The Issue Whether the amount collected from the tenants of Corley Island Mobile Manor by the Respondent for improvement and repairs to its sewage treatment plant was a "pass-through charge" as defined in Section 723.003(10), Florida Statutes, or was it collected as a matter of custom between the mobile home park owner and the mobile home owner or disclosed prior to tenancy in accordance with Section 723.031 (6), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Petitioner is the state agency governing the landlord tenant relationship in mobile home parks subject to Chapter 723, Florida Statute. The Park is, and at all times pertinent to this proceeding, has been a mobile home park subject to Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. The Park is owned equally by Respondents, Dale B. Downing, R. E. Downing and H. W. Whitcomb. The Park is operated under the name of Corley Island Mobile Manor. The Park's wastewater is handled through a package treatment plant owned and operated by the Respondents (the WWTF). Under its original configuration, wastewater entered the WWTF through an aeration tank. The Park utilized two separate aeration tanks where the wastewater was agitated and allowed to come in contact with oxygen and enzymes. This started the treatment process. After the wastewater flowed through the first and the second aeration tanks, it spilled into a clarifier. The clarifier is a quiet tank where solids are allowed to settle into a hopper shaped bottom for removal or additional treatment. The clear wastewater at the top of the clarifier flows into a chlorine contact chamber and then out to percolation ponds which allow the wastewater to filter into the ground water through the bottom of the ponds. Prior to November of 1987, the Park was experiencing increased flows of wastewater through the WWTF. The Respondents first investigated the collection system for the infiltration of ground water into the system. The Park also inspected the mobile homes and fixed any leaky faucets, toilets, etc. The Respondents retained Altair Maintenance to examine the collection system using television cameras and to make necessary repairs. On July 8, 1983, Altair Maintenance invoiced the Park for $3,450.00 for these services. Altair Maintenance was called back for additional work in December of 1985 for the repair of manholes at a total charge of $4,124.25. Altair was again called on July 1, 1992 for maintenance of the WWTF at a cost of $1,898.75. Extensive repairs to the manholes and other parts of the WWTF were completed by Roto-Rooter Plumbing. Roto-Rooter was paid $24,090.00 for a May 13, 1983 invoice and $5,891.50 for a July 22, 1983 invoice. Even further repairs to the Park's WWTF were made by Superior Asphalt. It was paid $3,413.00 for replacement of a manhole. The above-described sums were not charged to the residents of the Park. In spite of the maintenance activities described above, the Park continued to experience problems with increased wastewater flows into the WWTF. During peak flow hours (approximately 11:00 A.M.) the normally clear wastewater flowing out of the clarifier into the chlorine contact chamber would become cloudy. This wash through of solids resulted from increased flows during peak flow hours. Wastewater would not remain in the clarifier for a sufficient period of time for the solids to settle out. These solids would spill out of the clarifier or "wash through" causing the wastewater flowing into the chlorine contact chamber to become dark due to the heavy solids content. The agency of state government having jurisdiction over the permitting and operation of wastewater treatment facilities is the Department of Environmental Regulation ("DER"). On November 3, 1987, the DER issued a warning notice to the Park because of an abnormally high amount of solids content and a high BOD level in the wastewater flowing from the WWTF. The DER issued a notice of violation on the same grounds on December 1, 1987. The agency of local government having jurisdiction over the WWTF is the Lake County Pollution Control Department. Respondent, Dale Downing, spoke with an employee of the Lake County Pollution Control Department, Roy Green, to determine the measures necessary to resolve this "wash through" of solids. Green told Dale Downing that he would not be able to make the plant perform unless the Park modified the WWTF by adding a digester and surge tank. A digester is a holding tank for solids, a by-product of the treatment process. Solids remain in the holding tank until removed by a removal service. A surge tank is a large tank placed at the front of a wastewater treatment facility which catches the initial inflow of wastewater. Regardless of the rate of flow into the surge tank, pumps release the wastewater from the tank at a uniform rate. A surge tank allows an operator to balance the flow of wastewater through the WWTF eliminating these peak flow problems. The DER permit for the Park's WWTF was due to expire in January of 1988. The Respondents applied for a new permit but were told that the standard five year operating permit could not be issued because of the warning notices and notices of violation the Park had received because of high suspended solids and BOD levels in the effluent. The DER suggested that the Park get a temporary permit while corrections were being made to bring the plant up to performance standards. Respondent, Dale Downing, traveled to the DER's office in Orlando for a meeting with its permitting supervisor, Lee Miller. Miller confirmed that the Park's only options to alleviate its WWTF problems were a connection to the City of Leesburg's municipal system or the addition of a surge tank and digester to the existing plant. The Park's engineer, Richard Newman, prepared plans and specifications for the addition of a surge tank and digester to the WWTF which were submitted to the DER for approval. The DER accepted the modifications on the condition that the Park eliminate its single-cell percolation pond and construct a two-cell percolation pond system. The modifications were completed by the Respondents. As a result, the DER issued a standard five year permit. The WWTF has been trouble free since the modifications were placed in service. The actual expenses necessary for the plant modifications and the construction of the two-cell percolation ponds were passed through to the Park residents. The total costs of these improvements were divided by the Park's 151 lots and charged to each resident on a pro rata basis ($61,644.31/151= $408.24). The Respondents considered this charge as a "pass-through charge". The maintenance, or lack of maintenance, of the Park's WWTF had no impact on the need for the modifications (capital improvements) to the Park's WWTF. There is competent substantial evidence to establish facts to show that the capital improvements, including the two-cell percolation pond, made to the Park's WWTF by the Respondents were governmentally mandated in that DER would not have granted a permit to the Respondents for the operation of the Park's WWTF without these minimum capital improvements. And, the costs of such capital improvements come within the definition of "pass-through charges" as defined in Section 723.003(10), Florida Statutes. The prospectus for the park discloses in Article VIII that each resident's lot rental amount could be increased to recover the cost of the modifications to the WWTF.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a final order dismissing the Notice To Show Cause filed in this case and any enforcement action against the Respondents. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of June, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5692 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed Findings of Fact 1 through 4, 8 through 13 and 15 through 21 are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order, except where they may be subordinate, cumulative, unnecessary, irrelevant or immaterial. Proposed Findings of Fact 5 through 7 and 14 are rejected as not being supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed Findings of Fact 1 through 26 and 28 through 35 have been adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order, except where they may be subordinate, cumulative, unnecessary, irrelevant or immaterial. Proposed Findings of Fact 27 and 28 are covered in the Preliminary Statement and Conclusions of Law, respectively. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Harper Field, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 J. Allen Bobo, Esquire LUTZ, WEBB, PARTRIDGE, BOBO & BAITTY, P. A. Suite 504, One Sarasota Tower Two North Tamiami Trail Sarasota, Florida 34236 Janet Ferris, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Henry M. Solares, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums And Mobile Homes Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Donald D. Conn, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000
The Issue Whether an amendment to the Lee County Comprehensive Plan, adopted by Ordinance 15-10 on June 3, 2015, is “in compliance,” as that term is defined in section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2014).1/
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Roger Thornberry, Georgette Lundquist, Steven Brodkin, Ruby Daniels, Rosalie Prestarri, and James Giedman, reside in and own property within Lee County. Petitioners submitted oral and written comments to Lee County concerning the challenged Plan Amendment during the period of time beginning with the transmittal hearing for the Plan Amendment and ending with the adoption of the Plan Amendment. Respondent, Lee County (the County), is a political subdivision of the State of Florida with the duty and responsibility to adopt and maintain a comprehensive growth management plan pursuant to section 163.3167, Florida Statutes (2015). Intervenors, RH Venture II, LLC; RH Venture III, LLC; and Greenpointe Communities, LLC (Greenpointe), are the owners and developers of the property which is subject to the Plan Amendment. Intervenors are the applicants for the Plan Amendment. The Lee County Comprehensive Plan (Comprehensive Plan) allocates future land uses based on community plans for 22 distinct communities within the County. The Fort Myers Shores planning community is located in eastern Lee County. Within Fort Myers Shores is a sub-community planning area known as Caloosahatchee Shores, which is located south of the Caloosahatchee River, east of Interstate 75 (I-75), and west of Hickey’s Creek. The southern boundary of Caloosahatchee Shores is the Orange River and State Road 82. Caloosahatchee Shores contains a mixture of future land use designations. The majority of the land is designated Suburban, Sub-Outlying Suburban, Rural, or Urban Community. The subject property is located in Caloosahatchee Shores within an existing 1,978-acre mixed-use golf community known as River Hall. Most of the existing development in River Hall was completed between 2004 and 2009 by the original developer, Landmar Group, which was then owned by Crescent Resources. Crescent Resources declared bankruptcy in 2009. Those portions of River Hall subject to the Plan Amendment were acquired by Greenpointe in 2010. The property subject to the Plan Amendment is approximately 585 acres of non-contiguous land within the existing mixed-use development. All of the property subject to the Plan Amendment is located within the Rural future land use category. The Plan Amendment changes the future land use category of the subject property from Rural to Sub-Outlying Suburban.2/ The density of development allowed in Rural is one dwelling unit per acre and the density of development allowed in Sub-Outlying Suburban is two units per acre. In 2001, the Lee County Board of County Commissioners (Lee County Commission) adopted procedures to encourage community planning aimed at specific neighborhood interests within the County. A coalition of property owners in Caloosahatchee Shores developed the Caloosahatchee Shores Community Plan (Community Plan) between 2001 and 2003. The Community Plan was incorporated into the Comprehensive Plan in 2003 and is codified as Future Land Use Element (FLUE) Goal 21 and its implementing objectives and policies. FLUE Goal 21 reads as follows: GOAL 21: CALOOSAHATCHEE SHORES: To protect the existing character, natural resources and quality of life in Caloosahatchee Shores, while promoting new development, redevelopment and maintaining a more rural identity for the neighborhoods east of I-75 by establishing minimum aesthetic requirements, planning the location and intensity of future commercial and residential uses, and providing incentives for redevelopment, mixed use development and pedestrian safe environments. This Goal and subsequent objectives and policies apply to the Caloosahatchee Shores boundaries as depicted on Map 1, page 2 of 8 in the Appendix. The Community Plan was amended in 2007 and again in 2009. Policy 21.1.5 was added to the Community Plan in 2009, and reads as follows: POLICY 21.1.5: One important aspect of the Caloosahatchee Shores Community Plan goal is to retain its’ [sic] rural character and rural land use where it currently exists. Therefore no land use map amendments to the remaining rural lands category will be permitted after May 15, 2009, unless a finding of overriding public necessity is made by three members of the Board of County Commissioners. It is undisputed that the Plan Amendment removes land from the Rural land use category. It is undisputed that the Lee County Commission did not make a finding of an “overriding public necessity” when it adopted the Plan Amendment. Petitioners allege the Plan Amendment is internally inconsistent with Policy 21.1.5 because the Lee County Commission did not make the requisite finding of an “overriding public necessity” to remove property from the Rural land use category.3/ Respondent and Intervenors argue that Policy 21.1.5 does not apply to the Plan Amendment because the existing development on the property subject to the Plan Amendment is not rural in either character or land use. Respondent and Intervenors introduced abundant evidence to establish that the property subject to the Plan Amendment is suburban development served by the full spectrum of urban services and devoid of any of the trappings of rural development, such as large-lot residential and agricultural uses. Respondent and Intervenors advocate an interpretation of Policy 21.1.5 which requires a finding of “overriding public necessity” only if a plan amendment removes property that exhibits rural character or rural land use from the Rural land use category. The County offered the testimony of Brandon Dunn, one of its principal planners. Mr. Dunn characterized the Policy as an “if/then statement”: if property in the Rural land use category (subject to a plan amendment) exhibits rural character and rural land use, then a finding of “overriding public necessity” is required. Under Mr. Dunn’s analysis, Policy 21.1.5 does not apply to the Plan Amendment because River Hall is a suburban community. Intervenors’ planning expert, Dr. David Depew, testified that the first sentence narrows the application of the second. Dr. Depew testified that the first sentence indicates “we aren’t talking about the category per se.”4/ Under Dr. Depew’s reading, the second sentence only applies to plan amendments which exhibit rural character or rural land use, rather than all plan amendments removing property from the Rural land use category. Neither Mr. Dunn’s nor Dr. Depew’s opinion is persuasive.5/ The interpretation advanced by both Respondent and Intervenors adds language to the second sentence of Policy 21.1.5 limiting its application to only those plan amendments which exhibit rural character and rural land use. The plain language of Policy 21.1.5 contains no such limitation. The policy directs the County to make a finding of an “overriding public necessity” as a prerequisite to removing land from the Rural land use category in Caloosahatchee Shores. The first sentence of Policy 21.1.5 does not constitute a limitation on the directive for a finding of an “overriding public necessity.”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a final order determining that the Lee County Plan Amendment, adopted by Ordinance 15-10 on June 3, 2015, is not “in compliance,” as that term is defined in section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 2015.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent's proposed rule 7D-31.002 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The Petitioners and the Intervenor MLH Property Managers, Inc., contend that the rule is invalid. The Respondent and the Intervenor Federation Of Mobile Home Owners Of Florida contend the proposed rule is valid.
Findings Of Fact Facts stipulated to by the parties Petitioner, Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc. (FMHA), is a Florida nonprofit corporation whose address is 115 North Calhoun Street, Suite 5, Tallahassee, Florida 32301. The agency affected by this proceeding is the Respondent, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (DBR), whose address is The Johns Building, 725 South Bronough Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000. The DBR is charged with the implementation, enforcement and interpretation of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, concerning mobile home park lot tenancies. The DBR also possesses statutory authority to impose civil penalties against a mobile home park owner for any violation of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, a rule of the Department promulgated thereunder, or a properly promulgated park rule or regulation. This proceeding concerns the Respondent's proposed rule 7D-31.002, which was published in Vol. 16, No. 7 of the Florida Administrative Weekly (April 27, 1990). The FMHA is a Florida nonprofit corporation, which is organized and maintained for the benefit of the owners of approximately 1,000 mobile home parks containing a combined total of approximately 300,000 to 350,000 mobile home lots. The owners of the 1,000 mobile home parks comprise a substantial portion of the membership of the FMHA. One of the primary purposes of the FMHA is to act on behalf of its members before the various governmental entities of this state, including the Respondent, Florida Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes. FMHA member mobile home parks are subject to the provisions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, and the rules of the DBR contained in Rules 7D-30 through 7D-32, Florida Administrative Code. FMHA member mobile home parks are required to register with the DBR, to pay annual fees to the DBR, to file prospectuses and pay filing fees for the same to the DBR, to submit advertising to the DBR for approval, and are otherwise subject to the regulatory authority of the DBR with respect to the operation and management of their mobile home parks. Additionally, FMHA member mobile home parks are subject to the DBR's enforcement authority, which includes the power to fine or impose other civil penalties for failure to comply with the above-referenced rules and statutes. Each of the owners of the FMHA member mobile home is engaged in the business of leasing individual mobile home lots to mobile home owners. The mobile home owners lease mobile home lots for the purpose of installing on the lots a mobile home owned by the tenant. The Federation of Mobile Home Owners of Florida (FMO) is a Florida nonprofit corporation whose membership is comprised of over 100,000 mobile home owners residing in Florida. The normal activities of the FMO include, among other things, representing the interests of Florida's mobile home owners before Florida administrative agencies, including DBR and the Division of Administrative Hearings, in rulemaking proceedings and otherwise. Thousands of FMO members reside in mobile home parks which are governed by Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, and the rules adopted thereunder by DBR. Thousands of FMO members were tenants of those parks on June 4, 1984, and thousands more have become tenants by purchasing a home located in those parks from a former mobile home owner who was a tenant of those parks on June 4, 1984. MLH Property Managers, Inc. (MLH), a Delaware corporation, is the managing general partner of MLH Income Realty Partnership V, a New York limited partnership. MLH Income Realty Partnership V is the owner of eight mobile home parks in the State of Florida, each of which contain 26 or more mobile home lots which are offered for lease or rent for the placing thereon of mobile homes to be used as residences. NIH has entered into rental agreements with the majority of residents in each of the parks which have a one-year term, with the intent of NIH that the terms and conditions of tenancy be established on a yearly basis. The NIH parks contain lots which were leased to their present mobile home owner tenants (or their predecessor mobile home owners) prior to June 4, 1984. The full text of the proposed rule which is the subject of this proceeding is as follows: 7D-31.002 Tenancy. (a) A tenancy under chapter 723, Florida Statues, begins when the mobile home park owner and mobile home owner enter into an initial rental agreement as defined in section 723.003(4), Florida Statues, or when the mobile home owner assumes occupancy in the park, whichever occurs first. (b) Once a tenancy begins in accordance with paragraph (1)(a) of this rule, it is continuous and cannot be terminated by the mobile home park owner except pursuant to section 723.061, Florida Statutes. (a) The enactment of chapter 723, Florida Statutes, did not terminate the tenancy of a mobile home park owner which was in existence on June 4, 1984, the effective date of the chapter. Furthermore, chapter 723, Florida Statutes, does not allow or authorize the mobile home park owner to terminate a tenancy in existence on June 4, 1984, the effective date of the chapter, in any manner other than pursuant to section 723.061, Florida Statutes. (b) A tenancy in existence on June 4, 1984, the effective date of chapter 723, Florida Statutes, shall be deemed a tenancy under chapter 723 if, prior to June 4, 1984, the mobile home owner either entered into a rental agreement with the mobile home park owner, or the mobile home owner assumed occupancy in the mobile home park. The rest of the facts The Respondent has previously attempted to adopt a similar rule. In Volume 14, Number 7, of the Florida Administrative Weekly of February 19, 1988, the Respondent published a proposed rule 7D-31.002. The rule proposed in February of 1988 read as follows: 7D-31.002 Fee, Charges and Assessments. For tenancies in existence before June 4, 1984, including any assumptions of those tenancies pursuant to Section 723.059, Florida Statutes, the mobile home owner is not obligated to pay any fees, charges or assessments which were not disclosed fully in writing prior to occupancy, any provision to the contrary in a prospectus notwithstanding, unless the park owner can establish that the fees, charges or assessments have been collected as a matter of custom as defined in subsection (4) of this rule. Furthermore, the mobile home owner is not obligated to install any permanent improvements at all, including those mandated by governmental entities or utility companies. For tenancies created on or after June 4, 1984, pass through charges, as defined in Section 723.003(9), Florida Statutes, may be imposed by the mobile home park owner if the mobile home owner's obligation to pay such charges was disclosed in general terms pursuant to Sections 723.011 and 723.012, Florida Statutes, or pursuant to Section 723.013, Florida Statutes, even though the charge being imposed was not disclosed specifically, and the imposition of such pass through charges is not a violation of section 723.042, Florida Statutes. However, pass through charges may not be imposed if the mobile home owner's obligation to pay such charges was not disclosed generally and prior to occupancy as required by Sections 723.011(2) and 723.012, Florida Statutes, or Section 723.013, Florida Statutes, whichever is applicable. No fee, charge or assessment shall be imposed by a mobile home park owner on the purchaser of a mobile home situated in the park that is offered for sale by a resident of the park and as a condition to the purchaser being reviewed or approved for residency in the park. A fee, charge or assessment has been collected as a matter of custom if it was collected prior to July 1, 1967. In the case of Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc., v. Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, et al., 10 F.A.L.R. 3919 (June 24, 1988), the former proposed rule quoted immediately above was determined to be invalid on several grounds. The proposed rule that is the subject of this case will substantially affect the substantial interests of the Petitioner and each of the Intervenors. A substantial number of the members of the FMHA and the FMO are substantially affected by the proposed rule and the relief sought is the type and nature which these associations may properly seek on behalf of their respective members. Mr. Bob Custer is a Vice President in De Anza Corporation. De Anza Corporation is the owner of Mobile Americana Mobile Home Park. De Anza Corporation is a member of the FMHA. De Anza Corporation purchased the park in July 1976. At that time there was a written lease offered to all home owners in the park. Subsequently, the park offered written leases to home owners in the park. After the adoption of Chapter 723 on June 4, 1984, the park owner filed a prospectus with the DBR, received approval from the DBR, and distributed the approved prospectus to the mobile home owners in the park in 1985. The prospectus contains provisions, including fees and charges, that are different from the earlier offered rental agreements used in the park. The prospectus is the controlling document used by De Anza Corporation in determining increases in lot rent and fees and charges that will be collected during the tenancy. Mr. Tom Keenan is the Vice President for Property Operations for Mobile Home Communities, Inc., which owns and operates 10 mobile home parks in Florida. Each of the individual-parks is a member of the FMHA. Lake Haven Mobile Home Park is owned and operated by Mobile Home Communities, Inc. Lake Haven Mobile Home Park entered into 4 year leases with its tenants, beginning in 1975 and again in 1979. After the adoption of Chapter 723, on June 4, 1984, Lake Haven Mobile Home Park filed and received approval for a prospectus from DBR, which was distributed to mobile home owners in 1985. The prospectus, including the rental agreement therein, contains terms and conditions different from the earlier 4 year leases (including the term of the rental agreement which is changed to annual), and there are different fees and charges which can be collected. Of the 379 lots that are rented in the park, approximately 200 tenants entered the park prior to the delivery of the prospectus. Mobile Home Communities, Inc., operates the park pursuant to the disclosures contained in the prospectus. Ms. Jan West is the owner and operator of Eagle's Nest Mobile Home Estates, a 64 space mobile home park located in Fruitland Park, Florida. Ms. West is a member of the FMHA. Eagle's Nest was developed in the 1930's and purchased by Jan West's parents in the 1940's. Prior to 1987 the rental agreements in the park were all oral. Ms. West does not know the terms and conditions of the rental agreements offered to tenants when her parents operated the park. All 64 of the lots in the park were offered for rent or lease on June 4, 1984, the effective date of Chapter 723. In 1987 Eagle's Nest filed a prospectus with the DBR and the prospectus was approved. All of the tenants of the park signed the lease agreement contained in the prospectus in 1987 when the approved prospectus was delivered. The fees and charges that are included in the prospectus were never disclosed in writing to any of the tenants prior to the delivery of the prospectus. The prospectus is the document that Eagle's Nest uses to determine the landlord tenant relationship under Chapter 723. Eagle's Nest collects lawn mowing fees and special services fees when they apply. Ms. West does not know if there were charges, other than the base rent, that were collected prior to 1987. She does not know if other charges, like late charges, return check charges, guest fees, vehicle storage fees, pet fees, special services fees, or pass-through charges were charged prior to delivery of the prospectus. Lawn mowing fees and maintenance fees were collected prior to 1987. It is a common practice in the industry to use a fixed term lease, or a lease for a term of years, in the prospectus and rental agreement approved by the DBR. The Mobile Home Study Commission was created in 1988 to study problems with alternative dispute resolution relating to mobile home park rents. Chapter 88-147, Laws of Florida. The Study Commission was reauthorized in 1989 for another one year period to study this issue. Chapter 89-202, Laws of Florida. The Study Commission was in existence, in 1988, when the Florida Manufactured Housing Association challenged an earlier proposed rule, 7D-31.002, which regulated the fees and charges that could be collected in mobile home parks. In that case the Division of Administrative Hearings issued a Final Order invalidating the earlier proposed rule on several grounds. That Final Order was affirmed by the First District Court of Appeal. Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 10 F.A.L.R. 3919 (DOAH 1988), affirmed, 547 So.2d 636 (1st DCA 1989) (hereafter referred to as FMHA I). The DBR appeared at the Study Commission in 1990 and suggested legislation to directly overturn the hearing officer's decision in FMHA I. That suggested legislation was virtually identical to the proposed rule at issue in this proceeding. The legislation suggested by the DBR was not adopted. Thirty-five to forty percent of the tenants residing in MLH parks today resided there prior to the enactment of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, on June 4, 1984. MLH or its predecessors in interest delivered prospectuses approved by DBR to all tenants residing in the parks on June 4, 1984, at or before the expiration of those tenants' pre-Chapter 723 leases. The prospectuses delivered to such residents disclosed the manner in which the residents' lot rental amount would be increased, other fees and charges which the resident would thereafter be charged, and the manner in which pass-through charges (for governmentally- mandated capital improvements) would be assessed. In some of its barks MLH has passed on ad valorem property tax increases to park tenants. A number of tenants in MLH's parks are now contending that such charges cannot be passed on to them, even though such charges are disclosed in the park prospectuses which they received after enactment of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, because (the tenants assert) such charges were not disclosed to them prior to their moving into the parks before the enactment of Chapter 723. MLH has no knowledge as to whether each charge disclosed in its approved Chapter 723 prospectuses was disclosed by the previous owners of MLH parks at the time that the original tenant moved onto a particular lot before the enactment of Chapter 723. MLH intends to continue passing on ad valorem tax increases. The prospectuses for MLH parks approved by DBR provide for the collection of a $3.00 annual DBR filing fee. The obligation to pay that filing fee was not disclosed to tenants who moved into the parks before the enactment of Chapter 723 because, at that time, neither DBR nor any other state agency had regulatory jurisdiction over the parks and the legislature did not impose such a filing fee until the passage of Chapter 723 and the concomitant creation of the Bureau of Mobile Homes. As to the years prior to the enactment of Chapter 723, it is sometimes very difficult, if not impossible, for a current park owner to ascertain and establish what fees, charges, and assessments were disclosed to tenants before they moved into a park. There was no central regulatory authority at that time which was charged with the responsibility to monitor such disclosures. There was no required, standardized disclosure document such as the prospectus which is now required of most parks by Chapter 723. Some parks now subject to regulation under Chapter 723 came into existence as early as the 1930's and operated as informal, family-run businesses. Thus, for the industry in general, the records are not available to establish what disclosures were made to tenants who long ago moved in, and still reside in the parks, at the time they initially took up residence. MLH intends to continue the operation of its parks in Florida and, therefore, will be governed directly by the proposed rule, if it is adopted. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 723, there was no statutory limitation on the frequency of rent increases, no requirement that the park owner disclose the factors which would be considered in setting rents, and no requirement of the park owner to mediate rent disputes with statutorily recognized tenant organizations, all of which are now imposed under Chapter 723. All of the approved MLH prospectuses contain the land use descriptions required by Section 723.012(4)(c), (5), (14) (b), Florida Statutes, including a lot layout showing the location and size of all lots in the parks (whether vacant or occupied), the location of all recreation and common facilities, and a detailed description of those facilities. MLH was a member of the Florida Manufactured Housing Association at the time that the Division of Administrative Hearings rendered its opinion in Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 10 F.A.L.R. 3910 (D.O.A.H. 1988) ("FMHA I") and at the time FMHA I was affirmed by the First District Court of Appeal. DBR will apply the proposed rule to the administration of Section 723.031(5),(6), Florida Statutes. DBR will apply the proposed rule to the administration of existing rule 7D-31.001(5), Florida Administrative Code. "Length of tenancy," as used in existing rule 7D- 31.001(5), F.A.C., is not defined by Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, or by existing DBR rules. Nor is the term "tenancy" expressly defined in Chapter 723, Florida Statutes or in DBR's implementing rules. The word "continuous" used in the proposed rule is intended to have its common and ordinary meaning. The resale value of a tenant's mobile home in a park, as compared to the value of a comparable mobile home purchased from a dealer's lot, is significantly higher due to the recreational and other amenities which are provided by the park owner for the tenants' use. The resale value of a tenant's mobile home in a park, as compared to the value of a comparable mobile home purchased from a dealer's lot, is significantly higher if the tenant can pass on to the purchaser of the in-place home a rent schedule which is more favorable than the current rent schedule being charged for a home newly being placed in the park. MLH uses and has entered into fixed-term, twelve-month leases with tenants in some of its parks. Those leases are part of DBR-approved prospectuses for the parks. MLH's parks and other parks regulated under Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, compete vigorously for tenants and are willing to and, in fact, do negotiate long-term leases and even lifetime leases with residents of the parks. It is important to park operators to have the flexibility to modify the prospectus disclosures regarding the use of vacant lots, vacant common areas, and land and improvements devoted to recreation facilities, in order to meet market changes and competition. It is very difficult, and sometimes impossible to obtain unanimous consent of residents in a mobile home park on most issues. In the case of MLH's park at Ellenton, Florida, the park land and improvements are valued at approximately $22,000,000. Yet it would cost MLH conservatively, $56,300,000 to purchase the homes in the park from the tenants. It would cost MLH, conservatively, $9,200,000 to $22,000,000 to move all of the tenants' homes from the park. Moreover, a portion of that required purchase price is for value added to the homes by reason of the placement of the homes in the owner's park. Ninety-eight percent (98%) of the 1000 members in the full park division of the FMHA have parks that contain more than twenty-five (25) spaces. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services licenses a total of 5,500 mobile home parks in the State of Florida. FMHA developed a model prospectus for its members to comply with the law as enacted in 1984. FMHA advised its members to put all potential fees, charges, and assessments in prospectuses although such fees, charges, and assessments may not have been disclosed to the homeowner prior to the homeowner's occupancy in the park or prior to the homeowner entering into his or her initial rental agreement. Mobile Americana Mobile Home Park, a Pinellas County mobile home park, was purchased by De Anza in July, 1976. The park's prospectus number 5200119P was approved and delivered to homeowners in 1985. Since 1976, several leases and rules and regulations have been in effect in the park. The prospectus number 5200119P includes fees, charges, and assessments that were not previously disclosed in prior leases to homeowners. However, De Anza is not presently charging or collecting these undisclosed fees. De Anza manages A Garden Walk Mobile Home Park for MLH. Prospectus numbers 5000867P and 500086P86 are offered in the park. MLH offers various leases in A Garden Walk, including lifetime leases and the leased marked MLH Ex. $9. MLH Ex. #9 was used in the park after 1985 although the exact time of use is not known. Neither De Anza or MLH know what fees, charges, or assessments were disclosed to homeowners by previous park owners. For the last 3 years, De Anza has managed Hacienda Village Mobile Home Park. De Anza sets the rental amounts in its parks and uses the market approach. With the market approach, the park owners arrive at a market rent by comparing the rents in their parks with rents of other mobile home communities of comparable value. The park owners unilaterally arrive at the market value rent. The collection of governmental fees is accounted for in arriving at the market value rent. Approximately 5 to 7 years prior to the enactment of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, De Anza disclosed to homeowners living in De Anza owned parks the homeowners' obligations to pay for increased costs due to governmental actions and increases in taxes. All pre-1984 De Anza leases were subject to Chapter 83. Mobile Americana, Hacienda Village, and A Garden Walk are members of the FMHA. Mobile Home Communities also operates Windmill Village Mobile Home Park. Homeowners in Windmill Village were provided a prospectus in 1985. The prospectus contains terms and conditions that are different from the rental agreement that was in effect from 1983 until 1985. Five of the parks owned by MLH were purchased on July 1, 1987. The other three parks were purchased between July 2, 1986, and 1989. At the time MLH purchased its eight parks each park had an approved prospectus in place. One of MLH's parks, Colony Cove Ellenton, is located in Ellenton, Florida, and offers three separate prospectuses, including prospectus numbers 410024P, 410024P86 and 410024P2. Pages 74, 75, and 76 of Colony Cove Ellenton prospectus number 410024P describe the park's recreational facilities. The park owner, on page 77, paragraph 4(f), reserves the right from time to time to alter or change any of the facilities by the removal, relocation, or alteration of existing facilities or the construction of new facilities. Page 85 of this prospectus provides for the collection of costs incurred as a result of state and local government actions. MLH owns and operates Clearwater Cascade Mobile Home Community of Clearwater, Florida. Prospectus Number 5200525P86 lists each lot, including lot size, as well as describes recreational facilities and common facilities in the park. LaCasa Mobile Home Park, a MLH park, offers at least two prospectuses in the park, prospectus numbers 5800237P and 5800237P86. Prospectus number 5800237P describes the recreational facilities in the park. The prospectus provides for an assessment to homeowners for ad valorem taxes. The park owner also reserves the right from time to time to change any of the facilities by the removal, relocation, or alteration of existing facilities or the construction of new facilities. MLH has not been told by the Division it would not have a right to make modifications to its facilities in accordance with its prospectuses. The prospectuses delivered to homeowners in MLH parks allow for a variety of lease situations. There are no provisions in the prospectuses delivered by MLH which state that a prospectus applies only to persons who were in residence on June 4, 1984. All of the MLH prospectuses include reservation language similar to language contained in the Colony Cove Ellenton prospectus, reserving the right to modify facilities. MLH owns and operates Valleydale Estate Mobile Home Park, which it purchased on July 1, 1987. The Valleydale Estates prospectus contains some fees that were not disclosed to homeowners prior to occupancy. When MLH purchased Valleydale, it did not inquire as to disclosures made to homeowners. MLH also owns Heritage Village Mobile Home Park. Prior to its purchase of the park, MLH did not inquire as to disclosures made to homeowners living in the park. Since 1984, Dr. Faye Mayberry has been the Chief of the Bureau of Mobile Homes. The Division has the duty to review and approve prospectuses. Park owners draft prospectuses and submit them to the Division for review. Approximately 3000 prospectuses have been approved by the Bureau of Mobile Homes. As part of the approval process the Division does not verify the accuracy of the contents of the prospectus, nor does the Division determine if the contents of the prospectus are consistent with rental agreements offered to a particular mobile home owner. Park owners are advised by the Division that failure to cite deficiencies in the prospectus filing does not relieve them of obligations under the law. On January 10, 1985, Rule 7D-30.003 Florida Administrative Code, was adopted. Mobile home parks may offer more than one version of a prospectus in a park. Park owners sometimes submit subsequent prospectus filings that are inconsistent with previously delivered prospectuses. The Division has not established a policy regarding subsequent prospectus filings which contain disclosures concerning the number of lots in the park which are inconsistent with the disclosures in the previously approved and delivered version of the prospectus. Such inconsistencies between the subsequent prospectus and the previously approved and delivered prospectus filings are handled by the Division on a case by case basis. Prior to June 4, 1984, the primary issue of concern for mobile home owners was the mobile home park owners' failure to live up to disclosures that were given prior to the homeowners' occupancy in the park. (TV V, pg. 613). The prospectus delivered to mobile home owners residing in the following mobile home parks included fees, charges, and assessments other than pass-through charges, which were not disclosed to homeowners until after they moved into the parks: Park East Club -- Sarasota, Florida Caribbean Estates -- New Port Richey, Florida River Grove Mobile Home Village -- Sebastian, Florida Hacienda Village -- Winter Springs, Florida Ocean Pines Mobile Home Park - Indialantic, Florida A Garden Walk -- Palm Beach Gardens, Florida The amount for which a mobile home located in a mobile home park can be sold tends to decrease when the lot rental amount charged by the park increases. It costs several thousand dollars to move a double- wide mobile home within a 50 mile radius and set it up again the way it was before the move. /1 Many FMO members have complained to the FMO leadership of prospectuses being delivered in their mobile home parks which include fees, charges, or assessments which were not disclosed prior to June 4, 1984.
Findings Of Fact The Subject Property. The property at issue in this proceeding consists of approximately 66 lots (hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Property"), located in Highridge Estates Subdivision (hereinafter referred to as "Highridge"). Each lot is approximately one-third acre in size. Highridge and the Subject Property are located in Clay County, Florida. Highridge was filed in the public records of Clay County, Florida, as a platted subdivision in January of 1970. At the time Highridge was platted, each lot met the zoning requirements applicable to Highridge. Pursuant to then-existing zoning, each Highridge lot could be developed as a single-family residence by construction or the placement of a mobile home thereon. Adoption of the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan. Clay County adopted the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan"), on January 23, 1992, as required by the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, Part II, Chapter 163, Florida Statutes (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). At the time of the adoption of the Plan, the Plan contained policies which would have permitted lots such as those in Highridge that had not yet been developed to be developed as a single-family residence by the placement of a mobile home thereon. As required by the Act, the Plan was submitted to the Florida Department of Community Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), for review and determination of whether the Plan was "in compliance" as defined by the Act. During the time that the Plan was being considered it was publicly known that the policies which would allow the placement of mobile homes on each of the lots in Highridge might not be accepted by the Department. Petitioner's Acquisition of the Subject Property. During the early 1990's William Bitetti began looking for real estate to invest in. Mr. Bitetti, through the services of Century 21 Lakeside Realty, became aware of the availability of lots in Highridge as a possible investment. Mr. Bitetti was assured by Century 21 Lakeside Realty's realtor that Highridge could be developed by the placement of a single mobile home on each lot. On or about March 25, 1992 Mr. Bitetti entered into a Contract for Sale and Purchase of 56 lots in Highridge. The following condition was included in the Contract for Sale and Purchase: this contract is only conditioned upon Buyer being able to place a Doublewide Mobile Home with attendant well, septic tank and system and electric service on each Lot, to be deter- mined by Buyer's attorney within 2 (two) weeks of the effective date of this contract. Mr. Bitetti intended that the lots would be purchased by the Petitioner, St. William Land Company, Inc. Mr. Bitetti is the sole shareholder and the President of Petitioner. Mr. Bitetti intended that the lots would be marketed for sale as single-family mobile home sites. Mr. Bitetti's attorney, Paul D. Newell, had experience with Highridge, having owned lots within Highridge himself. Mr. Newell was also aware of the language of the Plan that would allow development of the lots in Highridge. Mr. Newell had attempted to keep himself informed as to the progress of the Plan. Mr. Newell spoke to an official of the Clay County Planning and Zoning Department to confirm the language that would allow development of the lots in Highridge was included in the Plan and was told that it was. Mr. Newell also confirmed that regulations in existence at the time would allow Mr. Bitetti to market the lots as intended. The evidence failed to prove that any official of Clay County gave Mr. Newell assurances that the Plan would be approved by the Department as written. Mr. Newell was aware that the Plan had been submitted to the Department for review and had not yet been approved by the Department. Mr. Newell was also aware that it was possible that the Department would not accept the portion of the Plan that allowed continued development of developments like Highridge. On May 21, 1992 the Petitioner purchased the 56 lots in Highridge. Two of the 56 lots were subsequently sold by Petitioner. On or about October 12, 1992, Petitioner purchased an additional 12 lots in Highridge. The 12 lots purchased on October 12, 1992 and 54 of the lots purchased on May 21, 1992 constitute the Subject Property. At the time of purchase, the Subject Property lots could be sold for the installation of a mobile home on each lot pursuant to the law then in effect. The Plan was, however, still being reviewed by the Department. The Subject Property lots have direct access to a publicly owned and maintained right-of-way or to a privately owned platted right-of-way. Alleged Government Action Relied Upon by the Petitioner. On or about July 5, 1992, after acquiring the first 56 lots, Petitioner was issued a permit by the Clay County Building Department authorizing Petitioner to place a mobile home sales model on one of the lots. The evidence failed to prove that Clay County made any representation to Petitioner or Mr. Bitetti, or their representatives, that the policies of the Plan which would allow each lot of the Subject Property to be developed as individual sites for mobile homes would be approved by the Department or that, if it was, the law would not subsequently be changed. Nor did the evidence prove that Clay County represented in anyway that the Subject Property could be developed as Petitioner intended. Petitioner's Alleged Detrimental Reliance. Petitioner purchased the Subject Property for approximately $49,048.18, including closing costs. Two of the 68 lots purchased by Petitioner were subsequently sold. Petitioner realized a profit of approximately $2,582.31 on the sale of these lots. During 1992 Petitioner paid $29,515.37 to purchase and locate a mobile home as a model on one of the lots, to furnish the mobile home, and for landscaping, utilities, and the installation of a well, septic tank and power pole associated with the lot the mobile home was placed on. Petitioner also incurred the following expenses: $1,452.29 for postage associated with attempting to sell lots; $250.00 for charitable donations; $167.66 in bank account service fees; $2,957.85 for hazard and liability insurance; $36.50 in "miscellaneous" expenses; $2,355.72 for ad valorem taxes; and $510.00 in legal fees. Similar expenses were also incurred in 1993. The evidence failed to prove that Petitioner incurred any expenses or obligations for the development of the Subject Property. Rights That Allegedly Will Be Destroyed. Subsequent to Petitioner's acquisition of the Subject Property, the issuance of the permit to place a mobile home sales model on one of the lots and the acquisition of the mobile home and placement of the mobile home on one lot, the Plan was determined to not be in compliance with the Act. In particular, it was determined that the policies of the Plan which would have permitted lots such as those in Highridge that had not yet been developed to be developed by the placement of a mobile home on each lot caused the Plan to be "not in compliance". Clay County subsequently amended the Plan to eliminate the policies that would have permitted lots such as those in Highridge that had not yet been developed to be developed by the placement of a mobile home on each lot. The Plan was determined to be in compliance on April 27, 1993. As a result of the elimination of the policies pertinent to this matter, Clay County was required to modify the zoning for the Subject Property. The Subject Property was zoned for use for the smallest lot size allowed pursuant to the Plan: one-half acre. As a result of the foregoing, most of the Subject Property lots are too small to be developed individually. Pursuant to the Plan, lots that stand alone may be developed by the placement of a single mobile home thereon. Two of the 66 lots stand alone and, therefore, may be developed by the placement of a single mobile home thereon. The remaining 64 lots of the Subject Property are located in contiguous groups and, pursuant to the Plan, must be combined into one-half acre lots or larger. As a result, the Petitioner will lose the ability to sell some number of his lots for the placement of a single mobile home thereon. The evidence failed to prove what the actual economic impact will be to Petitioner if it cannot sell each lot for use as a single mobile home lot. Petitioner was notified by a letter dated August 24, 1993 and a letter to its real estate broker dated January 24, 1994 and a letter to Mr. Bitetti dated February 2, 1994, of the restrictions on the use of the Subject Property. The letters were all from Clay County personnel.
The Issue The issue before the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC) in this proceeding is whether to grant the Petition to Establish the Lakewood Ranch Community Development District Seven (Petition). The local public hearing was for the purpose of gathering information in anticipation of rulemaking by FLWAC.
Findings Of Fact As of June 4, 1984, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided on the property. Some of those ten or more residents were Beverly Leight, William Daniel, Frank Addison, Keith Hellstrom, Faye Koch, and Helen Sutton. As of May 25, 1986, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided. On May 25, 1986, Johnny Owens owned the mobile home in which he resided on leased Lot 10. As of October 28, 1986, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided. On that date, Charles and Pauline Murphy owned the mobile home in which they resided on leased Lot 26. Upon paying the annual fee for southwinds Mobile Home Park, pursuant to Section 723.007 F.S., for the period of October 2, 1987 through October 1, 1988, Respondent Hugh D. Rowles, the park owner, advised Petitioner agency that he had dropped below ten lots available for rent. Respondent had reached this stage by simply not leasing out lots to new tenants as lots were voluntarily vacated by old tenants, and a natural attrition had occurred. The Petitioner's Fees Section accepted Respondent's word on the matter without further investigation, and Petitioner sent Respondent no more statements for the payment of the annual fee. In its business and public records, Petitioner listed Respondent and his park as not under jurisdiction of Chapter 723 F.S. On December 27, 1988, Respondent Rowles still owned Southwinds Mobile Home Park. As of that date, Beverly Leight, William Daniel, Frank Addison, Keith Hellstrom, Faye Koch, Helen Sutton, Johnny Owens, and the Murphys (8 tenants) were still residing in their respective mobile homes on the lots they were leasing from Respondent in Southwinds Mobile Home Park, as described supra. On that date, Leight, who had sold the park to Respondent in 1980, and Daniel, Addison, Hellstrom, Koch, and Sutton had been residents of Southwinds Mobile Home Park for at least three and a half years each; Owens had been a resident approximately two and a half years, and the Murphys had been residents approximately two years. In the park there were also some mobile homes owned' by Respondent which were rented as units--lot and mobile home together. To those individuals who owned their mobile homes and were leasing lots in Southwinds Mobile Home Park, Respondent sent a letter dated December 27, 1988, which provided in pertinent part: To those of you who own your own homes, I want to give you as much advance notice as possible. Sometime within the next few weeks, you will begin seeing land surveyors, soil testing people and others in the park. There is a VERY STRONG possibility that the property will be sold in JUNE of 1989. If and when the property is sold, there will NO LONGER be a trailer park here. It is STRONGLY SUGGESTED that you start making plans NOW for the removal of your trailer. If there is any way that I can assist you in relocating, I will be glad to help you. Until further notice, everything remains as usua1. After serving the letter f December 27, 1988, Respondent served the mobile home owners in Sothwinds Mobile Home Park with no other notice prior to June 1989. Faye Koch interpreted the letter of December 27, 1988 as requiring her to leave southwinds Mobile Home Park. Beverly Leight, on the other hand, understood it to mean that the park might be sold, but not that it definitely would be sold. In January 1989, Mr. Rowles offered Mrs. Koch $1,000 to leave the park by February 1, 1989. She moved out to a larger, better mobile home, after paying Respondent her overdue rent. Respondent rented the mobile home purchased from Mrs. Koch and the lot it was on, as a unit, to another person foil a short while. Rowles also purchased the mobile home of Keith Hellstrom for $1,000, which he likewise rented to someone else as a unit with his lot for a short time, He purchased Johnny Owens' mobile home for $1,000. Thereafter, Rowles sold each of these mobile homes at a loss. The Koch, Hellstrom, and Owens mobile homes were sold by Rowles for $100, $500, and $100, respectively. In March 1989, Respondent Rowles was contacted by a representative of Petitioner, apparently from the Enforcement Section, who had been contacted by Mrs. Leiht, and who advised Rowles of Petitioner agency's position that the tenancies of the remaining mobile home owners in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were subject to the protections of Chapter 723 F.S. Respondent advised Petitioner's representative that he did not regard his park as covered by Chapter 723 F.S. Respondent also requested Petitioner's representative to show Respond.ent that Chapter 723 FS was applicable to him and his park and advised the agency representative that, if he was subject to the agency's jurisdiction, he would comply. Respondent received no written response from the agency until the Notice to Show Cause was filed on July 18, 1989. On April 6, 1989, Respondent and his wife entered into a contract for the sale of the property comprising Southwinds Mobile Home Park to a third party. An addendum to the contract required Respondent to remove or pay for the removal of all personal property (that is, the mobile homes) located on the parcel upon being given thirty days notice from the third party buyer. The contract c6ntemplated that the property would continue to operate as rental property until the new owners elected to close it down or change its function. The closing on this contract for sale still had not occurred as of the date of formal hearing. The purchasers of the property comprising Southwinds Mobile Home Park have never given Respondent notice to remove any personal property from the park, nor has permitting of the property occurred such as would entitle the buyers to demand removal of such personal property. At the time Respondent entered into the April 6, 1989 contract for sale of Southwinds Mobile Home Park, only four mobile home owners were still leasing lots in the park. It may be inferred from the testimony as a whole that these were month to month tenancies. Respondent attempted to negotiate purchase of those four mobile homes. He did not suggest to any residents that they had any other options besides moving their mobile homes out of his park or selling them to him. Mrs. Leight held out for $2,500 and refused to move. She was joined in her refusal by Mr. Daniel, Ms. Sutton, and a Miss Warnock, all of whom were residing in their own mobile homes on Respondent's lots. On June 1, 1989, Respondent notified the fourmobile home owners remaining in Southwinds Mobile Home Park toremove their mobile homes no later than June 30, 1989. Thisnotification is in accord with the standards of Section 83.03(3)F.S. for month-to-month tenancies. At that point, Leight, Daniel, and Sutton were four-year residents There is noinformation as to Warnock's term of residency at southwindsMobile Home Park. On August 4, 1989, Respondent shut off waterservice to the mobile home owners remaining in southwinds MobileHome Park. As a result of Respondent's action, Beverly Leightwas compelled to move out of her mobile home in order to complywith health department requirements. In so doing, she incurredcosts of 4,486, for which she has not been reimbursed; however,she is one of the four remaining mobile homed owners (Leight,Daniel, Sutton, and Warnock) who left the subject property on orbefore October 30, 1989, pursuant to a stipulation with the Respondent whereby the Respondent deposited $10,000 with their attorney pending a judicial determination as to whether themobile home lot tenancies were governed by Chapter 723 or by Chapter 83, Parts II F.S. The Circuit Court action wherein the stipulation was filed had not yet resulted in such adetermination as of the date of formal hearing.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes enter a final order dismissing the Notice to Show Cause. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of March, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 89-4572 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: Accepted: 1-17, 19. Rejected as mere characterization of testimony and argument of counsel: 18 (with footnote) Respondent' s PFOF: Accepted: 1-3, 5-10, 12 Except for irrelevant, immaterial, subordinate or unnecessary material, the following PFOF are accepted: 4 Rejected as containing a conclusion of law: 11 COPIES FURNISHED: Eric H. Miller Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 F.A. Ford, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box-48 DeLand, Florida 32721-0048 E. James Kearney, Director Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Stephen R. MacNamara, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Joseph A. Sole, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 =================================================================
The Issue Whether the discriminatory housing practices alleged in Petitioner's amended housing discrimination complaint were committed by Respondents and, if so, what relief should the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) provide Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a woman of Native American heritage. The record evidence, however, does not reveal that, at any time material to the instant case, anyone outside of her family, including Respondents, was aware of Petitioner's Native American background; nor does the record evidence establish that Petitioner was ever subjected to derogatory remarks about being of Native American descent. At all times material to the instant case, Petitioner has suffered from health problems that have substantially limited her ability to walk and have required her to use a motorized wheelchair to ambulate. Petitioner is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, a resident of Kings Manor Estates (Park), a residential community of single-family mobile homes that is located in Davie, Florida. The Park is one of various mobile home communities that Respondent Uniprop Corporation (Uniprop) owns and operates. Like the other residents of the Park, Petitioner owns the mobile home in which she resides and pays rent to Uniprop for the use of the lot on which home is situated. Petitioner's home occupies lot 78 in the Park. As a resident of the Park, Petitioner has use of the Park's common areas and facilities, which include a swimming pool. There has been no showing that Petitioner has been denied access to any of these common areas or facilities due to her handicap. Residents of the Park must comply with the Park's rules and regulations. These rules and regulations reasonably require, among other things, that residents obtain, in addition to any permits they may need from the Town of Davie, the approval of Uniprop (referred to as "design approval") before constructing any improvements on their lots, including wheelchair ramps. To obtain such "design approval," a resident must submit to Park management a completed "design approval" application form and any supporting documentation. The application form provides a space for the resident to provide a "[d]escription, [d]rawing [l]ocation & [s]ize of [the proposed] [a]ddition." Immediately underneath this space on the form is the following pre-printed language: It is the Resident's responsibility to obtain all governmental approvals, to make certain the proposed improvement is suitable for the purpose intended and that the improvement complies with all applicable codes, standards and governmental requirements. Approval by Management of any improvement is limited to considerations of appearance. Resident agrees to have their home improvements built to the specifications listed above and illustrated in the space above and/or attached drawings, exhibits and permits. It is the responsibility of the Park's property manager, with the help of the Park's assistant property manager, to enforce the Park's rules and regulations. The duties of the Park's property manager and assistant property manager (whose work stations are located in the Park's business office) also include collecting rent from the Park's residents and taking appropriate action when residents are delinquent in their rental payments. There is a "drop off box" located outside the Park's business office in which residents can place their rental payments when the office is closed and the Park's property manager and assistant property manager are unavailable. Neither the property manager nor the assistant property manager is authorized to give residents "design approval." Only the Uniprop regional supervisor has such authority. The property manager and assistant property manager merely serve as "conduits" between the resident and the Uniprop regional supervisor in the "design approval" process. They take the completed "design approval" application form from the resident, provide it to the Uniprop regional supervisor, and, after hearing back from the regional supervisor, communicate the regional supervisor's decision to the resident. At all times material to the instant case, Respondent Delores Maddox was the Park's property manager. Ms. Maddox no longer works for Uniprop. Hazel Crain is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, the Park's assistant property manager. At all times material to the instant case, Milton Rhines was the Uniprop regional supervisor having authority over the activities at the Park. Mr. Rhines was based in Ft. Myers, Florida, on the other side of the state from the Park. Josephine Patricia Silver is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, employed as a sales consultant for Uniprop. In this capacity, she engages in activities designed to facilitate the sale of mobile homes manufactured by Uniprop (to be placed in the Park and other mobile home communities Uniprop owns and operates). Although her office is located in the Park, she plays no decision-making role in Park management. Notwithstanding that it is not her job responsibility to accept rental payments, she sometimes will do so as a courtesy to Park residents when she is at the Park on weekends or during the evening hours and the business office is closed. Although Ms. Silver and Petitioner do not get along, Ms. Silver has never threatened to "throw away" Petitioner's rental payments; nor has she ever told any of Park's residents that Petitioner was not paying her rent. Ms. Silver, however, has "gossiped" and made derogatory comments about Petitioner, but no showing has been made that Petitioner's handicap, her Native American heritage, or her having exercised any of her rights under Florida's Fair Housing Act played any role in Ms. Silver's having made these comments. In August of 2002, Petitioner mentioned to Ms. Crain about her interest in having a wheelchair ramp constructed on her lot. Ms. Crain suggested to Petitioner that she contact the Town to discuss the feasibility of such a project. Petitioner subsequently telephoned Brian Dillon, the Town's chief structural inspector. Mr. Dillon not only attempted to assist Petitioner in her efforts to obtain a permit from the Town to construct the wheelchair ramp, he also helped her make arrangements to have a boy scout troop construct the ramp for her with donated materials. The Town would not issue Petitioner a permit for the ramp unless and until she obtained the written approval of the Park owner, Uniprop. The ramp was constructed for Petitioner by the boy scouts during a weekend in mid-November 2002, without Petitioner's having first obtained Uniprop's "design approval" or a permit from the Town. Prior to the construction of the ramp, Petitioner had received a "design approval" application form from Ms. Crain and, on or about November 12 or 13, 2002, with Ms. Crain's assistance, had begun the application process. Petitioner, however, did not wait to receive the "design approval" she had applied for from Uniprop before giving the boy scouts the go ahead to start constructing the ramp. After discovering that the ramp had been constructed, Park management attempted to "work" with Petitioner to enable her to complete the paperwork necessary to obtain (belatedly) "design approval" for the ramp. On November 21, 2002, Petitioner submitted to Park management the following note from her physician, James Milne, D.O.: Due to Medical Necessity, my patient Mary Helen Meacham requires use of a motorized wheelchair, and it is necessary for her to have ramp access. If you have any questions, please feel free to call my office. By December 5, 2002, Petitioner had yet to submit the design plans needed to obtain "design approval" for the ramp. Accordingly, on that date, Uniprop's attorney, Ernest Kollra, Esquire, sent Petitioner, by certified mail, a Notice of Violation of Community Covenants, which read as follows: Please be advised the undersigned represents Kings Manor Estates with respect to your tenancy at the Community. This Notice is sent to you pursuant to Florida Statute, Chapter, 723.061, Et Seq. Park Management has advised the undersigned that you are in violation of the following Community Covenants of Kings Manor Estates: 7. Improvements: Before construction of any type is permitted on the homesite or added to a home, the Resident must obtain written permission from Management in the form of a Design Approval. Additional permits may be required by the municipality in which the Community is located. 10. Handicap Access: Any Residents requiring handicap access improvements such as ramps are permitted. All plans for such ramps must be approved by Management and comply with all other Community Covenants and governmental standards. You are in violation of the above Community Covenants, in that you have failed to submit plans to Management prior to the construction of your ramp. Park Management has been apprised by the Town of Davie that permits are required and none was obtained by you prior to construction, in compliance with Town of Davie governmental standards. In order to correct the above violation, you must within seven (7) days from delivery of this Notice, remove the ramp from your homesite. Delivery of the mailed notice is deemed given five (5) days after the date of postmark. If you fail and/or refuse to comply with this Notice, your tenancy will be terminated in accordance with Florida Statute Chapter 723.061.[2] If you have any questions concerning any of the above, you may contact Park Management at . . . . Petitioner did not remove the ramp by the deadline imposed by the December 5, 2002, Notice of Violation of Community Covenants. Park management, however, took no action to terminate her tenancy. After receiving the December 5, 2002, Notice of Violation of Community Covenants, Petitioner stopped making rental payments to Uniprop and, instead, deposited these monies with the Florida Justice Institute to be held in escrow until the controversy concerning the ramp was resolved. In or around mid-January 2003, Park management received from Petitioner corrected design plans for the ramp (that had been prepared by Doug Amos of Doug Amos Construction). On January 15, 2003, Ms. Maddox sent to Mr. Rhines, by facsimile transmission, a copy of these plans. Petitioner was subsequently granted "design approval" for the ramp. It has not been shown that there was any unreasonable or excessive delay involved in the granting of such approval. On February 19, 2003, Ms. Maddox wrote the following letter to the Town's Building Department: Please be advised that MaryHelen Meacham Woods is authorized to have permits issued for site #78 at 12620 SW 6th Street Davie, Florida 33325 for the Installation of a handicapped ramp. Thank you for your consideration in this matter. Following an inspection, the Town, in March 2003, issued a permit for the ramp. Petitioner has had use of the ramp since mid-November 2002 when it was first built (notwithstanding that she did not obtain Uniprop's "design approval" and a permit from the Town until some months later). On or about May 30, 2003, Petitioner authorized the Florida Justice Institute to deliver to Uniprop the rental payments it was holding (at Petitioner's request) in escrow. Uniprop accepted these rental payments when they were delivered. Petitioner has had raw eggs thrown at her wheelchair ramp. She suspects that Ms. Maddox's children were responsible for this vandalism, but there is insufficient record evidence to identify the culprits, much less ascertain their motives. On or about August 31, 2004, at a time when Hurricane Frances was approaching the Florida peninsula from the southeast, Park management sent Petitioner a Notice of Violation of Community Covenants, which read as follows: Pursuant to Florida Statute 723.061 et seq, you are hereby advised that you are in violation of the following Community Covenant(s) of which the Community first became aware on August 30, 2004. SECTION I: HOME AND SITE MAINTENANCE - Eachresident shall keep his/her site and home in a clean and neat condition and free of any fire hazards, there is no storage permitted around or under the home or in screened rooms. ALL items must be stored inside the home or storage shed. Although you have previously been furnished a copy of the Community Covenants of the park, and said Community Covenants are posted in the recreation center and business office, a copy of the rule(s) of which you are in violation is attached to this notice for your convenience. Specifically, you are in violation of the above Community Covenant(s) in that Your home, trim and utility shed are dirty, there is growth in the gutters and there is a window air conditioner on the home. In order to correct the above violation of the Community Covenant(s) you must Wash your home, trim and utility shed, paint with colors approved by management, clean the growth from the gutters and remove the window air conditioner within seven (7) days from delivery date of this letter. If you fail and/or refuse to correct the violations of the Community Covenant(s) in the manner listed above, the park will pursue all its rights and remedies pursuant to 723.061 et seq. PLEASE GOVERN YOURSELF ACCORDINGLY It has not been shown that Park management took this action to retaliate against Petitioner for having requested permission to construct a wheelchair ramp on her lot or that such action was motivated by any other improper purpose. Park management has not pursued the matter the further. At no time has Park management initiated legal action to terminate Petitioner's tenancy and evict her. The record evidence is insufficient to establish that Respondents, or anyone acting on their behalf, have said or done anything having the purpose or effect of disadvantaging Petitioner based on her handicap, her Native American heritage, or her having asked to be allowed to build a wheelchair ramp on her lot.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order finding that Respondents are not guilty of any "discriminatory housing practice" and dismissing Petitioner's amended housing discrimination complaint based on such finding. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___ STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of May, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Pleasant Living Mobile Home Park (Pleasant Living) is an established park with 245 lots in Riverview, Florida. It has been in existence for a number of years, and has had at least three different owners, according to the records and testimony presented at hearing. One witness who testified at hearing recalls moving into the park between 1974 and 1975. Since at least 1981, Pleasant Living has had written leases with each of its tenants. For purposes of this proceeding there are two different paragraphs in the lease that are important: (1) Paragraph 5 which limits annual rent adjustments to fifteen percent of the existing rental amount. (2) Paragraph 6 which requires the tenant to pay as additional rent its proportionate share of any increases in real estate taxes, utility assessments, or any other governmental costs or taxes if such taxes or costs increase during the term of this lease. In 1981, published park rules and regulations made it clear to park residents that lot rent includes water, sewer and trash collections. On June 4, 1984, Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, which is also known as "The Florida Mobile Home Act", was enacted. The Division is the state agency charged with the responsibility to enforce the statutes involving landlord/tenant relationships in mobile home parks in which homes are owned by the tenants and are affixed to lots owned by the landlord. Pleasant Living is a park which falls in the category of parks regulated by these statutes. Once Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, became law, park owners were required to file a prospectus or offering circular with the Division prior to entering into an enforceable rental agreement with tenants. The Division was to review the prospectus and decide if it meets the requirements of the act. If the prospectus did not meet the requirements, the park owner was to be notified of the deficiencies. Prospectus number 2900243P was prepared by the owner of Pleasant Living in order to comply with the act. It was filed with the Division in November 1984. As part of the prospectus review process, the park owner was required to complete a Park Owner Filing Statement. The owner notified the Division that two hundred and twenty-two mobile home lots would receive the prospectus being filed. The lot designations and the names of the two hundred and twenty-two tenants in the park on December 18, 1984, were given to the Division. In a separate listing, the names and lot designations of the two hundred and eight tenants residing in the park on June 4, 1984, were also provided. Copies of the two different rental agreements to be offered with the prospectus were also filed. One was going to be used for resales, the other would be used for new sales. The lease that applies to resales is the same lease used since 1981. The lease that applies to new sales contains the same wording as the other lease concerning the payment of additional rent for proportionate shares of any increases in real estate taxes, utility assessments, or any other governmental costs or taxes during the term of this lease. Again, this tenant obligation was found in paragraph 6 of the new agreement. Paragraph 5 provided that rent increases would not exceed an average of ten percent annually. The prospectus filed by Pleasant Living went through the review process within the Division, and after some revision, it was determined that the document met the requirements of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. The prospectus was officially approved on April 26, 1986. The approved prospectus advised tenants that they would receive at least ninety days notice in advance of an increase in rent. Only the new rental agreement originally designated as the one that applies to new sales was referenced in the prospectus. It was emphasized that all lots are governed by this rental agreement, which provides for rental increases not to exceed an average of ten percent annually. The payment of pass through charges by the tenant was also mentioned in the approved prospectus. Tenants were referred to the rental agreement, and were informed that the tenant will be responsible for payment of all costs charged to the park owner as a result of any action by state and local government, or public/private utilities. Tenants were further advised, as follows: The charges may be assessed more often than annually. The costs charged to the Park Owner will be assessed to the tenant on a pro rata basis. Any such increases shall be shared equally by the tenants of all leased lots in the mobile home park. The amount of an increase in pass-through charges shall be limited to the increased costs charged to the Park Owner and maintenance and administrative costs as permitted by Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. As to pass-through charges, the Park Owner cannot with any degree of accuracy disclose the potential financial obligation which the tenant will be responsible for paying. The rent may only be increased as is stated in the above Rental Agreement. The only other increased (sic) to rent will be per the increases that result from pass-through charges created by any governmental (sic) or utility as explained above. Tenancies under the 1981 lease form were still in effect, and the tenants could rely on the representations set forth in them. However, the landlord voluntarily waived his right to any maximum average annual rent increase that exceeded ten percent annually. Pursuant to these leases, which were obligations of contract that could not be impaired by the new laws, these leases were automatically renewed annually. Pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, the landlord informed all tenants that they would receive ninety days notice before any increases in rent occurred, as opposed to the thirty days set forth in the leases. This was a procedural change in the notice requirements that was governed by the new Florida Mobile Home Act. During the 1986 legislative session, amendments were made to the portions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, that set forth the information a prospectus or offering circular is required to contain. More stringent disclosure regarding services, user fees, and lot rental amounts charged by the park owner were required. To reconcile these changes with existing laws, the Legislature allowed previously approved prospectuses delivered to tenants on or before July 1, 1986, to remain valid if the park owner complied with all of the conditions set forth in the newly amended Section 723.011, Florida Statutes [1986 Supp.]. In order to comply with the new disclosure requirements in the laws relating to prospectuses for mobile home parks, the 1986 Pleasant Living park owner filed amendments to the original prospectus with the Division in August of 1986. The amended prospectus was given identification number 2900243P86, and was deemed adequate to meet the 1986 amendments to the statutes on September 26, 1986. When the proposed amendments to the prospectus were examined by the Division on August 28, 1986, the park manager was advised in writing that pursuant to Rule 7D-30.04, Florida Administrative Code, the approved amendments must be delivered to existing tenants prior to the renewal of their rental agreements. The two rental agreements used by the park remained the same after the amended prospectus became the park's disclosure document for tenants who came to the park on or after July 2, 1986. Respondent Wilder purchased Pleasant Living on June 11, 1987. Prior to the purchase, Respondent's predecessor in interest increased the rent to be paid in the 1987 rental year beginning August 1, 1987 by $7.00 per month for the upcoming one year term. Notice was given of the increase on April 24, 1987, to each affected mobile home owner. Notice was also given to the board of directors of the homeowner's association on April 29, 1987. These notices of rental increase complied with all of the procedural and time requirements imposed on the owner by Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. The notices specifically informed the recipients that Hillsborough County increased the ad valorem taxes for the park in the 1986 tax year, during the current term of each lease. The increase per unit was $76.22. Under the annual leases, the increase was payable at $6.35 per month for twelve months, effective August 1, 1987. The pass-through of the increased ad valorem taxes to tenants is authorized by Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, and was disclosed prior to occupancy to tenants who came to the park when the 1981 lease, the 1986 prospectus number 2900243P and the 1986 amended prospectus under number 2900243P86 were in effect. As all tenants who lived in the park prior to 1981 had the same written lease as the 1981 lease, according to the Park Owner Filing Statement completed in December 1984, the landlord had the right to charge additional rent based upon the tax increase. All leases specifically mention the ad valorem taxes, increases in governmental costs, as well as the three utilities: water, sewer and garbage. The notices sent in April 1987 by Respondent Wilder's predecessor in interest, also informed the recipients of the increases in the costs of the following utilities: rubbish pick-up, water charges, and sewer charges. The increase of the cost of rubbish pick-up during 1986 by $20.76 per unit charged by East Bay Sanitation was an increase in a utility charge which occurred during the current term of each lease. Under the leases, the increase was passed on to the mobile home owners. The charges were to be paid as additional rent or pass-through charges for one year at the rate of $.94 per month, effective August 1, 1987. The increase in the cost for water during 1986 by $18.36 per unit charged by Hillsborough County was an increase in a utility charge which occurred during the current term of the annual lease. Under the leases, the increase was passed on to the mobile home owners. The charges were to be paid as additional rent or pass-through charges for one year at the rate of $1.53 per month. The increase in the cost of sewer charges during 1986 by $9.48 per unit charged by Wilder corporation was an increase in a utility charge which occurred during the current term of the annual leases. Under the leases, the increase was passed on to the mobile home owners. The charges were to be paid as additional rent or pass-through charges for one year at the rate of $.79 per month. At the time of the purchase of the park, Respondent Wilder was aware that tenants had been given notice of the additional rent or pass-through charges which increased the payments to the park owner for the use of the lots during the 1987 rental year. The additional rent or pass-through charges were collected by Wilder for the one-year period, as stated in the notices. All of the above listed facts were contained in the agency's files prior to the issuance of the Notice to Show Cause.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended the Division enter a Final Order finding the Respondent not guilty of the alleged violations of Section 723.031(6), Florida Statutes, set forth in the Notice to Show Cause dated July 16, 1990. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER,CASE NO. 90-5933 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #17. Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Accepted for purposes of this proceeding. See HO #9. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. 6. Accepted. See HO #17, #18, #20 - #23. Accepted. Accepted. 9.-21. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #24. Accepted. See HO #25. Rejected. Contrary to fact. The charges related only to increases in charges. Rejected. Irrelevant. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #9 and HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #2 and HO #12. Accepted. See HO #11 - #12. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathryn E. Price, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 David S. Bernstein, Esquire Robbins, Gaynor & Bronstein, P.A. Post Office Box 14034 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 E. James Kearney, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000
The Issue A Notice to Show Cause issued on May 5, 1989, alleges that Respondent violated Sections 723.031(5) and (6), F.S. by increasing mobile home park lot rentals on January 1, 1987 and on October 1, 1987, and by collecting charges for water, sewer and waste disposal from at least one homeowner when such charges were not disclosed prior to tenancy. If it is determined that those violations occurred, it is necessary to recommend an appropriate penalty and corrective action.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to these proceedings, Alfred Herrick has been the park owner of Tan Tara Mobile Home Park, which is located in Melbourne, Florida. Respondent purchased the park in 1980. Eighty-four (84) lots are offered for rent or lease in the Tan Tara Mobile Home Park. Seventy-eight (78) lots are offered to tenants who own their home. Nineteen (19) lots were leased on or after November 1, 1986. The proposed prospectus for the Tan Tara Mobile Home Park was filed with the Division on September 13, 1985. The prospectus was deemed adequate to meet the requirements of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes on December 23, 1983. The prospectus was delivered to homeowners after January 1986. The prospectus review by the Division determines adequacy with Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. The prospectus is not reviewed to determine consistency with rental agreements or disclosures made to homeowners. Park owners are advised that approval of the prospectus by the Division does not relieve the park owner of any requirements under the law. The park owner determines the contents of the prospectus. Homeowners have no input as to the contents of or in the review process of the prospectus. The prospectus for Tan Tara Mobile Home Park contains a number of disclosures, as required by 723.012, F.S., relating to the mobile home park property, and sets out the terms and conditions of the rental agreement between the park owner and individual tenants of mobile home park. Included in the prospectus is the disclosure of all of the charges which may be charged by the park. Paragraph VII. UTILITY AND OTHER SERVICES, provides the following relevant disclosures: Water - Treated drinking water is provided by the City of Melbourne Utilities and is provided to each mobile home site. The charges for this service is [sic] currently included in the tenants' total monthly rental fee. * * * Sewage - Sewage disposal is provided by the City of Melbourne Utilities. The charges for this service is [sic] included in the tenants' monthly rental fee. * * * Waste and trash disposal - The collection of garbage and trash is provided by the City of Melbourne Utilities and is provided for each mobile home. The charge for this service is currently included in the tenants' total monthly rental fee. ... Paragraph VIII. RENT, RENTAL INCREASES AND OTHER CHARGES, provides the following relevant disclosures: The base rent and other charges applicable to your lot are effective January 1, 1985, as reflected in this section. The "base rent" refers to the regular monthly rent established by the Park Owner from time to time. The base rent is subject to annual rent increases effective each January 1st, after ninety (90) days notice from the Park Owner or Management of such increase. * * * "Other charges" refers to "special use fees" and "pass through charges". SPECIAL USE FEES refers to those separately itemized amounts charged in addition to the base rent for those specific items hereinafter set forth. The following special use fees are in effect within the park: Owner reserves the right to charge an Entrance or "Move-in" fee. The present amount charged for this fee in the Park is $1,000.00. Late rental payment fee of $10.00 after the fifth day of the month and $2.00 per day thereafter. Return check charge of $10.00 for each check not honored by the banking institution upon which the check is drawn. An additional charge of $5.00 per month for each and every person over two occupying a mobile home. Extra visitor and/or guest charge of $2.00 per person per day staying more than 15 consecutive days or 30 days total. Lawn maintenance fee, including mowing, edging, and trimming, in the amount of $10.00 for each required maintenance. If it becomes necessary for Management to place the Tenant' s garbage in proper containers, there will be an additional charge of $5.00 assessed to the Tenant for each occurrence. An additional charge of $5.00 per month for a Tenant's washing machine due to the extra water usage caused by the washing machine and also sewerage charges. For the purchaser, there will be a registration fee of $75.00 for investigating any proposed new Tenant into the Park. A new Tenant nonrefundable application fee of $75.00 for investigating any proposed new Tenant into the Park. A garbage and trash "removal" fee not included in the normal garbage or waste removal, of a minimum of $5.00, the exact charge to be determined by Park Management based upon size and weight of such excess refuse so removed by Management. Additional copies of the Prospectus are available at the park Off ice for Tenants requesting same for which there is a charge of $50.00 for each additional copy requested. Pet fee of 5.00 per pet per month. Skirting area clean up minimum fee of $20.00 if tenant fails to do this. * * * PASS THROUGH CHARGES, means those amounts other than special use fees, which are itemized and can be charged separately from the base rent and which represents the mobile home owner's share of cost charged to the park Owner by any State or local government or utility company. These charges will be passed on to the Tenant(s) on a pro rata basis. ("Pro rata basis" means that percentage derived by dividing the number of mobile home spaces leased by a resident by the total number of occupied mobile home spaces in the park.) The pass through charges which may be passed on to the Tenant(s) are as follows: Water charges or increases in same; Sewer charges or increases in same; Waste disposal charges or increases in same; * * * I. Replacement utility costs charged to the Park Owner by State or local government incurred as the result of the actions of any utility company for any utility or other services not provided or available to park residents on the delivery date that replaces, in whole or in part, any utility or other service that is provided or is available to park residents on the delivery date. * * * The above-mentioned pass through charges and costs which are billed by either the State or local governmental entities or utility companies may be passed through to the Tenants after providing at least ninety (90) days advanced written notice to all Tenants. The amount of an increase in pass through charges shall be limited to the increased costs or charges billed to the park owner by the State or local governmental agency or utility company plus any maintenance and administrative costs related to same as is permitted by 723.045, Florida Statutes. * * * (Petitioner's Exhibit #2, pp 11, 61-66, emphasis added) On September 2, 1986, Mr. Herrick gave a notice to all residents within the Tan Tara Mobile Home Park of a "base rent" increase effective January 1, 1987. On June 23, 1987, Mr. Herrick gave a notice of a pass through charge effective October 1, 1987. The notice provided for billing each tenant for the actual usage of water, sewer and waste disposal. In addition, the notice provided that the extra charge for washing machines would be eliminated effective October 1, 1987. Further, the notice indicated that due to the charges for water, sewer and waste disposal becoming effective October 1, there would not be a base rent increase on January 1, 1988. The cost of providing water, sewer and waste disposal, prior to October 1, 1987, had been included in the base rent charged by Tan Tara Mobile Home Park. Mr. Herrick calculated that the portion of base rent for those utilities was $12.50 for each lot. Individual water meters were installed and beginning October 1, 1987, the park owner began assessing all homeowners in the park for water, sewage and garbage based on individual usage. This cost was in addition to the base rent. The park owner also began assessing each homeowner two dollars and fifty cents ($2.50) per month, for meter reading Beginning January 1, 1989, Herrick started deducting from the base rent the $12.50 previously computed for utilities. He then continued to add on the utility charge based on the individuals meter reading. Bonnie and Reginald Charron are residents of Tan Tara Mobile Home Park. They first assumed occupancy in the park in 1982, leasing lot number 18. At that time they were given the park rules and regulations marked Petitioner's Exhibit 6. No disclosures regarding water, sewage, and garbage were made prior to occupancy. On or after August 30, 1984, the Charrons moved to lot 23. No other disclosures were made regarding the homeowners' obligation to pay for water, sewage or garbage. The prospectus was delivered to the Charrons on January 25, 1986. Since assuming occupancy in the park, the Charrons have been continuous residents and have not been evicted pursuant to Section 723.061, F.S. The Charrons paid fifteen dollars ($15.00) extra per month for their three (3) children plus five dollars ($5.00) per month for the washing machine. Mrs. Charron was advised the five dollars ($5.00) per person was required to cover the cost for extra water and sewage being used by those persons. When the Charrons began to pay for water, sewage and garbage based on individual usage) the fifteen dollars ($15.00) per month was never deducted from the base rent. Since October 1, 1987, the Charrons cost for water, sewage, and garbage has exceeded twelve dollars and fifty cents ($12.50) per month. Peggy E. Headley is a resident of Tan Tara Mobile Home Park. She moved into the park in September of 1982. On August 23, 1982, she was given the park rules and regulations marked Petitioner's Exhibit 8. No other disclosures were made regarding her obligation to pay for water, sewage and garbage. The prospectus was delivered to Mrs. Headley on January 25, 1986. Mrs. Eddie Walters is a resident of Tan Tara Mobile Home Park. She moved into the park in May of 1977. At that time, she received a copy of the park rules and regulations. On January 16, 1986, she received the prospectus. Respondent stipulated that water, sewage, and garbage charges have not been collected from homeowners as a matter of custom. It is undisputed that prior to occupancy in the mobile home park, the tenants listed above did not receive a disclosure from the park owner that they would be responsible for paying pass through or pass on charges as defined in the park prospectus. The rules and regulations which were in effect in the park were amended at various times, and at various times provided that water would be included in the base rent and/or that the park owner may charge separately for water. The set of rules and regulations attached to the prospectus provided that the management reserved the right to assess "pass through charges", including for water, on a pro rata basis. "Pro rata basis" is defined in the rules and regulations in the same manner as defined in the prospectus: "...that percentage derived by dividing the number of mobile home spaces leased by a resident by the total number of occupied mobile home spaces in the park." (Petitioner's Exhibit #2, p. 73) Neither the prospectus nor the rules and regulations provide for collection of water or other utilities based on individual usage. Oral lot rental agreements are in effect in Tan Tara Mobile Home Park. No written lot rental agreements have ever been executed between homeowners and the Respondent or prior park owners of Tan Tara. The term of the oral lot rental agreements is one year and begins January 1 of each year. Respondent has not been required by any governmental agency to install individual water meters or assess homeowners based on usage. However, an official with the City of Melbourne Water and Sewage Operations recommended installing individual meters as a means of finding out where the water was going. Herrick had contacted the city regarding high water and sewer bills. After the meters were installed the city noted an average monthly reduction of 173,200 gallons of water at the park. Water charges within the park are determined by reading individual meters which are located on each individual lot within the mobile home park. The meter readings are forwarded to New York, where Mr. Herrick maintains his residence and main business. A bill for water usage is sent from New York to each tenant and the payment is received in the New York office. Water usage records are kept each month by the New York office in order to determine water usage and the appropriate billing rates for water and sewer for individual residents.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered finding that Alfred Herrick, d/b/a Tan Tara Mobile Home Park violated Section 723.031(5), F.S., and requiring that: Respondent immediately cease assessing homeowner for utilities based on individual usage, and Respondent reimburse to each homeowner all sums collected since October 1, 1987, for utilities over and above that sum that would have been collected under a "pro rata" computation as described in the prospectus and park regulations. This latter computation should credit the homeowners for the $12.50 collected each month from October 1, 1987 until January 1, 1989. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 15th day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Debra Roberts Asst. General Counsel Dept. of Business Regulation 725 S. Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 David D. Eastman, Esquire P.O. Box 669 Tallahassee, FL 32302 James Kearney, Director Dept. of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 S. Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1060 Joseph A. Sole General Counsel Dept. of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 S. Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000 Stephen R. MacNamara Secretary Dept. of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 S. Bronough St. Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000 =================================================================
