The Issue Whether petitioner's application for a mortgage broker's license should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact Application and Reasons for Denial Applicant is a 52-year-old former mortgage broker who resides in Dade County, Florida. He was first licensed as a mortgage broker in Florida in 1959. His license remained in effect until it expired in 1976. He reapplied for registration as a mortgage broker in December, 1976. In June, 1977, the Department denied his application despite Applicant's attempt to withdraw his application in January, 1977. (P-1, R-6, R-7.) On March 18, 1981, Applicant filed another application with the Department for a license to act as a mortgage broker. That application is the subject of this proceeding. The Department seeks to deny it on grounds that the Applicant is insolvent; that he had a final judgment entered against him in a civil action on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit; and that he lacks the requisite competence, honesty, truthfulness, and integrity to act as a mortgage broker in Florida. II. Insolvency Applicant is insolvent and deeply in debt. His insolvency arises out of his association with a company known as Guardian Mortgage and Investment Corporation ("Guardian Mortgage"), a mortgage brokerage firm operating in Dade County. He was secretary/treasurer and one of several mortgage brokers who worked for that company. Prior to its going out of business in 1976, it and its several brokers were accused of numerous financial misdealings. Between 1974 and 1980, over 31 civil lawsuits were filed against Applicant concerning financial transactions in which he was involved; most of the transactions occurred in connection with his employment at Guardian Mortgage. As a result of these lawsuits, and his failure to defend against them (on advice of counsel) , final judgments in excess of $500,000 have been entered against him and remain unpaid. Applicant has not attempted to pay off any of these judgments, although his codefendant, Archie Struhl, has made efforts to satisfy some of them. (Testimony of Lipsitt, Haber; R-4, R-5, R-6.) After Guardian Mortgage ceased operations, Applicant ran a hotel and orange grove operation in Central America. His wife was a preschool teacher. He has not earned any money beyond that necessary to meet his basic needs. (Testimony of Haber.) In the past, the Department has ordinarily refused to issue mortgage broker licenses to applicants who are insolvent. The reason for this policy is that the public "could be injured if a man [mortgage broker] did not have sufficient monies to back him up . . ." Tr. 144.) The only exception to this policy of denying applications on grounds of insolvency is when an applicant has shown that he is making an honest effort to satisfy and pay off the outstanding judgments. (Testimony of Ehrlich.) III. Civil Judgment of Fraud Entered Against Applicant In April, 1977, a civil action was filed by Murray Ritter against three codefendants: Applicant, Archie Struhl, and Guardian Mortgage. (Circuit Court of Dade County, Case No. 77-10849, Division II.) Count II of the complaint alleged that the defendants committed fraud by failing to invest $10,000 in a first mortgage and, instead, converted the money to their own use. On July 20, 1977, the circuit court, upon plaintiff's motion, entered a Final Summary Judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the three defendants. The judgment awarded plaintiff $10,000 in compensatory damages, $5,000 in punitive damages, and court costs of $63, for a total of $15,063. (R-5, R-6.) IV. Experience, Honesty, Truthfulness, Integrity, Competency, and Background of Applicant Applicant was a licensed mortgage broker for many years. The Department acknowledges that his experience in mortgage financing is adequate. (Testimony of Ehrlich.) Applicant denies that he ever engaged in wrongdoing as a mortgage broker, that he knew of improprieties occurring at Guardian Mortgage, or participated in a cover-up. He denies that he ever misrepresented facts or acted dishonestly as a mortgage broker. The evidence is insufficient to establish that Applicant lacks honesty, truthfulness, or integrity. (Testimony of Haber.) However, Applicant has not demonstrated that he has the requisite background and competence to engage in financial transactions involving mortgage financing. Civil judgments were entered (by the Circuit Court of Dade County) against Applicant in the following cases, each of which involved mortgage financing, unsecured loan transactions, or real estate investments negotiated by Applicant: Irvings S. Philipson, et al. v. Venus Development Corporation, et al., Case No. 74-1320. Dr. Seymour Z. Beiser, et al. v. Guardian Mortgage and Investment Corporation, et al., Case No. 76-24374. Dade Federal Savings and Loan Association of Miami v. Brenda Alexander, et al., Case No. 75-16230. City National Bank of Miami v. Guardian Mortgage and Investment Corporation, et al., Case No. 75-39444. Leon Earler, et al. v. Venus Development Corporation, et al., Case No. 76-22138. Jesus Suarez v. Leonard Gordon, et al., Case No. 76-26381. John J. Nussman, et al. v. Melvin J. Haber, et al., Case No. 76-30569 (12). County National Bank of North Miami Beach v. Sid Shane, et al., Case No. 77-27909 (14). Herman Mintzer, et al. v. Guardian Mortgage and Investment Corporation, Case No. 76-16842. Melvin Waldorf, et al. v. Guardian Mortgage and Investment Corporation, Case No. 76-16344. Florence Margen v. Guardian Mortgage and Investment Corporation, et al., Case No 76-39412. Biscayne Bank v. Guardian Mortgage and Investment Corporation, et el., Case No. 76-39857 (8). Harry Jolkower, et al. v. Archie Struhl, et al., Case No. 77-19172. Hilliard Avrutis v. Archie Struhl, et al., Case No. 32494. Julius Wladawsky, et al. v. Melvin J. Haber, et al., Case No. 76-22554 (14). Taken as a whole, these judgments support an inference that Applicant lacks the competence and background necessary to act as a responsible mortgage broker in Florida. 2/ (Testimony of Ehrlich; R-4, R-5.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the application for a mortgage broker's license be DENIED. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 15th day of January, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1982.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's plea of nolo contendere to the crime of petit theft was to a crime that involves moral turpitude, whereby the Commissioner may lawfully deny an applicant for a bail bondsman's license, pursuant to Section 648.34(2)(f), Florida Statutes. Whether Petitioner failed to divulge that he had been charged with a felony on two different occasions when he applied for examination as a Life and Health Insurance Agent on July 6, 1987, and again on September 28, 1987, when he applied for licensure as a bail bondsman. Whether Petitioner's failure to divulge prior arrests and one conviction demonstrates a lack of fitness or integrity to qualify for licensure as a bail bondsman.
Findings Of Fact On or about August 28, 1978, in Hillsborough County, Florida, the Respondent was charged with throwing a deadly missile into an occupied vehicle [a felony violation pursuant to Section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1978)], based upon an Information filed by the State Attorney as Case No. 78-4345A in the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida (Hillsborough County). This case was later dismissed. On or about December 9, 1983, in Hillsborough County, Florida, the Respondent was charged with grand theft, a felony, based upon an Information filed by the State Attorney in Case No. 83-13308B. Court records show that on or about May 14, 1984, the Respondent pled nolo contendere to an amended Information charging him with petit theft, a misdemeanor violation pursuant to Section 812.014, Florida Statutes. On or about July 6, 1987, the Respondent filed an Application for Filing for Examination as a Life and Health Insurance Agent with the Department. To question 8 posed on the written and sworn application, "Have you ever been charged with a felony?," the Respondent answered "No." That response failed to disclose the 1978 charge or the 1983 charge noted above. On or about September 28, 1987, the Respondent filed an application with the Department of Insurance for examination as a bail bondsman. To question 8 posed on the written and sworn application, "Have you ever been convicted or pleaded guilty or no contest to a crime involving moral turpitude, or a felony . . .", the Respondent responded "No." That response failed to disclose the 1984 plea of nolo contendere to petit theft noted above. On or about February 2, 1989, the Department notified the Respondent that his application for examination as bail bondsman was denied. Petitioner testified that he marked "no" on the application because he did not believe that petit theft was a crime that involved moral turpitude. Petitioner's two character witnesses both testified that they knew Petitioner for many years, and that he was a hard worker and of good character. His prior arrests would not impair his ability to do a good job as a bail bondsman.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner' application for examination as a bail bondsman be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL N. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact. Respondent's proposed findings of fact: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerry Gordon, Esquire 1304 South DeSoto Avenue Tampa, FL 33606 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Robert F. Langford, Jr., Esquire Office of Legal Services Department of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Don Dowdell General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
The Issue The issue is whether the Office of Financial Regulation should approve Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is 42 years old. He served 10 years in the United States Air Force and is a veteran of the first Gulf War. Petitioner is a partner in a small business that offers executive recruiting services, Internet-based real estate advertising services, and mortgage brokerage services. Petitioner’s role in the business is “more on the IT side” and involves “a lot of phone work” as well as “the website, data base management [and] things like that.” On October 14, 2003, Petitioner submitted to the Office an application for licensure as a mortgage broker. Question No. 5 on the application asks whether the applicant has “pleaded nolo contendere, been convicted, or found guilty, regardless of adjudication, of a crime involving fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude.” Petitioner answered “no” to Question No. 5. Petitioner’s negative answer to Question No. 5 was based upon his understanding that the question was referring only to financial crimes, such as stealing money or extortion, and crimes involving drugs. Petitioner was not attempting to conceal his criminal history from the Office through his negative answer to Question No. 5. Indeed, at the time he submitted the application, Petitioner knew that the Office would conduct a background screening and learn of his criminal history because he was required to, and did, submit a set of fingerprints with his application. Petitioner’s understanding regarding the scope of Question No. 5 was not reasonable in light of the following definition of “moral turpitude,” which appeared immediately below the question on the application form: “Moral turpitude involves duties owed by persons to society as well as acts contrary to justice, honesty, principle or good morals.” This includes, but is not limited to theft, extortion, use of mail to obtain property under false pretenses, tax evasion, and the sale of (or intent to sell) controlled substances. Petitioner did not contact the Office prior to submitting his application to get clarification regarding the scope of Question No. 5, nor did he discuss the issue with legal counsel. Petitioner’s negative answer to Question No. 5 was a material misstatement of his criminal history. On October 21, 1997, Petitioner pled nolo contendere and was adjudicated guilty of one count of lewd and lascivious conduct for “handling and fondling a child under the age of sixteen years” (a second degree felony), one count of false imprisonment (a third degree felony), one count of aggravated assault (a third degree felony), and three counts of misdemeanor battery. On that same date, Petitioner was sentenced to two years of community control followed by eight years of probation for the lewd and lascivious conduct count, two years of community control followed by three years of probation for the false imprisonment and aggravated battery counts, and one year of community control for the battery counts. The sentences ran concurrently. Petitioner is still on probation for the lewd and lascivious conduct count and, as a result of his conviction on that count, he is a registered sex offender. Petitioner’s probation for the lewd and lascivious conduct count runs through October 2007. The Office first learned of Petitioner’s criminal history after it received the results of the background screening conducted by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement based upon the fingerprints submitted by Petitioner with his application. Thereafter, consistent with its standard practice, the Office requested an explanation from Petitioner regarding his criminal history. In May 2004, Petitioner provided a “Statement of Facts” to the Office in which he described the circumstances of his criminal offenses as follows: In October on a Saturday night [I] went into my stepdaughter bedroom and touch [sic] her private areas. I still think about standing at the door and knowing what I was about to do was wrong but I did it anyway. [My wife] and I were having problems and that was the last straw. I had been sleeping in our room and the tension was very high. [My wife] confronted me about what I had done and I of course denied it. The argument escalated and I lost control of my temper and threatened her if she did not shut up. I went to the bedroom and she followed me this is when I struck her the first time and told her to leave me alone. [My stepson] tried to defend his mother and I spanked him and grab [sic] him by his arms and carries [sic] him to his room. Likewise with [my stepdaughter]. I grabbed the keys to the car to leave and [my wife] told me if I took the car she would call the police and tell them that I had stolen it. I then threw the keys at her and grabbed her and threw her to the ground and told her that she would not want to get the police involved. She picked up her keys and tried to get her and the children out of the house and I would not let them leave. She pleaded with me to calm down and that I take care of the problems that I had created. I brought up the many things that she had done that had led up to that night. She told the kids to go back to their room and prepare for school the next day and that everything would be okay. I told her to go to our room and not say another word and she complied with my request. I eventually calmed down and we went to bed. The next day she took me to work as was the normal routine. Later on that day I was arrested and taken to jail. Petitioner expressed remorse for these offenses, both in the Statement of Facts and in his testimony at the final hearing. His remorse appeared to be sincere. Petitioner’s offenses were not acts of youthful indiscretion. He was 33 years old at the time and, as reflected in the Statement of Facts and as reaffirmed in his testimony at the hearing, Petitioner fully understood at the time that what he was doing was wrong. Petitioner’s offenses were extremely serious and are morally and socially reprehensible. Petitioner's stepdaughter, whose “private areas” he touched, was only 11 years old at the time, and his stepson, who he spanked and grabbed for trying to defend his mother from Petitioner, was only nine years old at the time. As Petitioner acknowledged in his testimony at the final hearing (Tr. 108, 119), the relationship between a stepfather and stepdaughter involves a special amount of trust and sexual contact between an adult and an 11-year-old child -- which is the essence of his lewd and lascivious conduct offense -- is contrary to good morals. Petitioner’s original Order of Probation, entered on October 21, 1997, required him to participate in and successfully complete domestic violence counseling and sex offender counseling. Petitioner testified that he successfully completed those counseling programs. Petitioner has not undertaken any volunteer work or other community service since his offenses. He testified that his status as a sex offender on probation makes it difficult for him to do so. Petitioner remained out of trouble with the law from the time that he was placed on probation in October 1997 through October 2005, when he was arrested for an alleged probation violation. A circuit court proceeding involving the alleged probation violation was still pending at the time of the final hearing. The alleged probation violation was based upon an affidavit of Desiree Washington, who was Petitioner’s probation officer in October 2005. The affidavit stated in pertinent part: [O]n 10-20-04, [Petitioner] was instructed not to have any contact with any child under the age of sixteen unless approved by this officer or the sentencing court and [Petitioner] did fail to carry out this instruction by having contact with four of Heather Fisher [sic] children, as told to this officer on 10-4-05 by Sherri [sic] Connelly of DCF. Petitioner testified that he was never given the instructions referenced in Ms. Washington’s affidavit, and it is questionable whether those oral instructions, if given, are consistent with the written conditions of Petitioner’s probation imposed by the court.1 Those issues are being litigated as part of Petitioner’s probation violation proceeding. The information that Ms. Washington was “told . . . by Sherri [sic] Connelly of DCF” is summarized in a letter from Ms. Connelly to Ms. Washington dated October 4, 2005, which states in pertinent part: In April 2005, I advised [Ms. Fisher] that the children were not to be unsupervised with [Petitioner]. At that time they did admit that he did spend time with the children but always supervised by the mother who knows of his offense. On 9/27/05 I received a new report on the children. All four [sic] the children stated that [Petitioner] does watch them sometimes when their mother goes to work. The boys all reported that he is mean and had hit them with his hand, belt, and paddle. [D.F.] and [J.F.] also reported that he slapped and slammed [J.F.]’s head in to the ground. [J.F.] reported that [Petitioner] is at their house every night when they go to bed but not in the morning. Those allegations were based upon Ms. Connelly’s interviews with Ms. Fisher’s children, who are ages 10, seven, five, and four. Petitioner disputes the allegations in the letter, except for the first and second sentences. Petitioner’s testified that he has never had unsupervised contact with Ms. Fisher’s children and that he has never disciplined or struck the children. That testimony was corroborated by Ms. Fisher’s testimony, and there is no credible evidence to the contrary in the record because the children did not testify at the final hearing and Ms. Connelly’s testimony regarding their statements was uncorroborated hearsay.2 The allegations in Ms. Connelly’s letter, which resulted in Ms. Fisher’s children being removed from her custody, are being litigated in circuit court as part of a dependency proceeding involving Ms. Fisher, her children, and the Department of Children and Families. The allegations in Ms. Connelly’s letter regarding the alleged abuse of Ms. Fisher’s children by Petitioner are not material to the pending probation violation proceeding because Ms. Washington unequivocally testified (Tr. 180-81, 190) that Petitioner was “violated” solely for having contact with the children, and not for the alleged abuse. Petitioner had not been charged with child abuse or any other crime based upon the allegations in Ms. Connelly’s letter as of the date of the final hearing, and it is unknown whether such charges are forthcoming from the local State Attorney. There is no credible evidence that Petitioner’s arrest for the probation violation and/or the removal of Ms. Fisher’s children were in any way connected with the Office’s review of Petitioner’s license application. There was not, as Petitioner implied in his testimony at the hearing, a conspiracy between the Office, his probation officer, and/or the Department of Children and Families against him and/or Ms. Fisher. Petitioner has accepted full responsibility for his criminal offenses, and he appears to be sincere in his efforts to turn his life around. By all accounts, he has been forthcoming with his friends and employers regarding his criminal history, and he goes out of his way to comply with the conditions of his probation. Petitioner's friends testified that they would trust him with their money.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Office of Financial Regulation issue a final order denying Petitioner’s application for a mortgage broker’s license. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 2006.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Stipulated Facts, Supplemental Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that Respondent, Department of Banking and Finance, enter a final order that the following disbursements from the Mortgage Broker Guaranty Fund be made Payee on the claims against Polk Investments, Inc.: Amount Amendolaro $ 2,661,22 Victorias 10,000.00 Fournier, Janice 10,000.00 Wilson 1,334.71 Ledfords 6,573.09 Fournier, Robert 10,000.00 Murphy 4,715.49 Murphy as Trustee 4,715.49 Total $50,000.00 RECOMMENDED this 13th day of November, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul C. Stadler, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dennis P. Johnson, Esquire SHELNUT AND JOHNSON, P.A. Suite One Belvedere Professional Center 1525 South Florida Avenue Lakeland, Florida 33806-2436 Cristy F. Harris, Esquire HARRIS, MIDYETTE & CLEMENTS, P.A. Post Office Box 2451 Lakeland, Florida 33806-2451 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Charles Stutts General Counsel Plaza Level The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner lacks good moral character in violation of Section 539.001(4)(a)1., Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). 1/
Findings Of Fact Petitioner and her husband own and operate Seminole Antiques and Pawn ("Seminole Antiques") at 6115 Seminole Boulevard in Seminole, Florida. The business of Seminole Antiques includes pawnbroking. Petitioner first engaged in the business of pawnbroking in 1990. On November 28, 1995, officers from the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office (the "Sheriff's Office") arrested Petitioner on charges of dealing in stolen property and failing to maintain adequate records. On March 4, 1995, Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to both charges. The court accepted Petitioner's plea, withheld adjudication of guilt, assessed costs of $144, and placed Petitioner on probation for two years. On March 14, 1997, the court entered an order terminating Petitioner's probation. Registration And License Prior to October 1, 1996, pawnbrokers had been required by former Chapter 538, Part I, Florida Statutes (1995). 2/ to register with the Department of Revenue ("DOR") as secondhand dealers. From 1990 through 1996, Petitioner was continuously registered with DOR as a secondhand dealer. In relevant part, former Section 538.09(4) provided: . . . registration may be denied . . . or any registration granted may be revoked, restricted, or suspended . . . if the applicant or registrant: (f) Has, within the preceding 5-year period, been convicted of, or has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to, a crime . . . which relates to registration as a secondhand dealer or which involves . . . dealing in stolen property. . . . The registration provisions in former Section 538.09 did not include a requirement that a pawnbroker be of good moral character. Effective October 1, 1996, Section 539.001 transferred responsibility for licensing and regulating pawnbrokers from DOR to Respondent and prescribed license eligibility requirements. 3/ The license eligibility requirements in Section 539.001 include a requirement that an applicant be of good moral character. On October 1, 1996, the eligibility requirements in Section 539.001 did not prohibit a plea of nolo contendere to a criminal charge of dealing in stolen property within a five year period. However, Sections 539.001(4)(a)3. and 4. did prohibit a conviction in the last 10 years of any felony or any other crime that directly relates to the duties and responsibilities of a pawnbroker ( a "related crime"). In 1997, the legislature amended Sections 539.001(4)(a) and 4. to prohibit a plea of nolo contendere to a felony or related crime. The amendments took effect on June 3, 1997, approximately 36 days after the hearing in this case. As amended, Section 539.001 provides inter alia: (4) ELIGIBILITY FOR LICENSE-- (a) To be eligible for a pawnbroker's license, an applicant must: 1. Be of good moral character; Not have been convicted of, entered a plea of . . . nolo contendere to, or had an adjudication withheld for a felony within the last 10 years . . . . Not have been convicted of, entered a plea of nolo contendere to, or had adjudication withheld for a crime that involves dealing in stolen property . . . within the last 10 years. * * * (6) SUSPENSION, REVOCATION, AND SURRENDER OF LICENSE . . . (a) The agency may, after notice and a hearing, suspend or revoke any license upon a finding that: The licensee . . . has violated this section . . . . A condition exists that, had it existed when the original license was issued, would have justified the agency's refusal to issue a license. . . . (emphasis supplied) The underlined provisions became effective June 3, 1997. Pawnbrokers already in business had six months from the date Section 539.001 became effective to comply with the "registration . . . provisions" of Section 539.001. 4/ Section 539.001(21) provides, in relevant part: (21) TRANSITION PERIOD FOR LICENSING--Each pawnbroker operating a pawnshop in business of the effective date of this section shall have 6 months from the effective date of this section to comply with the registration . . . provisions before the agency may initiate any administrative . . . action. (emphasis supplied) Section 539.001 became effective on October 1, 1996. Petitioner, had until April 1, 1997, to comply with the registration provisions in Section 539.001. Prior to April 1, 1997, Respondent was statutorily prohibited from initiating any administrative action against Petitioner. On October 8, 1996, Petitioner applied for a pawnbroker license. On December 4, 1996, Respondent initiated administrative action by denying the application. Notice In the letter of denial dated December 4, 1996, Respondent stated several grounds for denying Petitioner's application. In relevant part, the letter stated: Section 539.001(4) . . . provides that to be eligible for a pawnbroker's license, an applicant must be of good moral character and must not have been convicted of a felony within the last 10 years . . . that directly relates to the duties and responsibilities of a pawnbroker. Our background investigation has revealed that you were found guilty of or pleaded nolo contendere to dealing in stolen property and failure to maintain records, case number CRC9519648CFANOB in 1996 (sic). Based upon these findings, your application for a pawnbroker license is hereby denied for failure to meet the eligibility requirements of s. 539.001(4) . . . . (emphasis supplied) Consistent with Section 539.001(4), Respondent's letter of denial listed as separate and distinct requirements the requirement for good moral character and the requirement of no felony conviction within the last 10 years. However, Respondent's letter of denial deviated from the statute that was in effect at the time, by expanding the definition of a conviction to include a plea of nolo contendere. Petitioner timely requested an informal hearing with Respondent. Respondent conducted the informal hearing by telephone conference. During the telephone conference, Petitioner testified that she was not guilty of dealing in stolen property. She testified that law enforcement officers, posing as consumers, had tried, unsuccessfully, to get her husband to purchase a watch. The transaction was not completed, and Petitioner was not present at the time. Nevertheless, Petitioner was charged with dealing in stolen property and failure to maintain records. Petitioner further testified that she chose to enter a plea of nolo contendere in order to quickly resolve the issue. Respondent disregarded Petitioner's testimony. On January 13, 1997, Respondent issued a letter overruling Petitioner's objections and denying Petitioner's application. Respondent based its administrative action on the ground that Petitioner was not of good moral character. Respondent did not make an independent determination that Petitioner was guilty of dealing in stolen property. Respondent determined that Petitioner lacked good moral character solely on the basis of the criminal charge and plea of nolo contendere. In relevant part, Respondent's letter of January 13, 1997, stated: The facts set forth in the . . . denial letter dated December 4, 1996, are undisputed. As part of the . . . review of your application, a criminal background check . . . by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement . . . revealed that you pled nolo contendere to dealing in stolen property and failure to maintain records. Adjudication was withheld. During the proceeding, you stated that law enforcement officers, posing as consumers, had tried, unsuccessfully, to get your husband to purchase a watch. Although according to your testimony the transaction was not completed and your were not present at the time, you were charged. Subsequently, you chose to enter a plea in order to quickly resolve the issue. . . . Pursuant to Section 539.001(4) to be eligible for a pawnbroker license the applicant must be of good moral character. Based upon your criminal arrest and plea discussed herein, you fail to meet the eligibility requirements set forth in the Florida Pawnbroking Act. Therefore, your objections to the denial of your application for a license are hereby overruled. (emphasis supplied) Petitioner retained counsel. On February 5, 1997, Petitioner's counsel sent a letter to Respondent requesting a formal hearing. In relevant part, the letter stated: . . . my client . . . received a letter indicating that she had been turned down for her license because of a criminal matter where she had been charged with dealing in stolen property and received a withhold of adjudication and probation. It is my understanding that her probation is now complete. . . . Mrs. Garafolo received a letter from Geoffrey G. Luckemann informing her that she was not eligible for a pawn broker's license because she was not of good moral character. . . . I . . . believe that the ends of justice would be honestly met by allowing . . . a Formal Hearing. . . . (emphasis supplied) On February 24, 1997, Respondent referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of an Administrative Law Judge to conduct the administrative hearing. From February 24 through April 28, 1997, Petitioner's counsel did not file a request for discovery. On April 11, 1997, Respondent voluntarily served Petitioner's counsel with a copy of its administrative file. The administrative file contained numerous exhibits, including the exhibits Respondent submitted for admission in evidence at the administrative hearing. On April 15, 1997, the parties entered into a Prehearing Stipulation that included a list of Respondent's witnesses. The only witnesses listed by Respondent were the two undercover investigators Respondent called at the hearing. The Prehearing Stipulation stated that the issue for determination at the administrative hearing was whether Petitioner lacked good moral character. The parties did not stipulate that Respondent was limited to evidence of Petitioner's ". . . criminal arrest and plea . . .". In relevant part, the Prehearing Stipulation stated: . . . the application for a pawnbroker license was denied by respondent on the basis petitioner did not have good moral character. * * * The issue of fact to be determined is the good moral character or lack thereof by Nella Garafolo. At the administrative hearing, Respondent stated, for the first time, that it intended to prove Petitioner's lack of good moral character by evidence other than evidence of her ". . . criminal arrest and plea . . .". Respondent sought to prove that Petitioner actually dealt in stolen property and failed to keep adequate records. Petitioner's counsel objected to the admissibility of any evidence other than the ". . . criminal arrest and plea . . ." and moved to suppress any other evidence. Petitioner's counsel stated numerous grounds for the objection and motion, including due process requirements for adequate notice. The objections by Petitioner's counsel were overruled, and the motion was denied. Petitioner's counsel had adequate notice of the nature and scope of evidence Respondent intended to present at the administrative hearing. Even if Respondent had been required to file an administrative complaint in this case, due process would not require the complaint to satisfy the technical niceties of a legal pleading. 5/ Due process requires a specific accusation in the charging document or a procedure for disclosure, but not both. 6/ Respondent's letters of denial specifically charged that Petitioner lacked good moral character. Petitioner's counsel had adequate time from January 13, 1997, through April 28, 1997, to seek disclosure of the nature and scope of the evidence Respondent intended to adduce at the hearing. Petitioner's counsel declined to avail himself of the benefit of any procedure for disclosure. Petitioner's counsel had notice that Respondent intended to call the undercover investigating officers as witnesses in the administrative hearing. Neither Petitioner's arrest nor her plea were disputed issues of fact. The testimony of the undercover investigators was unnecessary to prove the criminal arrest and plea. It was reasonable to conclude that the undercover investigators were going to testify to facts other than Petitioner's ". . . criminal arrest and plea . . .". The notice to Petitioner's counsel was timely. On April 11, 1997, Respondent served Petitioner's counsel with a Notice of Filing Discovery. The notice listed the two undercover investigators as Respondent's only witnesses. On April 15, 1997, Petitioner's counsel signed the Prehearing Stipulation with a list of Respondent's witnesses attached as Exhibit 1. The Prehearing Stipulation identified the undercover investigators as Respondent's only witnesses. Petitioner's counsel had approximately 17 days from April 11, 1997, until the hearing on April 28, 1997, to inquire into the scope of the witnesses' testimony and to either prepare his case accordingly or to request a continuance to allow him time to do so. Petitioner's counsel chose not to avail himself of that opportunity prior to the hearing. There was no material error in procedure that impaired the correctness of Respondent's action. Respondent followed prescribed procedure. 7/ Good Moral Character In support of the allegation that Petitioner lacked good moral character, Respondent submitted evidence of an investigation and arrest that took place in November, 1995. On November 7, 1995, two undercover investigators for the Sheriff's Office began an investigation of Seminole Antiques. They were supported by four more officers at remote locations who monitored the conversations of the two undercover investigators. One or both of the undercover investigators visited Seminole Antiques on November 7, 14, 17, 20, 22, and 28. The investigation concluded on November 28, 1995, when Sheriff's deputies arrested Petitioner and her husband. The evidence submitted by Respondent consisted of the testimony of two undercover investigators, their arrest reports, tapes of visits they made to Seminole Antiques on November 14 and 17, 1995, transcripts of those two tapes, and transcripts of the tapes of the other visits. The evidence also included other miscellaneous documents. The tapes and transcripts purport to evidence conversations between the investigators, Petitioner's husband, and Petitioner. The two tapes submitted by Respondent are copies of the original tapes made by Sheriff's office personnel who monitored the conversations of the undercover investigators from outside Seminole Antiques. The original tapes were destroyed by the Sheriff's Office in accordance with department policy for cases in which a nolo contendere plea is entered. One of the undercover investigators made copies of the original tapes for November 14 and 17, 1997. Both copies are in evidence in this proceeding, without objection. Transcripts exist for the original tapes for each of the six visits that the undercover investigators made to Seminole Antiques. None of the transcripts are verbatim transcriptions. Each transcript is a summary prepared by one or the other of the two undercover investigators. Each summary contains only that portion of the recorded conversations which, in the opinion of the author of the transcript, are inculpatory. 8/ Respondent did not provide Petitioner with the notice of intent to use summaries that is required in Section 90.956. Similarly, Respondent did not make available to Petitioner the data from which the summaries were prepared because the data had been destroyed by the Sheriff's Office. The undercover investigators did not conduct business transactions every time they visited Seminole Antiques. On each occasion that the undercover investigators did conduct business, they used stolen property that the Sheriff's Office had recovered, inventoried in its log books, and stored. For the initial transaction conducted on November 7, 1995, the undercover investigators used two rings. One ring was a 14 karat gold ring with an onyx stone. The investigators placed a wholesale value of approximately $30 on the ring. The other ring was a gold ring with four diamond chips. The investigators placed a wholesale value of $35 on the second ring. On November 7, 1995, the undercover investigators pawned the two rings to Petitioner for $30. 9/ Petitioner completed the required paperwork evidencing the transaction. One of the undercover investigators returned to Seminole Antiques on November 14, 1995. He carried a bag containing two gold rings, two gold bracelets, and a gold necklace. One ring was a 10 karat gold ring with one sapphire stone flanked by two small diamond chips. The undercover investigator estimated its retail value at $40. The other ring was a 14 karat gold ring. The undercover investigator estimated its retail value at $39. One bracelet was a seven inch, 14 karat, bracelet. The undercover investigator estimated its retail value at $27. The other bracelet was also a seven inch, 14 karat, bracelet. The investigator estimated its retail value at $54. The necklace was an 18 inch, 14 karat, necklace. The undercover investigator estimated its retail value at $108. When the undercover investigator presented the bag of items to Petitioner, she and her husband were standing behind the counter at Seminole Antiques. Petitioner opened the bag and appraised the items inside while the undercover investigator conducted simultaneous conversations with Petitioner and her husband. Petitioner did not agree with the value placed on the goods by the undercover investigator. Petitioner gave the undercover investigator $30 for all of the items. She completed the required forms. The investigator terminated the transaction and returned to the Sheriff's Office. The same undercover investigator returned to Seminole Antiques on November 17, 1995. He did not conduct a transaction. He described to Petitioner and her husband a fictitious transaction on the previous day in which the investigator said he sold a gold Rolex watch to a competing pawn shop for $600. Petitioner was upset and told the investigator she would have given him more money. The investigator stated that Seminole Antiques was closed and that he needed the money. On November 20, 1995, both investigators returned to Seminole Antiques with unopened video cassettes. The investigators placed an aggregate value on the cassettes of $340. The investigators conducted a transaction with Petitioner's husband and agreed to take $60 for the cassettes. Petitioner paid the investigators $60 and completed the required forms. The investigators returned to the Sheriff's Office. On November 22, 1995, the two undercover investigators returned to Seminole Antiques with a video cassette recorder and remote control. They valued the two items at $149. The investigators conducted a transaction with Petitioner's husband and agreed to $55 for both items. Petitioner paid the investigators $55 and added the VCR to the pawn ticket for the previous transaction. On November 28, 1995, the two undercover investigators returned to Seminole Antiques with two Rolex watches. One watch was a stainless and gold watch. The other was an 18 karat gold watch with a 14 karat gold band. The undercover investigators valued each watch, respectively, at $2,995 and $6,995. The investigators first offered to sell the watches to Petitioner for $300 each. The investigators conducted the balance of the transaction with Petitioner's husband. The investigators agreed to accept $600 for the watches. Law enforcement officers from the Sheriff's Office arrested Petitioner and her husband. They took Petitioner and her husband to the Sheriff's Office and questioned them. Petitioner stated that she did not know any of the items had been stolen. She said that she was going to do the paper work on the watches and then resell them in the store. Petitioner did not have actual knowledge that the items she purchased were stolen. The investigators never represented to Petitioner that the items were stolen. As one of the investigators explained during his testimony: . . . at some time . . . it has to be represented as stolen. And that's hard to do sometimes because a lot of stores and pawn shops are fully aware of the law, and once you say something is stolen, they'll throw you right on out. * * * I did not say stolen. Transcript ("TR") at 40, 68. Respondent failed to show that Petitioner should have known that the items were stolen. Much of the evidence submitted by Respondent consisted of opinion testimony by the undercover investigators and hearsay statements by Petitioner's husband. The investigators opined that Petitioner paid them amounts far below the fair market value of the property. When asked how he determined the fair market value for each item, one investigator testified: . . . we've been taught by jewelers how to appraise and pawn brokers, and we give, at the Sheriff's Office, an incredibly low retail value. Wholesale and retail very low so that this way there's never no error. TR at 41. The investigators are not qualified experts in appraising property as diverse as jewelry, video equipment, VCRs, and watches. Respondent offered evidence that the investigators were dressed to portray someone who, in the opinion of the investigators, Petitioner should have known was of bad character. When questioned on this issue, one investigator testified: I had a goatee. I would wear a hat that I've got that's a very scrubby hat. I've got several of them that are scrubby. Holes in my pants. . . . I cut my grass. I don't shower. I get real sweaty. You can see the sweat stain on my shirt, and I walk in looking crummy. Pretty crummy. . . [t]o portray someone of bad character. TR at 42. Respondent offered evidence that the investigators conducted themselves in a manner which, in the opinion of the investigators, Petitioner should have known was typical of bad guys. When questioned on this issue, one investigator testified: I pulled the second [ring out of my pocket], which is typical of bad guys because they want to see how much money they can get for an item. TR at 47. The transactions conducted with Petitioner on November 7 and 14, 1997, do not show that Petitioner should have known she was dealing in stolen property. The investigators did not conduct a transaction on November 17. The transactions of November 20, 22, and 28, 1997, were conducted primarily with Petitioner's husband. Respondent relied on hearsay statements allegedly made by Petitioner's husband in the same room with Petitioner. Those statements are not competent and substantial evidence that Petitioner should have known she was dealing in stolen property. Petitioner maintained adequate records. The investigator who was at Seminole Antiques on each occasion originally testified that Petitioner did not complete the required records. He later testified that Petitioner completed the required paperwork after every transaction but did not give the investigator a copy of the paperwork.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order granting Petitioner's application for a pawnbroker license. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1997.
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact At all pertinent times, respondent Charlie James Perry has held a limited surety agent's license, No. L000078045, originally issued by petitioner in 1989. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. Asked by law enforcement in Daytona Beach to serve an arrest warrant on Jacqueline Yvette Wells Brown, Investigator Gayward Franklin Hendry of the Special Prosecution Division of the Fourth Circuit's State Attorney's office made inquiries in Jacksonville about Ms. Brown. Told that Ms. Brown worked at C.J. Frazier's Bail Bonds, he and Investigator Norris of Daytona Beach visited Frazier's, respondent's place of business at all pertinent times, on February 21, 1992. An African American woman told them Ms. Brown no longer worked there. Investigator Hendry telephoned Frazier's on March 10, 1992, and spoke to Mr. Perry, telling him of the outstanding arrest warrant for Ms. Brown. Respondent Perry told Mr. Hendry he did not know where Ms. Brown was, but that he would try to find out, and he asked Mr. Hendry not to tell anybody he was helping to try to locate her. After eight to ten subsequent attempts to reach Mr. Perry by telephone had proved unavailing, Mr. Hendry next spoke to him on or about April 30, 1992, when Mr. Perry reported he had been unable to get any information about Ms. Brown's whereabouts but that he was still trying. On May 13, 1992, Mr. Hendry and fellow investigator Bob Lassiter were again told that Ms. Brown worked at Frazier's, and were given a description of the car she drove. Half past nine o'clock that morning Investigators Hendry and Lassiter saw a car fitting the description at Frazier's. Mr. Hendry telephoned Frazier's from a pay telephone nearby, and asked for Jackie. Respondent answered, "Ok, hold," or "Yes, just a minute." Then Ronella Daniels got on the line and told Mr. Hendry that Jackie was not there. Investigators Hendry and Lassiter went from the telephone booth to Frazier's, where Ms. Daniels met them at the door. Eventually respondent Perry emerged from a back office to speak to the investigators, who announced that they had come for Ms. Brown. When Mr. Perry told them Ms. Brown was not on the premises, they asked to come in and look. Aware of the arrest warrant, Mr. Perry inquired whether they also had a search warrant, and was informed that they did not. He then made a telephone call to a lawyer in the midst of which Investigators Hendry and Lassiter pushed past him and found Ms. Brown hiding in a shower stall.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner suspend respondent's license for ninety (90) days. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact, except for No. 4, have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 4, several efforts to reach respondent by phone during that period were made, but without success till on or about April 30, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Tom Gallagher, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel T. Gross, Esquire Joseph D. Mandt, Esquire 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Charlie James Perry 2042 Moncrief Road Jacksonville, FL 32209-5775 Charlie James Perry 2180 Kingswood Road Jacksonville, FL 32207-4320
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: By application filed on November 5, 1990, with respondent, Florida Real Estate Commission (Commission), petitioner, Mark E. Smith, sought licensure as a real estate salesman. In response to question seven on the application, which asked whether the applicant had ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendere, even if adjudication was withheld, petitioner answered in the affirmative. As is relevant to this proceeding, respondent acknowledged that he had been convicted of driving while intoxicated (DUI) in December 1983 in St. Lucie County, Florida and again in March 1988 in Juanita County, Pennsylvania. 1/ After reviewing the application, respondent issued proposed agency action in the form of a letter on May 21, 1991, denying the application because of petitioner's "answer to Question #7 of the licensing application and/or your criminal record". The denial prompted petitioner to request a formal hearing. Smith, who just turned thirty six years of age, admitted that he once had a drinking problem which resulted in the two arrests. However, after his 1988 DUI arrest and conviction in Pennsylvania, Smith attended a twenty-eight day rehabilitation program in that state and thereafter received six months of out-patient counseling. He now regularly attends alcoholic anonymous meetings. Thus, to the extent a DUI can serve as the basis for denying an application, there has been a sufficient lapse of time since the convictions and subsequent good conduct on petitioner's part to demonstrate rehabilitation. Smith is presently employed by the marketing department of Sunrise Bay Resort and Club Condominium, a time sharing resort in Marco Island, Florida. His duties are to solicit prospective customers to visit the resort and hear a sales presentation. Smith desires a real estate license so that he can become involved in the sale of real estate, and if licensed, he intends to work for his present employer. His assertions that (a) he is simply attempting to better himself and (b) he poses no threat to society or the real estate profession, while self-serving to some degree, were not contradicted. Moreover, they are corroborated by a letter received in evidence as petitioner's exhibit 3. Finally, Smith's application file reflects that he was previously licensed in Florida as a real estate salesman from September 1983 until March 1985. There is no evidence that he was disciplined by the Commission during that period of time. Thus, it is found that Smith possesses the necessary attributes for licensure as a salesman.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Mark E. Smith for licensure as a real estate salesman be GRANTED. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1991.
The Issue The issue in these cases is whether petitioners are entitled to payment from the mortgage brokerage guaranty fund, and if so, in what amounts. A further issue is in what order of priority the claims should be paid. Based upon all of the evidence, including the pleadings filed in this cause, the following findings of fact are deter- mined:
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is eligible for licensure as a temporary resident limited surety agent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner applied to the Department for licensure as a temporary resident limited surety agent on February 11, 2008. Petitioner completed his application for licensure on-line by accessing the Department's website. One of the questions on the application for licensure as a temporary resident limited surety agent was the following: Have you been charged, convicted, found guilty, or pled guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a felony or crime under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction was entered? Initially, Petitioner responded "yes" to the question requiring that he disclose whether he had a criminal history. However, when Petitioner typed in "yes" to the question, the Department's website posted the "Stop" sign, and the Department's website did not allow Petitioner to proceed further on the application. Petitioner, with the aid of David DelGrosso, called the Department's customer service number. Petitioner told an unidentified customer service representative that after he answered "yes" to the question involving his criminal history, the Department's website had denied him further access and prevented him from answering subsequent questions on the licensure application. The Department's unidentified customer service representative then advised Petitioner to enter "No" to the question regarding any criminal history and to provide the Department with a written explanation as to his criminal history. After speaking with the unidentified customer representative, Petitioner changed his answer to the question related to his criminal history to "No." By doing so, he was able to complete and submit the on-line application for licensure. However, the answer that Petitioner gave to the question related to his criminal history was not truthful. When Petitioner submitted his application, he did not provide the Department with a written explanation as to his criminal history, as the customer service representative directed or suggested. Rather, Petitioner provided a written explanation concerning his criminal history about two months after he submitted his application and only in response to the Department's request that he do so, after its investigation revealed that Petitioner had a criminal record. On May 5, 1989, Petitioner entered a guilty plea to two felony counts of assault and was adjudicated guilty of those offenses before the Superior Court of the State of Washington for Pierce County. Petitioner was sentenced to and served 48 months in prison. Petitioner served his term of confinement and fulfilled all the terms of his sentence, including payment of a fine. Thereafter, on June 15, 1993, the Superior Court of the State of Washington for Pierce County entered a Certificate and Order of Discharge, which discharged Petitioner from the custody of the State's Department of Corrections and restored his civil rights. Since completing his sentence about 15 years ago, Petitioner has become a productive citizen in the community, has been employed in positions of trust, and has not committed any other crimes. For example, in 1994, Petitioner was licensed as a certified nursing assistant by the Florida Department of Health and, subsequently, worked as a certified nursing assistant in a nursing home and at the Sarasota Memorial Hospital. Petitioner also has been issued licenses by the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services-- a License D (concealed weapon permit) issued on July 5, 2007, and a License G (statewide firearm license) issued February 26, 2008. The foregoing licenses were issued to Petitioner despite his disclosure of his criminal history and/or because his civil rights were restored and/or his proven rehabilitation. Petitioner does not dispute that he entered a plea of guilty to two felony counts of assault and that he was adjudicated guilty of those offenses. However, Petitioner believes that given his record after being released from prison and the circumstances surrounding the incident which led to his conviction, his application for licensure as a temporary resident limited surety agent should be approved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Financial Services, enter a final order that: (1) finds Petitioner, A.D., ineligible for licensure; and (2) denies Petitioner's application for licensure as a temporary resident limited surety agent. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of December, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 2008.
