The Issue As to DOAH Case No. 90-3698: Whether Howell Vinson Peavy's insurance licenses should be disciplined for violations of Sections 626.611(7) and (14) and 626.621(8) F.S., and As to DOAH Case No. 90-6615: Whether Howell Vinson Peavy should be licensed to represent Bankers and Shippers Insurance Company as a general lines insurance agent.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Peavy is currently licensed and eligible for licensure and appointment in Florida as a life and health and general lines agent. Mr. Peavy began work at the Citizens (formerly Ellis) Bank of Bunnell, Florida in 1952. A director of that bank owned an insurance agency in town. In 1964, the owner of the bank, Mr. Creal; his mother; the bank attorney; and Mr. Peavy bought the insurance agency. Mr. Peavy continued to work at the Citizens Bank in the mornings and at the insurance agency in the afternoons and evenings. Mr. Peavy has been licensed by the Department of Insurance since purchasing the agency in 1964 and has had no previous disciplinary complaints against his insurance license(s) in the ensuing 26 years. Approximately ten years ago, in 1980, during a stressful and transitional period of the Citizens Bank operation, a customer came into Mr. Peavy's office at the bank and sought to pay in excess of $10,000 in cash in connection with a land transaction. Mr. Peavy received the money and turned it over to a bank secretary to make the deposit. The secretary subsequently put the money in the bank's loan department cash drawer instead of taking it to the head teller, who was the bank employee responsible for filing the Currency Transaction Report required by the federal Internal Revenue Service for such cash transactions. Mr. Peavy did not initially know that a Currency Transaction Report had not been filed. Indeed, he had never personally filled out or filed such a report before, and doing so was not normally his responsibility. Mr. Peavy received no personal gain from the failure to file the report. On July 13, 1985, approximately five years after Mr. Peavy's failure to file the Currency Transaction Report and five years before the instant state disciplinary charges were filed, a seven-count indictment was filed against Mr. Peavy in U.S. District Court in and for the Middle District of Florida, Case No. 85-99CR-JAX-12. Approximately five years ago, on October 4, 1985, Mr. Peavy entered a plea of guilty to one count of violating Title 18, USC Sections 1001 and 1002 in that he knowingly and willfully concealed and covered up and caused to be concealed or covered up, material facts within the jurisdiction of the Department of the Treasurer of the United States to wit: knowingly and willfully failing to file a Currency Transaction Report for a transaction in excess of $10,000. It appears that a total of $50,000 cash somehow wound up in an escrow account at the bank, but there is no evidence or admission to show that either Mr. Peavy or the bank realized any profit or benefit from the transaction. The transaction also was unconnected to Mr. Peavy's insurance business. Mr. Peavy's federal guilty plea was accepted, and on December 4, 1985, he was adjudicated and convicted of the named felony. U.S. District Court Judge Howell Melton imposed a $5,000 fine and placed Mr. Peavy on three years' probation. Prior to entering his guilty plea, Mr. Peavy had executed a "Stipulated Factual Basis for the Plea of Guilty to Count One of the Indictment." This document was not offered in evidence at formal hearing, but upon Mr. Peavy's testimony, it is found that he had the opportunity to review and sign this document before entering his guilty plea and knew that it confirmed his willful failure to file the Currency Transaction Report and that his willful failure to file the Currency Transaction Report was for the purpose of concealing the $50,000 cash transaction from the Internal Revenue Service. At formal hearing, Mr. Peavy elaborated on his reasons for entering his plea of guilty in 1985 as being, in part, due to monetary reasons; his lawyer had advised him of the difference in cost of going to court and fighting the charges contained in seven counts as compared to working out a plea agreement to one count. There is no dispute that Mr. Peavy pleaded guilty and was convicted of a felony punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under the law of the United States of America. However, at the time Mr. Peavy entered his plea, Florida's insurance disciplinary statutes did not specifically address federal felonies. The material state statutes in effect at the time of Peavy's failure to file, at the time of his plea, and at the time of his conviction read: 626.611 Grounds for compulsory refusal, suspension, or revocation of agent's, solicitor's, or adjuster's license or service representative's, supervising or managing general agent's, or claims investigator's permit.--The department shall deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew or continue the license of any agent, solicitor, or adjuster or the permit of any service representative, supervising, or managing general agent, or claims investigator, and it shall suspend or revoke the eligibility to hold a license or permit of any such person, if it finds that as to the applicant, licensee, or permittee any one or more of the applicable grounds exist: * * * (14) Having been found guilty or, or having pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to, a felony in this state or any other state which involves moral turpitude, without regard to whether a judgement of conviction has been entered by the court having jurisdiction of such cases. * * * 626.621 Grounds for discretionary refusal, suspension or revocation of agent's, solicitors, or adjuster's license or service representatives, supervising or managing general agent's, or claims investigator's permit.--The department may, in its discretion, deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew or continue the license of any agent, solicitor, or adjuster or the permit of any service agent, solicitor, or adjuster or the permit of any service representative, supervising or managing general agent or claims investigator, and it may suspend or revoke the eligibility to hold a license or permit of any such person, if it finds that as to the applicant, licensee, or permittee any one or more of the following applicable grounds exist under circumstances for which such denial, suspension, revocation, or refusal is not mandatory under Section 626.611: * * * (8) Having been found guilty of, or having pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to a felony in this state or any other state, without regard to whether a judgment of conviction has been entered by the court having jurisdiction of such cases. Mr. Peavy paid his fine, successfully completed his probation, and was granted restoration of his civil rights on January 13, 1989, pursuant to Article IV, Section 8, Constitution of the State of Florida. Robert Gayle Mercer is a Florida-licensed insurance agent in good standing. He was tendered and accepted over objection as an expert in the business of insurance. Mr. Mercer also has served for many years as a director of a state bank located in Kissimmeee, Florida. The bank of which Mr. Mercer is a director is substantially similar in all respects to the bank in Bunnell, Florida, where Mr. Peavy's legal difficulties arose. As a bank director, Mr. Mercer is familiar with the necessity that banks file Currency Transaction Reports. It was Mr. Mercer's expert professional opinion, rendered within his education, training, and experience as an insurance agent, that the failure to file a Currency Transaction Report is not directly related to the business of insurance and that such failure has not rendered Mr. Peavy unfit or untrustworthy to engage in the business of insurance. In assessing the weight and credibility to be assigned to Mr. Mercer's expert opinion, the undersigned is not unmindful that at some point in time the witness Mercer, and the accused, Peavy, practiced the insurance business together, but due to the lapse of time and the removal of Mr. Mercer from the immediate geographical community wherein Mr. Peavy resides and practices, Mr. Mercer's testimony is found to be credible in all respects. The agency offered no expert testimony/evidence to refute Mr. Mercer's opinion. Mr. Peavy was held in the highest esteem by business, professional, and community service colleagues at the time the federal charges arose, plea was entered, and conviction adjudged. At that time, Mr. Peavy attempted to resign as a member of the Flagler County Chamber of Commerce; his colleagues, knowledgable of the federal charges, refused to accept his resignation. Many prominent community leaders knowledgeable of the nature of the federal charges also wrote to Judge Melton extolling Mr. Peavy's virtues and urging that he be placed on probation. Mr. Peavy has lived in Bunnell, Florida, since 1939, except for a short period of military service. During the whole of that time, he has been a community leader and volunteer, serving at various times on the City Commission, the County School Board, the County Chamber of Commerce, and as a Governor- appointed member of the County Housing Authority. He is active in church and in service and charity organizations, particularly as a fund raiser for the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, the March of Dimes, and the Humane Society. Mr. Peavy's current reputation in his community is one of trust, confidence, fair dealing, and a respect for the rights of others. Upon the direct testimony of Captain C. B. Eisenbach, a retired captain of the Flagler County Sheriff's Department, and Mrs. Etta Peterson, Flagler County Supervisor of Elections, each rendered by deposition, and upon the hearsay evidence which may legitimately be characterized as "explaining or supplementing" direct evidence pursuant to Section 120.58(1) F.S., it is found that Mr. Peavy has consistently maintained and currently maintains an exemplary reputation in the community for honesty, trustworthiness, and good moral character, as well as a reputation for truth and veracity. In making the foregoing finding of fact, the undersigned has considered the somewhat vague understanding Ms. Peterson expressed with regard to the nature of Mr. Peavy's very stale federal crime/conviction but does not find that her vagueness on that legal concept detracts from the credibility or significance of her testimony concerning Mr. Peavy's current reputation and good character.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order dismissing the administrative complaint in Case No. 90-3698 and granting Peavy a license to as a general lines agent for Bankers and Shippers Insurance in Case No. 90-6615. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of February, 1991 at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Department of Insurance PFOF: 1, 2, 3, and 4 are all accepted. Peavy's PFOF: 1-5, 7-10, and 12 are accepted and adopted with minor modifications to better express the record as a whole and to eliminate legal conclusions. 6, and 11 are rejected as subordinate or unnecessary to the facts as found; admissible and reliable hearsay has been assessed within the RO. COPIES FURNISHED: Albert J. Datz, Esquire Datz, Jacobson and Lembcke Suite 2902 Independent Square Jacksonville, Florida 32202 W. Douglas Hall, Esquire R. Vincent Russo, Esquire Cynthia S. Tunnicliff, Esquire Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A. Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 John C. Jordan, Esquire Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a resident of the State of Illinois and is employed by Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company as an associate, selling life and health insurance. He has been licensed by the State of Illinois as an insurance agent for 22 years and has engaged in the insurance business for that length of time. On or about February 26, 1988, the Florida Department of Insurance advised Respondent, by letter, that his application for taking the exam was denied for the following reasons: On or about January 11, 1982 you pleaded guilty to the offense of Forgery, a felony involving moral turpitude as contained in Count II of a Bill of Indictment for Case Number 81CF299. You failed to divulge the fact on your application for qualification as a nonresident agent that on or about April 28, 1982, your licensing authority in the State of Illinois was revoked; and that on or about December 14, 1982, the Director of Insurance's Order of April 28, 1982 revoking your licensing authority was rescinded and you were required to pay a civil penalty of One Thousand dollars ($1,000.00). The Department cited Section 626.785(1); 626.611(1), (2), (7) and (14); and Section 626.621(8), Florida Statutes, as authority for its action. In the latter part of 1977, Respondent sold to Dr. Hanshaw, of Quincy, Illinois, a $100,000.00 life insurance policy on each of Dr. Hanshaw's two children. The cash value of Dr. Hanshaw's existing life insurance was used to pay for the premiums on the children's policies. In 1979, the children's policies had lapsed due to Respondent's inability to get Dr. Hanshaw, owner of the policies, to execute a form reinstating the policies. Finally, after repeated attempts to obtain Dr. Hanshaw's signature on the reinstatement forms, and after a telephone conversation with Dr. Hanshaw, Respondent caused a person in Respondent's office to sign Dr. Hanshaw's name to the reinstatement forms in order to reinstate the insurance. Respondent then transmitted the forms to the home office and the policies were reinstated. Respondent's total compensation for the reinstatement was $30.68. Respondent felt he had the permission of Dr. Hanshaw to sign Dr. Hanshaw's signature to the forms. Approximately one year later, Dr. Hanshaw decided to surrender the policy on his life, and found the surrender value to be approximately $2,700.00 less than he felt it should be. The difference was due to the year's worth of premiums on the children's policies which had been deducted from the cash surrender value of Dr. Hanshaw's policy after the children's policies had been reinstated. Dr. Hanshaw promptly inquired of Respondent about the cash surrender value. At that time Respondent advised Dr. Hanshaw of the above reason for the lesser amount of the cash value. Respondent also reminded Dr. Hanshaw that he had caused Dr. Hanshaw's signature to be signed by a third party in order to prevent the children's policies from lapsing the previous year pursuant to Dr. Hanshaw's instructions. Dr. Hanshaw denied he had so instructed Respondent to reinstate the policies. Respondent then offered and Dr. Hanshaw accepted, a personal check from Respondent for the amount of the cash value loss allegedly experienced by Dr. Hanshaw. Some time thereafter, Dr. Hanshaw filed a Complaint with the Adams County Illinois State Attorney and on October 27, 1981, a Bill of Indictment was filed against Respondent. After plea negotiations, Respondent pleaded guilty to Count II of the Indictment (Forgery) and on March 22, 1982, the Court accepted Respondent's plea, dismissed all other Counts in the indictment, sentenced Respondent to two years probation and imposed a fine of $2,500.00, plus court costs. Part of the plea negotiation included the State Attorney's help in obtaining favorable treatment in any licensing procedure. On March 4, 1984, Respondent's Probation was successfully discharged. As a result of the aforesaid plea of guilty to forgery, a felony in the State of Illinois, the Illinois Department of Insurance issued an Order revoking Respondent's insurance license. However, the Order of Revocation did not take effect since Respondent timely sought a hearing on the allegations of the Order of Revocation. As a result of the hearing, Respondent's insurance license was not revoked. Instead, Respondent paid a civil penalty of $1,000.00, plus court reporter costs. Respondent testified that he was not aware of the consequences of his plea of guilty on other insurance licenses he might wish to obtain once he had discharged his debt to society. He has since discovered these effects, but after presentation of the above facts has been able to obtain other insurance licenses in other states. On or about September 24, 1987, Respondent filed an Application For Qualification as a Nonresident Life and Health Agent with the Department of Insurance. In that application, Respondent answered "No" to question 9 which asked if his license had ever been declined, suspended, placed on probation or administratively fined. However, on question 12, Respondent clearly states that he had been charged with and convicted of a felony, the location of that offense, that there was one charge of forgery, a $2,500.00 fine, two years probation, and that his Illinois license had been stayed. The negative response in question 9 forms the basis of Petitioner's reason for denial stated in paragraph 2(b) above. Respondent did not mislead, misrepresent or misstate anything to the Department of Insurance with his negative response to Question 9 of the Application. Respondent's license had clearly never been declined, suspended, placed on probation or revoked since the Illinois Order of Revocation never took effect. Nor did he mislead misrepresent or misstate anything to the Department with his negative response in reference to an administrative fine. He felt the fine he actually paid was not what question 9 was asking since he had paid a civil and not an administrative fine. He also thought that the license action was part and parcel of the criminal action. Nowhere in the application is "administrative fine" defined. Reasonable people can differ on the meaning of "administrative fine" especially where one state uses the term civil fine. These facts bear out the vagueness of the term's meaning. Before a person can misstate a fact there must be some agreement or mutual understanding as to what the fact is being stated for. There was clearly no such understanding in this case. The answer does not even come close to fraud since no intent to defraud the Department was demonstrated by the evidence. Additionally, his response to Question 12, together with the information he supplied along with the Application, was sufficient notice to the Department of the facts surrounding his Illinois license. The information supplied in Question 12 renders the response in Question 9 as immaterial. Therefore, the reasons given by the Department in Paragraph 2(b) above cannot stand as a basis for denying Respondent's licensure application. The reason given by the Department in paragraph 2(a) above involves the Respondent's forgery conviction. The forgery conviction does include an allegation of an intent to defraud. However, the facts of this case fails to demonstrate that moral turpitude was involved. This is especially true since this was a plea bargained case and the technical aspects of a crime do not bear the importance those aspects would if a trial had taken place or if Respondent had known the full effect such a plea would have on future licenses. Moreover, Respondent has rehabilitated himself. The Order rescinding the revocation of Respondent's license in Illinois specifically incorporates the Conclusion of Law made by the Hearing Officer, to-wit: "4. That, although convicted of the felony of forgery, the Licensee has demonstrated that he is sufficiently rehabilitated to warrant the public trust as required by Section 502(h) of the Illinois Insurance Code." Further, the testimony of Angelo P. Schiralli at the hearing attests to the honesty and trustworthiness of Respondent. Respondent is a person of honesty and trustworthiness and has had no problems with the law since 1979.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent's application be accepted and he be permitted to take the Life and Health Agent's exam. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of November, 198, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1625 The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 3, 4 and 10 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are subordinate. The facts contained in paragraphs 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance, in so far as material. The facts contained in paragraph 9 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are irrelevant. The facts contained in the first two paragraphs of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 12 are adopted. The first sentence of the third paragraph is adopted. The last sentence of the third paragraph was not shown by the evidence. The fourth paragraph is adopted as to the first sentence. The remainder of the fourth paragraph is rejected. The first sentence of the fifth paragraph is subordinate. The remainder of the fifth paragraph is rejected. The first sentence of paragraph 13 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact is subordinate. Remainder of the paragraph is rejected. The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of Respondent's proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance, in so far as material. The facts contained in paragraph 10 of Respondent's proposed findings of fact are subordinate. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert C. Byerts, Esquire Department of Insurance Agency Regulation Section 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Donald H. Reed, Jr., Esquire First American Bank Building 2250 Glades Road Boca Raton, Florida 33431 Honorable William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 =================================================================
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Petitioner is entitled to a Resident Independent All-Lines Insurance Adjuster license.
Findings Of Fact On July 24, 1999, Petitioner was involved in a physical altercation in her driveway, defending herself against a female neighbor. Shortly after the altercation, Petitioner was arrested for Aggravated Battery. On January 12, 2000, a Criminal Information was filed against Petitioner charging her with Aggravated Battery Causing Great Bodily Harm. On August 15, 2000, Petitioner pled no-contest to Felony Battery and was placed on two-years' probation. Adjudication of guilt was withheld. Fourteen months later, on October 18, 2001, Petitioner's probation was terminated early without any violations. On March 11, 2002, Petitioner applied for licensure as a Resident Independent All-Lines Insurance Adjuster and provided the prior arrest information in her application. On May 24, 2002, Respondent denied Petitioner's application for licensure on the basis of her single arrest and subsequent plea. On June 18, 2002, Petitioner submitted a timely Election of Proceedings form requesting a formal hearing. Respondent's licensing review committee, composed of the Bureau Chief of Licensing Division, Licensing administrators, the Assistant Division Director of Agent and Agency Services, and a Department attorney, reviewed Petitioner's application and determined that she was unfit and untrustworthy to hold a license. The review committee's decision was based strictly on Petitioner's prior criminal plea and the limited time between her completion of probation and application for licensure. The evidence presented at hearing, however, demonstrated Petitioner's fitness and trustworthiness to hold a license. Petitioner, an African-American, lives in a 50-house subdivision containing approximately three African-American families. On July 24, 1999, Petitioner attempted to enter her driveway but was blocked by a car that was parked in front of her driveway. A Caucasian woman was parked in front of Petitioner's driveway and was reading mail that she had retrieved from the community mailbox located in Petitioner's front yard. Despite having experienced the woman's similar rude behavior 2-weeks prior, Petitioner politely "tooted" her horn to encourage the woman to move her van forward and patiently waited. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner again beeped her horn. In response, the woman glanced at Petitioner, looked away, and refused to move. Thereafter, Petitioner placed her car in park, approached the driver's side of the woman's car, knocked on her window, and said, "I want to go in my driveway." Again, the woman ignored her request and continued to read her mail. Petitioner stated that after further knocking, she opened the woman's door and said, "I don't know you and you don't know me. I want to go into my driveway and I need you to move your van." In response the woman said to Petitioner, "You need to move. I want to close my door." Immediately thereafter, and without warning, the woman pushed Petitioner to the ground, got out of her car and attacked Petitioner. After being repeatedly struck by the woman, Petitioner bit the woman's shoulder in self-defense. Within seconds, the altercation, which Petitioner alleges was racially motivated, ended and the woman drove away. Petitioner ran into her house and relayed the events to her teenage children. Prior to calling 911, Petitioner called her uncle for advice. While on the telephone with her relative, the police arrived at Petitioner's home and she was arrested. Petitioner retained a lawyer to contest the charge. Upon her attorney's advice, Petitioner reluctantly agreed to plead no-contest to the charge, accept two years of probation, and receive a withholding of an adjudication of guilt. Petitioner's probation was terminated after 14 months without incident. Petitioner has never been arrested nor convicted of any crime prior to this incident. Since 1987, Petitioner has been working in the insurance industry in various capacities including claims examiner. She is currently entrusted with large sums of money, successfully works in customer service, and routinely deals with difficult customers in an appropriate and professional manner. Petitioner has been praised by her employers and co-workers and possesses an excellent demeanor. Petitioner has been offered a position as an adjustor trainee with Zurich Insurance Company contingent upon obtaining an adjustor's license. On June 21, 2001, approximately nine months before Petitioner submitted her application, Respondent repealed its law enforcement waiting period rule which outlined the length of time an applicant was required to wait, following a felony plea, in order to qualify for licensure. While Respondent adopted a new law enforcement waiting period rule pursuant to Section 626.207, Florida Statutes, on October 17, 2002, approximately five months after Petitioner submitted her application, Respondent stipulates that the new rule does not apply to Petitioner. In fact, at the time Petitioner submitted her application in March 2002, Respondent stipulates that it operated strictly under Sections 626.611 and 626.621, Florida Statutes. Consequently, Petitioner applied at a time when Respondent admittedly used only the statutes as a basis for denial. Waiting periods were not applied to applications for licensure during March 2002. While Petitioner's Notice of Denial contains a typographical error as to the date on the first page of the letter, the Agent Personal Data Inquiry correctly shows that Petitioner was officially denied on May 24, 2002.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a Final Order approving Petitioner's application for licensure as a Resident Independent All-Lines Insurance Adjuster. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of March, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Ladasiah Jackson, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Maria N. Neal 5639 Breckenridge Circle Orlando, Florida 32818-1377 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, by entering a plea of nolo contendere to a misdemeanor charge of conspiracy to commit workers' compensation fraud, demonstrated a lack of fitness and trustworthiness to sell insurance in violation of Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was eligible for licensure and licensed in the following areas: (a) as a health insurance agent; (b) as a life insurance agent; (c) as a life and health insurance agent; (d) as a life, health, and variable annuity agent; (e) as a surplus lines insurance agent; and (f) as a general lines insurance agent. In June 1992, the insurance agency that Respondent worked for was purchased by another insurance agency. Ronald Palmerton was a client of the owner of Respondent's former employer. Mr. Palmerton held a workers' compensation policy issued by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual). After the owner of Respondent's former employer left the new agency, Respondent handled Mr. Palmerton's requests for additional insurance with Liberty Mutual. Respondent was never paid a commission for any work performed on Mr. Palmerton's behalf. Even so, Respondent's testimony that Mr. Palmerton was not up front with information that he provided to Respondent and that Respondent never told Mr. Palmerton that he could avoid his workers' compensation experience modification if he started another company is not persuasive. In a Fourth Amended Information dated April 16, 2001, Respondent and Mr. Palmerton, were charged in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District, in and for Escambia County, Florida, Case No. 99-2081 CF, with several felony and misdemeanor violations. Specifically, Respondent was charged as follows: (a) with racketeering, a first-degree felony in violation of Section 895.03, Florida Statutes; (b) with conspiracy to commit racketeering, a first-degree felony in violation of Sections 895.03(4) and 777.04(3), Florida Statutes; and (c) conspiracy to commit workers' compensation fraud, a misdemeanor in violation of Sections 440.37(4) and 777.04(3), Florida Statutes. The misdemeanor criminal charge was based on allegations that, beginning on April 4, 1993, Respondent and Mr. Palmerton did unlawfully and knowingly conspire to commit workers' compensation fraud by knowingly making false or misleading oral or written statements and representations and/or knowingly omitting or concealing material information required by Section 440.381, Florida Statutes. According to the Fourth Amended Information, the purpose of the conspiracy was to avoid or diminish the amount of payment of any workers' compensation premiums to be paid by Mr. Palmerton and/or his related companies to a carrier or self-insurance fund. The criminal trial was scheduled for April 16, 2001. On April 12, 2001, the State of Florida offered a plea agreement to Respondent. Respondent initially refused the offer but changed his mind after learning that Mr. Palmerton had agreed to plead guilty to felony charges for perjury and racketeering, with a sentence for 18 months' house arrest and 15 years of probation. Respondent understood that Mr. Palmerton would testify against Respondent if he elected to proceed to trial. On April 16, 2001, Respondent entered into a Plea Agreement in which he agreed to plead no contest to one count of conspiracy to commit workers' compensation fraud, a first-degree misdemeanor. The agreement included a provision for a sentence of one year of probation. Under the agreement, a sentence of nine months' incarceration in the Escambia County jail would be suspended pending Respondent's successful completion of all terms and conditions of probation. The agreement also provided that Respondent's probation would include the payment of any restitution ordered by the Court during a subsequent hearing. On April 16, 2001, the Court adjudicated Respondent guilty, withholding imposition of sentence and placing Respondent on one year of probation. The terms of Respondent's probation included, but are not limited to, the following: payment of a fine and court costs in the amount of $1,000; payment of the costs of prosecution in the amount of $5,000; and (c) payment of restitution as determined at a subsequent hearing. A few days after being adjudicated guilty, Respondent contacted Petitioner's staff to determine the effect of his nolo contendere plea to a misdemeanor offense on his licensure status. Petitioner's staff subsequently informed Respondent that a misdemeanor offense would not result in an automatic suspension of an insurance license. On April 11, 2002, the Court conducted a restitution hearing. During the hearing, the State of Florida and Respondent agreed and stipulated to the entry of a restitution order and judgment satisfactory to the victim, Liberty Mutual. On June 3, 2002, the Court entered a Restitution Order and Judgment against Respondent. The Order required Respondent to pay restitution in the amount of $225,000. Pursuant to the Order, Respondent and Mr. Palmerton are jointly and severally liable for payment of the restitution, with Respondent receiving credit toward the total obligation for $200,000 previously paid by Mr. Palmerton and $10,000 paid by Respondent on April 11, 2002. As such, the effective amount of the Restitution Order and Judgment was a $15,000 balance due from Respondent. In June 2002, Petitioner issued a renewal notice for Respondent's surplus lines insurance license. The notice requested the appointing insurance company or agency to certify that Respondent had not pled guilty, or nolo contendere to, or had not been found guilty of a felony since originally being appointed by the appointing entity. The notice did not inquire whether Respondent had pled guilty, or nolo contendere to, or found guilty of a misdemeanor. At the time of the formal hearing, Respondent and Mr. Palmerton were still jointly and severally obligated to pay $15,000 in unpaid restitution. Respondent had successfully completed his probation in all other respects. During the hearing, Petitioner denied any wrong doing in relation to the misdemeanor offense to which he pled no contest. Specifically, Respondent denied that he ever intended to assist Mr. Palmerton in any type of scheme to defraud or otherwise do harm to Liberty Mutual. Respondent's testimony in this regard in not persuasive. Respondent has been a licensed insurance agent for 32 years. Prior to the instant proceeding, Respondent's insurance licenses have not been the subject of a disciplinary proceeding or lawsuit. Liberty Mutual did not name Respondent as a party in its civil suit against Mr. Palmerton. Instead, Respondent cooperated with and testified on behalf of Liberty Mutual in that proceeding. Until Respondent committed the offense at issue here, his reputation in the insurance community indicates that he was an honest and trustworthy agent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order imposing a six-month suspension of Respondent's insurance licenses. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street, Room 612 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Thomas E. Wheeler, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 12564 Pensacola, Florida 32573-2564 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is eligible for licensure as a resident general lines agent.
Findings Of Fact On August 14, 1998, Robert Manns, a representative for Butler County, Missouri, filed a consumer complaint with the Missouri Department of Insurance, which alleged that Petitioner financed a premium for an insurance policy when the premium had, in fact, been paid by the county. On June 9, 1999, Petitioner was assessed a fine of $10,000.00 by the Missouri Department of Insurance based on Petitioner's having practiced forgery and deception in an insurance transaction. Specifically, it was found that Petitioner signed the names of the city finance director and county commission clerk to premium finance documents and letters representing that the city and county had financed a premium when, in fact, the city and county had paid the insurance premium for the city and county accounts in full on an annual basis. At the time Petitioner forged the premium finance agreement, he was licensed as an insurance agent in the State of Missouri. The Missouri Department of Insurance did not revoke Petitioner's license as an insurance agent in the State of Missouri. On February 14, 2000, the Indiana Department of Insurance denied Petitioner’s application for licensure based upon the Missouri administrative action. On September 19, 2003, Petitioner applied for licensure as a resident general lines agent in the State of Florida. Based on its review of Petitioner's application and the administrative documents from the Missouri Department of Insurance described in paragraphs 2 above, the Department denied Petitioner’s application. In regard to the incident described in paragraph 2 above, Petitioner denied that he forged the insurance contract, but he admitted that he forged the premium finance agreement associated with the subject insurance contract. However, Petitioner testified that "no one lost money" as a result of his forging the premium finance agreement. Petitioner testified that he was not proud of the incident, that he was very sorry for doing it, and that his actions could not be justified. The Department considers the forgery of documents and deception related to insurance documents and transactions by an insurance agent to be serious matters. This is particularly true in light of the fiduciary role of an insurance agent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that final order be entered denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a resident general lines insurance agent in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Johnny R. Howe 4367 Winding Oaks Circle Mulberry, Florida 33860 Michael T. Ruff, Esquire Ladasiah Jackson, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the license of Allen Franklin Meredith (Respondent) should be disciplined by the Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Petitioner) for allegedly allowing others to use his general lines insurance agent license, and to sign his name to insurance policy applications while Respondent was not present, as more particularly set forth in the Administrative Complaint issued herein on or about October 12, 1989.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been licensed, and eligible for licensure, in the State of Florida as a life and health insurance agent, health insurance agent, and a general lines insurance agent. During April, 1989, Respondent approached Gordon Rowan, owner of Gordon Rowan Real Estate and Insurance in Winter Haven, Florida, to inquire whether Rowan would assist Respondent in obtaining a renewal of his general lines insurance agent license. Respondent was residing with his family in Georgia at the time, and told Rowan that his Florida general lines agent license was about to expire, and he needed to get licensed with a Florida company in order to apply for renewal. Rowan agreed to pay for Respondent's renewal fee, and for licensing him with a Florida Company doing business through Rowan's agency. On or about April 30, 1987, Rowan applied to National Insurance Associates for licensure on behalf of Respondent, and paid the applicable license fee. On or about May 20, 1987, Respondent was licensed with National Insurance Associates as a general lines insurance agent, and his Florida general lines license was renewed. Respondent admitted in an affidavit executed on November 16, 1987, that he did authorize Rowan to use his general lines license from the beginning of May to the end of June, 1987, while he was still living in Georgia. This authorization was in exchange for Rowan's assistance in obtaining Respondent's licensure with National Insurance Association, and renewal of his Florida license. However, at hearing Respondent testified that he never authorized Rowan to "use" his license, only to "place" his license with Rowan's agency. Rowan testified that Respondent had, in fact, told him that he could use his license and write business under it, including signing Respondent's name to policy applications, even though Respondent was not in the office and did not participate in these transactions. Rowan's assistant, May Satava, was present when Rowan and Respondent discussed their arrangement, and confirmed Rowan's testimony. Based upon the demeanor of the witnesses, as well as the affidavit executed by the Respondent shortly after the events involved in this matter, it is found that Respondent's uncorroborated testimony at hearing is not credible, while that of Rowan and Satava is found to be credible and consistent with statements made to Luis Rivera, the Petitioner's investigator, in October, 1987. Respondent did tell Rowan that he could use his general lines license to write business, and to sign his name to applications in exchange for Rowan's assistance in obtaining the renewal of his Florida general lines agent license. Working under Rowan's control and supervision, Satava did sign Respondent's name to approximately 48 policy applications from May through July, 1987, while Respondent actually signed only 3 additional policy applications during this period. Thus, the vast majority of business written under Respondent's license during this time was actually completed by Satava, an unlicensed person working under the control and supervision of Rowan, without any involvement of Respondent, pursuant to his agreement with Rowan that Rowan could use his license. Respondent did receive a commission payment in the amount of $200 from Rowan for June and July commissions. This represented Rowan's estimate of a reasonable payment to Respondent for the use of his license during this time when Satava signed Respondent's name to approximately 48 policy applications.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order suspending Respondent's general lines agent license, and eligibility for licensure, for a period of six months. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th Florida. day of March, 1990 in Tallahassee, DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX Rulings on the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-2. Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 2. Adopted in Finding 3. 5-6. Adopted in Finding 6. Adopted in Finding 7. Adopted in Finding 8. Respondent did not file Proposed Findings of Fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Gordon T. Nicol, Esquire 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Allen Franklin Meredith 140 Flamingo Drive Auburndale, FL 33823 Don Dowdell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Hon. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
