The Issue Whether Rules 33-3.0084(1)(i)1 and 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioners, William Van Poyck and Mike Ramadanovic, are inmates in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioners are subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rules at issue in this proceeding. The rules at issue in this proceeding govern the treatment of inmates while in "disciplinary confinement." At the time of the formal hearing, neither of the Petitioners were in disciplinary confinement. Both Petitioners have, however, been in disciplinary confinement. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing the rights of inmates, inmate conduct, inmate discipline and all other aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. C. Rules 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), and 33-3.0084(1)(i)1, Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioners have challenged Rules 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), and 33- 3.0084(1)(i)1, Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Challenged Rules"). Rule 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part: (4) . . . . Inmates in disciplinary confinement status shall not be allowed to prepare legal documents and legal mail while in that status except under the following conditions: When there is a time limitation on the filing of legal material with a court and it reasonably appears necessary for the inmate to prepare the same while in confinement status in order to get the same filed within the required time. When the inmate wishes to prepare legal material to file with a court for the purpose of testing the legality of his disciplinary confinement. The specific statutory authority for Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code, is Sections 20.315, 944.09 and 944.11, Florida Statutes. The law implemented by Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code, is Sections 944.09 and 944.11, Florida Statutes. Rule 33-3.0084(1)(i)1, Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part: 1. Legal materials shall be accessible to inmates in disciplinary confinement provided such use of legal material is for the purpose of challenging such confinement or in the event there are time restrictions on filing court papers. The specific statutory authority for Rule 33-3.0084, Florida Administrative Code, is Section 944.09, Florida Statutes. The law implemented by, Rule 33-3.0084, Florida Administrative Code, is Sections 20.315 and 944.09, Florida Statutes. Chapter 33-22, Florida Administrative Code, titled "Inmate Discipline", specifies what constitutes prohibited conduct for inmates, the procedures for determining if an inmate has violated the rules establishing prohibited conduct and the maximum punishment which may be imposed if an inmate violates the rules establishing prohibited conduct. The "Rules of Prohibited Conduct" and the maximum punishment for an infraction of these rules are contained in Rule 33-22.012, Florida Administrative Code. Among other things, an inmate who violates the Rules of Prohibited Conduct, may be placed in "disciplinary confinement" for specified periods of time. The length of time an inmate may be placed in disciplinary confinement for is not to exceed 60 days for any one infraction. "Disciplinary confinement" is defined in Rule 33-22.002(3), Florida Administrative Code, as: (3) Disciplinary Confinement -- Confinement which includes the loss of privileges normally afforded other inmates and is effected only after procedures outlined in this chapter have been fully complied with. Although the maximum term of disciplinary confinement is 60 days, it is possible for an inmate to be placed in disciplinary confinement for longer periods of time: (1) an inmate may be convicted of more than one violation of the Rules of Prohibited Conduct and be sentenced to multiple 60-day (or less) sentences to be served consecutively; (2) an inmate may commit another infraction(s) (including a violation of the Challenged Rules) while in disciplinary confinement, resulting in additional disciplinary consecutive confinement sentences; and (3) an inmate may commit an infraction soon after release from disciplinary confinement and be returned to disciplinary confinement. It is also possible for an inmate to serve less than the full term of his sentence to disciplinary confinement. Being placed in disciplinary confinement is a direct result of the actions of an inmate in failing to follow the established rules of conduct of the Respondent. At least one inmate has been in disciplinary confinement for periods of up to two and one-half years. An inmate would have to commit a minimum of fifteen infractions to be sentenced to disciplinary confinement for two and one- half years. The evidence failed to prove that the one inmate that has been in disciplinary confinement for two and one-half years was in disciplinary confinement continuously without any break. The inmate could not recall. The number of inmates in disciplinary confinement for more than one year was not proven. At best, it was proved by the Petitioners that one inmate (Charles William Bowe, Jr.) has served more than one year in disciplinary confinement. Even the evidence concerning Mr. Bowe, however, did not prove that his time in disciplinary confinement was continuous and without any break. Based upon an estimate of the Respondent, it is likely that no more than 1% of the inmate population (less than 460) is in disciplinary confinement for more than one year. Although the evidence did not prove that any inmate has actually been in disciplinary confinement for more than two and one-half years, it is not impossible that an inmate could be in disciplinary confinement for an unlimited period of time, as long as the inmate continues to commit violations of the Respondent's Rules of Prohibited Conduct. Although it may be unlikely, it is not impossible for an inmate to be in disciplinary confinement for the entire term of his sentence. The purpose for placing an inmate in disciplinary confinement and the purpose of the Challenged Rules is to attempt to correct an inmate's demonstrated negative behavior; to eliminate "privileges" inmates normally are given. Pursuant to Rule 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code, an inmate who is placed in disciplinary confinement is prohibited from instituting any new litigation (other than a challenge to the decision to place the inmate in disciplinary confinement or litigation which must be instituted within a specified time period) while the inmate is in disciplinary confinement. Pursuant to Rule 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code, an inmate who is placed in disciplinary confinement is generally prohibited from preparing legal documents and legal mail unless the inmate is required to meet a time limitation in an existing legal matter or the inmate intends to test the legality of his disciplinary confinement. When an inmate is placed in disciplinary confinement, all of the inmate's legal materials are confiscated and impounded. Access to an inmate's legal materials may be obtained while in disciplinary confinement pursuant to the exceptions of the Challenged Rules. At Florida State Prison, access is allowed to an inmate' legal materials if the inmate can show the necessity for those materials through: (1) a court order that requires the inmate to take some action in a pending matter; (2) any other source, i.e., a rule of the court, indicating that the inmate must meet some procedural or other requirement of the court; or (3) if the inmate indicates a desire to prepare a challenge to the legality of his disciplinary confinement. The procedure followed at Florida State Prison for an inmate in disciplinary confinement to obtain access to the inmate's legal materials is as follows: The inmate makes a request to an institutional counselor assigned responsibility for the inmate; The inmate must indicate to the institutional counselor why one of the exceptions provided in the Challenged Rules allowing access to his legal materials applies; If the institutional counselor is convinced that one of the exceptions applies, access to the inmate's legal materials is allowed. If not, no access is allowed; The procedure followed at Florida State Prison if an inmate convinces an institutional counselor that access to his legal materials should be allowed is as follows: The institutional counselor retrieves the inmate's legal materials and brings them to the inmate's cell; In some instances the institutional counselor may give the legal materials to the inmate or require the inmate to describe to the counselor, and convince the counselor of, what materials he actually needs to meet the deadline or to challenge his disciplinary confinement; and The institutional counselor, based upon the inmate's description of the materials he needs, makes the final determination of what materials may actually be given to the inmate. If the inmate does not get the materials he needs, he then must convince the counselor of what additional materials are needed. If an inmate is denied access to his legal materials or is not provided with the materials he needs, the inmate may challenge the decision of the institutional counselor by filing a grievance. Based upon the experiences of the inmates who testified in this proceeding, requests for access to an inmate's legal materials may be granted or denied, and when granted, an inmate may be given the whole file, he may be denied materials, he may be asked "is this it" and he may get only the materials he actually needs. Institutional counselors may even make more than one attempt to find the requested materials. Pursuant to Rule 33-3.0084(1)(i)1, Florida Administrative Code, an inmate may not have access to any legal materials except to the extent necessary for the inmate to meet a time limitation in an existing legal matter or if the inmate intends to test the legality of his disciplinary confinement. Access to legal materials in the library may generally be obtained by inmates. Such access is not, however, without limitation. There are limitations on the procedure which must be followed to obtain access to the library and the amount of materials which may be obtained at any one time. An inmate in disciplinary confinement is further limited as to when and how he may access library resources pursuant to the Challenged Rules. At Florida State Prison, access is allowed to library legal materials only if an inmate can show the necessity for those materials in the same manner an inmate may obtain access to his own legal materials as explained in finding of fact 26. The procedure followed at Florida State Prison for an inmate in disciplinary confinement to obtain access to library legal materials is as follows: The inmate must make a request in writing to the librarian; The inmate must indicate to the librarian why one of the exceptions to the lack of access to library legal materials applies; If the librarian is convinced that one of the exceptions applies, access to the library's legal materials is allowed. If not, no access is allowed; The librarian, based upon the inmate's description of the materials he needs, makes the final determination of what materials may actually be given to the inmate. If the inmate does not get the materials he needs, he may make additional requests. If an inmate is denied access to library legal materials or is not provided with the materials he needs, the inmate may challenge the decision by filing a grievance. Institutional counselors and librarians are not required to have legal education or training. The evidence failed to prove that any inmate has been totally denied access to the courts by the proper application of the Challenged Rules. The evidence proved that the Challenged Rules are inconvenient and aggravating to some inmates who have experienced the procedures which must be followed in order to obtain access to the inmate's legal materials or library legal materials. The procedures can be a hinderance to an inmate's pursuit of litigation to the extent that the procedures are one more step an inmate must follow that the inmate would not otherwise have to follow if he were not in disciplinary confinement. The evidence proved that, although inconvenient, some of the inmates who testified were able to pursue litigation even though they have been in disciplinary confinement at times. There was some aggravation and frustration caused those inmates who testified because of the Challenged Rules, but the evidence failed to prove that any of the inmates who testified or any other inmates were actually prevented from pursing litigation: Inmate Bowe, who has served two and one-half years of disciplinary confinement (although it was not proved whether the time was without interruption because of Inmate Bowe's memory lapse), had several court proceedings (Florida and federal) pending at the time of the formal hearing and did not indicate that he has missed any court ordered or procedural time limit or that any case has been dismissed because of an inability to prosecute his cases caused by the Challenged Rules; Leonard Bean, another inmate who testified, has served 140 to 150 days in disciplinary confinement for multiple infractions. Although Inmate Bean testified that his co-defendant's conviction had been reversed (in February, 1991), the evidence failed to prove that Inmate Bean's conviction would have also been reversed but for his disciplinary confinement or, more importantly, would have also been reversed but for the Challenged Rules. Although Inmate Bean was released from disciplinary confinement in May, 1991, he still had not filed for habeas corpus as of the date of the formal hearing; Jimmy Stephens, another inmate who testified, has served 240 days of disciplinary confinement for four infractions during the past two years. Although inconvenienced by the limitation on library legal material use, Inmate Stephens did not indicate that he has missed any court ordered or procedural time limit or that any case has been dismissed because of an inability to prosecute his cases caused by the rules at issue; Carl Watts, another inmate who testified, served 180 days in disciplinary confinement prior to being transferred to Florida State Prison and another 60 days after arriving at Florida State Prison. Inmate Watts' testimony concerning a possible habeas corpus action failed to prove that he has missed any court ordered or procedural time limit or that any case has been dismissed because of an inability to prosecute his cases caused by the rules at issue; Petitioner Ramadanovic has served up to 100 days in disciplinary confinement. Although he filed two grievances dated August 22, 1990, concerning his efforts to file a brief in an appellate court proceeding, his disciplinary confinement ended August 23, 1990, and therefore, he failed to prove that he was prevented from filing a brief or any other pleading in any case pending while he was in disciplinary confinement. The evidence also failed to prove that he has missed any court ordered or procedural time limit or that any case has been dismissed because of an inability to prosecute his cases caused by the rules at issue; Petitioner Van Poyck failed to prove that he has missed any court ordered or procedural time limit or that any case has been dismissed because of an inability to prosecute his cases caused by the rules at issue. As long as an inmate is in disciplinary confinement, that inmate may not file an action for federal habeas corpus. An inmate in disciplinary confinement may also not file an action for habeas corpus in the State courts until some, unspecified date, which the Respondent determines is close enough to necessitate preparation of the pleadings in order to meet the time limitations on habeas corpus in Florida.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether the Respondent has violated statutory provisions relating to the practice of architecture, and, if so, what disciplinary action is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is licensed as an architect in the State of Florida. His license has been under suspension since April 27, 1978. On April 7, 1978, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, entered an Order adjudging the Respondent guilty of the following offenses: Unlawfully and knowingly conspiring with persons to commit an offense against the United States, that is: to conduct and participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, participation in the conduct of these affairs, and mail fraud; in violation of Sections 1962 (d), 1962(c), 2 and 1341, Title 18, United States Code, as charged in Counts 1, 2, 28 and 29 of the indictment. The Respondent was sentenced to serve ten years in prison based upon the convictions of Counts 1 and 2, and five years based upon the convictions as to Counts 28 and 29, with all four sentences to run concurrently. The Respondent appealed his conviction to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. His conviction was affirmed. The Respondent sought relief in the United States Supreme Court without avail. The Respondent's conviction is now final, and he has apparently begun serving his prison sentence.
Findings Of Fact On August 21, 1990, the Petitioner submitted an application for licensure as a real estate salesman in the state of Florida. Item 7 of the licensure application form required the applicant to answer the following question: "Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld?" Petitioner responded yes to that question. The application form provided that "If you answered 'YES,' please state the details including dates and outcome in full. (Use separate sheet if necessary)." The only response provided by Petitioner was "1970 found guilty shooting a firearm in a dwelling - served 28 months Avon Park and work release." In fact, Petitioner has been arrested and/or convicted on several other occasions that were not listed on his application. On October 19, 1964, the Petitioner was found guilty of breaking and entering an automobile, petit larceny, and carrying a concealed weapon in Case 64-755 in the Criminal Court of Record in and for Dade County, Florida. Petitioner was placed on probation for a period of one year in connection with that case. On August 13, 1975, the Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to a charge of unlawfully and feloniously breaking and entering a dwelling with the intent to commit a felony therein, to-wit: grand larceny. The court suspended imposition of sentence, withheld adjudication of guilt and placed the Petitioner on probation for a term of five years. This case was Case Number 75-5081 in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida in and for Dade County. On June 18, 1976, the Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to robbery, shooting into an occupied dwelling, and unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense. Petitioner was sentenced to five years in the state penitentiary. The case was Case No. 76-3328 in the Circuit of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida in and for Dade County. Apparently, this was the case the Petitioner was referring to in the disclosure set forth in his Application. However, the application lists the date of conviction as 1970 and the offense actually took place in 1976. As a result of the Petitioner's conviction in Case No. 76-3328, his probation in Case No. 75-5081 was violated and Petitioner was ordered to serve two years in the state penitentiary to run concurrently with the sentence in Case No. 76-3328. The violation of probation order was entered on June 18, 1976. In an Information dated April 26, 1982, the Petitioner was charged with disorderly conduct and two counts of resisting an officer without violence. The charges were assigned Case No. 82-61725 in the County Court for Dade County, Florida. Petitioner was found guilty of the two charges of resisting arrest without violence and was fined on June 21, 1982. On February 22, 1988, the Petitioner entered a plea of Nolo Contendere to the offense of battery on a law enforcement officer in Case No. CR-87-6784 in the Circuit Court of Orange County, Florida. On February 24, 1988, the court entered an order withholding adjudication and placing Petitioner on probation for two years. On November 29, 1988, the Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to two counts of grand theft in the third degree in Case Nos. 88-21122 and 88-21123 in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida. The Petitioner was ordered to serve one day imprisonment as a result of those convictions.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order denying the Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesman in the State of Florida. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of May 1991. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Stephen C. Stein 2515 Northeast 208th Terrace North Miami Beach, Florida 33160 Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs 400 West Robinson Street Suite S107 Orlando, Florida 32801 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent has failed to maintain the qualifications for certification as a correctional officer, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner certified Respondent as a correctional officer on August 31, 1994. She was issued correctional certificate number 145457. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was employed as a corrections officer at the Union Correctional Institution (UCI). She worked the 4:00 p.m.-12:00 midnight shift. R. E. Jernigan, Correctional Officer Inspector at UCI, received an anonymous telephone call on January 6, 1995. The caller stated that Respondent would be attempting to bring drugs into the institution on that date. As a result of this information, Inspector Jernigan arranged for a search of the correctional officers beginning the 4:00 p.m.-12:00 midnight shift. This included a search of the Respondent and her belongings. Correctional Officer Dana L. Alverez assisted in the search. Respondent gave her jacket to Officer Alverez to search. In the upper left pocket of the jacket, Officer Alverez discovered three fingertips cut from a rubber glove, containing what appeared to be marijuana. Officer Alverez removed the substance from the jacket and turned it over to Lieutenant D.L. Nichols. Lieutenant Nichols retained the substance until he turned it over to Inspector Jernigan. Inspector Jernigan notified the Union County Sheriff's Office about the results of the search. Lieutenant Gary Seay of that office responded to the institution. Lieutenant Seay took possession of the substance and placed Respondent under arrest. Lieutenant Seay packaged and sealed the substance in an evidence envelope. He mailed the package via certified mail to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement laboratory in Jacksonville for analysis. Crime Laboratory Analyst Niels H. Bernstein, tested the substance submitted by Lieutenant Seay in this case. Mr. Bernstein examined the package in which the substance was enclosed. He determined that the package was properly sealed. Mr. Bernstein then opened the package and tested the substance according to industry approved methods. He determined that the submitted substance was cannabis, 0.6 grams. UCI terminated Respondent's employment. Respondent entered into and successfully completed a Pre-Trial Intervention Program in regards to the criminal charges filed against her. Upon completion of the program, the criminal charges were dismissed. Respondent's testimony that she did not know her jacket contained cannabis is not credible.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order revoking Petitioner's certification as a correctional officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul D. Johnston, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Linda L. Paige-James Post Office Box 614 Macclenny, Florida 32063 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Bennie M. O'Kelley submitted an application to the Division of Licensing, Department of State, for licensure as a Class F, Unarmed Guard. O'Kelley indicated on his application that he had never been arrested, although he had been arrested some 15 times, the last time having been for assault and battery in 1969. In 1969, O'Kelley served 90 days in the Dade County Stockade for assault and battery. O'Kelley introduced evidence that he had been licensed by the Department of State earlier as an Unarmed Guard and stated that he had revealed his misdemeanor arrests on that application. O'Kelley stated that he knew that he could not be licensed if he had been arrested for a felony and assumed that misdemeanors were not disqualifying, and that therefore he did not have to report his misdemeanor conviction and arrests on his application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and considering the fact that O'Kelley has had a clean record for the past ten years, the Hearing Officer would recommend that his application for a Class F, Unarmed Guard, license be granted; however, because of O'Kelley's admitted history of being arrested for fighting, the Hearing Officer recommends that favorable consideration not be given to O'Kelley's application for a Class G, Armed Guard, license. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of February, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald Curington Division of Licensing The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Bennie M. O'Kelley 4711 SW 38th Street Hollywood, Florida 33023
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Eric Runge holds an inactive correctional officer certificate bearing number 502-2839. On January 9, 1983, the Respondent Runge was employed as a correctional officer at the Hendry Correctional Institute. On that date, the Respondent and four other officers were involved in the movement of a prisoner, Raymond Russell Ford, from one confinement area to another. Prior to the transfer, a supervisor, Lt. McNaughton, met with the officers involved in the transfer and explained to them that he wanted to see the inmate hurt. The officers, including the Respondent, went to the inmate's cell and found him asleep. Ford was awakened by one of the officers and handcuffs and leg irons were secured to his hands and feet. During the transfer, the inmate was placed on the ground several times, here he was struck and kicked by three of the officers. The Respondent was approximately 20 feet in front of the inmate when this occurred. The Respondent and another officer helped the inmate to his feet and turned him over to Sergeants Thompson and DeSilvestri. The inmate was tripped repeatedly by the two officers. This was visible to the Respondent since he was approximately 15 feet behind the inmate and escorting officers. At no time did the inmate fight with the officers or physically resist when they tripped and hit him. When the inmate arrived at his assigned cell, the Respondent and Officer Wilkerson contacted Betty White, a medical technician, in order to alert her of possible injuries to the inmate. Ford's injuries were not serious and consisted of multiple abrasions and scrapes to the face, legs and arms. When this incident came to the attention of prison authorities, all the officers involved were requested to give statements under oath concerning the transfer of the inmate. The Respondent was aware that he was required by Department of Corrections rules to truthfully answer inquiries made by the prison inspector. However, the Respondent admitted violating Department rules by falsifying his report to the prison inspector by denying that excessive force was used during the transfer of the inmate. This false report was made as part of an unsuccessful attempt by the officers involved to cover up the incident. As a result of this incident, several officers lost their jobs at Hendry and the Respondent's effectiveness as a correctional officer has been seriously reduced due to his role in the transfer and subsequent cover up. The involved officers are labeled as "dirty employees" which limits their ability to effectively discharge their duties inside the prison.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Petitioner suspending the certificate of the Respondent Eric C. Runge for three months. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis S. Valente, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Janet E. Ferris, Esquire General Counsel Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Eric C. Runge 1643 North Flossmore Road Fort Myers, Florida 33907 Robert R. Dempsey, Executive Director, Dept. of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Daryl McLaughlin, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION, Petitioner, vs. DOAH CASE NO. 83-2302 CJSTC CASE NO. CORO18-0274 ERIC C. RUNGE Certificate Number: 502-2839 Respondent. /
The Issue The matters to be determined in this case concern an administrative complaint which has been filed against Monroe Monford a/k/a Monroe Monford, Jr. seeking to take disciplinary action based upon the allegation that the Respondent, by the entry of a plea of guilty to a violation of Section 893.13(1)(e) Florida Statutes, possession of cocaine, has thereby violated Sections 455.227(1)(c) and 465.016(1)(f), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Monroe Monford also known as Monroe Monford, Jr. is a pharmacist licensed under the laws of the State of Florida, License No. 0009494 whose address is 3822 Elbert Avenue, Jacksonville, Florida 32208. In June of 1982 an investigation was conducted by the Duval County Sheriff's office, Duval County, Florida leading to the arrest of the Respondent. The arrest occurred at 5929 Ramona Boulevard in the Days Inn Motel. A monitor had been placed in the room where a suspected drug transaction was to occur and it was determined that the Respondent was involved in that transaction to the extent of conducting a test to ascertain if the substance being purchased was actually cocaine. It was later determined to be cocaine. Another individual who was in the room with Monroe Monford, one Eddie Lee Tuff, went to a car to obtain money that was being paid for cocaine. Subsequent to that time law enforcement officials entered the room which was under surveillance and found Monroe Monford on the bed counting the money in question. Monford was arrested for a violation of Section 893.135, Florida Statutes, trafficking in a controlled substance, namely cocaine. In response to charges which were brought against Respondent in the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, Case No. 82- 5383CFS, Respondent entered a plea of guilty to the sale of cocaine and received a period of probation of five years, assessment of court costs in the amount of $12,153 and as a special condition of probation, was prohibited from practicing pharmacy in Florida or any other state while serving the probationary term. The offense to which he plead guilty was a violation of Section 893.13, Florida Statutes. Respondent was not adjudged guilty of the violation of law to which he plead, imposition of the sentence having been withheld pending the satisfactory completion of the probationary period. The date of the court disposition of the case was October 15, 1982.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, the spouse of an inmate of the Florida correctional system, has standing to challenge Florida Administrative Code Rule 23-21.0155, which provides that if the Commission declines to authorize the effective parole release date of an inmate referred for extraordinary review, the Commission must suspend the established presumptive parole release date until the inmate is found to be a good candidate for parole release.
Findings Of Fact On October 10, 1995, Petitioner married Anthony Ray Peek, an inmate housed in a Department of Corrections facility. Mr. Peek is serving a parole-eligible sentence pursuant to chapter 987, Florida Statutes. On September 1, 2010, Petitioner appeared and spoke at a Commission hearing convened to determine whether to authorize Mr. Peek?s presumptive parole date of September 29, 2010. By order dated September 2, 2010, the Commission decided not to authorize Mr. Peek?s presumptive parole date, and referred the case for extraordinary review pursuant to rule 23-21.0155. On November 9, 2010, the Commission entered an order by which it determined that it would not authorize an effective parole date for Mr. Peek, that his presumptive parole release date remained suspended, and established May, 2017, as the date for Mr. Peek?s next extraordinary review interview. The Commission?s action applied the standards for placing an inmate on parole established in section 947.18, Florida Statutes. In taking its action, the Commission utilized the procedures for extraordinary review established in rule 23-21.0155, which provides, in its entirety, that: 23-21.0155 Extraordinary Review Procedures. When an inmate?s case is referred for extraordinary review by the Commission, an order shall be prepared outlining the reason(s) for the Commission?s decision. The order shall be acted upon by the Commission within 60 days of the decision declining to authorize the effective parole release date. The Commission?s order shall specifically state the reasons for finding the inmate to be a poor candidate for parole release pursuant to Section 947.18, F.S., and shall identify the information relied upon in reaching this conclusion. Additionally, the order shall suspend the established presumptive parole release date until such time that the inmate is found to be a good candidate for parole release. The determination, on extraordinary review, that an inmate is not a good candidate for parole release shall have the effect of overriding his presumptive parole release date however, the inmate shall continue to receive extraordinary interviews, which shall be scheduled pursuant to Rule 23-21.013, F.A.C. If upon extraordinary review, a majority of the Commission finds the inmate to be a good candidate for parole release pursuant to Section 947.18, F.S., the Commission shall enter a written order authorizing the effective parole release date and outlining the term and conditions of parole. Specific Authority 947.002, 947.07 FS. Law Implemented 947.002, 947.07, 947.18 FS. History–New 8-1-83, Formerly 23-21.155, Amended 8-17-06. Had he been released from prison on parole, Mr. Peek would have had the opportunity to live with Petitioner. As a result of the Commission?s action, Petitioner is not able to live and cohabitate with Mr. Peek as a married couple.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner falsified information on his application.
Findings Of Fact Michael James Quinn made application to the Department of State for licensure as an unarmed security guard in February of 1981, and for licensure as an armed security guard in May 1981. Quinn answered "no" to Question #13 on the applications, "Have you ever been arrested?" Quinn admitted, and his FBI record also revealed, that he was arrested on July 9, 1975, for possession of cocaine, sale of cocaine, possession of marijuana and aggravated assault. Quinn admitted, and his FBI record also revealed, that all of the charges were dismissed except that for possession of cocaine, to which adjudication was withheld, and he was placed on five years' probation. Quinn was advised by his attorney and his probation officers that upon satisfactory completion of his probation his record would be expunged. Quinn satisfactorily completed his five years' probation. Quinn was just over 18 years of age when he was arrested. During probation Quinn satisfactorily completed four years of college and received a Bachelor's degree in Criminal Justice. Quinn included with his initial application the affidavit of Lola A. Alston to his good character. Alston was Quinn's last probation officer. Quinn has had no arrests since July 9, 1975.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the Petitioner's applications for unarmed and armed guard licenses be approved. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of July 1981 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Michael J. Quinn 4601 Northwest Second Avenue, #801 Boca Raton, Florida 33431 James V. Antista, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 George Firestone, Secretary Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Petitioner’s request for exemption from employment disqualification should be approved.
Findings Of Fact On June 21, 1991, Aaron Foreman (Petitioner) was convicted of one count of "possession of THC with intent to deliver" in the Circuit Court of Walworth County, State of Wisconsin, Case Number 90CR00080. At the time of the arrest, the Petitioner was a student at the University of Wisconsin in Whitewater. He resided with several other students in the upstairs apartment portion of a residence. On or about February 1, 1990, local Whitewater law enforcement officials, apparently investigating one of the roommates for burglary, executed a search warrant and entered into the apartment where the Petitioner was living. During the search of the apartment, law enforcement officers discovered a quantity of marijuana in the apartment and bedrooms of the residents. The Petitioner had a refrigerator in his bedroom, within which law enforcement officers discovered a large plastic bag containing 26 smaller plastic bags, each containing a quantity of marijuana. The total weight of the plastic bags of marijuana within the Petitioner's refrigerator was identified in the charging document as approximately 126 grams. In Count One of the charge, the Petitioner and three other persons (apparently the roommates) were jointly charged with possession with intent to deliver more than 500 grams of THC, an element of marijuana. In Count Four of the charge, the Petitioner was individually charged with possession with intent to deliver 91 grams of THC. The record of the hearing does not establish the reason for the difference between the weight of the marijuana allegedly discovered and the THC quantities with which the defendants were charged. According to the Petitioner's testimony at hearing, the Petitioner participated in marijuana use, and bought and sold marijuana within a "small circle of friends" and his roommates. On June 21, 1991, the Petitioner entered a plea of "no contest" to Count Four as part of an agreement to resolve the drug possession charges, and as stated previously, was convicted of felony under Wisconsin law. According to the Judgement of Conviction, Count One of the charge was dismissed. As a result of the plea agreement, the Petitioner was sentenced to nine months in jail, two years of probation, and a fine of approximately $2,700. The Petitioner served the jail sentence in a work release program, continued to attend college and obtained an undergraduate degree in sociology from the University of Wisconsin. The Petitioner paid the fine imposed by the sentence and successfully completed the probationary period as of September 19, 1993. Subsequent to completion of the sentence, the Petitioner became employed as a licensed social worker in Wisconsin. From 1993 to 1999, the Petitioner was employed by "Southeastern Youth and Family Services," as a social worker. The Petitioner's employment evaluations range from "very good" to "outstanding." In July 1999, the Petitioner underwent a background screening prompted by his application for employment by Eckerd Youth Alternatives, Inc., a program that, in part, provides services to young persons involved in the juvenile justice system and funded through contract with the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (Department). Based on the conviction, the Department notified Eckerd Youth Alternatives, Inc., that the Petitioner was disqualified from employment. The Petitioner requested that the Department review the disqualification. The Department responded by letter dated June 19, 1999, advising that the desk review would be granted and identifying the information that the Petitioner was required to submit to facilitate the review. The Petitioner responded to the June 19 letter by supplying the requested information to the Department. The matter was apparently reviewed by a "Priscilla A. Zachary, BSU Supervisor" for the Department, who forwarded the file along with a cover memo to Perry Turner, the Department's Inspector General. As Inspector General, Mr. Turner is the person authorized by the Department to make decisions on disqualification exemption applications. Ms. Zachary's cover memo incorrectly identifies the crime for which the Petitioner was convicted and states that the Petitioner's June 21, 1991, conviction was for "Possession with Intent to Deliver" more than 500 grams of THC. According to the Judgement of Conviction, Count One of the charge, wherein the Petitioner and other persons were jointly charged with possession with intent to deliver more than 500 grams of THC, was dismissed. On August 5, 1999, Mr. Turner determined that the Petitioner's application for exemption should be denied. Mr. Turner based his decision on his belief that the Petitioner's felony conviction was for an amount of marijuana beyond that which Mr. Turner believes could be reasonably identified as being for "personal use" and which was intended for distribution. By letter dated August 5, 1999, the Petitioner was notified of the Department's decision by letter and advised of his right to challenge the denial in an administrative hearing. During the hearing, the Petitioner testified as to the events leading to his conviction and identified his efforts at rehabilitation. At the hearing, the Petitioner testified that his initial experience with marijuana occurred in approximately 1988, when he entered the University of Wisconsin at Whitewater. The Petitioner testified that at the time of the 1990 arrest, he was an "immature" college student who recreationally used marijuana within his circle of friends and with whom he sold or exchanged marijuana. Other than the Petitioner's admission, there is no evidence that the Petitioner actually sold marijuana. There is no evidence that the Petitioner was arrested or charged with the sale of marijuana. There is no evidence that the Petitioner was a part of any continuing marijuana distribution organization. There is no evidence that, other than the arrest at issue in this proceeding, the Petitioner has ever been arrested for any other reason. Review of the charging documents suggests that the charge of "intent to deliver" was based on the quantity of the marijuana found in the apartment and the apparent candor with which the residents dealt with the law enforcement officials who executed the search warrant and investigated the situation. The Petitioner's arrest occurred approximately eleven years ago. The Petitioner's conviction was approximately ten years ago. The Petitioner completed the probationary portion of his sentence more than seven years ago. There is no evidence that there was any physical injury or harm done to any individual as a result of the Petitioner's conviction. There is no evidence that granting the Petitioner's request for exemption presents a danger to the Petitioner or to any other person. The Petitioner has continued with his education and in December 2000 received his master's degree in Criminal Justice from the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee. The Petitioner has also sought to obtain a pardon from the Governor of Wisconsin. By letter dated August 28, 2000, the Governor's Pardon Advisory Board notified the Petitioner that it was recommending to the Governor that a pardon be granted. Although the vote by the Board was not unanimous, the majority of the members believed that the pardon should be granted "based on positive adjustment, lack of subsequent criminal justice system contacts, non-violent nature of the crime, and valid job concerns." As of the date of the hearing, the Governor of Wisconsin had not acted on the Board's recommendation to grant the Petitioner's pardon request.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Juvenile Justice grant the request of Aaron Foreman for exemption from employment disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Aaron Foreman 10500 West Fountain Avenue Apartment No. 411 Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53224 Lynne T. Winston, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 William G. Bankhead, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Robert N. Sechen, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building, 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
