The Issue The issues for determination in this case are whether Respondent, as a licensed citrus fruit dealer, breached the terms of an oral contract for the purchase of citrus fruit during the 1992-1993 shipping season, whether Respondent misappropriated certain other citrus fruit owned by Petitioner during the 1992-1993 shipping season, and further, whether such actions by Respondent constitute violations of the Florida Citrus Code for which the proceeds of the citrus fruit dealer's bond executed by Co-Respondent should be paid to Petitioner in satisfaction of Petitioner's claim pursuant to Section 601.66, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Riverfront Groves, Inc., is a corporation with an office in Vero Beach, Florida. At all material times, Petitioner was in the business of selling and marketing citrus fruit. At all material times, Daniel R. Richey was vice-president of Petitioner, in charge of the fresh fruit packing operation. Respondent, Bagaley Groves, is a business with an office in Vero Beach, Florida. At all material times, Respondent operated a citrus fruit gift shipping packinghouse. At all material times, Robert G. Bagaley was the owner of Respondent. Co-Respondent, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, is an insurance company, which was authorized to write surety bonds during the 1992-1993 citrus fruit shipping season. On December 10, 1992, Co-Respondent executed, as surety, Citrus Fruit Dealer's Bond No. 77-LP-007-245-0002, in the principal sum of $10,000.00, binding Co-Respondent as surety, to the Florida Commissioner of Agriculture. The terms and conditions of the bond were that Respondent, as the principal executing such bond, would comply with the provisions of the Florida Citrus Code during the 1992-1993 citrus fruit shipping season, and with the terms and conditions of all contracts relating to the purchase, handling, sale, and accounting of citrus fruit. Respondent held a valid citrus fruit dealer's license issued by the Department of Citrus for the 1991-1992 shipping season. On July 16, 1992, Respondent, by and through its owner Robert Bagaley, filed with the Department of Citrus an application for license as a citrus fruit dealer for the 1992-1993 shipping season. As indicated above, Respondent's bond required for licensure was not executed until December 10, 1992, and it was not until January 25, 1993, that Respondent was issued citrus fruit dealer's license No. 0269 for the 1992-1993 shipping season. The license is not specifically retroactive, and merely states that Respondent is ". . . granted a license to engage in the business of Citrus Fruit Dealer through July 31, 1993." At all material times Respondent, by and through its owner Robert Bagaley, held itself out as a licensed citrus fruit dealer in the state of Florida. In the fall of 1992, Respondent learned from a mutual friend, Henry Schacht, that Petitioner had navel oranges located in a grove in Indian River County, Florida, suitable for use in Respondent's fresh fruit packinghouse. In mid-November 1992, Petitioner, through its authorized representative Daniel R. Richey, and Respondent, through its owner Robert Bagaley, agreed that Respondent would purchase approximately 2,400 boxes of navel oranges from Petitioner at $7.00 per box. Respondent did not hold a valid license as a citrus fruit dealer in the state of Florida at the time this oral contract was entered into with Petitioner. Respondent harvested a total of 150 boxes of these navel oranges during the period of November 13 - 17, 1992, for which Respondent paid Petitioner the agreed upon price of $7.00 per box. This payment in the amount of $1,050.00 was made by check dated November 18, 1992. On December 3, 1992, Petitioner delivered a written contract to Respondent setting forth Petitioner's understanding of the terms of their agreement. The contract was executed by Petitioner. Respondent declined to sign the written contract, and the contract was returned to Petitioner on December 10, 1992. In early December 1992, Respondent learned from James Earl Brantley that some of the navel oranges in Petitioner's grove had green mold, a condition that would make the fruit unsuitable for fresh fruit packing. On December 10, 1992, Respondent repudiated the oral contract and notified Petitioner that Respondent could not use, and did not need, any more of Petitioner's navel oranges. Respondent did not inform Petitioner that some of the navel oranges had developed green mold, or that the navel oranges were otherwise not merchantable. At the time Respondent repudiated the oral contract, Respondent did not hold a valid license as a citrus fruit dealer in the state of Florida. By December 10, 1992, the marketing conditions for navel oranges were substantially deteriorating. From December 11 and 15, 1992, Petitioner harvested and processed the balance of the navel orange crop from the grove, some 2,785 boxes. Petitioner attempted to pack the oranges as fresh fruit. The packout ratio of these 2,785 boxes was approximately 18 percent, yielding Petitioner a net return of $78.01, ($129.38 return for 640 boxes picked December 11 and 12, 1992, and a loss of $51.37 on the remainder picked between December 12 and 15, 1992. Petitioner incurred a loss of $19,365.62, as result of Respondent's failure to pay the agreed upon contract price of $7.00 per box for the balance of the navel oranges. At the time Respondent (through Bagaley) notified Petitioner (through Richey) that Respondent did not intend to harvest the balance of the fruit, Petitioner informed Respondent that the remaining fruit would be harvested, that an accounting of the net proceeds for the remaining fruit would be made, and that the parties could then review the matter as to any outstanding indebtedness which might be due under the terms of the oral agreement. Respondent stated that a review after harvesting and accounting was acceptable. Within sixty days thereafter Petitioner (through Richey) received the accounting and met with Respondent (through Bagaley). At that time Respondent did not acknowledge the indebtedness, nor promise to pay the indebtedness to Petitioner. Subsequent to January 25, 1993, Respondent mistakenly picked red grapefruit from a grove owned by Petitioner, which was adjacent to a grapefruit block Respondent had purchased from a different owner. The parties agree that Respondent owes Petitioner $375.00 or $2.50 for 150 boxes of grapefruit picked from this grove. Respondent tendered a check to Petitioner in the amount of $375.00 for payment of the grapefruit; however, Petitioner declined to accept payment for the grapefruit pending resolution of Petitioner's claim for the navel oranges.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department enter a Final Order adjudicating the amount of indebtedness owed Petitioner by Respondent in accordance with Section 601.66, Florida Statutes, is $375.00 for 150 boxes of grapefruit mistakenly harvested. It is further recommended that Petitioner's claim for damages resulting from the contract for navel oranges entered into prior to Respondent's licensure as a citrus fruit dealer during the 1992-1993 shipping season be dismissed. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of August, 1995. RICHARD HIXSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of August, 1995. APPENDIX As to Petitioner's Proposed Findings: 1-9. Adopted and incorporated. Adopted, except to the extent that Respondent's repudiation of the contract was solely related to market conditions. Adopted except as to Respondent's promise to pay subsequent to January 25, 1993. 12-14. These paragraphs constitute conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas A. Lockwood III, Esquire PETERSON, MYERS, CRAIG, CREWS BRANDON & PUTERBAUGH, P.A. Post Office Drawer 7608 Winter Haven, Florida 33883-7608 Eugene J. O'Neill, Esquire GOULD, COOKSEY, FENNELL, BARKETT, O'NEILL & MARINE, P.A. 979 Beachland Boulevard Vero Beach, Florida 32963 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of License & Bond Department of Agriculture Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Mr. David Z. Cutright Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company 1324 16th Street Vero Beach, Florida 32960
The Issue Whether Sunny Fresh Citrus Export and Sales, Co., LLC, is liable to Petitioner in the amount of $44,032.00 for delivery of fruit which remains unpaid.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, DP Partners, Ltd. (Partners), is a Florida Limited Partnership located in Lake Placid, Florida, engaged in the business of citrus production. Daniel H. Phypers and Danielle Phypers Daum, brother and sister, and their father Drew Phypers, are limited partners in the business. Respondent, Sunny Fresh Citrus Export and Sales Co., LLC, (the LLC) is a Florida Limited Liability Company headquartered in Vero Beach, Florida, engaged in the business of exporting citrus for retail sale. The LLC was organized and registered with the State of Florida Division of Corporations on November 3, 2011. The members of the LLC are Kelly Marinaro and Jean Marinaro, husband and wife. Kelly Marinaro (Marinaro) formerly conducted business in the name of Sunny Fresh Citrus Export and Sales Co. (the DBA), a fictitious-name entity registered with the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, on October 23, 2007. The fictitious-name entity registration expired on December 31, 2012. Marinaro suffered a massive heart attack in November 2011 and was incapacitated. He did not return to work until the Spring of 2013. On November 4, 2011, after suffering the heart attack, and one day after organizing and registering the LLC, Marinaro conveyed durable power of attorney to Joseph Paladin (Paladin) as his Agent. Among the authority granted to Paladin, was the following: 2. To enter into binding contracts on my behalf and to sign, endorse and execute any written agreement and document necessary to enter into such contract and/or agreement, including but not limited to . . . contracts, covenants . . . and other debts and obligations and such other instruments in writing of whatever kind and nature as may be. * * * 9. To open, maintain and/or close bank accounts, including, but not limited to, checking accounts . . . to conduct business with any banking or financial institution with respect to any of my accounts, including, but not limited to, making deposits and withdrawals, negotiating or endorsing any checks . . . payable to me by any person, firm, corporation or political entity[.] * * * 12. To maintain and operate any business that I currently own or have an interest in or may own or have an interest in, in the future. In Marinaro’s absence, Paladin conducted the usual affairs of the business, including entering into contracts to purchase citrus from several growers. On October 19, 2012, Paladin entered into contract number 2033 with Partners to purchase approximately 6000 boxes of Murcots (a tangerine variety) at $12.00 per box.2/ The contract is signed by Paladin as the Agent of “Sunny Fresh Citrus Export & Sales Company, Licensed Citrus Fruit Dealer (Buyer).” On December 13, 2012, Sunny Fresh entered into contract number 2051 with Partners to purchase Hamlins (a different fruit variety) at $6.50 per box.3/ The contract price was for citrus “on the tree,” meaning it was the buyer’s responsibility to harvest the citrus. The contract is signed by Paladin as the Agent of “Sunny Fresh Citrus Export & Sales Company, Licensed Citrus Fruit Dealer (Buyer).” (Contract 2033 and 2051 are hereinafter referred to collectively as “the contracts”.) The contracts were prepared on pre-printed forms used by Marinaro’s businesses pre-dating Paladin’s involvement. The contract form is titled as follows: Citrus Purchase Contract & Agreement Sunny Fresh Citrus Export & Sales Company Cash Fruit Crop Buyer 2101 15th Avenue Vero Beach, Florida 32960 Paladin testified that he was not aware of more than one company for Marinaro’s fruit-dealing business. He testified that he was not aware of any difference between Sunny Fresh Citrus Export and Sales Company and Sunny Fresh Citrus Export and Sales Co., LLC. Paladin was not aware of when the LLC was created. Paladin’s testimony is accepted as credible and reliable. Paladin testified that his intent was to enter into the contracts for the benefit of “Sunny Fresh.” “Sunny Fresh,” written in twelve-point bold red letters over an image of the sun in yellow outlined in red, is a trademark registered with the Florida Division of Corporations. Marinaro first registered the trademark in February 1998. In his trademark application, Marinaro entered the applicant’s name as “Kelly Marinaro D/B/A Sunny Fresh Citrus.” Marinaro renewed the trademark registration in 2007. Marinaro testified that the “Sunny Fresh” trademark is “owned by the LLC.” On February 20, 2012, Paladin, Marinaro and a third partner, Gary Parris, formed another company, Sunny Fresh Packing, LLC, the purpose of which was to run a fruit-packing house in Okeechobee, Florida. Equipment for the packing house was obtained from a packing house in Ft. Pierce, Florida, which was indebted to Marinaro, in some capacity, and went “belly up.” In March 2013, the Okeechobee packing house was struck by lightning. Shortly after the lightning strike, Marinaro, Paladin, and Mr. Parris, signed a letter addressed “To our valued Growers.” The letter explained that, due to both the lightning strike, which shorted out all computers and electrical components at the packing house, and reduced demand for product due to severe weather in the northeastern United States, they had made a “business decision to end the year now and prepare for next year.” The letter further explained that, “rather than spending thousands of dollars all at once, we feel, it makes better sense to use our cash flow to pay our growers first . . . . We will be sending out checks every week or every other week until everyone is paid or until we receive supplemental cash infusions that we are working on. In that case we would just pay everyone in full, from that.” The letter was prepared on letterhead bearing the “Sunny Fresh” trademark logo. Paladin made a number of payments to Partners on the contracts during 2012 and 2013. Each check shows payor name as “Sunny Fresh” with an address of 2101 15th Avenue, Vero Beach, Florida 32960. Mr. Phypers met with Paladin a number of times to collect checks and understood that Paladin was making concerted efforts to pay all the growers. However, Partners did not receive full payment on the contracts. Paladin drafted a Release of Invoices Agreement (Agreement) by which creditor growers could receive partial payment on their outstanding contracts in exchange for a full release of liability from the buyer. The Agreement lists the following entities and persons as being released from liability: “Sunny Fresh Packing, LLC”; “Sunny Fresh Citrus Export and Sales Co., LLC”; and Kelly Marinaro. Paladin presented the Agreement to Partners with an offer to pay $36,449.45 in consideration for signing the Agreement. Partners did not sign the Agreement. The parties stipulated that the amount owed Partners under both contracts is $44,032.00. Respondent contends that Petitioner’s claim is filed against the wrong business entity. Respondent argues that Petitioner’s contracts were with the DBA, and that Petitioner’s claim is incorrectly brought against the LLC. Thus, Respondent reasons, the LLC is not liable to Petitioner for the monies owed. The DBA was registered with the State of Florida in 2007 and held an active fruit dealer’s license through July 31, 2012. Marinaro owned and operated the DBA at 2101 15th Avenue, Vero Beach, Florida 32960. The DBA filed a citrus fruit dealer’s bond with the Department of Agriculture for the 2008-2009 shipping season. Marinaro registered the trademark “Sunny Fresh” logo in the name of the DBA in 2007, and was still using the logo on his business letterhead in 2013. Marinaro formed the LLC in 2011, which holds an active citrus fruit dealer’s license. Marinaro and his wife, Jean, are the only members of the LLC. The principal address is 2101 15th Avenue, Vero Beach, Florida 32960. The LLC filed citrus fruit dealer’s bonds with the Department of Agriculture on June 28, 2012, for the shipping season ending July 31, 2013, and on May 2, 2013, for the shipping season ending July 31, 2014. Marinaro did not refile a bond for the DBA after forming the LLC. At all times relevant hereto, Marinaro’s fruit dealer’s business has been physically located at 2101 15th Avenue, Vero Beach, Florida 32960. The building at that address bears the name “Sunny Fresh.” Marinaro testified that he formed the LLC shortly after his heart attack to “protect his personal assets.” Marinaro explained that he had little revenue in the LLC “for the next two years,” and he planned for the LLC to conduct sales for the packing company. He expected the LLC would be purchasing fruit from other packing houses. In fact, he testified that, during his absence, he was not aware that either the DBA or the LLC were purchasing fruit. Marinaro was clearly upset about the financial state of his business when he resumed control in the Spring of 2013. He testified that, prior to his heart attack, he was running a business with a typical $10 to $12 million yearly revenue, but that he returned to a business in debt to the tune of roughly $790,000.00. Marinaro lamented that Paladin entered into contracts to buy citrus when that was not the plan for the LLC. Alternately, he blamed Paladin for taking too much money out of the LLC to set up the packing house. Marinaro’s testimony was inconsistent and unreliable. He first testified that Paladin had full authority to purchase fruit in his absence, but later professed to be “dismayed” that his company was purchasing fruit in his absence. The evidence does not support a finding that the LLC was formed for any reason other than to continue his fruit dealings in a legal structure that would protect his personal assets. Marinaro’s explanation that the purpose of the LLC was to conduct sales for the packing company also lacks credibility. The LLC was organized in November 2011, but the packing house in Ft. Pierce from which he acquired the equipment to set up a packing house in Okeechobee did not go “belly up” until February 2012. Marinaro would have had to be clairvoyant to set up an LLC for the sole purpose of sales to a packing house about which he was not aware until four months later. Marinaro’s testimony that he was in the dark about the running of his business and that he was somehow duped by Paladin is likewise unreliable. Marinaro testified that, during his absence, he was “concerned that Paladin was entering into contracts where a bond was required, but not secured.”4/ He could not have been concerned about contracts to buy fruit without posting the required bond if he was not even aware that his company was purchasing fruit. Further, Marinaro neither questioned Paladin about entering into the citrus contracts, nor suggested Paladin use a different contract form for the LLC. The evidence establishes that Marinaro knew Paladin was purchasing fruit during Marinaro’s absence to continue the regular fruit-dealer’s business, and further, that Marinaro knew Paladin was entering into contracts on behalf of the LLC, the company formed just one day prior to Marinaro granting Paladin full power of attorney to run his business. Finally, Marinaro knowingly participated in the formation of Sunny Fresh Packing, LLC, in February 2012, four months after he became incapacitated. This required his involvement in a complicated business scheme in which his company collected on a debt owed by a packing house in Ft. Pierce, and acquired the equipment to run the new packing house, with two partners, Parris and Paladin, located in Okeechobee on property owned by a third party, Mr. Smith, who is not a member of Sunny Fresh Packing, LLC. It is unlikely Marinaro was clueless as to the fruit dealings of the LLC in his absence. Further, it is disingenuous, at best, for Marinaro to suggest that the contracts entered into in 2012 are not with the LLC, the corporation he formed in 2011 to protect his personal assets from his business obligations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order approving the claim of DP Partners, Ltd., against Sunny Fresh Citrus Export and Sales Co., LLC, in the amount of $44,032.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Suzanne Van Wyk Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 2014.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 64-4.002 (the “Proposed Rule”) is an invalid exercise of the legislative authority delegated to the Department of Health (the “Department”).
Findings Of Fact In order to better contextualize the facts presented at final hearing and discussed below, the following excerpts from the Proposed Rule and the underlying statutory provision are provided: Section 381.986, Florida Statutes (8) Medical Marijuana Treatment Centers.- (a) The department shall license medical marijuana treatment centers to ensure reasonable statewide accessibility and availability as necessary for qualified patients registered in the medical marijuana use registry and who are issued a physician certification under this section. * * * The department shall license as medical marijuana treatment centers 10 applicants that meet the requirements of this section, under the following parameters: [Previously denied applicants meeting certain requirements not relevant to the instant action.] [One applicant from a specific class pursuant to a federal lawsuit.] As soon as practicable, but not later than October 3, 2017, the Department shall license applicants that meet the requirements of this section in sufficient numbers to result in 10 total licenses issued under this subparagraph, while accounting for the number of licenses issued under sub-subparagraphs a. and b. For up to two of the licenses issued under subparagraph 2., the department shall give preference to applicants thatdemonstrate in their applications that they own one or more facilities that are, or were, used for the canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing of citrus fruit or citrus molasses and will use or convert the facility or facilities for the processing of marijuana. (Emphasis added). Florida Administrative Code Rule 64-4.002 (Proposed) (1)(f) For applicants seeking preference for registration as a medical marijuana treatment center pursuant to ss. 381.986(8)(a)3., F.S., the applicant must provide evidence that: The property at issue currently is or was previously used for the canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing of citrus fruit or citrus molasses. In order to demonstrate the property meets this criteria, the applicant may provide documentation that the applicant currently holds or has held a registration certificate pursuant to section 601.40, F.S. A letter from the Department of Citrus certifying that the property currently is or was previously used for the canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing of citrus fruit or citrus molasses will be accepted as sufficient evidence. The applicant as an individual holds, in his or her name, or the applicant as an entity holds, in the legal name of the entity, the deed to property meeting the criteria set forth in subparagraph 1. above; and A brief explanation of how the property will be used for purposes of growing, processing, or dispensing medical marijuana if the applicant is selected for registration. * * * Subject matter experts will substantively and comparatively review, evaluate, and score applications using [the Scorecard incorporated by reference]. * * * (a)7.(b) Scores for each section of the application will be combined to create an applicant’s total score. The department will generate a final ranking of the applicants in order of highest to lowest scores . . . . (c) In accordance with ss. 391.986(8)(a)3., F.S., the two highest scoring applicants that own one or more facilities that are, or were, used for the canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing of citrus fruit or citrus molasses and will use or convert the facility or facilities for the processing of medical marijuana will receive an additional35 points to their respective total score. Licenses will be awarded, subject to availability as set forth in ss. 381.986(8)(a)2. and 381.986(8)(a)4., F.S., based on the highest total score in the following manner: The highest scoring applicant that is a recognized member of the Pigford or [the Black Farmers Discrimination Litigation] will receive a license. The remaining highest scoring applicants, after the addition of the preference points for applicants pursuant to paragraph (7)(c) above, will receive licenses up to the statutory cap set forth in ss. 381.986(8)(a)2., F.S. The remaining highest scoring applications, after removing any preference points received under paragraph (7)(c), will receive licenses up to the statutory cap . . . . (Emphasis added). The Department is an agency of the State of Florida charged with administering and enforcing laws related to the general health of the people of the state. § 381.0011(2), Fla. Stat. As part of this duty, the Department is charged with implementing the Compassionate Medical Cannabis Act of 2014. See § 381.986, Fla. Stat. Favero is a Florida corporation in good standing since its incorporation in 1974, primarily engaged in the business of growing orchids. Favero aspires to file an application for licensure as a medical marijuana treatment center (“MMTC”). Following the passage of Senate Bill 8A by the 2017 Florida Legislature, which substantially rewrote section 318.986, Florida Statutes, Favero decided to seek the citrus preference described in section 381.986(3)(a)3. (hereinafter referred to as the “Preference Statute”). To that end, Favero purchased a citrus processing business in Safety Harbor, Florida, for approximately $775,000, including the business’s real property and all facilities located thereon. The purchase took place prior to publication of the Proposed Rule. The purchase of the Safety Harbor property reduced Favero’s financial liquidity but, presumably, not its net worth as the value of the property would replace the cash expenditure made for the purchase. It is Favero’s intent to convert the citrus processing facility located on the property into a medical marijuana processing facility if Favero receives the requisite license as a MMTC. Favero contends, as stated in the following paragraphs of its Petition Challenging the Invalidity of Proposed Rule 64-4.002: The Proposed Rule grants a preference to an applicant who owns “property” that was once used for citrus processing. The statute, however, clearly grants the preference only to applicants who “own one or more facilities that are, or were, used for the canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing ” By using the broader word “property” rather than “facility,” the Department is granting the citrus preference to a broader group of applicants than the statute permits, such as owners of packinghouses and other properties that fail to meet the definition of “processor” or were not used for “canning” or “concentrating.” The statute is clear and unambiguous. The use of the word “property” rather than the statutory term “facilities” renders the rule invalid because the use of that term exceeds the Department’s rulemaking authority, enlarges and modifies and contravenes the requirements of Section 381.986(8)(a)3., is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, vests unbridled discretion in the agency and is arbitrary and capricious. See § 120.52(8)., Fla. Stat. * * * The Proposed Rule allows for a preference to only some applicants that own a citrus processing facility. Under the scoring system, applicants demonstrating that they own a citrus processing facility may receive an additional 35 points. However, the Proposed Rule does not guarantee that any applicant owning a citrus processing facility will actually receive those points or get a license. The Proposed Rule merely grants an additional 35 points to two applicants. The Department of Citrus has indicated that more than a dozen companies will qualify for the citrus preference. Under the Proposed Rule, most of those applicants would receive no additional points despite qualifying for the statutory preference. Additionally, the Proposed Rule provides no assurance that any applicant qualifying for the citrus preference will actually receive a license. The Form adopted by the Proposed Rule allows Department evaluators to award a maximum of 1,150 points in several categories. The additional 35 points available under the Proposed Rule amount to an addition of just a 3% bonus. If those extra 35 points are not enough to exceed the scores of other applicants, then no citrus-preference qualifying applicant will receive a license. Favero contends that reduction of its liquid assets could have a negative impact on its overall financial condition when considered by the Department as it reviews Favero’s MMTC application. Favero is concerned that this negative impact may not be completely offset by the citrus preference it is seeking. Mecca is a Florida corporation located at 7965 Lantana Road, Lantana, Florida. It has existed since November 15, 1973, has operated in Florida since the early 1970s, and began citrus farming on approximately 2,000 acres in 1983. Mecca has been and is currently licensed as a citrus dealer and a regulated citrus processing plant and citrus packinghouse. The “processing” done by Mecca does not involve canning or concentrating citrus. Mecca “processes” citrus in its “fresh fruit form” (discussed more fully below). Mecca intends to convert its property and facilities for the purpose of growing, processing or dispensing medical marijuana if its application for an MMTC license is approved. Mecca contends the citrus preference in the Proposed Rule needs further clarification. Mecca also asserts the evaluation and scoring system with respect to the citrus preference constitutes an invalid exercise of the Department’s delegated legislative authority. The Scoring System The MMTC application has 16 separate sections. An applicant may be awarded up to 50 points on some sections, up to 100 points on other sections. The total number of points any application might receive is 1150, presuming a perfect score on each section. Each of the individual sections, whether for 50 or 100 points, is graded in accordance with an evaluation rubric. The rubric contains five categories of scores which are used by reviewers, allowing for a range of points in each section. The five categories each have a range depending on whether the section allows 50 or 100 points. The rubric directs that a category 5 response could be awarded between 40 and 50 points in the 50-point sections, or between 80 and 100 points in a 100-point section. A category 4 response could get between 30 and 39 points (or 60 to 79 points); a category 3 could award 20 to 29 points (or 40 to 59 points); a category 2 could be worth 10 to 19 points (or 20 to 39 points); and a category 1 might award 0 to 9 points (or 0 to 19 points). Thus, an applicant may be awarded points anywhere within the range in each category for each section of the application. By way of example, category 5 under the rubric (wherein a reviewer may give an application 40 to 50 or 80 to 100 points) directs the reviewer as follows: Applicant addressed all items. When necessary, each item has multiple, specific examples of experience and knowledge. Experience and knowledge are connected to specific, identifiable people in the application. Plans are clear, detailed, well documented, and thorough. All charts, photographs, maps, sketches, and other supplemental information are clear and legible. When necessary, applicant provides full documentation for representations of future performance. Responses related to financial reflect robust financial resources and clear lines of authority within the organizations. By comparison, under Category 3, which could award 20 to 29 or 40 to 59 points, the rubric directs the reviewer to consider: Either: Applicant responded to all items. Applicant responds to items addressing experience and knowledge, though answers tend to lack specificity. Plans are provided, but are lacking in clarity, documentation, or thoroughness. When necessary, some supplemental information is provided. Responses related to financials do not reflect robust financial resources, but do not raise doubts of applicant’s financial viability, or the organization has unclear lines of authority, or; Most responses are sufficient to be considered Category 4 or 5 Responses, but applicant fails to address some items. Favero asserts that allowing a reviewer to award points from an allowable range gives unbridled discretion to the Department. The argument misses the point that the ranges in each category direct the reviewer on how to score, while allowing some leeway in determining which applications are slightly better or worse than their competitors. Depending on the strength or weakness of one applicant’s response vis-à-vis another applicant, it is reasonable to assign more or fewer points in a comparative review. The rubric is quite descriptive and allows for a nuanced review of responses by the Department reviewers. The Preference The Preference Statute asserts a preference “for up to two of the licenses issued,” i.e., past tense. There are no licenses “issued” during the application review process, so the preference is actually assigned before licensure. The Preference Statute is somewhat confusing in this regard. The Proposed Rule attempts to reconcile this discrepancy by assigning preference points as a part of the application review process, while still approving the most qualified applicants. That approach is reasonable and has merit; it allows the preference to be assigned but does not attempt to insert it into the actual licensure process. The Proposed Rule assigns the preference points at the end of the review, i.e., after an application receives its “total score.” Thus, an applicant could conceivably be awarded 1185 points on the 0 to 1150 point scale. Regardless of how the points are assigned, Favero contends that the 35 preference points are too insignificant as compared to a possible (perfect) score of 1150 during application review. That number of points (35) would be only about three percent of a perfect score. The lower the average scores of all applications, however, the more the 35 points might come into play. If all applicants received an average score of 575 total points, the preference points would be twice as important as compared to perfect 1150 scores. The assignment of the preference points only after totaling the scores is a legitimate and acceptable method. Taking the 16 sections of the application separately, 35 points assigned in any one section could be quite significant. In fact, the Department arrived at the 35 points by taking the average number of possible points per section, i.e., 72, and assigning approximately half of that amount to reach the 35- point preference. The preference points are not just an arbitrary number assigned by the Department. Favero also objects that the Proposed Rule only assigns the 35 preference points to the two highest scoring, eligible applicants, i.e., those who will convert a citrus facility to process medical marijuana. If those two eligible applicants were more than 35 points below other, non-eligible applicants’ scores, assignment of the preference points would not result in the approval of any eligible applicants. The plain language in the Preference Statute and the Proposed Rule allows for a preference of “up to two” applicants. There is, therefore, no mandate that any applicants must receive the preference. While the Legislature can be presumed to have wanted preference points to be awarded (else why would the Preference Statute exist?), the language of the statute merely limits the number of entities which could get such a preference. The Department, interpreting a statute it is charged with implementing, interprets section 381.986(8)(a)3. to mean the issuance of available licenses to as many as two entities which are eligible for the preference. The Proposed Rule allows the Department to assess an applicant’s entitlement to the preference, to assign the preference, and to meet its statutory obligation. Property versus Facility The Legislature clearly intended to give a preference to applicants who “own . . . facilities that are, or were, used for canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing of citrus . . . and will use or convert the . . . facilities for the processing of medical marijuana.” The Legislature failed, however, to provide guidance by way of definitions. While the Legislature chose the words “facility or facilities” in the Preference Statute, the Department complicated the issue by using the word “property” for the most part, but also using the words “facility” and “facilities” at times. Favero contends that a property is much broader in scope than a facility, and the Department therefore exceeded its delegated legislative authority. The Department argues that facilities used to process citrus must be located on some property, obviously. But, facilities located on a property might be leased, so that the fee simple owner of the property is different from the leaseholder of that facility. Thus, if an applicant for a medical marijuana treatment center license wants to avail itself of the preference, it would need to own the facility. Whether that means the applicant must own the property on which the facility is located is not clear in the Preference Statute or in the Proposed Rule. The Department argues that the way to show ownership of a facility is by way of a deed to the property on which the facility is located. In fact, Favero will use a warranty deed to prove ownership of the facilities it purchased in order to obtain the preference. But if Favero purchased land on which citrus had been grown but not processed, i.e., if there had been no facilities on the land to can, concentrate or otherwise process the fruit, except in fresh fruit form, the preference would not apply. And if an applicant obtained a leasehold interest in a facility, it would not be able to “show ownership” by way of a deed to the property. The Preference Statute requires the applicant to convert the facility in order to gain the preference. It is unclear how a piece of unimproved property can be “converted” to another use; land is land. This begs the question of whether growing citrus on a piece of property, and then removing all the citrus trees in order to grow medical marijuana, is a “conversion” of a facility as contemplated by the Legislature. Neither the Preference Statute nor the Proposed Rule contain any definitional assistance to answer that question. An important question to be answered is whether the growing of citrus constitutes “processing” as alluded to by the Legislature. The Preference Statute provides no definition of the word. The Citrus Code (chapter 601, Florida Statutes) also does not define “processing,” but does describe a “processor” of citrus as: ‘[A]ny person engaged within this state in the business of canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing citrus fruit for market other than for shipment in fresh fruit form.” § 601.03(32), Fla. Stat. (Emphasis added). Processing must therefore mean something other than merely growing citrus and packing it up for shipment. That being the case, a property where citrus is grown that is “converted” to a property growing marijuana would not afford an applicant a preference. There must be some “facility” that is or has been used to process citrus, i.e., doing something more with the raw product, in order to constitute “processing.” Therefore, a “packinghouse,” i.e., “[a]ny building, structure, or place where citrus fruit is packed or otherwise prepared for market or shipment in fresh fruit form,” would not be engaged in “processing” citrus. See § 601.03(29), Fla. Stat. Mecca, which owns property where citrus was grown, picked, graded, sorted, polished, cleaned and packaged for transfer “in fresh fruit form,” would not be a processor, either. Mecca owns a packinghouse only, not a processing facility as that term seems to be used by the Legislature. Its operations were not part of the “canning, concentrating, or otherwise processing citrus fruit other than for shipment in fresh fruit form.”
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent Clark's Country Farmers Market, Inc. owes Petitioner a sum of money for shipments of citrus fruit.
Findings Of Fact The evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. The Parties and Their Problem Spyke's Grove and Clark's are "citrus fruit dealers" operating within the Department's regulatory jurisdiction. As a wholesale shipper, Spyke's Grove packages and arranges for delivery of citrus products pursuant to purchase orders that retail sellers such as Clark's submit. The packages typically are labeled with the retail seller's name, and thus the retail buyer (and the recipient, if the citrus is purchased as a gift) usually will not be aware of Spyke's Grove's involvement. The instant case involves a series of orders that Clark's placed with Spyke's Grove between October and December 1999 for packages of gift fruit. Under a number of informal, largely unwritten contracts, Spyke's Grove agreed, each time it received an order from Clark's, to ship a gift fruit box or basket to the donee designated by Clark's' retail customer, for which fruit shipment Clark's agreed to pay Spyke's Grove. Spyke's Grove alleges that Clark's failed to pay in full for all of the gift fruit packages that Clark's ordered and Spyke's Grove duly shipped. Clark's contends (though not precisely in these terms) that Spyke's Grove materially breached the contracts, thereby discharging Clark's from further performance thereunder. The Transactions From mid-October 1999 until around December 12, 1999, Clark's faxed or e-mailed to Spyke's Grove approximately 350 individual orders for gift fruit packages. Among other information, each order consisted of a shipping label that identified the product (e.g. the type of gift box or basket), the intended recipient, and the destination. Spyke's Grove manifested its intent to fill these orders by faxing statements of acknowledgment to Clark's, by telephoning Clark's, or both. Although the many contracts that arose from these transactions were thus documented, the writings left much unsaid. For example, the parties did not explicitly agree in writing that Spyke's Grove would deliver the subject gift baskets to the donees before Christmas, nor did they make any express oral agreements to this effect.1 Further, the parties did not specifically agree that Spyke's Grove would be obligated to deliver the gift fruit into the hands of the donees and bear the risk of loss until such tender of delivery. Rather, the contracts between Spyke's Grove and Clark's were ordinary shipment contracts that required Spyke's Grove to put the goods into the possession of carriers (such as the U.S. Postal Service or United Parcel Service) who in due course would deliver the packages to the donees. For many weeks, until early December 1999, Clark's placed orders, and Spyke's Grove filled them, under the arrangement just described. The relationship was not completely trouble-free, for the parties had some problems with duplicate orders. Most, if not all, of these difficulties stemmed from the implementation of a computerized ordering system which allowed Clark's to "export" orders directly to Spyke's Grove's electronic database. The parties recognized at the time that errors were occurring, and they attempted contemporaneously to identify and purge unintended duplicates. Pursuant to the course of dealing between these parties, Spyke's Grove filled orders that were not affirmatively identified as errors prior to the scheduled shipment date. The Fire On the night of Sunday, December 12, 1999, a devastating fire at Spyke's Grove's premises caused substantial damage, temporarily disrupting its citrus packing and shipping operations at the peak of the holiday season. Working through and around the loss, Spyke's Grove soon recovered sufficiently to reopen for business. By around noon on Tuesday, December 14, 1999, its telephone service had been restored, and activities relating to shipping resumed on Friday, December 17, 1999. The Aftermath Meantime, Clark's contends, customers had begun calling Clark's on December 10, 1999, to complain that gift fruit packages were not being received as promised. None of the customers testified at hearing, however, and therefore no competent, non-hearsay evidence establishes the contents of their alleged out-of-court statements. On December 14, 1999, following several unsuccessful attempts to communicate with Spyke's Grove shortly after the fire (about which Clark's remained unaware), Denise Clark, acting on behalf of Clark's, reached Robert Spiece, a representative of Spyke's Grove, on his cell phone. At hearing, Ms. Clark and Mr. Spiece gave conflicting accounts as to the substance of their December 14, 1999, telephone conversation. Neither disputed, however, that during this conversation Ms. Clark and Mr. Spiece agreed, at Ms. Clark's request, that all orders of Clark's not yet shipped by Spyke's Grove would be canceled, effective immediately, as a result of the fire. Although Ms. Clark claimed that Mr. Spiece further informed her that Spyke's Grove could not identify which orders had been shipped, the factfinder does not believe that Mr. Spiece made such a sweeping negative statement. Rather, as Mr. Spiece explained at hearing, Ms. Clark probably was told that information regarding the filled orders would not be available that day. Without waiting for further information from Spyke's Grove, Clark's began calling its retail customers to ascertain whether they had received packages that were supposed to have been shipped by Spyke's Grove. Employees of Clark's who had participated in this process——which took four to five days—— testified at hearing about conversations between themselves and various customers. As uncorroborated hearsay, however, the out- of-court statements attributed to these customers were not competent substantial evidence upon which a relevant finding of fact, e.g. that any particular customer or customers had not received their gift fruit, could be based. Moreover, this hearsay evidence, even if competent, would still have been too anecdotal to establish persuasively any widespread failure on the part of the carriers to deliver the packages shipped by Spyke's Grove. On December 15, 1999, Spyke's Grove prepared three draft invoices for the gift fruit packages that Clark's had ordered and which Spyke's Grove had shipped before December 12, 1999. Numbered 1999113001, 1999121101, and 1999121201, the invoices sought payment of $688.72, $2,415.48, and $298.66, respectively. On the first page of Invoice #1999121201, Barbara Spiece, the President of Spyke's Grove, wrote: Some of these were lost in the fire. "A" day left in the morning. "Springfield" was on the floor to go out that night. I realize there are many duplicates in these shipped reports. We tried to watch for them but with different order numbers it was very difficult. Just cross them out [and] you will not be charged for them. I apologize for all of the problems we have had this season [illegible] wish you luck. These bills were faxed to, and received by, Clark's on December 16, 1999. Clark's did not pay the invoices, or dispute them, or cross out the unintended duplicate orders (as it had been invited to do) to effect a reduction in the outstanding balance. Instead, Clark's ignored Spyke's Grove's requests for payment. Not only that, in disregard of its existing contractual obligations and with no advance notice to Spyke's Grove, Clark's proceeded on its own to fill all of the orders that it had placed with Spyke's Grove before December 12, 1999——including those orders that Spyke's Grove, through its draft invoices, claimed to have shipped. Even after the fact, Clark's failed to inform Spyke's Grove that it had, in effect, repudiated its contractual promises to pay Spyke's Grove for the gift fruit packages already shipped as of December 12, 1999 (i.e. the orders not canceled on December 14, 1999). The Inevitable Dispute Having heard nothing from Clark's in response to its December 16, 1999, fax, Spyke's Grove sent its invoices out again, in final form, on January 25, 2000.2 This time, Ms. Spiece did not inscribe any instructions to cross out duplicates for a discount. Numbered 11063001 ($688.72), 11063002 ($2,449.14), and 11063003 ($195.52), these bills totaled $3,333.38. Each of these invoices contained the following boilerplate "terms": Net 14 days prompt payment is expected and appreciated. A 1 ½% monthly service charge (A.P.R. 18% per annum) may be charged on all past due accounts. Customer agrees to pay all costs of collection, including attorneys [sic] fees and court costs, should collection efforts ever become necessary. Clark's did not remit payment or otherwise respond to Spyke's Grove's statements. Accordingly, on June 20, 2000, Spyke's Grove sent a letter to the Department requesting assistance. Clark's was provided a copy of this letter. Shortly thereafter, Spyke's Grove filed a Complaint with the Department, initiating the instant proceeding. Ultimate Factual Determinations Clark's refusal to pay for the goods ordered from and shipped by Spyke's Grove constituted a breach of the contracts between the parties. Spyke's Grove did not materially breach the agreements. Further, Clark's did not object, within a reasonable period of time, to the statements of account that Spyke's Grove rendered preliminarily on December 16, 1999, and finally on January 25, 2000. Accordingly, these invoices amount to an account stated concerning the transactions between the parties. Clark's failed to overcome the presumption of correctness that attaches to an account stated, either by proving fraud, mistake, or error. Spyke's Grove has suffered an injury as a result of Clark's' breach. Spyke's Grove's damages consist of the principal amount of the debt together with pre-award interest at the statutory rate. Accordingly, Spyke's Grove is entitled to recover the following amounts from Clark's: Principal Due Date Statutory Interest $3,333.38 2/08/99 $ 298.66 (2/08/00 - 12/31/00) $ 335.56 (1/01/01 - 11/30/01) $3,333.38 $ 634.22 Interest will continue to accrue on the outstanding balance of $3,333.38 in the amount of $1.00 per day from December 1, 2001, until the date of the final order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order awarding Spyke's Grove the sum of $3,333.38, together with pre- award interest in the amount of $634.22 (through November 30, 2001), plus additional interest from December 1, 2001, until the date of the final order, which will accrue in the amount of $1.00 per day. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 2001.
The Issue Whether the Respondent Alilev Corporation failed to pay amounts owing to the Petitioner for the shipment of citrus fruit, as set forth in the Complaint dated April 30, 2001, and, if so, the amount the Petitioner is entitled to recover.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, Fresh Fruit Express and Bay Harbor Fine Foods were "citrus fruit dealers" licensed by the Department. Bay Harbor Fine Foods is a retail grocery store. As part of its business, it sells to its retail customers "gift fruit" consisting of oranges and grapefruit for shipment to third persons identified by the customers. Arthur C. Bergen is an owner of Bay Harbor Fine Foods and acted on its behalf with respect to the transactions that are the subject of this proceeding. Fresh Fruit Express is in the business of packaging and shipping "gift fruit" consisting of oranges and grapefruit pursuant to orders placed by other citrus fruit dealers. Barbara Spiece is the president of Fresh Fruit Express and acted on its behalf with respect to the transactions that are the subject of this proceeding. In November and December 1999, Fresh Fruit Express received via facsimile transmittal a number of orders for "gift fruit" from Bay Harbor Fine Foods. Most of the orders were for single shipments of fruit, although a few orders were for 12 monthly shipments of fruit. This was the first year Bay Harbor Fine Foods had done business with Fresh Fruit Express, and Bay Harbor Fine Foods and Fresh Fruit Express did not execute a written contract governing their business relationship. On the night of Sunday, December 12, 1999, Fresh Fruit Express's packinghouse was destroyed by fire, and its offices were substantially damaged. The fire could not have happened at a worse time because it was at the peak of the holiday fruit- shipping season. Fresh Fruit Express was able to move into temporary offices and to obtain the use of a packinghouse very quickly. It had telephone service at approximately noon on Tuesday, December 14, 1999, and it began shipping "gift fruit" packages on Friday, December 17, 1999, to fill the orders its had received. Mr. Bergen, the owner of Bay Harbor Fine Foods, learned of the fire at Fresh Fruit Express and attempted to contact its offices for an update on the orders Bay Harbor Fine Foods had placed for shipment during the holidays. Mr. Bergen was unable to contact anyone at Fresh Fruit Express for three or four days after the fire, and he was worried that his customers' orders for "gift fruit" would not be shipped on time.1 Mr. Bergen called two other packinghouses and placed orders duplicating some of the orders Bay Harbor Fine Foods had placed with Fresh Fruit Express. Mr. Bergen directed these packinghouses to ship the duplicate orders via expedited Federal Express and United Parcel Service shipping, and Bay Harbor Fine Foods incurred extra costs for the expedited shipping. Meanwhile, Fresh Fruit Express was giving priority to its smaller wholesale customers such as Bay Harbor Fine Foods, and it shipped all of the orders it had received from Bay Harbor Fine Foods. Bay Harbor Fine Foods did not cancel its orders with Fresh Fruit Express or otherwise notify Fresh Fruit Express that it should not ship the fruit; Mr. Bergen assumed that Fresh Fruit Express would contact him if it intended to ship the fruit ordered by Bay Harbor Fine Foods. Fresh Fruit Express prepared invoices for Bay Harbor Fine Foods dated January 24, 2000, in the amounts of $60.01, $599.43, and $511.80, respectively, for "gift fruit" shipments made in November and December 1999; it prepared an invoice for Bay Harbor Fine Foods dated February 18, 2000, in the amount of $92.00 for "gift fruit" shipments made in January and February 2000; it prepared an invoice for Bay Harbor Fine Foods dated March 21, 2000, in the amount of $69.34 for "gift fruit" shipments made in February and March 2000; and it prepared an invoice for Bay Harbor Fine Foods dated April 17, 2000, in the amount of $44.40 for "gift fruit" shipments made in April 2000. According to the invoices, Bay Harbor Fine Foods owed Fresh Fruit Express $1,376.98 as of April 17, 2000. All of the invoices to Bay Harbor Fine Foods that were submitted by Fresh Fruit Express contain the following: "Terms: Net 14 days prompt payment is expected and appreciated. A 1½% monthly service charge (A.P.R. 18% per annum) may be charged on all past due accounts. " By late April 2000, Fresh Fruit Express had not received payment for any of the "gift fruit" shipped pursuant to the orders placed by Bay Harbor Fine Foods. Ms. Spiece contacted Bay Harbor Fine Foods in late April 2000 and inquired about payment of the amounts owing. Ms. Spiece was told that Bay Harbor Fine Foods had no invoices from Fresh Fruit Express. Ms. Spiece sent duplicate invoices to Bay Harbor Fine Foods, and she called to confirm that the invoices had been received. After several attempts by Fresh Fruit Express to collect the amounts invoiced to Bay Harbor Fine Foods, Mr. Bergen tendered a check dated July 11, 2000, to Fresh Fruit Express on the Bay Harbor Fine Foods account in the amount of $591.90. The check was accompanied by a letter signed by Mr. Bergen, in which he stated: Enclosed is a check in the amount of $591.90 covering the shipments that we know were not duplicated due to your fire in late December. This amount reflects a deduction of $341.95 in freight charges paid by us to U.P.S. and Fed. Ex. to make our promised Christmas deadline. In the statement attached to the complaint filed with the Department, Fresh Fruit Express claims that Bay Harbor Fine Foods owes it a total of $1,034.62, which amount includes a credit for the $591.90 paid by Bay Harbor Fine Foods in July 2000 and amounts shown as "Finance" charges for the months of February 2000 through April 2001. Bay Harbor Fine Foods does not dispute Fresh Fruit Express's claim that $1,376.98 worth of "gift fruit" was shipped by Fresh Fruit Express pursuant to orders Bay Harbor Fine Foods placed in November and December 1999. Bay Harbor Fine Foods' position is that it need not pay Fresh Fruit Express for the fruit because Fresh Fruit Express did not notify it after the December 12, 1999, fire that it would ship the orders and because Bay Harbor Fine Foods had to make sure that its customers' orders were filled. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Bay Harbor Fine Foods was, at the times material to this proceeding, a Florida-licensed and -bonded citrus fruit dealer; that, in November and December 1999, Bay Harbor Fine Foods submitted orders to Fresh Fruit Express for the shipment of "gift fruit" consisting of oranges and grapefruit; that Fresh Fruit Express shipped all of the "gift fruit" ordered by Bay Harbor Fine Foods in November and December 1999; that the price of the "gift fruit" shipped by Fresh Fruit Express pursuant to Bay Harbor Fine Foods' orders totaled $1,376.98; that Bay Harbor Fine Foods paid Fresh Fruit Express $591.90 on its account on July 11, 2000; and that Fresh Fruit Express timely filed its complaint alleging that Bay Harbor Fine Foods failed to promptly pay its indebtedness to Fresh Fruit Express for citrus products shipped pursuant to orders placed by Bay Harbor Fine Foods. Fresh Fruit Express is, therefore, entitled to payment of the principal amount of $785.08, plus pre-judgment interest. Fresh Fruit Express presented no evidence to establish that it actually sent the invoices to Bay Harbor Fine Foods on or about the dates stated on the invoices. Therefore, payment of the $1,376.98 was due on May 1, 2000, after Ms. Spiece sent duplicate invoices to Bay Harbor Fine Foods and confirmed that they had been received, and pre-judgment interest on this amount would begin accruing on May 1, 2000. The payment of $591.90 on July 11, 2000, reduced the principal balance owing to Fresh Fruit Express to $785.08, and pre-judgment interest on this amount would begin accruing on July 12, 2000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order ordering Alilev Corporation, d/b/a Bay Harbor Fine Foods, to pay $785.08 to Spyke's Grove, Inc., d/b/a Fresh Fruit Express, Emerald Estate, and Nature's Classic, together with pre-judgment interest calculated at the rate specified in Section 55.03, Florida Statutes, on the amounts owing. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 2001.
The Issue Whether Respondent, The Citrus Store, a citrus fruit dealer, owes Petitioner, Hutchinson Groves, Inc., a grower of Florida citrus products, a sum of money for citrus fruit harvested from Petitioner's groves. SUMMARY DISPOSITION On or about December 16, 2003, Petitioner, Hutchinson Groves, Inc., filed a complaint with the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (the "Department"), alleging that Respondent, The Citrus Store, owes Petitioner the sum of $27,117.59, for oranges harvested from Petitioner's groves by Respondent pursuant to a written contract. Respondent conceded that it owed some lesser amount to the owner of the groves in question. However, the matter was complicated by the fact that, subsequent to the execution of the contract with Respondent, Petitioner had sold those groves to a third party who also asserted a claim to the proceeds from the sale of the fruit to Respondent. The matter was the subject of litigation in the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Highlands County (Case No. GC-02-587), which caused the Department to delay forwarding the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings until December 2, 2005. The case was assigned to the undersigned and set for hearing on February 2, 2006. The hearing was convened as scheduled. Prior to the taking of testimony, the parties discussed settlement of the matter. At the conclusion of their discussions, the parties stipulated: that the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over this matter and the parties thereto pursuant to Section 120.569 and Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2005); that, at all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner was a "producer" pursuant to Subsection 601.03(29), Florida Statutes; that, at all times relevant to this proceeding, The Citrus Store was a "citrus fruit dealer" pursuant to Subsection 601.03(8), Florida Statutes; that Respondent owes Petitioner $27,117.59 for the oranges harvested from Petitioner's groves; and that no interest would be sought or assessed against Respondent on the principal amount owing to Petitioner. Based on the foregoing stipulations, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered requiring Respondent, The Citrus Store, to pay to Petitioner, Hutchinson Groves, Inc., the principal sum of $27,117.59, without interest. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathy Alves Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland Post Office Box 87 Baltimore, Maryland 21203 William Hutchinson Hutchinson Groves, Inc. 1323 Edgewater Point Drive Sebring, Florida 33870 Clifford R. Rhoades, Esquire Clifford R. Rhoades, P.A. 227 North Ridgewood Drive Sebring, Florida 33870 Anthony W. Surber, Esquire Harbsmeier, DeZayas, Harden & DeBari, L.L.P. 5116 South Lakeland Drive Lakeland, Florida 33813 Chris Green, Chief Bureau of License and Bond Division of Marketing 407 South Calhoun Street, Mail Station 38 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue The issue presented for decision is whether Proposed Rules 20-15.001, 20-15.002, and 20-15.003 constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority pursuant to Section 120.52(8)(a)-(e), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulated facts, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Florida Citrus Commission was established in 1935 to organize and promote the growing and sale of various citrus products, fresh and processed, in the State of Florida. The purpose of the Citrus Commission is today reflected in Section 601.02, Florida Statutes. The powers of the Florida Citrus Commission ("the Commission") and the Department, are set forth in full in Section 601.10, Florida Statutes. The powers of the Department include the power to tax and raise other revenue to achieve the purposes of the Department. In particular, Section 601.10(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, state: The Department of Citrus shall have and shall exercise such general and specific powers as are delegated to it by this chapter and other statutes of the state, which powers shall include, but shall not be confined to, the following: To adopt and, from time to time, alter, rescind, modify, or amend all proper and necessary rules, regulations, and orders for the exercise of its powers and the performance of its duties under this chapter and other statutes of the state, which rules and regulations shall have the force and effect of law when not inconsistent therewith. To act as the general supervisory authority over the administration and enforcement of this chapter and to exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be imposed upon it by other laws of the state. The Department is authorized to set standards by Section 601.11, Florida Statutes, as follows: The Department of Citrus shall have full and plenary power to, and may, establish state grades and minimum maturity and quality standards not inconsistent with existing laws for citrus fruits and food products thereof containing 20 percent or more citrus or citrus juice, whether canned or concentrated, or otherwise processed, including standards for frozen concentrate for manufacturing purposes, and for containers therefor, and shall prescribe rules or regulations governing the marking, branding, labeling, tagging, or stamping of citrus fruit, or products thereof whether canned or concentrated, or otherwise processed, and upon containers therefor for the purpose of showing the name and address of the person marketing such citrus fruit or products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed; the grade, quality, variety, type, or size of citrus fruit, the grade, quality, variety, type, and amount of the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, and the quality, type, size, dimensions, and shape of containers therefor, and to regulate or prohibit the use of containers which have been previously used for the sale, transportation, or shipment of citrus fruit or the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, or any other commodity; provided, however, that the use of secondhand containers for sale and delivery of citrus fruit for retail consumption within the state shall not be prohibited; provided, however, that no standard, regulation, rule, or order under this section which is repugnant to any requirement made mandatory under federal law or regulations shall apply to citrus fruit, or the products thereof, whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, or to containers therefor, which are being shipped from this state in interstate commerce. All citrus fruit and the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed sold, or offered for sale, or offered for shipment within or without the state shall be graded and marked as required by this section and the regulations, rules, and orders adopted and made under authority of this section, which regulations, rules, and orders shall, when not inconsistent with state or federal law, have the force and effect of law. The Department is authorized to conduct citrus research by Section 601.13, Florida Statutes. To help pay for these duties of the Department, the Legislature first enacted the "box tax" in 1949. The box tax is now codified as Section 601.15(3), Florida Statutes. Section 601.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes, provides in relevant part: There is hereby levied and imposed upon each standard-packed box of citrus fruit grown and placed into the primary channel of trade in this state an excise tax at annual rates for each citrus season as determined from the tables in this paragraph and based upon the previous season's actual statewide production as reported in the United States Department of Agriculture Citrus Crop Production Forecast as of June 1. Section 601.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes, goes on to set forth specific rates for fresh grapefruit, processed grapefruit, fresh oranges, processed oranges, and fresh or processed tangerines and citrus hybrids. Section 601.15(1), Florida Statutes, sets forth the Department's authority to administer the box tax, as follows: The administration of this section shall be vested in the Department of Citrus, which shall prescribe suitable and reasonable rules and regulations for the enforcement hereof, and the Department of Citrus shall administer the taxes levied and imposed hereby. All funds collected under this section and the interest accrued on such funds are consideration for a social contract between the state and the citrus growers of the state whereby the state must hold such funds in trust and inviolate and use them only for the purposes prescribed in this chapter. The Department of Citrus shall have power to cause its duly authorized agent or representative to enter upon the premises of any handler of citrus fruits and to examine or cause to be examined any books, papers, records, or memoranda bearing on the amount of taxes payable and to secure other information directly or indirectly concerned in the enforcement hereof. Any person who is required to pay the taxes levied and imposed and who by any practice or evasion makes it difficult to enforce the provisions hereof by inspection, or any person who, after demand by the Department of Citrus or any agent or representative designated by it for that purpose, refuses to allow full inspection of the premises or any part thereof or any books, records, documents, or other instruments in any manner relating to the liability of the taxpayer for the tax imposed or hinders or in anywise delays or prevents such inspection, is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. The box tax was challenged in 1936 under various provisions of the Florida Constitution as well as the Export Clause, Article 1, s. 9, cl. 5, of the United States Constitution. The Florida Supreme Court issued an opinion in 1937 upholding the validity of the box tax. C.V. Floyd Fruit Company v. Florida Citrus Commission, 128 Fla. 565, 175 So. 248 (1937). In 1970, the Legislature enacted the "equalization tax," codified as Section 601.155, Florida Statutes. The statute mirrored Section 601.15, Florida Statutes, but added certain processors who were mixing foreign citrus products with Florida products. The purpose of the equalization tax was to have all Florida processors of citrus products help pay for the costs of the Department, rather than have the burden fall entirely on the Florida growers subject to the box tax. Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, provides, in relevant part: The first person who exercises in this state the privilege of processing, reprocessing, blending, or mixing processed orange products or processed grapefruit products or the privilege of packaging or repackaging processed orange products or processed grapefruit products into retail or institutional size containers or, except as provided in subsection (9) or except if a tax is levied and collected on the exercise of one of the foregoing privileges, the first person having title to or possession of any processed orange product or any processed grapefruit product who exercises the privilege in this state of storing such product or removing any portion of such product from the original container in which it arrived in this state for purposes other than official inspection or direct consumption by the consumer and not for resale shall be assessed and shall pay an excise tax upon the exercise of such privilege at the rate described in subsection (2). Upon the exercise of any privilege described in subsection (1), the excise tax levied by this section shall be at the same rate per box of oranges or grapefruit utilized in the initial production of the processed citrus products so handled as that imposed, at the time of exercise of the taxable privilege, by s. 601.15 per box of oranges. In order to administer the tax, the Legislature provided the following relevant provisions in Section 601.155, Florida Statutes: Every person liable for the excise tax imposed by this section shall keep a complete and accurate record of the receipt, storage, handling, exercise of any taxable privilege under this section, and shipment of all products subject to the tax imposed by this section. Such record shall be preserved for a period of 1 year and shall be offered for inspection upon oral or written request by the Department of Citrus or its duly authorized agent. Every person liable for the excise tax imposed by this section shall, at such times and in such manner as the Department of Citrus may by rule require, file with the Department of Citrus a return, certified as true and correct, on forms to be prescribed and furnished by the Department of Citrus, stating, in addition to other information reasonably required by the Department of Citrus, the number of units of processed orange or grapefruit products subject to this section upon which any taxable privilege under this section was exercised during the period of time covered by the return. Full payment of excise taxes due for the period reported shall accompany each return. All taxes levied and imposed by this section shall be due and payable within 61 days after the first of the taxable privileges is exercised in this state. Periodic payment of the excise taxes imposed by this section by the person first exercising the taxable privileges and liable for such payment shall be permitted only in accordance with Department of Citrus rules, and the payment thereof shall be guaranteed by the posting of an appropriate certificate of deposit, approved surety bond, or cash deposit in an amount and manner as prescribed by the Department of Citrus. * * * (11) This section shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes set forth and as additional and supplemental powers vested in the Department of Citrus under the police power of this state. In March 2000, certain citrus businesses challenged Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, as being unconstitutional. At the time of the suit, Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, read as follows: All products subject to the taxable privileges under this section, which products are produced in whole or in part from citrus fruit grown within the United States, are exempt from the tax imposed by this section to the extent that the products are derived from oranges or grapefruit grown within the United States. In the case of products made in part from citrus fruit grown within the United States, it shall be the burden of the persons liable for the excise tax to show the Department of Citrus, through competent evidence, proof of that part which is not subject to a taxable privilege. The citrus businesses claimed the exemption in Section 601.155(5) rendered the tax unconstitutionally discriminatory, in that processors who imported juice from foreign countries to be blended with Florida juice were subject to the equalization tax, whereas processors who imported juice from places such as California, Arizona and Texas enjoyed an exemption from the tax. The case, Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al. v. Department of Citrus, Case No. GCG-00-3718 (Consolidated) ("Tampa Juice"), was brought in the Tenth Judicial Circuit Court, in and for Polk County. Judge Dennis P. Maloney of that court continues to preside over that case. In a partial final declaratory judgment effective March 15, 2002, Judge Maloney found Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution due to its discriminatory effect in favor of non-Florida United States juice. In an order dated April 15, 2002, Judge Maloney severed the exemption in Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, from the remainder of the statute. The court's decision necessitated the formulation of a remedy for the injured plaintiffs. While the parties were briefing the issue before the court, the Florida Legislature met and passed Chapter 2002-26, Laws of Florida, which amended Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, to read as follows: Products made in whole or in part from citrus fruit on which an equivalent tax is levied pursuant to s. 601.15 are exempt from the tax imposed by this section. In the case of products made in part from citrus fruit exempt from the tax imposed by this section, it shall be the burden of the persons liable for the excise tax to show the Department of Citrus, through competent evidence, proof of that part which is not subject to a taxable privilege. Chapter 2002-26, Laws of Florida, was given an effective date of July 1, 2002. By order dated August 8, 2002, Judge Maloney set forth his decision as to the remedy for the plaintiffs injured by the discriminatory effect of Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes. Judge Maloney expressly relied on the rationale set forth in Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. McKesson Corporation, 574 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1991)("McKesson II"). In its initial McKesson decision, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. McKesson Corporation, 524 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1988), the Florida Supreme Court affirmed a summary judgment ruling that Florida's alcoholic beverage tax scheme, which gave tax preferences and exemptions to certain alcoholic beverages made from Florida crops, unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce. The Florida Supreme Court also affirmed that portion of the summary judgment giving the ruling prospective effect, thus denying the plaintiff a refund of taxes paid pursuant to the unconstitutional scheme. The decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In McKesson Corporation v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990), the United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court's decision as to the prospective effect of its decision. The United States Supreme Court held that: The question before us is whether prospective relief, by itself, exhausts the requirements of federal law. The answer is no: If a State places a taxpayer under duress promptly to pay a tax when due and relegates him to a postpayment refund action in which he can challenge the tax's legality, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the State to provide meaningful backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional deprivation. 496 U.S. at 31 (footnotes omitted). The United States Supreme Court set forth the following options by which the state could meet its obligation to provide "meaningful backward-looking relief": [T]he State may cure the invalidity of the Liquor Tax by refunding to petitioner the difference between the tax it paid and the tax it would have been assessed were it extended the same rate reductions that its competitors actually received. . . . Alternatively, to the extent consistent with other constitutional restrictions, the State may assess and collect back taxes from petitioner's competitors who benefited from the rate reductions during the contested tax period, calibrating the retroactive assessment to create in hindsight a nondiscriminatory scheme. . . . Finally, a combination of a partial refund to petitioner and a partial retroactive assessment of tax increases on favored competitors, so long as the resultant tax actually assessed during the contested tax period reflects a scheme that does not discriminate against interstate commerce, would render Petitioner's resultant deprivation lawful and therefore satisfy the Due Process Clause's requirement of a fully adequate postdeprivation procedure. 496 U.S. at 40-41 (citations and footnotes omitted). The United States Supreme Court expressly provided that the state has the option of choosing the form of relief it will grant. In keeping with the United States Supreme Court opinion, the Florida Supreme Court granted the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (the "Division") leave to advise the Court as to the form of relief the state wished to provide. The Division proposed to retroactively assess and collect taxes from those of McKesson's competitors who had benefited from the discriminatory tax scheme. McKesson contended that a refund of the taxes it had paid was the only clear and certain remedy, because retroactive taxation of its competitors would violate their due process rights. McKesson II, 574 So. 2d at 116. The Florida Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings on McKesson's refund claim, with the following instructions: While McKesson may not necessarily be entitled to a refund, it is entitled to a "clear and certain remedy," as outlined in the Supreme Court's opinion. Because nonparties, such as amici, will be directly affected by the retroactive tax scheme proposed by the state, all affected by the proposed emergency rule must be given notice and an opportunity to intervene in this action. Therefore, on remand, the trial court not only must determine whether the state's proposal meets "the minimum federal requirements" outlined in the Supreme Court's opinion, it also must determine whether the proposal comports with federal and state protections afforded those against whom the proposed tax will be assessed. We emphasize that the state has the option of choosing the manner in which it will reformulate the alcoholic beverage tax during the contested period so that the resultant tax actually assessed during that period reflects a scheme which does not discriminate against interstate commerce. Therefore, if the trial court should rule that the state's proposal to retroactively assess and collect taxes from McKesson's competitors does not meet constitutional muster and such ruling is upheld on appeal, the state may offer an alternative remedy for the trial court's review. However, any such proposal likewise must satisfy the standards set forth by the Supreme Court as well as be consistent with other constitutional restrictions. 574 So. 2d at 116. In the Tampa Juice case, Judge Maloney assessed the options prescribed by the series of McKesson cases and concluded that the only fair remedy was to assess and collect back assessments from those who benefited from the unconstitutional equalization tax exemption. His August 8, 2002, order directed the Department to "take appropriate steps, consistent with existing law, to assess and collect the Equalization tax from those entities which [benefited] from the unconstitutional exemption." On September 18, 2002, the Department promulgated the Emergency Rules that were at issue in DOAH Case No. 02-3648RE. The Emergency Rules were filed with the Department of State on September 24, 2002, and took effect on that date. Those emergency rules were held invalid in Peace River, and are not at issue in the instant case. In the November 15, 2002 issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly (vol. 28, no. 46, pp. 4996-4998), the Department published the Proposed Rules that were at issue in DOAH Case No. 02-4607RP. In the March 7, 2003, issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly (vol. 29, no. 10, p. 1036), the Department published amendments to the Proposed Rule. The Proposed Rules, as amended, read as follows: EQUALIZATION TAX ON NON-FLORIDA UNITED STATES JUICE 20-15.001 Intent. The Court in Tampa Juice Service, et al v. Florida Department of Citrus in Consolidated Case Number GCG-003718 (Circuit Court in and for Polk County, Florida) severed the exemption contained in Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, that provided an exemption for persons who exercised one of the enumerated Equalization Tax privileges on non-Florida, United States juice. The Court had previously determined that the stricken provisions operated in a manner that violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. On August 8, 2002, the Court ordered that the Florida Department of Citrus "take appropriate steps, consistent with existing law, to assess and collect the Equalization tax from those entities which [benefited] from the unconstitutional exemption." It is the Florida Department of Citrus' intent by promulgating the following remedial rule to implement a non- discriminatory tax scheme, which does not impose a significant tax burden that is so harsh and oppressive as to transgress constitutional limitations. These rules shall be applicable to those previously favored persons who received favorable tax treatment under the statutory sections cited above. Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, , 601.155 FS. History-- New . 20-15.002 Definitions. "Previously favored persons" shall be defined as any person who exercised an enumerated Equalization Tax privilege as defined by Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, but who was exempt from payment of the Equalization Tax due to the exemption for non-Florida, United States juice set forth in the statutory provision, which was ultimately determined to be unconstitutional and severed from Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes. The "tax period" during which the severed provisions of Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, were in effect shall be defined as commencing on October 6, 1997, and ending on March 14, 2002. "Tax liability" shall be defined as the total amount of taxes due to the Florida Department of Citrus during the "tax period," at the following rates per box for each respective fiscal year: Fiscal Year Processed Rate Orange Grapefruit 1997-1998 .175 .30 1998-1999 .17 .30 1999-2000 .18 .325 2000-2001 .175 .30 2001-2002 .165 .18 Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, , 601.155 FS. History-- New . 20-15.003 Collection. The Florida Department of Citrus shall calculate the tax liability for each person or entity that exercised an enumerated Equalization Tax privilege outlined in section 601.155, Florida Statutes, upon non-Florida, United States juice based upon inspection records maintained by Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and the United States Department of Agriculture. Subsequent to adoption of this rule, the Florida Department of Citrus will provide to the previously favored persons by certified mail a Notice of Tax Liability which shall contain a demand for payment consistent with the above-referenced itemized statement. The Department will deem late payment of Equalization Taxes owed by previously favored persons to constitute good cause, and shall waive the 5 percent penalty authorized by Section 601.155(10), F.S., as compliance with either of the following is established by Department [sic]: Lump sum payment of the tax liability remitted with the filing of Department of Citrus Form 4R (incorporated by reference in Rule 20-100.004, F.A.C.) for the relevant years and then-applicable tax rate(s) per subsection 20-15.002(3), F.A.C., within 61 days of receiving Notice of Tax Liability; or Equal installment payments remitted with the filing of Department of Citrus Form 4R (incorporated by reference in Rule 20- 100.004, F.A.C.) for the relevant years and then-applicable tax rate(s) per subsection subsection [sic] 20-15.002(3), F.A.C., over a 60-month period, the first payment being due within 61 days of receiving Notice of Tax Liability pursuant to subsection 20- 15.003(2), F.A.C.; or The Good Cause provisions of 601.155(10), F.S., shall not apply to persons who do not comply with paragraph 20- 15.003(2)(a), F.A.C., or paragraph 20- 15.003(2)(b), F.A.C. Failure to pay the taxes or penalties due under 601.155, F.S. and Chapter 20-15, F.A.C., shall constitute grounds for revocation or suspension of a previously favored person's citrus fruit dealer's license pursuant to 601.56(4), F.S., 601.64(6), F.S., 601.64(7), F.S., and/or 601.67(1), F.S. The Florida Department of Citrus will not oppose the timely intervention of persons who previously enjoyed the subject exemption that wish to present a claim to the Court in the Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al v. Florida Department of Citrus. However, the Florida Department of Citrus does not waive any argument regarding the validity of the calculation of the tax liability or that imposition of this tax is constitutional. Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. History-- New . The Final Order in Peace River held that the Proposed Rules were not an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, for reasons discussed in the Conclusions of Law below. Judge Maloney has yet to rule on the backward-looking remedy proposed by the Department. On March 26, 2003, Judge Maloney entered an order extending until May 1, 2003, the time for interested parties to file motions to intervene with regard to the Department's proposed backward-looking relief. The order noted that the parties have stipulated to the suspension of the back tax as to plaintiffs and objecting non-parties until further order of the court. On February 19, 2003, Judge Maloney entered an "Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment-- Import-Export." The sole issue before Judge Maloney was "whether Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, (the 'Equalization Tax'), as it existed in 1997, violates Article I, Section 10, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (the 'Import- Export Clause')." (Emphasis in original) After setting forth the standard for analysis of whether a taxing scheme violates the Import-Export Clause under Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 96 S. Ct. 535, 46 L.Ed.2d 495 (1976), Judge Maloney ruled as follows: It is precisely [the exemption for United States products found in 601.155(5), Florida Statutes] that causes the 1997 Equalization Tax to contravene the Import-Export Clause. Specifically, the court finds that because the statute exempts "citrus fruit grown within the United States," but does not exempt citrus fruit grown in foreign countries, the exemption causes the tax to "fall on imports as such simply because of their place of origin." Michelin, 423 U.S. at 286. Additionally, because the tax falls on foreign-grown citrus as such simply because of its origin but does not fall on domestic-grown citrus, the Equalization Tax, with the exemption, creates a "special tariff or particular preference for certain domestic goods." Id. (i.e. California, Arizona, and Texas citrus products). * * * In conclusion, because the court finds the exemption contained within the 1997 Equalization Tax violates both the first and third elements of the Michelin test,1 the court finds the 1997 Equalization Tax violates Article I, Section 10, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (the "Import-Export Clause"). On March 31, 2003, Judge Maloney entered an "Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment." In this order, Judge Maloney found that the box tax itself, Section 601.15, Florida Statutes, violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Petitioners and Intervenor in the instant case are licensed citrus fruit dealers regulated by Chapter 601, Florida Statutes. As such, they are subject to the rules of the Department. Petitioners and Intervenor buy, sell, and manufacture citrus juices. They shipped products made with non- Florida U.S. juice during the tax period without paying equalization taxes. Petitioners and Intervenor have been notified by the Department that they are liable to pay back taxes pursuant to the Proposed Rules, as well as the invalid Emergency Rules.
The Issue Is the general partnership, Schiller Investments, a party to the fruit purchase agreement that is the subject of this proceeding with standing to bring a claim for payment? Does the failure of Schiller Investments to register "Shell Creek Groves" as a fictitious name require abating this proceeding?1/ Does the election of remedies provision of section 601.65, Florida Statutes (2011)2/ prohibit the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and the Division of Administrative Hearings from taking jurisdiction of this matter? Is Gulf Citrus Marketing, LLC, liable to Schiller Investments in the amount of $259,817.41?
Findings Of Fact Schiller Investments is a general partnership formed by Friedrich Schiller and his wife, Barbara Ann Schiller, in Kansas on February 1, 2005. In the transactions involved in this matter, Mr. Schiller acted on behalf of Schiller Investments with full authority as a general partner. Although Schiller Investments has sometimes used the name Shell Creek Groves in business transactions, Schiller Investments has never registered Shell Creek Groves as a fictitious name in Florida. Schiller Investments and Mr. Schiller also used the name Shell Creek Citrus interchangeably with Shell Creek Groves. They also did not register Shell Creek Citrus as a fictitious name. Respondent, Gulf Citrus Marketing, LLC (Gulf Citrus), is a licensed fruit dealer in Florida. George Winslow is the managing member of Gulf Citrus and acted on behalf of Gulf Citrus in all of the communications and transactions with Mr. Schiller and Schiller Investments involved in this matter. On September 23, 2009, Schiller Investments and Gulf Citrus entered into Gulf Citrus Marketing Fruit Purchase Agreement No. 936 (Purchase Agreement). Mr. Winslow drafted the agreement with the assistance of a lawyer. Mr. Winslow has a college degree in agronomy. In contrast, Mr. Schiller's formal education ended with completion of the eighth grade. Mr. Schiller executed the Purchase Agreement on behalf of Schiller Investments. Mr. Winslow executed it on behalf of Gulf Citrus. The signature blocks in the document, drafted by Mr. Winslow and Gulf Citrus's lawyer, do not state the position either man held in the entities on whose behalf they signed, as shown below. But it is plain they are signing on behalf of an entity not as individuals. SELLER: SCHILLER INVESTMENTS dba Shell Creek Groves By: Name: Friedrich Schiller BUYER: GULF CITRUS MARKETING, LLC By: Name: George Winslow The Purchase Agreement was a contract between Gulf Citrus and Schiller Investments. The Purchase Agreement provided for Gulf Citrus to purchase all oranges grown in the Prairie Grove and Shell Creek Grove for four consecutive citrus seasons, beginning with the 2009-2010 season and ending with the 2012-2013 season. The Purchase Agreement provides specific descriptions by survey coordinates of the Charlotte County locations of the groves. Shell Creek Grove is much larger than Prairie Grove. It produced the vast majority of the oranges. From 2009 to present day, Mr. Schiller has owned Shell Creek Grove. Mr. Winslow always knew that Mr. Schiller owned Shell Creek Grove. Mr. Winslow brokered the foreclosure sale of the grove to Mr. Schiller from Metropolitan Life. Before then, Mr. Winslow was one of three co-owners of Shell Creek Grove. From May 17, 2002, until January 25, 2012, Prairie Groves, LLC, owned the Prairie Grove. Throughout the course of their various dealings, Mr. Winslow was aware that Mr. Schiller controlled both groves and business dealings involving them. He regularly communicated with Mr. Schiller about the groves and dealt exclusively with him on matters involving the groves. The Purchase Agreement provides that in the event of the sale of the groves, Gulf Citrus has the right, but not the obligation, to terminate the agreement. It contains other clauses that give Gulf Citrus the right to terminate the contract in certain circumstances. The Purchase Agreement also gives Gulf Citrus the right to assign or transfer the Purchase Agreement to any third party or successor in interest. Schiller Investments timely delivered the oranges from both groves for the 2010-2011 season, as provided in the Purchase Agreement. The oranges satisfied all of the quality standards and other requirements of the Purchase Agreement. Gulf Citrus accepted the oranges. It in turn sold the oranges and received payment for them. Gulf Citrus has not paid $259,817.41 owed for the oranges. During this time, Mr. Winslow experienced financial difficulties. Mr. Schiller allowed Mr. Winslow time to cure his problems and pay the debt. In September and October, 2011, Mr. Schiller communicated regularly with Mr. Winslow and his staff about the unpaid amount and Gulf Citrus's plan to pay it. Mr. Winslow promised payment several times and explained various plans to raise the money, including re-financing real estate. But he never delivered. One scheme Mr. Winslow proposed was for Schiller Investments to enter into a new fruit purchase agreement with a New Jersey company named Johanna Foods. Mr. Schiller chose not to do this. He had reasonable concerns. They were the fact that Johanna Foods was not a licensed Florida Fruit dealer4/, that he was unfamiliar with the company, and that the proposal included an unexplained payment described as a "bonus" that was to make up for the money Gulf Citrus had not paid. Mr. Winslow did not propose to assign the agreement to Johanna Foods. And Gulf Citrus never assigned the agreement.5/ Mr. Winslow acknowledged the failure to pay in writing on October 25, 2011. The letter he wrote and signed that day in Mr. Schiller's presence reads: Fred Schiller It is my intent to pay Shell Creek Grove $259,818.00, of past due fruit proceeds due; on or about Nov 10th subject to refinancing of property owned by George Winslow. In the interim I will advise you weekly of the progress beginning November 1st. George Winslow [signature] In the event payment is not tendered to Shell Creek Grove by Nov 15th Gulf Citrus Marketing will cancel the Fruit Purchase agreement between Gulf Citrus Mkt. and Shell Creek Grove. George Winslow [signature] On October 28, 2011, Mr. Schiller sent Mr. Winslow a handwritten letter stating he was terminating the Purchase Agreement. The letter quoted verbatim below states: Dear George, Due to your financial difficulties and your inability to meet your obligations in a timely manner I am terminating the agreements between "Prairie Grove-Shell Creek Citrus" and your companies at Gulf Citrus effective Nov. 30th 2011. I like to thank your staff especially Lori for everything they have done in the past years. Thank you Fred Schiller Prairie Creek Groves Shell Creek Citrus Cc: Lory Sabrina Mr. Schiller and Mr. Winslow have done business with each other since 2001. They and the entities that they controlled were engaged in other business relationships, including ones involving Prairie Grove and Shell Creek Grove. They included business relationships with Citrus Sweet, Inc., and Florida Gulf Citrus Management, Inc. The relationships included an agreement between Mr. Schiller and Gulf Citrus Management, a Mr. Winslow entity, for management of the Shell Creek Grove. In the course of their business dealings, Mr. Schiller twice provided Mr. Winslow with copies of the Schiller Investments partnership agreement. He provided it personally to Mr. Winslow in 2002. He provided it to Mr. Winslow's staff in 2008 or 2009.6/ Through Mr. Winslow, Gulf Citrus was fully aware of the parties that it was dealing with in all the business relationships including the Purchase Agreement. Gulf Citrus has sued Mr. Schiller in circuit court for claims involving the Purchase Agreement. There is no evidence that Schiller Investments has filed suit in circuit court. There is also no evidence that Gulf Citrus filed its circuit court action before the Department took jurisdiction of the claim of Schiller Investments.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended that the Department enter a final order approving the claim of Schiller Investments against Gulf Citrus Marketing, LLC, in the amount of $259,817.41. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2012.
Findings Of Fact Facts stipulated to by parties M & B Products, Inc., submitted the lowest bid on School Board Bid No. 050-P-03, bid title Fruit Juice II, on August 17, 1993. Exhibit A, attached to the stipulation, is a true and correct copy of the bid submitted by M & B Products, Inc. Exhibit B, attached to the stipulation, is a true and correct copy of a document entitled "Important Notice To Bidders, New Statement Must Be Submitted For All Bids after 1/1/93." This document was a part of the bid documents and was provided to all prospective bidders who received the bid documents. Exhibit C, attached to the stipulation, is a true and correct copy of a sworn statement pursuant to section 287.133(3)(a), Florida Statutes, which was submitted by the president of M & B Products, Inc., pursuant to the requirement of the statute and the previously mentioned statement incorporated in the bid documents. A recommendation for award to M & B Products, Inc., was submitted to the School Board of Dade County, Florida, at its meeting of September 22, 1993. The matter was tabled by the School Board. Attached to the stipulation as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the pertinent portion of that School Board meeting wherein this action was considered. On October 6, 1993, the School Board took this matter from the table. Exhibit E, attached to the stipulation, is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the meeting of October 6, 1993, wherein the School Board considered and took action rejecting all bids. After the September 22, 1993, School Board meeting, the attorney for the School Board received a letter, Exhibit F attached to the stipulation, from Joan Van Arsdall, Staff Attorney for the Department of Management Services of the State of Florida. Each member of the School Board received a copy of the letter per the School Board meeting on October 6, 1993. On September 8, 1993, Exhibit G was mailed to Phyllis Douglas. On September 10, 1993, Exhibit H was mailed to Phyllis Douglas. Those two letters were the only objections filed. On November 4, 1993, the bid on Fruit Juice II was canceled. See Exhibit I attached to the stipulation. Since June of 1987, the company known as M & B Products, Inc., has been doing business on a bid basis with over thirty (30) county school boards in the State of Florida. The Dade County School Board has, on previous occasions during the past several years, accepted the bid of M & B Products, Inc., when M & B Products, Inc., was the low bidder. No other school board has rejected the right of M & B Products, Inc., to bid and to have its bid accepted. The video tapes filed with the McClellan Affidavit accurately depict the events at the two relevant School Board meetings. No person or entity has complained about not being allowed to bid as a result of the bidding instructions furnished by the Dade County School Board. The only complaint was from the second lowest bidder. It is necessary for the employees of M & B Products, Inc., to work for several weeks prior to the submission of a bid to determine the cost availability of juice concentrate, freight, bank loans to carry the accounts receivable of Dade County, and the most economical distribution of the products to be assembled for the purpose of bidding. M & B Products, Inc., has never received a written protest of the bid. Facts based on stipulated documents The bid documents for the subject contract included the following language: IV. AWARDS A. RESERVATION FOR REJECTION OR AWARD. The Board reserves the right to reject any and all bids, to waive irregularities or technicalities and to request re-bids. The subject bid documents also included the following language: IMPORTANT NOTICE TO BIDDERS NEW STATEMENT MUST BE SUBMITTED FOR ALL BIDS AFTER 1/1/93 The State of Florida has enacted a new law that requires bidders or contractors to submit a sworn document stating whether or not a corporation, its officers, predecessors or successors have been convicted of a public entity crime as defined in Section 287.133(3)(a), Florida Statutes. In order to contract with a public entity, neither the bidder nor contractor nor any officer, director, executive, partner, shareholder, employee, member or agent who is active in the management of the business entity of the bidder, contractor or any affiliate shall have been convicted of a public entity crime subsequent to July 1, 1989. [Emphasis supplied.] The statement quoted immediately above was an erroneous description of the requirements of Section 287.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes. (See the text of Section 287.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes, in the conclusions of law below.) M & B Products, Inc., submitted a bid on the fruit juice contract notwithstanding the fact that its president had been convicted of a public entity crime subsequent to July 1, 1989. M & B Products, Inc., filled out the sworn statement required by the bid documents, correctly stating that an officer of the corporation had been convicted of a public entity crime. The second low bidder, Natural County Farms, protested the award to M & B Products, Inc., taking the position that the School Board should not contract with an entity whose officer had been convicted of a crime. The matter came on to be heard by the School Board on September 22, 1993, and the School Board attorney recommended that the award go to M & B Products, Inc., since neither that company nor its officer had been placed on the "convicted vendor list". Much discussion ensued during which the attorney for Natural County Farms alleged that M & B Products, Inc., was "not on that list because somebody messed up and didn't put him on the list". Board member Renick asked the School Board attorney to recheck the facts with Tallahassee. The attorney agreed to do so and the matter was ultimately tabled. The matter was taken from the table on October 6, 1993. At this meeting, the attorney for Natural County Farms for the first time raised the issue of the language set forth in the bid documents to the effect that no bidder may do business with a public entity if it or one of its officers has been convicted of a public entity crime. The attorney took the position that the School Board's own bid documents excluded M & B Products, Inc., from consideration notwithstanding the fact that M & B Products, Inc. was not "on the list". The attorney for the School Board explained that the bid document had incompletely stated the statutory provisions. Some Board members expressed concern about the erroneous interpretation of the statute and about the ambiguity it may have created in the bid preparation. Furthermore, some Board members expressed the view that the low bidder was not qualified pursuant to the Board's own bid specifications and the School Board attorney advised that if the Board did not want to award to the low bidder because of the statement in the specifications, it should reject all bids, rewrite the specifications and re- bid. At the meeting on October 6, 1993, the School Board voted to reject all bids.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Dade County, Florida, issue a Final Order in this case denying the relief sought by the Petitioner and dismissing the petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January 1994 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Harry M. Hobbs, Esquire Post Office Box 18225 Tampa, Florida 33679-8225 Phyllis O. Douglas, Esquire Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue #403 Miami, Florida 33132-1308 Octavio J. Visiedo, Superintendent Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue #403 Miami, Florida 33132-1308
