Findings Of Fact Robert & Gilman, Inc. at all times herein involved was registered as a real estate broker by the State of Florida. Delair A. Clark at all times herein involved was registered as a real estate salesman by the State of Florida. Residential property owned by William L. and Frances Crummett was listed with J.B. Steelman, Jr. real estate broker and put on Multiple Listing Service. On June 17, 1972, immediately after the For Sale sign was erected, Respondent, Delair A. Clark, presented an offer to the sellers on this property which was accepted by sellers on the same date presented (Exhibit 9). This contract provided the purchase price of $28,500 with a $300 earnest money deposit, the usual clauses in a form contract for sale and purchase, and two special clauses to wit: "A. Subject to: Buyer being reassigned to central Florida prior to June 22, 1972. In the event the assignment does not materialize by June 23, 1972 deposit will, be returned in full and contract will be null and void. B. Subject to: Buyer obtaining a 90 percent conventional loan for a period of 25 years or an FHA loan for 30 years." By telegram dated 6/20/72 (Exhibit 8) buyer confirmed re-assignment to Orlando, thus satisfying condition A in the contract. Buyers thereafter asked for earlier occupancy than originally called for. Since special arrangements would have to be made by sellers, Mr. Crummett asked for an amendment to the contract to increase the earnest money deposit to $1,000 of which $500 would be non-refundable if contract was not consummated. This amendment was duly executed by the buyers on July 15, 1972 and by the sellers. A copy thereof was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 11 which provides: "SPECIAL CLAUSE" "C. An additional deposit of $700 will be made on July 17, 1972, of which $500 will be non-refundable in the event the referenced contract is not consumated (sic)." This amendment was forwarded to the sellers by Respondent's Roberts & Gilman letter of July 17, 1972 which amendment was executed by the sellers upon receipt and mailed back to Roberts & Gilman. The July 17, 1972 letter was signed by Judy L. Rostatter of the sales processing department. A copy of the check received from the buyers was not enclosed although the letter stated it was enclosed. Prior to receipt of this amendment Crummett was advised by Richter, the buyer, that he had mailed a $700 check to Roberts & Gilman made payable to Crummett. Crummett was also advised by Respondent Clark that the check had been received. Since closing was scheduled to be held within a couple of days Crummett requested Clark to hold the check and he would endorse same at closing. Crummett never saw the original check for $700. On the day originally scheduled for the closing (circa July 18, 1972) Crummett received a telephone call from Respondent Clark to the effect that the appraisal on the property had come in some $3,000 below the asking price and inquiring if Crummett would accept $26,000 for his property. The latter advised he would not and, after some heated words, Crummett hung up. At this time it was evident to Respondent Clark and the sellers that the sale would not be consummated. Clark put a memo in the file dated July 28, 1972 saying: "Return checks of $700 + $300 in estrow (sic) to Richter. Seller advised we had no contract." A few weeks later, on August 3, 1972, after making several phone calls to Roberts & Gilman without success, Crummett had the listing broker, J.B. Steelman, write a letter (Exhibit 7) to Gilman making demand for the $500 deposit refund. By letter dated August 11, 1972 (Exhibit 6) Roberts and Gilman replied that they considered the contract had been terminated by the seller and saw no "justification by the seller to claim any escrow that has been returned to the buyer". This letter was signed "Dan T. Gilman /b.c." Several months later, in the spring of 1973, Crummett went to the office of Roberts and Gilman and obtained a photostatic copy of the check dated 7/15/72 that had been made by J.A. Richter in the amount of $700. This was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 12. At the hearing Dan G. Gilman, President of Roberts & Gilman, Inc. denied any recollection of any part of this transaction or ever having heard of the incident prior to the investigator from the FREC coming to inquire about the incident. At the time of this transaction the realtor's office was very busy with several branch offices and some 120 salesmen handling transactions in eight or ten counties in central Florida. He has no recollection of dictating Exhibit 12 or anything about the incident but his secretary at that time was Beverly Cass. It was standard practice for a broker to review every contract before trust account money was disbursed or refunded. His initial testimony that numerous people in the office had authority to sign his name to letters going out of the office was recanted when he was recalled as a witness after the close of the Commission's case. He then stated he never authorized anyone to sign his name to a document having legal implication. Clark testified that the first time he ever saw Exhibit 11, the amendment to the contract, was when shown to him by the investigator for the FREC. Likewise he claims never to have seen or received the $700 check signed by Richter. With respect to the return of the deposit to Richter, (after being shown Exhibit 13) his recollection of the cancellation of the contract was that Richter was not re-assigned to the Orlando area. This was the only contract ever handled by Clark which involved the return of an escrow deposit. He has no recollection of talking to any member of the realty firm regarding clearing the return of the escrow deposit to Richter. Exhibit 5 is a photocopy of the check by which the $300 earnest money deposit was returned to Richter. It is obvious that the contract for the sale of the residential property herein involved was amended to provide for an additional deposit from the buyers and a clause which required the buyer to forfeit one half of his deposit in the event the transaction was not consummated. It is incomprehensible that such an amendment to the contract could be made without the knowledge of the salesman or the broker. It therefore appears that the Defendants either: (1) are not telling the truth; (2) have faulty memories; (3) allowed the duties normally performed by brokers to be carried out by secretaries; or (4) operated a realty company in a slipshod manner without due regard to the duties and responsibilities imposed upon brokers and salesman by the real estate license law.
Findings Of Fact In September of 1976, Mr. and Mrs. Robert B. Kenney went to 8521 Madonna Place in Sarasota, Florida, in response to a newspaper advertisement. There they found respondent, who showed them through the house at that address, saying she was a friend of the owners who were offering it for sale. Respondent told the Kenneys that she was a registered real estate salesperson employed by Marjorie McCrory Real Estate, and gave them her card. But she said there would be no commission on any sale, because the owners were her friends and had helped her with babysitting. On October 2, 1976, the Kenneys entered into a written agreement with Mr. and Mrs. Robert C. Tritschler, owners of the house respondent had shown them. By this con tract, which was received in evidence as petitioner's exhibit No. 3, the Kenneys agreed to buy the house in the event that they were able to sell their mobile home within thirty days' time and in the event that they were able to obtain financing for 80 percent of the agreed purchase price. The Kenneys were unable to obtain such financing and were also unable to sell their mobile home within thirty days of the signing of the contract. On October 5, 1976, the Kenneys drew a check to respondent's order in the amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), on which was written "Earnest Money-Escrow." The check was delivered to respondent. On October 6 1976, respondent endorsed the check arid deposited it in a savings account. Afterwards, she showed the Kenneys her newly acquired pass book, on which was written "Sherry Gayer, Escrow Account for Robert L. Kenney." After the Kenneys' efforts to meet the conditions of the contract proved unavailing, they demanded the return of the money they had given respondent. Her refusal resulted in litigation which was settled when the Kenneys agreed to accept five hundred dollars ($500.00), plus the interest that had accrued on the entire one thousand dollars ($1 000.00) while it had been on deposit in respondent`s account. The other five hundred dollars ($500.00) went to the Tritschlers, in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner suspend respondent's license for sixty (60) days. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 904/488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Joseph A. Doherty, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Ms. Sherry L. Gayer 2116-59th Street Sarasota, Florida 33580
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility, and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent Paul F. Savich is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0077390 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Ernest M. Haefele, is a licensed real estate broker, having been issued license number 0517821 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. On October 1, 1984, the Respondents, purchasers in their individual capacities, entered into a contract for deed to a tract at the Tropical Acres Subdivision, with Tropical Sites, Inc., and Angie S. Crosby and Eugene T. Crosby, at a sales price of $9,046.50. Said amount to be paid at the rate of $90 per month until paid. Pursuant to the agreement, the Respondents agreed not to assign the agreement without the permission of Tropical Sites, Inc. A closing was held on May 8, 1990, and the Respondents transferred possession of the tract by assignment of contract to Leroy H. and Charlotte Beard. A mobile home on the real property was part of the purchase price for a total sales price of $39,000.00 The agreement called for a down payment of $2,000 to the Respondent Savich. The Beards also signed a mortgage note in favor of the Respondents Savich and Haffele, for $37,000. The note was payable at the rate of $373.15 per month. Upon payment in full, Respondents were obligated to deliver a good and sufficient deed to the property to the purchasers. At the closing, Respondent Haefele was not present. The Beards received two documents at closing, a contract for sale and one other document, but did not receive a copy of the original agreement for deed, a disclosure statement, or a title to the trailer on the tract. In addition, Respondent Savich did not seek permission of Tropical Sites, Inc., prior to the closing. Prior to the closing, the Beards moved onto the property, and subsequently began making monthly payments of $373.15 to Respondent Savich. The Beards had purchased two or three pieces of property in the past, but had always gone through a bank. In relation to this agreement, they understood the nature of the transaction at the time of the closing. In early 1991, Mr. Beard made a telephone inquiry to the County property appraiser's office as to the status of the property for homestead exemption purposes. He was advised that Tropical Sites, Inc. was the current owner of the tract, and that he was not eligible for homestead exemption. The Beards did not apply for homestead exemption at the appraiser's office. In August 1991, the Beards stopped making payments to the Respondents on the advice of their attorney, but continued to reside on the premises until December 1991. In November 1991, an attorney acting on behalf of the Beards made a demand upon Respondent Paul F. Savich for the return of the $2,000.00 deposit. The Respondents did not return the $2,000.00 deposit or otherwise pay the money claimed by the Beards. In his dealings with the Beards, Respondent Savich did not withhold information, lie or mislead the purchasers. They simply were unhappy with the agreement, and decided to get out of it when they recognized that they would not receive title to the mobile home and property until the note was paid in full. In early 1992, the Beards quitclaimed their interest to the property to Respondent Savich's former wife, and they were released from their obligations under the note.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondents Paul F. Savich and Earnest M. Haefele be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1992. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Adopted in substance: paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5,6,7(in part),8,9(in part)10,11,12,13 Rejected as against the greater weight of evidence: paragraphs 7(in part: the $2,000 was a down payment, not an earnest money deposit), 9(in part: the Beards moved on to the property prior to closing. Respondent's proposed findings of fact: Respondent submitted a proposed order with unnumbered paragraphs which partially recounted the testimony of several of the witnesses and combined facts and conclusions of law. Therefore, a separate ruling on Respondent's proposals are not possible. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Senior Attorney DPR - Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street #N-308 Orlando, FL 32801-1772 J. Stanford Lifsey, Esquire 101 E. Kennedy Blvd., Ste. 1465 Tampa, Florida 33602 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant, Bangert was a licensed real estate salesman with State of Florida license number 0312002. On or about May 1, 1986, Cynthia Green (now Cynthia Tyson) listed her house at 408 Lakeview Drive, Altamonte Springs, Florida, under an exclusive right of sale contract with J. Scott Jones, a licensed real estate broker. Through his broker, Help U. Sell (Thomas Jafek and Thomas Jafek II), Bangert offered $64,900.00 to Ms. Tyson for the Lakeview house. The contract for sale offered a $1,000.00 deposit note, with two mortgages, including a balloon mortgage, payment of $3,000.00 fix-up costs by the seller, and cash to the seller at closing in the amount of $15,659.00 The offer was rejected by Ms. Tyson. J. Scott Jones negotiated over the telephone with Thomas Jafek II, and then with Bangert. The basic requirement of Ms. Tyson was that she wanted $50,000.00 net at closing. She also wanted a cash deposit, as she had a previous negative experience with a deposit note. J. Scott Jones does not recall that he told Bangert that a cash deposit was required, but he knows the issue came up sometime during the telephone discussion. He did not speak to both Jafek and Bangert at the same time. A second contract offer was signed by Bangert and was accepted by Ms. Tyson on August 30, 1986. The purchase price and method of payment was set out as follows: PURCHASE PRICE $ 68,500.00 PAYMENT: Deposit(s) to be held in escrow by Help-U-Sell of College Park, upon acceptance in the amount of $ 1,000.00 Subject to AND [sic] assumption of Mortgage in good standing in favor of To Be Obtained having an approximate present principal balance of $ 40,000.00 Purchase money mortgage and note bearing interest at 9 percent on terms set forth herein below, in the principal amount of 360 payments of 189.10 to Balloon at 60th mo. $ 23,500.00 Other Purchase Money Mortgage @ 10 percent in a single payment at 60th mo. $ 5,000.00 Balance to close (U.S. cash, LOCALLY DRAWN certified or cashier's check), subject to adjustments and prorations $ 68,500.00 (Petitioner's Exhibit #4) The Contract also provided for the $50,000.00 net at closing to the seller. Bangert gave Thomas Jafek a deposit note in the amount of $1,000.00. Jafek did not know how to put a note in a trust or escrow account, so he held it in his files at Help U. Sell. Jafek had dealt with Bangert before in real estate transactions and had acted before as the escrow agent. In those dealings Bangert only put down notes, never cash. Jafek understood that Bangert's role was as a principal buyer and that Bangert intended to assign the contract for sale. The transaction was initially scheduled to close on September 26, 1987. On September 30, 1986, the parties agreed to extend the closing until October 10, 1986. When J. Scott Jones met with Bangert to get the extension signed, he learned that a note, rather than cash deposit had been made. The transaction never closed. For reasons that are not material to this proceeding, Bangert did not appear at the closing. Cynthia Tyson retained an attorney, Garrick N. Fox, who sent letters to Jafek and to Bangert on October 17, 1986. The letter to Jafek provides, in pertinent part: As per the contract for sale and purchase, your company holds one thousand dollars in escrow and we may [sic) hereby make demand that you remit to this law office the one thousand dollars held in escrow as partial damages for the default of the contract. (Petitioner's Exhibit #6) The letter to Bangert does not mention the deposit, but states that the contract is in default. The final paragraph states: It is my sincere desire that we can settle this matter amicably without the necessity of litigation. If you can close on this contract forthwith, all of these problems can be settled. If not I would appreciate it if you would have your attorney contact [sic] so that we can immediately take the proper steps to minimize Miss Green's damages. (Petitioner's Exhibit #7) The attorney never made an oral demand on Bangert for the $1000.00. Jafek did not consider his letter to be a present demand, but rather a statement of intent to make a demand in the future. Jafek did not tender the note and the $1000.00 was not paid. Bangert had no intent to make a cash deposit. He claims that he told "Tom Jr." " (Thomas Jafek II) to type "a deposit note" on the second contract offer, but that even without that language, a note, rather than cash, was not precluded by the contract terms. Bangert intended that the transaction take place and did not have an intent or motive to defraud the seller. If the transaction had closed, he claims he would have honored the note. As far as he knows, Jafek still has the note. Bangert claims also that it was an oversight that he did not reveal his real estate license status on the contract. The Jafeks knew he was a real estate salesman. Further, he and Scott Jones were teaching at the same real estate school and he felt that Jones should have known his status. He did not intend to hide the fact of his license from anyone. His business in the last three years has been actively serving as a principal buyer and seller for other parties. Bangert's liability on his note is not at issue. In the absence of clear evidence of his knowledge of the seller's conditions, I cannot find that he is guilty of fraud in putting a note cash on deposit. Nor did he deliberately misrepresent a material fact to the seller by failing to disclose that he was a licensed real estate salesman. Ms. Tyson never met Bangert. Both parties were dealing at arms length through their own brokers. Conclusions of Law The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section 120.57(1) F.S. and Section 455.225(4) F.S. Section 475.25(1) F.S. provides that the Florida Real Estate Commission may impose discipline if it finds that a licensee, (b) Has been guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction... DPR has the burden of proving the allegations of this complaint through evidence that is clear and convincing. Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So.2nd 292 (Fla. 1987). It is apparent now that Ms. Tyson wanted a cash deposit as one condition of accepting an offer to buy her property. It is not clear that the condition was communicated to Bangert by either his broker, Thomas Jafek, II, or by Ms. Tyson's broker, J. Scott Jones. Without this material evidence it cannot be established that Bangert deliberately engaged in a subterfuge. Without evidence of dishonest or illicit intent, there is no guilt under Section 475.25(1)(b), F.S. Morris v. Department of Professional Regulation 474 So.2nd 841 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). No rule nor provision of law has been cited to require a real estate licensee to reveal his status as such when engaging in the purchase and sale of property in his personal capacity. Nor was evidence produced that would establish and justify such a policy by the Board. In Santaniello v. Department of Professional Regulation 432 So.2nd 84 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1983), the court upheld the Board's right to determine that a broker violated Section 475.25(1)(b) F.S. when he failed to reveal that a purchaser was his mother-in- law. In that case, the court observed that the broker owed his allegiance to the sellers and was obligated to inform them of anything which might influence their decision to sell. Because of that, the existence of the mother-in-law relationship was deemed a material fact. No such foundation for a duty to inform was established here, therefore there was no violation of section 475.25(1)(b) F.S.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint against Larry G. Bangert be dismissed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of December, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Office Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3044 The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by Petitioner. Adopted in paragraph #1. Adopted in paragraph #2. Adopted in substance in paragraphs #3 and #4. Adopted in substance in paragraph #4. Evidence did not establish that Bangert was aware of the cash deposit condition by Ms. Tyson. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. The face of the contract does not require cash. Adopted in paragraph #7. Adopted in paragraph #8. Adopted in paragraph #6. Adopted in substance in paragraph #7. Adopted in paragraph #11. Adopted in paragraph #7. Adopted in part in paragraph #10. Bangert contended that the contract did not specify cash. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in paragraph #9. Rejected as immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: Copies furnished: DOAH Case No. 87-3044 James R. Mitchell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Legal Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Tallahassee, Florida 32802 Larry G. Bangert 103 Cashew Court Longwood, Florida 32750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 =================================================================
The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether Respondent violated Section 475.25(1)(b) Florida Statutes, 1/ by committing the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the governmental agency responsible for issuing licenses to practice real estate and for regulating licensees on behalf of the state. Respondent is a licensed real estate broker under license number 0478560. The last license issued to Respondent was issued as a broker t/a Concord Financial Realty Co. ("CFR"), 495 E. Semoran Boulevard #115, Casselberry, Florida 32708. Respondent is the sole owner of CFR. CFR carries on regular business activities that include apartment rentals and sales of real estate. On January 31, 1992, Respondent and Mr. Charles Wallman, Respondent's husband, owned all of the stock of C.L. Wallman Associates, Inc ("CWA"). 2/ Respondent's husband owned Concord Financial Services, Inc. ("CFS"). CFS was formed to sell insurance and securities. Respondent and her husband operated CFR, CWA, and CFS out of shared office space. Respondent performed bookkeeping and secretarial duties for CWA and CFS. In January, 1992, Respondent's husband (the "seller") verbally agreed ("agreed") to sell 35 percent of the stock of CFS to Mr. John Topercer (the "purchaser") for $35,000. The seller and purchaser agreed to operate the company as "partners." The sale proceeds were to be invested in the company in which the seller and purchaser were to be partners. The purchaser paid the $35,000 purchase price in five installments from January 31, 1992, through March 12, 1992. During that time, the seller agreed to sell an additional 14 percent of the stock of CFS for an additional $13,000. The purchaser paid the additional $13,000 in three installments from April 14, 1992, through May 13, 1992. In May, 1992, the purchaser and seller agreed to another stock acquisition for $20,000. The seller would merge CFS, CWA, and CFR into a new company to be known as Concord Financial Centre ("CFC"). All of the business activities carried out by the separate companies would be consolidated into CFC. The purchaser would receive 49 percent of the stock of CFC in exchange for his 49 percent stock ownership in CFS. The seller and purchaser would operate CFC as "partners" in the same manner as originally contemplated for CFS. The sale proceeds were to be invested in the company in which the seller and purchaser were to be partners. The purchaser paid $20,000 in five installments from June 2 through June 22, 1992, and tendered his stock in CFS. However, the purchaser never received any stock in CFC. CFC was never formed. The seller never tendered any stock in CFC to the purchaser. The seller used some of the sale proceeds to operate CFS. However, approximately $30,000 of the sale proceeds were misappropriated and used by Respondent and her husband for personal purposes including a down payment on a house and a car. On January 6, 1993, the purchaser filed a civil complaint against Respondent and her husband alleging fraud, recision, and mismanagement of corporate funds. On August 8, 1994, the purchaser received judgment against Respondent and her husband in the amount of $30,000. Respondent and her husband have not satisfied the judgment. Neither has paid any money toward the judgment, and the purchaser has been unable to satisfy the judgment. Respondent knew of the negotiations and business transactions between her husband and Mr. Topercer. Respondent performed the duties of bookkeeper and documented all of the payments made by Mr. Topercer. Respondent was present during some of the discussions between her husband and Mr. Topercer. Respondent agreed to the merger of CFR into CFC. Respondent participated in the misappropriation of the purchase proceeds for her own personal use. When considered in their totality, the acts committed by Respondent constitute fraud and dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Those acts were repeated and continued for more than six months. The amount misappropriated by Respondent is significant. During the three and a half years since June, 1992, Respondent has made no attempt at restitution.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b) and revoking Respondent's real estate license. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January 1996.
The Issue Whether the Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed by the Petitioner and, if so, whether Respondent's real estate license should be suspended, revoked, or otherwise disciplined.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165, Florida Statutes; Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes; and the rules adopted pursuant thereto. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Jared A. White T/A Jerry White Realty was a licensed real estate broker, having been issued license number 0187087 pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent was as a broker with an address of 231 Skiff Pt. 7, Clearwater, Florida 34630. TITLE TO THE PROPERTY The matters at issue began with Respondent's retention as a real estate broker to bid at a foreclosure auction for a beachfront house and lot at 235 Howard Drive in Belleair Beach, Pinellas County, Florida. Respondent was hired to submit the bid on behalf of Dr. Moshe Kedan and/or his wife, Ella Kedan. Prior to the auction on August 17, 1995, Respondent had no contact with the Kedans. Kathy MacKinnon of Viewpoint International Realty in Clearwater was Respondent’s point of contact with the Kedans. It was Ms. MacKinnon who obtained Respondent's services to bid on behalf of the Kedans, and Ms. MacKinnon who negotiated with Dr. Kedan as to the financial arrangements for both the bid and any ensuing commissions for Respondent. Neither Ms. MacKinnon nor Dr. Kedan was called as a witness in this case. Respondent attended the foreclosure auction and tendered the winning bid on the property. Respondent bid in his own name. Respondent testified that he had bid at several similar sales in the past, and his practice was to bid in the name of the person who would hold title to the property. Respondent did not follow his usual practice here because Ms. MacKinnon failed to instruct him as to whether the property would be titled in the name of Dr. Kedan, Mrs. Kedan, or one of their corporations. Ms. MacKinnon told Respondent she would know on August 18 how the property was to be titled. Respondent's testimony regarding the initial titling of the property is supported by a handwritten note faxed by Ms. MacKinnon to Dr. Kedan on August 17, shortly after the auction. Ms. MacKinnon's note provides instructions regarding payment of the purchase price, indicating that the money must be submitted to the Clerk of the Court no later than 10:30 a.m. on the morning of August 18. The note specifically asks, "Also, whose name do you want the house in?" Respondent testified that on August 18, he went to Atlanta on business, with the understanding that Ms. MacKinnon would handle the payments to the Clerk of the Court and the titling of the property on that date. This testimony is consistent with the handwritten note in which Ms. MacKinnon indicates that she will take the Kedans' checks to the court. The record evidence shows that the payments were made to the Clerk of the Court and that title insurance on the property was timely issued. However, the title and the title insurance policy listed Respondent as owner of the property. Respondent was unaware the property had been titled in his name until he received the certificate of title in the mail, approximately two weeks after the auction. Upon receiving the incorrect certificate of title, he went to the title company and signed a quitclaim deed, effective August 17, 1995, in favor of Ella Kedan. Respondent testified that he had learned from Ms. MacKinnon that the property would be titled in Ella Kedan’s name at sometime during the two-week period after the auction. The quitclaim deed was not notarized until October 9, 1995, and was not recorded until October 10, 1995. However, the face of the deed states that it was made on August 17, 1995. It is plain that the signature line of the notary statement on the quitclaim deed has been altered from August 17, 1995 to October 9, 1995. Respondent had no knowledge of how the quitclaim deed came to be altered. Respondent also had no clear recollection as to why he dated the quitclaim deed August 17, 1995, in light of his testimony that he signed it approximately two weeks after that date. A reasonable inference is that Respondent so dated the quitclaim deed to clarify that Mrs. Kedan's ownership of the property commenced on August 17, the date on which Respondent submitted the winning bid. Respondent also had no knowledge of why the title company failed to record the quitclaim deed at the time he signed it. He testified that on or about October 9, 1995, he checked the Pinellas County computer tax records and discovered that he was still the owner of record. At that time, he returned to the title company to make sure the quitclaim deed was recorded the next day. Petitioner offered no testimonial evidence regarding the events surrounding the titling of the property. Respondent's uncontradicted testimony is credible, consistent with the documentary evidence, and thus credited as an accurate and truthful statement of the events in question. THE CONTRACT FOR REPAIRS Shortly after the auction, Respondent began discussing with Dr. Kedan the possibility of Respondent’s performing repairs on the just-purchased property. Because Dr. Kedan did not testify in this proceeding, findings as to the substance of the negotiations between Respondent and Dr. Kedan must be based on the testimony of Respondent, to the extent that testimony is credible and consistent with the documentary evidence. Respondent testified that Ms. MacKinnon approached him after the auction and asked him if he would be interested in fixing up the house for the Kedans. Respondent testified that he was agreeable to contracting for the work because his carpenter was between jobs and could use the money. Respondent thus met with Dr. Kedan at the doctor’s office to discuss the repairs. Dr. Kedan explained to Respondent that his ultimate plan was to demolish the existing house on the property and to build a more elaborate residence. Dr. Kedan wanted to rent out the house for five years before tearing it down, and wanted Respondent to affect such repairs as would make the house rentable for that five-year period. Respondent testified that Dr. Kedan expressly told him he did not want to spend a lot of money on the repairs. Respondent quoted Dr. Kedan a price of $20,000.00, which was the price it would take to pay for the repairs, with no profit built in for Respondent. Respondent testified that he sought no profit on this job. He had made a substantial commission on the purchase of the property, and anticipated doing business with Dr. Kedan in the future, and thus agreed to perform this particular job more or less as a “favor” to Dr. Kedan. After this meeting with Dr. Kedan, Respondent walked through the house with Irene Eastwood, the Kedans’ property manager. Ms. Eastwood testified that she and Respondent went from room to room, and she made notes on what should be done, with Respondent either concurring or disagreeing. Ms. Eastwood typed the notes into the form of a contract and presented it to Respondent the next day. On September 21, 1995, Respondent signed the contract as drafted by Ms. Eastwood. There was conflicting testimony as to whether Respondent represented himself as a licensed contractor in the negotiations preceding the contract. Respondent testified that he never told Dr. Kedan that he was a contractor, and that he affirmatively told Ms. Eastwood that he was not a contractor. Ms. Eastwood testified that she assumed Respondent was a licensed contractor because Dr. Kedan would not have hired a nonlicensed person to perform the contracted work. She denied that Respondent ever told her that he was not a licensed contractor. The weight of the evidence supports Respondent to the extent it is accepted that Respondent never expressly represented himself as a licensed contractor to either Dr. Kedan or Ms. Eastwood. However, the weight of the evidence does not support Respondent’s claim that he expressly told either Dr. Kedan or Ms. Eastwood that he was not a licensed contractor. Respondent’s subcontractors commenced work immediately upon the signing of the contract. Ms. Eastwood was in charge of working with Respondent to remodel the house, and she visited the site every day, often two or three times. She only saw Respondent on the site once during the last week of September, and not at all during the month of October. She did observe painters and a maintenance man regularly at work on the property during this period. Respondent concurred that he was seldom on the property, but testified that this was pursuant to his agreement with Dr. Kedan that he would generally oversee the work on the property. Respondent testified that he was on the property as often as he felt necessary to perform his oversight duties. Ms. Eastwood testified as to her general dissatisfaction with the quality of the work that was being performed on the property and the qualifications of those performing the work. She conveyed those concerns to the Kedans. Respondent testified that he did not initially obtain any permits to perform the work on the house, believing that permits would not be necessary for the job. On or about October 11, 1995, officials from the City of Belleair Beach shut down Respondent’s job on the Kedans’ property for lack of a construction permit. Respondent made inquiries with the City as to how to obtain the needed permit. City officials told Respondent that a permit could be granted to either a licensed contractor, or to the owner of the property if such property is not for sale or lease. Respondent checked the City’s records and discovered that, despite the fact that he had signed a quitclaim deed on August 17, he was still shown as the owner of the property. Respondent then proceeded to sign a permit application as the homeowner, and obtained a construction permit on October 11, 1995. Respondent testified that because the City’s records showed him as the record owner of the property, he committed no fraud in obtaining a construction permit as the homeowner. This testimony cannot be credited. Whatever the City’s records showed on October 11, 1995, Respondent well knew he was not the true owner of this property. Respondent cannot be credited both with having taken good faith steps to correct the mistaken titling of the property and with later obtaining in good faith a construction permit as the record owner of the property. Respondent testified that in obtaining the construction permit under false pretenses, his main concern was to keep the job going and to finish it in a timely fashion. He testified that there was no financial advantage to him in having the property in his name: he was making no profit on the job, and actually lost money because he had to pay for another title policy in the name of the Kedans. While there may have been no immediate financial advantage to Respondent, he was clearly motivated by the prospect of future profits in projects with Dr. Kedan. The City’s closing down this project jeopardized Respondent’s anticipated continuing relationship with Dr. Kedan, and Respondent took the improper step of obtaining a construction permit as the property owner to maintain that relationship. The Kedans ultimately dismissed Respondent from the job. A claim of lien was filed against the property by the painter hired by Respondent, and the cabinet maker sent the Kedans a lawyer’s letter threatening to file a claim of lien. Mrs. Kedan testified that she paid off both the painter and the cabinetmaker in full. Ms. Eastwood estimated that the Kedans ultimately had to pay an additional $20,000 to $50,000 to complete the repairs to the house, some of which included correctional actions for the improper repairs performed by Respondent’s workers. ALLEGED PRIOR DISCIPLINE Respondent has been the subject of a prior disciplinary proceeding by the Florida Real Estate Commission. In that prior proceeding, the Division of Real Estate's Administrative Complaint alleged that Respondent was guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(b) and (1)(k), Florida Statutes. On September 25, 1995, Respondent and the Division of Real Estate entered into a Stipulation disposing of the Administrative Complaint. Under the terms of the Stipulation, Respondent agreed to pay a fine of $1,000, and be subject to one year of probation, during which he would complete 30 hours of post-license education for brokers. The Stipulation expressly stated that Respondent neither admitted nor denied the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint. The Florida Real Estate Commission entered a Final Order approving the Stipulation on November 14, 1995. Respondent's broker license was suspended by the Florida Real Estate Commission on January 24, 1996. The cause for this suspension was Respondent's failure timely to pay the $1,000 fine imposed by the Stipulation. Respondent paid the fine on February 19, 1996, and late renewed his license on April 24, 1997. In the instant proceeding, Respondent testified that by entering into the Stipulation, he had no intention of pleading guilty to any of the allegations, and that he would never have entered into the Stipulation had he known it would be construed in any way as a guilty plea.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing Counts One and Three of the administrative complaint, and finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count Two of the administrative complaint, and suspending Respondent’s real estate license for a period of three years and fining Respondent a sum of $1,000. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey T. Kirk, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, N-308 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 John Bozmoski, Jr., Esquire 600 Bypass Drive, Suite 215 Clearwater, Florida 34624-5075 Jared White White Realty 231 Skiff Point, Suite Seven Clearwater, Florida 34630 Henry M. Solares Division Director 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
The Issue In this disciplinary proceeding, the issues are whether Respondents, who are licensed real estate brokers, committed acts of dishonest dealing or culpable negligence in a business transaction; failed to account for and deliver trust funds; failed to maintain trust funds in an escrow account as required; intermingled personal funds with trust funds; obstructed or hindered Petitioner's investigator in an official investigation; or committed any of these offenses, as alleged by Petitioner in its Administrative Complaint. If Petitioner proves one or more of the alleged violations, then an additional question will arise, namely whether disciplinary penalties should be imposed on Respondents, or either of them.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent Marlene Montenegro Toirac ("Toirac") is a licensed real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Real Estate Commission ("Commission"). Respondent Home Center International Corp. ("HCIC") is and was at all times material hereto a corporation registered as a Florida real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission. Toirac is an officer and principal of HCIC, and at all times relevant to this case she had substantial, if not exclusive, control of the corporation. Indeed, the evidence does not establish that HCIC engaged in any conduct distinct from Toirac's in connection with the transactions at issue. Therefore, Respondents will generally be referred to collectively as "Toirac" except when a need to distinguish between them arises. Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings for the Commission. At the Commission's direction, Petitioner is authorized to prosecute administrative complaints against licensees within the Commission's jurisdiction. The Ramirez Transaction On or about September 9, 2003, Toirac, in her individual capacity, entered into a Sale and Purchase Contract (the "Contract") with Andres Ramirez ("Ramirez"), whereby Toirac agreed to sell, and Ramirez to buy, certain real estate then owned by Toirac. The Contract called for Ramirez to make several deposits toward the purchase price. Accordingly, Ramirez tendered to Toirac a total of $14,000 in pre-closing payments. Toirac accepted these payments, which were deposited in HCIC's operating account. At some point, Toirac withdrew Ramirez's deposits from HCIC's operating account, taking the money in cash. She brought the $14,000 in cash to her attorney, Alix Montes, who agreed to hold the money in escrow pending the closing of the sale to Ramirez. Mr. Montes placed the cash in a safe located in his home. The sale to Ramirez fell through after Ramirez failed to obtain acceptable financing and exercised his right to cancel the Contract in consequence thereof. Ramirez requested that his deposits be returned. Within a short time (not more than about two weeks), Toirac gave Ramirez his money back——in cash. The parties dispute whether Toirac properly handled Ramirez's deposits. Petitioner asserts that the $14,000 should have been held in an escrow account maintained at a financial institution such as a bank or title company. Toirac responds that she complied with a "Financing and Deposit Addendum" (the "Addendum") to the Contract. The Addendum, which is part of the Contract that Petitioner offered into evidence (as Petitioner's Exhibit 4), provides in pertinent part as follows: Seller acknowledges that in the event that the Buyer is not approved for a mortgage loan or the terms and conditions of said mortgage loan are not acceptable to Seller, Seller within thirty (30) days from the date Seller receives Buyer's written request for the return of its deposit, shall refund Buyer's deposit in full. Upon Seller's refund of the deposit, this contract will terminate and all parties will be relieved from the obligations and liabilities. Buyer acknowledges that the Seller herein is a licensed Real Estate Broker in the state of Florida and That Home Center International Corp. will not be the "Escrow Agent" in this transaction nor will Home Center International Corp. or any of its affiliates, officers, directors, agents and/or employees will receive a Real Estate Brokerage fee in connection with this transaction. Buyer authorizes Home Center International Corp. to place any and all deposits herein in its operating account. Buyer further authorizes Home Center International Corp, at any time to withdraw and/or transfer Buyer's funds from the operating account. In the event a transfer of any and all funds is effected, such funds shall be held by Alix J. Montes, Esq., Attorney for the Seller. This Addendum supercedes the provisions of paragraph 2 (A)2(B)(1), 16(A)(B)(C), 17, 18, and 19 of the "As Is" Sale and Purchase Contract signed by all parties herein. (In the original, the text is written in all capital letters.) The Addendum is dated September 9, 2003, and bears the purported signatures of Ramirez and Toirac. Petitioner alleged in its Administrative Complaint that Ramirez had denied executing the Addendum. At hearing, however, Petitioner failed to offer any proof——such as Ramirez's testimony or the testimony of an expert disputing the authenticity of Ramirez's purported signature on the Addendum—— to establish this allegation. In contrast, Toirac testified that both she and Ramirez had, in fact, signed the Addendum. As a result, on this record, the undersigned is not clearly convinced that the Addendum is fraudulent. Moreover, the Addendum and Toirac's testimony, taken together, are sufficiently persuasive (in the absence of evidence to the contrary) to prevent the undersigned from being clearly convinced that Toirac mishandled Ramirez's deposits or otherwise dealt dishonestly or improperly with him. The January 2004 Audit On January 20, 2004, Tibizay Morales, who was then employed by Petitioner as an investigator, conducted an audit of Toirac's records. (The impetus for this audit was Petitioner's receipt of a complaint from Ramirez.) During the audit, Toirac reported to Ms. Morales that she no longer maintained an escrow account but instead relied upon her attorney to act as escrow agent for funds entrusted to her. Toirac also told Mr. Morales that Ramirez's deposits initially had been held in HCIC's operating account, before being handed over to Mr. Montes for safekeeping. Toirac was not able, at the time of the audit, to produce bank statements for HCIC's operating account, and apparently a listing agreement that should have been in the broker's file was not there. Toirac agreed to provide the missing documentation. By letter dated January 20, 2004, Toirac informed Ms. Morales that she would forward requested documentation within 10 days. For reasons unknown, Toirac failed to follow through with this, prompting the instant disciplinary action. The Charges In Counts I and VII, Petitioner alleges that Respondents are guilty of culpable negligence or breach of trust in any business transaction, either of which is a disciplinable offense under Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's position is that Respondents mishandled Ramirez's deposits and misled him into believing that the money would be held in trust by HCIC as an escrow agent.1 In Counts II and VIII, Petitioner charges Respondents with failing to account for and deliver trust funds, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes. Petitioner's position is unclear. What is clear, however, is that Respondents returned Ramirez's deposit money within a reasonable time after his demand therefor. In Counts III and IX, Petitioner accuses Respondents of having failed to maintain trust funds in the real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was properly authorized, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. In Counts IV and X of its Administrative Complaint, Petitioner accuses Respondents of having intermingled personal funds with funds being held in escrow. Petitioner's position is that by initially depositing Ramirez's deposits in HCIC's operating account, Respondents failed to comply with Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-14.008(2), and hence violated Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. In Counts V and XI, Petitioner asserts that Respondents obstructed or hindered the enforcement of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, in violation of Section 475.42(1)(i), Florida Statutes, and therefore in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's position is that Respondents willfully interfered with Morales's investigation by failing to provide documentation as promised.2 Ultimate Factual Determinations Toirac handled Ramirez's deposit money in accordance with the unambiguous terms of the Addendum. Petitioner failed to prove that the Addendum is fraudulent. Thus, the Addendum, when considered in conjunction with Toirac's unrebutted testimony that she and Ramirez signed the instrument, is fatal to Counts I, III, IV, VII, IX, and X of the Administrative Complaint. Respondents are not guilty of the offenses charged therein. Toirac did, in fact, return Ramirez's deposit money within a reasonable time after he demanded a refund. Respondents therefore are not guilty of the offenses charged in Counts II and VII of the Administrative Complaint. When Ms. Morales interviewed Toirac in January 2004 in response to Ramirez's complaint, Toirac admitted most, if not all, of the material facts pertaining to the circumstances under which Ramirez's deposits had been held. Further, the documents that Toirac neglected to provide Ms. Morales, i.e. HCIC's bank records and a listing agreement that had gone missing, were claimed by Toirac to be corroborative of her statements to the investigator. Toirac's failure to produce such documents cost Toirac an opportunity to bolster her credibility——and enabled Petitioner to draw adverse inferences against Toirac, e.g. that the questioned listing agreement did not exist after all.3 Given these facts, the undersigned is not convinced that Respondents obstructed or hindered Petitioner's investigation. Consequently, Respondents are not guilty of the charges set forth in Counts V and VI of the Administrative Complaint.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Respondents not guilty of the offenses charged in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of September, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 2005.
The Issue Whether Respondents' licenses as real estate brokers should be suspended or revoked, or the licensees otherwise disciplined, for alleged violations of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint, dated September 28, 1981. This proceeding is based on an administrative complaint filed by Petitioner, Board of Real Estate, alleging that Respondents, while engaged in a rental service business which advertised and sold rental property information or lists, for an advance fee to prospective lessees, utilized a contract or receipt agreement which included language defining when a "rental has been obtained" that was contrary to the intent of Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code, and that therefore Respondents had violated Subsection 475.453 and 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. It further alleged that Respondents failed to refund 75 percent of an advance fee to specific prospective tenants as required by Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes and therefore constituted a violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes. At the commencement of the hearing, the parties submitted a Proposed Stipulation of facts which was accepted by the Hearing Officer and constitutes the Findings of Fact hereinafter. No witnesses testified at the proceeding nor were any exhibits entered in evidence other than the four exhibits attached to the Stipulation. (Exhibit 1)
Findings Of Fact Respondent Jack Braunstein is a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0146924. The last known address of this Respondent is 916 North Federal Highway, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304. Respondent Rent Aid, Inc., is a licensed corporate real estate broker having been issued license number 0133234. The last known main office address of Rent Aid, Inc., is 916 North Federal Highway, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304. At all times material herein Respondent Braunstein was the sole active broker of and for Respondent Rent Aid, Inc., doing business at the corporate main office located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. As said active broker, Braunstein was responsible and liable for the acts and/or omissions of the associates of Rent Aid, Inc. performed in the scope of their employment; and was responsible and liable for the acts and/or omissions of Rent Aid, Inc. At all times material herein, Respondent Rent Aid, Inc., was engaged in a full service real estate brokerage business which included representing potential buyers and sellers of real property and potential landlords and tenants with regard to rental properties. As part of the business Rent Aid, Inc. entered into contracts with prospective tenants for an advanced fee, as shown by Exhibit "A" to the Complaint and incorporated herein by reference. That the contract or receipt agreement forms provided by the Respondents, have inserted therein additional language as to specifically stating that "a rental has been obtained when company provides a guaranteed available rental unit upon the terms specified and requested by member. On or about September 16, 1980 Jan Spear and Deborah Nigro entered into the contract, an accurate copy of which is appended to the Complaint as Exhibit "A", with Rent Aid, Inc. That under the terms of the contract, Respondent had the discretion to refuse any and all refunds if they had shown to the prospective tenant an available rental unit which met the terms specified and requested by the prospective tenant, even if the prospective tenant declined to rent said unit and demanded a refund of the paid fee within the required time frame. That Respondent's practice was to refuse demands for refund made where, in Respondent's opinion, a bona fide effort had been made to obtain a rental, which efforts had been unsuccessful through no fault of Respondent's. Jan Spear and Deborah Negro made written demand upon Respondent's for a partial refund of the fifty ($50) fee which they had paid Respondent's pursuant to the contract. This demand was made within thirty days of the contract date as shown by therefund refusal dated October 12, 1980, attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by reference as true and accurate. The contract utilized by Respondent's does not strictly conform to the refund required by Rule 21V-10,30 in that the conditions under which a refund would be payable are restricted beyond the scope of said Rule, and SS 475.453(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent utilized the Contract form in question in reliance upon advice received from his prior counsel, Gregory Jones, as shown by a letter dated April 1, 1980. A true and accurate copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C". Sal Carpino, attorney for the Department of Professional Regulation, had been provided with a copy of the form utilized by Respondent and had approved the format of said form without approving a discrepancy of the language in question in this proceeding, to wit: "a rental has been obtained with company (Rent Aid, Inc.) provides a guaranteed available rental unit upon the terms specified and requested by members." In response to this proceeding, Respondent has made full and complete refund to Jan Spears and Deborah Nigro and has agreed to voluntarily stop all use of the Contract form in question, and use only such a form as strictly complies with 475.453(1) and Rule 210-10.30 and to furnish a copy of said form to the Department conformance with said Rule."
Recommendation That the Board of Real Estate issue a private reprimand and impose a $100 fine against Respondents Jack Braunstein and Rent Aid, Inc. for violation of Subsections 475.25(1)(d) and (e), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Suite 101 2715 East Oakland Park Boulevard Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33306 John P. Gaudiosi, Esquire 3801 North Federal Highway Pompano Beach, Florida 33064 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 C.B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent violated Sections 475.25(1)(a), 475.25(1)(b), 475.25(1)(d), 475.25(1)(e), and 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Phillip F. Niles, is and was, at times material to this matter, a licensed real estate broker. His license number is 0173298. Respondent's license was inactive from August 2, 1996, through March 31, 1997. It was invalid due to non-renewal from March 31, 1997 through May 28, 1997. From May 29, 1997 through August 20, 1997, Respondent was an active broker. From August 21, 1997 through June 10, 1998, Respondent was an inactive broker. From June 11, 1998, through the date of the formal hearing, Respondent was an active individual broker. The address of his last license was 1700 Ridge Avenue, Holly Hill, Florida 32117. Sam L. Berry owned a condominium located at 840 Center Street, Unit 101, Holly Hill, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the property). Sometime prior to April 27, 1997, Mr. Berry asked Respondent to sell the property. Mr. Berry wanted to receive $20,000 for the property. Mr. Berry told Respondent that he could keep any amount of the sales price in excess of $20,000. Respondent placed an advertisement for the sale of the property in the newspaper. Thereafter, he prepared a Contract for Sale and Purchase (the contract) for the sale of the property with $20,000 as the sales price. The buyer's name was John Richards. Meanwhile, Peggy Holloway became interested in the property after seeing Respondent's advertisement. Ms. Holloway contacted Respondent at the number referenced in the advertisement. Subsequently, she met Respondent at the property. At that time Respondent's broker's license was inactive. Ms. Holloway made an offer on the property. In order to make a commission or profit on the sale, Respondent decided to sell the property to her. He changed the existing contract by marking through Mr. Richard's name and adding Ms. Holloway's name as the buyer. Respondent changed the sales price on the contract to $23,000. On April 27, 1997, Ms. Holloway signed the contract as the buyer. That same day, Mr. Berry signed the contract as seller. As part of the contract, and pursuant to Respondent's instructions, Ms. Holloway made a check out to Respondent, personally, in the amount of $500. Respondent assured Ms. Holloway that he would place the money in an escrow account. The contract stated that the $500 deposit would be held in escrow. Respondent did not place Ms. Holloway's money in escrow. He cashed her check and kept the $500. At all times material to the transaction Ms. Holloway believed that Respondent was a licensed real estate broker. Additionally, the contract contained language stating that Respondent was a real estate broker. During subsequent conversations with Ms. Holloway about financing arrangements for the purchase of the property, Respondent appeared drunk. As a result of those conversations, Ms. Holloway became suspicious about Respondent's intentions and his competence to handle the real estate transaction. Ms. Holloway contacted Petitioner and learned that Respondent's license was inactive. On or about May 6, 1997, Ms. Holloway telephoned Respondent. She told him that she did not want to go through with the contract. She demanded that Respondent return her $500 deposit. Respondent failed to return Ms. Holloway's $500 deposit. Ms. Holloway then began to deal with Respondent's brother, Peter Niles, who is an attorney. Respondent's brother prepared a document for Mr. Berry to sign acknowledging receipt of the $500 deposit. Mr. Berry signed the document prepared by Respondent's brother even though Respondent never gave the $500 deposit to Mr. Berry. Ms. Holloway eventually decided to deal directly with Mr. Berry. They agreed on a sale price and closed the transaction with no assistance from Respondent, his brother, or any other individual. Ms. Holloway sued Respondent in the County Court of Volusia County, Florida. In Case No. 97-31586, the County Judge entered a judgment against Respondent in favor of Ms. Holloway. Respondent had not satisfied the judgment as of the date of the formal hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order suspending Respondent's license for a period of ten years and requiring him to pay a fine in the amount of $1,000 within one year of the date of the final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Laura McCarthy, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Phillip F. Niles 5747 Sweetwater Boulevard Port Orange, Florida 32127 Phillip F. Niles Apartment 503 100 Seabreeze Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32118 Herbert S. Fecker, Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 William Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
