The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that respondent Richard B. Watson holds a license issued by petitioner and has since 1976. He holds license No. 0163723, and has, at all pertinent times, worked as a broker-salesman for Liz Caldwell Realty, Inc., 126- 128 Eglin Parkway Southeast in Fort Walton Beach, Florida. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. On June 13, 1983, Lloyd H. Waldorff executed an employment contract under which Liz Caldwell Realty, Inc. was to have the exclusive right to sell the 25 units Waldorff Properties of Ft. Walton proposed to build as "phase two" of its La Mar West Townhouse Project in Mary Ester, Florida. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. Nobody signed the written agreement on behalf of the broker, but Mr. Waldorff's testimony that Ms. Caldwell or somebody in the agency "accepted" it was uncontradicted, and fully consonant with the other evidence adduced. Mr. Waldorff or his organization needed agreements from prospective buyers to purchase units when built, in order to induce a lender to lend money for construction of phase two. One Saturday, probably in mid-July of 1983, Ms. Caldwell presented him with 18 such agreements. It seemed peculiar to Mr. Waldorff, getting 18 purchase agreements at once; and he was also struck by the number of Californians and other non- Floridians among the putative purchasers. But he had nevertheless signed the agreements himself before Ms. Caldwell gave them to Mr. Watson for attestation; and he later furnished all of the purchase agreements to Security Federal Savings and Loan Association of Panama City in support of an eventually successful application for a $1,100,000.00 construction loan. (T.90) Mr. Waldorff signed the purchase agreements in a back room within the Liz Caldwell Realty, Inc. offices. At hearing he remembered that a woman was present. He did not recall respondent's being there. Seventeen of the 18 agreements furnished the lender were purportedly signed by persons to whose signatures, except in one instance, respondent Watson attested. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. On 16 of the 17 purchase agreements on which he signed as a witness to putative purchasers' signatures, respondent also signed as a witness to Mr. Waldorff's signature in a blank provided under the heading "signed in the presence of:". Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. Respondent was aware at the time that Mr. Waldorff, whom he considers a friend, needed such agreements in order to obtain financing. As time for closing on the purchase agreements approached, Mr. Waldorff testified, he became suspicious, and asked Ms. Caldwell to see her escrow account statements, but she put him off. Eventually he asked her if the purchase agreements were "bogus," and she answered by nodding affirmatively. It was at this point, Mr. Waldorff said, that he notified the lending institution of their falsity, and asked for an extension of time in which to repay the construction loan. But the weight of the evidence established that the purchase agreements were shams from their inception and that Mr. Waldorff knew it before he obtained the loans. On September 9, 1985, Paul R. Bratton, III, an investigator for DPR, asked Mr. Watson about the purchase, agreements on which he had witnessed purported parties' signatures. In this interview, Mr. Watson said, with respect to some of the contracts which he had signed as a witness, "that he did not see the buyers or the sellers sign the contract." (T.63) In a deposition he gave in the course of related civil litigation, respondent Watson testified that it was "(p)retty much," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5, p.10, "standard procedure" for him to witness signatures which he had not seen being affixed. In response to the question, "Does that mean also you wouldn't know whether these people exist in real life or not?", Mr. Watson answered, "It could be. ..." Id. as 15. Mr. Waldorff told Mr. Watson he was going to use the 18 purchase agreements, all but one of which respondent had signed as a witness, to secure a construction loan even though they were "bogus." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. This conversation antedated the loan closing. Id.
Findings Of Fact Florida Development and Sales Corporation (FDS) at all times here involved was a registered real estate corporate broker. Lawrence F. Taylor, at all times here involved, was a registered real estate broker and an Active Firm Member for FDS and Universal Realmark, Inc. Michael W. Levine, at all times here involved, was a registered real estate salesman for Universal Realmark, Inc., corporate broker. Florida Development and Sales was a wholly owned subsidiary of Universal Realmark, Inc. The two corporations occupied the same offices, had the same corporate officers, and used the same telephone numbers. Correspondence went out from either corporation on FDS stationery, and all employees of both corporations were paid by check drawn on FDS account. FDS entered into a non-exclusive brokerage agreement on August 2, 1971 (Exhibit 5) with Lake Lucie Estates, Inc., the owner of unimproved land it desired to sell in 1 1/4 acre tracts. Pursuant to said agreement the broker advertised and sold, generally by agreement or contract for deed and generally to out-of-state buyers, these 1 1/4 acre tracts. In 1973 Universal Realmark, Inc. acquired all of the stock of FDS and accepted the obligations of FDS under supplemental agreement dated May 23, 1973 (Exhibit 6). The brokerage agreement above referred to was undisturbed. By order dated May 6, 1974 the Commissioner of Securities, State of Missouri ordered St. Lucie Estates, Inc., and FDS, their representatives, inter alia, to cease and desist the offer and/or sale in Missouri of any agreement for deed securities. Chapter 409, Laws of Missouri, contain the Missouri Uniform Securities Act. Therein security, in 409.401(1), is defined to mean any contract or bond for the sale of any interest in real estate on deferred payments or on installment plans when such real estate is not situated in this state Section 409.201 makes it unlawful for any person to sell or offer for sale securities in Missouri without being registered to do so and Section 409.301 makes it unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in Missouri unless: (1) The security is registered, or (2) The security or transaction is exempted under Section 409.402. Pursuant to these and other provisions of the securities law the cease and desist order was issued and served by certified mail on Lake Lucie Estates, Inc. and FDS. Section 409.410 of the Missouri Statutes provides that any person who has been personally served with a cease and desist order and thereafter willfully violates same shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than three year, or both. The Act further provides for personal service upon an out-of-state violator of the act by serving the commissioner who sends notice of the service to the out-of-state violator. Here the Respondents acknowledged receipt of the cease and desist order. Subsequent to the receipt of the Missouri cease and desist order Levine negotiated agreement for deeds with three purchasers in Missouri of Lake Lucie Estates, Inc. property. On one of these the purchaser's check was made payable to Lake Lucie Estates, Inc. and the checks for the other two were made payable to FDS. During his interrogation by the investigator, Levine acknowledged that he was aware of the cease and desist order at the time he negotiated the three agreements for deed. He obtained his list of people to call from the office, i.e. FDS/Universal Realmark. At the hearing Levine did not remember whether or not he was aware of the cease and desist order at the time he negotiated the Missouri contracts. He did remember receiving a commission on each sale by check drawn by FDS although he was registered as a salesman under Universal Realmark, Inc. As noted above Lake Lucie Estates had a brokerage agreement with FDS and no such agreement was ever negotiated with Universal Realmark. Lake Lucie Estates would have no objection to Universal Realmark selling its property. Respondent Taylor was the Active Firm Member of FDS and Universal Realmark. He was serving in that capacity with Universal Realmark when FDS was acquired. At the same time he operated his own real estate broker's office on Miami Beach, spending part of his time supervising the activities of each office. Taylor's initial statements to the investigator that he learned of the Missouri cease and desist order in June 1974 upon his return to the office from a stay in the hospital was repudiated at the hearing when he stated he learned of the Missouri order only a few hours before he talked to the investigator in October, 1974. Taylor also testified that he never authorized Levine to sell under his brokerage even though Taylor was the Active Firm Member of Universal Realmark and Levine was registered under the corporate broker, Universal Realmark. Taylor's main concern appeared to be to insure that the salesmen for these out-of-state land sales adhered to the script that had been prepared for them and from time to time he monitored their conversations. When he realized that the alleged violations of the real estate license law were being investigated he resigned from FDS and Universal Realmark because "they were violating my trust". When the requests for renewal of the FDS corporate broker's registration was submitted in September, 1974, Taylor signed same a Vice President of FDS and the Active Broker of the corporation.
The Issue Whether the Respondent, a registered general contractor, violated Section 489.129(1)(e), Florida Statutes, (1979), by aiding and abetting an unlicensed person to evade the provisions of Part II, Chapter 468, Florida Statutes. Whether the Respondent violated Section 489.129(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1979), by knowingly combining or conspiring with an unlicensed person by allowing his license to be used by an unlicensed person. Whether Respondent violated Section 489.129(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1979), by acting in the capacity of a contractor under a name other than that listed on his license. Whether Respondent violated Section 489.129(1)(d) Florida Statutes (1979), by failing to properly qualify his company pursuant to Section 489.119(2) and (3), Florida Statutes (1979).
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds currently active registered general contractor's license No. RG0005734 in the name of "Clarence O. Nielsen." On June 9, 1978, Respondent entered into a written Joint Venture Agreement with Walter J. Howard with respect to a dwelling on property owned by Mr. Howard in Volusia County, Florida. This agreement provided as follows: For proposed construction on a lot owned by Mr. Walter Howard at 200 Howard Ave. N.S.B. This construction to be undertaken as a joint venture between Walter Howard and C. O. Nielsen. Division of any profits from this venture to be shared as follows; [sic] A ten percent profit on total sale to Mr. Howard based on total cost of lot and loan costs and all material and labor (including Mr. Howard's salary). Should any profit remain from sale of property it shall be divided equally between Mr. Howard and Mr. Nielsen. On June 28, 1978, Walter Howard signed and filed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Volusia County, Florida, a Notice of Commencement indicating construction of improvements which were the subject of the aforementioned Joint Venture Agreement. On July 10, 1978, Volusia County Building Permit No. 16379B was issued to Respondent, and listed "Nielsen Construction Company" as the contractor on the project to be constructed on Mr. Howard's property as aforesaid. As previously mentioned, Respondent is licensed only in the name of "Clarence O. Nielsen." Respondent admitted, however, that he had registered the name "Nielsen Construction Company" as a fictitious name in compliance with Section 865.09(2)(b) Florida Statutes, although no evidence of such compliance was furnished to Petitioner. It is uncontradicted in the record of this proceeding that Respondent was on the job site which is the subject matter of this proceeding from two to three times a week during the course of construction. Respondent supervised work while it was in progress, and called for periodic inspections to be made by the Volusia County Department of Building. Respondent was in fact observed to be on the job site by officials of the Volusia County Department of Building on at least two of the several occasions when they made periodic inspections. These inspections were made by officials of the Volusia County Department of Building on July 11, 1978; July 20, 1978; July 25, 1978; August 3, 1978; October 9, 1978; and December 29, 1978. Although Mr. Howard was frequently on the job site; signed the Notice of Commencement; obtained financing from First Federal Savings and Loan Association in New Smyrna Beach, Florida; made draw requests to that financial institution; and submitted an affidavit on December 29, 1978, indicating that all outstanding liens concerning the project had been satisfied, there is absolutely no direct, credible evidence of record in this proceeding to contradict Respondent's assertion that he took an active part as a contractor in the construction of the improvements on the property. Sometime in either October or November of 1978 Mr. Howard was contacted by the eventual purchaser of the home. Negotiations between Mr. Howard and the purchaser culminated in a down payment being made on the home in early December of 1978. The purchaser moved into the home on December 19, 1978, and later experienced problems with the construction of the house. The purchaser lodged complaints concerning the construction of the house with the Volusia County Department of Building, which apparently ultimately led to these charges being filed against Respondent.
The Issue Pursuant to the order of the First District Court of Appeal dated October 18, 2005, the issue before the Division of Administrative Hearings is a determination of the amount of attorneys' fees and costs to be awarded for the administrative proceeding in Department of Health v. Anthony Glenn Rogers, M.D., DOAH Case No. 02-0080PL, and for the appellate proceeding styled Anthony Glenn Rogers, M.D. v. Department of Health, Case No. 1D04-1153 (Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 18, 2005).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine, and the Board of Medicine ("Board") within the Department is the entity responsible for entering final orders imposing disciplinary action for violations of the laws regulating the practice of medicine. See §§ 455.225 and 458.331(2), Fla. Stat. On January 4, 2002, the Department of Health filed an Administrative Complaint charging Dr. Rogers with violations of Section 458.331(1)(m), (q), and (t), Florida Statutes (1998).3 The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, which assigned the matter DOAH Case No. 02-0080PL. The case was heard on May 7, 2002, by Administrative Law Judge Michael J. Parrish. Judge Parrish entered his Recommended Order on February 21, 2003, in which he found that the Department had failed to prove violations of Section 458.331(1)(q) and (t), Florida Statutes (1998), and recommended dismissal of those charges. Judge Parrish found that the Department had proven a violation of Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1998), failing to keep medical records as required by rule, and he recommended that Dr. Rogers be required to pay a $1,000.00 administrative fine and attend a Florida Medical Association record-keeping course as the penalty for the violation. The Board entered its Final Order on February 17, 2004, in which it adopted its own findings of fact and conclusions of law; found Dr. Rogers guilty of all three charges in the Administrative Complaint; and imposed a penalty on Dr. Rogers consisting of a $10,000 administrative fine, completing of a drug course sponsored by the University of South Florida, completion of a Florida Medical Association record-keeping course, and two years' probation, during which he was not permitted to practice medicine unless his practice was monitored quarterly by a physician approved by the Board. Dr. Rogers appealed the Board's Final Order to the First District Court of Appeal, challenging the Board's determination that Dr. Rogers had violated Section 458.331(1)(q) and (t), Florida Statutes (1998). Dr. Rogers filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs based on Section 120.595(5), Florida Statutes. In addition, Dr. Rogers filed a Motion for Stay of Final Order, which the Board opposed. The district court denied the motion for stay in an order entered April 2, 2004, and Dr. Rogers proceeded to comply with the terms of the two-year probationary period imposed by the Board, as well as fulfilling the other requirements set forth in the Board's Final Order of February 17, 2004. In an opinion issued on October 18, 2005, the First District Court of Appeal reversed the Board's Final Order with respect to its determination that Dr. Rogers had violated Section 458.331(1)(q) and (t), Florida Statutes (1998), and remanded the matter to the Board for entry of a Final Order consistent with its opinion. The district court held in its opinion that the Board had erroneously re-weighed the evidence and had rejected findings of fact in the administrative law judge's Recommended Order that were supported by competent substantial evidence. The district court also entered on October 18, 2005, the order granting Dr. Rogers's motion for attorneys' fees and costs that is the subject of this proceeding. The district court's mandate issued on February 23, 2006, and, on April 21, 2006, the Board entered a Final Order on Remand adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law in Judge Parrish's Recommended Order, finding that Dr. Rogers had violated Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1998), and imposing a $1,000.00 administrative fine on Dr. Rogers and requiring him to attend a medical record-keeping course. Based on the Amended Affidavit of C. William Berger filed August 24, 2006, the total number of hours Mr. Berger spent in representing Dr. Rogers in the administrative proceeding in DOAH Case No. 02-0080PL is 79.75, a total that the Department does not challenge. Mr. Berger's billing rate was $300.00 per hour, a rate that the Department accepts as reasonable. The total amount of attorney's fees paid to Mr. Berger for his representation of Dr. Rogers through the administrative proceedings before the Division of Administrative Hearings was, therefore, $23,925.00. Dr. Rogers was ultimately found to have violated one count of the three-count Administrative Complaint filed against him by the Department, the count in which the Department alleged that Dr. Rogers had violated Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1998), by failing to keep adequate medical records related to the patient that was the subject of the charges against him. Mr. Berger did not record in his billing statements the amount of time he spent researching this charge, preparing for hearing on this charge, or addressing this charge in the Proposed Recommended Order he filed in 02-0080PL. It is reasonable that Mr. Berger spent 10 percent of the hours included in his billing statements preparing Dr. Rogers's defense to the charge that he failed to keep adequate medical records.4 Accordingly, Mr. Berger's attorney's fees will be reduced by 10 percent, or by $2,392.50, for a total of $21,532.50. In reaching the percentage by which Mr. Berger's fees should be reduced, consideration has been given to the amount of the fees in relationship to the failure to prevail on the medical-records violation, to the seriousness of the alleged violations on which Dr. Rogers prevailed before both the administrative law judge and on appeal,5 and the penalty ranges that the Board could impose for the violations with which Dr. Rogers was charged.6 Based on the Supplemental Affidavit of Lisa Shearer Nelson Regarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs filed September 5, 2006, Ms. Nelson claimed that she spent a total of 187.1 hours "from the issuance of the final order of the Board of Medicine through the appeal and remand and initial preparation of the petition for attorney's fees and costs." Ms. Nelson's billing statements reflect that she represented Dr. Rogers during the appellate proceedings before the First District Court of Appeal in Case No. 1D04-1153 and before the Board on remand from the district court. Ms. Nelson's billing rate was $250.00 per hour, a rate that the Department accepts as reasonable. The total amount of attorney's fees paid by Dr. Rogers to Ms. Nelson for her representation was, therefore, $46,775.00. A review of the billing statements attached to Ms. Nelson's supplemental affidavit reveals that the final billing statement, dated June 9, 2006, was for "preparation of petition for fees and costs; preparation of affidavit re same." Dr. Rogers was billed for 1.9 hours in this billing statement, for a total of $475.00. Because the work done by Ms. Nelson reflected in this billing statement did not involve the appellate proceeding arising out of the Board's Final Order of February 17, 2004, the hours claimed by Ms. Nelson are reduced by 1.9 hours, for a total of 185.2 hours. Accordingly, Ms. Nelson's attorney's fees for her representation of Dr. Rogers on appeal total $46,300.00. The total costs identified in Mr. Berger's Amended Affidavit and in the billing statements attached to the Amended Affidavit is $4,462.55. This amount is reduced by $1,000.00 attributable to a retainer paid to a Dr. Spanos, who was initially retained as an expert witness but who ultimately did not testify on Dr. Rogers's behalf. The total allowable costs for the administrative proceeding, therefore, are $3,462.55. The total costs identified by Ms. Nelson in her Supplemental Affidavit and in the billing statements attached to the Supplemental Affidavit is $1,005.01. The total costs for both the administrative and the appellate proceedings are, therefore, $4,467.56. Dr. Rogers submitted an affidavit in which he claimed that he expended total costs of $154,807.23 in fulfilling the terms of the penalty assessed against him in the Board's Final Order of February 17, 2004, which was reversed by the district court.
Conclusions For Petitioner: C. William Berger, Esquire One Boca Place, Suite 337W 2255 Glades Road Boca Raton, Florida 33486 For Respondent: John E. Terrel, Esquire Michael D. Milnes, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the original Notice of Appeal with the agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner meets the qualifications for licensure pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On April 2, 1987, in Pinellas County, Florida, the Petitioner entered a nolo contendere plea to a charge of exposure of sexual organs, a violation of Section 800.03, Florida Statutes. On or about August 17, 1987, the Petitioner filed an application for licensure as a real estate salesman. In response to a question involving prior criminal violations, the Petitioner informed the Respondent of the past violation and his nolo contendere plea. On January 5, 1988, through its legal advisor, the Respondent notified the Petitioner that his application for a real estate license was denied because of the nolo contendere plea to the indecent exposure charge. The Petitioner requested a formal administrative hearing. During the administrative hearing, the Petitioner testified that on the date of the alleged criminal violation, he stopped on his way to shopping mall to relieve himself in a public restroom located in Freedom Lake Park. While in the restroom, he was approached by a man who strongly implied he wanted to see the Petitioner's sexual organs. At first, the Petitioner did not respond to the request. He then told the man "no" and went to use the urinal. The other man identified himself as a police officer and placed the Petitioner under arrest for exposure of sexual organs. Once charged with the offense, the Petitioner had to decide whether to contest the charge by requesting a trial or to enter into a plea bargain agreement. The Petitioner was a high school guidance counselor at the time of the arrest. Because of his employment, he was concerned about the notoriety a trial involving sexual misconduct would bring and its damage to his career. He was also concerned about the effects of a trial upon him and his family. The terms of the plea agreement were that if he were to enter a nolo contendere plea, adjudication of guilt would be withheld by the court. He would be fined $150.00, required to seek counseling, and be placed on six months of supervised probation. Upon advice of counsel, the Petitioner chose to enter the plea, and accept the plea bargain agreement.
The Issue At issue herein is whether Respondents' real estate licenses should be revoked or suspended or whether they should be otherwise disciplined for failure to comply with the provisions of Section 475.25(1)(a) Florida Statutes (1977) by failing to disclose a fire-damaged attic to the purchasers of a house.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent hereto, Respondents Maureen Ann O'Malley and Frederick E. Lewis held real estate license numbers 0065689 and 0052102 respectively. Respondent O'Malley was employed as a broker-salesman by Respondent Lewis, who operated under the trade name of Lewis Realty with offices in Atlantic Beach, Florida. On or about May 17, 1979, Respondent O'Malley negotiated a contract for the sale of a house owned by Respondents to James E. and Gloria Gipson, husband and wife (Respondents' Exhibit No. 1). The house was located at 825 Plaza Drive, Atlantic Beach, Florida, and the total purchase price was $28,500. In November, 1965, a fire had occurred in the attic of the Gipson's house causing damage to the electrical wiring, and leaving portions of the rafters and attic floor in a charred and blackened condition. However, no structural damage occurred. Shortly after the fire, some of the trusses in the roof were reinforced with two by fours in order to insure the structural integrity of the premises. The house has been sold on a number of occasions since the fire occurred, and before the Respondents purchased the house in early 1979, the most recent sale was 4 or 5 years earlier. The attic is a small space between the roof and the ceiling, and is reached by climbing a ladder and crawling through an opening in the ceiling. It is too small to stand in, cannot be used for living purposes, and its value is limited to storing boxes, suitcases and the like. Prior to the closing, the Gipsons were advised by O'Malley to inspect the property, and if any problems existed, they would he corrected at Respondents' expense. The Gipsons visited the house on at least one occasion before the closing, and were given the keys for the purpose of measuring curtains and installing a television antenna. However, at no time did they inspect the attic, or were they apprised by the realtor of the fact that a fire had occurred. The attic was finally inspected by Mr. Gipson several days after the house was purchased. He found portions of the attic charred, and covered with ashes and soot. Upon being advised by the Gipsons of the attic condition, O'Malley had a contractor check the attic for structural damage. There being none, she then offered to provide cosmetic repairs by spraying it with silver paint, and laying plywood strips on the floor. However, this was unsatisfactory to the Gipsons. Respondent O'Malley did not disclose the attic condition to the Gipsons because (a) she considered the matter to be "immaterial", particularly since there was no structural damage to the attic, (b) the house had been sold on several occasions since the fire, and (c) she was not aware of any prior complaints. Respondent Lewis had only limited contact with the Gipsons, and was not involved in the negotiation of the sale of the house.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings; fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Maureen Ann O'Malley be found guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(a) Flrida Statutes (1977), by reason of failure to disclose to or buyers a fire-damaged attic in a residence located at 825 Plaza Drive, Atlantic Beach, Florida. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent O'Malley be given a private reprimand. It is further RECOMMENDED that the charges against Respondent Frederick E. Lewis be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of February, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Ralph Fetner, Jr., Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Myron S. Dunay, Esquire 912 American Heritage Life Building Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Ms. Maureen Ann O'Malley 1195 Mayport Road Atlantic Beach, Florida 32233 Mr. Frederick E. Lewis c/o O'Malley Real R:tote 1195 Mayport Road Atlantic Beach, Florida 32233
Findings Of Fact There are no disputed issues of fact. The parties stipulated to the following facts: (Exhibits referred to are not attached to this Recommended Order) As to Sun Oil Company: On February 14, 1978, a claim for refund was submitted to the Florida Department of Revenue and the Comptroller of the State of Florida. A copy of the transmittal letter is annexed as Exhibit 8 and a copy of the claim for refund is annexed as Exhibit 9. On August 31, 1978, another claim for refund, covering a subsequent time period was filed. A copy of the transmittal letter is annexed as Exhibit 10 and a copy of the claim for refund is annexed as Exhibit 11. Meanwhile, to the knowledge of all parties, the Exxon appeal referred to below was prosecuted. As to Exxon Corporation: On January 19, 1978, Exxon submitted to the Department of Revenue and to the Comptroller a claim for refund of severance tax which may have been overpaid by Exxon Corporation for the period March 1, 1974, through December 31, 1976. The claim reflected its contingent nature. A copy of the transmittal letter is annexed as Exhibit 1. A copy of the claim for refund of severance tax is annexed as Exhibit 2. (Subsequently, claims for subsequent time periods have also been filed with the Comptroller). By letter dated February 6, 1978, the Department of Revenue responded that the claim was barred by the one-year provision contained in Section 211.06, Florida Statutes. Enclosed with the response was a copy of an earlier letter to Exxon Corporation from the General Counsel of the Comptroller of the State of Florida, setting forth the position of the Comptroller that the contingent nature of the claim created no problem, but that the one-year provision in Section 211.06 was a statute of limitations. A copy of the letter of February 6, 1978, together with the enclosure, is annexed as Exhibit 3. On February 27, 1978, Petitioner wrote the Comptroller requesting consideration of the claim for refund under the provisions of Section 215.26, Florida Statutes. A copy is annexed as Exhibit 4. By letter dated March 7, 1978, the Comptroller wrote Petitioner denying the claim because it was not filed within one year from the date of payment of the tax as allegedly required by Section 211.06(2), stating that no further administrative review was available, and inviting judicial review, under Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. A copy of the letter is annexed as Exhibit 5. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the order contained in the letter of March 7, 1978 (Exhibit 5). The First District Court of Appeal of Florida in due course rendered a decision and opinion, a copy of which is annexed as Exhibit 6. The First District Court of Appeal held that the one-year period described in Section 211.06 did not bar the application for refund, that the refund provisions of Section 215.26, Florida Statutes, were applicable, and remanded the case. Thereafter, the Comptroller's Office asked for a further statement of Exxon's position on this matter, which was given in a letter dated May 24, 1979, a copy of which is annexed as Exhibit 7. As to Louisiana Land and Exploration Company: On January 25, 1978, Louisiana Land and Exploration Company submitted to the Department of Revenue and to the Comptroller a claim for refund of severance tax which may have been paid by Louisiana Land and Exploration company for the period March 1, 1974, through December 31, 1976. The claim reflected its contingent nature. A copy of the transmittal letter is annexed as Exhibit A copy of the claim for refund of severance tax is annexed as Exhibit 13. By letter dated February 6, 1978, the Department of Revenue responded that the claim was barred by the one-year provision contained in Section 211.06, Florida Statutes. Enclosed with the response was a copy of an earlier letter to Exxon Corporation from the General Counsel of the Comptroller of the State of Florida, setting forth the position of the Comptroller that the contingent nature of the claim created no problem, but that the one-year provision in Section 211.06 was a statute of limitations. A copy of the letter of February 6, 1978, together with the enclosure, is annexed as Exhibit 14. On October 31, 1978, Louisiana Land and Exploration Company again submitted to the Comptroller of the State of Florida a claim for refund of severance tax which may have been paid by Louisiana Land and Exploration Company for the period March 1, 1974, through December 31, 1976. The claim reflected its contingent nature. A copy of the transmittal letter is annexed as Exhibit A copy of the claim for refund of severance tax is annexed as Exhibit 16. Meanwhile, to the knowledge of all parties the Exxon appeal referred to above was prosecuted. As to Roadway Express, Inc.: On December 14, 1978, a claim for refund was submitted to the Florida Department of Revenue and the Comptroller of the State of Florida. A copy of the transmittal letter is annexed as Exhibit 17 and a copy of the claim for refund is annexed as Exhibit 18. On November 13, 1979, a similar claim for refund was submitted to the Department of Revenue and the Comptroller of the State of Florida. A copy of the transmittal letter is annexed as Exhibit 19 and a copy of the claim for refund is annexed as Exhibit 20. Meanwhile, to the knowledge of all parties the Exxon appeal referred to above was prosecuted. As to all Parties: In the case of each of the parties, by document entitled "Notice of Intent to Deny Refund" dated August 30, 1979 (and in the case of the second Roadway Express matter, Case No. 80-098, January 2, 1980), the Comptroller gave notice of his intent to deny refund solely because the contingent nature of the claim, stating as the sole grounds for denial: "At this time there is no basis under Section 215.26, Florida Statutes, to grant the requested refund." In response to the Notice of Intent to Deny Refund, Petitioners promptly requested a hearing, which has resulted in the above consolidated proceedings. There are no disputed issues of material fact with respect to this proceeding, at which the issue is whether or not the contingent claims filed within the three-year period prescribed by Section 215.26, Florida Statutes, should be held in abeyance until the contingency has occurred or it is determined that it will not occur. By agreeing that there are no disputed issues of material fact for the purpose of this proceeding, no party waives its right to present facts or contest facts in the event the case is considered in the future on its merits.
