The Issue (1) Whether facts and circumstances demonstrate the existence, on August 20, 2019, of an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the students of Championship Academy of Distinction at Davie, Inc.-5422 d/b/a "Championship Academy" ("Championship") justifying the immediate termination of its charter by the Broward County School Board ("School Board") pursuant to section 1002.33(8)(c); and (2) whether the School Board formulated one or more agency statements that constitute unadopted rules, in violation of section 120.54(1)(a), and applied one or more of those unadopted rules as the basis for its agency action immediately terminating Championship's charter.1 1 Championship's rule challenge petition, as filed, also challenged an adopted School Board rule under section 120.56(3). This challenge was abandoned at the beginning of the final hearing.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Championship is a Florida not-for-profit corporation that holds the charter for numerous charter schools throughout Florida, including in Broward County, Florida. Championship was the holder of the charter for Championship Academy of Distinction at Davie, Inc., the charter school for which the charter was immediately terminated by the School Board on August 20, 2019.4 Pursuant to Article IX, section 4 of the Florida Constitution, the School Board is the political subdivision that operates, controls, and supervises all district public schools in Broward County, Florida.5 3 CS for CS Senate Bill 7030 (2019) substantially amended section 1006.12, Florida Statutes, regarding safe-school officers. This legislation was published as chapter 2019-22, Laws of Florida (2019) and has been codified in numerous Florida Statutes, including section 1006.12. 4 For purposes of this Final Order, including the stipulated facts, all references to "Championship" are to the Championship Academy of Distinction at Davie, Inc., the charter school for which the charter was terminated on August 20, 2019. 5 The School Board is an educational unit, as that term is defined in section 120.52(6), and, therefore is an "agency" for purposes of chapter 120. Pursuant to section 1002.33(8), Florida Statutes, the charter termination proceeding is conducted pursuant to sections 120.569 and In Florida, charter schools are nonsectarian public schools that operate pursuant to a charter contract with a public sponsor. § 1002.33(1), Fla. Stat. In this case, the School Board is the sponsor for Championship. Stipulated Facts At a regularly scheduled meeting, the School Board approved a renewal Charter School Agreement (the "charter"), dated April 5, 2016, with Championship. The charter became effective on July 1, 2016, for a term of five years. At a regularly scheduled meeting on August 20, 2019, the School Board voted to immediately terminate Championship's6 charter pursuant to section 1002.33(8)(c). As the basis for its action, the School Board concluded that the particular facts and circumstances indicated that an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of Championship's students existed on that date, due to Championship's failure to comply with and implement the requirements of section 1006.12, by failing to arrange for the assignment of one or more safe-school officers for the protection and safety of students, school personnel, and property, without interruption, during all school hours of every school day, and for repeatedly allowing a licensed security guard other than a safe-school officer to possess a firearm on Championship's campus in violation of section 790.115(2)(a), Florida Statutes. The School Board's notice of termination of the charter was delivered to Championship on August 22, 2019. The first day of the 2019-2020 school year for the students at Championship was Wednesday, August 14, 2019. Students attended classes at Championship on Wednesday, August 14, through and including Friday, 120.57(1). Additionally, pursuant to section 1001.41(2), Florida Statutes, the School Board is required to adopt its policies pursuant to the rulemaking procedure in section 120.54. 6 In the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, the parties interchangeably refer to "Championship" and the "Charter School." For consistency, the stipulated facts in this Final Order are modified to refer to "Championship." August 16, 2019, and on Monday, August 19, through Thursday, August 22, 2019. Pursuant to section 1022.33(8)(c), Florida Statutes, the School Board assumed operation of Championship after it immediately terminated Championship's charter. On August 14, 2019, Championship had an armed security guard, rather than a safe-school officer pursuant to one of the four options authorized and required by section 1006.12, present on its campus. On August 15, 2019, Championship had an armed security guard, rather than a safe-school officer pursuant to one of the four options authorized and required by section 1006.12, present on its campus. On August 14, 2019, Detra Adams observed a person sitting behind the front desk at the Charter School. Championship's principal, Todd Dupell, told her that that person was an armed guard. On August 15, 2019, starting at approximately 2:37 p.m., a police officer from the Davie Police Department was present on Championship's campus. A police officer from the Davie Police Department was present on Championship's campus during all school hours on Friday, August 16, 2019; during all school hours on Monday, August 19, 2019; and during all school hours on Tuesday, August 20, 2019. On August 19, 2019, Broward County Schools Superintendent Robert Runcie, Leslie Brown, and School Board Deputy General Counsel Robert Vignola received a copy of an email dated August 16, 2019, from Davie Police Department Captain Christopher Chastain to Todd Dupell, stating, in part: We will meet with the Town Administrator Monday morning to finalize everything. In the interim[,] there will be an officer at your location on school days. We hope to have an approved agreement ready for signing by Monday afternoon which will provide you with what is being requested by the county. Runcie stated the following during the School Board meeting on August 20, 2019: "I know, I think it was late on Thursday afternoon, and certainly on Friday when we checked, there was a full-time officer there from the City of Davie." Brian Katz, the School Board's Chief Safety, Security, and Emergency Preparedness Officer, stated the following regarding whether the Charter School was in compliance with section 1006.12, during the School Board meeting on August 20, 2019: "as of today [August 20, 2019], they are." School Board member Nora Rupert stated the following regarding a written communication she received from the Mayor of Davie, Judy Paul, during the School Board meeting on August 20, 2019: The Mayor of Davie, Judy Paul, says there presently are Davie officers in the three Davie charter schools, and the executed agreement will be forwarded, specifically, Championship, excuse me, when completed today. We take care of our own, ["]we["] meaning their city. They've always been a very good, good partner with us. I asked if I could say this publicly, and she said yes. This is for the public record. I also forwarded it to the attorney, as well as the Superintendent the minute I received it, and just so my colleagues could have that information, I had to say it here. Vignola stated the following during the School Board meeting on August 20, 2019: If there's an officer there [at Championship] now and . . . if there is a representation from appropriate officials in the City [Town of Davie] that they see themselves as having a binding obligation to provide safe-school officer coverage with continuity, that goes to your threshold question of whether immediate termination is appropriate. The following exchange occurred between School Board member Laurie Rich Levinson and Vignola during the School Board meeting on August 20, 2019: Levinson: "So, Mr. Vignola, I know it's a difficult question, but legally, where are we? As of today, we are going to have an agreement with the Town of Davie that this school is covered, so as of today, we're not able to terminate a contract." Vignola: "If we get that representation from the city, I think that I would counsel voting against immediate termination." School Board member Donna Korn stated the following during the meeting of the School Board on August 20, 2019: "Do I believe that our decision will be overturned? Unfortunately, to the extent we have a very mixed message, I do." Vignola stated the following at the meeting of the School Board on August 20, 2019: Right now, today, they have, as I've been—it's been reported to me, they have a safe[-]school officer on campus today that would be compliant. As for what they have down the road, the law is not very clear as to an obligation. There's nothing in here that says have a contract in place. At an emergency meeting held on August 27, 2019, the School Board voted against immediately terminating its charter school agreement with The National Ben Gamla Charter School Foundation, Inc. ("Ben Gamla Charter School"), pursuant to section 1002.33(8)(c), concluding that the particular facts and circumstances did not indicate that an immediate and serious threat to the health, safety, or welfare of that charter school's students existed on August 27, 2019. The School Board was aware, at its August 27, 2019, meeting that the security guard at the Ben Gamla Charter School campus was not a certified guardian pursuant to section 1006.12. School Board member Dr. Rosalind Osgood stated the following during the August 27, 2019, meeting of the School Board regarding the Ben Gamla Charter School: It was a problem because there were not enough law enforcement officers in the whole state even available to meet the demands of the legislature, so we had to be very creative in the way that we made decisions to keep our kids in the traditional public schools safe[,] with requiring that they have military or law enforcement background and training, which again, we keep hearing limited the pool, but it's the . . . safest way that we can address it. Runcie stated the following during the meeting of the School Board on August 27, 2019, regarding the Ben Gamla Charter School: "[s]o I think they're [Ben Gamla Charter School] working to try to get to a point where they have a sustainable plan, but if they currently have a plan, no matter how short-term it is, and they're able to have a safe[-]school officer on campus, they're technically in compliance." Chief of the Plantation Police Department, W. Howard Harrison, stated during the meeting of the School Board on August 27, 2019, that the Plantation Police Department did not provide any officers for the campus of Ben Gamla Charter School on August 14 through 16, and August 26, 2019. A Plantation Police Department Officer was provided to Ben Gamla Charter School for half a day on August 19, 2019, and an officer from the Broward County Sheriff's Office provided coverage for August 27, 2019. The School Board did not designate, assign, or provide any safe-school officers at Championship for the 2019-2020 school year. Championship timely filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearings with the School Board, requesting an administrative hearing on the School Board's immediate termination of its charter. The School Board referred Championship's request for hearing to DOAH on September 11, 2019. Findings of Fact Based on Evidence at Final Hearing Safe-School Officer Statute In response to the tragic school shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School that occurred on February 14, 2018, the Florida Legislature enacted the Marjorie Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act, a portion of which is codified at section 1006.12, the statute titled "Safe-school officers at each public school." Certain provisions of section 1006.12 have given rise to the matters in dispute in these consolidated proceedings. School Board Communications and Actions Regarding Charter School Compliance with Section 1006.12 On or about March 8, 2019, the Florida Department of Education ("DOE") contacted the School Board, requesting information regarding the status of compliance, by all public schools in the Broward County Public Schools District ("District"), including charter schools, with the statutory requirement in section 1006.12 for a safe-school officer to be present at each school. The request set a March 22, 2019, deadline for each school in the District, including charter schools, to provide that information to DOE. The School Board contacted all charter schools in the District, requesting that they provide the information requested by DOE by March 22, 2019. Championship did not provide the requested information by that date. The amendments to section 1006.12 enacted as part of SB 7030 became law on May 8, 2019. On May 15, 2019, Katz conducted an informational meeting with charter school personnel to inform them of the requirements of newly- amended section 1006.12, and to provide instructions to upload compliance documentation into the Charter.Tools application. Dupell attended the meeting. On June 28, 2019, Commissioner of Education Richard Corcoran sent a letter (the "Corcoran Letter") to the representatives of charter schools regarding compliance with newly-amended section 1006.12. The letter provided information regarding the options for meeting the requirement to have at least one safe-school officer present on campus while school is in session. The Corcoran Letter particularly addressed the expanded school guardian option codified at section 1006.12(3), and the new school security guard option codified at section 1006.12(4). The letter stated, in pertinent part: [E]very public elementary, middle, and high school in Florida, including all Florida charter schools, must have a Safe-School Officer (SSO) physically present on each campus while school is in session. . . . All charter schools without current [safe-school officer] coverage have until August 1 to come into compliance for the 2019-2020 school year For those charter schools that choose to treat our requests for information as optional, our only option going forward will be to use the full extent of the law to ensure compliance. On July 9, 2019, Katz and Leslie Brown, the School Board's Chief Portfolio Officer, issued a memorandum directed to the charter schools in the District. The memorandum stated: "[t]he statute requires each charter school to implement one of the safe-school officer options." The memorandum listed the options and explained that the first three options, with some legislative revisions, had been available to charter schools in the 2018-2019 school year. The memorandum further stated: [t]he School Board has taken no action to deny any charter school access to any of the safe-school officer options summarized above and more fully detailed in [s]ection 1006.12, Florida Statutes." Citing the Corcoran Letter, the memorandum stated, in boldface type: If one of the Safe[-]School Officer options is not confirmed by your location by August 1st,[2019,]such facts and circumstances will be considered by your charter school sponsor to present an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of your charter school's students. Please be advised that, under those circumstances, the school district will request the School Board of Broward County, Florida, to "use the full extent of the law[,]" as urged by Commissioner Corcoran and immediately terminate your charter agreement pursuant to [s]ection 1002.33(8)(c), Florida Statutes. July 9, 2019, memorandum, Exhibit JE-4 (emphasis added). From this memorandum, it is apparent that the School Board interpreted the phrase "use the full extent of the law," as referenced in the Corcoran Letter, to mean immediately terminating a noncompliant charter school's charter. In so stating, the School Board was not merely following guidance set forth in the Corcoran Letter—which did not mention immediate termination of a charter as a sanction for noncompliance with section 1006.12—but, instead, was articulating its own sanction, which it would impose for noncompliance with section 1006.12.7 The memorandum further stated: "[p]lease upload into Charter.Tools, under the benchmark entitled Senate Bill 7030, the attached form and pertinent documentation that confirms that your implemented Safe[-]School Officer option is in compliance with [s]ection 1006.12, Florida Statutes, for the 2019-2020 school year. This documentation is due by August 1, 2019." On July 31, 2019, the School Board sent a follow-up email to the principals of the charter schools in the District, reminding them of the August 1, 2019, deadline. 7 To this point, in response to an email from Broward County Public Schools Superintendent Robert Runcie dated August 15, 2019, Corcoran counseled against immediate charter termination to sanction noncompliant charter schools, recommending instead that the District take immediate steps to provide safe-school officer coverage at a noncompliant charter school, followed by steps to ensure that the school maintained coverage and implemented a long term solution. The School Board conducted another meeting with charter school principals on August 1, 2019, at which Katz highlighted the four safe-school officer options available under section 1006.12, and reminded the charter school principals of the School Board's position that charter schools were solely responsible for establishing and assigning one or more safe-school officers for their campuses. Championship did not meet the August 1, 2019, deadline to upload the safe-school officer documentation into Charter.Tools. Katz testified at the final hearing that the School Board did not establish or assign any safe-school officers at any charter schools in the District, including Championship, in the 2019-2020 school year. Actions Taken by Championship Regarding Safe-School Officer Requirement in 2019-2020 School Year On Friday, August 2, 2019, Linda Williamson, office manager for Championship, emailed Lieutenant Patricia Ravine of the Davie Police Department regarding obtaining a school guardian while Championship's security guard was in training to become certified as a School Guardian. Ravine told her that the Broward County Sheriff's Office ("BSO") was in the process of developing the guardian program, and that the Davie Police Department had a contract with the School Board for all 13 of its school resource officers to be assigned to the 12 traditional public schools in Davie. Ravine suggested that Championship contact a security agency, and she also suggested, as an alternative to a temporary guardian, that Championship secure the services of a Davie Police Department private duty detail officer. On or about Friday, August 9, 2019, Championship submitted a Private Duty Detail Application ("Application") to the Davie Police Department, requesting private duty detail officer coverage for Championship from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. for each school day, beginning on August 14, 2019, and ending on September 28, 2019. Private duty detail coverage consists of voluntary coverage by off-duty police officers whose presence is not guaranteed by the police department. To that point, the Application states, in pertinent part: "[e]very reasonable effort will be made to fill the detail request, but there is no guarantee that it will be filled. Members of the Davie Police Department, who are authorized to work Private Duty Detail, do so voluntarily during their off duty hours." The first day of the 2019-2020 school year for District schools, including Championship, was August 14, 2019. On August 14, 2019, the Davie Police Department did not send a private duty detail police officer to provide safe-school officer services to Championship, and Championship did not have any other persons qualified under any of the safe-school officer options in section 1006.12 present on its campus that day. On August 14, 2019, Championship did have present on its campus an armed security guard, Steven Carbone, who Championship had hired to provide school safety services on its campus. Although Carbone had not yet completed the school guardian training program, he met the other safe-school officer requirements set forth in section 1006.23, including having completed a psychological evaluation which indicated that he was suitable for the position, and holding Class D and Class G licenses under chapter 493, Florida Statutes. Additionally, Carbone was trained regarding domestic and foreign terrorism, explosives, improvised explosive devise recognition, and identification of hazardous materials. Detra Adams, Curriculum Supervisor of Secondary Literacy for the District, visited Championship's campus on August 14, 2019. She did not view a safe-school officer who met the requirements of section 1006.12 on Championship's campus that day. However, she did observe a person at the front desk wearing a security uniform and bearing a firearm. That person ultimately was identified as Carbone. Adams met with Dupell, who told her that Championship had procured the service of an armed security guard (Carbone) who was present on campus that day. Dupell acknowledged that Championship had not submitted the required documentation to the District to have an armed security guard on campus. He told Adams that Carbone was registered for a school guardian training program8 and that once he completed the training, Championship would submit the certification documents to the District. Dupell also told Adams that Championship had arranged for a Davie private duty detail police officer to be present at the school on some, but not all, school days. On August 15, 2019, the Davie Police Department did not send a private duty detail police officer to provide safe-school officer services to Championship, but did send an on-duty police officer who arrived shortly before the end of the school day. Donte´ Fulton-Collins, Director of the Charter Schools Management Support Department for the District, visited Championship's campus on August 15, 2019, and did not observe a safe-school officer meeting the requirements of section 1006.12 on campus that day. However, she did observe an armed security guard on that date. That person ultimately was identified as Carbone. Katz, along with Damien Kelly of the DOE Safe Schools Office, visited Championship's campus on August 15, 2019, to discuss with Dupell the need for Championship to secure the services of a safe-school officer who met the requirements of section 1006.12. At that meeting, Dupell provided documentation to Katz showing that Championship had filed the Application with the Davie Police Department, 8 On July 31, 2019, Championship entered into an agreement with the BSO to provide Carbone training to serve as a safe-school officer pursuant to the Aaron Feis School Guardian option under section 1006.12(3). The training course was only offered every three months, so when Carbone was hired to fill the safe-school officer position at Championship, the soonest he could obtain training by BSO was early September 2019, after the 2019-2020 school year had begun. requesting to have private duty detail officer coverage until Carbone could complete the training to satisfy the requirements for certification as a school guardian under section 1006.12(3). Dupell also provided Katz a list of dates for which Davie Police Department had signed up to provide private duty detail coverage at Championship between August 14 and September 28, 2019. Katz observed that for many of the shifts on school days during that period, no officers had signed up to provide coverage at Championship. In sum, for the first two days of the 2019-2020 school year, Championship was not in compliance with section 1006.12 because it did not have present on its campus an individual who met the statutory requirements to serve as a safe-school officer. Championship does not dispute that it was not in compliance with section 1006.12 on those days. For the first two days of the 2019-2020 school year, Championship did have an armed security guard, Carbone, who had been hired by Championship specifically to provide school safety services to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its students. As discussed above, although Carbone had not yet been trained as a school guardian, he met the other requirements to be a school guardian. Pursuant to an electronic mail exchange between Championship and Ravine on the afternoon of August 15, 2019, the Davie Police Department guaranteed police officer coverage for Championship's campus, for the full school day, on all the days requested in the Application for which no private duty detail officer had volunteered. Thus, by the afternoon of August 15, 2019, Championship had secured guaranteed police officer coverage from the Davie Police Department—albeit not pursuant to a fully-executed contract. Pursuant to this informal arrangement, a police officer from the Davie Police Department was present and provided safe-school officer services on Championship's campus for the entire school day on August 16 and 19 through 22, 2019. On Wednesday, August 22, 2019, Championship and the Town of Davie, Florida, executed a Safe School Officer Agreement ("SSO Agreement") for a term commencing on August 14, 2019, and ending no more than 90 days later. Article 2 of the SSO Agreement states, in pertinent part, T[own] shall assign a certified police officer to serve as a [Safe School Officer ("SSO")] at the charter school for a period not to exceed the school year [(sic)] to allow C[harter] to otherwise become compliant with the [c]hapter 2019-22, Laws of Florida (2019) . . . . The certified police officer assigned to the school will be working in an overtime capacity. There is no guarantee that the same officer will work at the school on a daily basis. The parties agree that this does not include any after[-]hours activities, sports programs, aftercare, etc. Assignment of SSOs. The Town may change the law enforcement officer assigned to participate as a[n] SSO at any time during the Agreement. Unless precluded by emergency circumstances, the T[own] shall at all times maintain an SSO on duty during those regular school hours. "Regular school hours" shall be defined as the respective [p]articipating school's posted bell schedule. Wherever possible, the T[own] shall assign a replacement SSO during the time that the assigned SSO is absent when students are required to be in attendance during regular school hours. Pursuant to the SSO Agreement, the Town of Davie guaranteed police officer coverage for Championship for every school day during regular school hours, commencing on August 14, 2019, and ending no more than 90 days later. This coverage was to be provided by private duty detail officers when available, and if no private duty detail officers were available, safe-school officer coverage would be provided by an on-duty police officer. Because the SSO Agreement was not fully executed until August 22, 2019, and because no private duty detail officers had volunteered to provide safe-school officer coverage at Championship on August 14 and 15, 2019, the Davie Police Department did not provide coverage on those dates. However, as found above, pursuant to the informal arrangement for private duty detail coverage that Championship had made with the Davie Police Department on August 15, 2019, a Davie police officer was physically present and provided safe-school officer services on Championship's campus on August 16 and 19 through 22, 2019. Thereafter, the Davie Police Department provided safe-school officer services to Championship under the SSO Agreement for the rest of the 2019- 2020 school year, until all District schools were closed in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Other School Safety Measures Taken by Championship Cynthia Dotson, Chief Executive Officer of the management company who provides services to small charter schools, including Championship, testified regarding the measures that Championship has implemented on its campus to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its students and staff. The Championship campus is located in a fenced facility within a small business park in a cul-de-sac. The school has one point of ingress and egress for the public, and additional means of ingress and egress for the provision of fire, life, and safety support services. Championship screens persons entering the campus through a software application used to determine whether that person has a criminal record. It also utilizes a video camera system to provide surveillance of the interior and exterior of the campus, an audio communication system consisting of an intercom system and walkie-talkies, and a software application through which faculty members can report suspicious activity to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, Championship has hired a retired SWAT team to train all of its employees to respond to active assailant situations on campus in order to mitigate any threat and prevent injury and loss of life. To this end, Championship conducts monthly code red drills in both the summer months and the school year. Before the 2017-2018 school year, Championship hired a school security guard, Yoan Herrera, to provide school safety services to its campus. Herrera became certified by the BSO on November 15, 2018, to serve as an Aaron Feis Guardian on Championship's campus.9 He provided those services to Championship until approximately mid-March 2019. After Herrera left his position, Championship retained the temporary services of the King Security Agency ("King") to provide school security services while it searched for a replacement school security employee. After an exhaustive search that yielded very few qualified applicants, Championship hired Carbone to fill the school security guard vacancy. Carbone had been an employee of King and had provided school security services to Championship during the last few months of the 2018-2019 school year. As noted above, Carbone's psychological evaluation indicated that he was suited for the position. Additionally, he had training regarding domestic and foreign terrorism, explosives, improvised explosive device recognition, and identification of hazardous materials, and he also held Class D and Class G licenses. After Championship hired Carbone, he was immediately enrolled in the Aaron Feis School Guardian certification program offered by the BSO. However, due to the high demand for such training and limited program 9 Notably, even though Herrera was present on Championship's campus while carrying a firearm for the entire 2017-2018 school year and a portion of the 2018-2019 school year, and for part of that time, provided school security services in a capacity other than as a safe- school officer pursuant to section 1006.12, no evidence was presented at the final hearing showing that the School Board considered Herrera's presence on Championship's campus as constituting a violation of section 790.115(2), warranting immediate termination of Championship's charter. offerings, Carbone was unable to begin the training before early September 2019. Thus, assuming he successfully completed the program, he would not have been certified as a school guardian pursuant to section 1006.12(3) until October 2019. Ultimately, Carbone did not successfully complete the training program. Additionally, on August 19, 2019, Championship hired Andre Chambers to serve as a safe-school officer at its campus. At the time Chambers was hired, he already was certified as an Aaron Feis School Guardian pursuant to section 1006.12(3). He began providing safe-school officer services on Championship's campus in September 2019, and did so until all District schools, including Championship, were closed in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. School Board's Immediate Termination of Championship's Charter As a result of Championship's failure to have a safe-school officer meeting the requirements of section 1006.12 on its campus on August 14 and 15, 2019, School Board personnel prepared an agenda item recommending immediate termination of the Charter for consideration at the School Board's next regular meeting, scheduled for August 20, 2019. At the final hearing, Brown and Katz testified that the School Board determined that Championship's failure to have, on campus, a safe-school officer who met the requirements of section 1006.12, constituted an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of Championship's students, which commenced on August 14, 2019, and continued through August 20, 2019, when the School Board immediately terminated Championship's charter. Brown acknowledged that the School Board was aware that as of August 16, 2019, Championship had a police officer from the Davie Police Department physically present on its campus. She testified that this did not change the School Board's position that an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare to Championship's students existed. As she put it: [t]he services were piecemeal, there was nothing that we could depend on, nothing had been established and nothing had been assigned. . . . There was no evidence that [having a Davie police officer on campus] was going to be the case as each—each minute or hour or day that was going to continue. Katz and Brown also testified that the School Board interpreted section 1006.12 as requiring a charter school to have in place a fully-executed contract for a safe-school officer in order to meet the statute's requirement that a safe-school officer be "established and assigned" to the school. To this point, Katz testified that having a Davie Police Department police officer present on campus would not, by itself, meet the safe-school officer requirement, because an executed contract "establishing" the presence of the officer also is required by the statute. He stated: "I believe both things are necessary, the agreement and presence. A fully[-]executed contract and presence [J]ust to be clear, a contract that states that there will be coverage, not a contract that says there may be coverage."10 Katz and Brown also testified that the School Board interprets section 1006.12 as placing the responsibility solely on the charter school to secure a safe-school officer for its campus. To this point, Katz testified that the School Board has "always believed that they [charter schools] were responsible for . . . assigning or establishing a safe school officer for every one of their schools." 10 In the stipulated facts set forth above, Katz stated, in response to a question from a School Board member at the August 20, 2019, meeting, that if Championship had a law enforcement officer present on its campus on that day, it was in compliance with section 1006.12. At the final hearing, Katz testified at the final hearing that this statement assumed the existence of a fully-executed contract on that date. As discussed above, the evidence establishes that the SSO Agreement was not fully executed until August 22, 2019. Brown testified that the School Board views Florida law as prohibiting the District from assigning a safe-school officer to a charter school. To that point, she testified that if a charter school wished to secure the services of a school resource officer under section 1006.12(1) to meet the safe-school officer requirement, the charter school would have to directly contract with the law enforcement agency to do so.11 Further to this point, Katz testified that the School Board did not have the authority to assign a law enforcement officer whose services are contracted by the District to provide safe-school officer coverage on a charter school's campus.12 Both Brown and Katz testified that the School Board met the requirement in section 1006.12 to "collaborate with charter school governing boards to facilitate charter school access to all safe-school officer options available" by providing information, presentations, and training to charter schools regarding the statute's safe-school officer requirements and available options for meeting those requirements. Katz acknowledged at the final hearing that Championship having an armed security guard who was not a safe-school officer present on its campus to provide school security services did not pose an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the students at Championship. Fulton-Collins testified that she assisted in preparing the School Board agenda item recommending the immediate termination of Championship's charter because, as she put it: 11 Section 1006.12(1), establishing the school resource officer option, states: "A school district may establish school resource officer programs through a cooperative agreement with law enforcement agencies." § 1006.12(1), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Notably absent from this provision is language authorizing charter schools to do so. 12 Section 1002.33(12)(a) states: "A charter school shall select its own employees. A charter school may contract with its sponsor for the services of personnel employed by the sponsor." § 1002.33(12)(a)(emphasis added). This provision appears to authorize a school board to contract with a charter school to establish or assign a safe-school officer at the charter school, pursuant to a partnership between the school board and a law enforcement agency or security agency as provided in the first sentence of section 1006.12. all charter schools must be in compliance with any requirements that the Legislature has deemed to be necessary to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the students. The Legislature specifically found in section 1006.12 . . . that the establishment or assignment of a safe school officer on a charter school campus is necessary for the protection of school personnel, property, students, and visitors. And by failing to do so, failing to establish and assign a safe school officer on the campus, Championship created an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, and welfare of its students. Fulton-Collins testimony, T. Vol. I, p. 192. Fulton-Collins acknowledged that section 1006.12 does not expressly state that charter schools are responsible for establishing and assigning their own safe-school officers.13 However, she maintained that charter schools are solely responsible for establishing and assigning safe-school officers for their own campus, and that the School Board's duty is "not impeding [them] on any opportunity that they have to secure a safe-school officer." Broward County Public Schools Superintendent Robert Runcie confirmed that the School Board interprets section 1006.12 as placing the sole responsibility on charter schools to secure their own safe-school officers. To this point, Runcie testified: " [j]ust as we [the District] go and secure [safe- school officers], by any means necessary, to have them on our campuses, [charter schools] are also required to go and use whatever means they can to secure them." Runcie also confirmed the School Board's position, articulated by Katz and Brown, that for charter schools to be in compliance with section 1006.12, a person meeting the requirements of one of the safe-school officer options 13 Notably, during the 2019 Legislative Session, the Legislature expressly rejected an amendment to SB 7030 that would have amended the first sentence of section 1006.12 to also require "charter schools, as applicable" to establish and assign one or more safe-school officers at its school facility. must be physically present on the school campus for the entire school day, and a fully-executed contract must exist, guaranteeing the presence of the safe-school officer on the campus each school day, for the full term of the contract.14 Runcie testified that the School Board interprets the terms "establish and assign" to require that both of these conditions be met for the charter school to be in compliance with section 1006.12. He acknowledged that section 1006.12 does not expressly state that a fully-executed contract is required for compliance with the statute.15 To this point, he testified: [t]he statute, itself, may not specify a contract. It says what you are required to do. And the reason why it doesn't specify a contract is that there are several means to do it. There are some school districts, like Miami, I believe Palm Beach may be similar, but there's a handful of them where they actually have their own police force. So they're not going to have a contract in order to meet that[.] So the legislation is not going to be that specific because there's varying ability in how school districts and charter schools go about securing safe- school officers. So it wouldn't have that . . . degree of specificity. Runcie testimony T., Vol. II, pp. 44-45. Further to this point, Runcie testified: It [(the statute)] doesn't specifically require that, but the—so, again, the statute speaks to multiple 14 Runcie testified that in the School Board's view, section 1006.12 does not require an executed long term contract, such as a school-year-long contract, securing safe-school officer services; rather, the School Board interprets the statute as requiring a fully-executed contract that guarantees continuous presence of a safe-school officer on campus for the duration of the contract's term, whatever that term is. 15 See paragraph 243, below. To the extent a statute does not specify the precise means by which it is to be implemented, rulemaking may be necessary in order for an agency to implement the statute. See § 120.52(16), Fla. Stat. (defining "rule" as a statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the procedure or practice requirements of an agency and includes any form which imposes any requirement or solicits information not specifically required by statute or by an existing rule). avenues, multiple ways of securing a safe-school officer. A couple of those don't require a contract. Again, if you have your own police force or you're using an armed guardian. So, for example, we actually have some schools that we have put in our detectives from our school investigative unit when we needed to. So we have 15, 20 police officers, if you will. So some districts, their whole entire system, they have their own police department. Or you can hire an individual, put him through the guardian program, have them become certified. Outside of doing those two things you would actually have to have a contract or some types of established agreement, an arrangement to be able to fulfill that. Runcie testimony, T. Vol. II, pp. 58-59. The School Board terminated Championship's charter on August 20, 2019, because Championship did not have a safe-school officer present on its campus for the first two days of the 2019-2020 school year, and because as of August 20, 2019, Championship did not have a fully-executed contract with the Town of Davie guaranteeing the presence of a police officer to serve as a safe-school officer on Championship's campus; thus, the School Board considered these circumstances to constitute an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the students at Championship, warranting immediate termination of the charter pursuant to section 1002.33(8)(c). Safety-Related Circumstances on Championship's Campus in the 2019- 2020 School Year Three parents of students who attended Championship in the 2019-2020 school year testified regarding the safety-related circumstances on Championship's campus at the beginning of the school year leading up to the School Board's termination of Championship's charter on August 20, 2019. Specifically, Anne-Valerie Daniel-Laveus, the mother of three students enrolled at Championship during the 2019-2020 school year and a teacher at Championship during that school year, testified that she observed a school security guard present at the school every day. In her experience as a teacher at Championship and as a mother whose children were enrolled there, she perceived conditions at Championship as being safe. To that point, no other parents or students relayed to her any concerns they had regarding safety at Championship at any time during the 2019-2020 school year, including on August 14 through 20, 2019. She was not aware of any incidents, threats, or weapons-related incidents having taken place at Championship at any time during the 2019-2020 school year. Sandra Acosta, the mother of a student enrolled at Championship, testified that she took her child to school daily during the 2019-2020 school year, that she always saw a security guard present on campus when she did so. She always felt that her child was safe at Championship, and that she was not aware of any incidents in which the safety of the students at Championship was threatened. Melissa Bustamante, the mother of two students enrolled at Championship during the 2019-2020 school year and a member of Championship's governing board since 2011, also testified regarding conditions at Championship during the 2019-2020 school year, including on the school days between August 14 and 20, 2019. Specifically, when she took her children to school, she always observed a security guard at the front of the school, which is the only publicly-accessible entrance to the school facility. She was not aware of any bomb threats, weapons threats, or trespassing by unauthorized persons on Championship's campus during the 2019-2020 school year, nor was she aware of any parents of Championship students having expressed concerns regarding safety-related matters at the school during the 2019-2020 school year. As a member of Championship's governing board, she verified that the school had secured the presence of a Davie police officer on campus before, and for some time after, the charter was terminated, and also had secured a school guardian (Chambers) to serve as a safe-school officer for the remainder of the 2019-2020 school year. No evidence was presented showing that there were any actual or imminent threats or dangers to the health, safety, or welfare of the students at Championship on any school days between August 14 and 20, 2019. Additionally, no evidence was presented showing that the presence of Carbone, who had been hired by Championship specifically to provide school safety and security services and who provided those services, presented a threat or danger to the students at Championship on August 14 through 16, 19, and 20, 2019. To the contrary, the witnesses who observed Carbone testified that he was at the front entrance to the school performing his school protection duties. None of them testified that they perceived him as a threat or saw him threatening or endangering the students, and all of them testified that his presence was one reason they perceived Championship's school campus as being safe. Additionally, as noted above, Katz conceded at the final hearing that Championship's having an armed security guard on campus to provide school security services on August 14 through 16, 19, and 20, 2019, did not present an immediate and serious danger to Championship's students. Championship's Standing The School Board took action on August 20, 2019, to immediately terminate Championship's charter, pursuant to section 1002.33(8)(c). Although the School Board subsequently operated Championship for the 2019-2020 school year while these proceedings were pending, if the School Board were to prevail in Case No. 19-4818, Championship's charter would be permanently terminated and the charter school could no longer operate. Thus, the School Board's immediate termination of Championship's charter has caused Championship to suffer an immediate, direct injury that is within the scope of these proceedings, which are brought under sections 1002.33 and 1006.12. Additionally, as discussed below, the School Board applied unadopted rules to Championship in these proceedings to terminate its charter. Findings of Ultimate Fact Immediate Termination of Charter under Section 1002.33(8)(c) Championship's Noncompliance with Section 1006.12 did not Cause Immediate and Serious Danger to Its Students Pursuant to the foregoing, it is found, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the School Board did not prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that an immediate and serious danger to Championship's students was in existence on August 20, 2019, when it immediately terminated Championship's charter. The School Board contends that Championship's failure to have present on its campus a person who met the statutory qualifications for serving as a safe-school officer on August 14 and 15, 2019, coupled with its failure to have a fully-executed contract securing the services of a safe-school officer for Championship by August 20, 2019, constituted an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of Championship's students warranting immediate termination of its charter, pursuant to section 1002.33(8)(c). However, the School Board presented no evidence of any particular facts and circumstances showing that an immediate and serious danger to Championship's students was in existence on August 20, 2019—whether due to Championship's failure to have a person on campus who met the statutory qualifications for serving as a safe-school officer plus a fully-executed contract securing the services of a safe-school officer for Championship, or for any other reason. To that point, there was no evidence presented showing that there were any threats or actions constituting a threat—such as bomb threats, trespassing by unauthorized persons, armed persons presenting a danger or threat, or any other circumstances on Championship's campus that existed on August 20, 2019—or on any other school day in the 2019-2020 school year, for that matter. To the contrary, Championship presented the testimony of three witnesses stating that to their knowledge, there had been no threat or danger whatsoever to Championship's students at any time during the 2019-2020 school year, including on the school days before and including August 20, 2019. Each of these witnesses was in a position to have personally known whether, or be informed if, there had been any actual, immediate threat or danger to the health, safety, or welfare of Championship's students. The very most that may be inferred from the evidence is that not having a person who was qualified as a safe-school officer on campus may have presented a potential threat to Championship's students on August 14 and 15, 2019. However, even such a potential threat—to the extent it may have existed—was substantially diminished by the presence of a trained, armed security guard who had been hired specifically to provide protection to the students, faculty, and staff on campus, and who had satisfied most of the requirements, including the psychological evaluation, to become certified as a school guardian. Further, starting on August 16, 2019, a Davie police officer was present and provided safe-school services on Championship's campus every day for the rest of the school year, including on August 20, 2019, when the School Board immediately terminated Championship's charter. There is no dispute that these law enforcement police officers met the qualifications expressly stated in section 1006.12 to serve as safe-school officers. Therefore, as of August 16, 2019, the only remaining ground for the School's Board's conclusion that an immediate and serious danger existed on Championship's campus warranting immediate termination of its charter was that a contract securing the guaranteed presence of a safe-school officer on Championship's campus had not yet been fully executed. However, no evidence was presented showing that Championship's failure to have a fully-executed contract for a safe-school officer constituted any danger—much less an immediate and serious danger—to its students. Accordingly, there was no factual or circumstantial basis for finding that an immediate and serious danger to Championship's students existed on August 20, 2019, when its charter was terminated. Based on the foregoing, it is found, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the evidence failed to establish the existence of an immediate and serious danger to Championship's students on August 20, 2019, as a result of Championship not having a safe-school officer on August 14 and 15, 2019. Additionally, it is found, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the evidence failed to establish the existence of an immediate and serious danger to Championship's students on August 20, 2019 (or on August 14 through 16, and 19, 2019), as the result of Championship not yet having secured a fully- executed contract guaranteeing the presence of a safe-school officer on Championship's campus. Presence of Armed Security Guard Did Not Constitute an Immediate and Serious Danger As previously discussed, no evidence was presented showing that Carbone presented any threat or danger to the students at Championship on August 14 through 16, 19, or 20, 2019. The witnesses who observed him on those days testified that he performed his school protection duties, and he did not threaten or endanger Championship's students. Additionally, the evidence establishes that the school security and protection services that Carbone provided on Championship's campus on these days were school-sanctioned activities. To that point, Championship hired Carbone for the specific purpose of providing school security services to its students. As such, Carbone was given express permission by Championship's governing board to be on campus specifically to provide school security services to enable and support school-related activities. Based on the foregoing, it is found, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the presence of the armed security guard on Championship's campus on August 14 through 16, 19, and 20, 2019, did not constitute an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of Championship's students warranting the immediate termination of its charter under section 1002.33(8)(c). Unadopted Rules Applied to Championship to Terminate Charter Section 120.57(1)(e)1. states, in pertinent part: "[a]n agency or administrative law judge may not base agency action that determines the substantial interests of a party on an unadopted rule." This provision prohibits an ALJ or an agency from basing agency action that determines the substantial interests of a party on an unadopted rule. Because this statute is directed at, and specifically circumscribes, the authority of the ALJ, or the agency, as applicable, neither the ALJ nor the agency is authorized to base agency action on an unadopted rule, regardless of whether a party has alleged that a particular agency statement constitutes an unadopted rule. The evidence establishes that in immediately terminating Championship's charter, the School Board determined Championship's substantial interests based on two unadopted rules. Unadopted Rule Interpreting Section 1002.33(8)(c) The evidence shows that the School Board has determined that the failure of a charter school (in this case, Championship) to have, on campus, a safe-school officer who meets the requirements of section 1006.12, to constitute an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the charter school's students, warranting immediate termination of the school's charter. In so determining, the School Board has interpreted section 1002.33(8)(c)—specifically, the first sentence of that statute16—to define a charter school's failure to comply with section 1006.12 as per se constituting an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the school's students. This interpretation ascribes a meaning to the first sentence of section 1002.33(8)(c) that is not readily apparent from the literal reading of the statute. Indeed, the first sentence of that section specifically speaks to the "particular facts and circumstances" showing that an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the charter school's students exists. Thus, the statute's plain language requires that the particular facts and circumstances of each particular case be considered to determine whether those particular facts and circumstances constitute an immediate and serious danger that exists at the time the charter is immediately terminated. Nowhere does the statute's plain language speak to, or authorize, a school board to formulate a categorical determination that a defined set of facts and circumstances—here, noncompliance with section 1006.12—per se constitutes an immediate and serious danger to the charter school's students. It is indisputable that the School Board's interpretation of section 1002.33(8)(c) requires compliance and has the direct and consistent effect of law. This interpretation requires a charter school to comply with section 1006.12—including all of the interpretive gloss the School Board has placed on that statute by imposing the requirement that a fully-executed safe-school officer contract be in place to be in compliance—or face having its charter immediately terminated on the basis of such noncompliance. 16 The first sentence of section 1002.33(8)(c) states: "[a] charter may be terminated immediately if the sponsor sets forth in writing the particular facts and circumstances indicating that an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the charter school's students exists." § 1002.33(8)(c), Fla. Stat. The evidence also establishes that the School Board uniformly applies this interpretation of section 1002.33(8)(c) to all charter schools in the District. Therefore, the School Board's interpretation of section 1002.33(8)(c) to determine that a charter school's noncompliance with section 1006.12 per se constitutes an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the charter school's students is a rule. This interpretation has not been adopted as rule pursuant to section 120.54, and, thus, constitutes an unadopted rule, as defined in section 120.52(20). The School Board applied this unadopted rule to Championship to determine that an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of Championship student's was in existence on August 20, 2019, such that its charter must be terminated. Unadopted Rule Interpreting Section 1006.12 The evidence also establishes that the School Board interprets section 1006.12 as requiring a charter school to have in place, at the time the school is in session, a fully-executed contract with an appropriate safe-school officer entity, guaranteeing that a safe-school officer will be present on the school's campus for the entire school day for the specified term of the contract.17 Nowhere in the plain language of section 1006.12 is there an express requirement for a charter school to have a fully-executed contract for safe- school officer services in order to be in compliance with the statute. Thus, the School Board's interpretation of section 1006.12 imposes a requirement that is not apparent from the literal reading of the statute. 17 Runcie, Katz, and Brown each testified that a fully-executed contract is necessary for a charter school to meet the statutory requirement that a safe-school officer be "established and assigned" to the school. This interpretation of section 1006.12 requires compliance and has the direct and consistent effect of law. Specifically, it requires a charter school to either have a fully-executed contract for safe-school officers in place by the time school is in session, or face having its charter immediately terminated on the basis of such alleged noncompliance. The evidence also shows that the School Board uniformly applies this interpretation of section 1006.12 to all charter schools in the District. Therefore, the School Board's interpretation of section 1006.12 as requiring a charter school to have in place, at the time the school is in session, a fully-executed contract with an appropriate entity that guarantees that a safe-school officer will be present on the school's campus for the entire school day for the specified term of the contract, is a rule. This interpretation has not been adopted as rule pursuant to section 120.54, and, thus, constitutes an unadopted rule, as defined in section 120.52(20). The School Board applied this unadopted rule to Championship to determine that Championship was not in compliance with section 1006.12 on August 20, 2019, such that an immediate and serious danger to its students was in existence on that date, warranting immediate termination of its charter. Alleged Unadopted Rules Challenged under Section 120.56(4) Championship alleges that in immediately terminating its charter, the School Board has formulated and applied two agency statements which constitute unadopted rules. As articulated in the Rule Challenge Petition, these statements are: "[T]he School Board's unadopted policy that it is not legally required to provide safe-school officers to charter public schools within its borders"; and "[T]he School Board's policy of failing to collaborate with charter schools to facilitate access to safe-school officers pursuant to section 1006.12. . . by directing charter schools to either comply with the statute or risk having their charters terminated." Each of these alleged unadopted rules is separately addressed. Alleged Unadopted Rule that School Board is not Legally Required to Provide Safe-School Officers to Charter Schools in the District The School Board takes the position that it is not required by section 1006.12 to establish or assign safe-school officers to charter schools in the District, and that the responsibility for securing a safe-school officer for a charter school rests solely with the charter school itself. To this point, the School Board contends that the only circumstance under which it ever would be required to assign a safe-school officer to a charter school is if it denied the charter school access to a safe-school officer—which the School Board claims means actively preventing a charter school from securing a safe-school officer, and then declares it has not done so.18 As more fully discussed below, the School Board's interpretation of section 1006.12 ascribes a meaning to the statute that is not readily apparent from a reading of the statute's plain language. Further, the School Board's interpretation requires compliance and has the force and effect of law because it directs charter schools to secure their own safe-school officers and imposes the penalty of charter termination for failure to do so. . The School Board's interpretation of section 1006.12 is applied to every charter school in the District, and, thus, is a statement of general applicability. Therefore, the School Board's statement that it is not required to establish and assign safe-school officers to charter schools except when it has affirmatively prevented a charter school from securing a safe-school officer, is an unadopted rule. 18 The July 9, 2019, memorandum from Brown and Katz to charter school principals states, in pertinent part: "The School Board of Broward County has taken no action to deny any charter school access to any of the safe-school officer options summarized above and more fully detailed in [s]ection 1006.12." The School Board applied this unadopted rule to Championship such that it did not assign a safe-school officer to its campus for the 2019-2020 school year. This led to the School Board determining Championship noncompliant with section 1006.12 and immediately terminating its charter on that basis. Alleged Unadopted Rule that School Board has a Policy of Failing to Collaborate to Facilitate Charter School Access to Safe-School Officers Championship also alleges that "the School Board has a policy of failing to collaborate with charter schools to facilitate access to safe-school officers pursuant to section 1006.12. . . by directing charter schools to either comply with the statute or risk having their charters terminated." By casting the alleged agency statement in these terms, Championship effectively asserts that by not establishing and assigning safe- school officers to charter schools, the School Board has a policy of "failing to collaborate" with charter schools in direct contravention of the second sentence in section 1006.12. The evidence does not show that the School Board has a policy of "failing to collaborate" with charter schools—which would be tantamount to the School Board having a policy of purposefully violating the statute. Rather, as more fully discussed below, the evidence shows that the School Board interprets the phrase "collaborate to facilitate" to mean that it is only required to communicate with charter schools and inform them regarding the safe-school officer requirements of section 1006.12, and to require them to provide documentation showing compliance.19 Championship disputes the correctness of this interpretation, and contends that instead, this phrase means that the School Board must 19 Championship has not challenged the School Board's interpretation of the phrase "collaborate to facilitate" as an unadopted rule in this proceeding. establish and assign a safe-school officer to each charter school if the charter school so chooses.20 Based on the evidence, and for the reasons more fully discussed below, it is determined that the School Board's alleged policy of "failing to collaborate" to facilitate charter school access to safe-school officers is not an unadopted rule. The School Board did not present evidence showing that to the extent the alleged agency statements constituted rules, rulemaking was not feasible or practicable, as provided in section 120.54(1)(a)1. and 2.
Findings Of Fact This case was presented for consideration based upon the Administrative Complaint and subsequent amendment presented by Ralph D. Turlington, as Commissioner of Education, State of Florida, against Michael H. Deis, holder of teaching certificate No. 356436, Rank II, post graduate valid through June 30, 1987. The accusations set forth in the Administrative Complaint and its amendment are as indicated in the Issues statement to this Recommended Order. The remaining facts found result from a formal Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, administrative hearing held upon request of the Respondent. The Respondent was born March 7, 1945, and is married and has three children, ages one and one-half, four, and eight. The Respondent has been married since June 17, 1972. Respondent has a Bachelor of Science degree, a Masters Degree in Business Administration and fifty-five hours' credit toward a Doctorate of Philosophy in Education. The Respondent has been employed with the Collier County School System in the State of Florida since February, 1974. Prior to that time, the Respondent had been employed in management for General Motors Corporation and with General Development Corporation for a period of three years in Miami, Florida. After becoming an employee of the Collier County School System, the Respondent taught math in the sixth through eighth grades at East Naples, Florida, Middle School. The range of ages for those students was twelve to fourteen years old. Beginning in the January term of 1975, the Respondent taught adult education in the Collier County School System. In 1976, Respondent moved to Everglades High School where he coached boys' basketball, varsity basketball and girls' basketball. His academic responsibility at that school included the teaching of basic math and other subjects to boys and girls whose ages ranged from fourteen to twenty. The Respondent then moved to Barron Collier High School in September, 1978, as a daytime adult education instructor. The age range for those students was from sixteen to eighty-three. In the school years 1978-79 and 1979-80, the Respondent coached girls' softball, girls' junior varsity basketball and assisted with the track program for girls. The ages of the girls Respondent coached or assisted were fourteen through eighteen. During the school year 1978-79, the Respondent met one Lori Tomaselli, a member of the girls' basketball team. This initial introduction was followed by correspondence of August 1979, addressed to the Respondent from Lori Tomaselli in which she made comment about her summer vacation and related that she had "missed" the basketball program. At that time Tomaselli was fifteen years old. The letter of August, 1979, was followed by an act on the part of Tomaselli on December 20, 1979, in which she walked up to the Respondent, turned him around and gave him a kiss. Deis' reaction was one of sunrise, followed by a comment to the effect that she was his favorite basketball player. She replied that she had cared for him since the first basketball meeting in October, 1978, when she was fourteen years of age. On December 30, 1979, Tomaselli wrote Deis while she was vacationing in the State of New York. The Respondent did not write in return or contact her. Respondent next saw Tomaselli on January 5, 1980, after she had returned from her vacation and was a participant in a basketball game which the Respondent coached. From the time of this basketball game forward through the basketball season, the Respondent would sit next to Tomaselli on the bus used to transport the basketball team. Approximately two weeks beyond January 5, 1980, the Respondent selected Tomaselli as his classroom assistant or aide. Tomaselli served in this capacity for a period of approximately two months, one hour each day. In the initial part of 1980, the Respondent would also assist Tomaselli with her math and science lessons. Beginning in February 1980, Tomaselli kept the statistics for the girls' softball team which was coached by the Respondent. At the time, Tomaselli was also participating on the girls' track team. The relationship between the Respondent and Tomaselli escalated and on March 7, 1980, Tomaselli kissed the Respondent and gave him a hug. The occasion for this display was that of the Respondent's birthday. Also in the month of March, the Respondent indicated that he began to feel an "interest" in Tomaselli. Prior to the spring school break for 1980, the Respondent paid Tomaselli $50.00 to assist in painting his home. During that same vacation, the Respondent met Tomaselli at a local beach, he coincidence. At one of the track events at which the Respondent was assisting and the young woman Tomaselli was participating, Tomaselli hugged Deis in the presence of her parents. During the time period of the track season, the Respondent drove Tomaselli to her home after school on three occasions and explained his reason for doing so as being one, that a girl friend of Tomaselli's car had broken down; two, that her parents would not pick her up and three, that Tomaselli had asked him for a ride. These rides took place before April 14, 1980. On Sunday, April 13, 1980, the parents of Lori Tomaselli had a discussion with Deis and through this conversation expressed the desire that Deis cease his relationship with their daughter to the extent of not associating with her. Among his responses, the Respondent indicated to the parents that if their daughter were eighteen years old and single, he would ask her out. On that same date, the Principal at Barron Collier High School called the Respondent to inform Deis that the Tomasellis had complained to the Principal. Deis then indicated that he would resign his coaching position effective the next morning. On Monday, April 14, 1980, the Respondent met with the Principal and a Mr. Munz, Assistant Superintendent of the Collier County School System, and as a result of that conference, was given a memorandum which instructed him to have no further contact with Lori Tomaselli. At that meeting, Respondent explained to the school officials that he had a strong emotional attachment for Lori Tomaselli. On the next morning, April 15, 1980, Tomaselli went to Deis' classroom and was shown a copy of the aforementioned memorandum and Deis told her "they would have to cool it." After Tomaselli left his classroom, the Respondent immediately went to see the Principal and told the Principal that he had shown the memorandum prohibiting contact to Tomaselli. As a result of this conversation with the Principal, the Respondent received a second memorandum from Assistant Superintendent Munz which reminded Deis that he was under direct order not to talk to Tomaselli and telling him that the conversation which Deis had had with Tomaselli about the meeting of April 14, 1980, was, by its terms, a violation of the Assistant Superintendent's instructions. The Respondent became angry about the second memorandum in that he thought it was unnecessary. He felt that he was being harassed. As a result of this attitude Respondent began to write to Tomaselli, and she in turn would reply. This letter writing activity continued on a daily basis. In some of these letters, the Respondent instructed Lori Tomaselli, when questioned by the Principal, "to keep cool" and further instructed Tomaselli that when she met with her mental health counselor that she should not indicate that she had been with the Respondent. The letters also indicated to Lori Tomaselli that the Respondent intended to divorce his wife and marry Tomaselli. In addition to the letter writing, Tomaselli began to call the Respondent as much as twice a day, using the cafeteria phone in the school to speak to the Respondent. In May, 1980, the Respondent accidentally saw Tomaselli at a local skating rink while there with his daughter. On May 14, 1980, Deis met with the School Superintendent, Dr. Thomas Richie, and through that conversation agreed to take personal leave. This leave was taken and the Respondent sought psychiatric counseling from Dr. Frank Dennis at the behest of school officials. The leave of absence was from the period May 15, 1980, through May 29, 1980. Dr. Dennis' fees were paid by the Collier County School Board. (During the month of April, 1980, the Respondent had had another meeting with Dr. Richie in which he expressed the opinion to Dr. Richie that he realized his relationship with Tomaselli had become too personal and that he had failed to take steps to correct the situation, and further that he was personally responsible for continuing the development of this relationship.) On May 16, 1980, Tomaselli mailed a letter to the Respondent expressing her affection for him. Around May 18, 1980, Tomaselli ran away from her home and a friend of hers took her to a location where the Respondent, acting as a real estate salesman, was showing a model home. At that time, the Respondent did not want Tomaselli to come into that location and resisted this encounter. The follow-up to the May 18, 1980, meeting was a series of calls from Tomaselli to the Respondent at a residence of a friend of the Respondent's, in view of the fact that Deis had moved from his home. On May 30, 1980, Respondent was called by Tomaselli to ask him to pick her up. The Respondent agreed and after picking up Tomaselli and being afraid of being detected with Tomaselli in his automobile, a circumstance developed in which Tomaselli exited his van and was slightly injured. The Respondent left the area where Tomaselli had jumped from the van and he then removed her property from his automobile. Sometime during the 1979-80 school year, the Respondent had returned Tomaselli's affection by kissing her and expressing his affection for her to the extent of telling Lori Tomaselli that someday she would be Lori Deis, meaning that she would be the Respondent's wife. On July 29, 1980, the Respondent resigned his teaching position in the Collier County School System. After his resignation, there have continued to be letters and telephone communications between tie Respondent and Lori Tomaselli. Those communications were as recent as March 24, 1981, at which time a letter was received by the Respondent from Lori Tomaselli. The relationship between the Respondent and Lori Tomaselli took place at a time when the Respondent was having marital problems and Lori Tomaselli was having difficulty with her parents. Those circumstances continued to exist at the time of the hearing. Nonetheless, the relationship was contrary to the expressed prohibition by the School Administration. The existence of such a relationship was such that it reduced the effectiveness of Deis as a teacher in the Collier County School System and did not provide a proper example for the students, nor allow the Respondent to practice his profession at the highest ethical standards.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Elizabeth Harrison, was an instructional employee of petitioner, School Board of Broward County. She has held a continuing contract of employment since 1961. When the events herein occurred, she was assigned as a media specialist (librarian) at Nova Middle School in Davie, Florida. Respondent has also used the name Elizabeth Dunn, her maiden name, and E. Dunn Harrison, a variation of her married name. Prior to this occasion, she had never been disciplined for misconduct. Harrison has known Walter James Stanley, Jr. since 1957 when Stanley was a student at a junior high school in Dade County where Harrison was employed. Stanley has been a mathematics teacher at Nova High School since 1981. Nova High School, Nova Middle School and two elementary schools share the same campus in Davie, but are located in different buildings and are considered separate schools within the Broward County school system. In 1984, Stanley made application with Southeast Bank, N.A. for various personal loans. In connection with one of those loans, he purchased insurance policy number 29-235, certificate number 188693, with Bankers Life Insurance Company of Florida (Bankers Life). Under the terms of the policy, whenever Stanley was disabled and unable to work, Bankers Life was obligated to pay the creditor (Southeast Bank) for that portion of the installment loan payment then due. On the credit application filled out on October 17, 1984, Stanley used the name "Walter Stanly," and gave his employment as a teacher at Nova High School. 2/ He also listed Elizabeth Harrison as his supervisor, and gave the telephone number 475-7760 as the number for the school. That telephone number was actually the telephone number in the media room at Nova Middle School where respondent worked. It should be noted that respondent had no personnel responsibilities in her position as a librarian, and had no connection whatever with Nova High School. Indeed, Stanley's personnel records were maintained by the office manager of Nova High School. On January 27, 1985, Stanley executed a claim form under policy number 29-235 with a general agent for Bankers Life. It was eventually forwarded to the claims department in St. Petersburg on February 20, 1985. The form has appropriate sections to be filled out by the creditor, insured, physician and employer. According to the section purportedly filled out by the employer on January 4, 1985, Stanley (referred to as "Stanly" in the form) had been disabled and absent from work at Nova High School since June 5, 1954. The employer section was not signed by an individual, but simply had the words "Personnel Records Secretary" in the signature block where the employer was to sign. However, in the line for the employer's address, the words "3600 College Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., 33314 Attn: Elizabeth Harrison" were written. The employer's telephone number was listed as 305-475-7760. To verify Stanley's absences at work, Patricia Verbosch, a claims representative, telephoned 305-475-7760 on February 25, 1985. After Verbosch explained who she was and the purpose of her call, the person who answered the telephone identified herself as Harrison and said she was the personnel records secretary. Although Harrison denies that it was she who spoke with Verbosch that day, it is found that Harrison did indeed speak with Verbosch. Harrison confirmed to Verbosch that she had filled out the form and that the absences for Stanley were correct. Having been satisfied that Harrison filled out the form, the claims department later approved the claim for absences from work for the period August 14, 1984 through February 1, 1985 and paid the creditor $839.36 by check dated April 11, 1985. Without Harrison's representation, the claim would not have been paid. On May 21, 1985 the claims department of Bankers Life was contacted by petitioner's director of internal affairs, Howard Stearns, and told that three other insurance companies were investigating Stanley. Stearns also gave the department's supervisor, Nancy Berghammer, the actual dates of absences by Stanley during school year 1984-85 as well as Stanley's correct name, address and social security number. Shortly afterwards, Stanley made claim under his policy for continued disability after February 1, 1985. In view of Stearns' conversation, and conflicting dates of absences, Berghammer spoke with Stanley by telephone on June 19, 1985. She then telephoned 305-475-7760 the same day and spoke with a female who identified herself as Elizabeth Harrison. Although Harrison denies it was she who spoke with Berghammer, this is not deemed to be credible. Berghammer requested copies of the computer printout for Stanley's attendance record in 1984-85 and an affidavit verifying his dates of absence. She was told by Harrison that it would be supplied by mail. On July 5, 1985, Berghammer received a letter dated June 26, 1985 on Nova High School stationery which read as follows: TO: Banker's Life Insurance Company Claim's Department RE: Walter Stanly's absences from work March 9, 1945/ss#263-71-5128 Mr. Stanly was absent from work from March '84 to June '84; August '84 to June '85. The letter did not bear the author's signature. In connection with a credit application filed with Sentry Acceptance Corporation (Sentry) in Coral Springs, Florida, Stanley purchased policy number 95735 with American Financial Life Insurance Company (America) effective February 29, 1984. This policy provided that during any period Stanley was disabled and out of work, American was required to pay Sentry that portion of the installment loan then due during the disability period. On the application, Stanley used the name "Walter Stanly" and gave March 19, 1945 and 263-71-5128 as his date of birth and social security number, respectively. In January, 1985 Stanley filed a claim for payment under policy number 95735. In the form it was represented that Stanley was absent from work continuously from June, 1984 through December 19, 1984. The portion of the form where the employer was to give the dates of absence from work was blank. After checking with Stanley, an American claims clerk sent a letter to respondent on January 24, 1985 at Nova High School requesting that she document his absences from work. The letter was returned to the claims clerk with a notation on the envelope "Not at Nova H.S." However, on January 31, 1985 a completed claim form was received in the mail by American. The employer's section stated that "Stanly" had been absent from work continuously from June 19, 1984 through January 30, 1985, and that the employer "(didn't) know when Walter will return to work." It bore the purported signature of Elizabeth Harrison, Secretary Records, and gave the telephone number 305-475-7760. At about the same time American had directly contacted the principal's office at Nova High School requesting verification of Walter Stanley's absences. On January 30, 1985, the principal sent American a letter advising that Walter Stanley was absent from work on December 11 through 14, 17 through 20, 1984 and on January 22 through 25, 1985. When no payment on his claim had been made, Stanley telephoned American in February and was told the school had sent a verification letter with different attendance dates than those given on the claim form. After speaking with Stanley, American's office manager, Laurie Ragan, telephoned Nova High School and obtained a different spelling of Stanley's last name, as well as a different date of birth and social security number than those given on the credit application. In an effort to clarify the matter, Ragan telephoned 305-475-7760 on the morning of February 20, 1985 because Harrison's name and telephone number were given on the claim form. Without identifying herself, Ragan asked to speak to Elizabeth Harrison. A second female came to the telephone, and after Ragan identified herself, she gave the purpose of her call. Although Harrison denied it was she who spoke with Ragan, this assertion is not deemed to be credible. Harrison told Ragan she had just seen Stanley that morning, and would forward the requested information. On February 25, 1985 Ragan received a letter dated February 27, 1985 on Nova High School stationery which stated as follows: Stanly, Walter/bd-March 19, 1945 To whom it may concern: Mr. Walter Stanly (263-71-5128) has been absent since June 15, 1984 and as of now he is still out, because of illness. Sincerely, Elizabeth Harrison The letter was written on Nova stationery which was no longer being used. Such stationery was available to all teaching personnel. On March 7, 1985 American sent Stanley a letter advising him that in view of the "many discrepancies" in his name, social security number, date of birth and absences from work, it would no longer honor his claims until such discrepancies were "cleared up." Stanley also purchased disability policy number H1-839-092 from Northwestern National Life Insurance Company (Northwestern). This policy was not purchased in connection with a loan. The application was made on October 26, 1984 and the policy became effective January 1, 1985. Stanley used the correct spelling of his name and date of birth on the application. On March 27, 1985 he executed a claim for disability benefits ($1,000 per month) under the above policy indicating he became totally disabled on February 1, 1985 and did not expect to return to work until August, 1985 due to a leg injury received from tripping over a water hose. The form also reflected that Elizabeth Harrison was the appropriate employer representative to be contacted. The telephone number 305-475-7760 was given. After receiving the claim on April 2, Anita Holmes, a disability claims examiner for Northwestern, engaged the services of Equifax, a firm which specializes in insurance investigations. Holmes requested, among other things, that Stanley be interviewed and that his attendance records from Nova High School be obtained. The investigator, Walter Lohmann, interviewed Stanley at his residence on April 19, 1985. After interviewing Stanley, Lohmann went to Nova High School to secure his attendance records, but he could not find an Elizabeth Harrison in that school's personnel office. On April 23 he returned to Nova Middle School and went to the media room. He entered, introduced himself to Harrison and requested Stanley's attendance records. She told him the hard copies were at the school board central office but she could supply the information from a 3x5 file card she had in her file box. She then retrieved a 3x5 card and told Lohmann that Stanley had been absent continually from February 2 through April 14, 1985. Lohmann later received a copy of Stanley's attendance records from Nova High School and they reflected that Stanley was actually absent on February 6 and March 7, 8 and 11 (1/2 day) due to illness. As a result of this investigation, Holmes wrote Stanley on May 3, 1985 advising him that his claim had been denied. Respondent denied (a) that she was involved with Stanley, (b) that it was she who had spoken with Verbosch and Ragan on the telephone, (c) that she had authored and mailed the employer's statements and various letters sent to the insurance companies, and (d) that she had given Lohmann the false attendance records on April 23, 1985. However, she did concede that Stanley, an old friend, may have asked her to participate in the scheme on one occasion. To support her steadfast denial, Harrison produced an "alibi" witness who claimed she was with respondent on the morning of February 25, 1985. According to this witness, she specifically remembered taking Harrison to work that day around 12:30 p.m., or after Verbosch had telephoned the media office and spoken with a female who identified herself as respondent. However, this testimony is discredited since the official school attendance records reflect Harrison was present at work the entire day. Harrison also offered an expert documents examiner who opined, without credible contradiction, that the signature on Harrison's personal checks was not the same as the signature on the letter purportedly authored by Harrison on February 25 and the employer's certificate on the various claim forms. In fact, the expert found that the claims form certificates may have signed by two or three different persons. In view of this testimony, it is found that Harrison did not author the letter dated February 25 or sign any of the various claim forms. It is further found that Harrison did not receive any financial reward by virtue of her conduct. 4/ However, the remainder of her testimony is not deemed credible, and it is found she had knowledge of the letters and forms, and otherwise aided and assisted Stanley in his efforts to defraud the insurance companies. A former associate superintendent testified on Harrison's behalf and stated that if the facts in the amended petition were true, it would still not justify her dismissal. However, the witness acknowledged that if Harrison represented herself to various insurance companies as a responsible school official for the purpose of allowing a third party to collect unauthorized benefits, such conduct would be "serious" and would warrant the consideration of dismissal as a penalty. Harrison's principal could not say whether Harrison's effectiveness as a teacher at Nova Middle School was impaired by virtue of her conduct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of immorality and she be suspended for school year 1986-87 and thereafter reinstated on probationary status the following two years, with a return to annual contract status in school year 1989-90. All other charges should be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 12th day of August, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALLD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of August, 1986.
The Issue Whether Respondent's employment with petitioner should be terminated pursuant to Section 231.36, Florida Statutes, and School Board Policy No. 2.25, as set forth in Notice of Charges, dated June 12, 1979.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Vernie M. Smith commenced employment with Petitioner School Board of Leon County in 1967 as a secretary and bookkeeper in the Transportation and Maintenance Office. She served in this capacity for a period of approximately eighteen months and then obtained private employment. In 1969 she returned to the Transportation Department as a secretary and has remained there continuously since that time, except for a six-month period in 1973, when she served as a secretary at the Leonard Wesson School, Tallahassee, Florida. Since 1975, Respondent has been employed in the capacity of Routes and Operations Supervisor, which involves supervision and coordination of the activities of school bus operators and scheduling bus routes. (Testimony of Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) During the period 1974 until March 1978, Respondent's immediate supervisor was Frank Barber, Director of Transportation. Commencing in 1975, Barber's supervisor was Cecil Hartsfield, Assistant Superintendent of Operations. During the first three years of Barber's tenure, he felt that Respondent did a good job and gave her exceptionally high performance evaluations. She received commendatory letters from school officials, including the Superintendent, concerning her work during this period. However, Barber experienced difficulties with Hartsfield during the school year 1977-78 which he partially attributed to disloyalty on the part of Respondent in providing misinformation concerning him to Hartsfield. No evidence was presented at the hearing to support Barber's perception of Respondent's disloyalty. (Testimony of Barber, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 10, Respondent's Exhibits 4-6) Upon Barber's departure in the spring of 1978, Respondent served as the acting Director of Transportation for about three months. She considered applying for the position on a permanent basis but refrained from doing so after Hartsfield advised her that it was doubtful if the School Board would approve her appointment. The job required a college degree and Respondent had only an eleventh grade education. In June 1978, Conway McGee was hired as Director of Transportation. In August, McGee learned that Respondent did not possess a state chauffeur's license although such a license was a requirement for the incumbent of her position. Respondent had an operator's license, but told McGee that her poor vision in one eye precluded her from obtaining a chauffeur's license. McGee took no action to verify this statement or to otherwise require Respondent to obtain a chauffeur's license. (Testimony of McGee, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) In February 1979, Respondent was obliged to complete a quarterly state report on operations of the county bus system. The preparation of such reports normally required that she work overtime for which she was not paid, but which could be taken as compensatory time during regular work days. During the period, she also was given an assignment by McGee to plan an extra bus route involving a large number of children. Although McGee had authorized compensatory time, if necessary, for such purposes, he later reviewed Respondent's time records and instructed the department bookkeeper to remove credit for eighteen and one-half hours of compensatory time. McGee had not checked Respondent's actual working hours, but was of the opinion that such time was excessive. He did not inform Respondent of his action in this regard and she later discovered it When she checked her leave record. (Testimony of Respondent, McGee, Driggers) Respondent went on vacation in March 1979. While she was absent, a parent called the Transportation Office and stated that she had been attempting to have a school bus stop to pick up her child since the fall of 1978, but that her request had been denied. McGee reviewed the particular route and decided that Respondent should have permitted the bus to pick up the child at an earlier date. He also noted that the routing form did not contain the name of the current driver and should have been updated in this respect. However, the request previously had been denied because there had been no place at the child's home for the bus to turn around and it was within the distance which required a student to walk to the bus stop. (Testimony of McGee, Driggers, Petitioner's Exhibit 7) Respondent's work hours were 6:00 A.M. to 2:30 P.M. On March 26, 1979, Respondent was absent from work due to illness. McGee had previously instructed her that in such instances she was to call Marjorie Conway, a coworker, in order that that employee could take over Respondent's duties at 6:00 A.M. He also had told Respondent that if she could not reach Mrs. Conway, she was to advise him of the situation. On March 26, Respondent was unaware that McGee had moved his residence. She was unable to reach him by telephone, and therefore called Reubin Brooks, the garage supervisor, at 5:00 A.M. and asked him to advise McGee of her absence. Brooks did so. Respondent had not called Mrs. Conway because she felt that there was insufficient time for her to arrive at the office from her home at Wakulla, Florida. On April 9, 1979, McGee placed a written reprimand of Respondent in her personnel file for failing to call him directly on March 26. Respondent believed that the reprimand was unjust and attempted to have it removed from her file by informal requests to school board authorities. These efforts did not succeed and therefore she instituted grievance procedures with the assistance of an attorney. After a hearing before Hartsfield, it was determined by him that the reprimand was appropriate, but that it would be removed from her personnel file in one year. During the same hearing, Respondent protested the disallowance of her compensatory time. Hartsfield reversed McGee and restored credit for the eighteen and one-half hours that McGee had previously disapproved. (Testimony of McGee, Hartsfield, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 4) On March 29, 1979, the assistant principal of Fairview Middle School called Respondent and asked her to see if McGee could attend a meeting that he was going to have on April 3 with some parents who had made a complaint about a bus driver. He planned to ascertain the parents' problem at the meeting before discussing the matter with the particular bus driver. Respondent noted the meeting on McGee's calendar. At the meeting, the parents became upset because the driver was not there, and McGee felt that Respondent should have notified the driver to be present. (Testimony of Carter, Respondent, McGee, Respondent's Exhibit 3) In the fall of 1978, McGee had installed a counter in the department office to restrict access of the bus drivers to the area in which the administrative employees performed their duties. Nevertheless, a coffee pot was located on the administrative side of the counter and the drivers frequently entered the area to obtain coffee if the clerical employees were not present or busy. Several drivers complained that another driver, Helen Smith, frequently was permitted to remain in the administrative area. McGee asked Respondent on several occasions to see that all drivers remained behind the counter. However, Hartsfield had told one of the administrative employees that the drivers could come behind the counter for coffee or to use the bathroom or telephone. (Testimony of McGee, Respondent, Driggers, Conway) On one occasion during the school year, weight restrictions placed on bridges on North Meridian Road required a study as to possible change of bus routes and drivers. McGee discussed the matter with Respondent as to changing the route of a certain driver. She advised him that prior to his tenure, this particular driver had been threatened with a weapon by a parent and that she had therefore taken him off the bus route. McGee agreed not to change the driver, but claimed at the hearing that Respondent had said it would be too much work to make so many changes. Respondent denied making such a statement at the hearing. On another occasion during the school year, Respondent forgot to assign a driver to pick up a group of school children. (Testimony of McGee, Driggers, Respondent) On April 11, 1979, a group of the bus drivers requested a meeting with Hartsfield to hear their complaints. At the meeting, attended also by McGee, the drivers were concerned about statements made by others attributed to McGee to the effect that the drivers would be fired for pulling off a road to stop at a store or for running out of gas on their routes. Although these statements had not been made to anyone by McGee, both he and Hartsfield were of the opinion that the drivers had said that Respondent had quoted McGee in those respects. Actually, however, the statements were made by other personnel of the department and not the Respondent. At the meeting, other complaints were raised against McGee by certain of the drivers concerning their working conditions and his lack of support regarding problems with other school officials. Some of these drivers complained about McGee's unfair censure of them as a result of bus accidents. (Testimony of McGee, Hartsfield, Gunn, Harvey, Harley, Tinnell, Taylor, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 5) At about 5:00 P.M. on April 19, 1979, McGee found that his private automobile which was parked in the department compound would not start. He was due to attend a meeting the next day and asked his garage supervisor, Reubin Brooks, if he would check the car the following day. It had been a long- standing practice for Brooks to assist departmental employees by performing minor repairs to their automobiles in such situations. Brooks always arrived an hour or so early for work and did not take a lunch hour or claim overtime for such period. The next day, Brooks checked the fan belt of McGee's automobile and applied jumper cables and let the motor run about five minutes. Since the compound parking area was being paved, he drove the car to the shop and ordered a new battery which he installed that day. He estimated that the entire work he performed on McGee's car took about ten minutes. Although there were dead-lined buses in his garage on April 20, this was not unusual since buses were dead- lined every day in the department and the time spent on McGee's car had not interfered with his regular work. Respondent observed Brooks working on the vehicle outside her office and thereupon secured an office camera and took photos of the scene through a window. At a subsequent meeting with Hartsfield on May 8 at which Respondent had complained about McGee's "call in" requirements, she showed Hartsfield the photographs and indicated that the car had been worked on during "company time." Hartsfield told McGee about the photographs several days thereafter. Respondent took the photographs on "impulse" because she thought such activity was a problem in the department and because she felt that her job might be in jeopardy at that time. (Testimony of McGee, Brooks, Ferguson, Hartsfield, Respondent, Driggers, Conway, Respondent's Exhibit 7) Respondent's annual performance evaluation for the period ending April 30, 1979, was completed and signed by McGee on May 5, 1979. The evaluation form provided for the entry of ratings in ten different categories as either "subnormal; frequent and repeated errors", "normal; seldom repeats errors", or "exceptionally high; rarely makes errors." Respondent was rated "subnormal" in six of the categories and "normal" in the remaining four categories of quality of work, cooperativeness, personal appearance, and tardiness. The "subnormal" ratings were for quantity of work, work attitude, reliability, health, absence, and general evaluation. As to the reliability category, McGee noted that Respondent had either been off or worked short days on over 57 work days, and as to the health category, he commented that she had lost 17 days due to illness. He also made a general comment that Respondent was capable of doing more and better work and that she was in "somewhat of a rutt [sic]; having worked in this department for many years." Respondent's absences from work during the year were authorized by her supervisor and for legitimate purposes. On May 9, McGee called the Respondent into his office and handed her a copy of the evaluation. After looking at it, Respondent crumpled it up and threw it toward McGee's desk stating "This is what I think of this and you too." She left the office and came back shortly thereafter accompanied by Driggers. At this time, she informed McGee that she thought she had been treated unfairly by him and that the evaluation was inaccurate. McGee then gave her another copy of the evaluation and she left the office. Although Respondent was upset and raised her voice somewhat during the encounters with McGee concerning her evaluation, she did not shout at him. (Testimony of McGee, Respondent, Brooks, Conway, Driggers, Petitioner's Exhibits 3, 6) On May 10, 1979, McGee sent an office memorandum to Respondent stating that she was suspended with pay immediately until a hearing could be held to decide the outcome of his recommendation to the superintendent that her employment be terminated. The memorandum further stated that the incident involving the evaluation form and other reasons which were unspecified in the memorandum were the basis for the recommendation. Thereafter, on June 26, 1979, the Leon County School Board considered charges filed against Respondent by the Superintendent of Schools, suspended Respondent without pay and referred the matter for hearing to this division. (Respondent's Exhibit 1, case pleadings) In July 1978, Respondent had moved from Leon to Gadsden County. Her two children had previously been attending Leon High School in Tallahassee. One was a special education student in the 10th-grade and the other was due to enter his senior year in the fall. In her desire to ensure that the latter child would graduate from Leon High, Respondent listed the address of a friend in Tallahassee as the residence of her children. In October, Respondent made McGee aware of the fact that she had children attending school in Leon County even though she then resided in Gadsden County. However, he took no action in this regard at the time. In May 1979, a school investigation revealed that Respondent's children had not lived at the Tallahassee address during the school year. On May 29, Respondent was informed by the Director of Student Services that her children would not be allowed to attend Leon County Schools for the 1979-80 school year unless it was shown that her primary residence was in Leon County. Thereafter, the senior student graduated from Leon High School and Respondent was granted an exception to school policy to permit the other child to remain in Leon County Schools due to the fact that he was in the exceptional student program. (Testimony of McGee, Respondent, Pla, Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 9, Respondent's Exhibit 2) Respondent's performance of duty in the school system under prior directors of transportation during the years 1966-1974 was exemplary and demonstrated her dependability and competence in the department. Her relationships with principals of Leon County Schools over the years were excellent and she was invariably cooperative and helpful in assisting such officials in solving school transportation problems. (Testimony of Sullivan, Coggins, MacElwee, Carter, Murphy, Montford, Ferrell, and Ingram, Chambers, (Stipulation))
Recommendation 1. That the School Board of Leon County reinstate Respondent Vernie M. Smith to employment within the Leon County School System under the following terms: That such reinstatement shall be without pay during the period of Respondent's prior suspension by the School Board. That Respondent be issued a written reprimand for misconduct in office and gross insubordination as set forth in paragraphs 3c and 4a of the foregoing Conclusions of Law. That Respondent be restored to her former position or transferred within the school system, as deemed appropriate by the Board. DONE and ENTERED this 21 day of December, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Charles A. Johnson, Esquire 2757 West Pensacola Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 S. Gunter Toney, Esquire 200 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. N. E. (Ed) Fenn Superintendent of Leon County Schools 2757 West Pensacola Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact Respondent has for twelve years been an instructional employee of the School Board of Broward County, Florida. She currently holds a continuing contract as a classroom teacher, and is assigned to Perry Elementary School in Miramar, Florida. During the same time period, Harold McKahand, Respondent's husband, and Peggy Freeman were instructional employees of the Broward County School Board assigned to Perry Middle School, adjacent to Perry Elementary where Respondent taught. From as early as 1979, Respondent had suspected that her husband and Mrs. Freeman were having a love affair. These suspicions were a frequent topic of conversation between Respondent and her husband. In fact, Respondent had indicated to her husband her intention to seek a divorce. Notwithstanding Mr. McKahand's assurances that he did not want a divorce and would no longer see Mrs. Freeman, he continued to do so, and Mrs. Freeman on many occasions made telephone calls to the McKahand residence, which Respondent apparently considered harassing in nature. All of this culminated in a discussion between Respondent and Mrs. Freeman in August of 1981 in which Respondent requested that Mrs. Freeman cease making telephone calls to her home because they disturbed her and her two children. After this discussion between Respondent and Mrs. Freeman, there was little or no personal contact between them until the act which gave rise to this proceeding. On December 12, 1981, Respondent, her husband and two children attended a racquetball tournament. After the tournament, they returned to their home and Respondent busied herself with work around the home. Respondent's husband, unbeknownst to Respondent, took the family car and proceeded to Perry Middle School to obtain some work folders from his office. Upon arriving at Perry Middle School, Mr. McKahand discovered Mrs. Freeman conducting a Saturday afternoon basketball practice with the school's girls basketball team, which she served as coach. Mr. McKahand and Mrs. Freeman conversed briefly, and Mr. McKahand departed the school and returned home. Meanwhile, Respondent's oldest son had left the family home without performing certain chores which had been assigned to him by Respondent. Upon discovering her son's absence, Respondent took her bicycle and began to search the neighborhood for him. Her search carried her ultimately to the gymnasium at Perry Middle School. Respondent had no knowledge that her husband had gone to his office at Perry Middle School, nor did she know that Mrs. Freeman was conducting a basketball practice at the school. When Respondent arrived at the school, she walked into the gymnasium to see if her son was there. Upon entering the gym, she saw the basketball practice in session, and noticed Mrs. Freeman. When she did not see her son, Respondent started walking from the gym. A member of the girls basketball team advised Mrs. Freeman that Mrs. McKahand was at the door. Although there is some conflict in the testimony on this point, it appears that Mrs. McKahand did not beckon to Mrs. Freeman to follow her outside the gym, but that one of the team players told Mrs. Freeman of Respondent's presence, and indicated to Mrs. Freeman that Respondent wanted to talk to her. Upon being advised of this, Mrs. Freeman walked across the basketball court, picked up her purse from a table, and proceeded to the gym door through which Respondent had exited. By this time Respondent was outside the gym. Mrs. Freeman forcefully opened the gymnasium door behind which Respondent was standing, striking Respondent on the arm. As Mrs. Freeman exited the door, she and Respondent grabbed one another and a fight ensued. The girls basketball team members were at various positions inside the gymnasium at the time the scuffle between Respondent and Mrs. Freeman started. It is clear from the record, however, that each of the students were located behind Mrs. Freeman and, therefore, were not in the best of positions to observe the precise manner in which the conflict started. It is also equally clear that the physical confrontation between Respondent and Mrs. Freeman occurred quickly and spontaneously, and, as a result, the various eye-witness accounts contained in this record predictably contain varying and conflicting versions of the events leading up to and culminating in the scuffle between Respondent and Mrs. Freeman. During the course of their physical confrontation, Mrs. Freeman placed one of her hands on Respondent's throat and the other in Respondent's hair, and Respondent reciprocated, pushing Mrs. Freeman against the gymnasium wall. Several blows were exchanged between the two women. Although the gymnasium door had closed behind Mrs. Freeman, several of the basketball team members followed the two teachers out the door and attempted to separate them. After the fight began, there is no evidence that Respondent acted other than in defense of the actions of Mrs. Freeman. When the students were finally successful in separating the two combatants, Respondent began looking for her sunglasses, which had fallen off, and Mrs. Freeman retrieved her purse, which she had dropped during the altercation. Upon finding her purse, Mrs. Freeman called to several of the students to stand back, whereupon she removed a .22 calibre pistol from her purse, and fired at least two shots. Respondent, upon observing Mrs. Freeman to be armed, began to run from the school premises, retrieved her bicycle, and retreated to her home. Apparently unsatisfied with these results, Mrs. Freeman incredibly loaded several of the team members, including some of the students who testified in this proceeding, into her car, where she reloaded her weapon. Mrs. Freeman then proceeded to drive in a reckless manner, including running several stop signs, to Respondent's home. Upon arriving at Respondent's home, Mrs. Freeman pulled her car into the driveway, took her pistol, got out of her car, and again confronted the Respondent who was standing in her driveway with her two children. Respondent picked up a broom in her garage and got her two children to stand behind her in an attempt to shield them from Mrs. Freeman. Mr. McKahand, who was inside the home during this time, came outside, and ultimately was able to get Respondent inside their home. Mrs. Freeman then departed the McKahand residence, but shortly thereafter began making harassing telephone calls to the McKahand home. Later that afternoon, Mr. McKahand attempted to take Respondent to her part-time job in a local department store, but was prevented from doing so when Mrs. Freeman attempted to run the McKahand car off the street with her vehicle, and further fired upon the McKahands with her pistol. As previously indicated, Petitioner has charged Respondent with referring to Mrs. Freeman as a "bitch" during the course of their fight. Respondent denies making such a statement, and the only testimony in the record which would establish a finding that such a statement was made is contained in the conflicting testimony of Mrs. Freeman and Rachel Geathers, one of the student basketball players. Mrs. Freeman's testimony in this regard, which the Hearing Officer hereby finds unworthy of belief, was that Respondent referred to her as a "filthy bitch" as Mrs. Freeman exited the gymnasium door. Ms. Geathers' testimony was that Respondent referred to Mrs. Freeman as a "bitch" after the two combatants had exited the gym and enough time had passed to allow all of the basketball players to run through the door and outside the gym. Ms. Geathers' testimony in this regard is also rejected, in that several of the other students who were in a better position to observe and hear Respondent and Mrs. Freeman testified that they heard no such statement made. Accordingly, it is specifically concluded that the evidence in this case fails to establish Respondent's use of profanity in the presence of students as alleged in the Petition. There is no evidence in the record of this proceeding to indicate the Respondent's effectiveness as an employee of the Broward County School System has in any way been adversely affected by the above-described events. In fact, Respondent's principal and grade chairman both testified that Respondent is a good teacher, and they would welcome her back on the faculty of Perry Elementary School should she be absolved of the allegations involved in this proceeding. Even a cursory review of the record in this case will reveal sharp divergencies and conflicts in the testimony of several witnesses. In attempting to resolve these conflicts, the Hearing officer has observed the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, their interest, if any, in the outcome of this proceeding, together with any motive, bias or prejudice which might affect their credibility. Further, the Hearing Officer has also taken into account the conditions existing at the time of the incident observed by the witnesses in weighing the credibility to be attached to the various accounts contained in this record. In so doing, the Hearing Officer has concluded that Respondent did not go to the Perry Middle School gymnasium seeking a confrontation with Mrs. Freeman. Indeed, the record clearly establishes that Respondent did not know Mrs. Freeman was even at the gymnasium on the date in question. Further, it is concluded, despite some evidence to the contrary, that Respondent did not summon Mrs. Freeman to follow her outside the gymnasium, but that Mrs. Freeman was induced to do so as a result of a student telling her that someone was outside the gym to see her. Finally, the quality as opposed to the quantity of the evidence in this case does not support a factual conclusion that Respondent, in fact, initiated the physical confrontation with Mrs. Freeman. Because of her conduct at the time of the incident, and further because of the inaccuracies and inconsistencies in Mrs. Freeman's testimony at the final hearing in this cause, her testimony, in its entirety, is worthy of little credibility. Because of this, her testimony that Respondent initiated the fight has been found unworthy of belief. The testimony of Mrs. Freeman's students, several of whom testified that the first aggressive gesture they saw was made by Respondent, is tainted both by their admitted allegiance to their teacher, Mrs. Freeman, and by their physical positioning which would not admit a particularly clear view of the incident. Conversely, the factual version of this incident given by Respondent in her testimony was, in every particular, more plausible than that contained in the testimony of either the students or Mrs. Freeman. At the time of the above- described incident, almost three and one-half months had passed since Respondent had last spoken in person with Mrs. Freeman. The Respondent did not know that Mrs. Freeman was at the gymnasium when she arrived there looking for her son. As a result, there could not have been any premeditated design on the part of Respondent to assault Mrs. Freeman and, due to the passage of time since her last contact with Mrs. Freeman, there is no apparent motive of record to explain a spontaneous assault. As a result, the only way to resolve the conflict in the testimony concerning how this altercation originated is to weigh the credibility of the various participants. Making such a choice is perhaps the most difficult task a finder of fact must face in a proceeding such as this, but by applying the aforementioned factors, the Hearing Officer has determined that in the areas of conflict, the testimony of the Respondent is more credible than that of either Mrs. Freeman or her students.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed any of the acts alleged in Petitioner’s Amended Administrative Complaint; and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Background on Mr. Alden Mr. Alden began working as an educator in 2004 when he was hired to work at the Clark County Alternative School in Athens, Georgia. When that school closed in 2009, Mr. Alden relocated to Clark Central High School. After taking a year off to care for his terminally ill mother, Mr. Alden relocated to Florida and took a position with Gateway High School in Osceola County in 2011.3 In 2017, Mr. Alden took a teaching position with Lecanto High School (“Lecanto High”) in Citrus County, Florida. During the 2018-19 school year, Mr. Alden was an economics and government instructor at Lecanto High. He also taught one section of world history. Allegations by students regarding Mr. Alden’s conduct led to the initiation of an investigation in September of 2018 and the issuance of a written reprimand on September 25, 2018. A second investigation began on May 2, 2019, but was closed on May 9, 2019, due to Mr. Alden’s resignation from Lecanto High. Mr. Alden worked as a sixth-grade world history teacher at Liberty Middle School in Marion County, Florida, during the 2019-20 school year. As explained in more detail below, two incidents during the 2019-20 school year led to Mr. Alden not being recommended for reappointment. 3 Mr. Alden holds Florida Educator’s Certificate 1186313, covering the areas of Educational Leadership, Elementary Education, Gifted, and Social Science, which is valid through June 30, 2022. Findings as to Whether Mr. Alden Referred to Students as “Dumb,” “Stupid,” or Words to that Effect S.H. was a senior at Lecanto High during the 2018-19 school year and was in Mr. Alden’s economics class. S.H. has a learning disability and reported in September of 2018 to her case manager, Karen Harper, a math teacher at Lecanto High, that Mr. Alden would become angry with her for asking questions. Mr. Alden supposedly displayed that anger by sighing heavily and telling S.H. that she didn’t know what she was talking about.4 S.H. offered the following testimony during the final hearing: Q: Tell us about what your concerns were in Mr. Alden’s class. A: Well, I was – not repeatedly, but I have heard him putting down students. On top of that I was making a statement about something he said and he said that I didn’t know what I was talking about and that I was stupid. Q: Okay. Now, did that bother you what Mr. Alden said to you? * * * A: Yes, sir. Q: When he called you stupid, did he say this in front of other students? A: Yes, sir. Q: What you just told us here today, was that some of what you told Mr. Harper? 4 Ms. Harper also acted as a case manager for a student named A.M., who stated to her that Mr. Alden referred to him as stupid and a failure when he sought assistance from Mr. Alden. Because A.M. did not testify during the final hearing, the portion of Ms. Harper’s testimony concerning A.M.’s allegations is uncorroborated hearsay that cannot support a finding of fact. See § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2020)(providing that “[h]earsay evidence may be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence, but it shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions.”). A: Yes, sir, * * * Q: Okay. You say he has put you down when asked questions. What do you mean by that? What did he do? What was going on? * * * A: Like anything I would say – and, honestly, it sounded pretty dumb in my mind as well, my questions, but I could understand why he put me down, but it’s still unacceptable. But I was just saying things that provoked it. So. He put me down, like, you know, called me, you know, stupid, tell me I wasn’t – I didn’t know what I was talking about. Like that. Q: Okay. So even if you felt like you asked a dumb question, you didn’t expect him to call you stupid in front of your peers? * * * A: Yes. Because my other teachers don’t do that. Q: Okay. How did that make you feel for him to call you stupid? A: Not good. It just made me feel kind of depressed, like I wasn’t good enough for his class. Just did not feel good about it. Other former students of Mr. Alden’s from the 2018-19 school year did not corroborate S.H.’s testimony. For example, J.S. testified that Mr. Alden implied that particular students were dumb or stupid but never directly said so. However, J.S. did not explain how that implication was expressed. K.S. did not remember Mr. Alden using the words “dumb” or “stupid.” M.M. could not recall any instances in which Mr. Alden demeaned a student. C.S. denied ever observing Mr. Alden disparage a student or call a student “stupid” or “dumb.” B.S. never heard Mr. Alden call a student “dumb” or “stupid” and did not recall Mr. Alden disparaging or embarrassing any students. S.C. never witnessed Mr. Alden disparage or belittle any students and never heard Mr. Alden call any students “stupid” or “ignorant.” M.J. never observed Mr. Alden disparaging any students or call a student “dumb” or “stupid.” R.C. denied ever observing Mr. Alden disparage a student. When asked if he remembered Mr. Alden explaining the difference between “stupid” and “ignorant,” R.C. gave the following testimony: A: I remember the comment. If I believe. I mean, it’s been two years, but to my best knowledge I believe that the comment was made on the note that, as long as you’re – as long as you’re trying and you’re asking questions and you’re trying to be engaged and learn, that you can’t be stupid. But if you’re choosing not to learn and you’re choosing not to try and give no effort, then you’re just ignorant. But you can’t be stupid as long as you try. Q: Okay. And did you ever observe Mr. Alden, you know, directly, call a student stupid or dumb? A: No, sir. Mr. Alden vehemently denied Petitioner’s allegation that he referred to students as “dumb” or “stupid”: A: I spent 15 years in the classroom working with kids that have been disparaged by their community and their families. Came to me using I am stupid as their – as their – as an excuse for not putting effort into their education. They had to – they had been convinced that there was no point in trying because they weren’t – they were going to fail. I spent 15 years, from the minute I walked into the classroom, trying to convince these kids that they were not stupid, that they were, in fact, more than capable and trying to deprogram them from the belief that there was no point in trying. I made, every year, the first day of the – the first day of class I made a point to illustrate to the kids that there was a difference between ignorant and stupid. Because a lot of them conflated those two terms. I would point out that ignorant means you have not learned and stupid means you cannot learn. And to drive the point home, especially with the age group that I worked with, I went into a little conversation about human growth and development and the formation of the prefrontal cortex and that that’s the part of your brain that allows you to make rational decisions and it doesn’t finish forming until your early-to-mid 20s. * * * I also used the secondary working definition of stupidity that ignorant means you don’t know any better and stupid means you know better, but you do it anyway. And I use that to short circuit what a lot of these kids would interpret as a disparaging remark from other adults. That when an adult might say, that was stupid, they weren’t talking about you as a person, they’re talking [about] your actions. * * * Q: How often would you have to have that sort of discussion with your students? A: Well, as I said, I would do it at the beginning of the term, just to sort of begin that deprogramming process. I would also reiterate the lesson at every available opportunity. If I heard a kid say, I’m stupid, I would stop the world and point out to them, no, you’re not, you can’t be. It’s physiologically impossible and all the rest. If I heard a kid disparage another student, say that was stupid or are you stupid or don’t be stupid, I would clarify for both the student making the comment as well as the student the comment was towards, that that’s not how you want to say that. You want to say, that was careless, that was thoughtless, that was reckless. Not that that was stupid. And stress to the student that was – that had engaged in observable behavior that could be defined as a stupid action and say, look, you’re not stupid. You knew better. Think about what you’re doing before you do it. And, you know, you don’t have to worry about people coming to the wrong conclusions. Findings as to Whether Mr. Alden Told His Students That a Class Was Divided Into “Smart” and “Dumb” Sections S.B. was a sophomore at Lecanto High during the 2018-19 school year and had Mr. Alden for world history. When asked about how Mr. Alden seated students in his classroom, S.B. gave the following testimony: A: He would separate the classroom. Smart people would be in the back of the classroom and then the dumber kids, or what he would refer [to as] the kids who failed the test or didn’t make good enough grades, he would put them in the front and refer to them as dumb. Q: How did you know Mr. Alden was putting the smart kids in the back? A: He had said it. Q: And the not so smart or dumb kids in the front? How did you know that? A: He had said it himself. A kid has asked why we were being separated and he just said that he had separated the kids because the smart kids go in the back and the dumb kids go up front, is what I had overheard in the class period. Q: Okay. Did that make you feel any particular way when he would put – separate kids like that? A: Yes. Because that’s not how a teacher should be speaking to their students. So I don’t think that was right. * * * Q: Now, even though you’re in the smart group, did you feel bad for the kids that were in the, what he described, as you say, the dumb group? A: Yes, of course. Because he would always repeat and make it known that those were the dumber kids. Q: Okay. And what did he tell you he based putting the smart kids in the smart group and the dumb kids in the dumb group? How did he – did he tell you how he made that determination as to which kids were going to go in any particular group? A: Usually it would be because of the quiz grades or the test grades that we had received [that] day. J.D. was a senior at Lecanto High during the 2018-19 school year and was one of Mr. Alden’s students. J.D. offered the following testimony about Mr. Alden’s method of seating students: Q: Okay. Let’s start talking about [allegation] 3-A. Tell us what you know about 3-A. A: All right. So 3-A, it says that in the classroom he referred to students as dumb or stupid. I never heard him actually refer to any individual student individually as dumb or stupid, but I know that he did refer to people collectively as not willing to learn. But I do not know that he actually referred to any [ ] particular student as dumb or stupid. Q: Did you hear him use those words toward any group of students as being dumb or stupid? A: Implied, yes. But not directly. Q: Okay. What do you mean when you say implied? A: So, like, in the next part, in 3-B, when he divided the section into smart and dumb students. And smart students were in the back and dumb students were in the front. That did happen and that does imply that he thought that those kids were not as smart as the kids in the back. Q: Okay. So, by the way, were you in either one of those groups? A: Yes, I was. I was in the back. Q: Okay. So, you were in the smart kids’ group; is that right? A: Exactly. Q: Okay. Now, how did you – did you – did that make you feel in any way? How did you know that the smart kids were in the back and the dumb kids were in the front? I mean, how did you know that? A: Because it’s what the other kids were saying. The other kids in the class. It made them feel that the kids in the back were better than they were. And those were – those are words from the students. Like, when I was – so, in the class, I was in the back and me and another student in the back would – we would, you know, bicker and argue. So I asked Mr. Alden to move me to a different setting so that we just wouldn’t bicker and argue anymore. And when I was sitting with those students, they would always refer to me as the smart kid in the group. And it made a distinction. It actually, in a way, segregated the class based on the level of intelligence. * * * Q: Okay. Did Mr. Alden tell you that [was] why he was separating [students] into different groups? The kids who scored well on the exams were put in the back and the kids who didn’t score well, they were put in the front. A: Exactly. That is how he explained it in the beginning of the school year. Q: Okay. And you were talking about the interaction between the kids. Based on the way he had told you all he was segregating you with the kids that scored well in the back and kids that didn’t score well in the front, did that cause some tension or problems between the students in the classroom? A: I wouldn’t say tensions, but it did ostracize people who sat in the front, people who sat in the back. And then when you, like, try to talk to people from a different area, it was, like, you were either below them or above them. Q: Okay. And that was discussions among the students based on where they were placed; is that correct? A: Right. And that is my experience from sitting in a different group. K.S. was aware that Mr. Alden based students’ seat assignments on their class performance. However, he testified that Mr. Alden “never said that we were either stupid or smart in one place or another.” R.C. gave the following testimony about the seating arrangement: Q: How was the seating arrangement in Mr. Alden’s classroom, if you recall? A: It varied. Normally we could sit kind of wherever we want[ed] when we came in. But then, after test days, we would be split into groups where the first row back, if I recall, the highest test grades would be in one area and the lowest test grades in the other. We’d talk and go over the test and then we would be split into groups based on lowest test grades with the highest test grades put together and all mixed out so that everybody could help each other and help each other learn. Q: Okay. And did you find this effective? A: I believe so. Because some days I had a bad test and someone else did better and they could help me. Then if I had a better test and someone else didn’t, I could help them. You got to know everybody in the class better and I feel, again, it was just very productive overall. Q: Did the seating arrangement ever cause you any embarrassment? A: No, sir. C.S. testified that the seating arrangement helped “students that weren’t really doing well on their tests by putting students that had lower grades on tests up in front. That way [Mr. Alden] could do one-on-one with them, if needed.” When asked if the seating arrangement ever caused him embarrassment, C.S. testified that, “I actually really enjoyed it since there would be certain lessons I didn’t understand that well and so being up closer to him, it allowed me to, like, get his attention and be, like, can you help me understand this.” When asked about the seating arrangement in Mr. Alden’s class, B.S. testified that “he just put it to where he thought would be the best for people that needed to learn a little bit better. But it wasn’t like anything like embarrassing or anything like that. Like it was what he thought was the best seating arrangement to do.” S.C. seemed to agree when asked if Mr. Alden ever announced that he was dividing a class “between dumb students and smart students.” However, S.C. testified that no one took any offense and that the seating arrangement never caused him any embarrassment. M.J. did not recall students being seated based on test scores, but she did remember that students who needed more help were placed closer to the front of the classroom so that they could get Mr. Alden’s attention. She denied ever hearing Mr. Alden state that he was dividing a class into smart and dumb sections. Mr. Alden readily acknowledged that he placed students in different sections of his classroom based on test scores during the time in question and had used this method during seven school years: After the first unit test, they were grouped by their test score. So the highest performing students were in the back of the room. They were – my independent learners were in the back of the class. And the lowest scoring kids in the group were my dependent learners and they needed more support from me and I put them in – not necessarily in the first group because the very first group was closer to the door to the classroom. The second and third – the second, third – no, wait. One, two, three. The second, fifth and fourth groups were the ones closest to my desk. And that’s where I arranged the students that needed more help with the content. And sometimes it was a bad test taker or sometimes they were having trouble with the read – with reading comprehension. Sometimes it was an issue with communication with their peers. And having them closer to me allowed me to observe their interactions and, where necessary, step in and provide one-on-one support and determine if I had to address a learning deficiency or if it was a struggle – they were struggling with a particular piece of content. Mr. Adlen denied referring to students as being in “a dumb section or stupid section”: Whenever the students would make comments to that – to that end, I was vehement and immediate in my correction of it. I made – on numerous occasions I would say that the kids in the back of the room might have gotten a hundred percent on the test and the kids in the front of the room might have gotten a 90. That I only have limited amount of space and I can’t put every A in the back of the room. I don’t have enough room to put everybody in the back of the room. So everybody’s got to go somewhere and it -- ending up in the front of the room does not mean you’re low performing. It doesn’t mean you have a poor performance. There’s no such thing as good enough grades. * * * The folks in the front are the folks that need support. The folks in the back are – I’m able to leave to their own devices. Findings as to Whether Mr. Alden Used Profanity in the Classroom S.H. testified that Mr. Alden uses the words “bitch” and “shit” in class. S.C. read from a prior written statement in which he stated that Mr. Alden is “very blunt, uses uncalled for words. He speaks about other students, but doesn’t use specific names, like mistakes they have done. He cusses, such as words as damn, shit and hell. He’s used the n-word before. Does not think before he speaks.” S.B. testified that Mr. Alden “would curse a lot” and used the words “bitch,” “shit,” and “ass.” That made S.B. uncomfortable because she thinks that teachers should not be using such language around students. J.S. testified that Mr. Alden used the words “bitch,” “shit,” and “hell” in class. J.S. added that Ms. Alden expressed his preference for Milton Friedman’s economic theories by stating that John Maynard Keynes “didn’t know shit.” O.L. was a senior at Lecanto High during the 2018-19 school year and was in Mr. Alden’s economics class. She testified that Mr. Alden told a joke5 to a student in which the set-up was “what is the difference between a bitch and a ho?”6 K.S. remembered Mr. Alden using the term “shit” at least a couple of times. He also remembered the joke described by O.L. R.C. testified that Mr. Alden occasionally used profanity in the classroom. However, according to R.C., Mr. Alden did not use profanity in a derogatory manner and did not direct any profanity toward any students. C.S. denied hearing Mr. Alden ever say anything inappropriate. Mr. Alden7 conceded during his testimony that he had a relaxed attitude toward profanity: Q: The Amended Administrative Complaint in 3-C states, specifically, Respondent used profanity in the classroom, including the words bitch, shit and hell. Could you respond to that accusation? A: Incidental profanity was not a thing that I made a big deal about. It was more that the students engaged in it than that I participated in it. I did participate in it, but very infrequently. 5 The Amended Administrative Complaint did not mention the joke at issue, but Mr. Alden did not assert that he was not on notice that testimony regarding the joke would be used to substantiate the allegation that he used profanity in the presence of students. 6 I.G. did not testify at the final hearing but a written statement from her was accepted into evidence as part of Petitioner’s Exhibit 6. I.G. wrote that “Alden said ‘this is a joke’ and asked the class not to tell, because I believe some other students were making jokes about being called a whore, then he said ‘What’s the difference between a whore and a bitch? A whore gets with everyone and a bitch gets with everyone but you.’” Even if I.G.’s statement was offered to prove that Mr. Alden made the statement at issue, I.G.’s statement supplements and corroborates O.L.’s testimony. Accordingly, I.G.’s statement is admissible. See § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2020)(providing that “[h]earsay evidence may be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence, but it shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions.”). 7 As noted in the Preliminary Statement, Mr. Alden is deemed to have admitted using profanity in the classroom. It originated with students in the class using that language without sign of disquiet. They – I remember distinctly one student saying to me, Mr. Alden, I really like your class because you talk to us about real shit. And I was, like, whoa. But he showed no signs that he was aware that he had said something inappropriate and nobody in the class showed signs that it was an inappropriate thing to say. At that point I noticed that it was – it was not an infrequent thing among the students. So rather than make it – I mean, I worked at an alternative school where I dealt with juvenile felons. I worked in a school where we – our number one problem was kids getting into gang fights. So in my career there had just been bigger fish to fry and more important issues to address. So, at Lecanto, when the students informed me, through their behavior, that incidental profanity was not a thing that they were going to get bent out of shape about, I tried to manage it in what I thought was the best way possible. I made very strict rules. Nothing over – nothing more than PG-13. Nothing that you would not hear on commercial television in prime time. And the f-word – never in anger, never towards another person, never used to aggress against another student, never used to disparage or insult another student. And the f-word was forbidden. Mr. Alden denied ever using the n-word. With regard to the testimony that he told a joke with the words “bitch” and “ho,” Mr. Alden offered the following context: I had a senior girl that was in crisis. She was being accused of being a whore by the ex-girlfriend of her current boyfriend. The agitator was a junior. My girl was a senior and she was about to graduate. She was within just a few short weeks of graduating. She came into class [visibly] upset, surrounded by a group of girls who were egging her on and she kept saying she was going to beat her. I tried to intervene to calm her down, kind of talk her off the ledge. * * * So, I did the last thing I could think to do. I just said, hey, do you know what the difference is between a b_ _ and a ho? Because that was the topic that she was upset about. Being called a whore. That got her attention. * * * And I said, so what is the difference. Tell me what the difference is. And it took a little while to kind of talk her through it, but she got the point that it wasn’t about the behavior, it was about the perception of the behavior. That it wasn’t about the person who was acting, it was about the outside observer and their judgment of the person’s behavior. Karen Harper is a teacher at Lecanto High and explained why teachers using profanity in the classroom could be harmful to learning: Q: Now, in your career, do you use those kinds of words in your classroom? A: No. Q: Do you believe – is there any particular reason why you don’t use those words in your classroom? A: It’s not professional. I know that during -- whenever you’re hired, you have to go to – the beginning of school or when you get hired by a county, you have to go through an orientation and they talk about code of ethics and things that they, you know, as a teacher, this is what’s expected of you. And that was just something that was – I know that it’s a code of ethic[s] you shouldn’t be doing that. Q: Well what about just in terms of how – based on what you know about students, how using those kinds – that kind of language impacts students? A: Some students are – you never know. Just like in [the] general population. You don’t know who you’re going to offend, who you’re not going to offend. So it’s best just to avoid it and not say them. * * * Q: Okay. So, but if the teacher wants to characterize a person in a history book as a bitch or something that they did in the context of history as . . . If the teacher, then, wants to say that something that the queen or the king did was shitty, in your professional view, is that an appropriate context to use those kinds of words? A: No. Teachers and students at Lecanto High are prohibited from using profanity. Findings as to Whether Mr. Alden Embarrassed J.S. by Engaging in a Religious Debate and Stating That a Belief of J.S.’s Was “Demonstrably Fallacious” M.M. was a senior at Lecanto High School during the 2018-19 school year, and Mr. Alden was his economics teacher. On a day in early May of 2019, M.M. disclosed to classmates sitting at his table during economics class that he was transgender, and that led to his classmates asking several questions about M.M.’s family life and religious views. When M.M. expressed a favorable view about Jehovah’s Witnesses, J.S. approached the table where M.M. was seated, stood over him, and inserted himself into the conversation. M.M. described the ensuing events as follows: I can’t remember exactly what brought up J.S. joining this conversation. I do remember that I started with saying my own opinion on Jehovah’s Witnesses, stating that it was a truer religion than most that I have viewed. And I remember him walking up to my desk, standing less than a foot over me while I was seated. And I am a very, very short, small man. Very, very scared of many people, especially in high school. He stood over me and he told me right off the bat that I was wrong. And I said, it’s okay, man, no problem. Conversation over. We’re done. And I just acted as if I was going back to my assignment. He was like, no, no, no, you are wrong. And I want to tell you that you are wrong and that Jesus and God are one and the same. And I was, like, okay, that’s your belief, my belief is different. Just, that’s it. He was, like, no, no, man. And I was, like, I don’t want to – I don’t want to deal with someone pushing someone’s beliefs on me right now. You know, I’m in school, I just want to finish my assignment. And he was like, I’m not pushing my beliefs, I’m enlightening you. And as he’s talking to me he is in a way towering over me, is how I viewed it. I’m assuming that Mr. Alden saw that I was getting very uncomfortable and Mr. Alden came to the other side of me, looked at Mr. J.S. and said, you are wrong for doing this to him, you need to back off. And at that point, the conversation diverted, while it was over me, still to J.S. going after Mr. Alden with the same phrases and repeating the exact same argument that he was doing to me. Mr. Alden kindly enough diverted the argument away from my desk and got sort of to the other side of the classroom at that point. J.S. described the events in question as follows: So they were talking about that topic and they were talking – kept talking about, you know, mainstream Christianity. So I walked over there and I wanted to share my belief, since they were already on that topic, to inform them of that in case they were not aware of a different way of thinking, a different way of believing. So I walked over there and I made the comment, I said, did you know that Jesus is God. And after I said that comment, Mr. Alden walked over to me and he said, don’t say that Jesus is God. That’s demonstrably fallacious. And Jesus is God is one of the core beliefs of my faith. The fact that [he] believes that Jesus is God and that God is the Holy Ghost and that all of them are one person is one of the founding principles of what I believe. So in essence, he was saying, don’t say what you believe is true, because it’s clearly and evidently based on something that is false. * * * And after that, he engaged me in a whole debate, trying to prove what I believe to be wrong in front of all of [my] peers. Q: Okay. So his demeanor towards you while he was telling you that what you believe was demonstrably fallacious, what was his demeanor like? A: It was cocky, it was arrogant, it was – it seemed like he thought no one could ever prove him wrong. And even when you tried to use the sources that you draw your faith from, such as the Bible, I was – when we were talking, I was trying to use scriptures that I believe to be doctoral scriptures from the Bible. And he said – he told me that I could not use the Bible because it was inaccurate and false, due to the Council of Nicaea. So he not only was disparag[ing] my faith, but he disparaged the spiritual book that I draw my faith from. Q: Okay. Emotionally how did that make you feel? A: Emotionally, I was embarrassed. I was upset. I was angry. But I was just going to let it -- I was just going to let it go. I was just going to let it roll off – roll off like water on a duck’s back. The undersigned does not credit J.S.’s assertion that he was embarrassed. During his testimony, J.S. presented as a very outgoing and opinionated young man who has no inhibitions about expressing his views and engaging in debates. In fact, J.S. testified that “I am a, you know, I hate to say it, but I am an opinionated person and that tends to get me into discussions based on different topics, such as, you know, politics, opinions, the whole nine yards.” Mr. Alden’s description of this incident corroborates M.M.’s testimony, and his description of J.S. matches the opinion formed by the undersigned: [J.S.] was aggressively opinionated. And I had to remove him from two groups at the request of the members of his groups because he would not acquiesce ever. A big part of the class was they would take quizzes as a collaborative group and they would discuss and debate what was the best evidence for their answers on the quiz. And J.S. would not keep – J.S. would get his opinion on what was the best evidence and he would not hear anyone nay-saying it. So, two different groups of kids said, could you please remove him because we can’t have a debate with this guy. He was also very aggressive about his religious beliefs. And I, on more than one occasion, reminded him that belief is individualized. You cannot require anybody else to agree with your beliefs. If it’s just a matter of a difference of opinion on beliefs, on faith, then you have to agree to disagree. It’s unjust. Otherwise it’s unjust. The particular incident involving M.M. – M.M.’s characterization of the interaction is a lot more intimidating than I thought it was. I just – I just saw J.S. in the back of the room with a group that had asked him to be removed from them. And I stepped up to just sort of reestablish that boundary. That, you know, this is -- this is a group of kids that really doesn’t – they got a problem with you, there’s a personality conflict or something going on here. I had no – I didn’t know that M.M. was feeling bullied at the time. And I – when I stepped to M.M. or when I stepped to J.S., I heard him – all I – I heard him say that Jesus and God are literally the same thing. And I heard M.M. very gently disagreeing, but clearly not wanting to get into a debate – a debate with J.S. I certainly did not want to get into a debate about religious beliefs, so I employed the Socratic method and I just asked J.S., what do you base that on. And J.S. said, I base it on the Bible. And I said, okay. Let me just ask you questions based on your source material and let’s see if we can figure out if that’s an accurate claim. Like, can you make that claim using your own sources. And I just asked him a few simple questions about the biblical nature of God as defined by the Bible and the nature of Jesus as outlined in the Bible and showed the contrast between God of the Bible and the Jesus of the Bible to show him that, okay, that claim, you can’t defend. You can’t make that claim based on the source material. Findings Regarding the Allegation that Mr. Alden Grabbed a Student’s Hair Mr. Alden taught world history at Liberty Middle School in Marion County, Florida, during the 2019-20 school year. K.R.H. was a student at Liberty Middle School that year and had Mr. Alden for eighth-grade history. On approximately October 8, 2019, K.R.H. was walking into Mr. Alden’s classroom and Mr. Alden was positioned near the entrance. K.R.H. had long hair and was wearing it in a ponytail. She testified that Mr. Alden “pulled my hair pretty roughly and it made my head go back a little.” K.R.H. did not say anything to Mr. Alden. However, when she looked back at him, she testified that he was laughing and did not offer an apology. K.R.H. called her parents about the incident, and her father then called the school. Melissa Forsyth, the principal of Liberty Middle School, fielded the call and began an investigation. In addition to interviewing K.R.H., Ms. Forsyth interviewed two other students who witnessed the incident and corroborated K.R.H.’s assertion that Mr. Alden pulled K.R.H.’s hair.8 Ms. Forsyth and her assistant principal viewed security camera footage of the incident9, and Ms. Forsyth discussed the incident with Mr. Alden: And we saw Mr. Alden’s hand go around her ponytail and kind of -- it went up and then her head tilted back as she was walking into the room. Q: Okay. Did you talk to Mr. Alden about that? A: We did. Q: What did he tell you? A: So at first he said that he oftentimes greeted students at the door. High fives, fist bumps, elbows. And he never pulled anyone’s hair. I did take that opportunity and reminded him that there were security cameras in the hallway. And then he said, he swatted at K.R.H.’s ponytail jokingly to flip it and a finger got caught in a tangle. Q: So is it your testimony that when you first talked [to] Mr. Alden about it, he denied ever pulling the student’s hair? A: Yes, sir. Q: And then when you informed him that you had video and you had seen him grab the student’s hair 8 Neither of the alleged witnesses testified at the final hearing. 9 The security camera footage was not offered into evidence during the final hearing. and pull her head back, did he – that’s when he told you what he did was swat at her head? A: Right. I didn’t tell him I saw anything. I just reminded him that there were video cameras in the hallway. Q: Okay. And then that’s when he changed his story about what happened? A: He swatted at her ponytail jokingly to flip it and a finger got caught in a tangle. Q: Okay. Now, is that what you saw when you observed it yourself? A: It did not appear that way. Q: Okay. It appears as you’ve described, that he grabbed her ponytail and pulled her head back; is that correct? A: That it was – that it was around the hand – the hair and then her head tilted back after it went up. While denying that he grabbed and pulled K.R.H.’s ponytail, Mr. Alden testified that his hand accidentally got entangled in K.R.H.’s hair: I was standing at – I was standing in the doorway on the hallway side, greeting students as they came in. The doorway was inset about three feet from the wall. So, if I’m standing in the doorway observing the hallway, I couldn’t clearly see into the classroom. As K.R.H. came in I said, hi, she said hi. And as she – I put my fist out to bump her and as she walked by I – I assume she didn’t see me with my hand out or she was distracted. As she walked by, I swatted at her ponytail, just like, oh, you’re going to ignore me. Okay. Swatted at her ponytail. I wear a ring on my little finger and it got caught – my finger or the ring or some combination got caught in her hair and that’s – that’s why on the camera it appeared to flip up and then get pulled back down because that’s how gravity works. You hit a thing, it’s going to fall back down. Got my finger caught and her head came back and I got my finger out. She kind of jerked. I said, my bad. I couldn’t really say a lot to her because there was another student right in front of me that was in the moment trying to get my attention. So, just – it was just an incidental movement that got taken wildly out of proportion. Findings Regarding the Allegation that Mr. Alden Embarrassed a Student by Touching His Forehead and Saying “Think.” Kayla Palacios was an assistant principal at Liberty Middle School during the 2019-20 school year, and she was conducting a formal observation of one of Mr. Alden’s classes on February 25, 2020. She testified that Mr. Alden was standing at the front of the classroom and directing questions to specific students. When A.C. was unable to answer the question posed to him, Ms. Palacios testified that “Mr. Alden poke[d] A.C. in the forehead with two fingers and A.C.’s head went back.” Ms. Palacios discussed the incident with Mr. Alden later that afternoon and relayed that it is inappropriate for teachers to touch students. According to Ms. Palacios, Mr. Alden “acknowledged it and we moved forward from that conversation.” Because she considered the incident sufficiently significant, Ms. Palacios informed Ms. Forsyth about it the next morning. Mr. Alden described the incident as follows: On this particular day I was being observed, so I wanted to make a good impression on Ms. Palacios. So, I went to A.C. on a difficult question that I was sure he would have the right answer to. And he didn’t. He kind of flubbed the answer a little bit. And when I didn’t give him that immediate, you’re right, he got flustered. And because he was, you know, the teacher’s pet and because he was the guy that always had the right answer, his peers were starting to kind of snicker. There was a little bit of tension between him and the rest of the class that didn’t really bother him, usually. But on this day, when his friends were snickering and he felt like he had it and then realized he hadn’t, he got a little flustered. To try to focus his attention on me and ignore the rest of the class, I very delicately placed two fingers on his forehead, while he was looking up at me. He did not have his head down. He was looking me in the face, trying to figure it out. And I just – and I just – to focus him, stop, think, think about what you’re doing, you know this, you’ve got this. And he did. He came up with the correct answer. And he beamed when he got it right. A.C. did not testify at the final hearing, and there was no evidence as to whether Mr. Alden’s action embarrassed him. Ultimate Findings Regarding Petitioner’s Allegations Petitioner’s first two allegations are closely related. The first alleges that Mr. Alden referred to students as “dumb,” “stupid,” or words to that effect. The second alleges that Mr. Alden told his students that his class was divided into one section for “smart kids” and another for “dumb kids.” Petitioner presented testimony from S.H. and S.D. that clearly supported the first two allegations. Because the other witnesses who testified about these allegations contradicted the testimony given by S.H. and S.D., the undersigned is not left with a firm conviction regarding these two allegations. Thus, Petitioner did not prove the first two allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In contrast, Mr. Alden’s own admission and the witness testimony clearly and convincingly established that Mr. Alden used profanity in the classroom. Moreover, Ms. Harper, a teacher at Lecanto High, persuasively testified why teachers using profanity in the classroom is harmful to learning and would reduce a teacher’s effectiveness. However, there was no persuasive evidence that any students were seriously harmed by Petitioner’s use of profanity. Petitioner also alleged that Mr. Alden embarrassed J.S. by engaging J.S. in a religious debate and telling J.S. that one of his religious beliefs was “demonstrably fallacious.” Even if Petitioner could prove that Mr. Alden characterized one of J.S.’s religious beliefs as “demonstrably fallacious,” Petitioner has not proven that the debate between Mr. Alden and J.S. embarrassed the latter. After having the opportunity to observe J.S.’s demeanor, the undersigned does not credit J.S.’s assertion that he was embarrassed. As for the allegation that Mr. Alden grabbed K.R.H.’s hair and caused her head to be pulled backwards, there is no doubt that one of Mr. Alden’s hands made contact with K.R.H.’s ponytail and caused her head to be pulled backwards. The only question pertaining to this allegation is whether Mr. Alden grabbed K.R.H.’s ponytail or inadvertently got entangled with it. Other than Mr. Alden and K.R.H, Ms. Forsyth was the only witness to testify about the incident. However, her testimony was based on her observation of security camera footage, and Petitioner did not attempt to move that footage into evidence. As a result, there is no way to ascertain whether the footage was detailed enough for Ms. Forsyth to accurately distinguish whether Mr. Alden grabbed K.R.H.’s ponytail or inadvertently got entangled within it. In other words, the absence of that footage and the absence of testimony from other witnesses at the scene of the incident precludes the undersigned from finding that Petitioner proved this allegation by clear and convincing evidence.10 10 This finding should not be construed as the undersigned accepting Mr. Alden’s version of events. Even if Mr. Alden simply swatted at K.R.H.’s ponytail, he exhibited poor judgment by doing so. He also exhibited poor judgment by using profanity in the classroom. Petitioner also alleges that Mr. Alden embarrassed A.C. by touching A.C.’s forehead and saying “think” when A.C. was initially unable to answer a question. While the evidence clearly and convincingly established that Mr. Alden touched A.C.’s forehead, there was no evidence as to whether A.C. was embarrassed thereby because A.C. did not testify. Accordingly, this allegation was not proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Ron Weaver, Esquire Post Office Box 770088 Ocala, Florida 34477-0088 For Respondent: Branden M. Vicari, Esquire Herdman & Sakellarides, P.A. Suite 110 29605 U.S. Highway 19 North Clearwater, Florida 33761
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent violated section 1012.795(1)(g) and 14 Rule 6B-11.007 was last amended on December 10, 2019. None of the provisions relevant to the instant case changed. section 1012.795(1)(j) through rule 6A-10.081(2)(a)1., and that Respondent’s educator’s certificate be placed in probationary status for one year. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of June, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 2021. Lisa M. Forbess, Interim Executive Director Department of Education Education Practices Commission Turlington Building, Suite 316 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Ron Weaver, Esquire Post Office Box 770088 Ocala, Florida 34477-0088 Matthew Mears, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Branden M. Vicari, Esquire Herdman & Sakellarides, P.A. Suite 110 29605 U.S. Highway 19 North Clearwater, Florida 33761 Randy Kosec, Jr., Chief Office of Professional Practices Services Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 224-E 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observations of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. By letter dated October 1, 1980, Respondent's mother was advised by Gus Sakkis, Superintendent of Schools, that her son was being temporarily suspended from the Pinellas School System and that he (Sakkis), was further recommending that her son be expelled from the public schools for the remainder of the 1980/81 and the 1981/82 school years for the stated reason that Petitioner committed a battery while on school grounds on September 19, 1980 following a high school football game at Gibbs Senior High School. (Joint Exhibit 1) At that time, Ms. Wynn was also advised of the availability of counselling and alternative placement for Petitioner in an educational facility in Pinellas County. In support of the suspension, Respondent presented witness David Anderson, A fifteen year old student who attends Gibbs Senior High School. Anderson testified that following the football game on September 19, 1980, while leaving the area near the Band room, he was struck with a black umbrella on the back of his neck by Petitioner. There were no witnesses to this incident and Anderson has not been involved in other incidents with Petitioner. Paula Sitzelberger, a Detective with the St. Petersburg Police Department investigated the subject incident and interviewed Anderson to determine the sequence of events. Student Anderson reiterated the events as stated above and also noted that Petitioner was accompanied by a group of at least two other students. Detective Sitzelberger also interviewed Petitioner who denied any involvement with or commission of a battery upon their person of student Anderson and also related that Petitioner indicated that he left the game and attended a party. Petitioner, testifying on his own behalf, left the game in the company of Tondrea Givens and Leroy Jones. Petitioner attended a party on 12th Street immediately following the game and attended a party. Petitioner denied striking David Anderson with an umbrella, as charged. Hope Wynn, Petitioner's sister, also attended the subject game and observed that Petitioner was accompanied by Tondrea Givens and Leroy Jones. Ms. Wynn observed Petitioner leaving the game immediately following the end of the fourth quarter, and later witnessed Petitioner with Givens and Jones at a party on 12th Street. Ella Jones, the sister of Leroy Jones, also appeared at the hearing and indicated that Petitioner was with Tondrea Givens and her brother Leroy Jones during and immediately following the game. Tondrea Givens also appeared and confirmed that he accompanied Petitioner following the subject game to the 12th Street party following the game. Givens also denied that Petitioner was involved in any physical contact with David Anderson.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent's expulsion of Petitioner be revoked and the student be permitted and afforded an opportunity to make up the school work missed as provided for in Chapter 4(b) (1) (h), Code of Student Conduct, adopted by the Pinellas County School Board. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 14th day of January, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Mrs. Margaline Wynn 1527 Scranton Street South St. Petersburg, Florida 33711 William A. Borja, Esqiure Suite 204 501 South Fort Harrison Avenue Clearwater, Florida 33516 JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 1981.
