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CYNTHIA STEBBINS vs APPLIANCE DIRECT, 08-000394 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Viera, Florida Jan. 24, 2008 Number: 08-000394 Latest Update: Apr. 10, 2009

The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to race and gender discrimination, sexual harassment/hostile work environment, and retaliation, as alleged in her Petition for Relief.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, a 36-year-old Caucasian female, was employed by Respondent as a sales associate. She first worked for Respondent at its Sebastian, Florida, store where she started in June 2006. She voluntarily resigned from the Sebastian store in October 2006 and was hired by Respondent's Merritt Island, Florida, store one week later. Respondent owns and operates an appliance retail store in Central Florida. Respondent employs more than 15 people. At some time during Petitioner's employment, John Barnaba, an operations manager who rotated among several stores, said things to her that she found "unacceptable." For example, "You would look good on my Harley," "You look like a biker chick," and "You must be anorexic." He also clapped his hands behind her and said, "hurry, hurry, hurry." She reported Mr. Barnaba's conduct to Phil Roundy, her manager and manager of the Merritt Island store, who said "That's just the way he is," or words to that effect. She was unaware of any other action undertaken by Mr. Roundy regarding her complaint. In January 2007, Petitioner began a voluntary sexual relationship with Mr. Roundy, which involved at some point, Petitioner and Mr. Roundy living together. This relationship lasted until April 29, 2007, when the parties separated. She and Mr. Roundy "got back together in May, about a week after her termination." Mr. Roundy did not sexually harass Petitioner based on the voluntary nature of their relationship, nor did he sexually harass Petitioner between April 29 and May 18, 2007. After Petitioner and Mr. Roundy separated, he started treating her "differently." She reports that he became critical of her and would not assist her. Respondent has published an "information resource for common questions and concerns" titled, "Associate Handbook" that addresses sexual harassment and presents a grievance procedure for employees who believe they have been subjected to unfair treatment. It contemplates reporting the unfair treatment to (1) "your immediate manager"; (2) the store manager; or (3) "[s]hould the problem, however, be of a nature which you do not feel free to discuss with your manager, you are encouraged to discuss the problem in confidence directly with Human Resources." Petitioner requested a transfer to another store on May 1, 2007. She requested the transfer before Mr. Roundy started treating her "differently." She called Human Resources on May 9 and 15, 2007; it is unclear as to whether she called to check on the requested transfer or to report the alleged sexual harassment. She did not timely pursue any recourse suggested in the Associate Handbook. On May 9, 2007, Mr. Barnaba, the operations manager mentioned above, authored an email that characterized several of Petitioner's activities of that work day as "completely unprofessional and insubordinate." The following day, Mr. Roundy emailed his supervisor that Petitioner had gone through his private, business-related emails and discovered Mr. Barnaba's May 9, 2007, email. He also related several incidents that he thought unprofessional and that reflected bad customer service. He advised that Petitioner accused Barnaba and himself of conspiring to try to terminate her. Petitioner was scheduled to work on May 16 and 17, 2007, but did not report to work. She was scheduled to work on May 18, 2007; as a result, Kevin Draco, a risk manager for Respondent, went to the Merritt Island store to interview her. When Petitioner did not appear, management made the decision to terminate Petitioner for "absenteeism."

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of April, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Maurice Arcadier, Esquire 2815 West New Haven Avenue, Suite 303 Melbourne, Florida 32904 Christopher J. Coleman, Esquire Schillinger & Coleman, P.A. 1311 Bedford Drive, Suite 1 Melbourne, Florida 32940

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.10760.11
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF RESPIRATORY CARE vs JENNIFER ABADIE, R.R.T., 18-005694PL (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Oct. 26, 2018 Number: 18-005694PL Latest Update: Nov. 08, 2019

The Issue Did Respondent, Jennifer Abadie, R.R.T., violate sections 468.365(1)(q), 468.365(1)(x), 456.072(1)(v), or 456.063(1), Florida Statutes (2018),1/ by committing sexual misconduct?

Findings Of Fact Section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 468, Florida Statutes, charge the Board with regulating the practice of respiratory care in Florida. Ms. Abadie is a licensed registered respiratory therapist in Florida. Ms. Abadie worked for Comprehensive Healthcare of Clearwater (Comprehensive) from October 24, 2017, through February 4, 2018, at its Pinellas County, Florida, location. Comprehensive is a residential rehabilitation and nursing facility. Ms. Abadies’s 89-year-old father was a patient at Comprehensive from before she started working there until his death. He suffered from dementia. Ms. Abadie visited her father frequently, before and after her shifts and when she was not working. G.B. was a severely ill patient at Comprehensive trying to recover from multiple strokes. G.B. was only 56 years old. However, he had extensive medical conditions. They included hypertension, congestive heart failure, fibromyalgia, diabetes, blindness and end-stage renal (kidney) disease. G.B. received dialysis three times a week for his kidney disorder. He took dozens of medications daily. G.B. also had a tracheostomy. A tracheostomy is a tube that goes into the trachea to help people with impaired breathing breathe. The heavy treatment load weighed on G.B. psychologically and caused him anxiety and depression. Ms. Abadie provided respiratory therapy services to G.B. G.B. recognized Ms. Abadie from an earlier time when she worked at Florida Hospital where he had been a patient. He reminded her of that time and established a friendship with her. Over time, the friendship grew closer. As a result of their friendship and Ms. Abadie's compassion for G.B., Ms. Abadie and G.B. spoke regularly. When Ms. Abadie visited her father, she usually checked on G.B. He and Ms. Abadie talked about the range of subjects that acquaintances talk about including families, children, marital status, holiday plans, and day-to-day lives. They spoke regularly by telephone as well as in person. Although they spoke regularly, Ms. Abadie and G.B. did not always speak at length. Sometimes she just waved and poked her head in to say hello. At G.B.'s request, Ms. Abadie brought him items from outside the facility, such as toiletries and a blanket. G.B. grew very fond of Ms. Abadie and wanted her as his girlfriend and eventually his wife. Ms. Abadie did not encourage or reciprocate these feelings or intentions. Lisa Isabelle was G.B.'s only other visitor. G.B. was a friend of her husband. She had known G.B. for most of their lives. Ms. Isabelle rented G.B. a residence on her property. Ms. Isabelle described her relationship with G.B. as "love-hate." Ms. Isabelle held a durable power of attorney for G.B. His family lived out of town and decided it would be good for somebody local to hold the power of attorney. On Sunday, February 4, 2018, Ms. Abadie came to Comprehensive to visit her father. She wanted to watch the Eagles play in the Super Bowl with him. Their family is from Philadelphia. Ms. Abadie stopped at G.B.'s room first. Charity Forest, L.P.N., was on-duty that day. G.B. was one of her patients. Towards the end of the first of her two shifts, Ms. Forest noticed that the curtain by G.B.’s bed was pulled halfway around his bed, which was unusual. The door was open. Ms. Forest entered G.B.’s room and looked around the curtain. She saw G.B. and Ms. Abadie sitting on the bed, on top of the covers. The head of the bed was raised about 45 degrees to provide a backrest. G.B. was wearing long pajama pants but not wearing a shirt. Ms. Abadie was wearing jean shorts, a T-shirt, and Keds®. Ms. Abadie was resting her feet on her iPad® so she would not dirty the covers. G.B. and Ms. Abadie were not touching each other. They were talking, watching television, and looking at pictures on Ms. Abadie's telephone. The room was a two-bed room. There was a patient in the other bed. Ms. Forest thought that the two sitting on the bed was inappropriate and left in search of her supervisor. Ms. Forest could not locate her supervisor. But she met another L.P.N., Ruth Schneck. Ms. Forest told Ms. Schneck what she had observed. Ms. Schneck went to G.B.'s room. The door was open. Ms. Schneck briefly entered the room. G.B. and Ms. Abadie were still sitting on the bed. Ms. Schneck left immediately, closing the door behind her. She joined the search for the supervisor. Neither Ms. Schneck nor Ms. Forest could locate the supervisor. While looking for the supervisor, Ms. Forest and Ms. Schneck encountered Sean Flynn, L.P.N. They told him what they had seen. Mr. Flynn was a licensed practical nurse and a case manager at Comprehensive. He had come to the facility briefly that day in order to take care of some paperwork. After talking to Ms. Forest and Ms. Schneck, Mr. Flynn went to G.B.’s room and opened the door. Ms. Abadie and G.B. were sitting on the edge of the bed facing the door. Mr. Flynn asked them if anything was going on. They said no. Mr. Flynn left the room and called Nicole Lawlor, Comprehensive's Chief Executive Officer. Ms. Lawlor told Mr. Flynn to return to G.B.'s room, instruct Ms. Abadie to leave, and tell her that she would be suspended pending an investigation. He returned to G.B.'s room with Ms. Forest and Ms. Schneck. G.B. and Ms. Abadie were still sitting on the bed. Mr. Flynn asked Ms. Abadie to step outside. She did. G.B. soon followed in his wheelchair. Mr. Flynn told Ms. Abadie that she was suspended and had to leave. G.B. overheard this and became very upset and aggressive. He insisted that Ms. Abadie was his girlfriend and that he wanted her to stay. Ms. Abadie asked to visit her father before she left. Mr. Flynn agreed. Ms. Abadie visited her father for a couple of hours. Ms. Abadie also called Ms. Isabelle to tell her that Mr. Flynn asked her to leave and that G.B. was very upset. After Ms. Abadie's departure, G.B. became increasingly upset and loud. His behavior escalated to slamming doors and throwing objects. Comprehensive employees decided G.B. was a danger to himself and others and had him involuntarily committed under Florida's Baker Act at Mease Dunedin Hospital. On her way home, Ms. Abadie received a telephone call offering her full-time employment at Lakeland Regional Hospital. February 4, 2018, at 6:08 p.m., Ms. Abadie submitted her resignation from Comprehensive in an e-mail to Ms. Lawlor. Ms. Abadie's only patient/caregiver relationship with G.B. was through her employment with Comprehensive. As of 6:08 p.m. on February 4, 2018, G.B. was not a patient of Ms. Abadie. She no longer had a professional relationship with him. Ms. Lawlor suspended Ms. Abadie on February 4, 2018. She based her decision on the information that Ms. Forest, Ms. Schneck, and Mr. Flynn told her, not all of which is persuasively established or found as fact in this proceeding. Still, Ms. Lawlor's memorandum suspending Ms. Abadie reveals that the nature of G.B.'s relationship with Ms. Abadie and the events of February 4, 2018, were not sexual. Ms. Lawlor's Employee Memorandum suspending Ms. Abadie does not identify a state or institution rule violated in the part of the form calling for one. She wrote "Flagrant violation of code of conduct." The description in the "Nature of Infraction" section of the form reads, "Employee was found cuddling in bed with a resident during her time off." There is no mention of sex, breasts, genitalia, or sexual language. None of the varying and sometimes inconsistent accounts of the day mention touching or exposure of breasts, buttocks, or genitalia. None of the accounts describes or even alludes to sex acts or statements about sex. The only kiss reported is a kiss on the cheek that G.B. reportedly forced upon Ms. Abadie as she was leaving. The deposition testimony of the Board's "expert," offers many statements showing that what the Board complains of might be called "inappropriate" or a "boundary violation" but does not amount to sexual misconduct. He testified about the strain a patient expressing romantic feelings toward a therapist puts on the professional relationship. He says the professional should tell the patient that the statements are inappropriate. The witness says that if the patient starts expressing the romantic feelings by touching the therapist, the therapist must tell the patient that his behavior is inappropriate and begin recording the events for the therapist's protection so that "no inappropriate allegations are made later." (Jt. Ex. 3, p. 3). Asked his opinion about allegations that Ms. Abadie was laying on G.B.'s bed, the witness says the behavior "crossed a professional boundary" and that he was not aware of the "behavior being appropriate in any situation." (Jt. Ex. 3, p. 16). The witness acknowledged that a hug is not inherently sexual. (Jt. Ex. 3, pp. 24 & 30). In addition, the training and experience of the witness do not qualify him as someone whose opinion should be entitled to significant weight. Among other things, he has never written about, lectured about, or testified to an opinion about sexual misconduct. Had the deposition not been offered without objection, whether the testimony would have been admissible is a fair question. § 90.702, Fla. Stat. After February 4, 2018, Ms. Abadie attempted to continue her friendship with G.B. by telephone calls and visits. However, Comprehensive refused for several weeks, against G.B.'s wishes, to allow Ms. Abadie to visit G.B. and would only permit Ms. Abadie brief, supervised visits with her father. G.B. was very upset by Comprehensive's prohibition of visits from Ms. Abadie. He began refusing food and treatment, including medications and dialysis. G.B.'s condition deteriorated to the point that he was admitted to hospice care. At that point, on February 24, 2018, Comprehensive contacted Ms. Abadie and gave her permission to visit G.B and lifted restrictions on visiting her father. A February 27, 2018, e-mail from Shelly Wise, Director of Nursing, confirmed this and admitted that the Agency for Health Care Administration had advised that G.B.'s right as a resident to visitors trumped Comprehensive's concerns. Ms. Abadie resumed visiting her friend, G.B. On May 21, 2018, G.B. passed away. G.B. was a lonely, mortally ill man. He initiated a friendship with Ms. Abadie that she reciprocated. Ultimately, he developed unfounded feelings about her being his girlfriend and them having a future together. The clear and convincing evidence does not prove that the relationship was more than a friendship or that it was sexual in any way.

Conclusions For Petitioner: Mary A. Iglehart, Esquire Christina Arzillo Shideler, Esquire Florida Department of Health Prosecution Services Unit 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 For Respondent: Kennan George Dandar, Esquire Dandar & Dandar, P.A. Post Office Box 24597 Tampa, Florida 33623

Recommendation Based on the preceding Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Petitioner, Department of Health, Board of Respiratory Care, dismiss the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of July, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 2019.

Florida Laws (9) 120.569120.5720.43456.063456.072456.073468.353468.36590.702 DOAH Case (4) 12-1705PL18-0263PL18-0898PL18-5694PL
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SUSAN KIRBY vs APPLIANCE DIRECT, INC., 07-003807 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Viera, Florida Aug. 24, 2007 Number: 07-003807 Latest Update: Feb. 11, 2008

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a white female. Petitioner worked as a salesperson at Respondent’s Melbourne store from April 2006 to September 2006. Petitioner’s primary job duty was selling appliances to retail customers. She also performed ancillary duties, such as tagging merchandise, cleaning and organizing the showroom floor, scheduling deliveries, and making follow-up calls to customers. Petitioner was not paid a salary. Her income was solely commission-based. She earned a total of $11,826.14 while working for Respondent, which equates to an average weekly gross pay of $537.55. Petitioner had several managers during the term of her employment. She did not have a problem with any of her managers, except for Jeffrey Rock. Mr. Rock is a black male, and by all accounts, he was a difficult manager to work for. He was “strict”; he often yelled at the salespersons to “get in the box”2 and “answer the phones”; and, unlike several of the prior managers at the Melbourne store, Mr. Rock held the salespersons accountable for doing their job. Petitioner testified that Mr. Rock "constantly" made sexual comments in the store, including comments about the size of his penis and his sexual prowess; comments about sex acts that he wanted to perform on a female employee in Respondent’s accounting office, Ms. Miho; “stallion” noises directed at Ms. Miho; and a question to Petitioner about the type of underwear that she was wearing. Petitioner’s testimony regarding the sexual comments and noises made by Mr. Rock was corroborated by Neina Blizzard, who worked with Petitioner as a salesperson for Respondent and who has also filed a sexual harassment claim against Respondent. Mr. Rock denied making any sexually inappropriate comments or noises in the store. His testimony was corroborated by Guy Ruscillo and Carissa Howard, who worked as salespersons with Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard and who are still employed by Respondent. Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard testified that Mr. Rock gave favorable treatment to Ms. Howard and two other female salespersons with whom he had sexual relationships and/or who found his sexual comments funny. Mr. Rock denied giving favorable treatment to any salesperson, except for one time when he gave a “house ticket”3 to Ms. Howard because she took herself off the sales floor for six hours one day to help him get organized during his first week as manager at the Melbourne store. Ms. Howard is white. The record does not reflect the race of the other two female salespersons -- Rebecca and Shanna -- who Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard testified received favorable treatment by Mr. Rock, and the anecdotal evidence of the favorable treatment that they allegedly received was not persuasive. Petitioner did not have any complaints regarding her schedule. Indeed, she testified that Mr. Rock changed her schedule at one point during her employment to give her more favorable hours. Petitioner’s testimony about other salespersons having sexual relationships with Mr. Rock and/or receiving favorable treatment from Mr. Rock was based solely upon speculation and rumor. Indeed, Rebecca, one of the salespersons with whom Mr. Rock allegedly had a sexual relationship, was “let go” by Mr. Rock because of the problems with her job performance observed by Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard. Petitioner’s last day of work was Saturday, September 30, 2006. On that day, Petitioner came into the store with Ms. Blizzard at approximately 8:00 a.m. because, according to Petitioner, another manager had changed her schedule for that day from the closing shift to the opening shift. Mr. Rock confronted Petitioner when she arrived, asking her why she came in at 8:00 a.m. since he had put her on the schedule for the closing shift. An argument ensued and Petitioner went into the warehouse in the back of the store to compose herself. When Petitioner returned to the showroom several minutes later, Mr. Rock was engaged in an argument with Ms. Blizzard. During the argument, Ms. Blizzard demanded a transfer to another store, which Mr. Rock agreed to give her. Then, as a “parting shot,” Ms. Blizzard told Mr. Rock that he was a “racist” who was “prejudiced against white women.” Ms. Blizzard testified that Mr. Rock told her that she was fired immediately after she called him a racist. Petitioner testified that after Mr. Rock fired Ms. Blizzard, he asked her whether she wanted to be fired too. Petitioner testified that even though she did not respond, Mr. Rock told her that “you are fired too.” Then, according to Ms. Blizzard and Petitioner, Mr. Rock escorted them both out of the store. Mr. Rock denies telling Ms. Blizzard or Petitioner that they were fired. He testified that they both walked out of the store on their own accord after the argument. Mr. Rock’s version of the events was corroborated by Mr. Ruscillo, who witnessed the argument. Mr. Ruscillo testified that he heard a lot of yelling, but that he did not hear Mr. Rock tell Ms. Blizzard or Petitioner at any point that they were fired. Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard met with an attorney the Monday after the incident. The following day, Petitioner gave Ms. Blizzard a letter to deliver on her behalf to Respondent’s human resources (HR) Department. The letter, which Petitioner testified that she wrote on the day that she was fired by Mr. Rock, stated that Petitioner “was sexually harassed and discriminated against based on being a white female by my manager, Jeff Rock”; that Petitioner “previously reported numerous incidents of this discrimination and sexual harassment to upper management”; and that she was fired “as a result of this discrimination and the refusal to put up with Mr. Rock’s sexual advancement.” This letter was the first notice that Respondent had of Petitioner’s claims of sexual harassment or discrimination by Mr. Rock. Petitioner considers herself to be a very good salesperson, but Mr. Rock described her as an “average” salesperson. Mr. Rock’s characterization of Petitioner’s job performance is corroborated by Petitioner’s acknowledgement that her sales figures were lower than those of at least Mr. Ruscillo, Ms. Blizzard, and Ms. Howard. Petitioner complained to another manager, Al Sierra, about Mr. Rock’s management style at some point in mid-September 2006. She did not complain to Mr. Sierra or anyone else in Respondent’s upper management about the sexual comments allegedly made by Mr. Rock. Indeed, as noted above, the first time that Petitioner complained about the sexual comments allegedly made by Mr. Rock was in a letter that she provided to Respondent’s HR Department several days after she was fired and after she met with a lawyer. Petitioner testified that she did not complain about the sexual harassment by Mr. Rock because he threatened to fire any salesperson who complained to upper management about the way that he ran the store and because she did not know who to complain to because she never received an employee handbook. There is no evidence that Mr. Rock fired any salesperson for complaining about how he ran the store, and he denied making any such threats. He did, however, acknowledge that he told the salespersons that they were all replaceable. Mr. Rock’s testimony was corroborated by Mr. Ruscillo and Ms. Howard, who were at the sales meetings where Petitioner and Ms. Blizzard claim that the threats were made. The training that Petitioner received when she started with Respondent was supposed to include a discussion of Respondent’s policies and procedures, including its policy against sexual harassment. The trainer, Kit Royal, testified that he remembered Petitioner attending the week-long training program and that the program did include a discussion of the sexual harassment policy and other policies and procedures. Petitioner, however, testified that no policies and procedures were discussed during the training program. Petitioner was supposed to have received and signed for an employee handbook during the training program. No signed acknowledgement form could be located for Petitioner, which is consistent with her testimony that she never received the handbook. The fact that Petitioner did not receive the employee handbook does not mean that the training program did not include discussion of Respondent’s sexual harassment policies. Indeed, Petitioner’s testimony that the training program did not include any discussion regarding salary and benefit policies (as Mr. Royal testified that it did) and that she was never told what she would be paid by Respondent despite having given up another job to take the job with Respondent calls into question her testimony that the sexual harassment policy was not discussed at the training program. Petitioner was aware that Respondent had an HR Department because she met with a woman in the HR Department named Helen on several occasions regarding an issue that she had with her health insurance. She did not complain to Helen about the alleged sexual harassment by Mr. Rock, but she did tell Helen at some point that Mr. Rock “was being an ass” and “riding her,” which she testified were references to Mr. Rock’s management style not the alleged sexual harassment. Petitioner collected employment compensation of $272 per week after she left employment with Respondent. Petitioner testified that she looked for jobs in furniture sales and car sales while she was collecting unemployment, but that she was unable to find another job for approximately three months because of the slow economy at the time. She provided no documentation of those job-search efforts at the final hearing. Petitioner is currently employed by Art’s Shuttle. She has held that job for approximately nine months. Petitioner drives a van that takes cruise ship passengers to and from the airport. The record does not reflect how many hours per week Petitioner works at Art’s Shuttle, but she testified that she works seven days a week and earns approximately $500 per week. No written documentation of Petitioner’s current income was provided at the final hearing. Respondent has a “zero tolerance” policy against sexual harassment according to its president, Sam Pak. He credibly testified that had he been aware of the allegations of sexual harassment by Mr. Rock that he would have conducted an investigation and, if warranted, done something to fix the problem. The policy, which is contained in the employee handbook, states that Respondent “will not, under any circumstances, condone or tolerate conduct that may constitute sexual harassment on the part of its management, supervisors, or non-management personnel.” The policy defines sexual harassment to include “[c]reating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment or atmosphere by . . . [v]erbal actions, including . . . using vulgar, kidding, or demeaning language . . . .” Mr. Pak agreed that the allegations against Mr. Rock, if true, would violate Respondent’s sexual harassment policy. The employee handbook includes a “grievance procedure” for reporting problems, including claims of sexual harassment. The first step is to bring the problem to the attention of the store manager, but the handbook states that the employee is “encouraged and invited to discuss the problem in confidence directly with Human Resources” if the problem involves the manager. Additionally, the handbook states in bold, underlined type that “[a]nyone who feels that he or she . . . is the victim of sexual or other harassment, must immediately report . . . . all incidents of harassment in writing to your manager or the store manager, or if either person is the subject of the complaint, to the president.” Mr. Pak had an office at the Melbourne store. He testified that he had an “open door policy” whereby employees could bring complaints directly to him. The only complaint that Mr. Pak ever received about Mr. Rock was from another salesperson, Rod Sherman, who complained that Mr. Rock was a “tough manager.” Mr. Pak did nothing in response to the complaint and simply told Mr. Sherman that different managers have different management styles.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of November, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 2007.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.10
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SHERRY VERES vs ENERGY ERECTORS, INC., 04-003004 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Leesburg, Florida Aug. 24, 2004 Number: 04-003004 Latest Update: May 30, 2006

The Issue Whether Respondent Employer is guilty of an unlawful employment practice pursuant to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, by discriminating against Petitioner based upon her sex (gender). Specifically, whether Petitioner was sexually harassed in the work place and/or unlawfully terminated for refusing sexual favors.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is a corporation engaged in the utility construction business. Respondent employs approximately 150 people for a variety of tasks. At all times material, Respondent's president, Bill Beers (male), had at least a partial ownership interest in the company. He currently "owns" the company. Petitioner is female. Petitioner was initially employed with Respondent as an accounting assistant on July 22, 1998. Petitioner had earned a high school diploma and an accounting certificate from Lake Technical Center. She has completed approximately one year of junior college. Jerry Schinderle (male), Respondent's Vice-President of Finance and its Comptroller, made the decision to hire Petitioner. He was in charge of Respondent's accounting department in which Petitioner was employed. Bill Beers did not participate in, or have input for, the decision to hire Petitioner. Mr. Schinderle promoted Petitioner to an accounts payable position on or about August 21, 1998, when another female employee was either terminated or quit. With her promotion, Petitioner received a raise in pay. In her new position, Petitioner's duties were to handle accounts payable, job costing reports, and job tracking. From Petitioner's date of hire until approximately October 1999, Mr. Schinderle was Petitioner's sole immediate supervisor. At all times during this period there were a total of four employees in the accounting department, including Petitioner, Mr. Schinderle, and two female employees. From approximately October 1998 to October-November 1999, Petitioner and Bill Beers engaged in a consensual and intimately sexual romantic relationship. While they were dating in 1998 and 1999, Petitioner gave Mr. Beers a kiss in the morning in his office on the ground floor of the employer's building, before she reported to work in her second floor office. However, it is undisputed that Petitioner and Mr. Beers never had sexual relations at the office. During the period from October 1998 to October-November 1999, their sexual activities occurred only after the work day was over or during their mutual lunch hours in Petitioner's home, in Mr. Beers' home, or in a car. In 1999, Deborah Goodnight (female) was hired from outside the company as Mr. Schinderle's Assistant Comptroller. As such, Ms. Goodnight became Petitioner's immediate superior, and Mr. Schinderle remained in a supervisory capacity over the entire accounting department, which continued to be made up of four employees, counting himself, Ms. Goodnight, Petitioner, and one other female employee. Petitioner complained herein that Mr. Beers promised her the promotion and that she should have been promoted instead of Respondent's hiring Ms. Goodnight from outside the company. Mr. Beers testified that he had refused Petitioner's request to intervene on her behalf with Mr. Schinderle about the promotion. Mr. Schinderle confirmed that Ms. Goodnight was hired solely by himself. Ms. Goodnight had a four-year bachelor's degree in accounting and had been comptroller of another company previously. Ms. Goodnight's qualifications for the position for which she was hired clearly exceeded those of Petitioner. Thereafter, until Petitioner was laid off by Respondent on June 1, 2001, there continued to never be more than a total of four employees in the accounting department: Mr. Schinderle, Deborah Goodnight, Petitioner, and one other female employee. Most of Respondent's employees became aware that Petitioner and Mr. Beers were dating when Mr. Beers escorted Petitioner to a company Christmas party (year unspecified). Petitioner personally told Ms. Goodnight that they were dating. However, no employee who testified was aware of any unprofessional or inappropriate conduct by Mr. Beers with Petitioner in the office at any time while she was employed by Respondent. Sadly, Petitioner's and Mr. Beers' relationship was rocky, and in October or November 1999, Mr. Beers initiated a break-up of their consensual sexual relationship. Petitioner initially claimed that she initiated the break-up but ultimately admitted that she and Mr. Beers mutually agreed to terminate their consensual sexual relationship at that time. Petitioner and Mr. Beers have different views of who pursued whom between November 1999 and February 2000, but both agree that in February 2000, they resumed a sexual relationship outside the office. By each protagonist's account, during a large part of the period from February 2000 to late summer or the autumn of 2000 (see Findings of Fact 16-17), there were periods of good relations and periods of bad relations between the two of them. There were break-ups, one-night stands, and reconciliations at various times. It was, at best or worst, an "on-again-off- again" romance, but there still was no unprofessional or improper conduct observed by anyone at the office. Any sexual liaisons occurred outside the office as previously described. It is undisputed that in July 2000, Mr. Beers left a note on Petitioner's vehicle in which he expressed his desire to terminate their relationship once and for all. Mr. Beers and Petitioner disagree as to whether or not they had sexual relations after July 2000. Petitioner claimed that Mr. Beers importuned her at every possible opportunity, in or out of the office, to have sex with him and had sex with her as late as January 2001. Mr. Beers denied any pursuit of Petitioner and denied any sexual contact with Petitioner after July 2000. Both Petitioner and Mr. Beers have some confusion of dates between what happened at their November 1999 break-up versus their July 2000 breakup, and it is possible to interpret part of Mr. Beers' testimony to the effect that there was a sexual encounter between them as late as November 2000, but upon the greater weight of the credible evidence as a whole, it is found that their sexual relationship ended once and for all in July 2000.. In August 2000, Mr. Beers began dating another woman. In February 2001, he became engaged to her, and she moved into his home. They were married in July 2001. Petitioner claimed to have been harassed by co-workers at Mr. Beers' instigation from the beginning of her employment in 1998 to its end on June 1, 2001. She further alleged that from February 2000 until her termination on June 1, 2001, she strongly felt that she had to comply with Mr. Beers' requests for sexual favors or she would receive some "punishment" in the workplace or lose her job. Likewise, she believed that any advantage she gained in the employment field also was a "gift" from Mr. Beers either to woo her for future sexual favors or to reward her for immediately past sexual favors. Some of Petitioner's allegations in this regard are less than credible simply because she claimed that she was "punished" even while she was engaging in admittedly consensual sex with Mr. Beers from October 1998 to November 1999. Other of her specific allegations of receiving quid pro quo advantages and punishments from Mr. Beers after February 2000, were either not credible on their face or were affirmatively refuted as set out infra. Testimony from other employees and record evidence indicated that Respondent's employment practices were uniform towards all employees, including Petitioner. Petitioner testified that so long as she was engaging in sexual activities with Mr. Beers, she received the benefit of being assigned a company cell phone, but that when she refused to perform sexual favors for Mr. Beers that benefit was taken away. The better evidence shows that soon after they started dating in 1998, Mr. Beers loaned Petitioner a company cell phone, assigned to himself, which he let her use for approximately one week, because she had confided to him that the man that she was living with was abusive and she was afraid of him. Also, when Petitioner or anyone else handled the payroll, that person had the use of a company cell phone. Petitioner was unable to show that at any time during her employment from 1998 to 2001, there was any permanent, or even lengthy, assignment of a company cell phone to her, or that such an assignment was taken away from her. Petitioner testified that so long as she was engaging in sexual activities with Mr. Beers she received the benefit of being assigned a company car for personal use. Petitioner was able to establish only that, occasionally, during their first consensual relationship in 1998-1999, Mr. Beers loaned her the use of his company-issued car and also provided her with his company-issued credit card with which to pay for gassing-up that car for both of them to use. While this may constitute a misuse of the employer's car and card by Mr. Beers, the greater weight of the credible evidence is still contrary to Petitioner's unsupported testimony that a company vehicle was assigned to her and then removed from her custody due to her refusal of sexual favors to Mr. Beers. The testimony of several witnesses on this point was corroborated by a list of vehicles and the names of employees to whom those vehicles had been assigned. Petitioner's name does not appear on this list. The list further supports a finding that the majority of vehicles owned by Respondent employer were trucks and other types of heavy equipment which were assigned to male employees working in the field, as opposed to ordinary vehicles assigned to any office staff, either male or female. Like all Respondent's other employees, Petitioner had access to a company pool vehicle which any employee was allowed to use for company business or for personal use when his or her own vehicle was being repaired or was otherwise out of commission. This vehicle was never individually assigned to any employee. Petitioner claimed that during and after her sexual relationships with Mr. Beers, and continually until her 2001 termination, he directed other employees to purposefully harass her, withhold information or invoice sheets, or create other road blocks to her successfully performing her job duties or completing her assignments at work. Petitioner's testimony is particularly incredible on this point because she specifically contended that several of the instances when other employees harassed her or made her job more difficult took place during the time she admittedly was engaging in a consensual relationship with Mr. Beers in 1998-1999. Also, no other evidence or testimony corroborated Petitioner's analysis in this regard for any time period. No employees were affirmatively shown to have intentionally tried to prevent Petitioner from being able to perform her job duties at any time, including 2000-2001. Moreover, at no time did Petitioner report any harassment by co-workers to Ms. Goodnight or Mr. Schinderle. Petitioner was only occasionally reprimanded for not doing her job well, and she continued to be employed and to receive regular raises throughout her 1998-2001 employment Petitioner contended that Mr. Beers described in lurid detail their sexual activities to other male employees, who then accosted her with suggestive comments. There was no corroboration for this allegation. Although it is probable that rough-and-tumble male employees speculated about the relationship between their boss and Petitioner and it is further probable that they occasionally goaded Petitioner with their speculations, there is no corroboration, whatsoever, that Mr. Beers discussed Petitioner with co-workers or encouraged any bad behavior toward Petitioner by them. The comments, if they occurred, certainly were not shown to be pervasive behavior in the workplace. Petitioner also incredibly claimed that, in general, other employees were instructed not to talk to her both during and after the end of her sexual relationship with Mr. Beers. Other employees testified that they were not aware of any instructions at any time by Mr. Beers or anyone else that they should refuse to speak with Petitioner. Even Petitioner conceded that Ms. Goodnight was reasonably cordial to her at all times. Petitioner specifically claimed that one particular employee, Glen Busby, was instructed by Mr. Beers not to speak to her and was "punished" for speaking with her by having a company vehicle taken away entirely or replaced with an older, poorer quality car. She conjectured that Mr. Busby was also terminated by Respondent as a result of befriending her. Contrariwise, Mr. Busby testified credibly that he was never instructed by Mr. Beers or his supervisors not to speak to Petitioner. Mr. Busby stated that he had left Respondent's employment for approximately a year in order to care for his mother, who was dying. He also related that when he returned to work for Respondent, he was not assigned a vehicle such as he had previously been assigned, because he came back as a project manager, working primarily in the office, as opposed to returning as a construction site employee who needed a heavy duty vehicle on a jobsite. He acknowledged that while he had been in the field, several company vehicles had been assigned to him and that these were frequently replaced with newer, better- conditioned vehicles. Petitioner was unable to show that any professional training element of her employment was dependent on whether she did, or did not, provide sexual favors. The greater weight of the credible testimony, plus records and calendars, demonstrated that Petitioner received the same internal accounting training as other accounting department employees, mostly from Mr. Schinderle on a rotating basis. Mr. Schinderle testified, and Petitioner acknowledged, that she also was provided with specialized accounting programming training by an outside computer company representative. Petitioner described one instance, apparently in late 1998, possibly while the consensual relationship with Mr. Beers was still "on," when she took off from work for approximately two weeks. She passed the first week as a Mayo Clinic outpatient for kidney problems and passed the second week in her home or in hospital emergency rooms, due to postoperative problems. She claimed that during these two weeks, she was unable to have sexual relations with Mr. Beers and refused to have sex with him when he personally delivered her paycheck to her home after the first week. She claimed that he had promised her that she would get her check for the second week, too, but when she refused him, he refused to pay her for the second week that she was unable to work. Actually, Respondent's records show that Respondent had paid Petitioner regular wages for ten days, but she was required to reimburse the employer for the tenth day she was off work that was not covered by saved sick leave or another leave policy. Although Petitioner showed some abuses of company policy regarding breaks and smoking committed by individual employees, the greater weight of the credible evidence is that such company policies were equally applied and enforced among all employees, including Petitioner. Petitioner characterized a bonus she got in February 2000, the first month of the February 2000-July 2000 reconciliation, as a quid-pro-quo reward from Mr. Beers because she had agreed to resume her relationship with him. However, in fact, it was company policy to distribute annual bonuses to everyone in the company in February of each year. The amount paid out by the company depended on the amount authorized by auditors based on the prior year's business profit. Petitioner received an annual bonus each February she worked for Respondent, but the amount varied, according to the company's profit, for Petitioner and for all other employees. In February 2000, all employees received their annual bonuses. Petitioner and two other members of Respondent's office staff, who were not having an affair with the company president, received identical amounts of $2,500.00 annual bonus based on their function within the company. It is undisputed that on January 19, 2001, after their final break-up, Petitioner approached Mr. Beers in his office and indicated that she was having difficulty accepting the end of their relationship. She had apparently anticipated that they would eventually marry, and was struggling with the fact that Mr. Beers was romantically involved with the woman he had begun dating in August 2000. Petitioner asked Mr. Beers to pay her money so that she could go away and find other employment. Petitioner contends that this was a request for Mr. Beers to pay her the bonus that Respondent annually paid its employees each February. Mr. Beers interpreted Petitioner's January 19, 2001, request for money as a demand that he pay her to quit her job and get out of his life. He refused to accept her offered letter of resignation. Petitioner claims that on January 26, 2001, Respondent advertised as vacant her position as "account payable specialist" in the newspaper, but no date appears on the supporting exhibit; Petitioner was not terminated; and no replacement for Petitioner was hired. At all times material, Respondent had a sexual harassment policy in place which required a victim of sexual harassment to report such harassment to his/her supervisor or the company president. Petitioner received a copy of the policy when she was hired in 1998. Petitioner admittedly did not complain to her immediate superior, Ms. Goodnight, at any time. Although Petitioner claimed she reported harassment by Mr. Beers, the company president, to Mr. Schinderle in late 1998, just prior to her first break-up with Mr. Beers, Mr. Schinderle recalls no such report. Although Mr. Schinderle testified that if Petitioner had reported any alleged sexual harassment by the company president he would have brought the complaint to the attention of the company's then-majority stock-holder, Mr. Schinderle is less than credible on that single point. However, Petitioner's "resignation letter" of January 19, 2001, may be considered notification to Mr. Beers and Respondent employer of most of the allegations raised in this case. Sometime in February of 2001, Petitioner received her annual bonus, like any other employee. It was based on the earnings of the company in the year 2000. Every employee on the second floor of Respondent's office got the same amount. On February 23, 2001, Petitioner received a raise from $13.00 to $13.50 per hour for taking on the additional responsibility of adding a new phone system. The appropriate paperwork was filled out for this raise, and witnessed by Mr. Schinderle and Mr. Beers. Given the foregoing, plus Petitioner's admission that she voluntarily took on the additional phone duties in order to get the raise, Petitioner's characterization of the raise as her reward for giving Mr. Beers sexual favors is not credible. Sometime in March 2001, Petitioner showed up at Mr. Beers' home intoxicated. Mr. Beers' fiancée and his son were residing in the home. Petitioner asked to come in, and Mr. Beers asked her to go away and not make a scene because he did not want to have to call the police. One Sunday a few weeks later, Petitioner approached Mr. Beers' fiancée and his mother in WalMart. Petitioner's characterization of this conversation varies, but it is clear that what she said was intended to shock the fiancée and damage Mr. Beers' relationship with fiancée. Petitioner left a message on Mr. Beers' telephone before his mother and fiancée could return home from WalMart. Her message was to the effect, "I just caused you a bunch of problems." Petitioner came to Mr. Beers' office at Respondent's place of business on the following Monday morning and gloated. Mr. Beers angrily ordered her out of his office, but he did not terminate her. Petitioner testified that she believed that Mr. Beers ordered all of Respondent's employees to be tested for drugs on March 19, 2001, in an effort to "catch" her because she had confided to him back on November 25, 2000, that she had smoked "pot" (marijuana) in order to relieve her distress over their deteriorating relationship. At first, Petitioner claimed that she was too frightened to show up for the test. Later, she claimed to have been "escorted" to the drug testing center by two other employees. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that company policy was to do drug testing of every employee when that employee was hired and then drug test selected employees at random intervals, but that the policy had been only loosely followed. Of the employees who testified on the subject, only Mr. Schinderle recalled being drug-tested upon his date of hire in 1993. Ms. Goodnight and others had never been tested. It appears that Bill Padgett, Respondent's head of security, had previously done random drug testing in a very random manner, so all employees who had not previously been tested for drugs, including Ms. Goodnight, Petitioner, and the other female employee in the accounting department, were tested on March 19, 2001. Petitioner rode, as a matter of convenience, in the same car to the drug-testing site with the other two females employed in the accounting department. Petitioner was not singled out at that time. In fact, all employees, even Mr. Padgett and Mr. Beers, were tested. Petitioner passed the drug test and was not laid off in March 2001. Petitioner kept a log of personal notes and summarized them into a diary. This item, which may have been edited and copied over several times, reflects that Petitioner connected every life event, however small, to Mr. Beers. According to Petitioner's notes from March 20, 2001, Petitioner was "an emotional wreck," and she thought that Mr. Beers wanted to "get rid of" her and was "finished with me now." In her accounting post, she had seen a $5,000.00 check Mr. Beers had written on "Monday" and speculated whether or not it was for an engagement ring. Mr. Beers and his fiancée had become formally engaged in February 2001. (See Finding of Fact 17.) Although Petitioner testified that on March 21, 2001, Mr. Beers arranged for her to get additional company medical and/or dental benefits so as to make good a promise to her in return for her sexual favors, several of Respondent's employees testified more credibly that Petitioner was given the same health and other benefits as all other employees in her "Hourly B" class, throughout her employment with Respondent. Moreover, the greater weight of the credible evidence is that all of Respondent's employees were offered an opportunity to sign-up for additional health benefits and that Petitioner had the same opportunity for this benefit as every other employee did, and that she had, in fact, received the benefits for which she signed-up. At the beginning of the second quarter of the year 2001, in approximately April or May, Respondent made the decision that each department would have to cut staff and overhead expenses due to deteriorating business conditions and the cancellation of a lot of expected work. Mr. Beers gave each department head, including Mr. Schinderle, the sole discretion to make the decision as to who would be laid-off, based upon the position the department head believed would be most easily and efficiently eliminated. Mr. Schinderle was department head for the accounting department. He made the decision to lay-off Petitioner effective 6/1/2001. Mr. Schinderle did not receive any input or guidelines from Mr. Beers except to lay-off the one employee he could best do without. Mr. Beers had no discussions with Mr. Schinderle regarding the decision to lay-off Petitioner. Mr. Schinderle testified that he felt Petitioner's position could be the most easily eliminated because the Assistant Comptroller, Deborah Goodnight, was able to perform the functions of her own position and the functions of Petitioner's position. In fact, Ms. Goodnight was capable of doing the work of either Petitioner or the other female employee, but she was not consulted by Mr. Schinderle. On or about June 1, 2001, Petitioner and three other employees were laid-off from their positions with Respondent. Each of the other employees was from a different department and the decision to lay-off each of them had been made by different department heads than Mr. Schinderle. Mr. Schinderle listed Petitioner as eligible for re- hire. Petitioner never called back to Respondent in any attempt to be re-hired after her lay-off. After Petitioner was laid-off, there remained only three (not four) employees in Respondent's accounting department. The accounting department was able to effectively and efficiently function with the reduced three-person staff and did not acquire additional staff for approximately four years, until May 2005.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John Vernon Head, Esquire John Vernon Head, P.A. 138 East Central Avenue Howey-in-the-Hills, Florida 34737 Stephen W. Johnson, Esquire Stephanie G. McCullough, Esquire 1000 W. Main Street Leesburg, Florida 34748

Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.10760.11
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MICHELE PRICE vs FLAGLER COUNTY SCHOOLS, 07-005677 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bunnell, Florida Dec. 14, 2007 Number: 07-005677 Latest Update: Nov. 13, 2009

The Issue Whether Respondent has committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2006), and if so, what remedy should be ordered?

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female formerly employed by the School District. From February 2006 to April 18, 2007, she was employed as a paraprofessional in the special education unit at Flagler Palm Coast High School. Petitioner is an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of Section 760.02(6) and (10), Florida Statutes, in that Petitioner is female and filed a complaint of gender discrimination and retaliation with the Commission. Respondent is an "employer" within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. From the inception of her employment and until March 13, 2007, Ms. Price was assigned as a paraprofessional (parapro) in Mr. Robert Rinker's classroom. Ms. Price had not been in the work force for several years before taking the job at Flagler Palm Coast High School and was taking classes at night to obtain her teaching degree. Mr. Rinker teaches in what was described as a self- contained classroom for students who are classified as emotionally handicapped in the exceptional education program. At Flagler Palm Coast High School, at least some of the students in the program would attend classes in the 300 building of the campus, and would have fewer classes and teachers compared to a traditional schedule. However, students would not necessarily be limited to one classroom all day. They could, for example, have classes with other special education teachers in the 300 building. Parapros are evaluated by the assistant principal. While teachers with whom the parapro worked might be asked to provide input for evaluations, the teachers are not considered to be their supervisors. Ms. Price was in the classroom with Mr. Rinker during first and second periods, between classes, and during lunch. During third and fourth period, Mr. Rinker supervised students in the gym while Ms. Price remained in the classroom with students who did not go to the gym. Stan Hall also teaches special education in the 300 building of Flagler Palm Coast High School. During Ms. Price’s employment, he was assisted by a parapro named Kathy Picano. Ms. Picano sometimes visited Ms. Price in Mr. Rinker’s classroom. She is significantly younger than both Ms. Price and Mr. Rinker. Mr. Rinker is a jovial man and a veteran teacher. He coaches soccer and has coached basketball. He is well liked by his peers and by the students he teaches. Mr. Rinker often tells jokes and stories, and sometimes his jokes are “off color” or of a sexual nature. The jokes and stories are told to both male and female colleagues and not in the presence of students. No other staff member had ever told Mr. Rinker that his jokes were offensive and no one had ever complained to supervisory personnel that they were offended by Mr. Rinker’s behavior. Mr. Rinker sometimes used the phrase, “a good lovin’ is the universal cure.” He testified that he had heard this phrase since his childhood from his older relatives, and simply meant that when someone is having a bad day, a hug or other encouragement helps make things better. The remark could be addressed to students and staff alike. He did not mean anything sexual by the phrase, and others hearing the phrase did not interpret it as a sexual remark. Mr. Rinker’s testimony is credited. Ms. Price, however, was offended by Mr. Rinker’s jokes. She testified that nearly every conversation with Mr. Rinker became focused on sex. According to Ms. Price, the first week she worked with Mr. Rinker, they were discussing mailboxes in the classroom, and he stated, “let’s talk about the box you are sitting on.” She understood that he was referring to her vagina. Ms. Price stated that she was shocked by this statement, but did not say so because it was her first week on the job. Mr. Rinker does not remember ever making such a statement. Whether or not this incident actually happened, it occurred over a year prior to Ms. Price's complaint to either the School District or the Commission. Also that first week, Ms. Price mentioned in the classroom that she had a headache, and in response Mr. Rinker rubbed her shoulders or neck. Ms. Price was offended but did not tell Mr. Rinker his touch was unwelcome. Ms. Price claims that while things were not too bad the first semester she worked with Mr. Rinker, eventually it got to the point where she was unable to have a conversation with Mr. Rinker without it focusing on sex. She claimed that he sometimes purposefully rubbed up against her in the classroom.1/ In order to avoid talking to him or being physically close to him, she moved her desk to another part of the room. While she claimed the situation was intolerable, she did not report Mr. Rinker’s behavior to any supervisor and did not tell him she was offended by his conduct. Kathy Picano and Ms. Price sometimes spent time together in Mr. Rinker’s classroom. Mr. Rinker sometimes told jokes in Ms. Picano's presence and sometimes “invaded her personal space.” He acknowledged that he might have patted her on the back in passing as part of a greeting, but Ms. Picano described the touch as no different from what she might have received from her grandmother. Although Ms. Picano did not particularly care for Mr. Rinker’s jokes, she attributed them to being “just his personality.” She was not offended by Mr. Rinker’s behavior and, before being questioned with respect to Ms. Price's complaint in this case, never complained about it to him or anyone else in authority at the school. She acknowledged hearing Mr. Rinker make the “good lovin” comment, but found it endearing, as opposed to harassing. Ms. Price, however, was deeply offended by what she viewed as Mr. Rinker’s behavior toward Ms. Picano. The things with which she took offense did not stop with Mr. Rinker’s jokes or the attention she perceived that he gave to Ms. Picano. She did not think that Mr. Rinker or Mr. Hall did an adequate job of teaching, and was upset that Mr. Hall’s students were allowed, on occasion, to come to Mr. Rinker’s classroom to finish assignments because they were disruptive. She did not appreciate the way Mr. Peacock, the assistant principal, performed his job and believed there was an unwritten code where coaches and athletes did not have to follow the same rules as others on campus. Perhaps most of all, she was offended because students in Mr. Rinker’s classroom talked about sex too much and she did not believe that he did enough to stop it. In her view, this was exacerbated when Mr. Hall’s students were allowed to come over and finish work. Further, she believed that the students were using the computers in the classroom to access inappropriate videos and music that were offensive. Computers were in the classroom for students to complete assignments and to do research for school projects. When they were finished with their work, students sometimes played games on the computers and checked sports sites. Sites such as “myspace,” however, were blocked in accordance with school policy. While Ms. Price claimed the students were using the computers for inappropriate purposes, she admitted that she could not see what was on the computer screens from where she sat in the classroom. The testimony of the students did not corroborate her claim. All stated computers were used for school work and when school work was finished, to play games as stated above. Only one student indicated that he watched music videos. All the others denied doing so. There is no question that the students in Mr. Rinker’s class sometimes talked about sex and used profanity in the classroom.2/ One of the classes was a health class. The students were teenagers, many of whom had significant emotional problems with little or no support at home. Some of their individual education plans addressed the problem of too much use of profanity, with a goal of reducing its use in the classroom setting. Staff who testified all stated that trying to eliminate the use of profanity entirely was probably not a realistic goal, but modifying behavior to reduce it was. Their testimony is credited. Ms. Price was not the only one who complained about students talking about sex in the classroom. Barbara Ryan was another parapro who sometimes worked in Mr. Rinker’s classroom. She agreed that the students sometimes talked about sex and remembered a particular incident where she thought the discussion was particularly explicit and she said something to Mr. Rinker. He told the students involved to “knock it off.” In December 2006, an anonymous call came in to Ms. Myra Middleton at the District office complaining about inappropriate language used by students in the 300 building. Ms. Middleton referred the person to Mr. Peacock in accordance with School District policy. She spoke to Mr. Peacock, who said he would take care of it. After the phone call, Mr. Peacock went to each of the classrooms in the 300 building and spoke to the students about the inappropriateness of using profanity and talking about sex in the classroom. There was no evidence, however, that the anonymous call was placed because of conduct occurring in Mr. Rinker's classroom. The talk by students did not necessarily stop after Mr. Peacock spoke to the students. However, the more credible evidence is that these conversations did not involve the entire class, but rather small groups of students. Several students testified they never heard talk about sex in the classroom. The conversations that did occur took place while other conversations were also taking place. When Mr. Rinker heard the conversations, he told students to stop. There is no credible evidence that Mr. Rinker heard each conversation that Ms. Price heard or that he deliberately chose not to address the students’ behavior. Nor is there any evidence that the students’ discussions regarding sex were in any way directed toward her. Mr. Rinker was not particularly computer literate. As a consequence, Ms. Price entered all of the students' grades in the computer. She had access to Mr. Rinker’s password and would print out his e-mail. In early March, 2007, Mr. Rinker received an e-mail from Mr. Peacock’s secretary directing that he see Mr. Peacock regarding his evaluation. Ms. Price did not believe that Mr. Peacock intended to complete the required observation for Mr. Rinker's evaluation, and this offended her. Ms. Price answered the e-mail as if she were Mr. Rinker, noting that no observation had yet taken place. This conduct violated the written standards applicable to parapros. Mr. Peacock discovered that Ms. Price, and not Mr. Rinker, had responded to his secretary's e-mail. On March 9, 2007, Mr. Peacock called Ms. Price into his office and told her that it was improper for her to send e-mails under Mr. Rinker’s name. During the meeting, Ms. Price explained that she was inputting grades, attendance and all other computer data. Mr. Peacock advised that additional training would be made available for Mr. Rinker, but that she was not to perform his duties. Ms. Price was under the impression that she was receiving a reprimand. She also felt that Mr. Rinker, who was also counseled by Mr. Peacock, did not defend her as vigorously as he should, and that he was the one who should be in trouble. In fact, Mr. Rinker told Mr. Peacock that Ms. Price had his permission to use his password for the computer and that she was very helpful. Ms. Price’s reaction to this incident was well out of proportion to the incident itself. Moreover, she did not appear to recognize that what she did in signing Mr. Rinker’s name to the e-mail was wrong. She was crying, both after the meeting and into the next week. The meeting with Mr. Peacock took place on a Friday. On Monday, Ms. Price was on a previously-scheduled day off. On Tuesday, she was still upset to the point of tears, and went to see Sue Marier, the ESE Department head. Although she was told repeatedly, both by Ms. Marier and by Mr. Peacock, that she was not being formally reprimanded for the incident, she continued to believe she was being treated unfairly. She told Mr. Rinker, Ms. Marier and Mr. Peacock that if she was going down, then so was Mr. Rinker. The following day, March 14, 2007, Ms. Price went to the principal, Nancy Willis, and complained that Mr. Rinker had been sexually harassing her since the beginning of her employment. Ms. Willis advised Ms. Price to put her complaint in writing, which she did. The complaint was forwarded immediately to the district office for investigation. During the investigation, Mr. Rinker was suspended with pay. Mrs. Willis also asked Ms. Price if she wanted to be moved to a different classroom, and Ms. Price indicated she did not want to be around Mr. Rinker. Mrs. Willis went to Sue Marier, the ESE Department Head, and asked where there was a need for a parapro so that Ms. Price could be transferred. At the time of the request, Ms. Marier did not know that Ms. Price had filed the complaint regarding sexual harassment and thought Ms. Price was still upset over the computer e-mail incident. She told Mrs. Willis that the greatest need was in the class for autistic children, and Ms. Price was transferred to that class. A decision had been made to add more staff, including another teacher, for that area, but positions had not yet been advertised. Parapros do not generally have the right to choose their assignments. They are placed in the classroom with the greatest need. At the time of Ms. Price's transfer, the autistic classroom was the classroom with the greatest need. This transfer did not result in a change in pay or status. There were significantly fewer students in the autistic class than in Mr. Rinker's class, and at least one of the students had a one-on-one aide in the classroom. While there was a slight change in schedule, it was not significant, and she remained a parapro at the same rate of pay. Both Sue Marier and Nancy Willis went by at different times to check on Ms. Price in her new placement. The more credible evidence indicates that Ms. Price did not complain about being in this classroom. The School District has two policies that deal with sexual harassment: Policy number 662, entitled Prohibition of Sexual Harassment - Employees, and Policy number 217, entitled Prohibiting Discrimination, Including Sexual and Other Forms of Harassment. It is unclear why the School District has both at the same time. The definitions regarding sexual harassment in both policies are similar, with Policy number 217 being slightly more detailed. The complaint procedure outlined in Policy number 217 is clearly more detailed, and it cannot be said that it was followed to the letter in this case. However, Policy number 217 was amended after the investigation took place in this case. No testimony was presented to show whether the more detailed procedures presently listed in Policy number 217 were in place at the time of the investigation. Further, the documents related to the investigation reference Policy number 662, as opposed to Policy number 217. It is found that the investigation was conducted in accordance with Policy number 662, and that to do so was appropriate. Ms. Price’s complaint of sexual harassment was investigated by April Dixon and Harriet Holiday. Over the course of the next several days, both Mr. Rinker and Ms. Price were interviewed (separately) as well as several other staff members. Those staff members included Sue Marier, Kathy Picano, Donna Dopp, Stan Hall, Pat Barile (Sue Marier's assistant), Mr. Tietema (another teacher), and Barbara Ryan. The investigation conducted was reasonable, given the allegations by Ms. Price. Ms. Price's written complaint stated that Mr. Rinker made inappropriate sexual comments; that he rubbed up against her on numerous occasions; that Mr. Rinker allowed the students to talk in the classroom using sexually explicit language and had made no effort to stop it; and that he had made inappropriate sexual comments to Ms. Picano. Policy number 662 provides in pertinent part: Sexual harassment consists of unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other inappropriate oral, written or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: submission to such conduct is made, either explicitly or implicitly, a term or condition of employment (or of an individual's education). submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as the basis for an employment or employment decisions affecting that individual; or such conduct substantially interferes with an employee's work performance, or creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. Sexual harassment, as defined above, may include but is not limited to the following: verbal harassment or abuse; pressure for sexual activity; repeated remarks to a person with sexual or demeaning implications; unwelcome or inappropriate touching; suggesting or demanding sexual involvement accompanied by implied or explicit threats concerning one's employment. * * * Procedures. -- Any employee who alleges sexual harassment by any staff member must report the incident directly to the building principal or the employee's immediate supervisor. Alternatively, the employee may make the report to the Assistant Superintendent of Instructional Accountability. Filing a complaint or otherwise reporting sexual harassment will not affect the individual's status, future employment or work assignments. The right of confidentiality, both of the complaint and of the accused will be respected, consistent with the Board's legal obligations, and with the necessity to investigate allegations of misconduct and take corrective action when this conduct has occurred. In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the totality of circumstances, the nature of the conduct, and the context in which the alleged conduct occurred will be investigated. The Superintendent or designee has the responsibility of investigating and resolving complaints of sexual harassment. A substantiated charge against a Board employee shall subject such employee to disciplinary action, including but not limited to warning, suspension or termination, subject to applicable procedural requirements. After investigation of Ms. Price's complaints, April Dixon discussed her findings with Mr. Delbrugge, the School District Superintendent. She also turned over to him all of the transcripts of taped interviews and her conclusions regarding the investigation. She concluded, and he agreed, that the investigation showed Mr. Rinker told inappropriate jokes in the workplace but that in all other respects Ms. Price's complaints were not substantiated. The investigation also revealed that Ms. Price also used profanity and occasionally told sexually- related jokes in the workplace. The Superintendent decided that the appropriate penalty (in addition to the suspension with pay already imposed) was to reprimand Mr. Rinker with a letter in his file; to require him to receive additional training on sexual harassment; to warn him that further complaints would result in termination; and to place him on probation for the remainder of the school year. This discipline was consistent with the School District's collective bargaining agreement concerning discipline of instructional staff. Mr. Rinker was informed of this result March 19, 2007, and completed the sexual harassment training as required. Ms. Price was notified informally of the results of the investigation that same day. She received official notification by letter dated May 3, 2007. Ms. Price was very dissatisfied with the results of the investigation and the action taken by the School District. She felt that Mr. Rinker should be fired. It is clear, after hearing, that nothing less then Mr. Rinker's termination would appease her. Ms. Price was also unhappy with her new placement. She did not like being in the classroom with the autistic students and felt they were dangerous. She felt that she should have been allowed to remain in her original classroom and Mr. Rinker should have been removed. After less than three weeks, she tendered her resignation. This three-week period included one week off for Spring Break and some personal leave days taken due to Ms. Price's husband having a stroke. Her resignation is dated April 18, 2007, but her last day working in the classroom was approximately April 6, 2007. Ms. Price's resignation was voluntary. While there was some belief that she left because of her husband's stroke, Ms. Price disputes that assertion and insists that it was because of the conditions in the new classroom to which she was assigned. Her resignation letter, however, references neither reason. It states: Dear Ms. Willis: It is with sincere regret that I am writing this letter of resignation as an ESE Para Professional for Flagler Palm Coast High School. Please accept this as such. I do apologize for the short notice. I would also like to take this opportunity to express to you my appreciation of your handling of my complaint. You are the only one who has validated me as a person and as a worthy employee. I only had a brief encounter with you but it was enough for me to know that working directly under you would have been a pleasure as well as a great learning experience as I respect your leadership abilities. I recognize that this is a trying situation for all involved and that you have done your very best to rectify the matter under the circumstances. It is important for me to let you know that whatever happens in the future in regards to my claim, this is no way a reflection on you. I truly hope that you can appreciate my position and the importance of making positive changes for the future. Based upon the evidence presented, it is found that Ms. Price resigned for a variety of reasons, including her husband's stroke and her unhappiness with the new placement. However, her dissatisfaction with the handling of the complaint regarding Mr. Rinker and his continued employment was at least a part of her decision. Ms. Price was not subjected to an adverse employment action as a result of her complaint. To the contrary, school officials transferred her to another classroom at her request. The conditions in the new classroom setting were not onerous.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Human Relations Commission dismissing Petitioner’s complaint in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 2008.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.02760.10
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BOARD OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINERS vs. JEFFREY R ALSHIN, 86-000959 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-000959 Latest Update: Nov. 10, 1986

The Issue At issue is whether Jeffrey Alshin is subject to discipline for violation of Section 490.009(2)(k), Florida Statutes (1983), by committing an act upon a client which would constitute sexual battery or sexual misconduct as defined in Section 490.0111, Florida Statutes (1983). Sexual misconduct in the practice of mental health counseling is prohibited by Section 490.0111, Florida Statutes (1983); that statute states that sexual misconduct shall be defined by rule. According to the Administrative Complaint, Rule 21U-15.04, Florida Administrative Code, defines sexual misconduct. The Administrative Complaint also alleges a violation of Section 490.009(2)(s), Florida Statutes (1983), for failing to meet minimum standards of performance in professional activities when measured against generally prevailing peer performance. The factual basis for these various grounds for discipline is alleged to have been engaging in sexual activity with a client during the period March, 1984, through July 1984, when a counselor-client relationship existed with the client.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Jeffrey R. Alshin, is a mental health counselor who has been licensed by the State of Florida during the times material to the allegations made in the Administrative Complaint. The client with whom Alshin is accused of sexual involvement, J.S., was referred to him by a Dr. Lemberg, who saw J.S. on March 1, 1984 (Tr. 24). J.S. telephoned Alshin's office and made an appointment to see him on Monday, March 5, 1984 (Tr. 24). On March 5, 1984, J.S. went to Alshin's office for a therapy session and met Alshin for the first time. She had another session with him on March 9, 1984 (Tr. 24-25). From March 5, 1984 a counselor-client relationship existed between Alshin and J.S. (Tr. 82). On the morning of Sunday, March 11, 1986, Alshin invited J.S. to his home for a barbecue (Tr. 26). After the barbecue, Alshin and J.S. went to Respondent's apartment and that evening they engaged in sexual intercourse (Tr. 27-28). Alshin engaged in sexual intercourse with his client on five other occasions between March and June, 1984 (Tr. 29). During the period in which Alshin and J.S. were sexually involved, Alshin was counseling J.S. (Tr. 28-29). Alshin was never married to J.S. Expert testimony submitted at the hearing establishes that for a mental health counselor to have a sexual relationship with a client is conduct which falls below the minimum standards of performance in professional activities for a mental health counselor when measured against prevailing peer performance (Tr. 80).

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Secretary of the Department of Professional Regulation finding the Respondent guilty of a violation of Sections 490.009(2)(q) and (s), Florida Statutes (1983), and that his license as a mental health counselor be REVOKED. DONE AND ORDERED this 10th day of November, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1986.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57490.009490.0111
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IIEENE C. MCDONALD vs BOTTLING GROUP, LLC, 17-003201 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Jun. 01, 2017 Number: 17-003201 Latest Update: Feb. 08, 2018

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawfully discriminatory employment practice against Petitioner on the basis of sex, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 ("FCRA"), section 760.10, Florida Statutes; and, if so, the remedy to which Petitioner is entitled.

Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Ileene C. McDonald, is a female, and, thus, is a member of a class protected under the FCRA. At the time of the alleged discriminatory conduct that gave rise to this proceeding, Petitioner was employed by Kelly Services ("Kelly") as a temporary employee and was assigned to work at Respondent's facility located in Riviera Beach, Florida. Respondent is a limited liability company registered to do business in Florida. It owns and operates a beverage bottling facility in Riviera Beach, Florida. It is owned by PepsiCo, Inc. ("PepsiCo"). Respondent is an "employer," as that term is defined in section 760.02(7).4/ Evidence Adduced at Hearing As noted above, Petitioner was employed by Kelly as a temporary worker. Pursuant to a national contract between Respondent and Kelly, Petitioner began working at Respondent's facility as a temporary worker in early to mid-May 2016.5/ She was assigned to work in a warehouse, sorting and preparing cardboard sheets for use and reuse in Respondent's processes. Her work hours were from 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. Petitioner credibly testified that as soon as she started working at Respondent's facility, she was constantly subjected to verbal and physical harassment of a sexual nature from one of Respondent's hourly-paid employees, Brandon Owens. The credible evidence establishes that on an essentially daily basis, Owens made suggestive and overt comments of a sexual nature to Petitioner. These included remarks about her "nice small frame" and, among other things, suggestions that they "spend time together" and engage in acts involving "whipped cream, strawberries, and chocolate sauce." Additionally, on one occasion, Owens grabbed Petitioner's arm and told her "you need a real man." These actions by Owens made Petitioner uncomfortable, nervous, and frightened for her personal safety. Petitioner credibly testified that she repeatedly verbally rebuffed Owens' advances and that on the occasion when he grabbed her arm, she hit him and told him if he didn't leave her alone, she was going to hurt him. Petitioner testified, credibly, that some of Respondent's workers observed Owens talking to Petitioner on numerous occasions. Petitioner identified these workers as "Eugene Johnson" and "Willie Tate." She testified, credibly, that she told Johnson and Tate about being harassed and bothered by Owens. She testified that they told her to contact "Reggie," and that she had tried to do so, but was unable to reach him. The evidence does not establish how many times Petitioner attempted to reach him. Although Petitioner thought Johnson was a supervisor at Respondent's facility, the evidence establishes that neither Johnson nor Tate was in a supervisory or management position at Respondent's facility. As such, neither was under any employment-imposed duty to report Owens' conduct to Respondent's management. The evidence establishes that the "Reggie" whom Petitioner had attempted to contact was Reggie Tribble, a warehouse supervisor for Respondent's first shift at its Riviera Beach facility. Tribble was Petitioner's direct supervisor. However, the credible evidence establishes that Petitioner did not contact Tribble, and that he did not observe, was not informed of, and did not otherwise know about Owens' conduct toward Petitioner. Petitioner testified that another employee, Robert Gary Walker, frequently saw Owens near her at work. She testified: He [Walker] noticed that he was constantly over by me. And he asked, 'is he bothering you,' and he was looking at me and he turned his head. I started shaking my head 'yes' and he left. And a little while after that, Gary came back and he said —— 'Gary tried to get me in trouble, but Reggie didn't do anything.' I don't know what was said after they went over that way, but that's what Brandon told me when he came back. I don't know if it was true or not, but that's what Brandon told me.[6/] Petitioner testified that based on this discussion with Walker, she thought he would report Owens' behavior to the appropriate authority at Respondent's facility. The evidence establishes that Walker was a supervisor on Petitioner's shift.7/ Petitioner also credibly testified that while she worked at Respondent's facility, other male workers who drove forklift trucks often would come around to where she was working to talk to her, and that some had asked for her telephone number and had asked her out on dates. She credibly testified that she consistently rebuffed their advances. On or about the morning of June 17, 2016, as Petitioner arrived at work, Owens drove a semi-trailer truck in front of her, cutting her off as she approached the warehouse in which she worked. This badly frightened her. Petitioner credibly testified that as a result of Owens' action in cutting her off by driving a truck in front of her, she was afraid for her personal safety, and that as result, she left Respondent's facility and did not return. Petitioner's last day of work at Respondent's facility was June 17, 2016. On June 20, 2016, Petitioner reported Owens' behavior to Christie Finnerty, her supervisor at Kelly. This was the first time Petitioner had reported Owens' conduct to Kelly. She also testified that she "may" have verbally reported to Finnerty at that time that a man on a forklift truck came over to talk to her while she was working at Respondent's facility. Finnerty completed a Harassment Complainant Interview ("Harassment Form") memorializing Petitioner's statements regarding the alleged harassment. Attached to the form were four handwritten pages prepared by Petitioner, describing Owens' conduct toward her. Petitioner signed the form and handwritten pages. On cross-examination, Petitioner acknowledged that she did not report Owens' behavior or that of Respondent's other male employees who had talked to her, asked her out, or asked for her phone number, to Respondent's management. The competent, credible evidence establishes that on one occasion, in response to a question from Walker, she confirmed that Owens was "bothering" her. However, there is no evidence showing that Petitioner specifically told Walker that Owens had made physical and verbal advances of a sexual nature toward her, and there is no evidence showing that Walker was otherwise aware of the sexual nature of Owens' conduct toward Petitioner. Petitioner testified that the incident in which Owens drove a truck in front of her "rattled her nerves a little bit," affected her sleep and appetite, and bothered her "a lot," but that she can "get over it."8/ On June 21, 2016, Finnerty contacted Respondent's production supervisor, Norman Medina, by electronic mail ("e-mail") to inform Respondent of Petitioner's harassment complaint that was filed with Kelly on June 20, 2016. Attached to the e-mail were the Harassment Form and a video depicting an individual identified as Brandon Owens. Medina immediately notified Respondent's Riviera Beach plant director, Armando Velez, of Petitioner's harassment complaint. By e-mail sent on June 21, 2016, Velez notified Jacer Collins, Respondent's senior human resources manager for the south and southwest Florida markets, of Petitioner's complaint. Collins was at Respondent's Miami location when she was informed of Petitioner's complaint. On June 22, 2016, Finnerty forwarded to Collins and Velez a copy of the video showing Brandon Owens talking to Petitioner. Also attached to the e-mail was a photograph that appeared to be a still shot of Owens taken from the video. The video, taken by Petitioner and depicting her vantage point, shows Owens approaching Petitioner in the warehouse where she was working. Owens and Petitioner are the only individuals that appeared in the video. Owens followed Petitioner and stood in close proximity to her as the video was recorded. Parts of the conversation between Petitioner and Owens are unintelligible due to the background noise of the vacuum Petitioner was using. However, Petitioner can be heard telling Owens "I can't stand you," Owens asking why, and Petitioner responding "you know why" and admonishing Owens for grabbing her. Owens responded that he was just playing with Petitioner, apologized, and said he would not come over to talk to her anymore. The evidence does not definitively establish the date on which the video was taken. PepsiCo has adopted a global equal employment opportunity policy that applies to, and is enforced by, Respondent in the operation of its Riviera Beach facility. Among other things, this policy prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. Additionally, PepsiCo has adopted a global anti- harassment policy, also applicable to and enforced by Respondent, that prohibits any type of harassment or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, age, national origin, disability, veteran status or any other category protected by law. The policy states in pertinent part: Sexual Harassment According to PepsiCo policy, sexual harassment is any verbal, visual or physical conduct of a sexual nature that is unwanted and that a reasonable person, on account of his or her gender, would find offensive. * * * Sexual harassment includes unwelcome sexual advances; requests for sexual favors; and other verbal or physical contact of a sexual nature when: * * * Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment. Sexual harassment can occur in many different forms. It can be physical, verbal, visual or in a written form. Examples of sexual harassment include but are not limited to: unnecessary and unwelcome touching; unwelcome sexual flirtation; direct or subtle pressure for sexual activity; coercion to date or unwelcome demands for dates; unwelcome or offensive sexual jokes, innuendo, lewd language or obscenities; explicit or degrading remarks about another person or his/her appearance or body; e-mails, posters, graffiti, calendars or other sexually suggestive pictures or objects displayed in the work place; demands for sexual favors accompanied by implied or overt threats concerning pay or other aspects of employment; the taking of or refusal to take any personnel action based on an employee's submission to or refusal to submit to sexual overtures or behavior. * * * Reporting Procedure If you are being subjected to conduct that you believe violates this policy, you should: Step 1: Tell or notify the offending person that such conduct is not welcome and to stop. Step 2: In addition to Step 1, immediately report the incident or your complaints to your supervisor. However, if you believe it would be inappropriate to discuss the matter with your supervisor or you are uncomfortable discussing the matter with your supervisor, report the matter to your Human Resources Representative. You may also contact the PepsiCo Speak Up Line. In the U.S., call 1-866-729-4888 . . . . You may file a complaint via the Speak Up Webline by visiting https://speakup.eawebline.com[.] Step 3: If additional incidents occur, you should immediately report them to the above individuals. Any reported incident will be investigated by the Company. Complaints and actions taken to resolve complaints of harassment or discrimination will be handled as confidentially as possible. Retaliation against an employee who makes a claim of harassment or discrimination is prohibited. Violation of this policy, including retaliation against a person who brings a claim and/or who participates in an investigation pursuant to this policy, may result in discipline up to and including termination on the first offense. Further, any manager/supervisor who receives a complaint of harassment, discrimination or retaliation and fails to notify Human Resources will also be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment. As soon as Respondent was informed of Petitioner's complaint, it initiated an investigation of the matter. Specifically, on June 23, 2016, Collins interviewed employees, including Johnson and Owens, at the Riviera Beach facility. Owens was not scheduled to work on June 21 or 22, so June 23 was his first day available to be interviewed. Owens denied having spoken to Petitioner and denied all of her allegations regarding his conduct toward her. Respondent suspended Owens from his employment on June 23, 2016. Owens was escorted from Respondent's facility that day and not allowed to return pending completion of the investigation into Petitioners' complaint. Respondent's investigation confirmed that Owens had engaged in the conduct that Petitioner had alleged. Specifically, the video that Petitioner provided, as well Owens' inconsistent answers to questions Collins asked him based on the information provided by Petitioner in the Harassment Form, established that Owens had engaged in the sexually harassing conduct that Petitioner had alleged in the Harassment Form. This conduct violated Respondent's Global Anti-Harassment Policy. On July 12, 2016, Respondent terminated Owens' employment.9/ As part of its investigation into Petitioner's complaint, Respondent also attempted to identify the forklift drivers, including a "Hispanic male" driver to which Petitioner had referred in the handwritten pages attached to the Harassment Form. However, due to the non-specific description provided in the Harassment Form, Respondent was unable to identify the forklift drivers, including the "Hispanic male" driver, who Petitioner claimed made unwelcome advances toward her.10/ It is undisputed that while she was employed at Respondent's Riviera Beach facility, Petitioner did not report to Respondent's management or to her supervisors that forklift drivers had engaged in unwelcome advances toward her. Additionally, in the handwritten pages attached to the Harassment Form, Petitioner acknowledged that the "Hispanic male" forklift driver had approached her only once and that at the time, she "didn't think it was something to report." The credible evidence establishes that once Respondent concluded its investigation, verified Petitioner's allegations regarding Owens' conduct, and terminated Owens, Respondent contacted Finnerty at Kelly Services to let her know that Petitioner was welcome to return to her temporary position at Respondent's facility. Petitioner declined to do so. Findings of Ultimate Fact As discussed in greater detail below, the credible, persuasive evidence establishes that while she was employed at Respondent's Riviera Beach facility, Petitioner suffered severe, pervasive harassment as a result of Owens' frequent verbal and physical advances of a sexual nature toward her. However, the competent, persuasive evidence does not establish that Respondent received, during Petitioner's employment at Respondent's facility, either constructive or actual notice of the sexual nature of Owens' conduct toward Petitioner. The evidence shows that Petitioner indicated, by nodding her head in response to a question from Walker, that Owens was "bothering" her. However, there is no competent, credible evidence in the record showing that Petitioner specifically informed Walker of the sexual nature of Owens' conduct toward her, or that Walker otherwise had knowledge of such conduct. Thus, at most, the evidence shows only that Walker was informed that Owens was "bothering" Petitioner. Further, there is no competent evidence establishing that any other supervisors or managers of Respondent's Riviera Beach facility were aware, or should have been aware, of the sexual nature of Owens' conduct toward Petitioner. The evidence shows that Respondent only received notice of Owens' sexual conduct toward Petitioner when she complained to Kelly after she had left her employment with Respondent, and Kelly then forwarded that complaint to Respondent. The credible, persuasive evidence further establishes that as soon as Respondent received notice of Owens' conduct, it immediately initiated an investigation and interviewed persons identified by Petitioner as witnesses, including Johnson and Owens. As a result of Respondent's investigation, Owens was suspended from employment on the day he was interviewed, and was terminated from employment once Respondent completed its investigation——approximately 21 days after Respondent received notice of Owens' harassing behavior toward Petitioner. Additionally, the evidence shows that Respondent diligently attempted to identify and investigate the forklift drivers who were mentioned in the Harassment Form and accompanying pages, but due to the non-specific description provided therein, were unable to do so.11/ Finally, the credible, persuasive evidence establishes that once Owens was discharged, Respondent contacted Kelly to let them know that Owens was no longer employed at the Riviera Beach facility, and that Petitioner was welcome to return to her previous position. Notwithstanding that Owens no longer worked there, Petitioner refused to return.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of November, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of November, 2017.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57760.01760.02760.10760.11
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs LLOYD H. SISK, 89-006813 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Port Charlotte, Florida Dec. 12, 1989 Number: 89-006813 Latest Update: Aug. 27, 1990

The Issue The issue is whether respondent's law enforcement certification should be disciplined for the reasons stated in the administrative complaint.

Findings Of Fact Base upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Lloyd H. Sisk, held law enforcement certificate number 2252 issued by petitioner, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission). Respondent has held his license since April 3, 1971. When the events herein occurred, Sisk was employed as a detective with the Charlotte County Sheriff's Department. The charges against respondent are based upon an allegation of sexual abuse lodged against him by his niece, S. C., who is now seventeen years of age. The abuse allegedly occurred between December 1986 and February 1988. To place this controversy in proper perspective, a brief discussion of the living arrangements in the Sisk household is appropriate. In 1983 respondent, his wife, Brenda, and Brenda's mother (grandmother) decided to jointly purchase a home in Port Charlotte, Florida. Also residing with the Sisks were their teen-age son, Jeffrey, and the alleged victim. The grandmother had been given legal custody over the alleged victim, who was the daughter of Janis, Brenda's sister. Janis lived in Pinellas County, but because of various legal and personal problems, she had relinquished custody of her daughter to the grandmother shortly after S. C.'s birth. In late 1986, and over the objections of the grandmother and alleged victim, the Sisks decided to sell the home. This in turn engendered antagonism and animosity between the members of the family component and eventually culminated in the sexual abuse charges being made. The home was finally sold in February 1988, or more than a year later. Before the sale occurred, the Sisks advised the grandmother and alleged victim that, because of constant friction, the grandmother and S. C. would not live with the Sisks and their son when they relocated to a new home. At almost the same time the sale took place, S. C. began making sexual abuse allegations against respondent. In this regard, the testimony is sharply conflicting. In resolving these conflicts, the undersigned has accepted the more credible and persuasive evidence. The allegations first surfaced on an undisclosed date in February 1988 when S. C. told her sixteen year old boyfriend, James, that respondent had touched her breasts, buttocks and vaginal area while giving her back massages and had put a condom on his penis while in her presence. On February 17, 1988, S. C. telephoned her mother in Pinellas County and said respondent had been coming home in the afternoon and asking to give her backrubs. The alleged victim further complained that, during those backrubs, respondent was "rubbing her butt and in between her legs". That same day, S. C. told her grandmother that respondent had touched her breasts, buttocks and vaginal area while giving her backrubs. Three days later, S. C.'s mother, while in an intoxicated state, telephoned the Largo Police Department and relate the abuse allegations to a detective. That led to an investigation by the Charlotte County Sheriff's Office and the eventual filing of criminal charges by the state attorney and sexual abuse charges by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). 1/ At final hearing, the former boyfriend, grandmother and natural mother related the allegations described in the previous finding of fact. In addition, statements made by S. C. to an HRS counselor were offered into evidence. Finally, the alleged victim gave her version of what transpired. This included a rather graphic account of respondent, while in the presence of S. C., placing a condom on his penis and masturbating, and after attaining an erection a few minutes later, positioning his body next to S. C. and demonstrating various coital positions to his niece. The testimony of the alleged victim is not accepted as being credible for a number of reasons. To begin with, S. C. was extremely upset with respondent because the family home was being sold and she had been told that she could not remain with the Sisks. Her animosity towards respondent is also evidenced by the fact that, just prior to final hearing, she encouraged her mother (Janis) to "slam him (respondent)" with her testimony. It is also noted that the alleged victim's testimony at hearing differed in several material respects with the complaints she made to the Commission, HRS and in prior court testimony. Finally, the testimony of Lloyd, Brenda and Jeffrey Sisk, which is accepted as being credible, demonstrated numerous inconsistencies in S. C.'s testimony. Accordingly, it is found that respondent did not commit a lewd and lascivious act in the presence of his niece by exposing his penis and masturbating, and he did not handle her breasts, buttocks and vaginal area as alleged in the administrative complaint.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusion of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the administrative complaint be DISMISSED, with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Heading Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 1990.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57943.13943.1395 Florida Administrative Code (1) 11B-27.0011
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CAROLYN R. OSTRUM vs A UNIQUE FLOOR OF THE GULF COAST I, 10-001180 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Marianna, Florida Mar. 10, 2010 Number: 10-001180 Latest Update: Feb. 09, 2011

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2009),1 by discriminating against Petitioner based on her gender and by allowing her to be sexually harassed.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is a for-profit Florida corporation owned by Robert J. Morrisseau, Sr. Even though he was Respondent's president, Mr. Morrisseau, Sr., was not usually involved in the company's day-to-day operations. Robert J. Morrisseau, Jr., is Respondent's vice- president. Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., was primarily responsible for the company's operation. He also served as crew supervisor. Most of Respondent's work, which involved installing carpeting and tile in commercial facilities, was performed in locations that required the work crew to travel. Respondent's crew often had to stay in motels. Respondent contracted with an employee leasing company to handle Respondent's payroll and workers' compensation administration. All employees filled out an application provided by the employee leasing company, but Respondent made all hiring and firing decisions. Respondent did not give its employees information regarding Respondent's human resource policies and procedures. Employees were not told what to do when they believed someone in the company was discriminating against them. Petitioner is a female who dated Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., in the fall of 2008. While they were dating, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., told Petitioner he would give her a job and teach her to lay tile. Petitioner and Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., stopped dating in December 2008. However, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., made good on his promise to Petitioner, hiring her as a laborer on January 26, 2009. In January 2009, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., wanted to reestablish a personal relationship with Petitioner. Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., hoped giving Petitioner a job would facilitate that goal. Petitioner was thankful for the job, but she did not want to date Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., again. At all times material here, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., was Petitioner's supervisor. He also employed and supervised Petitioner's sister and her boyfriend and Petitioner's daughter and her boyfriend. Off and on in January 2009 through March 2009, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., supervised a crew laying carpet and tile in Spanish Fort, Alabama. Petitioner and Petitioner's daughter and sister and their boyfriends were also part of the crew on at least two trips to Alabama. Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., rented three motel rooms for the Alabama job. He took one room with one bed. The other two rooms had two beds. On one occasion, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., told Petitioner she could sleep in the room with him or with her sister and the sister's boyfriend or the other male employees. On another occasion, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., told Petitioner she could sleep with her daughter and her daughter's boyfriend or the other male employees. On both occasions, Petitioner chose to sleep on the extra bed in a room with one of the couples. Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., never threatened Petitioner, directly or indirectly, with consequences if she did not choose to stay in his room. There is no evidence that Petitioner felt Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., was giving her a quid pro quo choice. Petitioner's job responsibilities included driving company vehicles, preparing floors for tile, and learning to lay tile. She was not expected to carry 40-foot rolls of carpet or to carry heavy loads of tile up three flights of stairs. However, Petitioner was willing to help any way she could. One time in Alabama, Petitioner and her daughter were on their knees, preparing a floor for tile. Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., took pictures of the women from the back and made a comment about the daughter's backside, stating it was as big as a man's. Respondent also had a job in Daytona Beach, Florida. Petitioner was part of the crew that worked in Daytona Beach, along with Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., and several male employees during the weeks of February 27, 2009, and March 2, 2009. Once again, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., rented three motel rooms. He gave Petitioner the option of staying in the room with him or with the other men. Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., did not think anything of asking Petitioner if she wanted to stay in the room with him because he and Petitioner had stayed in the same hotel room previously on other occasions. During the weeks of February 27, 2009, and March 2, 2009, Petitioner elected to stay in the room with her co-workers rather than in the room with Mr. Morrisseau, Jr. There is no evidence that Petitioner believed Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., was giving her a quid pro quo choice. On one trip to Daytona Beach, Florida, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., and another male employee bought cocaine and brought it back to the motel. Petitioner does not deny that she used some of the cocaine that night. The next morning, the crew, including Petitioner, went back to work at 7:30 a.m. On March 11, 2009, Respondent fired Petitioner. During the hearing, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., testified that he did not fire Petitioner because she used drugs in Daytona Beach. This testimony is contrary to a statement made by Mr. Morrisseau, Sr., in an e-mail dated December 7, 2009. During the hearing, Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., testified that Petitioner was not fired because she was a woman and inadequate to perform the work. However, Petitioner and other employees heard Mr. Morrisseau, Sr., and Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., state that Petitioner and her daughter, as females, were inadequate for the job and/or that women did not need to work out of town. According to Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., he fired Petitioner because, after returning from Daytona Beach, Petitioner's work was not satisfactory. He claims that she failed to report for work because she was using illegal drugs with her boyfriend. He also claims that Petitioner was fighting with other employees, referring to an alleged altercation between Petitioner and her daughter. Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., admitted during the hearing that he had no first-hand knowledge that Petitioner continued to use drugs after returning from Daytona Beach. He did not see Petitioner fighting with other employees. Mr. Morrisseau, Sr., testified at hearing that he had no issue with Petitioner's work the one weekend he went to the Alabama job. According to Mr. Morrisseau, Sr., Petitioner "worked her little tail off" that weekend. The reason Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., gave for terminating Petitioner's employment is not credible. The most persuasive evidence indicates that Mr. Morrisseau, Jr., terminated Petitioner's employment because she was a woman and, in his opinion, inadequate to do the job. Respondent also fired Petitioner's daughter on March 11, 2009. However, Respondent rehired the daughter on March 20, 2009. The daughter worked for Respondent until the company went out of business in June 2009. The jobs in Alabama and Florida were not done properly. Mr. Morrisseau, Sr., had to bring in another company to redo and complete at least five jobs. Mr. Morrisseau, Sr., closed down the business and let all employees go in June 2009. Petitioner was unemployed from March 11, 2009, through January 1, 2010. She is entitled to lost wages for that period of time. However, Petitioner failed to present any evidence regarding the amount of lost wages during the hearing.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order, directing Respondent to cease violating Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 2010.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.68760.01760.10760.11
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JEFFREY DEAN JOHNS vs NASSAU COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 00-003251 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fernandina Beach, Florida Aug. 02, 2000 Number: 00-003251 Latest Update: Dec. 18, 2000

The Issue The issue in this case is whether there is just cause, within the meaning of Section 231.36(1), Florida Statutes (1999), to terminate Respondent's employment as a non-instructional employee for alleged sexual harassment of a co-worker. (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (1999) unless otherwise stated.)

Findings Of Fact Petitioner has employed Respondent as a maintenance worker at Yulee Primary School in Yulee, Florida (the "school") for approximately 18 years. Petitioner has employed Ms. Joyce Sullivan as a food service worker for approximately three years. Respondent and Ms. Sullivan are co-workers. Respondent has no supervisory authority over Ms. Sullivan, has no authority to discipline Ms. Sullivan, and has no authority to affect the conditions of employment for Ms. Sullivan. The material facts in this case transpired over approximately ten minutes during work hours on April 6, 2000. Respondent approached Ms. Sullivan in the back kitchen of the school cafeteria shortly after breakfast and asked to speak to her privately. Ms. Sullivan agreed, and the two moved to the adjacent serving area near the checkout counter in the cafeteria. Respondent asked Ms. Sullivan to pose for pictures that would be nude, semi-nude, or partially clothed and that Respondent would enter into a contest on the internet. Respondent explained that the pictures would not identify Ms. Sullivan because the pictures would be taken from the neck down and that Ms. Sullivan could wear a bikini, a thong, or a bra. Ms. Sullivan asked Respondent what he was talking about. Respondent assured Ms. Sullivan that she would not be identified because the pictures would not identify Ms. Sullivan's face. Ms. Sullivan told Respondent that he was crazy. The entire conversation lasted approximately three minutes. Ms. Sullivan left Respondent and walked to the cash register to "ring up" the school principal who purchased some food. Ms. Sullivan went to an office in the back of the cafeteria with Ms. Sullivan's assistant manager. Respondent went to the back room and told Ms. Sullivan that he would show her some pictures on his computer. Respondent exited the room through the back door of the room to retrieve a laptop computer. Ms. Sullivan and her assistant manager went outside the back room and discussed the situation. Ms. Sullivan was embarrassed. After four or five minutes, Respondent returned to the back room and placed the laptop on the desk in front of Ms. Sullivan. The assistant manager was in the same room at another desk engaged in a telephone conversation. It took about 1.5 minutes for Respondent to turn on the laptop and display some pictures. The pictures included pictures of partially clad women and topless women. The situation terminated after 1.5 minutes when the assistant manager ended her telephone conversation, a child asked Ms. Sullivan to "ring up" some papers, and Ms. Sullivan's manager approached the room. Respondent changed the computer screen to a picture of his daughter and began talking to Ms. Sullivan's manager. Respondent left the school with the computer. Ms. Sullivan reported the incident to her manager, but Ms. Sullivan did not file a complaint for sexual harassment or state to her manager that she had been sexually harassed. Ms. Sullivan's manager relayed the information to Respondent's supervisor who discussed the matter with Respondent. Respondent admitted to the facts and expressed regret. Respondent's manager relayed the information to the Superintendent. The Superintendent investigated the matter and determined that Respondent had engaged in sexual harassment. The Superintendent based his determination on the definition of sexual harassment in the Board's Official Rule 3.54I.C. Rule 3.54I.C., in relevant part, states that sexual harassment consists of: . . . unwelcomed sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other inappropriate oral, written or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: . . . such conduct substantially interferes with an employee's work performance . . . or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work . . . environment. Respondent's request for Ms. Sullivan to pose for sexually revealing pictures was either an unwelcomed sexual advance, request for sexual favor, or other inappropriate oral or written conduct of a sexual nature within the meaning of Rule 3.54I.C. Respondent's conduct substantially interfered with Ms. Sullivan's work performance or created an offensive work environment. The Superintendent testified during cross-examination that he would not have determined that Respondent engaged in sexual harassment if Ms. Sullivan had not said no to Respondent's request. A preponderance of the evidence fails to show that Ms. Sullivan expressly said "no" when asked pose or view pictures. However, a preponderance of the evidence shows that Ms. Sullivan was embarrassed and that the entire episode was unwelcomed and offensive within the meaning of Rule 3.54I.C. Respondent has no previous discipline history. Article VII of the collective bargaining agreement between the Board and its employees prescribes progressive discipline procedures for this case. Except in unusual circumstances, employment can be terminated only after an oral warning for a first offense, a reprimand for a second offense, a written warning for a third offense, and suspension for a fourth offense.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of sexual harassment and suspending Respondent from employment for the time of the current suspension. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry W. Whitmore, Chief Bureau of Educator Standards Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Suite 224E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael H. Olenick General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. John L. Ruiz, Superintendent Nassau County School Board 1201 Atlantic Avenue Fernandina Beach, Florida 32304 Brent P. Abner, Esquire Suite F 4741 Atlantic Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Brian T. Hayes, Esquire 245 East Washington Street Monticello, Florida 32344 Martha F. Dekle, Esquire 806 G Street Post Office Box 1644 Jacksonville, Florida 32207

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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