The Issue Whether Respondent, a day-care center, committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and if so, the penalties Petitioner should impose against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the regulatory authority responsible for licensure and enforcement of day-care centers in Florida. Respondent is a day-care center in Miami, Florida, and currently holds child care license C11MD0340. Respondent has operated as a day-care center since April 19, 1990. At the time of the formal hearing, Kevin Lennon was the owner and operator of Respondent. S.B. and L.B. are young sisters who stayed at Respondent’s day-care center in July 2014. On July 9, 2014, one of Respondent’s employees gave S.B. and L.B. a small cup of Cheez-Its as a snack. Mr. Lennon was present when the two girls were sharing the cup of Cheez-Its. After S.B., who is the older and bigger child, finished her share of the Cheez-Its, S.B. began to hit her sister to take her sister’s share of the Cheez-Its. Mr. Lennon separated the two girls and permitted L.B. to eat her share of the Cheez-Its. Mr. Lennon testified, credibly, that he did not take the Cheez-Its from S.B. to punish S.B. Petitioner offered no competent, credible evidence to refute Mr. Lennon’s testimony. On March 25, 2014, Petitioner received from Respondent an “Application for a License to Operate a Child Care Facility” (the application). Mr. Lennon completed the application on behalf of Respondent. The application contained an attestation section that required Mr. Lennon’s signature to be notarized. On March 25, 2014, Petitioner received an attestation section (first attestation section) signed by Kevin Lennon on February 28, 2014. The first attestation section contains Ivanne Albarran’s notary seal and a signature dated February 28, 2014. Mr. Lennon testified, credibly, that he signed the first attestation section as Kevin Lennon. Mr. Albarran testified, credibly, that he signed the first attestation section as the notary public. Petitioner offered insufficient evidence to refute that testimony. The application package contains a second attestation section that was received by Petitioner on March 28, 2014. The second attestation section contains Mr. Lennon’s signature and a date of March 26, 2014. The second attestation section contains Mr. Albarran’s notary seal and a signature dated March 28, 2014. Mr. Lennon testified, credibly, that he signed the second attestation section as “Kevin Lennon.” Mr. Albarran testified, credibly, that he signed the second attestation section as the notary public. Petitioner offered no competent, credible evidence to refute that testimony.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Howard J. Hochman, Esquire Law Offices of Howard J. Hochman 7695 Southwest 104th Street, Suite 210 Miami, Florida 33156 (eServed) Karen A. Milia, Esquire Department of Children and Families 401 Northwest Second Avenue, Suite N-1014 Miami, Florida 33128 (eServed) Paul Sexton, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Rebecca Kapusta, Interim General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed) Mike Carroll, Secretary Department of Children and Families Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed)
The Issue Whether the Petitioners are entitled to participate in the Florida Retirement System (FRS).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (Respondent or Department), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering the FRS. Accordingly, the Respondent must resolve as part of its normal course of duties whether or not individuals are eligible to participate in the FRS. The Petitioner, Eric Eggen, is an attorney authorized by the Florida Bar to practice law within the State of Florida. Mr. Eggen has practiced law since 1974. On March 15, 1991, Mr. Eggen was appointed by the Chief Judge of the First Circuit to serve as a "part time Child Support Hearing Officer." Mr. Eggen was directed to perform such duties as part of a program that coordinates the enforcement of child support. Although Florida's First Circuit encompasses more than two counties, the vast majority of Mr. Eggen's work has been performed for and funded primarily by Escambia County and Santa Rosa County. The child support program pertinent to these cases is a federally funded program that channels monies from the federal government to local governments through the State Department of Revenue. Local governments are required to "match" a certain percentage in order to receive the federal funds. In these cases, the First Circuit (when the program was initiated) decided to use non-Article V hearing officers to perform the work. This process had been approved by the Florida Supreme Court and allows the judges of the First Circuit more time to perform their other responsibilities. Accordingly, for reasons not fully set forth in this record, Mr. Eggen was selected to be the hearing officer for the First Circuit child support enforcement program. How or by whom Mr. Eggen would be compensated for his efforts was not set forth by any written document. He was simply designated by the Chief Judge to be the person who would do the work. The work consisted of conducting child support hearings to determine whether child support was owed, whether someone had the ability to pay child support, and whether someone might be willfully refusing to pay child support. Issues such as paternity required an Article V judge. Mr. Eggen was not authorized to make such determinations. Initially the work was considered part-time, but as the volume of cases increased over time Mr. Eggen's ability to perform other legal work diminished. He maintains that the child support enforcement work now consumes his full-time schedule. Exactly when Mr. Eggen went to full-time work as a hearing officer was not proved. The contracts governing how monies are treated by Escambia County and Santa Rosa County do not include any specification regarding the Petitioners by name. Presumably any individual performing Mr. Eggen's duties would be entitled to the compensation he receives for the work performed. In fact, when Mr. Eggen substitutes for another hearing officer he is similarly compensated. Mr. Eggen does not have a permanent office within the court facilities, does not receive office supplies through the court or county facilities, and does not have sick leave or annual leave through any agency. When Mr. Eggen performs the work, he is paid by submitting invoices to the counties for whom the work is performed. Neither the First Circuit, the Court Administrator's Office, nor the Department of Revenue pays Mr. Eggen directly for the work performed. In remitting funds to Mr. Eggen the counties do not deduct social security, withholding, or any other amount such as medical insurance costs. There is no evidence that Mr. Eggen receives any benefits such as medical insurance, dental insurance, or deferred compensation through any entity. Further, there is no evidence that those types of benefits were made available to Mr. Eggen but declined by him. Typically those types of benefits are available to full- time state employees. At all times prior to the initiation of these cases, the Petitioner Eggen held himself out as "self-employed." Mr. Eggen's work as a hearing officer did not preclude him from representing private clients on matters not in conflict with his role as the child support enforcement hearing officer. The extent of Mr. Eggen's private practice before the volume of child support enforcement hearings caused him to work full-time as a hearing officer is not proved. Whether or not he could perform other legal work at this time is also unknown. The Petitioner Munro is a full-time employee of Mr. Eggen. She is paid a salary and receives a W-2 from Mr. Eggen. Her services to the child support enforcement program are billed to the counties at a daily rate as "clerical assistance." Mrs. Munro designates herself as a "judicial assistant." Mr. Eggen uses monies from the paid county invoices to partially fund Mrs. Munro's monthly wage. Mrs. Munro was hired by Mr. Eggen in approximately 1975. No one from the counties, the Court Administrator's Office, or the Judges of the First Circuit had any input to Mr. Eggen's selection of Mrs. Munro. No one from those entities can fire Mrs. Munro, discipline her, reward her, or pay her. Her sole source of remuneration flows through Mr. Eggen. How Mrs. Munro accounts for her work time to Mr. Eggen was not proved. Neither Mr. Eggen nor Mrs. Munro is required to account for time spent on child support cases to the Court Administrator's Office, the Judges of the First Circuit, or the Department of Revenue. The Petitioners Eggen and Mrs. Munro set the hearing schedule for the child support cases, coordinate the hearings with court space available to conduct the cases, and complete the paperwork associated with the cases at their own designated pace. No one instructs Mr. Eggen as to when he must work, how he must work, or whether he must work. If Mr. Eggen chose not to work, he would not be paid. The completion of the work drives the payments. No work and no invoice to counties would lead to no compensation to Mr. Eggen. Whether Mrs. Munro would be paid by Mr. Eggen under those circumstances was not proved. Neither Petitioner is identified or specified as an employee of the Court Administrator's Office. Neither Petitioner is identified or specified as an employee of the First Circuit. Neither Petitioner is identified or specified as an employee of the Department of Revenue. Neither Petitioner holds a position or job classification that has been identified, specified, or funded by the Florida Legislature. Prior to the initiation of this action, neither Petitioner had ever publicly claimed to be a "state employee." There is no evidence that either Petitioner received a statement of benefits accrued from any state entity setting forth the Petitioners' entitlements or declined benefits. Whether or not any entity pays workers' compensation, leave, or insurance benefits for the Petitioners was not proved. There is no evidence that any state, court or county agency does so. The Court Administrator of the First Circuit is a state agency as contemplated by Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. When the Petitioners first believed they were entitled to benefits as an "officer" or "state employees" was not proved. Clearly, the first claim for FRS entitlement was not filed until 2001, some ten years after Mr. Eggen had been designated to do the work as a child support enforcement hearing officer. Other child support enforcement hearing officers who are considered "state employees" for purposes of working through the Court Administrator's Office are designated "OPS." As such, those employees are not eligible to participate in the FRS nor do they receive other benefits afforded to state employees.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, issue a Final Order denying eligibility to these Petitioners. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of April 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Sarabeth Snuggs, Interim Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Division of Retirement Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 George R. Mead, II, Esquire Moore, Hill & Westmoreland, P.A. SunTrust Tower, Ninth Floor 220 West Garden Street Pensacola, Florida 32501
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed an act of violence or used force on any person except in the lawful protection of one's self or another from physical harm and, therefore, should have his license renewal as a Class "D" Security Officer denied pursuant to Section 493.6118(1)(j) and (2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Michael S. Snow, was at all times relevant to these proceedings a licensed Class "D" Security Officer. The Respondent is the agency that licenses and regulates security officers pursuant to Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. On or about April 12, 2003, the Petitioner filed an application to renew his license as a Class "D" Security Officer. The Respondent advised the Petitioner by letter of its intent to deny his application; the Petitioner requested a hearing; and these proceedings ensued. Subsequently, the Respondent amended its letter of denial, and the letter of August 14, 2003, (Second Amended Administrative Denial of License), constitutes the charging document. That letter states that the application is denied because of the applicant's failure to qualify under Section 493.6118(1)(j), Florida Statutes, because the applicant committed an act of violence or used force on another person that was not for the lawful protection of himself or another. At the hearing, Union County Deputy Sheriff Terry Cranford was called to testify. Deputy Cranford identified an affidavit that he had prepared on November 24, 2002, in relation to an investigation in which the Petitioner was the alleged perpetrator of abuse of an 18-month old child. The affidavit, Respondent's Exhibit numbered 1, was prepared by the deputy after he had interviewed various witnesses in the case; however, the deputy did not observe any of the alleged conduct. The deputy did observe the child on November 22, 2002, during the course of his investigation. The alleged incident, which involved the Petitioner striking the child in the face, took place on November 21, 2002, some 24 hours earlier. The deputy did not mention in his affidavit any injuries he observed. The deputy did not testify at hearing to any injuries to the child. The deputy stated that the child was too young to provide any information on the incident. The deputy's investigative focus at the time he prepared the affidavit was on the mother of the child and another relative. He did not interview the Petitioner. All the information that he obtained about the Petitioner's involvement was through the Child Protective Investigator, Ms. Joiner. The Respondent called Janice Joiner, an investigator with the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), who testified regarding her investigation of the incident. Like the deputy, above, Ms Joiner did not observe the incident. It is clear from her testimony and that of the child's mother, that the child's natural father reported the incident. He picked up the child from the daycare on the afternoon of November 21, 2002, and raised questions about the red handprint on the child's face. As a result of the investigation, DCFS initiated a dependency action, which precluded with the right of the child's mother to have custody of the child during the investigation, legal proceedings, and subsequent mediation between attorneys representing the child's mother and father. As a result of the investigation initiated by the child's father, his ex-wife, the child's mother, had to agree to end her relationship with the Petitioner. Ms. Joiner testified regarding what the Petitioner told her. He admitted he struck the child while putting the child in his car seat, when the child grabbed his uniform epaulet and would not let go. Ms. Joiner opined that this was abusive, and stated that the doctor who examined the child said it was abusive. Ms. Joiner did not state upon what information she based this opinion. She mentioned the handprint she saw on the day following the incident, which she described as faint. The Petitioner entered pretrial intervention on the charges brought against him, and successfully completed the program which called for him, to among other things, attend parenting and anger management classes. He was never tried; has never plead or been found guilt of any offense related to this incident; and his civil rights were never affected.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department issue the Petitioner a Class D Security Officer's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael S. Snow Post Office Box 1131 MacClenny, Florida 32063 Michael T. McGuckin, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Division of Licensing Post Office Box 6687 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6687 Brenda D. Hyatt, Bureau Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Mail Station 38 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6687 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6687
