within the agency's budgetary limits for the current year for accomplishing the work requested by the RFP. Four of the five members of the HRS Evaluation Committee recommended award of the contract to Deloitte, in the following language: Deloitte & Touche scored higher in all areas including recommendations. Deloitte and Touche is the incumbent contractor and therefore there are no risks associated with the transition. Deloitte understood the requirements of the RFP and addressed them more completely in their proposal. Therefore, it is our recommendation that the contract should be awarded to Deloitte & Touche. (Emphasis added). One member of the Evaluation Committee recommended the decision be left to the Secretary of HRS. None of the members of the HRS Evaluation Committee recommended award of the contract to Unisys. HRS SECRETARY'S DECISION TO AWARD TO UNISYS On January 27, 1995, prior to preparation of the recommendations contained in, or the issuance of, the Evaluation Committee's Final Report, HRS Secretary James Towey convened a meeting with Deputy Secretary Lowell Clary, John Holland, Bill Belleville and the department's legal counsel to discuss the contract award process, a draft of the Evaluation Committee's Final Report and other matters the Secretary felt relevant to HRS' ultimate decision on the RFP. At the meeting, Towey was informed by Bill Belleville that Deloitte's proposal was the "best." Towey was also informed by John Holland and Bill Belleville that both companies could perform under the contract. However, neither Holland's nor Belleville's assessments were based on responses to the RFP, but rather upon their own experience with the two vendors outside of this RFP process. Belleville conceded that he believed that a proposer was qualified to perform the contract by merely meeting the "mandatory" requirements of the RFP, a category that was accorded zero points in the scoring criteria. Informed that both companies could perform under the contract, Towey "zeroed in" on costs as the major consideration for the award of the contract. At the meeting, he considered a present-value calculation of the payments that the State would make over the course of a contract, if the contract had been for a 48 month term. The calculation had been prepared by Dean Modling, an HRS senior management analyst supervisor, although the RFP had been approved by the Department of Management Services without provision for such an analysis. The RFP not inform proposers that a present-value analysis would be performed and provision for the present-value of a contract was not included in the scoring criteria for the proposals. Present value calculation became an issue when it was raised and discussed at the January 27, 1995 meeting, and subsequently used in the Secretary's decision to award the contract to Unisys. Towey also considered, in deciding to award the contract to Unisys, a calculation of "raw costs," provided after the January 27, 1995 meeting. These "raw costs" were presented on two charts. Both added up the amounts submitted by each proposer for fixed price tasks and monthly costs, over 36 months. Although the RFP did not request, and neither proposer submitted costs for a 48 month contract, the two charts included a calculation for a hypothetical 48 month contract using the same monthly payments submitted for the 36 month contract. In addition, one of the two charts included a 5.8 percent factor for overtime, which was also not addressed by the RFP or by the proposals submitted in response to the RFP. There was no evaluation criteria contained in the RFP which dealt with the issue of "raw costs" over the term of the contract. Prior to the decision to award to Unisys, HRS never performed and Towey never considered a present value analysis for the 36 month contract period provided for in the RFP. Finally, as a result of concern expressed at the January 27, 1995 meeting regarding whether Unisys could handle the immediate tasks required by the contract, including requirements of the Child Support Enforcement and federal certification programs, Towey considered whether there would be any risk of transition if Unisys were unable to hire some of Deloitte's employees and subcontractors should he decide to award the contract to Unisys. Towey specifically requested Deputy Secretary Clary to research this issue. In order to obtain information, Clary had HRS personnel directly contact Deloitte's subcontractors. Clary responded to Towey three days later on January 30, 1995, the day before the decision by Towey to award the contract to Unisys, that Deloitte's subcontractors would not be prohibited from working for Unisys. Consideration of overtime and risk of transition were not criteria contained in the RFP, nor were these elements evaluated and scored by the HRS Evaluation Committee. By way of a January 31, 1995 memorandum to Clary announcing the award of the contract to Unisys, Towey stated: I have now had an opportunity to review the report of the evaluators of this RFP, the recommendations contained therein, the raw data submitted with the proposals, and the RFP. I understand the nature of the project and its importance to the agency. Based upon my review of the information presented to me and my understanding of similar projects in the past, my decision is to award the contract to Unisys as the proposal most advantageous to the state of Florida, taking into consideration the price and other criteria set forth in the RFP. Although I have considered the risk of transition to a new contractor, I find that I am unable to ignore the dollar savings which will result in awarding the contract to Unisys. Since you and your staff have assured me that both companies are technically competent to perform the work, I believe the monetary savings outweigh any risk that might exist in the transition of contractors. Therefore, I have determined that it is in the state's best interest to award the contract to Unisys. Please take whatever steps are necessary to implement this decision. (Emphasis added). By his actions, Towey exercised more than the prerogative conferred by the RFP to "take any additional administrative steps deemed necessary in determining the final award" and actually evaluated criteria other than that contained in the RFP in reaching his decision to award the contract to Unisys. Further, in awarding the contract to Unisys, Towey effectively altered the relative weight of the criteria as specified in the RFP. Towey relied upon the advice of Clary. Illustrative of Clary's perspective is his testimony at the final hearing that he believed the 60/40 weighting contained in the RFP to be inapplicable to decision making by the Secretary of HRS. Neither Bill Belleville nor John Holland reviewed, in detail, the proposals submitted in response to the RFP. Neither performed their own independent analysis of the responses. Further, Clary never reviewed the RFP nor the proposals submitted in response to the RFP. In the course of his decision making process with regard to award of the contract to Unisys, Towey relied on the advice of Clary, Belleville and Holland, referred to by Towey as his "top managers", despite their undisputed lack of familiarity with the Deloitte and Unisys proposals. While his memorandum dated January 31, 1995, states he reviewed the RFP, Towey admitted in his testimony at the final hearing that he had not personally reviewed the document. Further, he never reviewed or performed his own analysis of the two proposals submitted in response to the RFP. The members of the Evaluation Committee members were the only persons to fully and carefully evaluate the two proposals and score them under the criteria contained in the RFP. Since that time, no one else from HRS has attempted to reevaluate or re-score the proposals. Neither Towey nor anyone else involved in the January 27, 1995 meeting disagrees with the analysis and scoring of the proposals by the Evaluation Committee. PRESENT-VALUE ANALYSIS Section 1.2 of the RFP, states, in part: This RFP will result in a thirty-six month contract. Further, Section 4.12(C) of the RFP states, in part: Upon selection of the winning proposal, the department shall enter into a contract for thirty-six (36) months. Although the possibility of renewal of the contract for a maximum of a single, one year term is contained in the RFP, there is no provision in the RFP which requires that HRS renew the contract after 36 months or that the contractor accept a renewal after 36 months for any specific term. By the terms of the RFP, any renewal of the contract for a period beyond the 36 month term is subject to negotiation between the contractor and the department. While proposals submitted by Unisys and Deloitte commit to maintaining the same costs in the event of renewal, negotiation as to the length, price and staffing for any renewal period less than a year, is not excluded by the terms of the RFP. Neither HRS nor the contractor is bound, under the terms of the RFP, to any extension of the contract. HRS' own manual, HRSP 75-3, entitled "Developing a Request for Proposal," states, in the section on contract renewals: If Contract Renewals have been provided for in this RFP, include the following recommended language in the Special Provisions subsection of the RFP: This contract may be renewed on a yearly basis not to exceed two (2) years beyond the initial contract or for a period no longer than the term of the original contract whichever period is longer. Such renewals shall be contingent upon satisfactory performance evaluations as determined by the department and shall be subject to the availability of funds. As specified in the provider's response to the RFP/ITB, the total cost for the contract under the' first year renewal will not exceed $ and the second year renewal will not exceed $ . Each renewal shall be confirmed in writing and shall be subject to the same terms and conditions set forth in the initial contract. (Emphasis added). Another in-house document at HRS is HRS manual, HRSM 75-2 (May 1, 1994 update), entitled "Contract Management System for Contractual Services". Chapter 5 of that document, entitled "Contractual Procurement Requirements," states, in pertinent part: The dollar amount and the manner in which the costs for the . . . renewals will be calculated must be specified in the response to the RFP and in the resulting contract document. By contrast, the RFP contains none of the language specified in either HRS manual regarding renewal. Section 4.12(c) of the RFP merely states: This contract term shall be renewable for a max- imum of a one year term upon the mutual agreement in writing of the contractor and the department. (Emphasis added). Terms of the RFP did not invite proposers to submit a specific cost or any other information for a renewal period or explain how costs for a renewal period would be calculated. Neither did the RFP contain any language that renewals would be conditioned on satisfactory performance by the contractor. Proposers, on blank cost forms, were requested in the RFP to provide HRS with their proposed prices for fixed price items, monthly costs and hourly costs. The forms, contrary to the requirements of HRS manuals applicable in situations where information for a renewal term is requested, did not provide a place for proposers to indicate costs for any renewal term or to demonstrate how those costs were calculated. Both contractors understood that any renewal would be subject to negotiation. The "Standard Contract" contained in the RFP provides only for a term of 36 months and a cost for that specific contract term. Consistent with the terms of the RFP that the contract was for a 36 month term, HRS submitted, on more than one occasion, materials to ITRPAC. In those materials, HRS represented that the proposed budget amounts of $25 million and $28 million for the project were for a three year term contract. The Notice of Award which HRS issued stated that a three year contract was to be awarded. Although the RFP addressed staffing at a maximum of 107 persons, HRS was aware that 100 percent staffing might not always occur. Section 2.l(B)(5) of the RFP permits 90 percent of the maximum staffing level at a given time without the vendor incurring a penalty. At one point in the RFP preparation, a draft of the RFP required 95 percent staffing. Even that level was considered by HRS to be too restrictive and anti-competitive and was amended to 90 percent out of fear that a 95 percent staffing level would discourage submission of competitive proposals. The 90 percent figure was also used in the RFP to account, in part, for projected attrition of contractor employees that HRS had historically experienced on this project. From the standpoint of budgetary allowances by HRS for the project, it is realistic to believe that the job will be staffed at somewhere between 90 percent and 95 percent rather than at the maximum staffing level of 107 employees. Although Section 4.15(D)(5) of the RFP states that the State is not responsible for paying contractor's employees for leave or vacation time, the testimony of Petitioner's financial expert, Dr. Elton Scott, establishes that a reasonable assumption is to assume that each employee is entitled to, and would take, at least two weeks vacation. Such an assumption should also be included when performing a present value analysis, particularly when assuming 100 percent staffing. Depending on budget allocations for this project, it is possible that HRS would only require that the contractor provide as few as 46 employees. The present value calculation performed by HRS indicated that, over 48 months, at 100 percent staffing (107 employees), the monetary cost of awarding the contract to Unisys would be approximately $500,000 less than the cost of awarding the contract to Deloitte, a savings of approximately 1.5 percent over the term of the contract. As demonstrated by HRS' subsequent present value calculation performed at final hearing in this cause, for the 36 month actual contract period, at maximum staffing, HRS would realize a savings of no more than $39,802 by awarding the contract to Unisys, a savings of less than 2/10ths of 1 percent. None of HRS' present value calculations accounted for leave/vacation time or for any staffing levels under 100 percent for any other reasons. Based upon the terms of the RFP, the language of HRS' procurement manuals, and the expert testimony of Dr. Scott, any valid present-value analysis should have included a 36 month term contract. Any such analysis should also have taken into account varying levels of staffing, leave/vacation time, and overtime if staffed at the minimum required. A properly performed present-value analysis indicates that Deloitte's proposal is less expensive than the Unisys proposal in the following amounts over a 36 month contract term, at the staffing levels indicated: Employees Leave/Vacation Time Overtime Deloitte Savings 107 2 weeks none $12,791 96 none none $109,062 96 none 5.8 percent $ 18,327 46 none none $844,473 (Pet. Exh. 15) The only scenario in which the Unisys proposal is less costly than the Deloitte proposal, using the proper present value analysis, would be at 107 employees, with no accounting for leave time. This unlikely future scenario would result in a savings of no more than $47,378, or less than 2/10ths of l percent of the contract amount over 36 months. Because it requires an up-front payment of more than $1,600,000 (as compared to $78,000 for Deloitte), the Unisys proposal places the State of Florida at substantially more financial risk than the Deloitte proposal in the event of nonperformance by Unisys. On February 1, 1995, HRS posted its notice of intent to award the Contract to Unisys. Deloitte filed its timely notice of intent to protest on February 3, 1995, and filed its timely formal protest and request for hearing on February 13, 1995.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered which declines the award to Unisys and takes into account the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law when deciding the future course of contracting for the services sought by the RFP. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of May, 1995. DON W. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 1995. APPENDIX In accordance with provisions of Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, the following rulings are made with regard to purposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Intervenor's Proposed Findings: Adopted. Adopted as to 1st sentence. Remainder not relevant with exception of last sentence which is adopted. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. Accepted. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 6.-7. Rejected, cumulative. 8. Accepted. 9.-10. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. Accepted. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. Accepted. Rejected, cumulative. 15.-17. Rejected, subordinate. 18.-20. Rejected, relevance. 21.-22. Accepted. 23. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 24.-25. Accepted. 26.-29. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 30. Accepted. 31.-36. Rejected, subordinate. Rejected, weight of the evidence. Rejected, opinion, weight of the evidence. 39.-41. Rejected, subordinate. Respondent's Proposed Findings: 1.-3. Adopted, not verbatim. 1.-6. Adopted by reference. 7. Rejected, relevance. 8.-9. Rejected, cumulative, unnecessary. 10.-12. Accepted. 13. Rejected, cumulative. 14.-16. Accepted. Rejected, weight of the evidence. Rejected, relevance. Rejected, weight of the evidence. 20.-21. Rejected, argument. 22.-23. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 24. Rejected, argument. 25.-27. Rejected, subordinate, weight of the evidence. 28.-29. Rejected, relevance. 30.-31. Rejected, subordinate. Rejected, weight of the evidence. Rejected, subordinate, weight of the evidence. Rejected, relevance. 35.-36. Rejected, cumulative. Rejected, weight of the evidence. Accepted. Rejected, argument, weight of the evidence. Rejected, relevance, argument. 41.-42. Rejected, argument. Rejected, subordinate. Rejected, 20 percent difference, improper characterization. Rejected, relevance, argument. Rejected, argument, subordinate. Rejected, redundant, subordinate. Rejected, legal conclusion. Rejected, relevance, argument, lack of credible evidence. Rejected, weight of the evidence. Rejected, subordinate. Rejected, weight of the evidence. Rejected, relevance. Rejected, argumentative, legal conclusion. Rejected, legal conclusion, argument. Rejected, legal conclusion. Petitioner's Proposed Findings Of Fact: 1.-43. Accepted, though not verbatim in some instances. 44. Subordinate to HO findings. 45.-48. Accepted. Subordinate. Accepted. Subordinate. 52.-70. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: William E. Williams, Esq. Red D. Ware, Esq. Huey, Guilday & Tucker, P.A. 106 E. College Ave., Ste. 900 Tallahassee, FL 32301 William A. Frieder, Esq. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 W. Robert Vezina, III Cummings, Lawrence & Vezina, P.A. 1004 DeSoto Park Dr. Tallahassee, FL 32302 Steven A. Blaske Unisys Corporation 4151 Ashford Dunwoody Rd. Atlanta, GA 30319 Robert L. Powell, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Kim Tucker, Esq. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700

Florida Laws (6) 120.53120.57159.07287.012287.057287.0572
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