The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a physician by examination pursuant to Section 458.311(8), Florida Statutes, should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner attended medical school in Cuba from September 1978 through July 1984. In that country, the academic year commences in September and ends in July. The medical school program in Cuba is a six-year curriculum which is divided into three phases, with each phase lasting two years. Phase I involves the study of normal structures and functions of the human body (basic science courses); Phase II involves the study of pathological structures and functions (clinical rotations in hospitals); and Phase III involves integral medical care. Clinical rotations continue through the first half of Phase III, the student's fifth year in medical school. During the second half of Phase III, the medical student undertakes a rotating internship in four disciplines or a vertical internship in an individual discipline. The four disciplines are internal medicine, pediatrics, obstetrics and gynecology, and surgery. The student must pass a theoretical and practical examination in each discipline in order to proceed to the next rotation. After the medical student successfully completes each Phase, including the internship, the student is awarded the degree of Doctor en Medicina. During Phase III, instruction is given in the form of lectures, small group seminars, individual instruction, practical training, and problem-oriented instruction. Students rotate to different teaching hospitals and polyclinics. At the teaching hospitals, students review clinical records with the principal professors and discuss, as a group, patient symptoms, diagnoses, and treatment. The polyclinics are neighborhood clinics emphasizing preventative medicine. While students are working at the polyclinics, they are not members of the staff; rather, the staff doctors supervise and consult with the medical students rotating through the various polyclinics. A medical student graduates after completion of the sixth year's curriculum without the necessity of taking a written examination. To practice medicine in Cuba, however, it is necessary for the medical school graduate to obtain a license and register with the national health registry. Upon registering, the physician receives a medical card, which carries the picture and signature of the physician. Petitioner completed a rotating internship from September 1983 through July 1984 as part of her medical education. She was assigned to a physician/specialist in each field of study during her internship rotation. She examined patients in front of her fellow students and/or the professor. She participated in discussions regarding pathology or symptoms, particular diagnoses, and appropriate treatments. She interviewed patients, performed physical examinations, and ordered laboratory tests if indicated. She did not participate in surgical procedures during the surgical rotation of her internship. Although Petitioner completed her medical school curriculum in July 1984, she did not receive a diploma. She did not register with the national registry and, therefore, did not receive a medical card. In September 1984 Petitioner left Cuba and went to Venezuela. Petitioner offered no evidence as to her activities from July 1984 when she completed her medical school curriculum until September 1984 when she left Cuba. Petitioner has taken the examination offered by the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates once, but she did not receive a passing grade on that examination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure pursuant to Section 458.311(8), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of June, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 4, 5, and 5 [sic] have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 2 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting a conclusion of law. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 3 has been rejected as not being supported by the evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-9 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1 and 10 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank Valladares, Esquire 2955 Southwest 8th Street Suite 204 Miami, Florida 33135 Gregory A. Chaires, Esquire Christopher E. Butler, Legal Intern Office of the Attorney General Suite PL01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Dr. Marm Harris, Executive Director Agency for Health Care Administration Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0770 Tom Wallace, Assistant Director Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Adolph B. Cone, at all times pertinent to these proceedings, held a medical doctor's license issued by the Petitioner, valid in the State of Florida. The Petitioner is a regulatory agency charged with the licensing, regulation and disciplining of those persons licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. The Respondent, at all time material hereto, has been engaged in the general practice of medicine at Jacksonville Beach, Florida. The Respondent has resided in Jacksonville Beach, Florida, since 1939, and has been licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida for 43 years. He is 69 years of age, divorced and the father of 4 children, the oldest of whom is 22 years of age and attending the University of Florida Medical School, and the youngest of whom is gravely ill with cancer (hemangiocytoma). The Respondent continues to maintain his medical practice and contributes substantially to the support of his children. On or about January 21, 1971, a Final Order was entered by the Board of Medical Examiners suspending the Respondents license to practice medicine until such time as he could demonstrate his competency to resume active practice. In connection with that disciplinary proceeding, Joseph Virzi, M.D. first encountered Dr. Cone as a psychiatric patient in November of 1970, when the Respondent was an inpatient at Memorial Hospital in Jacksonville, Florida. By Final Order dated July 31, 1972, the Board of Medical Examiners reinstated Dr. Cone's license on a 5 year probationary status, with one of the stipulated conditions being that he continue medical treatment under the direction of Dr. Virzi. Dr. Virzi at first treated Dr. Cone as a psychiatric patient in November of 1970, when he was at Memorial Hospital in Jacksonville due to depression, and overuse of alcohol. An additional proceeding was instituted against the doctor which culminated in a Final Order of the Board on January 31, 1973, placing his license on a 5 year probationary status, with the condition that the first 12 months of that term of the licensee would be limited to supervised practice of medicine under the personal supervision of a physician and that he continue medical treatment under Dr. Virzi's direction. The allegations in the Administrative Complaint, culminating in that Final Order of January 31, 1973, involved the Respondent's alleged abuse of alcohol which allegations were upheld and found to be true in that Final Order. Dr. Virzi continued his treatment of the Respondent as a patient and saw the patient for the last time in April of 1973. At the time Dr. Virzi discharged him, he felt that the Respondent had a characterological disorder, wherein he had difficulty accepting how he affects other people and difficulty in operating under stress with a tendency to become hostile and argumentative. Dr. Virzi found, however, that his depression at that time had been successively treated and he had undergone a complete recovery from his depression. Dr. Virzi felt that Dr. Cone had a problem with alcohol from 1970 to 1973. Dr. Virzi testified that in his opinion Dr. Cone suffers from alcoholism which is a chronic and recurrent disorder, but Dr. Virzi had not seen Dr. Cone since 1973, and could not testify regarding his more recent drinking habits and thus was unable to testify as to whether Dr. Cone has been impaired in his ability to safely and competently practice medicine due the abuse of alcohol or drugs. Similarly, although Dr. Virzi testified that Dr. Cone had a characterological disorder, his testimony was nonspecific in describing it as manifested by a suspicious nature, difficulty in personal relationships with others and a denial of any problem with alcohol. Dr. Virzi's testimony does not, within reasonable medical probability, relate any characterological disorder believed to exist in 1973 with any current impairment and with Dr. Cone's ability to safely and competently practice medicine. Subsequent to his treatment of the Respondent in 1973, Dr. Virzi, in 1973, opined that the Respondent was capable of resuming the practice of medicine at that time. It was Dr. Virzi's opinion in testifying in this proceeding, that if the Respondent does not drink or take drugs that would impair his mind, he would be able to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety. Dr. Virzi corroborated the testimony of Dr. Cone himself, establishing that Dr. Cone has suffered from hypoglycemia, which, according to Dr. Virzi, is a rather mild impairment, but if combined with alcohol would produce more severe temporary symptoms of mental impairment, such as decreased judgment and temporary impairment of memory. The injestion of alcohol during a hypoglycemic state tends to aggravate the overt symptoms caused by the alcohol's effect on the body according to Dr. Virzi. Dr. Virzi, however, was unable to testify that Dr. Cone had taken any alcohol either in or out of the course of his practice of medicine since he last saw him in 1973. He could only speculate that had he had such information regarding more recent use of alcohol it would be consistent with his 1973 diagnosis and prognosis. Such speculation cannot serve as the basis of a finding of fact that the Respondent has abused alcohol, within times pertinent to this Administrative Complaint. The only other witness testifying regarding the issue of the Respondent's alleged abuse of alcohol was Marcelle P. Alford-Nolan. She was employed as a medical assistant in Dr. Cone's office from March, 1978, through March 1979. Ms. Nolan testified that she observed Dr. Cone intoxicated in his office on several occasions. She had, however, never observed him drinking an alcoholic beverage, but merely felt that he was under the influence of alcohol to one degree or another by observing his speech pattern, unsteady gait and general demeanor. It is established in the record, however, that during this time he was also suffering from hypoglycemic reactions which produce similar symptoms involving unsteady gait, slurred speech and sometimes impaired memory or judgment. This witness did testify she saw the Respondent in possession of alcoholic beverages in a bottle during 1977 or 1978 (she could not specifically recall when), she never observed the Respondent actually consume any alcoholic beverages on the premises of his office or at any other location however. In short, there is insufficient proof to establish that the Respondent has consumed alcohol or used any controlled substances since 1973, aside from his own testimony that he took an occasional beer or wine and there is an absence of proof that the use of alcohol or controlled substances has had any effect on his practice of medicine. The Respondent's unrefuted testimony is that his hypoglycemia is under control at the present time and he has not had a reaction in approximately the last 6 months prior to the hearing. On February 28, 1981, Drew Rose Warrener, an undercover law enforcement officer for the Duval County Sheriff's Office, made an appointment to visit Dr. Cone in his office at 4:00 p.m. that day. She appeared at Dr. Cone's office shortly prior to that time, using the name Joanne Wells. Dr. Cone was not at his office when she arrived and while she waited for him to arrive she filled out a patient information and patient history card. The patient history form included questions about her family, family illnesses or conditions as well as any illness or medical condition which she suffers or had suffered from in the past. When Mr. Cone arrived they proceeded into his medical office and she explained to Dr. Cone that she was having trouble with fatigue and staying awake in her job, that she was a dancer at a lounge and she wanted "something" (a medication) to help her dance better and stay awake. She informed the doctor that she actually had no health problems requiring treatment. Dr. Cone at first told her that he could not prescribe something for that reason, but in response to her entreaties he called a local pharmacy and inquired of the pharmacist regarding what drugs he could legally prescribe Ms. Warrener for "fatigue," questioning the pharmacist regarding which drugs were on, a "prohibited list." After consulting with the pharmacist, Dr. Cone ultimately determined that he could prescribe Ritalin and reluctantly prescribed her 15 Ritalin tablets on a non-refillable basis. Prior to prescribing the drug, he questioned her in some detail regarding her physical or medical condition and observed her appearance, her manner of speaking and her general condition, although he did not actually perform a physical examination before making the prescription. He did, as mentioned early, take a written and verbal patient history from Ms. Warrener prior to prescribing the Ritalin. Prior to departing his office, Ms. Warrener and the Respondent entered into a discussion concerning her living arrangements with the Respondent informing her that he had a vacant apartment for rent which she might wish to look at. Accordingly, he invited her across the street from his office to his apartment house to look at the vacant apartment, with the view that she might wish to rent it. Ms. Warrener declined at that time, but promised to return a short time later. She then proceeded to a nearby pharmacy to fill the Ritalin prescription. She filled the prescription at the pharmacy and then returned to Dr. Cone's medical office and was informed by his employee that he had returned home and she was directed to his apartment-house across the street. She was invited into the apartment by Dr. Cone and he proceeded to show her around the apartment, suggesting that she might be interested in living there. During the course of the conversation, Dr. Cone asked her certain questions concerning her life-style, occupation and living arrangements and suggested at one point in the conversation that she move into his apartment with him. She did not answer his question to that effect directly, but responded that she was really interested at that time in obtaining some Preludin tablets. Dr. Cone repeatedly advised her against taking such drugs, warning her that it was not healthy to do so. He ultimately went, or made a pretext of going, to his bathroom and looking through his supply of medications, informing her that he had no Preludin. After approximately 30 minutes she informed him that she had to report to her job and so she left. At the point of leaving his apartment he informed her that he might be able to obtain some Preludin for her if she came back later that night. On that same evening, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Ms. Warrener returned to Dr. Cone's apartment pursuant to his earlier invitation. As she was entering the door of his apartment he peered down the front of her blouse at her breasts which he commented upon in an admiring way. He showed her a bedroom which he offered to let her use and engaged in a conversation with her regarding her personal life, discussing to some extent her sex life, her supposed occupation as a dancer in a night club and her present living arrangements, as making a renewed offer to have her come live with him in his apartment. Dr. Cone never offered to give her drugs in return for sexual favors, but sexual ideas and inferences were expressed in his statements to her a number of times and her general response was that what she was really interested in was obtaining drugs, particularly Preludin. During the course of this visit, Dr. Cone showed her 4 pills which he described as Preludin and gave her 2 of them, although she requested all 4. These pills proved to be aspirin. During the course of this conversation, Dr. Cone repeatedly remonstrated with her concerning her ill-advised wish to obtain and take drugs. He informed her that he would give her the 2 Preludin (aspirin), but would give her no more. He finally relented to the extent of writing her a prescription for 24 Valium tablets. After receiving this prescription she left his apartment on the pretext that she had to return to her place of employment as a dancer. Dr. Cone conducted no physical or medical examination prior to prescribing the 24 Valium tablets and asked for and received no payment for this visit or prescription. Ms. Warrener was suffering no illness or condition for which Valium was medically indicated at the time. Dr. S. J. Alford testifying on behalf of the Petitioner and qualified as a expert medical witness, established that Ritalin and Valium are scheduled controlled substances pursuant to Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Valium is a short term drug used for nervousness, anxiety and a muscle relaxer. It is a depressant type of drug which can produce sleep. It should not be used in conjunction with Ritalin. A medical examination should be performed prior to prescribing Valium which should consist of a full medical history as well as a physical examination, including examination of a patient's blood pressure, heart and lungs in order to detect any contraindications associated with the prescription, which can be dangerous for patients with certain physical conditions. Although Dr. Cone took a medical history of Drew Warrener that day, and visually examined her, listened intently to her conversation in order to check her emotional status, and observed her skin color, her conversation, tone of voice and general manner of talking, he failed to actually do an examination of blood pressure, heart or lungs which Dr. Alford established to be required by good medical practice prior to prescribing Valium.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the evidence in the record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore RECOMMENDED: That Dr. Adolph Cone be found guilty of a violation of Section 458.331(1)(q), Florida Statutes, and that his license as a medical doctor be suspended for one (1) year, but with that suspension held in abeyance and a one (1) year probationary term imposed in its stead provided the Respondent successfully completes, under close supervision of the board, a comprehensive continuing medical education course of the board's designation designed to further and sufficiently enlighten him on the appropriate prescribing, dispensing, administering, mixing and preparing of legend drugs, including controlled substances as a prerequisite to his reinstatement. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of November, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph W. Lawrence, II, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lacy Mahon, Jr., Esquire 350 East Adams Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= BEFORE THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, Petitioner, vs. FOSH CASE NO. 81-1653 CASE NO. 8530 ADOLPH B. CONE, M.D., License No. 2225, 15 South First Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32250, Respondent. /
The Issue At the commencement of the final hearing the parties stipulated that the specific issue for determination is whether Dr. Walker's medical clerkships constituted allopathic medical education. Counsel for respondent argued that this proceeding affects only Dr. Walker's eligibility to take the licensure exam. For the reasons set forth below, that characterization is rejected.
Findings Of Fact Ralph Waldo Walker II graduated from the American University of the Caribbean in Plymouth, Montserrat, British West Indies. He obtained his medical school diploma in May 1982. As part of the curriculum in medical school he partiipated in clinical clerkship training at Mercy Medical Center in Des Moines, Iowa. All of his clerkships, except psychiatry, were at that hospital and were completed during 1981 and 1982. (Exhibit 1) In Iowa, hospitals are not licensed as osteopathic or allopathic, but rather are simply licensed as hospitals. In Des Moines there is only one hospital that is identified as osteopathic: Des Moines General. Unless a hospital is specifically identified as osteopathic, it is considered allopathic. It is possible, however, for both allopathic medical doctors and osteopaths to practice at either hospital. (transcript, p. 17, 18; Deposition of Dr. Gay, p. 5-7) During the time that Dr. Walker served his clerkship, Mercy Hospital had medical students from the medical school in Guadalajara, Mexico, the American University of the Caribbean, and the University of Osteopathic Medicine and Health Sciences in Des Moines. Less than half of the students rotating on a regularly scheduled basis were from the osteopathic school. Less than half of the students at Mercy during 1981 and 1982 were under the direct supervision of an osteopathic physician. (deposition of Dr. Gay, pp. 8, 10) In his clerkship experience at Mercy Medical Center, Dr. Walker was never supervised by an osteopathic physician. (transcript, p. 17) Mercy Medical Center is listed in the 1980-81 Directory of Residency Training Programs as a hospital approved by the American Medical Association for allopathic residency training in the speciality area of pathology. (deposition of Dorothy Faircloth, pp. 10-11) Dr. Waldo first applied for licensure in Florida in 1983. He paid the $350 application fee, and on February 10, 1984, he appeared before the Board of Medical Examiners' Foreign Medical Graduate Committee where he was guestioned at length regarding his background and education. Upon the affirmative recommendation of that committee, the full board voted to allow him to take the examination. (Exhibit 1, including transcript of the February 10, 1984, appearance) He took the June 1984 exam and failed; he repeated the process and failed the December 1984 exam. He applied for the June 1985 exam and was sent an admission card, but he decided instead to stay out and study. He applied again in August l985, and was sent an admission card for the December 1985 exam. (Exhibit 1) He was a1so reguired to appear again before the Board on November 23, 1985. The basis for the appearance, as stated by Executive Director Dorothy Faircloth, was a letter from a patient in Georgia. The letter was discussed and explained, and the Board questioned Dr. Waldo regarding his clerkships at Mercy Medical Center. The outcome of this appearance was denial of Dr. Waldo's application for licensure. The grounds for denial stated in the Board's order filed on February 6, 1986 are: The applicant's supervised clinical training was not obtained in either a hospital affiliated with a medical school accredited by the Liaison Committee on Medical Education or in a residency program accredited by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education in the specialty area in which the clinical training is being obtained, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 21M-22.18. Furthermore, the applicant's core clerkships were performed in an osteopathic institution, rather than an allopathic institution and do not constitute medical education as that term is used in Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. (Exhibit 1, including transcript of November 23, 1985, appearance before the Board) Dr. Walker. took the Federation licensing Examination (FLEX) in the State of Iowa and passed with scores of 78 and 81. A score of 75 on each component is considered a passing score in Florida. Dr. Walker became licenced to practice medicine in Iowa on August 22 1986. (Exhibit l, transcript, pp. 14, 26)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that a final order be entered approving Ralph Waldo Walker's application for licensure to practice medicine in the state of Florida. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 31st day of December, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1986.
Findings Of Fact STIPULATED FACTS The facts set forth below in paragraphs 1.-20. are stipulated to by the parties. The initial notarized application of Petitioner, Henry Calas, for licensure by endorsement was filed on September 29, 1993, and is known as the "September 29 Application." A second notarized application submitted by Dr. Calas on or about January 27, 1994, is known as the "January 27 Application." A third notarized applcation was submitted by Dr. Calas on or April 25, 1994, and is identified as the "April 25 Application." This third application was filed at the direction of the Credentials Committee during its March 25, 1994 meeting. On March 25, 1994, Petitioner appeared before the Credentials Committee of the Board of Medicine. At the time, the Credentials Committee had two applications before it, the September 29 Application and the January 27 Application. On May 13, 1994, Dr. Calas appeared before the Credentials Committee of the Board of Medicine. At that time, the Credentials Committee had before it all materials dated prior to that time that are presently contained in the parties' joint exhibit 1. This exhibit consists of all materials in Petitioner's application file. By order filed August 10, 1994, the Board of Medicine approved Dr. Calas' application for licensure: . . .contingent upon applicant being on probation for 2 years, 6 months of said probation shall be under indirect supervision by a licensed physician who shall review 50 percent of patient records including billing. The Board hereby states as the basis for this decision that you misrepresented your qualifi- cations on your application for licensure. See Section 458.331(1)(gg). Petitioner timely filed his Petition for Formal Hearing disputing the Board's finding that he had misrepresented his qualifications on his application and requested that he be granted an unrestricted Florida medical license. Dr. Calas obtained his Doctor of Medicine degree from Universidad Central Del Este in the Dominican Republic on February 3, 1984. Dr. Calas participated in a residency in Internal Medicine at Northwestern Ohio College of Medicine from May 15, 1989, until December 30, 1990. Throughout that time, the program director was Dr. Andre J. Ognibene, Professor of Medicine and Chairman of the Department of Medicine. Dr. Callas successfully completed a three year residency in Neurology at Albany Medical College, Albany Medical Center Hospital, Albany, New York from January 1, 1991 to December 31, 1993. During his third year, Petitioner served as Chief Resident. Dr. Calas meets all statutory educational and training qualifications required of him for licensure as a physician in Florida. THE ELLIS HOSPITAL ISSUE In his September 29, 1993 application on page 3, Dr. Calas represented that he currently had privileges at Ellis Hospital stating "Ellis Hospital 1101 Nott St. Schenectady NY 12308 I just obtained privieleges (sic), and I have not begun to work there yet." Dr. Michael SS. Jakubowski, Vice President, Medical Affairs, Ellis Hospital, wrote the Florida Board of Medicine regarding Petitioner on April 6, 1994. THE NORTHEASTERN OHIO COLLEGE OF MEDICINE ISSUE On October 18, 1990, Dr. Calas and Dr. Ognibene met regarding the Petitioner's record and performance in his Internal Medicine Residency. That meeting was memorialized by Dr. Ognibene in a document entitled, "Counseling Session/Longitudinal Evaluation" and signed by Dr. Ognibene and placed in Petitioner's file at Northeastern College of Medicine. On October 18, 1993, Dr. Andre J. Ognibene wrote the Florida Board of Medicine to return a training and evaulation form of the Board regarding Petitioner. On October 28, 1993, the Medical Board staff wrote Dr. Ognibene inquiring, in part, "Accordingly, please clarify why [Calas] left prior to completion, or if he was given credit for a complete year, on what basis(es); indicate whether he left in good standing and specify if he was (or would have been) offered a contract to continue to complete the program." On November 4, 1993, Dr. Ognibene responded by letter to the Board staff's letter of October 28, 1993. On February 11, 1994, the Medical Board staff wrote Dr. Ognibene, acknowledged receipt of his November 4, 1993 letter and inquired as follows: Please specify if he was (or would have been) offered a contract to continue to complete your program? On February 14, 1994, Dr. Ognibene responded by letter to Board staff's letter of February 11, 1994. At the request of Dr. Calas, Dr. Ognibene wrote a letter to the Board of Medicine dated April 25, 1994, which was received by the Board in time for the Credentials Committee meeting of May 13, 1994. OTHER FACTS By letter dated January 12, 1994, Petitioner represented to the Board of Medicine that he "completed PGY-1 [Post Graduate Year 1] in good standing" and "chose not to remain in medicine despite the offer of a PGY-2 contract" in the residency program at Northeastern Ohio College of Medicine's internal medicine program. By letter dated January 15, 1994, to an administrative assistant to the Board, Petitioner stated he "declined" the contract for a second year. In actuality, Petitioner had completed PGY-1 in good standing, but was counseled by Dr. Andre J. Ognibene, the program director, to seek another specialty. Petitioner was perceived as deficient in organizational skills necessary to meet the complexities of internal medicine. Petitioner elected neurology. Ognibene concurred with Petitioner's choice "because he could then focus on one organ system and not 17 organ systems which were rather difficult for him [Petitioner] to assimilate." If Petitioner were unable to secure a PGY- 2 position in neurology, Ognibene agreed that Petitioner would be permitted to stay for another year in internal medicine, although there was no expectation by Ognibene that Petitioner could complete the internal medicine residency. Petitioner, in effect, was promised a safety net in the event he did not secure a neurology position, but he was not "offered" a position for the subsequent year in internal medicine which he could have immediately accepted or declined. Petitioner's statement on the September 29 application that he currently had privileges at Ellis Hospital was also artfully inaccurate. Petitioner possessed no documentary evidence confirming any grant of privileges from the hospital to himself at the time he completed the application. Instead, if his testimony is credited, he relied upon the representation of a clerical worker at the hospital made to him in the course of a telephone conversation which he instigated wherein he was allegedly told that "all approvals had been received and he was ready to begin." This recital by Petitioner of a statement made to him on the telephone by an individual known only as "Nancy" is not corroborated by other direct evidence and is further complicated by Petitioner's almost hypertonic demeanor and behavior while testifying; consequently, Petitioner's testimony on this point is not credited. Although his application was pending, privileges are granted only when a staff vacancy ocurrs and employment begins. Petitioner knew at the time that he stated he had privileges at Ellis Hospital that a neurology position on the staff was not yet available and added the words "I have not begun to work there yet." As stated by Petitioner at the final hearing, he would have better served his own interest by not representing that he possessed privileges since the purpose of disclosure of such information is to enable the Board of Medicine to review an applicant's performance. Petitioner's action in stating that he possessed privileges at Ellis Hospital constituted misrepresentation by him, notwithstanding the addition by him on the application of the words "I have not begun to work there yet".
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application, absent the legal determination of the Board of Medicine to permit the conditioned admission of Petitioner to the practice of medicine in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings. Adopted. Adopted as to first sentence, remainder rejected as redundant. 3.-12. Adopted. 13.-35. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. Respondent's Proposed Findings. 1.-10. Adopted, but not verbatim and frankly in much more condensed form than that proposed by Respondent's counsel. COPIES FURNISHED: Wilson Jerry Foster Attorney at Law 227 E. Virginia St. Tallahassee, FL 32301 Gregory A. Chaires Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Harold D. Lewis General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Board of Medicine Agency for Health Care Administration The Northwood Centre 1940 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue Whether the Petitioner has met the requirements for licensure as a medical doctor in the State of Florida set forth in Section 458.311(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.), as required by Section 458.313(1), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.)?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner applied for licensure by endorsement as a medical doctor in Florida in September of 1986. Following notification by the Respondent that additional materials were required to complete the Petitioner's application, the Petitioner timely submitted the materials. In March of 1987, the Petitioner appeared before the Foreign Medical Graduate Committee of the Respondent. On April 5, 1987, the Respondent entered an Order titled Notice of Intent to Deny the Application for Licensure by Endorsement of Hien B. Nguyen. The stated basis for the denial of the Petitioner's application was that the Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that he graduated from a medical school. The Petitioner began medical school in 1967 at the University of Saigon, Faculty of Medicine, in Saigon, Republic of Vietnam. The Petitioner Successfully completed the six years required course work in medicine at the University of Saigon, Faculty of Medicine, in 1974. Following the completion of the course work required to earn a medical degree at the University of Saigon, Faculty of Medicine, the Petitioner was drafted into the Republic of Vietnam's military. He attended training for approximately six months immediately following the completion of his medical degree course work. The Petitioner was required to complete a thesis before being eligible for a medical degree from the University of Saigon, Faculty of Medicine. Upon completion of military training, the Petitioner commenced and completed work on his thesis. The Petitioner's thesis consisted of a translation of "Central Nervous Disease in Children," of Nelson's Pediatric Textbook, from English into Vietnamese. The Petitioner presented his thesis on April 14, 1975. Thuc R. Bach, M.D. attended the presentation of his wife's thesis on April 14, 1975, and witnessed the Petitioner's thesis presentation. The Petitioner was awarded a Certificate from the University of Saigon, Faculty of Medicine, on April 14, 1975, which indicated that the Petitioner had completed work necessary to be awarded a medical degree. The Certificate was issued temporarily. After approximately five years the Petitioner was required to return the Certificate at which time he could be issued an official diploma. On approximately April 30, 1975, the government of the Republic of Vietnam fell to the army of North Vietnam. Following the fall of the Republic of Vietnam, the Petitioner was confined to a concentration camp where the Petitioner acted as camp doctor. Following the Petitioner's release from confinement in 1976, the Petitioner worked as a physician at Saint Paul Clinic in Saigon until 1979. From 1977 until 1980 the Petitioner also attended and taught at a medical training center in Saigon. In October, 1980, the Petitioner escaped from Vietnam. He resided in Galang, Indonesia until March, 1981, when he moved to the United States. The Petitioner has completed the following since his arrival in the United States: December, 1981: Sat for the Federation Licensing Examination and was subsequently certified by the Federation of State Medical Boards; January 24, 1983: Certified by the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates; July, 1984 - June, 1985: Interned at the Cook County Hospital, Chicago, Illinois; July, 1985 - June, 1987: Residency program at Cook County Hospital, and February 19, 1986: Licensed as a physician by the State of Illinois (the license is currently active and unrestricted). The Petitioner was presented with a certificate from the Faculty- Council-in-Exile of the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Saigon dated April 20, 1981. The certificate affirms that the Petitioner "Successfully completed the course of study leading to the degree of Doctor of Medicine..." The certificate is signed by the Dean Emeritus of the University and Dao Huu Anh, M.D., Associate Dean of the University. Prior to the fall of the government of the Republic of Vietnam, graduates of the University of Saigon, Faculty of Medicine, were presented with a certificate authorizing them to practice as a physician without restriction upon completion of the required courses of study and a thesis. Graduates were not issued an Official Diploma until five years had passed since the issuance of their certificate. Although the Petitioner completed the required courses of study, presented his thesis and received a certificate authorizing him to practice as a physician, the Petitioner was not able to obtain an Official Diploma five years later because of the fall of the government of the Republic of Vietnam. In light of the fall of the government of the Republic of Vietnam, it is doubtful that the records of the University of Saigon, Faculty of Medicine are available or that the Petitioner could obtain an Official Diploma. The Petitioner is a graduate of the University of Saigon, Faculty of Medicine, a medical school.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued GRANTING the Petitioner's application for licensure by endorsement as a medical doctor in the State of Florida. DONE AND ORDERED this 25th day of January, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2969 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1. 2 2. 3 3. 4 4 and 5. 5 6. 6 7-10. 7 11-12. 13. The Petitioner worked at the training center from 1977 through 1980. 15. The Petitioner went from Vietnam to Indonesia in October of 1980. He did not travel to the United States until March of 1981. 10-12 Cummulative, summary of the evidence and unnecessary. Dr. Nghia Van Tran's letter was not accepted into evidence. 13 16. The last sentence is cummulative, a summary of evidence and unnecessary. The footnote is irrelevant. The burden of proof in this proceeding was on the Petitioner. The Respondent is not required to verify the signature of Dr. Dao. 14 10 and 17. 15 17-18. 16-18 Cummulative, summary of the evidence and unnecessary. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 1 and 3. 2-5 The Respondent's remaining proposed findings of fact are essentially summaries of the Respondent's inter- pretation of the evidence and argument concerning the evidence. The Respondent's interpretation of the evidence is rejected. The following is a brief discussion of why the Respondent's arguments have been rejected. The first two sentences are true and support the finding of fact that the Petitioner began medical school in 1967, completed his course work in 1974 and presented his thesis in April of 1975. See findings of fact 4-5 and 9. The third and fourth sentences are true but the Respondent has overlooked the fact that the Petitioner presented other evidence which supports his position. Therefore, even if the fifth sentence were correct, there is other evidence which supports findings of fact 4-5 and 9. The sixth sentence is irrelevant. Although the Board may have raised a question, the correct answer to that question is a matter of proof. The seventh sentence is true but irrelevant. The eighth sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. There was no testimony sufficient to support any finding of fact concerning Dr. Dao's signature on any document. Although the ninth sentence is correct, the weight of the evidence does not support the alleged fact set out in the tenth sentence. The eleventh sentence was taken into account in the weight given to Dr. Dao's statement. Although the twelfth sentence is correct the thirteenth and fourteenth sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. While it is true that the Petitioner's testimony with regard to when he completed his course work at the University of Saigon was not totally consistent, the weight of the evidence supports a conclusion that the Petitioner finished his course work in June of 1974. The Petitioner's explanation concerning the inconsistency in his testimony was credible. The first and second sentences are true. The third sentence is true but overlooks the fact that it corroborates non-hearsay evidence. The fourth sentence is law. The fifth sentence is true. The sixth and seventh sentences are true. The eight sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The ninth and tenth sentences are true but they do not support the ultimate conclusion the Respondent suggests. It is possible that the Certificate in question could have been based upon other credible evidence. The first sentence is true. The second sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The Petitioner testified that he completed his course work in 1974. The third sentence is true. The fourth and fifth sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Carolyn S. Raepple, Esquire Cheryl G. Stuart, Esquire Hopping, Boyd, Green & Sams 420 First Florida Bank Building Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 32314 M. Catherine Lannon, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Administrative Law Section Department of Legal Affairs Room 1601, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Ms. Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Tom Gallagher, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William O'Neil Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to licensure by endorsement.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: The Petitioner, Gerardo Hevilla, completed the application for licensure by endorsement and submitted all degrees, test results, certificates, recommendations, and other documents required by law to be considered for licensure by endorsement as a medical doctor in Florida. The degrees, test results, recommendations and other documents submitted by Petitioner are authentic. Petitioner obtained a doctor of medicine degree from the Universidad Nacional De Rosario in Argentina on July 1, 1980. Universidad Nacional De Rosario Medical School (School) is a medical school duly listed by the World Heath Organization. Graduates of the School are eligible to seek medical licensure in Florida by endorsement pursuant to the provisions found in Section 458.313, Florida Statutes, and the rules and regulations promulgated by the Board of Medicine (Board). On November 20, 1985, Petitioner satisfied the requirements of the Educational Council on Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG) and was issued ECFMG certificate no. 339-394-9. Petitioner obtained a passing score on the Federated Licensing Examination (FLEX) within 10 years immediately preceding his application for licensure by endorsement in Florida. Petitioner successfully completed one year of post- graduate training at Lincoln Medical and Mental Health Center as a resident in general surgery. Petitioner has satisfied all preliminary requirements of the Board to be considered for licensure by endorsement. Petitioner came to Florida in April, 1981. At that time he did not speak English and, therefore, was not able to pass the English portion of the ECFMG examination. In order to learn English, he enrolled at Miami High School. While enrolled at the high school, Petitioner volunteered his services to a clinic located approximately two blocks from the school. Petitioner worked at this clinic, LeGran Familia Clinic (Clinic), from 1982 until 1984, while he attempted to learn English. Since many of the doctors and patients at the Clinic spoke Spanish, Petitioner did not have difficulty. The Clinic had 20-22 licensed physicians on staff during the time Petitioner worked there. During the time Petitioner worked at the Clinic, he was primarily under the supervision of Dr. Mirabal. According to Dr. Mirabal, Petitioner was a brilliant, though ambiguous, physician. Petitioner did not represent himself to patients as a physician but was responsible for taking vital statistics, patient histories, and transcribing Dr. Mirabal's dictation. A licensed physician was present at the clinic at all times during which Petitioner performed these services. Subsequently, the Clinic came under investigation for Medicaid fraud. Petitioner was named as one of several defendants in the criminal prosecution. This charge was later dismissed by the prosecuting State Attorney and is not claimed as a basis for the denial of Petitioner's application for licensure. A second charge, the unauthorized practice of medicine, was alleged against Petitioner in State of Florida v. Gerardo Hevilla, Dade County Circuit Court, Criminal Division, case no. 84-8608. Initially, Petitioner pled not guilty to this charge. On May 3, 1985, Petitioner changed his plea to nolo contendere based upon a representation by the State Attorney to the trial judge that the Department of Professional Regulation had been contacted and had agreed that such plea would not be used against Petitioner in his future licensing efforts. This representation was made on the record and is a part of the plea colloquy. Prior to this presentation, Petitioner had refused, and intended to continue to refuse, to change his plea because of his concern that such a plea would adversely affect his ability to become licensed. The estimated cost to defend the criminal case exceeded $25,000. Petitioner accepted the negotiated plea as a financial concession only after the assurances were given that it would not affect his ability to become licensed. In January or February, 1984, Petitioner became employed at the South Florida Medical and Surgical Center (Center). He remained associated with the Center until June, 1986. While at the Center, Petitioner worked as a surgical assistant and helped the licensed surgeons as they directed. Petitioner did not treat patients independently of the licensed doctors and did not hold himself out as a licensed physician. He told one patient, Zoraida Wong, that he was a student. Petitioner assisted Dr. DeGeronimo and Dr. Alexander at the Center. These doctors found Petitioner to be competent, skilled, and a good worker. In fact, Dr. DeGeronimo was so pleased with Petitioner's work that he employed him at his private office until June, 1986. The work performed by Petitioner at the Center and with Dr. DeGeronimo consisted of setting up the operating area, ordering supplies, assisting in surgery by wiping blood, holding retractors, or cutting stitches, and bandaging wounds. All work was done under a licensed physician's supervision. From June, 1986 until July, 1987, Petitioner performed a one year residency at the Lincoln Medical Hospital. During this period, Petitioner was supervised by Drs. Stahl, the program director, and Kazigo, an associate professor. According to these physicians, Petitioner is qualified for licensure, possesses the requisite knowledge and skill, and successfully completely the residency program. Following the completion of his residency, Petitioner returned to Miami and is employed again as an assistant to Dr. DeGeronimo in his plastic surgery practice. Petitioner did not perform facial plastic surgery on the patient, Zoraida Wong. Petitioner did not withhold facts regarding his criminal plea from the Board.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That The Board of Medicine enter a final order approving Petitioner's application for licensure by endorsement. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 30th day of December, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: The first sentence in Paragraph 1 is accepted. With regard to the sentence, that portion which alleges Petitioner took courses at the University of Miami is accepted the rest is rejected as beyond the scope of evidence presented or irrelevant to these proceedings. Paragraph 2 is accepted as to all parts. With regard to paragraph 3A. with the exception of the reference to full-time study of English it is accepted. The record does not conclude whether or not Petitioner was in school full-time, he did enroll at Miami High School to learn English so to that extext it is accepted, otherwise rejected as not supported by the record. Paragraphs 3B-D are accepted. Paragraph 4 is accepted. Paragraph 5A. is accepted. The first sentence and last sentence of the first paragraph of paragraph 5B are accepted; the remainder of the first paragraph is rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, not supported by the record or speculation. The second, third and fourth paragraphs of Paragraph 5B are accepted. The first paragraph of SC is accepted. The second paragraph of SC is rejected as irrelevant; the Board has not claimed the allegations relating to the alleged Medicaid fraud were a basis for denial of Petitioner's license. The first three sentences of the first paragraph of Paragraph 6 are accepted. The remainder of the first paragraph is rejected as a recitation of testimony, irrelevant, or unsupported by the record. The second paragraph of Paragraph 6 is rejected as a recitation of testimony, irrelevant, or argument. The third paragraph of Paragraph 6 is rejected as a recitation of testimony, irrelevant, or argument. The fourth paragraph of Paragraph 6 is rejected as a recitation of testimony, irrelevant, or argument. With regard to these paragraphs, see finding of fact which concludes Petitioner did not operate on the patient Wong. Petitioner's testimony, Dr. DeGeronimo's, and Urquiza's testimony were deemed credible. Dr. Garcia-Lavin and Wong were not. The fifth paragraph of Paragraph 6 is rejected as argument, but as to facts therein see explanation in p. 13 above. RULINGS ON RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Paragraphs 1-11c are accepted. The first sentence of paragraph 12 is accepted. The remainder of paragraph 12 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Petitioner was not eligible to take the residency until he had mastered English to a sufficient level to pass required examinations. Petitioner's explanation for the period was acceptable. Paragraph 13 is accepted. Paragraph 14 is rejected as contrary to the credible evidence, argument or irrelevant. Petitioner is found to be credible. Paragraph 15 is rejected as contrary to the evidence, argument or irrelevant. Paragraph 16 is rejected as irrelevant, unsupported by the credible evidence or argument. Paragraph 17 is rejected as irrelevant or argument. That the Department did not actually pledge to hold Petitioner harmless by reason of the plea is not a disputed issue Petitioner had a reasonable basis for believing that to be the case; however, and was induced to change his plea on that basis. Paragraph 18 is accepted but is irrelevant; see p. 7 above. The first three sentences of paragraph 19 are accepted. The record does not disclose how many licensed physicians may performed surgery at the Center; therefore the fourth sentence is rejected. The record does support a finding that Drs. Alexander, DeGeronimo, and Garcia-Lavin worked there and that the facility only used one surgical room. Paragraph 20 is rejected as irrelevant to the issues of this case. Paragraph 21 is rejected as irrelevant, immaterial or unnecessary to the resolution of the issues of this case. Paragraph 22 is rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, contrary to the evidence or unnecessary to the resolution of the issues of this case. The first two sentences of paragraph 23 are accepted, the remainder is rejected as contrary to the credible evidence, irrelevant, or immaterial to the resolution of the issues of this case. Paragraphs 24-26 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence, irrelevant or immaterial to the resolution of the issues of this case. It is possible that Petitioner remained associated with the Center and also worked for Dr. DeGeronimo. The testimony of the three (Petitioner, Alexander, and DeGeronimo) does not conflict. COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney W. Bryson Bryson & Berman, P.A. Suite 219 8525 N.W. 53rd Terrace Miami, Florida 33166 Ann Cocheu Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Suite 1603, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Bruce D. Lamb General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact Jack I. Newcomer, a foreign medical school graduate, applied for licensure by endorsement and the Board of Medical Examiners considered his application on April 12, 1985. Newcomer's application was denied by Order of the Board dated May 9, 1985, on the following ground: The applicant's supervised clinical training was not obtained in either a hospital affiliated with a medical school approved by the Council on Medical Education of the American Medical Association or in a residency program approved by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 21M21.18[sic]. Pierre Andre, M.D., a foreign medical-school graduate certified by the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG) applied for licensure by endorsement. Andre had passed the ECFMG examination and also the Foreign Licensure Examination (FLEX). The Board considered his application, and denied said application on the ground that his supervised training was not obtained in either a hospital affiliated with a medical school accredited by the Liaison Committee on Medical Education or in a residency program accredited by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education in the specialty area in which his clinical training was obtained as required by Rule 21M-22.18, Florida Administrative Code. The Board adopted Rule 21M-22.18, which took effect on November 28, 1984, and it provided: Foreign Medical Graduates: Qualification Requirements. Before any foreign medical school graduate, except a graduate of an approved school in Canada is admitted to take the written licensure examination or be licensed by endorsements[sic], he or she must demonstrate (in addition to other requirements set forth in Chapter 458, F.S.) that the supervised clinical training received in the United States as part of the curriculum of the foreign medical school was obtained either in a hospital affiliated with a medical school approved by the Council on Medical Education of the American Medical Association or in a residency program approved by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education. The Board subsequently amended Rule 21M-22.18, and the amendment took effect March 13, 1985, to provide: Foreign Medical Graduates: Qualification Requirements. Before any graduate of a medical school not accredited by the Liaison Committee on Medical Education, except a graduate of an accredited school in Canada, is admitted to take the written licensure examination or be licensed by endorsement; he or she must demonstrate (in addition to other requirements set forth in Chapter 458, F.S.) that the supervised clinical training received in the United States as part of the curriculum of the medical school was obtained either in a hospital affiliated with a medical school accredited by the Liaison Committee on Medical Education or in a residency program accredited by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education in the specialty area in which the clinical training is being obtained. This rule, as well as its amendment, were adopted to implement Sections 458.311 and 458.313(4), Florida Statutes. The parties stipulated at the hearing that only Rule 21M-22.18 as originally enacted was applied to Petitioners and not the amendment which took effect March 13, 1985. According to Charles P. Gibbs, M.D., Assistant Dean for Curriculum at Shands Teaching Hospital and former chairman of the clerkship committee at Shands, clerkships are an essential part of a medical education because they are the first time the student is introduced to the real practice of medicine and contact with patients. Clerkships occur in the third and fourth years of a medical education, after the student has had courses in the basic sciences, pathology, pharmacology and an introduction to clinical medicine. During a clerkship, the student participates as part of a team and does patient histories, physicals, participates in discussions about patient care, observes operations and attends lectures. Dr. Gibbs testified that written exams, such as FLEX or the National Board, are important in measuring a student's cognitive knowledge and determining minimum qualifications, but cannot measure clinical qualities of a doctor such as how he relates to patients and reacts in stress situations, how he works with colleagues, and how he communicates. Clerkships are important in determining a student's performance level in these clinical qualities. The Liaison Committee on Medical Education has adopted standards for the accreditation of medical education programs which were ratified by the Council on Medical Education of the American Medical Association on March 1, 1985, and the Executive Council of the Association of American Medical Colleges on April 4, 1985, and which state in part: The traditional required clinical subjects, which should be offered in the form of required experiences in patient care (customarily called clerkships), are internal medicine, obstetrics and gynecology, pediatrics, psychiatry and surgery. Additionally, many schools require a clerkship in family medicine . . . . The curriculum must provide grounding in the body of knowledge represented in the disciplines that support the fundamental clinical subjects, for example, diagnostic imaging and clinical pathology. Students must have opportunities to gain knowledge in those content areas that incorporate several disciplines in providing medical care, for example, emergency medicine and the care of the elderly and disabled. In addition, students should have the opportunity to participate in research and other scholarly activities of the faculty. Robert B. Katims, M.D., testified as a member of the Board and Chairman of the Foreign Medical Graduates Committee of the Board. As Committee Chairman he had noted problems with the clinical experience being received by graduates of certain foreign medical schools that are not accredited and that are relatively new schools whose primary purpose is to train United States students rather than their own nationals. Dr. Katims observed that problems with the clinical experience offered at these schools arise because there are not enough teaching hospitals in some foreign countries, and therefore students cannot receive clinical training in those countries through a clerkship. Instead, they must arrange their own clinical experience, usually a preceptorship, in the United States. A preceptorship differs substantially from a clerkship in that it is usually either a one on one affiliation with a practicing physician with very little structured training, or occurs at an outpatient prepaid health plan facility. Dr. Katims testified that preceptorships do not meet the clinical training standards of the Liaison Committee on Medical Education, and do not represent supervised clinical training.
Findings Of Fact At some time prior to August 14, 1986, the Petitioner herein, Marilyn L. Edwards, submitted an application for examination for licensure as a technologist in Florida under the provisions of the Florida Clinical Laboratory Law, Chapter 483, Florida Statutes. Petitioner's application was reviewed in the Office of Licensure and Certification of DHRS by Mr. George S. Taylor, Jr. Assistant Administrator of the Laboratory Personnel Licensure Section. The criteria for licensure as a technologist are outlined in Section 10D-41.69, Florida Administrative Code, which provides that the applicant must have one of the following: A bachelor's degree, from an accredited college or university in an approved Medical Technology Program, or 90 semester hours at an accredited college or university in addition to one year in an AMA approved school of medical technology, or A bachelor's degree from an accredited college or university in one of the chemical, physical, or biological sciences with one year laboratory experience at the technician level, or An associate degree or 60 semester hours at an accredited college or university in an approved Medical Laboratory Technician Program which includes 8 hours in chemistry and 8 hours in biological science, or 60 semester hours at an accredited college or university including 20 hours of science of which at least 8 hours is in chemistry and 8 in biological science plus 4 years experience as a chemical laboratory technician. Petitioner's application was filed under the provisions of Rule 10D- 41.69(4), Florida Administrative Code, above. However, Petitioner did not meet that criteria. The school at which she was trained a program administered by the Veteran's Administration, (VA), Hospital in Dublin, Georgia, was not an accredited college as required. Ms. Edwards attended a VA certified laboratory assistant program in Dublin, Georgia, approved by the American Society of Clinical Pathology during 1970 and 1971. After graduating from that program, she took and passed the technician's examination in Florida. The course work included in the VA program included 1388 of classroom hours of course work which have not, to this date, been converted to equivalent credit hours. The course work did, however include such subject matters as anatomy, organic and inorganic chemistry, hematology parasitology, microbiology, urinalysis coagulation, and aminohematology. Ms. Edwards contends that according to the current schedule of Miami-Dade Community College the above courses make up the course work for the Associate degree in technology and in addition to the above, Ms. Edwards did her practicals, which included phlebotomy training, at the VA Hospital in Dublin. Ms. Edwards has had fourteen years of training and experience in the medical technician field. Based on the course work taken and her fourteen years experience, she contends she meets the criteria for examination. It is her opinion that the agency, in denying her application for examination, has failed to consider the years of experience she has and it is her contention that some of the programs approved by the agency are not as thorough in the laboratory sciences as that which she took. Ms. Edwards feels she has the knowledge to be a technologist, but admits the rules currently existing prohibit her certification because of the fact that she does not have the required course work at an approved college or university. The American Medical Association approves various types of allied health education and three types of medical technology education which are referenced in the agency rule. These are: Medical technologist (a four year degree program from an accredited academic institution), A medical laboratory technician associate degree program offered by various community colleges (This is very similar to and generally geared to the technician levels but there is more academics involved than for the technician certification. This second pathway meets the academic requirements for certification.), and A one year medical laboratory technician course (not referenced for technologist licensure but for technician only). There is a difference between a technician and a technologist. The former can perform with supervision and undertake tasks requiring limited judgment. The latter may work independently without supervision. Petitioner is already designated as a medical technician. In her application, according to the agency, Petitioner submitted evidence of a course of training for a technician in order to be certified as such. She also submitted the same educational background with her application for licensure as a technologist. The Veteran's Administration Hospital's course is not accredited for college credit. Even though she applied under Section (4) of the rule, she could be considered under Subsection (5) which calls for 60 semester hours plus 20 hours of scientific courses in biology and chemistry, along with four years clinical laboratory experience. Petitioner has the clinical laboratory experience and has taken some courses, but she is not considered as meeting the academic requirement because the institution where her educational courses were taken is not an accredited academic institutions as outlined in the Education Directory published by the National Center for Education Statistics sponsored by the United States Department of Education. As a result, the courses she took do not qualify as college academic courses at the technologist level. DHRS does not establish equivalent course work. The 1388 hours of classroom work taken by the applicant are not semester hours. Though Mr. Taylor said that if she had an accredited junior college or other academic institution translate the equivalents within its degree program and give her academic credit for them and if it is determined by the institution that her course work is equivalent to the required 60 hours for licensure, Petitioner will be permitted to sit for the examination, this really cannot be done. The equivalents outlined in the rule refer to equivalent courses that is semester hours to quarter or trimester hours - not equivalent institutions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lawn it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Marilyn Edwards, be denied examination for 1icensure as a certified laboratory technologist in Florida based on her current educational background. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of July, 1987, at Tallahassee Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Powers, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee Florida 32399-0700 Marilyn L. Edwards 2300 Northwest 94th Street Miami, Florida 33147 Leonard T. Helfand Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 401 Northwest 2nd venue, Suite 1040 Miami, Florida 33128
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner made application to the Board and its physician assistant committee for certification as a physician assistant, pursuant to Section 458.347(7)(b), Florida Statutes. After three appearances before the committee, the committee recommended and the Board voted to deny his application by order of February 9, 1993. That order indicated that the Petitioner had failed to demonstrate to the committee's satisfaction that he had received a medical education, as the term is defined and employed in Chapter 458, Florida Statutes (specific citations omitted). The Petitioner timely sought a formal proceeding to contest that denial, which resulted in the matter being referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings and the undersigned Hearing Officer for conduct of that proceeding. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged, in pertinent part, with administering the provisions of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, and related rules involved in regulating entry and licensing of persons entering the physician assistant professional field. Among other duties, the Respondent agency is charged with ascertaining whether an applicant for certification has completed an appropriate medical education so as to be entitled under the relevant statutes for admission to the certification examination. Such a determination was made in this case, which resulted in the denial of the application and this formal proceeding. In addition to finding in its order of February 9, 1993 that, in effect, the medical education of the Petitioner was deficient under the relevant statutes, the Board also determined that there were discrepancies in the applications on file with the Board and in the supporting documentation and testimony before the Physician Assistant Committee (Committee). The Board also determined that due to the extended length of time since the Petitioner last worked in the field of clinical medicine and because of the length of time since any significant medical education or training had taken place, the Petitioner had not established that he was currently able to practice as a physician assistant with reasonable skill and safety to the public, as envisioned by Sections 458.331(4) and 458.301, Florida Statutes (1991). Prior to the hearing, the Hearing Officer granted a motion to amend the denial order to add as a basis for denial the Petitioner's alleged ineligibility to sit for the examination for certification because of failure to pay the required fee. See Section 458.347(7)(b), Florida Statutes. A passing score on the certification examination is a prerequisite to being certified as a physician assistant. There are certain discrepancies between the applications that the Petitioner filed with the Board, as well as with regard to documentation submitted to the Committee and to the Board. The Petitioner filed three applications with the Board. On each, he, in essence, swore that he had carefully read the questions on the application, had answered them completely without reservation, and that all statements were true and correct. On all of the applications, the questions required the applicant Petitioner to be specific as to the medical schools attended, to account for each year, and to list all universities and colleges attended where medical training was received. On the first application, the Petitioner stated, in response to the question to list all universities or colleges attended or where medical training was received, that he attended Universidad Central De Este (UCE) from November 1977 to August 1980, and that he attended CETEC University from August 1980 to June 1982. When he appeared before the Committee, he acknowledged also attending classes or receiving training at Ross University (formerly known as the University of Dominica). After that appearance before the Committee, he filed a second application and in response to the same question concerning his medical education, he responded that he had attended UCE from November 29, 1977 to August 24, 1980; that he attended the University of Dominica (Ross) from August 24, 1980 to August 7, 1981; and that he attended CETEC University from August 24, 1980 to June 12, 1982. Thus, he claimed that his attendance at Ross and CETEC actually overlapped. Documentation submitted, contained in Petitioner's exhibit 17 and in the Respondent's composite exhibit, reveals that he was not accepted as a student at CETEC until August 7, 1981, however. Subsequently, he filed a third application. On this application, he, in response to that same question, as pertinent to this issue, listed attendance at UCE from November 29, 1977 to August 24, 1980; at University of Dominica from August 24, 1980 to August 6, 1981; at CETEC from August 7, 1981 to June 12, 1982; at CJ Institute from April 26, 1982 to June 8, 1982; at Adelphi University from April 4, 1981 to June 12, 1981; and CETEC (graduation) on June 12, 1982. The Petitioner, at the hearing, admitted that he had not completed an application listing Ross University until after the Committee already knew he had attended Ross. When asked at the hearing why he omitted Ross from his first application, he testified that he did not put it on the application because he did not consider that he had attended Ross. This response as to why he had made a misrepresentation on his initial application is lacking in credibility. His own testimony and evidence established that he took examinations at Ross on August 24 and 25, 1980, but he paid $9,000.00 in entrance fees to Ross in the fall of 1980, that Ross arranged a psychiatry clerkship, that he took a course in physical diagnosis specifically because Ross informed him that he needed to do so in order to take future medical clerkships; that he paid $75.00 in the spring of 1981 for malpractice coverage for those clerkships under the alleged auspices of Ross and that he was still considered a student at Ross when he began his pediatric clerkship. If he did all of this educational effort supposedly in connection with Ross University, according to his own testimony and other evidence, it is unbelievable that he could not have considered that he had attended Ross University when he filled out the subject application. His own sworn affidavit submitted to the Board explaining why he did not list Ross on the applications stated that he did not list Ross University because he did not think that there were any transcripts to indicate that he had attended Ross. He testified and stated on affidavits to the Board that the reason he transferred from Ross to CETEC was because of a sudden demand by Ross for an additional $24,000.00 in order for him to continue his education there, in excess of the amount the initial agreement had provided for. Even if that is the case, it does not change the fact that, by his own testimony, he knew that he had attended Ross University and did, in fact, attend it. Thus, under all of these circumstances, it is apparent that, for whatever reason, he intentionally misrepresented this portion of his educational history. Another discrepancy or area of misrepresentation occurred on the three applications concerning the medical clerkships which the Petitioner supposedly completed. On all three applications, he was requested to specifically describe and account for each clerkship, giving specific dates, type of rotation, the name and location of the hospital, institution or individual where or with whom the clerkship was performed or supervised. He was required to list all affiliated universities or colleges. In responding to this question, he listed on his first application the following: Psychiatry October 13, 1980 to January 1, 1981. Pediatrics July 13, 1981 to December 4, 1981. Internal medicine September 7, 1981 to October 5, 1981. Internal medicine October 5, 1981 to February 1, 1982. Surgery February 1, 1982 to April 30, 1982. OB/GYN May 1, 1982 to June 6, 1982. On the second application, he added a third internal medicine clerkship stating that it took place from October 3, 1981 to February 28, 1982. It thus overlapped his surgery clerkship. On his fourth application, he added a clerkship for radiology, showing that that clerkship had taken place from February 1, 1982 to April 30, 1982. During parts of February 1982, the Petitioner was taking clerkships in three subject areas at the same time, internal medicine, surgery, and radiology, if the disclosures on his third application are true. In discussing the radiology clerkship on cross- examination, the Petitioner acknowledged that it was somewhat of a combined surgery and obstetrics and gynecology clerkship as part of the same program. The Petitioner received an M.D. degree from CETEC. He began his medical education at UCE. He attended this university as a resident student on its campus. His transcript from UCE shows a lack of a passing score on nine courses. Ross University wrote a letter to him dated June 16, 1981, which he, in turn, provided to the Board, to the effect that he needed transcripts from UCE showing passing scores in histology, biochemistry, neuroanatomy, micro- biology, or that he would otherwise receive F's in those courses. However, the later CETEC transcript shows that CETEC "convalidated" those four courses, even though there was no evidence that he passed them. Convalidation means that the courses were accepted as having been taken and passed at another school. In fact, the accuracy and sufficiency of his medical education is complicated by the fact that his CETEC transcript credits him with courses as having actually been taken at CETEC that even the Petitioner acknowledges were not actually taken at CETEC, such as: community health III and IV, human behavior III, physiopathology, and family medicine. His speculation as to what courses he took at UCE must have counted at CETEC misses the point that CETEC does not "count" them as convalidated, but as taken at CETEC. These discrepancies bring into question the validity of his CETEC education and the documentation submitted regarding it. Whether the inaccuracy is the Petitioner's or attributable to the fault of CETEC is of no moment in determining whether the Petitioner actually received the medical education claimed or the medical education actually "documented". The Petitioner called into question Ross University's record-keeping accuracy, blamed Ross for changing its requirements, for losing his records, and allegedly reneging on certain promises, such as counting courses he supposedly previously took at UCE. However, the Petitioner has not shown any explanation of the CETEC record-keeping "errors" which give him credit for completion of courses at CETEC which he did not even take at CETEC, for his completion of courses at UCE which UCE documents as incomplete, nor for his completion of courses or credits at Ross for which there is no documentation either. It is also noted that he "attended Ross" without ever going to its campus and attended "CETEC" by only appearing on campus for his graduation. Additionally, besides the discrepancies in the academic courses established, there were a number of discrepancies related to the clerkships and preparation for the clerkships. The first of these was that he stated that he had to take a course in physical diagnosis before he could take a pediatrics clerkship through Ross. He therefore obtained an old family friend, Dr. Fleisher, to teach him physical diagnosis. Additionally, he took two nursing courses in physical diagnosis at Adelphi University. Dr. Fleisher is not an M.D., however, but rather is a podiatrist. Dr. Winchester, testifying as an expert in the medical field at hearing, established that a podiatrist cannot teach a physical diagnosis course sufficiently detailed and thorough for a medical student seeking an M.D. degree because a podiatrist is trained, experienced and qualified only to practice at or below the knee. When podiatrists are on hospital staffs in Florida, they may admit patients for surgery, but they must have an M.D. perform the history and the physical examination because of their limited expertise. See, Section 461.003(3), Florida Statutes. A medical student cannot obtain the appropriate education and physical diagnosis by taking a nursing course. In fact, physical diagnosis is an integral part of any quality medical education program and, although it may not be taught as a separate course in all of the accredited medical schools in the United States, it is taught as part of the ongoing education by the faculty of the medical school itself. Students are not sent off to find their own tutors or to attempt to obtain physical diagnosis training from taking nursing school courses in medical schools or medical education programs which are deemed in Florida to be programs or schools which have furnished their successful graduates an adequate medical education. It is thus found, based upon Dr. Winchester's testimony, that the Petitioner's education under the auspices of Ross or CETEC, whichever it was, did not constitute a medical education with regard to the physical diagnosis education. The clerkships were not taught by faculty members of medical schools or in teaching hospitals. In fact, the Petitioner began the pediatrics clerkship under the auspices of one school and finished under the auspices of another school. As established by Dr. Winchester at hearing, this would be unheard of in an accredited medical school in the United States. Since the clerkships are supervised by faculty of the medical school, a student would not transfer medical schools without having to change from one school's clerkship program to another. In addition, the clerkships are characterized by physicians writing letters of verification as to their clerkships or observerships. An observership is an educational experience in which a student only observes what is going on with regard to a particular procedure and does not actually participate. Finally, the testimony revealed that the Petitioner received clinical credit for taking an examination preparation course. This, too, would be unacceptable in a legitimate medical education setting, as shown by Dr. Winchester. Additionally, it is noted that three of the clerkships, internal medicine, surgery, and radiology all overlapped in some point in time, with all three being taken during February of 1982. A clerkship is essentially a full- time experience. A medical education, as that term is used in Florida, does not contemplate taking multiple clerkships at the same time. It is expected that a medical student will give full attention to the area of study and to the patients to which the student is assigned during the clerkship. This cannot be done if three clerkships are being performed at the same time. That this might be perceived as inadequate, even by the Petitioner, is evident in his letter of November 11, 1992 to the Board in which he stated that he had not mentioned his radiology clerkship previously because it overlapped his surgery clerkship. In summary, as to the clerkships, it is determined that they were not of the quality required to be considered a medical education in the State of Florida. This finding is based upon the testimony of Dr. Winchester, which is accepted over that of the Petitioner. Ability to Practice with Reasonable Skill and Safety The testimony and evidence of record does not indicate that the Petitioner has had an adequate medical education. In addition to the inadequacies in his medical education described in the above Findings of Fact, he has not practiced medicine since his graduation from medical school in 1982 nor has he had employment or practice experience related to the field of medicine. He has not worked in a hospital, doctor's office, clinical laboratory, or any other setting in which he might keep his medical knowledge current. He has taken a large number of continuing medical education courses of late, since he filed his initial application. The concept of continuing medical education, however, is that a person should be continually building on an actual basic medical education. The Petitioner has not demonstrated that he is currently able to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety because of this lack of continuing medical experience and education when added to the basic inadequacy of his underlying medical education, as proven by the evidence in this record. Examination Fee Section 458.347(7)(b)1., Florida Statutes, requires that an applicant pay the application fee and the examination fee. This statutory provision specifically provides that the applicant must pay the fee for the examination and if he is later deemed ineligible to take the examination, then the fee will be refunded. The Petitioner admits that he never paid the examination fee. He insists that he should not have to pay the fee until after he is declared eligible for the examination. While one can understand the applicant feeling that he should not have to pay the fee until after being ruled eligible, the legislature decided otherwise and directed that the fee be paid in order for an applicant to be considered eligible for the examination on a threshold basis. Ms. Faircloth testified that the names of students who were to take the examination have to be sent to the Bureau of Examination Services prior to the examination so that expense and other arrangements can be made for the correct number of examination booklets and proctors for the practical examination. This is a practical policy reason underlying the passage of the statute providing for the advance payment of the fee and for the manner in which the agency interprets that statute. Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates Examination. The Petitioner submitted evidence that he had obtained a score of 65 on the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates Examination (ECFMGE). He thus maintained at hearing that he was eligible for certification as a physician assistant simply because he had received a score of 65. This evidence was presented and admitted over objection by the Respondent on the grounds that the Respondent had not been placed on notice of such issue because it was not raised in the petition. Be that as it may, the Petitioner has failed to establish eligibility for examination under that provision for the reasons stated in the Conclusions of Law below.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Board of Medicine denying the Petitioner's application for certification as a physician assistant. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1310 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-5. Accepted. 6. Rejected, as not in itself dispositive of the issue presented. 7-15. Accepted. 16. Rejected, as unnecessary and immaterial. 17-23. Accepted. 24. Accepted, but not itself dispositive of material issues. 25-30. Accepted, in part, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and to some degree not supported by the preponderant evidence of record. 31-33. Rejected, as immaterial. 34-35. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter, although the fact that he took a physical diagnosis course from Dr. Fleischer is accepted. Rejected, as not itself materially dispositive of the relevant issues. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not in itself dispositive of material issues. 39-43. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not in themselves materially dispositive findings of fact. 44. Rejected, as not supported by the preponderant evidence of record. 45-46. Accepted, but not in themselves materially dispositive. 47. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. 48-50. Accepted, but not in themselves materially dispositive findings of fact. 51-60. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not entirely in accord with the preponderant evidence of record. 61-73. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not in their entirety materially dispositive. Rejected, as not entirely in accord with the preponderant evidence of record and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but not itself material, and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but not itself materially dispositive. 77-84. Accepted, in part, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not in themselves materially dispositive. 85. Accepted. 86-98. Accepted, but not in themselves materially dispositive, and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. 99-101. Accepted, but not in themselves material. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-31. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert J. Boyd, Esquire BOND & BOYD 411 East College Avenue Post Office Box 26 Tallahassee, FL 32302 M. Catherine Lannon, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Ms. Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.30 and Chapters 455 and 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent is a licensed physician in the State of Florida and holds license number ME 0043566. Respondent has never been the subject of a previous complaint from the Department of Professional Regulation (now the Department of Business and Professional Regulation). No patient involved in this proceeding incurred injury as a result of any procedure performed by Respondent or as a result of any medical record kept by Respondent, nor did any patient claim injury or make a complaint against Respondent. Respondent derived no financial gain from any act or omission alleged in the administrative complaint. All events pertaining to this proceeding occurred in 1987 or 1988. Prior to February 8, 1988, the effective date of Chapter 88-1, Laws of Florida, Section 458.331(1), Florida Statutes provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The following acts shall constitute grounds for which the disciplinary action specified in subsection (2) may be taken. * * * (m) Failing to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient, including, but not limited to, patient histories, examination results, and test results. * * * (t) Gross or repeated malpractice or the failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. The board shall give great weight to the provisions of s. 768.45 when enforcing this paragraph. As used in this paragraph, "repeated malpractice" includes, but is not limited to, three or more claims for medical malpractice within the previous 5-year period resulting in judgment or settlement and which incidents involved negligent conduct by the physician. As used in this paragraph, "gross malpractice" or "the failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances", shall not be construed to require more than one instance, event, or act. Section 25 of Chapter 88-1, Florida Statutes, became effective February 8, 1988, and amended the pertinent provisions of Section 458.311(1), Florida Statutes, to read as follows: The following acts shall constitute grounds for which the disciplinary action specified in subsection (2) may be taken. * * * (m) Failing to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient, including, but not limited to, patient histories, examination results, test results, records of drugs prescribed, dispensed, or administered, and reports of consultations and hospitalizations. * * * (t) Gross or repeated malpractice or the failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. The board shall give great weight to the provisions of s. 768.45 when enforcing this paragraph. As used in this paragraph, "repeated malpractice" includes, but is not limited to, three or more claims for medical malpractice within the previous 5-year period resulting in judgment or settlement and which incidents involved negligent conduct by the physician. As used in this paragraph, "gross malpractice" or "the failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances", shall not be construed to require more than one instance, event, or act. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to require that a physician be incompetent to practice medicine in order to be disciplined pursuant to this paragraph. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner had adopted no rules pertaining to the keeping of records by a licensed physician. Imperial Point Medical Center (Imperial Point) is a hospital located in Broward County, Florida. Unless otherwise indicated, all hospital records referred to in this matter are from Imperial Point. PATIENT #1 (C.S.) On August 8, 1988, Respondent performed an upper endoscopy on Patient #1, a male, who was 44 years old at the time of the procedure. This procedure was performed at Imperial Point on an outpatient basis. An upper endoscopy is the viewing of the mouth, the pharynx, the esophagus, the stomach and portions of the duodenum with a fiber optic instrument that allows direct visualization of the lining of these structures and allows therapeutic maneuvers. The records kept of this procedure performed on Patient #1 on August 8, 1988, include an outpatient hospital record entitled "Operative Report". The description of the procedure portion of this report includes the following: ". . . The gastric portion was infiltrated with 1:1,000 adrenaline . . ." Adrenaline, also known as epinephrine, is a vasoconstrictor that can be used to control minor bleeding and oozing. It is used regularly in gastroenterology to treat actively bleeding lesions or ulcers with evidence of recent bleeding prior to performing a more permanent type of hemostasis. Dr. Goldberg testified that epinephrine was usually injected into these areas by a needle. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that epinephrine should not be used in cases of trivial bleeding or oozing or after routine biopsies unless there is an imminent danger of a significant arterial bleed. The testimony of Dr. Cerda and Dr. Singh established that spraying epinephrine over an area that is subject to bleeding is a precautionary technique some gastroenterologists follow. Dr. Singh and Dr. Cerda have both either used this technique, or have observed its use by other physicians. The expert witnesses agreed that the injection by needle of epinephrine into the gastric wall would be a procedure that falls below an established standard of care. There was a dispute among the expert witnesses as to how the term "infiltrated" should be interpreted. Petitioner contends that the term "infiltrated" is synonymous with the term "injected", and that the medical records should be construed to mean that Respondent injected the gastric wall with a needle, and therefore practiced below the standard of care. This contention is consistent with the testimony of Dr. Goldberg. Respondent asserts that the medical record should be construed to mean that Respondent sprayed the gastric wall as a precautionary measure. This contention is consistent with the testimony of the expert witnesses who testified on behalf of the Respondent. This dispute is resolved by finding that the term "infiltrated" does not have the same meaning as the term "injected" and does not prove that Respondent injected Patient #1's gastric wall with a needle. This conclusion is based, in part, on the definition of the term "infiltrate" and on the context in which epinephrine is sometimes administered by gastroenterologists during this type procedure. According to The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, the term "infiltrate" means to pass a liquid or a gas into something through its interstices or to permeate with a liquid or gas passed through interstices. Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, Twenty Sixth Edition (Dorland) has a similar definition of the term "infiltrate". According to Dorland, an "interstice" is small interval, space, or gap in a tissue or structure. According to Dorland, the term permeate means to penetrate or pass through, as through a filter. Also according to Dorland, the term inject means the act of forcing a liquid into a part, as into the subcutaneous, the vascular tree, or an organ. Based on these definitions, it is found that the use of the term "infiltrate" is more consistent with the practice of spraying epinephrine onto the gastric wall, and that the use of the term "infiltrate" does not prove that Respondent injected the epinephrine into the gastric wall with a needle. It is found that Petitioner failed to prove that the use of epinephrine was improper or that the manner in which Respondent used the epinephrine during the subject procedure was improper. Since Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent injected Patient #1 with epinephrine, its charge that Respondent failed to document his reasons for doing so must also fail. A pathology report dated August 8, 1988 contained in the medical file provided a pathological diagnosis as follows: "esophageal brushings: no evidence of malignancy." Brushings are the result of passing a small brush through the biopsy channel of an endoscope, rubbing it over an area of concern that might have either a malignancy or a fungal infection, taking the brush out of the scope, wiping it on a microscopic slide, and sending the slide to the pathologist for cytological examination. The reference to the "esophageal brushings" in the pathology report was error. The brushings taken from Patient #1 during the procedure on August 8, 1988, came from the stomach, a fact obvious to all of the expert witnesses in light of the operative report and operative drawing made by Respondent. Because Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent took esophageal brushings from Patient #1, its charge that he failed to properly document his reasons for doing so must also fail. 1/ Petitioner proved that Respondent's medical records, including his office notes as to Patient #1 failed to contain an adequate medical history for Patient #1 and failed to reflect the findings of any physical examination of Patient #1 by Respondent. Petitioner further proved that such failures fall below an established standard of care as alleged in Count Two of the Amended Administrative Complaint. PATIENT #2 (R.B.) Patient #2 was a 70 year old male seen by Respondent for a consultation because of the patient's history of hematemesis, which is the vomiting of blood. Respondent prepared a formal consultation note dated September 25, 1988. The consultation note contains a description of the patient's condition, references a rectal exam, which was positive for blood, and indicates that a physical examination of the patient was made. Respondent again saw the patient on September 27, 1988 and performed an upper endoscopy. Dr. Goldberg was critical of the medical records kept by Respondent as to this procedure and was of the opinion that the medical records were inadequate. Other, equally credible expert witnesses were of the opinion that the medical records provided sufficient information to document the procedure. While it may be concluded that Respondent's medical records could be improved, it is found that Petitioner failed to prove that the medical records pertaining to this patient were inadequate. It is further found that Petitioner failed to prove the standard by which the adequacy of medical records are to be judged, other than the pertinent statutory standards set forth above. The records kept of this procedure reflect that Respondent "infiltrated" Patient #2 with epinephrine. This is the identical dispute over the meaning of the term "infiltrated" that pertained to Patient #1 as discussed above. For the reasons given in resolving the dispute as it pertains to Patient #1, it is found that the term "infiltrated" does not have the same meaning as the term "injected" and that the use of the term does not prove that Respondent administered the epinephrine by injecting Patient #2 with a needle. It is found that Petitioner failed to prove that the use of epinephrine was improper or that the manner in which Respondent used the epinephrine during the subject procedure was improper. Since Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent injected Patient #2 with epinephrine, its charge that Respondent failed to document his reasons for doing so must also fail. PATIENT #3 (B.B.) Patient #3, a 65 year old female was admitted to Imperial Point with chest pains by her physician, a Dr. Fanfan. Patient #3 had a history of cancer which included the prior surgical removal of a tumor. On October 3, 1988, Respondent performed a colonoscopy of Patient #3. A colonoscopy is an examination of the colon from the anus to the ileocecal valve using a fiber optic instrument. A colonoscopy is indicated to evaluate abnormal X-rays, changes in bowel habits, evidence of bleeding, suspicions of inflammation, tumors, or polyps. Respondent adequately performed the procedure on Patient #3. The colonoscopy detected that Patient #3 had polyps. Subsequent laboratory results established that these were hyperplastic polyps that required no follow-up. Had the polyp been an adenomatous polyp, which is a true neoplasm with malignant potential, a follow-up for recolonoscopy would have been appropriate in one year. Prior to receiving the pathology reports, on the polyp, Respondent recommended a six month follow-up for the patient. This follow-up recommendation was appropriate at the time it was made. Petitioner failed to prove that the recommendation that a follow-up be performed was below an established standard of care. Petitioner failed to prove that the recommendation that the follow-up for this patient with a history of cancer be in six months as opposed to one year fell below an established standard of care. The barium enema for this patient was originally scheduled by the attending physician, Dr. Fanfan. Dr. Fanfan clearly wrote a note on the same day following Respondent's report of the colonoscopy that the barium enema was pending, yet the attending physician did not cancel the barium enema. There is no disagreement among the experts that the barium enema was unnecessary in light of the findings of the colonoscopy. It is medically unnecessary and inappropriate for both tests to be performed on the same day. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent was responsible for the patient once he began his consultation and that Respondent should have canceled the barium enema. Dr. Cerda, Dr. Eberly and Dr. Singh were of the opinion that the attending physician was responsible for scheduling the barium enema and that the attending physician or the radiologist should have canceled the barium enema. Dr. Eberly testified that as the primary care physician, the admitting physician is the "captain of the ship" and has the responsibility to make final determinations with respect to tests of this nature. Because of the conflicting testimony from equally credible expert witnesses, it is found that Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated an established standard of care by not cancelling Patient #3's enema. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent's medical records pertaining to Patient #3 were inadequate. He had several criticisms of the records. Dr. Goldberg opined that there should have been a formal consultation note on Patient #3's chart that included past history, present illness, review of systems, allergies, pertinent laboratories, a thorough organ specific or system examination, an impression, an adequate discussion of the consultant's impression and the consultant's plans. He opined that the indications for Patient #3's procedure were inadequately dictated on the procedure notes and that Respondent's history pertaining to Patient #3 was inadequate because there was no pertinent review of systems or past history, no mention of the previous tumor, no mention of allergies, and an extremely scant examination. Other, equally credible expert witnesses were of the opinion that the medical records were adequate. It is found that Petitioner failed to prove the standard by which the adequacy of this patient's medical records are to be judged, other than the pertinent statutory standards set forth above. While it may be concluded that Respondent's medical records could be improved, it is found that Petitioner failed to prove that the medical records fell below an established standard of acceptability. PATIENT #4 (E.K.) On October 4, 1988, Patient #4, a 92 year-old female, was admitted to the hospital with an acute onset of vomiting, dehydration, and abdominal pain. Respondent was asked by Patient #4's attending physician to evaluate Patient #4 for a potential small bowel obstruction following an X-ray that was consistent with a small bowel obstruction. Respondent performed an upper endoscopy on Patient #4 on October 7, 1988. An obstruction of the intestines is a blockage in the large or small intestine. The bowel behind the blockage may become inflated with fluid or air and may be seen on X-ray. The obstruction may result from a variety of abnormalities. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that the upper endoscopy was contra- indicated and potentially dangerous to the patient because of the X-ray indicating a complete bowel obstruction. Dr. Goldberg was also of the opinion that an upper endoscopy should be used only under compelling circumstances if there is a partial bowel obstruction. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent did the right tests on Patient #4, but in the wrong order since he did not first rule out an obstruction. Prior to performing the upper endoscopy Respondent monitored the patient for several days. During that time period, examinations indicated that the patient was having bowel movements. Both the attending physician's notes, Respondent's notes, and the nurse's notes indicate positive bowel signs on October 5 and 6, indicating that there was not a complete bowel obstruction. Respondent ordered a Golytely preparation administered to the patient, which usually consists of one or two liters of non-absorbable solution that basically washes the bowel out. That preparation would have been improper with a complete bowel obstruction. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that the use of a Golytely prep in this patient was a gross judgment error. Dr. Singh was of the opinion that there was no contra-indication for using the preparation in this situation. Petitioner failed to prove that Patient #4 had a complete bowel obstruction or that the procedure, including the use of the Golytely preparation, violated an established standard of care. It is found that Respondent was acting within the scope of his discretion as the consulting physician to order the administration of the Golytely preparation and to perform the upper endoscopy. On October 11, 1988, Respondent performed a colonoscopy on Patient #4. Respondent stated on the operative report that the colonoscopy was indicated because of diverticulitis. Diverticulitis was not mentioned in any of Respondent's notes concerning Patient #4, and there was no notation as to the reasons Respondent thought the patient had diverticulitis. Although Respondent failed to document why he felt that diverticulitis was an appropriate indication for the colonoscope, there is no dispute that a colonoscope was, in fact, indicated. Further, the colonoscope established that the pretest diagnosis of possible diverticulitis was not incorrect. The colonoscopy revealed areas of colitis, and the pathology report noted an ulcer with acute and chronic inflammation. Respondent's experts testified that they were of the opinion that Respondent violated no established standard by listing diverticulitis as an indication for the colonoscopy. It is found that Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent practiced below an established level in listing diverticulitis as an indication for the colonoscope. During the colonoscopy, Respondent found several mildly bleeding areas and infiltrated Patient #4 with epinephrine. For the reasons discussed pertaining to Patient #4, it is found that Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated an established standard of care in administering epinephrine to Patient #4. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent's handwritten consultation report was inadequate. Dr. Goldberg bases his conclusion on the following observations. The report was difficult to read and failed to include any significant historical events concerning Patient #4. In his consultation report, the Respondent failed to note anything about having done a rectal examination on this patient, whether or not the abdomen was distended, and whether there were active or inactive bowel sounds. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that these findings would help to distinguish between an obstruction and an ileus or paralysis of the bowel. Dr. Goldberg was also of the opinion that the patient's records of the upper endoscopy performed October 7, 1998, fail to reveal any significant findings. Other, equally credible expert witnesses were of the opinion that the medical records were adequate. It is found that Petitioner failed to prove the standard by which the adequacy of medical records are to be judged, other than the pertinent statutory standards set forth above. While it may be concluded that Respondent's medical records could be improved, Petitioner failed to prove that the medical records fell below an established standard of acceptability. PATIENT #5 (J.T.) Patient #5, an 89 year-old male, was admitted to Imperial Point with a history of peptic ulcer disease and arthritis. This patient was seen by Respondent on a consulting basis. The patient was vomiting blood and Respondent was asked to see the patient to determine the source of the bleeding. Respondent performed an upper endoscopy on October 13, 1988, and found a significant outlet obstruction. On October 17, 1988, a G.I. series was performed and a repeat upper endoscopy and pyloric dilatation was performed. The procedures performed by Respondent were properly indicated and had a beneficial result to the patient. Back-to-back pyloric dilatations were appropriate and clinical judgment was properly exercised. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent failed to keep adequate written medical records pertaining to the upper endoscopy of October 13, 1988, in that Respondent's operative report failed to document Respondent's findings in detail. Dr. Goldberg testified that an essential endoscopy report that physicians are trained to do should include the following: indications for the procedure, medication used to sedate the patient, identification of instrument used, description of the anatomical landmarks and their condition as visualized by the physician passing the endoscope, the removal of the scope, the physician's impressions and what the physician plans to do about those impressions, how the patient tolerated the procedure and what the patient's condition was after the procedure, and that the patient was sent to the recovery area. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent failed to keep adequate written medical records pertaining to the procedures performed on this patient on October 17, 1988, in that Respondent's operative report did not document Respondent's findings in detail and did not indicate if the scope was passed through Patient #5's dilated pylorus into the duodenum. In Respondent's impressions on the second endoscopy, he noted pyloric stenosis and duodenal ulcer. In his procedure note Respondent does not mention whether he passed the scope into the duodenum or how he knew there was a duodenal ulcer. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent did not properly document what he did. On October 18, 1988, Respondent performed a repeat pyloric dilation on Patient #5. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent failed to record the reasons for the second procedure and to document his findings. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that the third endoscopy note did not adequately detail the examinations of the esophagus and stomach. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that every procedure note stands alone, and that if a physician does an endoscopy on day one and repeats it on day two, the physician still must make that report complete because it is not always going to be part of a document. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent's records did not stand alone. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent's handwritten consultation note was sketchy and should have contained a history of allergies because of the need to give the patient medications for sedation. Dr. Goldberg's criticisms of Respondent's medical records do not prove that the medical records kept by Respondent were inadequate as measured by an established standard. Other, equally credible expert witnesses were of the opinion that the medical records provided sufficient information to document the procedures and that the records were adequate. While it may be concluded that Respondent's medical records could be improved, it is found that Petitioner failed to prove that the medical records were inadequate. It is further found that Petitioner failed to prove the standard by which the adequacy of medical records are to be judged, other than the pertinent statutory standards set forth above. PATIENT #6 (D.Y.) From October 19, 1988, until October 22, 1988, Respondent was consulting physician to Patient #6, a 72 year-old male, who was admitted to Imperial Point with rectal bleeding. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent failed to keep adequate written medical records pertaining to Patient #6 because a formal consultation note was lacking. The medical records which were reviewed by Dr. Goldberg were incomplete when reviewed by him. A specific reference is made to a consultation note that is not contained in the hospital records. Respondent established that other medical records were missing from the hospital records. In light of the specific reference to the consultation note, it is found that the absence of this consultation note from the hospital records is insufficient to prove that there existed no consultation note. On October 20, 1988, Respondent performed an colonoscopy on this patient and a biopsy was taken in the segmental descending colon area. The colonoscopy could not be completed because the colonoscopy could not pass to the patient's cecum. The following recommendation was made by Respondent (the original is in all capital letters): IN VIEW OF NOT REACHING TO THE CECUM, THE PATIENT WOULD NEED BE (this is an abbreviation for barium enema) AND ALSO IF EVERYTHING IS NEGATIVE, RECOLONOSCOPY IN ONE YEAR AND IF THERE ARE ANY CHANGES IN THE BIOPSY OF THE POLYP, THEN ACCORDINGLY WILL PLAN. On October 21, 1988, the follow-up barium enema was performed by Dr. Nicholas M. Arfaras, a radiologist. The radiology report reflected the following finding: "Also in the sigmoid there is an approximately 1 cm. rounded filling defect identified near the junction with the descending colon. This is felt to be secondary to a polyp." The possible polyp detected by the barium enema should have been followed up. However, it was not established that Respondent was consulted by the attending physician about the results of the barium enema. Dr. Lipton, as the attending physician, would have had the responsibility for following up the recommendations made by Respondent and for bringing Respondent or another gastroenterologist in for further consultations following the barium enema if Dr. Lipton had believed it necessary to do so. This patient was discharged from Imperial Point by Dr. Lipton on October 22, 1988. The final page of the discharge summary for this patient reflected the following notation: "Condition was improved. The patient is to have a follow up in one week in the office with Dr. Lipton and with Dr. Gupta in two weeks." The evidence presented in this proceeding, including Respondent's office notes, does not reflect that Respondent had any involvement with this patient after October 21, 1988, until 1990, when he performed on the patient at North Broward Medical Center a procedure described as a "multiple colonoscopy with multiple biopsies and cauterization." This procedure in 1990 revealed multiple polyps. The polyp removed on colonoscopy in 1988 was an adenomatous polyp, a polyp with significant malignant potential. This patient needed a follow-up colonoscopy in one year. Respondent was the consulting physician and recommended reevaluation of the patient in one year. Follow-up care was not the responsibility of Respondent, but of the treating physician. Dr. Goldberg was of the opinion that Respondent failed to keep adequate written medical records in that Respondent failed to adequately document the indications for the colonoscopy performed on Patient #6 and why the colonoscope could not be passed to Patient #6's cecum. Dr. Goldberg opined that a physician doing a colonoscopy needs to tell why he did not get to the cecum so that the next physician colonoscoping this patient can take appropriate precautions. Other, equally credible expert witnesses were of the opinion that the medical records were adequate and provided sufficient information to document the procedures that were performed. Petitioner failed to prove that the medical records were inadequate. Petitioner failed to prove the standard by which the adequacy of medical records are to be judged, other than the pertinent statutory standards set forth above. PATIENT #7 (C.R.) Respondent was a consulting physician to Patient #7, a 64 year old male who was hospitalized with rectal bleeding. Respondent saw this patient because of a possible colonic fistula, which is a connection with any piece of the intestine and some other structure. Respondent recommended a barium small bowel X-ray and a barium enema, both appropriate clinical recommendations. On November 11, 1987, Respondent performed a colonoscopy on Patient #7. Petitioner contends that Respondent failed to keep adequate written medical records pertaining to the aforementioned procedure in that Respondent failed to document an adequate history as an indication of Patient #7's colonoscopy. This contention is rejected based on the testimony of Dr. Singh. The medical records provide adequate justification for the procedure. Dr. Goldberg was critical of Respondent's records pertaining to this patient and considered the records inadequate. He was of the opinion that the records should have better detailed his findings and should have recorded any follow-up plans for a repeat colonoscopy on the patient. Other, equally credible expert witnesses were of the opinion that the medical records were adequate and provided sufficient information to document the procedures that were performed. Petitioner failed to prove that the medical records were inadequate. Petitioner failed to prove the standard by which the adequacy of medical records are to be judged, other than the pertinent statutory standards set forth above.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order which finds that Respondent violated the provisions of Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes, by failing to provide a history or physical examination for Patient #1 as alleged in Count Two, which reprimands Respondent for that violation, and which imposes an administrative fine in the amount of $250.00 against the Respondent for that violation. It is further recommended that all other charges against Respondent contained in the Amended Administrative Complaint be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 1993.
