The Issue Whether Respondent, Seven Lakes Association, Inc. (the Association), violated section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2018),1 by discriminating against 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory and administrative rule references are to the 2018 codifications of the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner, Donald Chew, based on his race (African American) when it terminated his employment; and, if so, what is the appropriate remedy.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Donald Chew, is an African American male who was employed by the Association from January 23, 2017, to September 19, 2018. During the time he was there, Mr. Chew was one of the Association's few non-white employees. Respondent, the Association, is a condominium association governed by chapter 718, Florida Statutes. According to Mr. Chew, a majority, if not all, of the condominium owners are white. The Association has approximately 50 employees. The Association is governed by a Board of Directors (Board), made up of five to seven members. All the Board members who testified at the hearing were white. The Board hires a General Manager, who oversees the day-to-day operations of the Association. This includes oversight over the condominium grounds, recreation, and financial aspects of the Association. The General Manager had check-writing authority for the Association. For the times relevant to Petitioner's claims, Timothy Day served as the General Manager.2 Prior to being hired Mr. Day was involved in an investigation related to his employment with a local government entity. 2 Mr. Chew was hired by the Association's General Manager Judy Grosvenor, but Mr. Day became General Manager in August 2017. Neither the reason for the investigation nor the outcome of that investigation was clear from the evidence. Regardless, Mr. Day was given the opportunity to explain the circumstances related to the investigation to the Board prior to being hired. Relevant to this case, the General Manager oversaw the Accounting Manager, who managed a staff of accountants. June Gibbs served as the Accounting Manager who oversaw Mr. Chew from the date of his hire to May 2018, while he was in the staff accountant role. MR. CHEW'S JOB HISTORY AND DUTIES The Association originally hired Mr. Chew for the position of staff accountant. The hiring process consisted of review of Mr. Chew's resume, an interview, and then a criminal background and reference check. The Association did not check Mr. Chew's litigation history at the time it hired him. In September 2017, Ms. Gibbs gave Mr. Chew a mixed written performance review. Although he was "Above Average" in initiative and working relationships, Ms. Gibbs indicated he was "Below Average" in his basic accounting skills and his tardiness. In her comments, she noted: Don, I really dislike writing a negative evaluation. But, your accounting skills really concern me. This is why I hired you and the core of your position. It's been great that you have done well with the insurance and working with Brown & Brown. Even though we have struggled with the accounting parts of the insurance UMS you have done well assisting everyone setting [ ] this software up. And I believe you are above average in computer technology. But, once again accounting is the core. At this point because I really need someone strong in accounting behind me. I am going to have you stay with what you are good at – working on the insurance and UMS. And I will appoint you some basic accounting jobs. Also work on any tardiness issues. In March 2018, the Association requested that Mr. Chew obtain a Community Association Manager License (CAM License) from the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation. Mr. Chew submitted an online application in which he was required to answer a number of questions, including the following: 2. Are you or have you ever been a defendant in civil litigation in this or any other state … in which the basis of the complaint against you was alleged negligence, fraudulent or dishonest dealing, foreclosure, bankruptcy, or breach of fiduciary duty related to the practice or profession for which you are applying, or is there any such case or investigation pending. Mr. Chew answered "No" to this question. On May 2, 2018, the Association promoted Mr. Chew to the Administrative Services Manager (ASM) position, which reported directly to the General Manager, Timothy Day. Along with this promotion, Mr. Chew received a salary increase. In the ASM position, Mr. Chew handled a variety of issues and considered himself the General Manager's "right hand man." Mr. Chew did very well in this position and was well liked by the Board, Mr. Day, and the Association staff. In August 2018, Mr. Day announced that he would be resigning from the Association and recommended Mr. Chew for General Manager position. On August 30, 2018, the Board voted unanimously to appoint Mr. Chew as the Interim General Manager. The credible testimony at the hearing established that at this point the Board believed a final decision would be made for the permanent General Manager position after more extensive background checks were conducted on Mr. Chew. Meanwhile, Mr. Chew would serve in an interim capacity. Later on August 30, Mr. Day informed Mr. Chew that he had received information that there was judgment for embezzlement against Mr. Chew in an action brought by the Attorney General for the State of Illinois. Mr. Chew explained that the suit was not against him personally, but against a corporation. On September 4, 2018, Mr. Day informed Mr. Chew that he was being placed on paid administrative leave pending an investigation into the Illinois litigation. On September 19, 2018, the Association's attorney sent Mr. Chew a letter of termination. DISCRIMINATORY ACTS Mr. Chew testified that his accounting co-workers made racial comments that made him feel uncomfortable while he was working as a staff accountant. As described by Mr. Chew, these remarks were made while he was working under Ms. Gibbs, prior to May 2018. Mr. Chew's co-worker, Joan Farus, confirmed that Ms. Gibbs (Ms. Farus's and Mr. Chew's supervisor) and other employees talked about "black people" in a derogatory way around Mr. Chew.3 The undersigned finds that Petitioner established that he was subject to discriminatory comments by staff prior to Mr. Chew becoming an ASM. Mr. Chew also asserts that he was treated less favorably by the Board than the white employees. Mr. Chew presented little, if any, evidence of how he was treated less favorably by the Board. To the contrary, based on the testimony at the hearing by the Board members and staff, it was clear that Mr. Chew was well liked; the Board promoted him and provided him with bonuses and pay raises. The fact that the Board unanimously approved him for the Interim General Manager position on August 30, 2018, leads to the conclusion that the Board did not have any racial animus toward Mr. Chew. Although the Association has an Equal Opportunity Employer and Non-Harassment Policy, there is nothing in its Employee Handbook 3 Ms. Farus was terminated by the Association in August 2018. specifically prohibiting discriminatory conduct based on race. The Handbook indicates employees "deserve to be treated with respect and courtesy." It also states it is company policy that the "workplace be free of tensions involving matters which do not relate to our business" such as "ethnic, religious, or sexual remarks," but stops short of explicitly prohibiting racism or racist comments. The Handbook does urge an employee who feels harassed to notify a supervisor or the Human Resources department. It also provides that any grievances regarding the job, working conditions, or problems with another employee be submitted to the employee's immediate supervisor in writing. There is no credible evidence Mr. Chew ever submitted a written complaint to his supervisor, Human Resources, or anyone else at the Association regarding the racist comments. MR. CHEW'S BACKGROUND HISTORY After the Board appointed Mr. Chew as the Interim General Manager, Kathy Miske, a white female who lived in an Association condominium, researched Mr. Chew's background.4 Ms. Miske previously performed background checks for a law firm in Chicago before she moved to a condominium in the Association. She researched Mr. Chew because she had a "habit of checking on people," and she had been approached by a condominium resident, Debbie Combs, also a white female, who was suspicious of Mr. Chew. The reason for Ms. Combs's suspicion was not disclosed at the hearing. Ms. Miske discovered that the Attorney General of Illinois had filed a "Verified Complaint for an Injunction, an Accounting, Surcharge, and Other Equitable Relief" (Complaint) against Mr. Chew personally in May 2013. The Complaint essentially described an embezzlement scheme, and specifically accused Mr. Chew of abusing a position of trust while employed at Marcy- 4 Although she later became a Board member, at the time she researched Mr. Chew she was not. Newbury Association, Inc. (MNA). It alleged Mr. Chew had misappropriated funds, in violation of the Illinois Charitable Trust Act. Although not a criminal prosecution, the Illinois Attorney General sought injunctive relief, civil damages, punitive damages, and civil penalties against Mr. Chew. Ms. Miske also discovered an Order of Final Judgment (Final Judgment) had been entered against Mr. Chew in the Illinois case on September 9, 2013. The Final Judgement seems to be a default judgment. As a result, Mr. Chew was enjoined from serving as a charitable trustee, was ordered to pay $205,372 in damages, and was also required to pay interest and investigative costs. Although Mr. Chew had a plausible explanation as to the circumstances surrounding the Illinois case, there was no evidence that the Final Judgment had been appealed, withdrawn, reversed, or nullified in any way. Mr. Chew admitted he did not notify the Association of the Final Judgment and that he did not list MNA on the resume he provided to the Association. Ms. Miske made copies of the Complaint and Final Judgment against Mr. Chew. She distributed the copies to three of the Board members that she knew personally. Eventually, copies were provided to the President of the Board, Mr. Day, and the Board's attorney. The Association was required by law to maintain a bond to cover its employees, including the General Manager.5 The Board members testified they were concerned that the Final Judgment would affect the Association's ability to obtain the proper bond if Mr. Chew became General Manager. The Board members relied on the Association's attorney's advice regarding the Association's ability to obtain a bond and the attorney's recommendation to terminate Petitioner based on the Complaint and Final Judgment. Mr. Chew claims that he was discriminated against because he was not given an opportunity to explain the Final Judgement or underlying facts to the Board. In comparison, he claims Mr. Day was given an opportunity to explain a criminal investigation against him and was hired despite the investigation. Mr. Day had previously been involved in the local government, but the nature of the investigation or the outcome of that investigation was not established at the hearing. Mr. Chew had a Final Judgment against him by the Illinois Attorney General for what essentially amounted to embezzlement. In contrast, Mr. Day was only under investigation; there was no evidence he was found guilty of anything. Moreover, Mr. Chew failed to disclose a former employer, MNA. There is no proof that Mr. Day tried to hide that he had been under investigation or that he hid his employment by a previous employer. 5 Section 718.111(11)(h), Florida Statues, states: (11) INSURANCE. * * * (h) The association shall maintain insurance or fidelity bonding of all persons who control or disburse funds of the association. The insurance policy or fidelity bond must cover the maximum funds that will be in the custody of the association or its management agent at any one time. As used in this paragraph, the term "persons who control or disburse funds of the association" includes, but is not limited to, those individuals authorized to sign checks on behalf of the association, and the president, secretary, and treasurer of the association.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Donald Chew's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 2020. Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Donald Chew 1262 Northeast 41st Terrace Avenue Cape Coral, Florida 33909 (eServed) Christina Harris Schwinn, Esquire Pavese Law Firm 1833 Hendry Street Post Office Drawer 1507 Fort Myers, Florida 33901 (eServed) Vanessa Fernandez, Esquire Pavese Law Firm 1833 Hendry Street Fort Myers, Florida 33901 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue The ultimate issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether the Respondent has committed violations of the Florida Condominium Act (Chapter 718, Florida Statutes) and, if so, whether a cease and desist order and/or civil fine should be imposed. Petitioner contends that the allegations of the Notice to Show Cause have been established and that a cease and desist order and civil fine are appropriate. The Respondent contends that to the extent any violations of the Act have been established, they are only of a technical sort, and do not justify the imposition of any sanction.
Findings Of Fact Nautico Bay Club, Inc., is the developer of the Nautico Bay Condominium, located at 6937 Bay Drive, Miami Beach, Florida. At all times material to this proceeding, Samuel Weintraub was the president of Nautico Bay Club, Inc., and was primarily responsible for conducting its day-to-day business activities. The Nautico Bay Club Condominium includes 48 residential units. The first units were sold on December 1, 1980. The final closing on the 48 units occurred on December 31, 1980. The Respondent failed to call an annual meeting of the unit owners at Nautico Bay Condominium during 1981. The Respondent was having some difficulty communicating with some of the unit owners because they lived outside of the country. Nonetheless, the Respondent did not give written notice to unit owners of an annual meeting during 1981, did not post notice of an annual meeting during 1981 on the condominium property, did not send a notice of an annual meeting during 1981 by mail to each unit owner, and did not retain a post office certificate of mailing as proof of mailing of notice to unit owners. No annual meeting of unit owners was conducted during 1981. As the developer who maintained control over condominium activities during 1981, the Respondent was obliged to call and conduct an annual meeting of unit owners. The Respondent retained a private public accounting firm to prepare a financial statement for the Nautico Bay Club Condominium for the year ending December 31, 1981. The statement was completed on February 10, 1982. The Respondent remained in charge of the administration of the condominium association at that time. The Respondent made no effort to provide copies of the financial statement by mail or personal delivery to each unit owner. While some unit owners may have obtained copies of the financial statement within 60 days of December 31, 1981, most did not. At least one unit owner did not receive a copy of the financial statement until sometime in November, 1982. On or about September 17, 1982, the Respondent turned over operation of the condominium association to the Nautico Bay Club Condominium Association. The Respondent's president, Mr. Weintraub, offered to have the financial records reviewed by the independent certified public accounting firm that he had utilized in the past. The unit owners protested and asked instead that he pay to have the documents reviewed by a firm of their choosing. The Respondent did not have the financial records and statements reviewed by an independent accounting firm. He offered to have them reviewed by the firm he had utilized in the past, but the unit owners declined that offer. In the prospectus that the Respondent offered to potential unit purchasers, an estimated monthly operating budget and an estimated annual operating budget for the condominium, and an estimated monthly operating budget and an estimated annual operating budget per unit were set out. No other proposed budget was issued for 1981, nor does it appear that one was required, since the first persons who purchased units did not do so until December, 1980. No proposed annual budget of common expenses was prepared for the 1982 calendar year. Instead, the Respondent merely utilized the estimated budgets that had been set out in the prospectus. These were never, however, presented as a proposed annual budget for 1982. The Respondent did not provide as a part of its budgets for 1981 or 1982 for reserve accounts for capital expenditures and deferred maintenance. Accounts were not established to reserve funds for roof replacement, building painting, pavement resurfacing, and the like. The estimated replacement costs of such items were not a part of any budget prepared by Respondent. The funds were neither established nor funded by the Respondent. Mr. Weintraub testified that the reason the accounts were not established is that he had difficulty collecting assessments from unit owners. It does not appear, however, that the Respondent made any effort to collect assessments from unit owners, nor that the accounts were established with such funds as could have been collected.
Findings Of Fact The Division is the administrative agency of this state empowered to ensure that condominium associations comply with the Condominium Act. The Association is the condominium association which manages and operates 12 separate condominiums known as the Pines of Delray, located in Delary Beach, Florida. This case involves a structure placed on the common elements of three of those condominiums: The Pines of Delray condominiums 5, 6, and 11. Condominium 5 has 64 units, 6 has 72 units, and 11 has 96 units. Initially, the 12 condominiums received television under a "Central Television Antenna System Lease" with the Pines of Delray CAT, an agent of the condominium developer. On November 1, 1979, the unit owners of 8 of the 12 condominiums, including condominiums 5, 6 and 11--by vote equal to or in excess of 75 percent of the unit owners in each of the 8 condominiums--voted to cancel or terminate the television system lease pursuant to Section 718.302, Florida Statutes. The leased television equipment was eventually removed by the owner. On February 1, 1982, the Association entered into a written agreement with A-I Quality TV, Inc. d/b/a Denntronics Cable to provide television service for the 12 condominiums. The agreement was authorized by the Association's board of directors; the unit owners were not given an opportunity to vote on the agreement. An addendum to the agreement was entered in December, 1982. The addendum authorized Denntronics to install a satellite receiving station or dish at an unspecified location on the property of the 12 condominiums. The addendum was authorized by the Association's board of directors, but again, a vote of the unit owners was not taken. The Board subsequently selected the site for the receiving dish, centrally locating it on common elements of condominiums 5, 6, and 11, between building no. 65 in condominium 6, no. 25 in condominium 5, and nos. 66 and 110 in condominium 11. On December 24, 1982, Denntronics, with the Board's authorization, entered the premises of the condominiums and cut down four full-grown pine trees on the site to allow construction of a concrete foundation or pad and erection of the satellite dish. The parties stipulate that this cutting of the trees was an alteration of the common elements and that it was not approved by the owners of 75 percent of the condominium units in the affected area. The pertinent declarations of condominiums provide a specific procedure for obtaining approval before altering or improving common elements of the condominium. Article 5.1(b) of each declaration states: 5 MAINTENANCE, ALTERATION AND IMPROVEMENT Responsibility for the maintenance of the condominium property and restrictions upon the alteration and improvement thereof shall be as follows: .1 Common Elements. (b) Alteration and Improvement. After the completion of the improvements included in the common elements which are contemplated in this Declaration, there shall be no alteration nor further improvement of common elements without prior approval, in writing, by record owners of 75 per cent of all apartments. The cost of such alteration or improve ment shall be a common expense and so assessed. After removing the trees, Denntronics poured the concrete pad and attached it to the realty. The pad measures 10 feet by 10 feet, has a depth of 18 inches, and is reinforced with no. 5 grade steel bars. The construction of this pad, as with the tree removal, was not approved or voted on by the condominium owners. Denntronics then anchored the satellite receiving dish to the concrete pad. The dish is approximately 16 feet in diameter, extending 20 to 25 feet in the air. It remains the property of Denntronics since it was only leased to the Association. It is not a fixture since it may be detached and removed from the concrete pad. The cutting of the trees, the construction of the concrete pad, and the erection of the satellite dish altered the common elements. The condition of the real property was changed and the satellite dish affected nearby residents' view and enjoyment of the park-like green space in which it was placed. The replacement of the trees with the concrete pad and satellite dish affected the appearance of the surrounding area. A park-like environment of grass and pine trees surrounds the condominiums; it was this feature which persuaded some residents to originally purchase condominiums at Pines of Delray. Both the name of the condominium and its accompanying description on the condominium documents, "A Condominium in the Woods" emphasize this aesthetic feature of the condominium. As shown by the photographs in evidence, the reinforced concrete pad with satellite dish is an intruding presence in a park- like, pristine area. It is an incongruous, even imposing structure, 1/ and, in the setting in which it was placed, is aesthetically displeasing. 2/ It has adversely affected some residents' enjoyment of the grassy green space and has disturbed the scenic view which they enjoyed from their windows. Some residents now keep their window shades closed or no longer use the park-like surroundings. One resident was so upset by the sudden placement of the structure that she sold her condominium and moved away. Another nearby resident who purchased his unit, in large part, because of its proximity to the park-like green space, would not have purchased it if the pad and satellite dish had been there. Denntronics has a franchise application pending before the City of Delray Beach. If it is granted a franchise, Denntronics will remove the pad and satellite dish, and replace it with underground cable. If Denntronics is not granted a franchise, it intends to maintain and operate the satellite dish at least until June 30, 1987, when the agreement with the Association expires and is up for renewal. If the satellite dish is removed now, however, the Pines of Delray Condominium will not necessarily be without cable television service. Leadership Cable, the only cable T.V. company franchised by the City of Delray Beach, is willing and able to provide cable T.V. reception to the pines of Delray Condominiums.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums find the Association guilty of violating Section 718.113(2) and order it to cease and desist from further violations. Further, the order should require the Association to remove the concrete pad and satellite receiving dish within 10 days and restore the affected area, as nearly as possible, to its prior condition. Restoration should include the placing and maintenance of grass sod and at least four healthy trees, aesthetically pleasing and not less than 12 feet in height. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of June, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. Caleen, Jr. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 1984.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner herein is the State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes. One Respondent in this matter is Tanwin Corporation (hereinafter "Tanwin") the developer of two residential condominiums known as Vista Del Lago Condominium I and Vista Del Lago Condominium II, located in West Palm Beach, Florida. The other Respondent is Vista Del Lago Condominium Association, Inc. (hereinafter "Association"), the condominium association for Vista Del Lago Condominiums I and II. Transition from developer control of the Association has not occurred, and at all times pertinent hereto, Respondent Tanwin has in fact controlled the operation of the Respondent Association. The Declaration of Condominium for Vista Del Lago Condominium I (hereinafter "Condo I") was recorded in the public records on December 12, 1980. The Declaration of Condominium for Vista Del Lago Condominium II (hereinafter "Condo II") was recorded in the public records on March 11, 1982. Condo I contains 16 units; and Condo II contains 18 units. Herbert and Judith Tannenbaum are the President and Secretary, respectively, of both Tanwin and the Association and are members of the Association's Board of Directors. The developer-controlled Association failed to provide a proposed budget of common expenses for Condo I for the fiscal year 1982. The developer-controlled Association failed to provide a proposed budget of common expenses for Condo I and Condo II for 1983 until the unit owner meeting in March or April of 1983. The budget provided at that time contained no provision for reserves. Although the document alleged to be the 1983 proposed budget admitted in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 17 does contain an allocation for reserves, Petitioner's Exhibits numbered 17 is not the 1983 budget disseminated to unit owners at the annual meeting in 1983. In addition, the 1983 budget was received by the unit owners at the meeting at which the proposed budget was to be considered and not prior to the budget meeting. Statutory reserves were not waived during the period December, 1980 through December, 1983. The "start-up" budgets contained as exhibits to the Declarations of Condominium indicate that reserves were to be collected from unit owners at the rate of $15 per month per unit at least during the first year commencing December of 1980 with the first closing. Hence, reserves were not waived December, 1980 through December, 1981. From November, 1981 through December, 1983, no vote to waive reserves was taken by the unit owners. Although reserves were discussed at the 1983 meeting, no vote was taken during the period in question including 1983, to waive reserves. The developer as owner of unsold units; has failed to pay to the Association monthly maintenance for common expenses during the period December, 1980 through December, 1983. The developer Tanwin has, in the nature of an affirmative defense, alleged the existence of a guarantee of common expenses pursuant to Section 718.116(8), Florida Statutes, which purportedly ran from the inception of the condominiums to date. Accordingly, the initial issue for resolution is whether the developer pursuant to statute guaranteed common expenses. Section 718.116(8)(b) provides that a developer may be excused from payment of common expenses pertaining to developer-owned units for that period of time during which he has guaranteed to each purchaser in the declaration of condominium, purchase contract or prospectus, or by an agreement between the developer and a majority of unit owners other than the developer, that their assessments for common expenses would not increase over a stated dollar amount during the guarantee period and the developer agrees to pay any amount necessary for common expenses not produced by the assessments at the guaranteed level receivable from other unit owners, or "shortfall". Actual purchase agreements were admitted in evidence. Respondents seek to label certain unambiguous language in the purchase contracts as a guarantee. This language, uniform throughout all those contracts as well as the form purchase contract filed with Petitioner except that of Phillip May, provides as follows: 9. UNIT ASSESSMENTS. The Budget included in the Offering Circular sets forth Seller's best estimation of the contemplated expenses for operating and maintaining the Condominium during its initial year. Purchaser's monthly assessment under the aforementioned Budget is in the amount of $109.00. Until Closing of Title, Seller has the right (without affecting Purchaser's obligation to purchase in accordance with the provisions hereof, to modify the estimated Budget and assessments periodically if then current cost figures indicate that an updating of estimates is appropriate). [Emphasis added]. That portion of the purchase agreement set forth above does not constitute a guarantee. Instead, the purchase agreement simply includes a best estimation of expenses for the initial year. It does not govern assessments after the expiration of one year, and even as to the initial year, the language in the contract sets forth only a "best estimation" and not a guarantee that the assessments would not increase during the "guarantee period." Phillip May's purchase agreement reflects that he purchased his unit in August of 1983; after condominium complaints had been filed by the unit owners with the Florida Division of Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes. His purchase agreement has been altered from the purchase agreement of earlier purchasers in that his purchase agreement expressly, by footnote contains a one- year guarantee running from closing. The guarantee contained in his purchase agreement was presented by the developer without any request from Mr. May for the inclusion of a guarantee in his purchase agreement. The guarantee language in this purchase agreement is useful for the purpose of comparing the language with those portions of the pre-complaint contracts which Respondents assert contain or constitute a guarantee. Similarly it is determined that no guarantee of common expenses exists in the Declarations of Condominium for Condo I and II or in the prospectus for Condo II. While Respondents seek to assert the existence of a guarantee in those documents, the portions of those unambiguous documents which according to Respondents contain a guarantee, have no relation to a guarantee or do not guarantee that the assessments for common expenses would not increase. Respondent Tanwin also seeks to prove the existence of an oral guarantee which was allegedly communicated to purchasers at the closing of their particular condominium units. However, purchasers were told by Herbert or Judith Tannenbaum only that assessments should remain in the amount of $109 per month per unit unless there existed insufficient funds in the Association to pay bills. This is the antithesis of a guarantee. During a guarantee period the developer in exchange for an exemption from payment of assessments on developer- owned units agrees to pay any deficits incurred by the condominium association. Accordingly, no guarantee was conveyed at the closing of condominium units. Further Respondent Tanwin's additional contention that an oral guarantee arose when the condominiums came into existence is plainly contradicted by the express language throughout the condominium documents and purchase agreements that there exist no oral representations and that no reliance can be placed on any oral representations outside the written agreements. Further, prior to December, 1983, no reference was ever made by the developer either inside or outside of unit owner meetings as to the existence of the alleged guarantee. Moreover, a comparison between on the one hand, the 1981 and 1982 financial statements prepared in March of 1983, and on the other hand, the 1983 financial statements, clearly reveals that even the accountant for Tanwin was unaware of the existence of a guarantee during the period in question. While the 1983 statements, prepared in 1984 after unit owners filed complaints with Petitioner contain references to a developer guarantee, the 1981 and 1982 statements fail to mention a guarantee. Instead, included in the 1981 and 1982 statements of the Association are references under the current liabilities portion of the balance sheets for those years, to a "Due to Tanwin Corporation" liability in the amounts of $2,138 for 1981 and $2,006 for 1982. Petitioner through Ronald DiCrescenzo, the C.P.A. for Tanwin, established that at a minimum, the $2,006 figure reflected in the 1982 balance sheet was in fact reimbursed to Tanwin. Section 7D-18.05(1),(c), Florida Administrative Code, entitled "Budgets" and effective on July 22, 1980, was officially recognized prior to the final hearing in this cause. That section requires each condominium filing to include an estimated operating budget which contains "[a] statement of any guarantee of assessments or other election and obligation of the developer pursuant to Section 718.116(8); Florida Statutes." The estimated operating budgets for Condo I and Condo II do not include a statement of any guarantee of assessments or other election or obligation of the developer. The testimony of Herbert Tannenbaum with regard to an oral (or written) guarantee is not credible. He first testified that an oral guarantee was communicated to purchasers at the closing of each unit. In contrast, Tannenbaum also testified that the first discussion he had regarding a guarantee occurred with his attorney after the filing of the Notice to Show Cause in this action. Tannenbaum further testified that he did not understand what a guarantee was until after this case had begun and was unaware of the existence of any guarantee prior to consulting with his attorney in regard to this case. Moreover, Ronald DiCrescenzo, the C.P.A. for Tanwin testified that it was Tannenbaum who informed DiCrescenzo of the existence of a guarantee but DiCrescenzo was unable or unwilling to specify the date on which this communication occurred. Respondent Tanwin also seeks to establish the existence of a guarantee through Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5 which is a document signed by less than the majority of unit owners even including Tannenbaum and his son, and signed on an unknown date during 1984. The document provides: The undersigned Unit Owners at the Vista Del Lago Condominium do not wish to give up the benefits of the developer's continuing guarantee which has been in effect since the inception of the condominium and agreed to by a majority of unit owners and whereby the developer has continuously guaranteed a maintenance level of no more than $109.00 per month per unit, until control of the condominium affairs is turned over to the unit owners in accordance with Florida's Condominium law. According to Respondent Tanwin, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5 constitutes a memorandum signed by unit owners evidencing their belief that a continuous guarantee of the developer has been in effect. First, however, this document was never admitted into evidence for that purpose; rather the document was admitted only to establish the fact that a unit owner had signed the document. Second, this document, unlike the purchase agreements or other condominium documents is ambiguous and is not probative of the existence of a guarantee. Instead, the evidence is overwhelming that the document was prepared by the developer in the course of this litigation for use in this litigation. Moreover, unit owner testimony is clear regarding what Mr. and Mrs. Tannenbaum disclosed to unit owners as the purpose for the document when soliciting their signatures, to- wit: that the document was a petition evidencing the unit owners' desire that their monthly maintenance payments not be increased and that prior confusion as to whether reserves had been waived needed resolution. Respondent Tanwin did pay assessments on some developer-owned units during the period December, 1980 through December, 1983, a fact which is inconsistent with its position that a guarantee existed. Noteworthy is the statement by Ronald DiCrescenzo, the C.P.A. for Tanwin, in his August 16, 1983, letter to Herbert Tannenbaum wherein it is stated: "It is my understanding that you are doing the following: . . .[Playing maintenance assessments on units completed but not sold." It is inconceivable that a developer during a "guarantee period" would pay assessments on some developer units as the purpose of the statutory guarantee is to exempt the developer from such assessments. The assessments for common expenses of unit owners other than the developer have increased during the purported guarantee period. At least some, if not all, unit owners paid monthly assessments of $128 - $130 for at least half of 1984. This fact is probative of the issue of whether a guarantee existed because unit owner assessments must remain constant during a guarantee period. At the Spring 1984 meeting chaired by Mr. Tannenbaum a vote was taken for the first time as to whether reserves should be waived. Although only 21 owners were present in person or by proxy; the vote was tabulated as 12 in favor and 12 opposed. Mr. Tannenbaum, therefore, announced an increase in monthly maintenance payments to fund reserves. Thereafter owners began paying an increased assessment. The fact that the developer-controlled Association collected increased assessments from unit owners during 1984, and had up to the time of the final hearing in this cause made no effort to redistribute those funds suggests that the developer-controlled Association and the developer considered themselves to be under no obligation to keep maintenance assessments at a constant level. There was no guarantee of assessments for common expenses by Tanwin from December, 1980, through at least December, 1983. Since there was no guarantee during the time period in question, Respondent Tanwin is liable to the Respondent Association for the amount of monthly assessments for common expenses on all developer-owned units for which monthly assessments have not been paid. In conjunction with the determination that Tanwin owes money to the Association (and not vice versa), Respondent Tanwin attempted to obtain an offset by claiming the benefit of a management contract between either Tannenbaum or Tanwin and the Association. No such management contract exists, either written or oral. Although a management contract is mentioned in one of the condominium documents there is no indication that one ever came into being, and no written contract was even offered in evidence. Likewise, no evidence was offered to show the terms of any oral contract; rather, Tannenbaum admitted that he may never have told any of the unit owners that there was a management contract. Tannenbaum's testimony is consistent with the fact that no budget or financial statement reflects any expense to the Association for a management contract with anyone. Likewise, the "budget" contained within Condo II's documents recorded on March 11, 1982, specifically states that any management fee expense was not applicable. Lastly, Tannenbaum's testimony regarding the existence of a management contract is contrary to the statement signed by him on February 10, 1981, which specifically advised Petitioner that the Association did not employ professional management. To the extent that Respondent Tanwin attempted to establish some quantum meruit basis for its claim of an offset, it is specifically found that no basis for any payment has been proven for the following reasons: Tannenbaum had no prior experience in managing a condominium, which is buttressed by the number of violations of the condominium laws determined herein; Tannenbaum does not know what condominium managers earn; no delineation was made as to specific duties performed by Tannenbaum on behalf of the Association as opposed to those duties performed by Tannenbaum on behalf of Respondent Tanwin; since there was no testimony as to duties performed for the Association, there was necessarily no testimony as to what duties were performed on behalf of the Association in Tannenbaum's capacity as President of the Association and member of the Association's Board of Directors as opposed to duties allegedly performed as a "manager." Tannenbaum's testimony as to the value of his "services" ranged from $10,000 to $15,000 a year to a lump sum of $60,000; it is interesting to note that the value of his services alone some years exceeded the Association's annual budget. Respondent Tanwin has failed to prove entitlement to an offset amount, either pursuant to contract or based upon quantum meruit. The financial statements of the Association--including balance sheets, statements of position, and statements of receipts and expenditures--for 1980-81 and for 1982 reveal consolidation of the records for Condo I and Condo II in these statements. Additionally, DiCrescenzo admitted that separate accounting records were not maintained for each condominium and Herbert Tannenbaum also admitted to maintaining consolidated records. Accordingly, the developer- controlled Association failed to maintain separate accounting records for each condominium it manages. The By-Laws of the Association provide: SECTION. 7. Annual Audit. An audit of the accounts of the Corporation shall be made annually by a Certified Public Accountant - and a copy of the Report shall be furnished to each member not later than April 1st of the year following the year in which the Report was made. The financial statement for 1981 bears the completion date of February 9, 1983. The 1982 financial statement contains a completion date of March 1, 1983. Both the 1981 and the 1982 statements were delivered to the unit owners in March or April, 1983. Accordingly, Respondents failed to provide the 1981 financial report of actual receipts and expenditures in compliance with the Association's By-Laws. As set forth hereinabove, statutory reserves were not waived during the period of December, 1980 through December, 1983. Being a common expense, reserves must be fully funded unless waived annually. In the instant case, Respondents, rather than arguing that reserves had in fact been fully funded, sought to prove that reserves had been waived during the years in question. The fact that reserves were not fully funded is established by reviewing the financial statements. In accordance with the start-up budgets, reserves were initially established at the level of $15.00 per unit per month. Therefore, during 1981, for Condo I containing sixteen units, the Association's reserve account should contain 16 multiplied by $15.00 per month multiplied by 12 months, or $2,880. Since the Declaration of Condominium for Condo II was not recorded until March 11, 1982, assessments for common expenses including allocations to reserves, were not collected from Condo II during 1981. Therefore, the balance in the reserve account as reflected in the balance sheet for the year 1981 should be no less than $2,880. The actual balance reflected in this account is $2,445. Both Tannenbaum and DiCrescenzo testified that most of the balance in that account was composed of purchaser contributions from the closing of each condominium unit "equivalent to 2 months maintenance to be placed in a special reserve fund" as called for in the purchase contracts. Tannenbaum further admitted that instead of collecting $15.00 per month per unit for reserves, the money that would have gone into the reserve account was used "to run the condominium." Similarly, for the year ending 1982, the balance in the reserve account also reflects that reserves were not being funded. First, the amount of reserves which should have been set aside in 1981 of $2,880 is added to the total amount of reserves which should have been collected for 1982 for Condo I ($2880), giving a total figure of $5,760. To this figure should be added the reserves which should have been collected from units in Condo II during 1982. This figure is derived by multiplying the total number of units in Condo II, 18 units, by $15.00 per unit multiplied by 8 months (since Condo II was recorded in March of 1982) to yield a figure for Condo II of $2,160. Adding total reserve assessments for Condo I and II, $2,160 plus $5,760 equals $7,920 the correct reserve balance at the close of 1982. The actual balance for the period ended December 31, 1982, is reflected to be $4,138. Similarly, the amount of reserves required for Condos I and II as of December 31, 1983, can be calculated using the same formula. Although the 1983 financial statement prepared in 1984 reflects the existence of a funded reserve account, both DiCrescenzo and Tannenbaum admitted there was no separate reserves account set up during the time period involved herein. Statutory reserves were not waived and were not fully funded for the period of December, 1980 through December, 1983. All parties hereto presented much evidence, unsupported by the books and records of the corporations, for the determination herein of the amounts of money owed by Respondent Tanwin to the Association to bring current the total amount which Tanwin should have been paying to the Association from the inception of each condominium for monthly maintenance on condominium units not yet sold by the developer, together with the amount owed by Tanwin to the Association so that a separate reserve account can be established and fully funded for all years in which the majority of unit owners including the developer have not waived reserves. No findings of fact determining the exact amount Tanwin owes to the Association will be made for several reasons: first, the determination of that amount requires an accounting between the two Respondents herein which is a matter that can only be litigated, if litigation is necessary, in the circuit courts of this state; second, the determination of the amount due between the private parties hereto is not necessary for the determination by Petitioner of the statutory violations charged in the Amended Notice to Show Cause; and third, where books and records exist; one witness on each side testifying as to conclusions reached from review of those records, even though the witnesses be expert, does not present either the quantity or the quality of evidence necessary to trace the income and outgo of specific moneys through different corporate accounts over a period of time, especially where each expert opinion is based upon questionable assumptions. It is, however, clear from the record in this cause that Respondent Tanwin owes money to the Respondent Association and further owes to the Respondent Association an accounting of all moneys on a specific item by item basis.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Finding Respondent Tanwin Corporation guilty of the allegations contained in Counts 1-7 of the Amended Notice to Show Cause; Dismissing with prejudice Count 8 of the Amended Notice to Show Cause; Assessing against Respondent Tanwin Corporation a civil penalty in the amount of $17,000 to be paid by certified check made payable to the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes within 45 days from entry of the Final Order herein; Ordering Respondents to forthwith comply with all provisions of the Condominium Act and the rules promulgated thereunder; And requiring Tanwin Corporation to provide and pay for an accounting by an independent certified public accountant of all funds owed by the developer as its share of common expenses on unsold units and the amount for which Tanwin is liable in order that the reserve account be fully funded, with a copy of that accounting to be filed with Petitioner within 90 days of the date of the Final Order. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 9th day of August, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Karl M. Scheuerman, Esquire Thomas A. Bell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joseph S. Paglino, Esquire 88 Northeast 79th Street Miami, Florida 33138 E. James Kearney, Director Department of Business Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard B. Burroughs, Jr., Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL CONSENT ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES, Petitioner, CASE NO. 84-0437 DOCKET NO. 84001MVC TANWIN CORPORATION and VISTA DEL LAGO CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. Respondents. / FINAL CONSENT ORDER The Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, (hereinafter the Division), Vista Del Lago Condominium Inc., (hereinafter the Association), and Tanwin Corporation, (hereinafter Tanwin), hereby stipulate and agree to the terms and issuance of this Final Consent Order as follows: WHEREAS, the Division issued a Notice to Show Cause directed to Respondents and, WHEREAS, after issuance of the Recommended Order in this cause, the parties amicably conferred for the purpose of achieving a settlement of the case, and WHEREAS, Tanwin is desirous of resolving the matters alleged in the Notice to Show Cause without engaging in further administrative proceedings or judicial review thereof, NOW, THEREFORE, it is stipulated and agreed as follows:
Findings Of Fact The parties to this proceeding have stipulated to the correctness of the following facts: Respondent filed a Consent and Joinder simultaneously with the Declaration of Tuscany Place, a condominium, which was recorded in Official Records Dock 1281, Page 1833, Public Records of Seminole County, Florida, and was filed with the Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums under I.D. #80 CN5742. Respondent accepted deeds in lieu of foreclosure from the Developer, Goehring Development Corp., under paragraph number 16.5 of the Declaration of Condominiums which deeds were dated May 10 and May 12, 1982, and recorded in Official Records Book of Seminole County, Florida. (Copies of the deeds are attached [to the Stipulation as to Facts] and are self-explanatory.) Respondent sold Unit 16-E to Huey M. Napier. All remaining units were sold to Larry J. Whittle on January 31, 1983. Copies of contracts for the two purchases are attached [to the Stipulation as to Facts]. The term "developer" was defined in paragraph 21.7 of the Condominium Declaration and was approved for filing by the Division including the provision that any successor or alternate developer must indicate its consent to be treated as the developer. Respondent attempted to comply with oral and written communications from the Division as to the regulation relating to "Subsequent Developer," as Respondent could not locate Statutes or Division Rules requiring Subsequent Developer filing. Copies of letters from the Division are attached [to the Stipulation as to Facts]. Respondent admits the sales described above, but denies any liability under Statutes or Rules as a matter of Law. The above-numbered paragraphs constitute the facts stipulated between the parties. Attached to the parties' stipulation are a series of documents. These documents establish that the aforementioned sale from Respondent to Huey M. Napier occurred on or about October 22, 1982. This sale involved a single condominium unit. The remaining ten units obtained by Respondent from the original developer by virtue of a deed in lieu of foreclosure were sold on or about January 4, 1983. On or about November 29, 1982, representatives of Petitioner warned Respondent's counsel that failure to file as a second developer with Petitioner in accordance with Section 718.502, Florida Statutes, would place Respondent in violation of that law. Respondent subsequently filed with Petitioner in accordance with the requirements of Section 718.502, Florida Statutes, on or about January 14, 1983.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following Findings of Fact: The Respondent, Ocean Dunes Development Corporation, is the developer of a residential condominium known as Ocean Dunes, located in Highland Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida. Count One The first closing on a unit in Ocean Dunes occurred on April 30, 1982. The Respondent controlled the operation of the condominium association from the incorporation of the association up to February 4, 1986, when unit owners other than the developer elected a majority of the members of the board of administration of the condominium association. Pursuant to the Articles of Incorporation of the condominium association, the board of directors is composed of three members. According to the by-laws of the association, unit owners other than the developer are entitled to elect at least one-third of the members of the board when they own fifteen per cent of the units in the condominium. The by-laws further provide that within sixty days after unit owners other than the developer are entitled to elect a member of the board, the association shall call and give not less than thirty days notice of a meeting of the unit owners for this purpose. on July 15, 1982, unit owners other than the developer owned fifteen per cent of the total number of units in the condominium. The first association unit owner meeting after July 15, 1982, occurred in April of 1983. Present at the meeting were several unit owners and Mr. Philip Connor, president of both the association and the developer corporation. According to the association by-laws, a quorum is achieved by a majority of the votes of the entire membership. In April of 1983 there were 48 units in the condominium, 17 units were owned by someone other than the developer. Therefore, the developer's unit votes were absolutely necessary to achieve a quorum. At the beginning of the meeting, Mr. Connor, the president of the developer corporation, stated that he was not authorized to utilize the developer's unit votes through proxy or otherwise. Mr. Connor stated: First item, obviously is to determine whether we have a quorum in order to properly conduct business. I am not voting on behalf of the developing company this evening. Mr. Hubert (the general counsel of the developer) as far as I know we do not have a quorum. Therefore, the meeting is officially adjourned. But, Mr. Connor went on to add: However, I would like to spend some time with you this evening to go over and formulate any questions or problems, et cetra. Unit owners other than the developer did not elect a member of the board of administration of the association until April 17, 1984. Count Two While operating the condominium association, the Respondent used condominium association common funds to pay for certain carpentry expenses in the amount of $1,836. The carpentry expenses were the responsibility of the Respondent as developer. During the initial phases of the investigation of this case by the Department of Business Regulation, the Respondent agreed that the carpentry expenses were the developer's responsibility and reimbursed $1,836 to the association on August 29, 1984. Count Three An "election period" is a mechanism by which the developer, as the owner of units, is excused from the payments of assessments against those units for a certain period of time. See Section 718.116(8)(a)(1), Florida Statutes. During an election period, the developer does not pay assessments on developer-owned units, but instead pays the difference between the common expenses of the association and monies received from other unit owners in the form of assessments during that period of time. In other words, if assessments collected from other unit owners are insufficient to meet common expenses, the developer is required to pay the deficiency. The election period must terminate no later than the first day of the fourth calendar month following the month in which the first closing of a unit in a condominium occurs. See Section 718.116(8)(a)(1), Florida Statutes. The first closing on the first unit in Ocean Dunes Condominium occurred on April 30, 1982. During the election period, the developer periodically funded the association and made available to it funds to pay required bills on a current, "as-due" basis. Thus, the Respondent attempted to satisfy its election period payment requirements on a cash accounting basis. The developer did not perform an election period calculation on the condominium's books and records to determine the difference between expenses incurred during the election period and assessments collected form other unit owners. Mr. Larsen, a certified public accountant and the Petitioner's expert witness, reviewed the condominium's financial records and calculated an election period deficit of $45,077.88. Mr. Larsen arrived at the figure of $45,077.88 by calculating that assessment revenues from non-developer unit owners amounted to $5,393.92 and that common expenses during the period amounted to $50,471.40, the difference being $45,077.88. The $45,077.88 figure arrived at by Larsen was composed in part of unfunded reserves during the election period, certain association bills which were left unpaid during the election period but had balances which came due later and certain prepaid assessments from other unit owners paid in advance, but which would have come due after the expiration of the election period. In arriving at the election period deficit of $45,077.88, Larsen completed a review or compilation of the financial records of the association using generally accepted principles of accounting for a review or compilation of financial statements. Count Four Unit owners other than the developer remitted their assessments on a quarterly basis. In contrast, the Respondent developer provided some funds to the association on a monthly, "as-needed" basis. Typically, when the association funds became inadequate to pay outstanding bills, the developer would contribute its assessments. At the end of each calendar year, the developer calculated an outstanding assessment liability on its inventory units and recognized that liability on the association's books. The Declaration of Condominium at Article 6.2, provided that assessments not paid on a timely basis would bear interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date when due until paid. Although unit owners were paying their assessments on a quarterly basis, neither the Declaration of Condominium nor the by-laws established a date when assessments were due. Count Five The percentage of ownership interest of each individual unit owner in the common elements of Ocean Dunes Condominium is set forth in Exhibit B to the Declaration of Condominium. The percentage of common elements per unit ranged from a minimum of .01959 to a maximum of .02170. The quarterly assessments to unit owners were not based on the percentages of their ownership of the common elements as outlined in the recorded Declaration. Prior to the formal hearing, the Respondent acknowledged that the proper percentages were not being assessed, and adjustments were made for all unit owners' assessments. Count Six A condominium association's annual budget must include a reserve account (unless specifically waived by the association) for capital expenditures and deferred maintenance. The reserve account of the association is set aside for long term items such as roof replacement, building painting and pavement resurfacing. See Section 718.112(2)(f), Florida Statutes. Ocean Dunes Condominium Association established a budgeted annual reserve figure of $6,000 per year (reserves were not waived). On December 31, 1984, the reserve account, if fully funded, would have contained $16,569.86. While in control of the condominium association, the Respondent did not maintain a separate, funded reserve account. Rather, the Respondent showed the reserve account as a liability in its accounting statements. The listing of a reserve account as a liability on a financial statement would not violate, nor be contrary to, generally accepted principles of accounting. The Respondent believed in good faith that it was allowed to carry reserves as liability in the association's financial books. Count Seven The Respondent employed the accounting firm of Coopers and Lybrand to handle the financial books and records of the condominium association. Coopers and Lybrand has offices in both Broward and Palm Beach Counties. Although the Respondent maintained the corporate books and records of the association at the Royal Palm Beach Bank in Palm Beach County, portions of the accounting records were routinely transferred between Coopers and Lybrand's offices in Palm Beach and Broward Counties. Count Eight On February 4, 1986, unit owners other than the developer assumed control of the condominium association. After turnover, the Respondent provided the association with the annual audits performed by the accounting firm of Coopers and Lybrand. The annual audits did not cover the election period and the period early in 1986 which the audit for the year 1985 did not cover. After turnover of counsel of the association, the annual audits were the only review of the association's financial records provided to the association by the developer. After turnover, the association at all times made the corporate books and records available to the developer. Upon turnover, the Respondent offered to the association 9 pages of separate plans and specifications utilized in the construction of the condominium. Although the plans contained the certificate of a surveyor, only one of the nine plans contained a signed affidavit that the plans were authentic.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is. RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Requiring the Respondent pay to the association $45,077.88 (representing the deficit which existed during the developer election period) no later than 45 days from the date of the Final Order; Requiring that Respondent obtain, and provide to the association, no later than 60 days from the date of the Final Order, a turnover review of the financial records of the association prepared in strict compliance with Section 718.301(4)(c), Florida Statutes, and Rule 7D-23.03, Florida Administrative Code; Requiring that Respondent obtain and deliver to the association no later than 60 days from the date of the Final order, a copy of the construction plans of the condominium with a certificate in affidavit form prepared in strict compliance with Section 318.301(4)(f), Florida Statutes; and Assessing a civil penalty of $5,000. DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of December, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Karl M. Scheuerman, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Philip R. Connor, Jr., President Ocean Dunes Development Corporation Suite 205 2929 East Commercial Boulevard Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33308 James Kearney, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Thomas A. Bell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Richard Coats, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner: Addressed in Procedural Background section. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5 and 9. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6, 7 and 8. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10 and 11. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 15. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. Rejected as misleading as stated, but adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 18. Rejected as misleading as stated, but adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 19, 20 and 21. The last sentence of Paragraph 19 is rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 22. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 23. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 25. Matters note contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 25 and 26. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 29. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 32. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Matters not contained therein are rejected as argument and/or subordinate. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 33. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 35. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent: Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 Matters not contained therein are rejected as Subordinate and/or a recitation of testimony. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence of this paragraph is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. The remainder of the paragraph is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18. Matters contained in Paragraph 3 which are inconsistent with the Findings of Fact previously mentioned are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence and/or subordinate. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 19, 20 and 21. Matters not contained therein are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence and/or subordinate. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 22 and 23. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 24, 25, 26 and 27. Matters not contained therein are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 29. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence and/or a recitation of testimony.
Findings Of Fact The Declaration of Condominium for Oaks of Broward was filed by Margen, a Florida Partnership, in May, 1974 in the Public Records of Broward County and with the Petitioner. All documents required to be filed by Margen with Petitioner were filed and the fees paid. Simultaneously a recreational lease was filed of property adjacent to the condominium in which Barnett Bank of Hollywood was named as Trustee and Lessor, and The Oaks Condominium Association, Inc. of Broward as Lessee. Between May 1974 and early 1976 Margen sold to individuals 39 condominium units at Oaks of Broward. In early 1976, Housing Investment Corporation, mortgagee, began foreclosure proceedings which resulted in title to all of the Oaks condominium property, except for the 39 units previously sold, being taken by The Oaks of Broward, Inc., Respondent. Thereby Respondent became successor in title to the previously unsold 75 units in the building and to the position of the Lessor on the long-term recreational lease. On or about August 1977, Respondent offered for sale the 75 condominium units pursuant to prospectus admitted into evidence as Exhibit 2. In addition thereto and as part of the sales effort Respondent executed and recorded the Declaration Waiving Rents, a copy of which was admitted into evidence as Exhibit Neither of these documents was filed with Petitioner. The 75 units owned by Respondent were sold with the recreational lease rents waived. Pursuant to the terms of the recreational lease the original 39 buyers pay $20 per month, either to the Association or directly to the Lessor. This lease is a net/net lease, which means the Lessor performs no services except to provide the premises themselves. The Condominium Association is responsible for and pays all maintenance, taxes, upkeep and expenses for the operation of the Recreation Area. All condominium units, the original 39 as well as the remaining 75, pay to the Association, as part of the common expenses, their pro rate share of those operating expenses. It is this disparate treatment of the two groups of unit owners with respect to the recreational lease rent payment of $20 per month that is one subject of Petitioner's request for a cease and desist order. The second subject of the Petition for a cease and desist order is Petitioner's contention that Respondent is a Developer and is required to file documents and pay a $10 filing fee for each of the 75 condominiums sold, regardless of whether fees for these 75 units were paid by Respondent's predecessor in title.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a Florida limited partnership which developed a 230-unit condominium in Orlando, Florida, by conversion of existing rental apartments. The condominium was registered with Petitioner, and Respondent received written notice of approval of the condominium documents in January, 1980. Respondent recorded the Declaration of Condominium in June, 1980, and closed the first sale of a condominium unit in September, 1980. The condominium documents prepared by Respondent and approved by Petitioner in January, 1980, included an estimated operating budget for the condominium Association for the year 1980. This budget proved sufficiently accurate that it was used for the years 1981 and 1982 without amendment or republication. This budget established a reserve for replacement of $1,500 per month. Paragraph 20 of the Declaration of Condominium provides: The Developer shall not be liable for the payment of ordinary common expenses on units which it owns. Unless and until the Developer elects to pay the regular assessments for common expenses charged against all other unit owners, the Developer guarantees that: (1) monthly assessments for common expenses shall not increase over the amounts set forth in Schedule B and (2) it will pay all actual ordinary common operating expenses in excess of the amounts collected from unit owners other than the Developer at the amount stated above. Pursuant to the developer's understanding of this provision, no payments were made by the developer for any unit which it owned, i.e., which remained unsold. However, as the units were sold, common expenses were charged to each new owner. No separate agreement was entered into between the developer and the unit owners regarding the former's contribution to the common expenses. Reserves for replacement are a necessary expense for the operation of improved real estate. Here, where the building was not newly constructed but converted from an existing apartment building, the remaining life of the building is shorter than would be the life of a new building, therefore a greater need exists for immediately commencing the funding for replacement than would exist with a new building. Respondent made no contribution to the reserve account for those units it owned before they were sold, but commenced charging the new owners for those expenses as soon as the units were purchased. In February, 1983, Respondent turned over control of the condominium Association to the unit purchasers. At this time there was $24,228.15 in the Association's bank account. Although the unit owners approved a proposed 1983 budget in June, 1982, no proposed budget was submitted to the unit owners in 1980 or 1981 for use in 1981 and 1982. The initial operating budget was used for 1981 and 1982, and this same budget was approved by the unit owners for use in 1983. Respondent failed to provide an annual accounting to each unit owner within 60 days of the end of fiscal years 1980 and 1981. No unit owner requested such an accounting until May of 1982, at which time Respondent' prepared an accounting for the operations of the condominium Association from its inception and delivered it to those two unit owners. Respondent fully accounted for all receipts and expenditures accruing to the Association from its inception until turned over to the unit owners in February, 1983. Petitioner did not audit the books and records of the Association until late in 1982 when the alleged discrepancies were noted.
