Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondents be found guilty of violating Subsection 718.301(4)(c) , Florida Statutes, and that a $500 civil penalty be imposed; the remaining charge should be DISMISSED. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of January, 1983 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 1983.
The Issue The issue to be resolved concerns whether the Petitioner was the victim of a discriminatory housing practice, by allegedly being denied the opportunity to rent an apartment from the Respondents, and by being falsely informed of its non- availability, based upon her race.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an African-American female. In early January 2007, she learned of an apartment for rent, owned or managed by the Respondents. She called to inquire about the apartment and was told by the Respondent, Ms. Lindsay, that the rent would be $625.00 per month, with a one-month rent amount and security deposit due in advance. She was told that the Lessee of a neighboring apartment, Clint Cook, would have a key and would show her the apartment. She went to view the apartment, and decided that she wished to rent it. She then telephoned Ms. Lindsay, and Ms. Lindsey faxed an application to her to complete. In the conversation, she told Ms. Lindsay she would not have the required deposit money until Friday. This was on a Monday or Tuesday. Ms. Lindsay then told her securing the apartment was on a “first come-first-served” basis. The Petitioner never completed the application and never tendered the security deposit. Shortly after that telephone conversation, Ms. Lindsay was contacted by Stacey Edwards, while the apartment was still available for rent, concerning rental. Ms. Edwards, on behalf of herself and her boyfriend/husband, submitted an application to rent the apartment, together with the appropriate required deposit and rental amount on January 15, 2007. Ms. Lindsay leased the apartment to the couple. They had a planned move-in date of February 1, 2007. They are a mixed-race couple, and Ms. Lindsay was aware of that fact when renting to them. Sometime after January 15, 2007, the Petitioner called Ms. Lindsay a second time, and was told that the apartment had been rented (to the Edwards couple) and was no longer available. Testimony to this effect is corroborated by the Edwards rental application and deposit receipt, which are in evidence. The Edwards rental was documented on January 15, 2007. Later that month, the Petitioner noticed the “for rent" sign displayed, or displayed again, and she and/or her witness, Lynn Kliesch, called about the apartment’s availability. Ms. Lindsay again stated that it was rented. Indeed, it was, to the Edwards. The rental sign had been left up because the Edwards couple were not scheduled to move in until February 1, 2007. This communication between the parties occurred before Ms. Edwards informed Ms. Lindsay that they would not be moving in. Shortly before February 1,2007. Ms Edwards and her husband/boyfriend learned that his employment had ended (or he was transferred to another job location). They therefore informed Ms. Lindsay that they had to re-locate to South Florida and could not take the apartment. She charged them for the two weeks of rental, and refunded their deposit. She then placed the apartment back on the rental market. On January 31, 2007, Ms. Mari Ferguson inquired of Ms. Lindsay about the apartment’s availability. This was after Ms. Edwards had informed Ms. Lindsay that she would not be renting the apartment. Ms. Lindsay told Ms. Ferguson that the property was available and she rented it to Ms. Ferguson that same day. Ms. Ferguson and her boyfriend, who occupied the apartment with her, were also a mixed-race couple, with children. In fact, the boyfriend is the nephew of the Petitioner herein. Ms. Ferguson and family moved into the apartment. Some months later a hostile situation arose between the Respondents and Ms. Ferguson. Ms. Lindsay apparently received reports that “drug dealing” was occurring in the apartment. Ms. Ferguson and/or the other occupants were responsible for some damage, and Ms. Ferguson became several months behind on rental payments. The Respondents therefore, through legal process, had her evicted. The Respondent, Ms. Lindsay, through her firm, Elite Properties of Northwest Florida, Inc., manages some 37 rental properties in Escambia and Santa Rosa Counties. She is the president and broker for the firm and has no employees or agents. Among the rental property owners she and her firm represent is her Co-Respondent, Michael Houser. Both Ms. Lindsay and Elite Properties, as well as Mr. Houser, have a significant number of minority tenants, both Hispanic and African-American. A substantial number of those, both historically, and at the time of the hearing are single, African-American females, as heads of households. There is no evidence, aside from the Petitioner’s unsubstantiated opinion, that either the Respondent has ever refused to rent to the Petitioner or anyone else, based upon race, nor that they have falsely denied availability of a dwelling for rent or sale for that reason. There is no evidence that they have refused or attempted to avoid holding out a property for rent or sale for reasons based on racial animus.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations, determining that the Respondents did not commit a discriminatory housing practice based upon the Petitioner's race and that the Petition be dismissed in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Sylvia Mims 3382 Greenbriar Circle, Apt. B Gulf Breeze, Florida 32561 Beverly Lindsay 5252 Springdale Drive Milton, Florida 32570 Michael Houser 3533 Edinburgh Drive Pace, Florida 32571 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner herein is the State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes. One Respondent in this matter is Tanwin Corporation (hereinafter "Tanwin") the developer of two residential condominiums known as Vista Del Lago Condominium I and Vista Del Lago Condominium II, located in West Palm Beach, Florida. The other Respondent is Vista Del Lago Condominium Association, Inc. (hereinafter "Association"), the condominium association for Vista Del Lago Condominiums I and II. Transition from developer control of the Association has not occurred, and at all times pertinent hereto, Respondent Tanwin has in fact controlled the operation of the Respondent Association. The Declaration of Condominium for Vista Del Lago Condominium I (hereinafter "Condo I") was recorded in the public records on December 12, 1980. The Declaration of Condominium for Vista Del Lago Condominium II (hereinafter "Condo II") was recorded in the public records on March 11, 1982. Condo I contains 16 units; and Condo II contains 18 units. Herbert and Judith Tannenbaum are the President and Secretary, respectively, of both Tanwin and the Association and are members of the Association's Board of Directors. The developer-controlled Association failed to provide a proposed budget of common expenses for Condo I for the fiscal year 1982. The developer-controlled Association failed to provide a proposed budget of common expenses for Condo I and Condo II for 1983 until the unit owner meeting in March or April of 1983. The budget provided at that time contained no provision for reserves. Although the document alleged to be the 1983 proposed budget admitted in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 17 does contain an allocation for reserves, Petitioner's Exhibits numbered 17 is not the 1983 budget disseminated to unit owners at the annual meeting in 1983. In addition, the 1983 budget was received by the unit owners at the meeting at which the proposed budget was to be considered and not prior to the budget meeting. Statutory reserves were not waived during the period December, 1980 through December, 1983. The "start-up" budgets contained as exhibits to the Declarations of Condominium indicate that reserves were to be collected from unit owners at the rate of $15 per month per unit at least during the first year commencing December of 1980 with the first closing. Hence, reserves were not waived December, 1980 through December, 1981. From November, 1981 through December, 1983, no vote to waive reserves was taken by the unit owners. Although reserves were discussed at the 1983 meeting, no vote was taken during the period in question including 1983, to waive reserves. The developer as owner of unsold units; has failed to pay to the Association monthly maintenance for common expenses during the period December, 1980 through December, 1983. The developer Tanwin has, in the nature of an affirmative defense, alleged the existence of a guarantee of common expenses pursuant to Section 718.116(8), Florida Statutes, which purportedly ran from the inception of the condominiums to date. Accordingly, the initial issue for resolution is whether the developer pursuant to statute guaranteed common expenses. Section 718.116(8)(b) provides that a developer may be excused from payment of common expenses pertaining to developer-owned units for that period of time during which he has guaranteed to each purchaser in the declaration of condominium, purchase contract or prospectus, or by an agreement between the developer and a majority of unit owners other than the developer, that their assessments for common expenses would not increase over a stated dollar amount during the guarantee period and the developer agrees to pay any amount necessary for common expenses not produced by the assessments at the guaranteed level receivable from other unit owners, or "shortfall". Actual purchase agreements were admitted in evidence. Respondents seek to label certain unambiguous language in the purchase contracts as a guarantee. This language, uniform throughout all those contracts as well as the form purchase contract filed with Petitioner except that of Phillip May, provides as follows: 9. UNIT ASSESSMENTS. The Budget included in the Offering Circular sets forth Seller's best estimation of the contemplated expenses for operating and maintaining the Condominium during its initial year. Purchaser's monthly assessment under the aforementioned Budget is in the amount of $109.00. Until Closing of Title, Seller has the right (without affecting Purchaser's obligation to purchase in accordance with the provisions hereof, to modify the estimated Budget and assessments periodically if then current cost figures indicate that an updating of estimates is appropriate). [Emphasis added]. That portion of the purchase agreement set forth above does not constitute a guarantee. Instead, the purchase agreement simply includes a best estimation of expenses for the initial year. It does not govern assessments after the expiration of one year, and even as to the initial year, the language in the contract sets forth only a "best estimation" and not a guarantee that the assessments would not increase during the "guarantee period." Phillip May's purchase agreement reflects that he purchased his unit in August of 1983; after condominium complaints had been filed by the unit owners with the Florida Division of Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes. His purchase agreement has been altered from the purchase agreement of earlier purchasers in that his purchase agreement expressly, by footnote contains a one- year guarantee running from closing. The guarantee contained in his purchase agreement was presented by the developer without any request from Mr. May for the inclusion of a guarantee in his purchase agreement. The guarantee language in this purchase agreement is useful for the purpose of comparing the language with those portions of the pre-complaint contracts which Respondents assert contain or constitute a guarantee. Similarly it is determined that no guarantee of common expenses exists in the Declarations of Condominium for Condo I and II or in the prospectus for Condo II. While Respondents seek to assert the existence of a guarantee in those documents, the portions of those unambiguous documents which according to Respondents contain a guarantee, have no relation to a guarantee or do not guarantee that the assessments for common expenses would not increase. Respondent Tanwin also seeks to prove the existence of an oral guarantee which was allegedly communicated to purchasers at the closing of their particular condominium units. However, purchasers were told by Herbert or Judith Tannenbaum only that assessments should remain in the amount of $109 per month per unit unless there existed insufficient funds in the Association to pay bills. This is the antithesis of a guarantee. During a guarantee period the developer in exchange for an exemption from payment of assessments on developer- owned units agrees to pay any deficits incurred by the condominium association. Accordingly, no guarantee was conveyed at the closing of condominium units. Further Respondent Tanwin's additional contention that an oral guarantee arose when the condominiums came into existence is plainly contradicted by the express language throughout the condominium documents and purchase agreements that there exist no oral representations and that no reliance can be placed on any oral representations outside the written agreements. Further, prior to December, 1983, no reference was ever made by the developer either inside or outside of unit owner meetings as to the existence of the alleged guarantee. Moreover, a comparison between on the one hand, the 1981 and 1982 financial statements prepared in March of 1983, and on the other hand, the 1983 financial statements, clearly reveals that even the accountant for Tanwin was unaware of the existence of a guarantee during the period in question. While the 1983 statements, prepared in 1984 after unit owners filed complaints with Petitioner contain references to a developer guarantee, the 1981 and 1982 statements fail to mention a guarantee. Instead, included in the 1981 and 1982 statements of the Association are references under the current liabilities portion of the balance sheets for those years, to a "Due to Tanwin Corporation" liability in the amounts of $2,138 for 1981 and $2,006 for 1982. Petitioner through Ronald DiCrescenzo, the C.P.A. for Tanwin, established that at a minimum, the $2,006 figure reflected in the 1982 balance sheet was in fact reimbursed to Tanwin. Section 7D-18.05(1),(c), Florida Administrative Code, entitled "Budgets" and effective on July 22, 1980, was officially recognized prior to the final hearing in this cause. That section requires each condominium filing to include an estimated operating budget which contains "[a] statement of any guarantee of assessments or other election and obligation of the developer pursuant to Section 718.116(8); Florida Statutes." The estimated operating budgets for Condo I and Condo II do not include a statement of any guarantee of assessments or other election or obligation of the developer. The testimony of Herbert Tannenbaum with regard to an oral (or written) guarantee is not credible. He first testified that an oral guarantee was communicated to purchasers at the closing of each unit. In contrast, Tannenbaum also testified that the first discussion he had regarding a guarantee occurred with his attorney after the filing of the Notice to Show Cause in this action. Tannenbaum further testified that he did not understand what a guarantee was until after this case had begun and was unaware of the existence of any guarantee prior to consulting with his attorney in regard to this case. Moreover, Ronald DiCrescenzo, the C.P.A. for Tanwin testified that it was Tannenbaum who informed DiCrescenzo of the existence of a guarantee but DiCrescenzo was unable or unwilling to specify the date on which this communication occurred. Respondent Tanwin also seeks to establish the existence of a guarantee through Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5 which is a document signed by less than the majority of unit owners even including Tannenbaum and his son, and signed on an unknown date during 1984. The document provides: The undersigned Unit Owners at the Vista Del Lago Condominium do not wish to give up the benefits of the developer's continuing guarantee which has been in effect since the inception of the condominium and agreed to by a majority of unit owners and whereby the developer has continuously guaranteed a maintenance level of no more than $109.00 per month per unit, until control of the condominium affairs is turned over to the unit owners in accordance with Florida's Condominium law. According to Respondent Tanwin, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5 constitutes a memorandum signed by unit owners evidencing their belief that a continuous guarantee of the developer has been in effect. First, however, this document was never admitted into evidence for that purpose; rather the document was admitted only to establish the fact that a unit owner had signed the document. Second, this document, unlike the purchase agreements or other condominium documents is ambiguous and is not probative of the existence of a guarantee. Instead, the evidence is overwhelming that the document was prepared by the developer in the course of this litigation for use in this litigation. Moreover, unit owner testimony is clear regarding what Mr. and Mrs. Tannenbaum disclosed to unit owners as the purpose for the document when soliciting their signatures, to- wit: that the document was a petition evidencing the unit owners' desire that their monthly maintenance payments not be increased and that prior confusion as to whether reserves had been waived needed resolution. Respondent Tanwin did pay assessments on some developer-owned units during the period December, 1980 through December, 1983, a fact which is inconsistent with its position that a guarantee existed. Noteworthy is the statement by Ronald DiCrescenzo, the C.P.A. for Tanwin, in his August 16, 1983, letter to Herbert Tannenbaum wherein it is stated: "It is my understanding that you are doing the following: . . .[Playing maintenance assessments on units completed but not sold." It is inconceivable that a developer during a "guarantee period" would pay assessments on some developer units as the purpose of the statutory guarantee is to exempt the developer from such assessments. The assessments for common expenses of unit owners other than the developer have increased during the purported guarantee period. At least some, if not all, unit owners paid monthly assessments of $128 - $130 for at least half of 1984. This fact is probative of the issue of whether a guarantee existed because unit owner assessments must remain constant during a guarantee period. At the Spring 1984 meeting chaired by Mr. Tannenbaum a vote was taken for the first time as to whether reserves should be waived. Although only 21 owners were present in person or by proxy; the vote was tabulated as 12 in favor and 12 opposed. Mr. Tannenbaum, therefore, announced an increase in monthly maintenance payments to fund reserves. Thereafter owners began paying an increased assessment. The fact that the developer-controlled Association collected increased assessments from unit owners during 1984, and had up to the time of the final hearing in this cause made no effort to redistribute those funds suggests that the developer-controlled Association and the developer considered themselves to be under no obligation to keep maintenance assessments at a constant level. There was no guarantee of assessments for common expenses by Tanwin from December, 1980, through at least December, 1983. Since there was no guarantee during the time period in question, Respondent Tanwin is liable to the Respondent Association for the amount of monthly assessments for common expenses on all developer-owned units for which monthly assessments have not been paid. In conjunction with the determination that Tanwin owes money to the Association (and not vice versa), Respondent Tanwin attempted to obtain an offset by claiming the benefit of a management contract between either Tannenbaum or Tanwin and the Association. No such management contract exists, either written or oral. Although a management contract is mentioned in one of the condominium documents there is no indication that one ever came into being, and no written contract was even offered in evidence. Likewise, no evidence was offered to show the terms of any oral contract; rather, Tannenbaum admitted that he may never have told any of the unit owners that there was a management contract. Tannenbaum's testimony is consistent with the fact that no budget or financial statement reflects any expense to the Association for a management contract with anyone. Likewise, the "budget" contained within Condo II's documents recorded on March 11, 1982, specifically states that any management fee expense was not applicable. Lastly, Tannenbaum's testimony regarding the existence of a management contract is contrary to the statement signed by him on February 10, 1981, which specifically advised Petitioner that the Association did not employ professional management. To the extent that Respondent Tanwin attempted to establish some quantum meruit basis for its claim of an offset, it is specifically found that no basis for any payment has been proven for the following reasons: Tannenbaum had no prior experience in managing a condominium, which is buttressed by the number of violations of the condominium laws determined herein; Tannenbaum does not know what condominium managers earn; no delineation was made as to specific duties performed by Tannenbaum on behalf of the Association as opposed to those duties performed by Tannenbaum on behalf of Respondent Tanwin; since there was no testimony as to duties performed for the Association, there was necessarily no testimony as to what duties were performed on behalf of the Association in Tannenbaum's capacity as President of the Association and member of the Association's Board of Directors as opposed to duties allegedly performed as a "manager." Tannenbaum's testimony as to the value of his "services" ranged from $10,000 to $15,000 a year to a lump sum of $60,000; it is interesting to note that the value of his services alone some years exceeded the Association's annual budget. Respondent Tanwin has failed to prove entitlement to an offset amount, either pursuant to contract or based upon quantum meruit. The financial statements of the Association--including balance sheets, statements of position, and statements of receipts and expenditures--for 1980-81 and for 1982 reveal consolidation of the records for Condo I and Condo II in these statements. Additionally, DiCrescenzo admitted that separate accounting records were not maintained for each condominium and Herbert Tannenbaum also admitted to maintaining consolidated records. Accordingly, the developer- controlled Association failed to maintain separate accounting records for each condominium it manages. The By-Laws of the Association provide: SECTION. 7. Annual Audit. An audit of the accounts of the Corporation shall be made annually by a Certified Public Accountant - and a copy of the Report shall be furnished to each member not later than April 1st of the year following the year in which the Report was made. The financial statement for 1981 bears the completion date of February 9, 1983. The 1982 financial statement contains a completion date of March 1, 1983. Both the 1981 and the 1982 statements were delivered to the unit owners in March or April, 1983. Accordingly, Respondents failed to provide the 1981 financial report of actual receipts and expenditures in compliance with the Association's By-Laws. As set forth hereinabove, statutory reserves were not waived during the period of December, 1980 through December, 1983. Being a common expense, reserves must be fully funded unless waived annually. In the instant case, Respondents, rather than arguing that reserves had in fact been fully funded, sought to prove that reserves had been waived during the years in question. The fact that reserves were not fully funded is established by reviewing the financial statements. In accordance with the start-up budgets, reserves were initially established at the level of $15.00 per unit per month. Therefore, during 1981, for Condo I containing sixteen units, the Association's reserve account should contain 16 multiplied by $15.00 per month multiplied by 12 months, or $2,880. Since the Declaration of Condominium for Condo II was not recorded until March 11, 1982, assessments for common expenses including allocations to reserves, were not collected from Condo II during 1981. Therefore, the balance in the reserve account as reflected in the balance sheet for the year 1981 should be no less than $2,880. The actual balance reflected in this account is $2,445. Both Tannenbaum and DiCrescenzo testified that most of the balance in that account was composed of purchaser contributions from the closing of each condominium unit "equivalent to 2 months maintenance to be placed in a special reserve fund" as called for in the purchase contracts. Tannenbaum further admitted that instead of collecting $15.00 per month per unit for reserves, the money that would have gone into the reserve account was used "to run the condominium." Similarly, for the year ending 1982, the balance in the reserve account also reflects that reserves were not being funded. First, the amount of reserves which should have been set aside in 1981 of $2,880 is added to the total amount of reserves which should have been collected for 1982 for Condo I ($2880), giving a total figure of $5,760. To this figure should be added the reserves which should have been collected from units in Condo II during 1982. This figure is derived by multiplying the total number of units in Condo II, 18 units, by $15.00 per unit multiplied by 8 months (since Condo II was recorded in March of 1982) to yield a figure for Condo II of $2,160. Adding total reserve assessments for Condo I and II, $2,160 plus $5,760 equals $7,920 the correct reserve balance at the close of 1982. The actual balance for the period ended December 31, 1982, is reflected to be $4,138. Similarly, the amount of reserves required for Condos I and II as of December 31, 1983, can be calculated using the same formula. Although the 1983 financial statement prepared in 1984 reflects the existence of a funded reserve account, both DiCrescenzo and Tannenbaum admitted there was no separate reserves account set up during the time period involved herein. Statutory reserves were not waived and were not fully funded for the period of December, 1980 through December, 1983. All parties hereto presented much evidence, unsupported by the books and records of the corporations, for the determination herein of the amounts of money owed by Respondent Tanwin to the Association to bring current the total amount which Tanwin should have been paying to the Association from the inception of each condominium for monthly maintenance on condominium units not yet sold by the developer, together with the amount owed by Tanwin to the Association so that a separate reserve account can be established and fully funded for all years in which the majority of unit owners including the developer have not waived reserves. No findings of fact determining the exact amount Tanwin owes to the Association will be made for several reasons: first, the determination of that amount requires an accounting between the two Respondents herein which is a matter that can only be litigated, if litigation is necessary, in the circuit courts of this state; second, the determination of the amount due between the private parties hereto is not necessary for the determination by Petitioner of the statutory violations charged in the Amended Notice to Show Cause; and third, where books and records exist; one witness on each side testifying as to conclusions reached from review of those records, even though the witnesses be expert, does not present either the quantity or the quality of evidence necessary to trace the income and outgo of specific moneys through different corporate accounts over a period of time, especially where each expert opinion is based upon questionable assumptions. It is, however, clear from the record in this cause that Respondent Tanwin owes money to the Respondent Association and further owes to the Respondent Association an accounting of all moneys on a specific item by item basis.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Finding Respondent Tanwin Corporation guilty of the allegations contained in Counts 1-7 of the Amended Notice to Show Cause; Dismissing with prejudice Count 8 of the Amended Notice to Show Cause; Assessing against Respondent Tanwin Corporation a civil penalty in the amount of $17,000 to be paid by certified check made payable to the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes within 45 days from entry of the Final Order herein; Ordering Respondents to forthwith comply with all provisions of the Condominium Act and the rules promulgated thereunder; And requiring Tanwin Corporation to provide and pay for an accounting by an independent certified public accountant of all funds owed by the developer as its share of common expenses on unsold units and the amount for which Tanwin is liable in order that the reserve account be fully funded, with a copy of that accounting to be filed with Petitioner within 90 days of the date of the Final Order. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 9th day of August, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Karl M. Scheuerman, Esquire Thomas A. Bell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joseph S. Paglino, Esquire 88 Northeast 79th Street Miami, Florida 33138 E. James Kearney, Director Department of Business Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard B. Burroughs, Jr., Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL CONSENT ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES, Petitioner, CASE NO. 84-0437 DOCKET NO. 84001MVC TANWIN CORPORATION and VISTA DEL LAGO CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. Respondents. / FINAL CONSENT ORDER The Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, (hereinafter the Division), Vista Del Lago Condominium Inc., (hereinafter the Association), and Tanwin Corporation, (hereinafter Tanwin), hereby stipulate and agree to the terms and issuance of this Final Consent Order as follows: WHEREAS, the Division issued a Notice to Show Cause directed to Respondents and, WHEREAS, after issuance of the Recommended Order in this cause, the parties amicably conferred for the purpose of achieving a settlement of the case, and WHEREAS, Tanwin is desirous of resolving the matters alleged in the Notice to Show Cause without engaging in further administrative proceedings or judicial review thereof, NOW, THEREFORE, it is stipulated and agreed as follows:
The Issue Whether Respondent, Seven Lakes Association, Inc. (the Association), violated section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2018),1 by discriminating against 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory and administrative rule references are to the 2018 codifications of the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner, Donald Chew, based on his race (African American) when it terminated his employment; and, if so, what is the appropriate remedy.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Donald Chew, is an African American male who was employed by the Association from January 23, 2017, to September 19, 2018. During the time he was there, Mr. Chew was one of the Association's few non-white employees. Respondent, the Association, is a condominium association governed by chapter 718, Florida Statutes. According to Mr. Chew, a majority, if not all, of the condominium owners are white. The Association has approximately 50 employees. The Association is governed by a Board of Directors (Board), made up of five to seven members. All the Board members who testified at the hearing were white. The Board hires a General Manager, who oversees the day-to-day operations of the Association. This includes oversight over the condominium grounds, recreation, and financial aspects of the Association. The General Manager had check-writing authority for the Association. For the times relevant to Petitioner's claims, Timothy Day served as the General Manager.2 Prior to being hired Mr. Day was involved in an investigation related to his employment with a local government entity. 2 Mr. Chew was hired by the Association's General Manager Judy Grosvenor, but Mr. Day became General Manager in August 2017. Neither the reason for the investigation nor the outcome of that investigation was clear from the evidence. Regardless, Mr. Day was given the opportunity to explain the circumstances related to the investigation to the Board prior to being hired. Relevant to this case, the General Manager oversaw the Accounting Manager, who managed a staff of accountants. June Gibbs served as the Accounting Manager who oversaw Mr. Chew from the date of his hire to May 2018, while he was in the staff accountant role. MR. CHEW'S JOB HISTORY AND DUTIES The Association originally hired Mr. Chew for the position of staff accountant. The hiring process consisted of review of Mr. Chew's resume, an interview, and then a criminal background and reference check. The Association did not check Mr. Chew's litigation history at the time it hired him. In September 2017, Ms. Gibbs gave Mr. Chew a mixed written performance review. Although he was "Above Average" in initiative and working relationships, Ms. Gibbs indicated he was "Below Average" in his basic accounting skills and his tardiness. In her comments, she noted: Don, I really dislike writing a negative evaluation. But, your accounting skills really concern me. This is why I hired you and the core of your position. It's been great that you have done well with the insurance and working with Brown & Brown. Even though we have struggled with the accounting parts of the insurance UMS you have done well assisting everyone setting [ ] this software up. And I believe you are above average in computer technology. But, once again accounting is the core. At this point because I really need someone strong in accounting behind me. I am going to have you stay with what you are good at – working on the insurance and UMS. And I will appoint you some basic accounting jobs. Also work on any tardiness issues. In March 2018, the Association requested that Mr. Chew obtain a Community Association Manager License (CAM License) from the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation. Mr. Chew submitted an online application in which he was required to answer a number of questions, including the following: 2. Are you or have you ever been a defendant in civil litigation in this or any other state … in which the basis of the complaint against you was alleged negligence, fraudulent or dishonest dealing, foreclosure, bankruptcy, or breach of fiduciary duty related to the practice or profession for which you are applying, or is there any such case or investigation pending. Mr. Chew answered "No" to this question. On May 2, 2018, the Association promoted Mr. Chew to the Administrative Services Manager (ASM) position, which reported directly to the General Manager, Timothy Day. Along with this promotion, Mr. Chew received a salary increase. In the ASM position, Mr. Chew handled a variety of issues and considered himself the General Manager's "right hand man." Mr. Chew did very well in this position and was well liked by the Board, Mr. Day, and the Association staff. In August 2018, Mr. Day announced that he would be resigning from the Association and recommended Mr. Chew for General Manager position. On August 30, 2018, the Board voted unanimously to appoint Mr. Chew as the Interim General Manager. The credible testimony at the hearing established that at this point the Board believed a final decision would be made for the permanent General Manager position after more extensive background checks were conducted on Mr. Chew. Meanwhile, Mr. Chew would serve in an interim capacity. Later on August 30, Mr. Day informed Mr. Chew that he had received information that there was judgment for embezzlement against Mr. Chew in an action brought by the Attorney General for the State of Illinois. Mr. Chew explained that the suit was not against him personally, but against a corporation. On September 4, 2018, Mr. Day informed Mr. Chew that he was being placed on paid administrative leave pending an investigation into the Illinois litigation. On September 19, 2018, the Association's attorney sent Mr. Chew a letter of termination. DISCRIMINATORY ACTS Mr. Chew testified that his accounting co-workers made racial comments that made him feel uncomfortable while he was working as a staff accountant. As described by Mr. Chew, these remarks were made while he was working under Ms. Gibbs, prior to May 2018. Mr. Chew's co-worker, Joan Farus, confirmed that Ms. Gibbs (Ms. Farus's and Mr. Chew's supervisor) and other employees talked about "black people" in a derogatory way around Mr. Chew.3 The undersigned finds that Petitioner established that he was subject to discriminatory comments by staff prior to Mr. Chew becoming an ASM. Mr. Chew also asserts that he was treated less favorably by the Board than the white employees. Mr. Chew presented little, if any, evidence of how he was treated less favorably by the Board. To the contrary, based on the testimony at the hearing by the Board members and staff, it was clear that Mr. Chew was well liked; the Board promoted him and provided him with bonuses and pay raises. The fact that the Board unanimously approved him for the Interim General Manager position on August 30, 2018, leads to the conclusion that the Board did not have any racial animus toward Mr. Chew. Although the Association has an Equal Opportunity Employer and Non-Harassment Policy, there is nothing in its Employee Handbook 3 Ms. Farus was terminated by the Association in August 2018. specifically prohibiting discriminatory conduct based on race. The Handbook indicates employees "deserve to be treated with respect and courtesy." It also states it is company policy that the "workplace be free of tensions involving matters which do not relate to our business" such as "ethnic, religious, or sexual remarks," but stops short of explicitly prohibiting racism or racist comments. The Handbook does urge an employee who feels harassed to notify a supervisor or the Human Resources department. It also provides that any grievances regarding the job, working conditions, or problems with another employee be submitted to the employee's immediate supervisor in writing. There is no credible evidence Mr. Chew ever submitted a written complaint to his supervisor, Human Resources, or anyone else at the Association regarding the racist comments. MR. CHEW'S BACKGROUND HISTORY After the Board appointed Mr. Chew as the Interim General Manager, Kathy Miske, a white female who lived in an Association condominium, researched Mr. Chew's background.4 Ms. Miske previously performed background checks for a law firm in Chicago before she moved to a condominium in the Association. She researched Mr. Chew because she had a "habit of checking on people," and she had been approached by a condominium resident, Debbie Combs, also a white female, who was suspicious of Mr. Chew. The reason for Ms. Combs's suspicion was not disclosed at the hearing. Ms. Miske discovered that the Attorney General of Illinois had filed a "Verified Complaint for an Injunction, an Accounting, Surcharge, and Other Equitable Relief" (Complaint) against Mr. Chew personally in May 2013. The Complaint essentially described an embezzlement scheme, and specifically accused Mr. Chew of abusing a position of trust while employed at Marcy- 4 Although she later became a Board member, at the time she researched Mr. Chew she was not. Newbury Association, Inc. (MNA). It alleged Mr. Chew had misappropriated funds, in violation of the Illinois Charitable Trust Act. Although not a criminal prosecution, the Illinois Attorney General sought injunctive relief, civil damages, punitive damages, and civil penalties against Mr. Chew. Ms. Miske also discovered an Order of Final Judgment (Final Judgment) had been entered against Mr. Chew in the Illinois case on September 9, 2013. The Final Judgement seems to be a default judgment. As a result, Mr. Chew was enjoined from serving as a charitable trustee, was ordered to pay $205,372 in damages, and was also required to pay interest and investigative costs. Although Mr. Chew had a plausible explanation as to the circumstances surrounding the Illinois case, there was no evidence that the Final Judgment had been appealed, withdrawn, reversed, or nullified in any way. Mr. Chew admitted he did not notify the Association of the Final Judgment and that he did not list MNA on the resume he provided to the Association. Ms. Miske made copies of the Complaint and Final Judgment against Mr. Chew. She distributed the copies to three of the Board members that she knew personally. Eventually, copies were provided to the President of the Board, Mr. Day, and the Board's attorney. The Association was required by law to maintain a bond to cover its employees, including the General Manager.5 The Board members testified they were concerned that the Final Judgment would affect the Association's ability to obtain the proper bond if Mr. Chew became General Manager. The Board members relied on the Association's attorney's advice regarding the Association's ability to obtain a bond and the attorney's recommendation to terminate Petitioner based on the Complaint and Final Judgment. Mr. Chew claims that he was discriminated against because he was not given an opportunity to explain the Final Judgement or underlying facts to the Board. In comparison, he claims Mr. Day was given an opportunity to explain a criminal investigation against him and was hired despite the investigation. Mr. Day had previously been involved in the local government, but the nature of the investigation or the outcome of that investigation was not established at the hearing. Mr. Chew had a Final Judgment against him by the Illinois Attorney General for what essentially amounted to embezzlement. In contrast, Mr. Day was only under investigation; there was no evidence he was found guilty of anything. Moreover, Mr. Chew failed to disclose a former employer, MNA. There is no proof that Mr. Day tried to hide that he had been under investigation or that he hid his employment by a previous employer. 5 Section 718.111(11)(h), Florida Statues, states: (11) INSURANCE. * * * (h) The association shall maintain insurance or fidelity bonding of all persons who control or disburse funds of the association. The insurance policy or fidelity bond must cover the maximum funds that will be in the custody of the association or its management agent at any one time. As used in this paragraph, the term "persons who control or disburse funds of the association" includes, but is not limited to, those individuals authorized to sign checks on behalf of the association, and the president, secretary, and treasurer of the association.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Donald Chew's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 2020. Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Donald Chew 1262 Northeast 41st Terrace Avenue Cape Coral, Florida 33909 (eServed) Christina Harris Schwinn, Esquire Pavese Law Firm 1833 Hendry Street Post Office Drawer 1507 Fort Myers, Florida 33901 (eServed) Vanessa Fernandez, Esquire Pavese Law Firm 1833 Hendry Street Fort Myers, Florida 33901 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the parties' factual stipulations, the following relevant facts are found: Respondent Sheldon West, Inc. was the developer of Sheldon West Mobile Home Community, a "condominium," as those terms are used and defined in Chapter 718, Florida Statutes. The Declaration of Condominium was recorded in the official records of Hillsborough County on September 27, 1978. The respondent transferred control of the Sheldon West Condominium Owner's Association, Inc. to the unit owners on June 30, 1986. In the Declaration of Condominium, respondent provided a guarantee of common expenses pursuant to Section 718.116(8)(a)2, Florida Statutes. Under the guarantee, respondent was excused from the payment of common expense assessments on developer-owned units for a period of five years. During that period, respondent guaranteed to unit owners that assessments would not exceed a certain stated level, and respondent obligated itself to pay any amount of common expenses incurred during the period and not produced by the assessments at the guaranteed level receivable from other unit owners. Common expenses during the guarantee period amounted to $57,895.00. Assessments collected from unit owners during the guarantee period amounted to $49,190.00. Thus, respondent's liability for common expenses during the guarantee period was $8,705.00. Respondent's guarantee of common expenses ended September 26, 1983. From September 27, 1983, through June 30, 1986, the date of the turnover, respondent paid no assessments on the lots it still owned. The Declaration of Condominium provides that assessments not paid within five days of the due date shall bear interest at the rate of ten percent per annum from the due date until paid. Respondent's liability for assessments from September 27, 1983, through June 30, 1986, amounted to $40,870.00, and the interest on the overdue assessments amounted to $7,032.35. The Homeowners Association over-reimbursed respondent for expenses incurred during the guarantee period in the amount of $12,968.00. In addition, respondent received two payments from Association funds in June, 1986 of $7,000.00 and $8, 000.00. In January of 1986, the respondent and the Department of Business Regulation entered into a Final Consent Order, which called for a $500.00 civil penalty. The respondent paid the civil penalty, and, in March of 1986, he was reimbursed from the Association funds for payment of said penalty. The payables due from the respondent to the Homeowners Association, amounting to almost $70,000.00, were not paid to the Association at turnover. Instead, they were applied and offset against what were represented to be advances and receivables payable to the respondent from the Association in the amount of $77,142.00. This amount represents the cost of construction by the respondent of a pool and a clubhouse on the common property, interest charged on the advance of funds from respondent to the Association, and management fees due on uncollected assessments. Construction on the pool and clubhouse began in November of 1980 and ended in February of 1981. Neither the Prospectus nor the Declaration of Condominium mention the construction of a pool or clubhouse. No vote on construction of the pool and clubhouse was ever taken of unit owners other than the Board of Directors. No approval in writing was ever given by unit owners. The Declaration of Condominium was never amended to reflect the addition of a pool or clubhouse. The minutes of a special meeting of the Directors of the Association held on October 21, 1980, reflect that one of the three Directors gave a report that "residents wanted a Pool and Rec. Building" located on the common property and "were willing to pay for the same from the assessments on the residents." The minutes further reflect that a motion was made and adopted that the developer construct the pool and building and that, in return, the Association agreed to repay the developer the cost of same, estimated at $60,000.00, on or before turnover to the resident unit owners. The minutes further state "copy sent to Residents and Directors." These minutes are unsigned, but typewritten are the names of Tom F. Brown, the President of Sheldon West, Inc.; Anna K. Laughridge, Mr. Brown's daughter; and Ken Lord, who apparently was a unit owner. As reflected in a document received into evidence as petitioner's Exhibit 11, the members of the Board of Directors of the Association on January 2, 1981, consisted of Ora Katherine Brown, apparently Tom Brown's wife; and Anna K. Laughridge. The minutes of a "special joint meeting of Board of Directors" of the Association held on January 2, 1981, reflect that the resignation of Ora Katherine Brown as an officer and director was accepted, and that Tom Fairfield Brown and Anna K. Laughridge were named as Directors. The minutes of a "special meeting of directors" of Sheldon West, Inc., held at 10:00 A.M. on February 24, 1981, reflect the adoption of a motion that Sheldon West, Inc. would advance the funds for payment of the cost of construction of the pool and recreation building with the understanding that it would be repaid for the funds so advanced, and that it would receive credit therefore by the Association for any sums which might be due, owing or claimed by the Association. The minutes make reference to a promissory note evidencing the agreement. The promissory note, respondent's Exhibit 4, states that at a special meeting of the Association held on February 24, 1981, the Association agreed to repay and credit Sheldon West, Inc. for all sums advanced for the construction of the pool and recreation building. This promissory note is dated February 24, 1981, and is signed by Tom F. Brown as the President of the Association. The minutes of the "special meeting of directors" of the Association held on February 24, 1981, at 4:00 P.M. reflect that Directors Tom F. Brown, Anna K. Laughridge and Ken Lord were present. The minutes further make reference to an agreement that the costs of the pool and recreation building were to be advanced by Sheldon West, Inc. with the understanding that it would receive credit for such funds and be reimbursed for any balance on the date of turnover to the unit owners. These minutes state "copy posted outside clubhouse and del. to residents."
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent be found guilty of violating Section 718.116(8)(a)2, Florida Statutes, for its failure to fund the deficit during the guarantee period; and that a civil penalty in the amount of $5,000.00 be imposed for this violation; Respondent be found guilty of violating Section 718.116(1)(a) and (8)(a), Florida Statutes, for its failure to pay assessments on developer-owned units after expiration of the guarantee period; and that a civil penalty in the amount of $5,000.00 be imposed for this violation; and Respondent be found guilty of violating Rule 7D- 23.003(3), Florida Administrative Code, for utilizing Association funds for the payment of a civil penalty; and that a civil penalty in the amount of $1,000.00 be imposed for this violation. Respectfully submitted and entered this 2nd day of December, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1988. APPENDIX The proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties have been carefully considered and are accepted, incorporated and/or summarized in this Recommended Order, with the following exceptions: Petitioner 24 and 25. Accepted as factually correct, but not included as irrelevant and immaterial to the issues in dispute. Respondent 4 and 5. Partially rejected and discussed in the Conclusions of Law. 7 and 9. Rejected as irrelevant to the issues in dispute. 10. Amount stated rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Scott Charlton, Esquire Peavyhouse, Grant, Clark Charlton, Opp & Martino 1715 N. Westshore Post Office Box 24268 Tampa, Florida 33623 David L. Swanson, Esquire Sandra E. Feinzig, Esquire Assts. General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 S. Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 James Kearney, Director Department of Business Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Camino Real Village, is the joint venture and developer of a sixty-four unit condominium project known as Camino Real Village V (project) in Boca Raton, Florida. The project consists of two buildings (5751 and 5801) with thirty-two units each. Respondent, B&S Ventures, Inc. (B&S), a Florida corporation, is a partner in the joint venture. The other partner, Middlesex Development Corporation, a California corporation, was not named a respondent in this cause. Although the development consists of at least four separate condominium projects known as Camino Real Villages II, III, IV and V, only Camino Real Village V is in issue in this proceeding. Respondents, as the developer and partner of the joint venture, are subject to the regulatory requirements of petitioner, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Division). They are charged with violating various provisions of Chapter 718, Florida Statutes (1985), as set forth in greater detail in the Division's notice to show cause issued on July 17, 1986. The Camino Real project is considered to be a multi-condominium project. This means the development includes more than one condominium project but that all are operated by a common association. The parties agree that the project is not a phase condominium project. Under Division rules and applicable statutes, the developer of a multi-condominium project is required to file with the Division a set of "creating" documents at the inception of the project. The creating documents include, among other things, a prospectus, declaration of condominium, plans and survey, legal description, percentages of common ownership, surplus and expenses, articles of incorporation, by- laws, site plan, restrictions (if any), and the estimated operating budget for the first year. Such documents must be submitted for each condominium within the project. However, where the documents are identical to those submitted for another condominium, the developer may file a "certificate of identical documents" wherein the developer certifies that all disclosure items are identical with items for another condominium within the project which has been previously filed with the Division. After the creating documents are filed, the developer must thereafter file additional documents as new condominiums are constructed and completed. This is generally accomplished by filing an amendment to the original declaration for condominium. The amendment includes a surveyor's certificate attesting that the construction on the project has been completed. The purpose of the later filing is to inform the Division that construction on the new condominium has been substantially completed. On an undisclosed date in 1979, respondents filed their creating documents for certain condominiums in Camino Real Village. On November 19, 1980, they submitted their filing for the creation of Camino Real Village V. These documents were accepted as to "form" on December 11, 1980. They included a certificate of identical document signed by B&S' president which certified certain documents were identical to those previously submitted for Camino Real Village IV, a legal description of the property on which the condominium sits, sketches of the types of units to be built, a typical floor plan for Buildings 5751 and 5801, an estimated operating budget based on sixty-four units and common ownership percentages for each unit in the two buildings. Under Division requirements and state law, the documents should have contained a statement reflecting that the condominium was not substantially completed. 3/ However, they did not, and this omission was not detected by the Division when it reviewed and approved the initial filing. On October 23, 1984 respondents filed the declaration of condominium for Camino Real Village V in the local public records. The documents have been received in evidence as petitioner's composite exhibit 1. They reflected that the percentage of ownership in the common elements for both buildings equaled one hundred percent. Section 3(b) of the declaration provided for the creation of a condominium consisting of two buildings (5751 and 5801) containing thirty- two units each. The documents included a surveyor's certification that Building 5751 was substantially completed. However, as to Building 5801, which was not completed at that time, no statement reflecting its state of completion was filed. It is also noted that the declaration was not filed with the Division as required by law, and the Division did not learn of its existence until sometime later. Since the filing of the declaration, respondents have operated Camino Real Village V as a condominium. On October 23, 1984, respondents executed the closing documents on the sale of the first unit (Unit No. 106 in Building 5751) in Camino Real Village V. The warranty deed was later recorded in the local public records on November 1, 1984, and it is found this is the appropriate date on which the sale of the first unit occurred. This is consistent with the standard practice of parties executing documents prior to closing but not considering a unit sold until the money is actually transferred from the buyer to the seller. This date is significant since it may bear directly upon the date when the developer must begin paying common expenses on developer-owned units. On or about October 24, 1985 a "First Amendment to the Declaration of Camino Real Village V" was recorded by respondents in the local public records. It amended the declaration previously executed on October 23, 1984 and included, among other things, a surveyor's certificate reflecting that Building 5801 had been substantially completed. It also attempted to submit Building 5801 to condominium ownership. Although the amendment and attached documents should have been filed with the Division, respondents neglected to do so. The Division first learned that the documents existed during the course of this proceeding. According to paragraph 15 of the declaration, common expenses can only be assessed by the Association against "each condominium parcel." A condominium parcel is defined in paragraph 4(c) as "the condominium unit, together with an undivided share in the common elements appurtenant thereto." A condominium unit in turn is defined in paragraph 4(a) as "the unit being a unit of space, designated 'condominium unit' on the sketch of survey and plans attached hereto and marked as Exhibit B." The latter exhibit, which is attached to the declaration, contains the plans and survey of the project, the surveyor's certification of substantial completion, and a graphic description of each finished unit within the project. Therefore, the above definitions evidenced an intent that common expenses could be assessed only against completed units. Pursuant to Subsections 718.116(1) and (8), Florida Statutes (1985), a developer is responsible for paying his pro- rata share of common expenses on all developer-owned units. The same law permits the declaration to provide that the developer is relieved of this per-unit obligation until the expiration of a ninety-day period after the first unit is sold. In this case, the declaration had such a provision in paragraph 14. It provided in part as follows: . . . for such time as the Developer continues to be a Unit Owner, but not exceeding ninety (90) days subsequent to the closing of the first condominium unit, the Developer shall only be required to contribute such sums to the common expenses of the Condominium, in addition to the total monthly common expense assessments paid by all other Unit Owners, as may be required for the Condominium Association to maintain the condominium as provided in said Declaration of Exhibits . . . Developer hereby reserves the option to guarantee the level of assessments to unit owners for a specified time interval and thereby limit its obligations to contribute to condominium maintenance in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 718.116(8), Florida Statutes. The parties agree that the monthly assessments for common expenses during the period relevant to this proceeding were as follows: Type A Units $135.20 Type B Units 138.64 Type C Units 163.96 The declaration also provides that ten percent interest must be added to any liability owed. The record reflects, and respondents concede, that such assessments were not paid on any units in Building 5801 until the following dates: Units 100-107 ----------- August 28, 1985 Units 200-207 ----------- September 5, 1985 Units 300-307 ----------- September 10, 1985 Units 400-407 ----------- September 18, 1985 The above dates are exactly ninety days after certificates of occupancy were issued for each of the four floors of Building 5801. Even though assessments were not paid by respondents until those dates, beginning on January 31, 1985 and continuing until such assessments were paid, other unit owners were charged and paid assessments based upon a budget for sixty-four units. As it turned out, the difference between the budget and annual common expenses actually incurred by the project was approximately $32,100, or the amount the Division contends respondents owe. In 1982-84, petitioner conducted an investigation of Camino Real Villages II, III and IV based upon complaints received from a certain unit owner. The complaint concerned allegations that access to association books was denied, that the declaration contained a developer guarantee, that maintenance expenses were not properly paid, and that improper assessments were levied on unit owners. The file was closed in November, 1984 after the Division's enforcement supervisor concluded that the allegations were either "unfounded" or could be resolved through voluntary compliance by the Association. As to the fourth issue, which was an allegation that the developer- controlled Association had improperly assessed unit owners from November, 1980 to January, 1982, the investigative report noted that the developer was "allocating them based on the completed units versus the total units filed for the entire community." The enforcement supervisor concluded that this was "the method chosen by the Association," and "absent specifics in the documents, we lack jurisdiction . . . to question this practice." There is no mention of the term "certificate of occupancy" in the report. However, uncontradicted testimony by respondents reflects that its use of the date of issuance of the certificate of occupancy to determine when assessments became due was the focus of the investigation, and that respondents relied upon those statements in continuing their practice of not paying assessments until ninety days after a certificate of occupancy was issued on a unit. They did so, at least in part, on the theory that the Association did not assume responsibility for expenses until that time. Respondents point out that the filing documents submitted to the Division in November, 1980 were defective in that the surveyor's certificate was incorrect. They go on to suggest that, because of this deficiency, the filing might be invalidated by a court and therefore the statutory assessment provision would not apply. However, no person has ever challenged the validity of the filing, and the general law contains a curative provision for any initial filing errors. They also assert that, if any liability is in fact owed, they are entitled to set-offs for expenses incurred by the developer while the project was being constructed. These include payments for real estate taxes, utility bills, Boca Del Mar Improvement Association, Inc. fees, trash removal, insurance, security service, assessments and maintenance and are itemized in attachments to respondents' exhibit 1. However, there is no rule or statutory provision which authorizes this type of set-off to be applied against common expenses. Therefore, the expenses itemized in respondents' exhibit 1 are deemed to be irrelevant.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the respondents be found guilty of violating Section 718.116, Florida Statutes (1985), as charged in the notice to show cause, and that they be required to pay the Association for past due common expenses on developer-owned units in Building 5801 as set forth in paragraph 8 of the conclusions of law plus ten percent interest to and including the date of payment. DONE AND ORDERED this 30th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1988.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Graystone Fairways Corporation (GFC), is wholly owned by Louis Wingold, a Canadian developer. He is also its president. In January, 1979, GFC entered into a five-year joint venture with Tamway Corporation (Tamway), whose president was Harvey Kaliff. The agreement provided that GFC and Tamway would construct, develop and market a two phase condominium project in Tamarac, Florida known as Fairways of Tamarac III (Fairways or project). Each phase of the project was intended to have thirty units. To date only the first phase of the project has been constructed. Building permits for the second phase have been obtained, but no construction work has commenced. The project was apparently subject to registration requirements with petitioner, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Division). It is that agency which has initiated the complaint herein, of which two of three counts therein remain pending. Under the foregoing joint venture agreement, GFC generally provided the financing for the project while Tamway provided the site construction and sales of units. The agreement further designated Tamway as the managing partner to conduct the day-to-day business of the joint venture. Among other things, Tamway was authorized to enter into purchase and sale contracts for the sale of individual units in the project. Accordingly, Wingold had no active participation in the management of the project's day-to-day business, for the agreement provided that Kaliff would have that responsibility. After Fairways of Tamarac III was constructed, Kaliff hired Ron Settler and Victoria Falzone as salespersons to market and sell the individual units. The first unit was sold by Settler to Irving A. Goodman in November, 1982. Goodman was represented by counsel at the closing and, through counsel, received a packet of documents. In the summer of 1984 Goodman learned that he should have received a prospectus prior to closing, but did not. He was given a prospectus by the present project manager, Joan Nathanson, after asking for a copy. Two other units were purchased in July and September, 1983, respectively, by Sidney G. Resnick and Morton Tolmack. Both were sold by either Settler or Falzone. Tolmack was represented by counsel at closing while Resnick had no attorney. Although both executed receipts for condominium documents which reflected a prospectus was included in their packet of documents, their oral testimony to the contrary is accepted as being more credible and persuasive, and it is found that neither received a prospectus at or before closing. When they discovered at a later date they were supposed to have received one, they were given one by Nathanson. Wingold had no knowledge of Tamway's failure to give a prospectus to Goodman, Resnick and Tolmack. He first learned of this when the complaint herein was filed. Sometime in 1983 or early 1984, Wingold discovered that Kaliff was not fulfilling the terms of his obligation under the joint venture. Beginning in February, 1984, three circuit court actions were filed, and a settlement, the joint venture was dissolved, and GFC was given exclusive title and rights to the project by Tamway/Graystone. According to Wingold, Settler was convicted on 22 counts of theft from the project. He was dismissed from employment around May, 1984. During the course of the above litigation, no units could be sold because Kaliff would not agree to sign any documents conveying clear title to the purchaser. Consequently, no sales efforts could be made during this period of time. Except for the time when the litigation was pending, the unsold project units were being offered for sale by the developer in the ordinary course of business. When the settlement was executed on September 5, 1984, thirteen out of thirty units had been sold by Kaliff and Tamway. The last closing under Kaliff's management occurred in May, 1984. Wingold hired a new project manager that same month, and after the litigation was settled, began advertising in local newspapers in an effort to sell the remaining units. This included periodic advertising in two Fort Lauderdale newspapers in September and October, 1984 and January, 1985. This effort met with little or no success due to the then-existing "glut" of condominiums in South Florida. Wingold then searched for a broker to sell the units. Although he had a difficulty in finding a broker who was interested in marketing the units, in February, 1985 he executed a six-month agreement with Condovest, Inc., a firm in Miami that specializes in such sales. Since September, 1984 the developer has closed on six units and has four more under constract at the present time. This leaves seven unsold units, all of which are now rented except one which is used as a model apartment and office. The office is open only on week-days except by special appointment. The unsold units were rented by Wingold due to a large monthly payment ($15,000) on the construction loan. Such units were offered for rent in local newspaper advertisements and at one time on a sign appearing at the front entrance to the property. The rents are used to cover the debt service until the units are sold. The oldest lease agreement expires in May, 1986. Therefore, only the model unit is immediately available for occupancy by a buyer. All others must be sold subject to the lease. Even so, four units are now under contract subject to the leases, and Wingold continues to seek buyers for the remaining rented units. Subsection 718.503(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1984), requires that a prospectus be given to purchasers of condominium units prior to closing. Goodman, Resnick and Tolmack were not given such documents as required by law. This finding is based upon the testimony of the three unit owners which is accepted as being the more persuasive evidence on this issue. However, there is no evidence that any of the three was harmed or disadvantaged by their failure to receive copies of the prospectus until 1984 or 1985, particularly since two were represented by counsel at closing. Subsection 718.301(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1984), also requires that a meeting be called to allow unit owners to elect a majority of the members of the board of administration when none of the unsold units in the project are being "offered for sale by the developer in the ordinary course of business." There is no evidence of record as to how the agency construes that term, or what is the generally accepted meaning within the condominium industry. It is undisputed that no meeting has yet been called by Wingold. However, Wingold has not done so nor is he required to do so since units have been and are still being offered for sale in the ordinary course of business. Besides this, he fears that he cannot fulfill the terms of the four pending purchase and sell contracts if control of the project is turned over to the present unit owners.3 But this concern is irrelevant to a determination of the issue presented herein.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty as charged in Count II of the amended notice to show cause, and that it be fined $500.00 to be paid within thirty days from date of the Final Order in this Cause. Count I should be DISMISSED, with prejudice. DONE and ORDERED this l6th day of December, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 1985.
The Issue Whether La Vita Condominium Association, acting through its Board of Directors, refused to allow Linda C. Andzulis, a member of the association, to fill a vacancy on the board because of her gender, and thereby committed a discriminatory housing practice in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act?
Findings Of Fact The Parties Linda C. Andzulis is a resident of the La Vita Condominium. As the owner of the condominium unit in which she resides with her husband, Ms. Andzulis is also a member of the La Vita Condominium Association. She has never served on the Association’s Board of Directors, but she has a keen interest in the business of the association. She frequently attends board meetings. Ms. Joan Di Gregorio, past President of the Board sums up Ms. Andzulis’ participation at board meetings: Ms. Andzulis is a “strong individual . . . who has her agenda and she will bring it forward.” Described by some who live at the condominium as an “aggressive woman of integrity,” energetic, very intelligent, even “brilliant,” Ms. Andzulis' views and methods of expressing her views finds opposition among other association members. The La Vita Condominium Association is a Florida not- for-profit corporation. Organized pursuant to Chapter 617, Florida Statutes, the Association operates and administers the condominium officially known as “La Vita, a Condominium.” The condominium is located in Altamonte Springs, Florida. The Board and its HistoryComposition There are five seats on the Association’s board. In January of 1995, (the time at which the main act of discrimination on the basis of gender is claimed by Ms. Andzulis to have been committed by the board,) four of the five seats were filled, all by men: H. C. Roddenberry, then the president, Robert Shorthouse, Tom Anderson and a fourth man who had filled a vacancy on the board the month before but who did not attend the January, 1995 board meeting. At least six women have served on the board over the years, four prior to January, 1995, and two since January of 1995: Rosemary Anderson, Sue Bridwell, Joan di Gregorio, Brenda Herndon, Shirley Turner, and Patricia Schmidt. Several women have served as president of the board, including the board’s current president, Rosemary Anderson. These women have been encouraged to serve on the board by both Mr. Roddenberry and Mr. Shorthouse. In some cases they were not only nominated as candidates for the board by Mr. Roddenberry or Mr. Shorthouse, but were actually recruited to run for the board by either Mr. Roddenberry or Mr. Shorthouse, or both. Of these six female board members, Ms. Schmidt found it necessary to end her service on the board at one point because she was being bothered by a member of the association. There is nothing to indicate that the harassment was on the basis of gender. Furthermore, the harassment was from an individual and not in any way the result of any action by the association or the board, itself. Ms. Schmidt’s experience is all too typical for condominium association board members in this state, particularly when the association is plagued with the intra-association conflict, internal dissension, and turmoil that afflicts La Vita. None of the six women who have served as members of the board, including Ms. Schmidt, recount any trouble with any board member on account of their gender. In fact, all state that they have never been treated by male members of the board in any way other than with courtesy. They have been comfortable serving on the board with the board’s male members and relate that they have been treated “just the same as any other board member.” In short, they report that during their tenures on the board they have been accorded the respect due each and every member willing to be subjected to the rigor of running for the board and, if elected, to assume the demanding, often thankless, task of serving on the association’s board of directors. b. Issues Confronting the Board As is typical of condominium associations in Florida, particularly those with retired residents on fixed incomes, the Board of Directors of the La Condominium Association has faced many tough issues over its lifetime. One of the most difficult issues for the board has been the roofing system at the condominium. Not long after Hurricane Andrew struck South Florida, Central Florida was hit with a number of serious storms. During this time, La Vita Condominium suffered numerous roof leaks. It was difficult to obtain bids from licensed roofing contractors, let alone find a qualified roofing contractor to actually provide necessary repairs and roof replacements, because so many local roofing contractors were in South Florida in response to the tremendous demand for roofing services in the aftermath of Andrew. Roofers who remained in Central Florida were tied up with local business created by the demand for roofing services in the wake of the serious storms of 1992-93. The board of directors did the best it could, including frequently seeking the consult of legal counsel, with a difficult roofing situation. Ms. Andzulis, however, among others, felt the board had not handled the situation properly. She was not shy about bringing her opinion on the matter to the attention of the board at its regularly scheduled meetings. Another difficult problem with which the board has been and continues to be beset is the association’s relationship to the developer of La Vita and the developer’s refusal to pay assessments for “phantom” units, unbuilt units in phases of the condominium not yet constructed. The Board has struggled with the issue for many years. Again, it has sought the advice of counsel and gone to the length of bringing suit against the developer. None of the attempts to resolve the developer’s refusal to pay assessments have borne fruit. As one board member stated, the developer has more attorneys, threatens or commences bankruptcy proceedings and always seems to be “one step ahead” of the board. Just as Ms. Andzulis has not been satisfied with the board’s attempts to address the association’s roofing problems, she has not been satisfied with the association’s attempts to deal effectively with the developer. Again, she has not been shy to make her feelings known at the board meetings. While there are certain members of the Association who support Ms. Andzulis’ views on these matters, her participation at board meetings has reached the point where a number of observers feel that she has monopolized time at the board meetings to the detriment of the board being able to accomplish the business of the association. Achieving Board Membership There are three ways to become a member of a board of directors of a condominium association in Florida. The first and most obvious is by election. The latter two are without election: (a) when time for nomination for candidates in an election closes and the number of nominated candidates do not exceed the number of seats up for election; and, (b) by filling a vacancy on the board that occurs before the expiration of the vacant seat’s term. There is a critical difference between the two ways of taking a seat without election. As explained by Mr. Peter McGrath, who has served as legal counsel to the Board in the past, if there are only as many candidates for election to the board as there are seats, by operation of law, those candidates automatically become members of the board. In other words, the election is dispensed with as unnecessary. The reason for dispensing with an election and seating the candidates automatically is the difficulty many condominium associations have experienced, particularly the longer they have existed and the more intractable the problems they have faced, in finding association members willing to serve on the association’s board. In such a case, any qualified and duly-nominated party willing to serve takes a seat on the board. No one has any power to refuse to seat the candidate. In contrast, Mr. McGrath, as an expert in condominium law, explained that when there is a vacancy on the board mid- term, a person who offers his or her services does not automatically assume the position. The board may legitimately refuse to seat a qualified person who seeks the seat. The reason for the difference in approach when an entirely new board is seated as opposed to when a vacancy mid- term occurs is timing. A board that has been in existence when a vacancy occurs may have embarked on a certain course of action. Or an individual member of the board may have hopes of convincing other members that a certain direction should be pursued. Members of the board are allowed to consider whether a volunteer for board service will support that course or direction. In undertaking consideration of the volunteer’s offer it is legitimate to examine the volunteer’s statements and opinions as to the board’s direction. It is completely legitimate for a board member to vote against a volunteer on the basis that he or she would be an impediment to the board’s adopted course or to the direction the director chooses to pursue and hopes the board will pursue. Ms. Andzulis Expresses Interest in Membership on the Board On July 12, 1994, Ms. Andzulis had a conversation with Mr. Shorthouse, then a member of the board of directors. Ms. Andzulis told Mr. Shorthouse that she hoped to serve on the board since the board had asked for volunteers the previous June 7, following the occurrence of one or more vacancies. Ms. Andzulis left the discussion thinking that Mr. Shorthouse would place her name in nomination at the next board meeting on August 9, 1994. Neither Mr. Shorthouse nor anyone else nominated Ms. Andzulis to fill a vacancy on the board at the August 9, 1994 meeting. Ms. Andzulis did not step up at the meeting to volunteer. The next morning, August 10, 1994, Ms. Andzulis confronted Mr. Shorthouse. At hearing, Ms. Andzulis attempted to prove that Mr. Shorthouse said to her on the morning of August 10, 1994, that the board did not want women on the board. Other than the association’s presentation of Mr. Shorthouse’s testimony, neither party presented any witnesses to this conversation. Ms. Andzulis attempted to prove her version of the conversation through witnesses to a second conversation she had with Mr. Shorthouse following a board meeting months later. She asked these witnesses whether she had stated to Mr. Shorthouse that he had told her during the August 10, 1994 meeting that the board did not want women on the board and Mr. Shorthouse, in the presence of these witnesses, did not deny the accusation. Each of the three witnesses answered in the affirmative. In his testimony, however, Mr. Shorthouse, adamantly denied that he ever made any such statement. Ms. Andzulis, the only person other than Mr. Shorthouse who heard the August 10, 1994 conversation, did not testify at the hearing. This second conversation in the presence of witnesses took place following a board meeting on January 10, 1997. At this meeting, Ms. Andzulis again had hopes that she would be accepted to fill a vacant seat on the board. Prior to the January 10, 1997 board meeting, Ms. Andzulis asked Mr. Roddenberry, then president of the board, if he would meet with her. He agreed. Their meeting took place on January 5, 1996. They discussed Ms. Andzulis’ interest in filling a vacancy on the board. During the discussion Mr. Roddenberry pointed out the many difficulties of serving on the board. He asked Ms. Andzulis, in light of those difficulties, if she was sure she wanted to be on the board. Mr. Roddenberry left the meeting with the expectation that if Ms. Andzulis continued to be interested in being on the board, she would raise her hand during the meeting to indicate her interest. Mr. Roddenberry was hoping against hope that Ms. Andzulis would not volunteer at the meeting. He could not support her candidacy and he did not want her to know that he would vote against her. He did not want her to know because he feared repercussions both to himself and any other board member, repercussions that he believed would be brought by Ms. Andzulis. Ultimately, Mr. Roddenberry was concerned about what might happen to the association and the business of the condominium should Ms. Andzulis’ offer be turned down by the board. Normally at La Vita, when an association member offers to fill a vacancy on the board, the wish is made known at the opening of the meeting and a vote is immediately taken so that if the volunteer is approved by vote of the board then the new director will be able to participate in the business conducted at the meeting. At the January 10, 1995, board meeting this procedure was not followed. It was not followed because Ms. Andzulis did not make her wish to be on the board known at the opening of the meeting and because Mr. Roddenberry was not then certain whether Ms. Andzulis wanted to fill the vacancy or not. As the meeting came to a close, however, Ms. Andzulis raised her hand. For the first time in the meeting, Mr. Roddenberry realized Ms. Andzulis had made up her mind; she wanted to fill the vacancy. Mr. Roddenberry, as president of the board, called for a secret ballot on whether the Board should seat Ms. Andzulis. Unbeknown to Mr. Roddenberry at the time, and apparently to everyone else present (including Ms. Andzulis since she did not make an issue of it at the meeting,) secret votes by a condominium association are in violation of the Condominium Act. Mr. Roddenberry called for the secret ballot, not because he had any intention of violating the condominium law, but because Mr. Roddenberry, for the reasons stated earlier, did not want Ms. Andzulis to know how he would vote. As it turned out, all three board members present voted against seating Ms. Andzulis on the board. The secret nature of the ballot was short-lived. Soon after the result of the vote was announced, it was also announced that all three members of the board present had voted against seating Ms. Andzulis. The March 6, 1996 Emergency Meeting On March 6, 1996, a duly-noticed emergency meeting of the board was convened. Mr. Roddenberry read a statement to all assembled. The statement reviewed Mr. Roddenberry’s tenure as President of the association and his accomplishments. After relating that he had enjoyed the challenges confronting the association and did not regret the time spent participating in the business of the condominium, the statement concluded as follows: Since the January board meeting, the association has had to deal with a homeowner’s onslaught of insurance claims, a complaint filed with the State of Florida, a complaint filed with the board of directors, all of which has significantly increased the amount of time that I must devote to association business . . . The final act of this homeowner was to file a housing discrimination complaint based on sex discrimination against the three board members who voted against her being on the board. I feel that this claim is a malicious attack on my integrity. If this is what a board member must be subjected to, then I respectfully submit my resignation to the Board of Directors effective immediately and I also am withdrawing my name from nomination at the annual meeting. Petitioner’s Ex. No. 8, page 1 of 3. The homeowner to whom Mr. Roddenberry referred in this statement is Ms. Andzulis. Mr. Roddenberry’s resignation was greeted generally by the members of the association with dismay. As a person of considerable business, financial and accounting experience, he had been instrumental while serving on the board in setting up a new accounting system and had been invaluable in many ways to the association in the conduct of its business. He was well- respected and his resignation was a great loss to La Vita. In her Petition for Relief from a Discriminatory Housing Practice, which serves as the foundation of this proceeding, Ms. Andzulis refers to the March 6 emergency meeting as “retaliatory.” The meeting was not retaliatory. It was for Mr. Roddenberry to resign effective immediately, nothing more, nothing less. His resignation, as is evident from the statement read at the meeting, was because of the numerous issues he had had to deal with subsequent to the board’s vote to turn down Ms. Andzulis' offer to fill a vacancy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order concluding that the La Vita Condominium Association, through the action of its board or otherwise, did not commit a discriminatory housing practice by refusing to allow Linda C. Andzulis to fill a vacancy on the association’s board of directors. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda M. Skipper, Esquire Paul L. Wean, P.A. 1305 East Robinson Street, Suite C Orlando, Florida 32801 Linda C. Anzulis, pro se 546-202 Via Fontana Drive Altamonte Springs, Florida 32714 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
