The Issue Whether Appellants were wrongfully denied a variance of 16-17 parking spaces that could allow an existing 2170 square foot restaurant to transfer and use its 2-COP State alcoholic beverage license at 201 South Gulfview Boulevard on Clearwater Beach, in the City of Clearwater.
Findings Of Fact Appellants own real property on the north corner of South Gulfview Boulevard and First Street on Clearwater Beach. The property is in a zoning district designated as CR-28 (Resort Commercial District/Commercial Tourist Facilities), and is primarily used by Appellants to operate a motel business. The surrounding land uses to the north, south and east are primarily motel. To the west is a public parking lot and the beaches. In May 1990, Appellants leased a portion of the ground floor to James B. Mayes so that he could operate a restaurant known as Britt's Beachside Cafe at that location. In order to build a restaurant on premises, 2170 square feet of gross floor area was improved by the lessee. Pursuant to code, 11 parking spaces were needed for the restaurant to meet parking space requirements for an eating establishment at this site. The parking space calculation was made according to the formula of one space per 100 square feet of gross floor area, the general parking formula for restaurants, with a 50 percent reduction allowed for Clearwater Beach locations. Prior to the opening of the business, only 9 off-street parking spaces were allocated to Britt's Beachside Cafe. During May 1990, a variance of 2 parking spaces was requested by Appellants and granted by the Development Code Adjustment Board. At that time, Britt's Beachside Cafe was involved with food and non-alcoholic beverage sales. With the approved variance, the restaurant was granted an occupational license and a certificate of occupancy for the operation of the restaurant at this location. Previously, Mr. Mayes operated his restaurant in a larger motel with a smaller parking lot and fewer parking spaces approximately 60 feet north of the subject property for almost four years. The former restaurant had 120 seats for patrons as opposed to the current 84 seats. Beer and wine was sold in the restaurant under a 2-COP State alcohol beverage license. The beverage license was acquired because this location was exempt from the current city parking requirements under a grandfathering provision of the Clearwater Code. In addition, Mr. Mayes' restaurant was exempt from the code requirement that 51 percent of sales had to be from food and non-alcoholic beverages because the business existed before the ordinance went into effect. When the restaurant moved, the exemption from current parking space requirements remained with the original location, and the exemption from the 51 percent sales from food and non-alcoholic beverages for the business was removed. The 2-COP State alcohol beverage license for Britt's Beachside Cafe, however, was attached to the business and could easily transfer to the new location if local zoning laws permitted its use there. In order to have the alcoholic beverage license transferred to the new business location, the state requires the business to continue with its compliance with local zoning and development laws. To accomplish this, the restaurant is required to have one parking space per 40 square feet of gross floor area, with the 50 percent reduction formulated and allowed for a Clearwater Beach location. As Britt's Beachside Cafe is currently operating under the 11 parking space requirement, 16-17 more parking spaces are needed for the business to transfer the beverage license to the new business location. The actual number of parking spaces for the restaurant on location is During site review prior to the granting of the certificate of occupancy, city staff improperly counted four illegal parking spaces along First Street as legitimate, non-conforming off-street parking spaces. The restaurant caters primarily to persons walking to the restaurant either from adjacent motels or the beach. Few automobiles are driven and parked at Britt's Beachside Cafe. Even when the business was located in the other motel with more seating and fewer parking spaces, parking was never a problem in the area. There is considerable public parking immediately adjacent to Appellant's property, both across the street, and approximately one block to the north. When restaurant patrons are unable to use the parking spaces on location, they park in these convenient public spaces. Since Mr. Mayes relocated his restaurant, he has served beer and wine on premises, without charge. It has always been his intent to transfer his 2- COP State alcoholic beverage license to this new location if permitted to do so through a parking space variance. The City's requirement that the restaurant acquire more off-street parking spaces is factually unnecessary if the sole purpose of the ordinance is to provide parking for the restaurant patrons. At the old location, parking was never a problem. Likewise, no problems exist at the new location. As the restaurant no longer seeks to expand, the major differences a parking variance would make are that Mr. Mayes could charge for the beer and wine served and use his 2-COP license. When Appellants proceeded through the first phase of the approval process to obtain a decision from the Planning and Zoning Board, their conditional use application met with approval. It was determined, however, that the preliminary approval would be subject to the obtainment of a parking space variance, which needed to be decided by the Development Code Adjustment Board. Accordingly, the application proceeded to the second phase. If granted in the second phase, Appellants would go to the City Commission for a variance from the separation requirement. The application for a variance that removes the requirement for 16-17 additional parking spaces to enable the sale of beer and wine on premises was denied by the Development Code Adjustment Board and this appeal followed. The appeal was filed based upon the allegation that the decision of the Development Code Adjustment Board departs from the essential requirements of law. The Code of Ordinances of the City of Clearwater requires additional parking for establishments with alcoholic beverage licenses, which by nature of their license only, can be converted from restaurants to taverns or night clubs. Mr. Mayes' restaurant, which is subject to the additional parking space requirement because of the type of alcoholic beverage license he seeks to transfer, is already prevented from converting to a tavern or a night club by virtue of the restaurant's location in the CR-28 zoning district. In the CR-28 zoning district, all alcoholic beverage sales for consumption on premises shall be located only within a hotel or motel in conjunction with a 4-COP license or within a restaurant deriving 51 percent or more of its gross revenue from the sale of food and non-alcoholic beverages. The restrictive requirement that a 2-COP license be used solely to accompany a restaurant business, as opposed to a tavern or night club in the special CR-28 zoning district, is balanced by the Clearwater Code provision that reduces the required number of parking spaces by 50 percent for Clearwater Beach locations and the opportunity to have a business that sells alcoholic beverages in a resort commercial district. The 2-COP license was acquired prior to the restaurant's move to its current location. If Appellants request for a parking space variance is denied, Mr. Mayes' application for transfer of his beverage license to a new location will likely be denied by the state, pursuant to Section 561.331, Florida Statutes. The request for the variance is based primarily on Mr. Mayes' desire for greater financial return on his business and to keep his 2-COP license attached to the restaurant. The Development Code Adjustment Board has granted parking variances to other 2-COP restaurants before and after Appellants' application in the same zoning district. These variances were based on applications and evidence presented at Board hearings.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 112.3143(3)(a), 112.3143(4), and 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), by committing the acts alleged in the Order Finding Probable Cause and, if so, what penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact All times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent served as a member of the Mexico Beach Planning and Zoning Board (Zoning Board). Respondent began his service on the Board in mid-April, 1994. In that public position, Respondent was subject to the requirements of Part III, Chapter 112, Florida Statutes, the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees. In late 1993, Respondent contracted with the owners of Toucans Restaurant (Toucans) to build an additional story on the existing building. Toucans is a bar/restaurant located on Highway 98 in Mexico Beach, Florida. The Zoning Board is empowered to make decisions relative to zoning and rezoning matters, including the granting of parking variances. In furtherance of his work for Toucans, Respondent sought a parking variance from the Zoning Board. To this end, Respondent appeared before the Zoning Board on three separate occasions. The last time Respondent appeared before the Zoning Board regarding the parking variance for Toucans was April 19, 1994, shortly after his appointment to the Zoning Board. At that meeting, Respondent was representing Toucans before the Zoning Board and attempting to secure a parking variance for Toucans. At the April 19, 1994 meeting, when Respondent presented the Toucans parking variance issue before the Zoning Board, he participated in the Zoning Board's discussion of the matter. Prior to his participating in the Zoning Board's discussion of the Toucans matter on April 19, 1994, Respondent failed to formally announce his interest in the Toucan project. Respondent failed to file a written memorandum disclosing his interest in the matter prior to the April 19, 1994 meeting. Respondent failed to orally disclose the nature of his interest in the Toucans project at the April 19, 1994 Zoning Board meeting. At its April 19, 1994 meeting, the Zoning Board voted on the Toucans project. Respondent abstained from voting on the Toucans parking variance request at that meeting, but did not file a written memorandum disclosing his interest in the project within fifteen days of the vote. Respondent filed a Memorandum of Voting Conflict with respect to the Toucans parking variance request on May 27, 1994.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Final Order and Public Report be entered by the Florida Commission on Ethics finding that Respondent, Jim McCoullough, violated Sections 112.3143(3)(a), 112.3143(4) and 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), and imposing a civil penalty of $300.00. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of April 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUMCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric Scott, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Kerrie Stillman Complaint Coordinator Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Mr. James Naus 115 Fifth Street Mexico Beach, Florida 32410 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, within the past year, purchased two tracts of property 50 feet by 100 feet located at 614-620 Mandalay Avenue on Clearwater Beach. This property is zoned "CG" or "General Business" and there are four buildings on this property comprising five dwelling units. The land use plan for this location is commercial/tourist facilities. Petitioner submitted an artist's drawing of what the site could look like if the variance requested was granted. No building permits have been requested; accordingly, no specific plans have been submitted to establish the use to which the property would be put if the variance requested is granted. The proposal of Petitioner (such as it is) contemplates converting the ground floors of the existing structures to commercial use. If the existing buildings were so converted, with the upper floors remaining residential, the zoning code requires provision be made for twenty-eight off-street parking spaces. Since the existing five dwelling units would be credited (grandfathered) for having eight such parking spaces due to the construction having occurred before the zoning code was enacted, Petitioner is requesting a variance for the remaining twenty off-street parking spaces that would be required. Actually, there are no off-street parking spaces on this property but five or six parking spaces exist in the right-of-way for Mandalay Avenue. There are no off-street parking spaces on Mandalay Avenue in the vicinity of Petitioner's property and none are proposed to be provided by Petitioner. Mandalay Avenue is the main north-south artery on Clearwater Beach and is four-laned in the vicinity of Petitioner's property, which lies near the northern terminus of "CG" zoning. At the hearing before the Board one witness spoke in favor of the variance requested because the proposal by Petitioner was better than if the property was used for the construction of a high-rise residential unit, which the zoning would permit. Since no specific proposal is before the Respondent for the issuance of a permit, there is no assurance that granting the requested variance would preclude the construction of high-rise residential units. The dwellings occupying this property were constructed some thirty years ago and are expensive to maintain and are not a very attractive investment. Petitioner referred to several other businesses where variances in parking requirements have been granted when bars and restaurants on Mandalay Avenue were rebuilt or expanded; however, little evidence was presented that parking variances have been granted when a new use for the property was proposed.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents are guilty of housing discrimination against Petitioner based on disability, in violation of Section 760.23, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner suffered a stroke in September 1997 and was consequently disabled. His right side was impaired. Petitioner's right foot drags when he walks, and his right arm is of limited use. Petitioner is unable to walk long distances or stand for a significant period of time. To walk at all, Petitioner requires the use of a cane or a walker. Petitioner has been in this condition from September 1997 through the date of the final hearing. At all material times, Petitioner has possessed a handicapped parking sticker due to these disabilities. For many years, Petitioner's wife has lived in unit 102 at the Majestic Gardens Condominium, Building "C," Lauderhill, Florida. Petitioner married his wife shortly before suffering the stroke and moved into her condominium unit at Majestic Gardens in December 1997. Petitioner and his wife resided together at unit 102 until April 2001, when they rented the unit and moved to a house in Miramar. All of the buildings at Majestic Gardens Condominiums comprise 238 units. Building "C" is a three-story building with 41 units. Each unit in Building "C" is assigned one parking space. The assigned parking spaces are in close proximity to the entrances of the units. Building "C" provides nine guest parking spaces, but the parking is limited at Majestic Gardens, and these spaces are routinely unavailable. In the case of Petitioner's unit, the assigned space is less than 15 feet from the front door to the ground-floor unit. At all material times, Petitioner's wife has parked her car in this space. The two spaces to the left of Petitioner's assigned space, as one faces the unit, are slightly closer to Petitioner's unit and are designated as guest spaces. Both Respondents are jointly responsible for operating and assigning the parking spaces immediately adjacent to Building "C." From 1998 through 2001, Petitioner and his wife tried unsuccessfully to convince Respondents to designate a parking space in front of their unit as handicapped, so that Petitioner, who can still drive, could park his car directly in front of his unit. Respondents refused to designate a handicapped space because the effect of such a designation would have been that Petitioner and his wife would have had two spaces in front of their unit, when all of the other unitowners had only one space. Respondents have not designated any handicapped parking adjacent to Building "C." They have designated three handicapped spaces at a nearby clubhouse, but, after Petitioner started parking his car in one of these spaces, Respondent Majestic Gardens Condominium Association, Inc., informed Petitioner that these spaces were reserved for use by persons using the recreation facilities. Because Petitioner was not using the recreation facilities, he could not park in one of these handicapped spaces. Later, Respondent Majestic Gardens Condominium Association, Inc., painted over the blue lines and removed the handicapped-parking sign, thus allowing all users of the recreation facilities to park in the three spaces previously reserved for handicapped users of the recreation facilities. At that point, the entire eight-building Majestic Gardens complex lacked any parking designated exclusively for handicapped use. Relations between the condominium management and Petitioner and his wife became strained at times. Petitioner received cautionary notes and threats of towing whenever he parked his car in a guest space. However, Respondents gave Petitioner's wife the names of persons who might be willing to rent their assigned parking spaces. Despite several efforts, Petitioner and his wife were unable to secure another space by this means.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Stewart Lee Karlin Stewart Lee Karlin, P.A. 315 Southeast 7th Street, Second Floor Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Roosevelt Walters Qualified Representative 1509 Northwest 4th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33311 Florida Donaldson Majestic Gardens Condominium 4045 Northwest 16th Street, Building C Lauderhill, Florida 33313
The Issue : The issue in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner has been the victim of a discriminatory housing practice, in alleged violation of Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2007).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a physically handicapped person. He resides in a residential unit (Unit 11C) in the Sea Cabins residential complex. The Petitioner is a full-time resident at Sea Cabins and is the owner of unit 11C. The Respondent is a Florida Corporation (not for profit) and is a homeowners association, as defined by Section 720.303, Florida Statutes (2008). Sometime in early May 2007, Nancy Maconi, the Petitioner's wife, placed a number of signs around the Sea Cabins property. The Respondent purports that there were approximately 13 signs. One of the signs was a designated handicap parking space sign for unit 11C. It was erected in close proximity to the Petitioner's Sea Cabins unit 11C. Thereafter, the Petitioner sought reimbursement for the cost of the signs from the homeowners association board of directors, the Respondent. The request was denied at a meeting of the board of May 11, 2007, with the minutes reflecting that the Petitioner had not requested nor been granted permission to install any signs, hence the denial at that point. Ms. Maconi testified at the hearing that she had asked the Respondent's manager for permission to install the signs, which the manager, Willa Merriott, denied. The action of the board at the May 11, 2000 meeting, however, is not in dispute. Thereafter, on approximately June 22, 2007, the attorney for the Respondent wrote the Petitioner requesting that the designated handicap parking sign be removed since it had not been authorized by the board, nor had any formal request for the installation of the sign been made. On June 23, 2007, the Petitioner responded to that letter by requesting that the board formally authorize the handicap parking sign. A letter from the Veterans Administration was attached to that letter to the effect that the Petitioner had a service-connected disability. The specific nature of the disability was not specified, however. In any event, the Respondent association acquiesced in the handicap parking sign at issue remaining in place and use while it investigated whether the Petitioner was actually entitled to a handicap parking space. The Petitioner was advised by letter of October 11, 2007, by the Respondent, that the handicap parking sign could remain in place while his application was pending. A series of letters then passed between the parties or their representatives in October through December 2007. Pursuant to its policy concerning the granting of handicapped parking spaces and the like, the association sought information on the nature of the Petitioner's disability or handicap. The Petitioner countered by taking the position that the association already had enough information upon which to make its decision. In any event, however, through this period, the Petitioner's designated handicapped parking space and sign remained in place in the original location where Ms. Maconi had placed it. The Respondent acquiesced in its presence and in the Petitioner's use of the handicapped space. Counsel for the Respondent received a letter dated January 3, 2008, from Paul E. Brooks, a Podiatrist, revealing for the first time the specifics of the Petitioner's disability. That is, he has an orthopedic condition which limits his ability to walk. This letter was received on January 8, 2008, and considered by the board of directors at a special meeting held January 28, 2008. At that meeting the board formally granted the Petitioner's application for a designated handicap parking space and voted to allow the sign already erected by Ms. Maconi to remain permanently in place. Due to a misunderstanding between the board and its counsel as to who should notify the Petitioner of the decision, the Petitioner was not actually notified of the decision until March. By letter of March 17, 2008, counsel for the homeowners' association wrote the Petitioner of the actions of the board regarding the sign.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the subject Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2009.
Findings Of Fact In March, 1992, the Department of Labor and Employment Security ("Department") issued a Request for Proposal and Bid Submittal ("RFP") seeking to lease approximately 21,033 square feet of office space in Pinellas Park, Florida. The RFP specifies that "approximately" 130 off-street no charge parking spaces were required for the exclusive use of the employees and clients of the Respondent. The RFP states that "[p]arking space must be under the control of the bidder and be suitably paved, lined, and bumper pads installed." The Department received two bids in response to the RFP; one submitted by Hart-Land Ext., Inc., ("Petitioner") and the other submitted by Resolving, Inc. Both bids were signed by James Hartley, as Vice President of the respective corporations. The Department initially determined that, on the basis of the representations contained in the bids, both bids were responsive. An evaluation committee determined that the bid submitted by the Petitioner was the lowest and best bid. On the basis of the evaluation, the Department awarded the bid to the Petitioner by letter dated May 13, 1992. Subsequent to the bid award, the Petitioner submitted several differing site plans to the Department. The site plans indicated various amendments to the configuration of parking spaces available. None of the plans indicated that there would be less than 130 parking spaces available for use by Department personnel. The Department suggests that the revisions of site plans raised doubts as to whether the property was under the control of the Petitioner, that such information was requested of the Petitioner and that appropriate responses were not forthcoming. Nothing in the site plans would suggest that the property was not under the Petitioner's control. The evidence establishes that sufficient information was provided by the Petitioner in response to Department inquiries related to property ownership. By letter dated August 24, 1992, the Department rescinded its award to the Petitioner. The stated reason for recission was that the Petitioner did not have control over 130 paved and lined parking spaces as the time of the bid opening. At the time the Petitioner submitted the proposal, it had the right, pursuant to an executed Contract for Sale and Purchase, to purchase the property which was identified in the proposal as the site upon which the office space was located. The contract was valid at all times material to this case. The Department accepts the existence of a valid Contract for Sale and Purchase as sufficient evidence of a bidder having control over the property proposed for use. The evidence establishes that at all times material to this case, the Petitioner controlled the property proposed for use in his response to the RFP. As to the parking requirements, the Department offered testimony asserting that the language in the RFP requires that such spaces be paved, lined, and bumper-pads installed, at the time the bid is submitted. The RFP includes no requirement, either express of implied, that the parking area proposed must be paved, lined, and bumpered at the time of bid submission. The Petitioner's response to the RFP met the parking requirements set forth therein. The Department asserts that because the parking spaces were not lined, it was unable to determine the number of spaces available in each area proposed for parking. The Department had ample opportunity to inspect the property proposed in the Petitioner's bid, and in fact, such inspections did occur. The Department reviewed site plans, floor plans, physically inspected the structure and had full access to the property. The fact that the parking spaces were not lined or bumper-padded at the time of bid submittal would have been obvious. Further, the RFP seeks to have "approximately" 130 spaces available. Of the 130 spaces the Petitioner said would be available, 118 spaces were paved at all times material to this case. The remaining 22 parking spaces were located in an unpaved area which would have been paved prior to the date upon which the Respondent would have occupied the building, at which time all 130 spaces would have been lined and bumper-padded also. Therefore, even if the agency's position that the RFP required paved spaces at time of bid submission were supported by evidence, the Petitioner's proposal would meet the requirement. Subsequent to the award of the project, the Petitioner closed the contract for sale in escrow and placed $150,000 in trust to close the sale. The Petitioner employed a general contractor, obtained completed floor plans, mechanical plans, electrical and plumbing plans for the structure, performed roof repairs and purchased new air conditioning equipment. At the request of Department's representatives, the Petitioner also made arrangements for additional parking spaces beyond the 130 spaces previously proposed, with the additional spaces being located off-site and across the street from the office space. The total cost of these actions is approximately $179,600. The purchase of the property and incurrence of related costs was done in good faith and in reliance upon the award of the project.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Labor and Employment Security enter a Final Order awarding proposed lease 540:0921 to Hart-Land, Ext., Inc. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 24th day of March, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 1993. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 92-5748BID The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order. Respondent The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: Rejected, unnecessary. Rejected as to reference of difficulty in determining availability of parking spaces, not supported by greater weight of evidence. Measurement would have established whether space was adequate. There is no evidence that it was not. 6-9. Rejected as to inference that submission of amended site plans was inappropriate, not supported by greater weight of evidence. There is no evidence that the agency rejected the proposal based on the amendment of site plans, irrelevant. As to the amendment of site plans being indicative of a lack of 130 paved spaces, rejected immaterial. 11. Rejected as to determination that such spaces were not available on property controlled by the Petitioner, not supported by credible and persuasive evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley Gooding, Acting Secretary Suite 303, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Cecilia Renn Chief Legal Counsel Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 William H. Walker, Esquire NCNB Bank Building, Suite 403 501 First Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Edward Dion, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Fair Housing Act by discriminating against Petitioner based on her sex, national origin, and/or handicap by the manner it enforced its vehicle parking rules.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an 81-year-old female who is a native of Peru. Petitioner does not speak, write, or read English. Petitioner and her late husband were owners and residents of a condominium unit managed by Respondent. Petitioner continued to own and reside in the unit after her husband's death in September 2009. Petitioner and her husband had ten children, two of whom are Patricia Ramirez and Gloria Silva. At the time of his death, Petitioner's husband owned an automobile that he had properly registered with Respondent. Following her husband's death, Petitioner inherited the automobile he had owned. Petitioner does not drive and does not have a driver's license. On September 17, 2009, the title to the car was changed into the names of Petitioner and Gloria Silva. Gloria Silva has not been recognized by Respondent as a "resident" of Petitioner's unit.2 Respondent's rules and policies are set forth in a "Handbook of Rules and Regulations" (the Handbook). Respondent's vehicle parking policies begin on page 28 of the Handbook. Respondent's parking policies for a "Resident Parking Decal" provide, in relevant part, as follows: A "Resident" as set forth in these regulations is a person who has been registered at the Management Office and has been approved by the Association to live in the Unit whether it is an owner or a tenant. All vehicles of Residents parked in the Condominium Property must have a "Resident PARKING DECAL" [sic]. This permit consists of a decal containing a number that is placed on the outside top or bottom left- side corner of the rear glass of the vehicle. For your protection, this decal shall be applied to the glass by an Association Representative only. Only Residents actually living all year round in the Condominium Property and owning a valid driver's license will be issued a Resident Parking Decal. . . .. Only one vehicle is allowed per Resident with a valid driver's license and a Vehicle Registration to such vehicle issued in the Residents' name. There will be a $25.00 refundable deposit for every Resident Parking Decal issued. Failure to return the Decal to the Management Office upon selling and/or disposing of his/her vehicle (including total loss due to an automobile accident) or moving out of the Property, such $25.00 shall be forfeited. . . . If the Resident sells or in any other way disposes of a vehicle to which a Resident Parking Decal was previously issued, that Resident must remove and bring to the Management Office such Resident Parking Decal before a new Resident Parking Decal is issued for a new vehicle. Gary Mars, an attorney representing Respondent, advised Petitioner by letter dated September 10, 2009, that she was in violation of Respondent's vehicle parking policy and its occupancy policy. As to the parking policy, the letter provided, in relevant part, as follows: The Rules and Regulations state that "[o]nly Residents actually living all year round in the Condominium Property and owning a valid driver's license will be issued a Resident Parking Decal. Absentee owners who lease their units are not entitled to having a Resident Parking Decal. Only one vehicle is allowed per Resident with a valid driver's license and a Vehicle Registration to such vehicle issued in the Resident's name. " . . . This correspondence serves as . . . demand that any and all guests of your Unit cease and desist utilizing a resident parking decal immediately upon receipt of this communication and secure the appropriate parking decals from the Property Management Office. Mr. Mars wrote a second letter to Petitioner on November 9, 2009, containing the following demand: This letter is being provided in order to notify you as to a recently recognized violation of the Declaration of Condominium which requires your immediate attention. Specifically, the Association has recognized that the vehicle registered to your deceased husband continues to maintain a residents [sic] parking decal even though the vehicle is utilized by your daughter, Ms. Gloria Silva, who is not a resident of the Condominium. Therefore, this use of a decal is improper and in violation of the Association's controlling documents. The Rules and Regulations state that "[o]nly Residents actually living all year round in the Condominium Property and owning a valid driver's license will be issued a Resident Parking Decal. Absentee owners who lease their units are not entitled to having a Resident Parking Decal. Only one vehicle is allowed per Resident with a valid driver's license and a Vehicle Registration to such vehicle issued in the Resident's name. " Notice is hereby provided of this violation. Specifically, the Association is demanding that your guest permanently cease and desist utilizing a resident parking decal, and remove and return the decal within seventy-two hours of this communication to the Property Management Office. In the event you and your guests fail to comply with the request as set forth herein, the Association may have no alternative but to enforce the Rules and Regulations which may include the towing and removal of the vehicle . . . By letter dated December 31, 2009, Mr. Mars wrote to Petitioner a third and final letter, styled "Final Demand," repeating his notice that the vehicle would be towed if she did not comply with the resident parking policy. On the following dates Respondent had Petitioner's vehicle towed from the condominium property: January 19, January 22, and February 9, 2010. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner was out-of-compliance with Respondent's resident parking policy. There was no evidence that Petitioner ever surrendered the Resident Parking Decal that remained on the vehicle after her husband died. There was no evidence that Petitioner filed an application reflecting the change of ownership of the vehicle following her husband's death or paid the application fee for a new decal.3 There was no evidence that Respondent knew or should have known that Petitioner was handicapped or disabled.4 There was no evidence that Respondent's enforcement of its parking policies was motivated by Petitioner's sex, national origin, or handicap.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of March, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2011.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent's proposed award of DCPHU Bid I-90 to the Intervenor, Meyers Parking Systems, Inc., for the management of a parking facility located at 1350 Northwest 14th Street should be upheld.
Findings Of Fact For approximately the last ten years, Kinney has operated the parking lot at the Dade County Public Health Unit building located at 1350 N.W. 14th Street in Miami, Florida (the "Parking Lot") pursuant to a contract with HRS. The existing contract between Kinney and HRS for the management of the Parking Lot was entered in June 1989 and was scheduled to expire on June 30, 1990. That contract included two one-year options to renew. The contract also included a provision that allowed either party to terminate the contract upon thirty days notice. The contracts for management of the Parking Lot in previous years were substantially identical in form to the existing contract. In February of each year, a contract review committee consisting of the head of the administrative services department of the facility (the "Contract Manager') and several other employees of the facility would meet to discuss the Parking Lot contract and to determine whether to renew the contract or rebid it. (This Committee will be referred to as "Parking Lot Committee.") The Contract Manager (whose title has been recently changed to Administrative Services Director) essentially chaired the Parking Lot Committee and appointed the other employees who served on the Committee. For the last ten years the Contract Manager has been responsible for overseeing this contract. During this time, his main contacts at Kinney were Chuck Adams, who was usually at the Parking Lot on a daily basis, and Mr. Adams' supervisor, Ken Deutsch. Both Mr. Deutsch and Mr. Adams left the employ of Kinney sometime prior to February, 1990. The exact date of their departure was not established. Both Mr. Deutsch and Mr. Adams now work for Meyers. Kinney's new representative with respect to the Parking Lot contract was Tony Benyon, who assumed those responsibilities on February 1, 1990. Mr. Benyon had previously worked for Meyers and was on the job only twenty two days before the decision was made to rebid the contract. On February 22, 1990, the Parking Lot Committee met and determined not to renew the contract with Kinney. At the time this decision was made, the Contract Manager was aware that the former Kinney employees had switched jobs and were now working for Meyers. However, it does not appear that he brought the job changes to the attention of the Parking Lot Committee because at least one member of the Committee was not aware of the job changes. On or about March 23, 1990, HRS issued an invitation to bid for the management and operation of the Parking Lot (the "Invitation to Bid.") Although the evidence did not establish exactly how many time this contract had been bid in the past, it appears that bids were solicited for this contract on at least two prior occasions during the ten years that Kinney had been operating the Parking Lot. On each occasion, the Invitation to Bid form was substantially identical to the form used in March of 1990. Page 6 of the Invitation to Bid requested bidders to submit a resume of their backgrounds. Page 8 of the Invitation to Bid was entitled "Bid Sheet" and required bidders to submit the following information: "(1) Proposal for Operating the Lot; (2) Proposed Rates, (3) Proposed Net Income Distribution." The Invitation to Bid did not require the bidders to provide any documentation regarding their financial condition nor did it indicate that prior job performance would be considered in evaluating the bids. The Invitation to Bid contained a provision that "any questions concerning conditions and specifications shall be directed in writing to this office for receipt no later than ten (10) days prior to the bid opening." Between the time the Invitation to Bid was sent out and the bids were received, the Contract Manager admits that he "probably" had conversations with some of the bidders and responded to questions about the bid. The Contract Manager could not specifically recall any such discussions with potential bidders between the time the Invitation to Bid was sent out and the date the bids were submitted. However, he admitted that it was likely that some discussions took place. Kinney was never advised of any such discussions between the Contract Manager and other potential bidders. Three sealed bids (including proposals from Kinney and Meyers) were received and opened by HRS at a bid opening on April 4, 1990. A fourth bid was disqualified because it was not sealed. The members of the Parking Lot Committee and representatives of the bidders were present at the bid opening. The bid submitted by Kinney proposed a net income distribution to HRS of 82.5 percent with the remaining 17.5 percent being retained by Petitioner. The Kinney bid also contained a specific breakdown of anticipated costs, fees and expenses to be deducted from the projected gross income to achieve projected net income, a resume and a list of references regarding other-lots being managed by the Petitioner in the area. Meyers and Hi-Rise Parking Systems, Inc. ("Hi- Rise") also submitted bids. Both of those bids contained a proposed net income distribution of 90 percent to HRS. Neither the Hi-Rise nor the Meyers' bids contained a resume or a list of local references of other lots being managed by the companies nor did they contain a listing of anticipated costs, fees and expenses. At the bid opening, the Contract Manager indicated that the bids submitted by Meyers and Hi-Rise were the low bids and the Parking Lot Committee would meet to determine how to "break the tie." At this point, Kinney was effectively eliminated from consideration. By letter dated April 10, 1990, the Contract Manager requested additional information from Meyers and Hi-Rise as follows: Company background information including officers, organization and latest financial/management audit; [and] At least three references to include name of contact person, firm, mailing address and telephone number. The Contract Manager did not request any additional information from Kinney or the disqualified bidder. On or about April 16, 1990, Meyers submitted the requested information to the Contract Manager. On or about April 17, 1990, Hi-Rise submitted the requested information to the Contract Manager. Thus, it is clear that information regarding the financial condition of Meyers and Hi-Rise was not submitted until after the bids were opened. On May 1, 1990, the Parking Lot Committee met to discuss the additional information received from Meyers and Hi- Rise. At that meeting, the members of the Committee completed a "bid selection review form" that listed (1) net income distribution (2) references and (3) company management and financial condition as the criteria for evaluation of the bids. The Committee determined that Meyers and Hi--Rise were "tied" in all categories except financial condition. At best, the submitted financial information provides a cloudy picture of Meyers' financial status. The information indicates that Meyers showed an income loss for the year 1988-1989 of $3,670,000. While a large portion of this loss is apparently related to corporate restructuring, it does not appear that any members of the Parking Lot Committee understood or fully considered this financial information nor did they seek to have the submitted financial information reviewed by an accountant. Hi-Rise's financial records indicate that it is a significantly smaller company, but its records indicated a positive cash flow for the preceding year. Notwithstanding these facts, the Committee decided to award the contract to Meyers. This decision was essentially made on the recommendation of the Contract Manager. The bid selection review form stated as follows: Based on bids and additional information provided, the Parking Lot Management Bid Selection Team recommended award of DCPH Bid No. I-90 to Meyers Parking System, Inc. On May 9, 1990, HRS provided all interested parties with a notice of its selection of Meyers as the successful bidder. In the Notice of Selection, HRS indicated that Meyers had been selected based on the proposed net income distribution, references, background and financial condition. Petitioner timely filed a protest of the proposed award of the contract. The Parking Lot Committee excluded Kinney from consideration based solely upon the net income distribution percentage. However, since the Invitation to Bid did not require the bidders to specify or limit in any way the expenses that could be deducted from gross revenues prior to distributing proceeds to HRS, there was an insufficient basis to accurately evaluate the proceeds that HRS could reasonably expect pursuant to any of the bid proposals. HRS and Meyers have argued that, because HRS has many years experience and expense records relating to the operation of the Parking Lot, the information provided pursuant to the Invitation to Bid provided HRS with sufficient information to make a reasonable evaluation of the financial terms of the proposals. This contention is rejected. To permit such uncertainty and discretion to be built into the bid process would substantially undermine the integrity and dependability of the process. Item 12 on page 6 of the Invitation to Bid required that "bidders will submit a resume of their background and other local lots they are currently managing." No such resume or lists were provided by Meyers. Meyers contends that its response to Item 1 on Page 8 of 8 adequately addressed this requirement. That response provided as follows: PROPOSAL FOR OPERATING LOT. Meyers Parking System, Inc. proposes to operate the Dade County Health department's parking lot with the same high degree of professionalism that we are known for and have demonstrated to our other clients throughout the county. The facility will be managed by trained, uniformed, courteous employees and supervised regularly and closely with our field supervisors and our Regional Vice-President... This statement is not a sufficient response to Item 12 of the Invitation to Bid. During the Parking Lot Committee meeting on February 22, 1990, several complaints were made regarding Kinney's performance under the existing contract. However, no efforts were ever undertaken by HRS to terminate the existing contract with Kinney. While HRS contends that the complaints were part of the reason for deciding to rebid the contract, no steps were taken to disqualify Kinney from bidding on the new contract. In any event, most of the complaints voiced on February 22, 1990 would have been the responsibility of the prior managers of Kinney who now work for Meyers. In February and March of 1990, the disbursements to HRS under the existing contract diminished significantly. This decrease in payments was the result of embezzlement by Kinney employees. While HRS has cited this shortage to justify its decision in awarding the contract to Meyers, there is no evidence that HRS ever attempted to terminate the existing contract nor does it appear that the Parking Lot Committee considered this fact in deciding to eliminate Kinney's bid from consideration. Similarly, the evidence established that there have been problems during the months of March, April and May of 1990 with attendants failing to appear at work on time or leaving the job site. Again, however, there is no indication that HRS attempted to terminate the existing contract or that the Parking Lot Committee relied upon these factors in deciding to eliminate the Kinney bid from consideration. There have been recurring complaints made to Kinney under the existing contract regarding excessive towing of cars from the Parking Lot. The problem of parking lot attendants ordering cars towed without the permission of HRS has existed off and on for sometime. Even though HRS representatives had voiced complaints about the. towing policies, the evidence indicates that this recurring problem became worse in the late spring and early summer of 1990. Nonetheless, HRS never sought to terminate the existing contract because of the towing problems nor did the Parking Lot Committee rely upon this fact in deciding to eliminate the Kinney bid from consideration.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order rejecting all bids for DCPHU Bid I-90 and issue a new Invitation to Bid. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 31 day of October, 1990. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31 day of October, 1990.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners' application for site plan approval for a proposed renovation and addition to their restaurant should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this local land use dispute, Petitioners, Ypapanti and Sevasti Alexiou, who operate a restaurant under the name of Frenchy's Rockaway Grill, have appealed a decision by the Community Development Board (Board) to deny an application to renovate and expand their restaurant located at 7 Rockaway Street, Clearwater Beach, Florida. The Board, which is made up of seven local residents, acts as the local planning agency for Respondent, City of Clearwater (City). Although the City staff supports the project, the City is technically opposed to the application since the Board failed to approve the project by a 3-3 tie vote. In denying the application, the Board rejected the City staff's recommendation that the application be approved. Intervenor, Hunter Hotel Company, owns and operates a hotel known as Clearwater Beach Hotel which is contiguous to, and south of, Petitioners' property. It objects to the application on the grounds that "the criteria for the flexible development approval were not met nor proved, [and] that the relief requested [by Petitioners] is of such a magnitude that it is not warranted and cannot be allowed under the Code." As further clarified by Intervenor, the City's parking shortage in the Beach area is the "core issue on this appeal." Until the City solves the parking problem, Intervenor suggests that there should be a moratorium on development in the Beach area. Petitioners own and operate a popular and successful one-story restaurant and bar on a 0.38-acre lot at 7 Rockaway Street, Clearwater Beach, which fronts directly on the Gulf of Mexico. The property is zoned as a part of the City's Tourist District and is bounded by the Gulf of Mexico on the west, a municipal parking lot to the north, a motel on the east, and the Clearwater Beach Hotel on the south. Due to the small size of their lot, Petitioners seek to vertically expand their restaurant by adding a second story consisting of 3,487 square feet, including an approximately 2,300 square foot open deck and 1,200 square feet of enclosed area. Both sections will accommodate bar patrons and diners. Petitioners also intend to remove and replace a 945 square foot storage room attached to the south side of the building which is structurally unsound. To accomplish these changes, Petitioners will need "flexibility" in meeting setback and parking requirements. Because more than 95 percent of the City is now "built out," and very little land is vacant, the City has adopted comprehensive infill criteria for non-conforming structures, such as Petitioners' restaurant. The criteria which apply to Petitioners' project are found in Section 2- 803C. of the City of Clearwater Redevelopment Code (Code) and allow flexibility in promoting redevelopment and infill throughout the City, including the Clearwater Beach area. As pointed out by City staff, infill projects are often used on Clearwater Beach because there are so many non-conforming structures in that area. In determining whether a project should be given flexibility as an infill project, the City evaluates the proposed project against its infill criteria. Strict compliance with all criteria is not required, but rather the criteria are weighed or balanced collectively. If a project cannot meet a "significant number of [criteria], or a significant one in a meaningful way," then an applicant "would have problems [with gaining approval]." Once a project qualifies as an infill project, an applicant may then use flexible development standards for setbacks, height, size, and minimum off-street parking. In this case, Petitioners seek flexibility for setback and off-street parking requirements. As noted earlier, the main concern raised by Intervenor centers around item 9. of the criteria, which reads as follow: 9. Adequate off-street parking in the immediate vicinity according to the shared parking formula in Division 14 of Article 3 will be available to avoid on-street parking in the immediate vicinity of the parcel proposed for development. Intervenor contends that this criterion was not satisfied, and thus the project cannot qualify as an infill project. In addition, in its Proposed Final Order, the City contends that Petitioners have failed to satisfy items 1. and 5., which read as follows: The development or redevelopment of the parcel proposed for development is otherwise impractical without deviations from the use, intensity and development standards; 5. Suitable sites for development or redevelopment of the uses or mix of uses within the comprehensive infill redevelopment project are not otherwise available in the City of Clearwater. Table 2-803 of the Code establishes minimum off- street parking requirements of 7 to 15 parking spaces per 1,000 square feet for restaurants in the Tourist District. Therefore, a restaurant of Petitioners' size (that was not an infill project) would be required to have at least 47 off- street parking spaces. In actuality, Petitioners have only 13, due to a variance having been previously granted. Since Petitioners intend to add around 3,400 square feet through the second floor addition, the Code would normally require a minimum of 24 additional parking spaces, or a total of 71. However, these off-street standards do not apply to infill projects. Instead, another provision in Table 2-803 of the Code provides that minimum off-street parking for infill projects shall be "[d]etermined by the community development coordinator based on the specific use and/or ITE [Institute of Transportation Engineers] Manual standards." Therefore, using the guidelines in the foregoing provision, the community development coordinator determines the number of additional off-street parking spaces, if any, that an infill project will require. Because the City staff concluded that a parking study would assist it in analyzing the specific use of the property, it requested that Petitioners perform a parking study. The study was conducted by Robert Pergolizzi, a certified planner, who has performed a number of parking studies during his career. The Code does not describe any criteria for a parking study for an infill project. Therefore, the staff looked at other sections of the Code in arriving at a methodology to be used for the study. More specifically, it first considered Section 2-803J.6.a., which provides in part that off-street parking requirements can be relaxed if "the physical characteristics of the proposed building are such that the likely uses of the property will require fewer parking spaces per floor area than otherwise required." Because the restaurant sits directly on the beach, the staff believed that the primary destination of many of the customers was the beach, and not the restaurant, and that the visit to the restaurant was a side trip by the customers. Thus, the parking study methodology was designed, in part, to confirm or disaffirm that assumption. Section 2-803J.6.c. also provides flexibility in off-street parking requirements if "adequate parking is available on a shared basis as determined by all existing land uses within 1,000 feet of the parcel proposed for development, or parking is available through any existing or planned and committed parking facilities." The staff used this section of the Code to determine that 1,000 feet was an appropriate distance to analyze available parking for a restaurant. Therefore, Pergolizzi was directed by the staff to analyze available parking within 1,000 feet of the restaurant. Pergolizzi conducted his study on August 25 and 26, 2000, the Friday and Saturday which preceded the Labor Day holiday weekend. It is undisputed, and the parties have stipulated, that Pergolozzi conducted the study entirely consistent with the agreed methodology. The study confirmed that the primary destination of 49 percent of the restaurant's customers was the beach, and not the restaurant. In other words, the expansion would not affect the parking demand generated by almost one-half of the customers. The study also confirmed that there was available parking within 1,000 feet of the restaurant to accommodate not only the existing business, but the proposed expansion as well. As noted above, Table 2-803 of the Code required that the community development coordinator determine the minimum off-street parking after consideration of the specific proposed use and/or the ITE Manual standards. Here, the City staff looked at the specific use, the ITE Manual standards, and the parking study to determine the minimum off-street parking required for the restaurant. It concluded that there was available parking within 1,000 feet of the restaurant and that no additional parking spaces were required. The community development coordinator concurred with the results of the study and analysis and likewise determined that the minimum off-street parking for the project were the existing 13 spaces. This determination was wholly consistent with the requirements of the Code. In recommending to the Board that the project should be given flexibility as an infill project, the staff's report contained the following conclusion: The proposal is in compliance with the standards and criteria for flexible development approval, with maximum development potential, requirements of the Comprehensive Infill Redevelopment Projects, and with all applicable standards of the Community Development Code. A more detailed analysis of how each of the ten criteria were satisfied is found in Petitioners' Exhibits 9 and 14 received in evidence. At the hearing on March 27, 2001, the City's assistant planning director also established that the proposed expansion and renovation complied with all applicable standards of the Code. Intervenor's expert witness, Gail Easley, a certified planner, questioned whether the methodology used by Pergolizzi complied with the Code. More specifically, she contended that the City was required to determine minimum off- street parking for infill projects in the manner described in Section 2-803C.9. That section provides that "[a]dequate off- street parking in the immediate vicinity according to the shared parking formula in Division 14 of Article 3 will be available to avoid on-street parking in the immediate vicinity of the parcel proposed for development." If this contention were true, however, it would render meaningless the provision in Section 2-803C.8., which provides that "[f]lexibility in regard to lot width, required setbacks, height and off-street parking are justified by the benefits to community character in the immediate vicinity of the parcel proposed for development and the City of Clearwater as a whole." In other words, there would be no flexibility for off-street parking as permitted by that section. This would be contrary to the very purpose of infill projects. Witness Easley's interpretation is also inconsistent with Table 2-803, which states that "minimum off-street parking will be determined by the community development coordinator based on the specific use and/or ITE Manual standards." Under her interpretation of the Code, the community development coordinator would have no right to determine minimum off-street parking for infill projects based on the specific use and/or ITE Manual standards, despite clear language in the Code to the contrary. More importantly, the criteria in Section 2-803C., including item 9., are used to determine whether a project should be considered an infill redevelopment project under the Code. Item 9. is simply one of those criteria, and it does not establish minimum off-street parking requirements for an infill project. Witness Easley also opined that it was inappropriate for the parking study to consider on-street parking. However, the Code does not prohibit the community development coordinator from requesting a parking study which includes on- street parking. It only requires that he consider the specific use and/or ITE manual standards when determining off- street parking for an infill project. Other contentions that the methodology was flawed, including a concern about the date and time of the study and the use of 1,000 feet as a measuring stick for available parking, have been considered and found to be without merit. A contention was also made that certain other infill criteria were not met. However, there was no evidence to support these contentions, and the more persuasive evidence supports a finding that all criteria have been satisfied, and that Petitioners qualify as an infill project. The undersigned has also considered the testimony of the owners of two competing restaurants who object to the project. While they contended that the lack of parking motivated their opposition to the application, it is fair to infer from their testimony that they object mainly because they fear that Petitioners may capture some of their business through an expansion of their restaurant. Finally, in its Proposed Final Order, the City has contended that Petitioners have failed to satisfy a general standard contained in Section 3-913A.6., which requires that an applicant ensure that: [t]he design of the proposed development minimizes adverse effects, including visual, acoustic and olfactory and hours of operation impacts, on adjacent properties. Given the modifications agreed to by Petitioners in the following Finding of Fact, the requirements of this section have been met. In the nature of an affirmative defense, Petitioners have raised the issue of equitable estoppel and contend that Intervenor should be estopped from opposing the application. The facts underlying this argument are as follows. On November 21, 2000, the Board heard testimony and considered the application for the first time. At that meeting, Intervenor's counsel represented to the Board that "my client's concern is not the parking. My client's concern is because of proximity of noise and light intrusion." In light of these concerns, counsel for Petitioners and Intervenor reached an agreement wherein Petitioners agreed to limit the addition to the northern one-half of the existing building, construct an 8-foot concrete block wall on the south property line between the restaurant and the hotel, close the upstairs addition at 10:00 p.m. on week nights and 11:00 p.m. on Fridays and Saturdays, place no outside speakers and allow no live music on the upstairs addition, and direct upstairs lighting away from the hotel. With these accommodations, counsel for the hotel represented to the Board that "if [the Board] approve[s] this, you have addressed our primary areas of concern." After the close of public comments, the Board voted to approve the application by a 3-2 vote. Because four votes are required to approve an application, and one member was absent from the meeting, the matter was continued to the next meeting on December 12, 2000. By letter sent to Petitioners' counsel on December 5, 2000, Intervenor's counsel identified the "commitments at the preceding hearing, which [Petitioners were] willing to make to the Clearwater Beach Hotel." Upon receipt of that letter, Petitioners advised the City by letter that they were in agreement with Intervenor's counsel that "these are the conditions agreed to at the last CDB meeting, which shall be binding upon my client." Notwithstanding earlier representations, by letter dated December 7, 2000, counsel for Intervenor indicated that "the owners of Clearwater Beach Hotel have instructed us to object to the pending application. Upon further review, prompted by the renderings, the magnitude of this project is simply too great for the size of the property." The letter further stated that it was to be considered "as withdrawal of our prior letter and position of 'no objection,'" and that Intervenor would attend the December 12 hearing "to formally object." Petitioners have further contended that Board member William Johnson had ex parte communications with some of his neighbors concerning the merits of this application, and this constituted a departure from the essential requirements of the law. Section 4-206D.2. of the Code provides that "no member of the community development board or the city commission shall engage in any ex parte communications with any person in regard to the substance of a quasi-judicial matter which is to be considered by the board or commission, as the case may be." If such communications occur, Section 4-206D.3.a. requires that a member disclose these communications at the meeting. There is no record of any disclosure being made. At the first Board meeting on November 21, 2000, member Johnson had moved for approval of the application. Without any explanation, at the second meeting on December 12, 2000, he voted against the application. Member Johnson did not testify at hearing to confirm or deny Petitioners' allegation of wrongdoing. However, witness Pergolizzi testified that he spoke with member Johnson just after the December 12 meeting, at which time member Johnson allegedly admitted that he had such conversations with his neighbors and was sorry for his change of vote. But the out-of-court statements of member Johnson are hearsay in nature, do not supplement or explain any other competent evidence on this issue, and they cannot form the basis for a finding of fact.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner and Rutenberg Corporation were the only bidders on lease No. 700:0490 to provide approximately 7500 square feet of office space to Respondent. Item 7 of the bid proposal relating to parking spaces is the only portion of the Rutenberg bid proposal challenged by Petitioner. That section specifies that 60-70 off-street parking spaces must be provided by the lessor for the exclusive use of the employees and the clients of the lessee at no additional charges to the lessee. The parking spaces so provided must be under the control of the bidder and suitably paved, lined, etc. The bid response, to be completed by the bidder, provided three options for the bidder to meet the 60-70 parking spaces requirements. Rutenberg's bid was: 30 exclusive spaces available on site and no cost to the lessee; exclusive spaces available off- site at no cost to the lessee; or As An Option 133 non-exclusive spaces available at no cost to lessee. Space located adjacent to building from proposed facility. (distance) Item 7 is a standard provision of bid proposal forms utilized by State of Florida agencies in leasing office accommodations. This item provides three options for the bidder to provide parking so long as the space so provided is under the control of the bidder. These are the three listed in finding 3 above. So long as the bid proposal provides the required parking space utilizing the available options the bid is responsive. Accordingly, the bid submitted by Rutenberg is a responsive bid. Further, the Rutenberg bid was substantially below the bid submitted by Petitioner. In fact, Petitioner's bid exceeded the Respondent's budget by a considerable sum and, even if the Rutenberg bid was found to be unresponsive, it is doubtful the bid could have been awarded to Petitioner due to budgetary limitations. Here Petitioner does not contend that the bid should have been awarded to him.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the petition of Professional Center IV to have the bid of Rutenberg found to be unresponsive be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 1989 COPIES FURNISHED: Richard L. Dugger, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 Louis A. Vargas General Counsel Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 James C. Hartley, Pro Se 4200 Fourth Street, North St. Petersburg, FL 33703 Drucilla E. Bell, Esquire 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500
