Findings Of Fact On July 20, 1987, a DOT sign inspector observed a sign owned by Respondent alongside U.S. 19, 500 feet south of S.R. 590 which appeared to be on the DOT right-of-way of U.S. 19. Measurements of the distance of the sign from the pavement of U.S. 19 were taken. The right-of-way of U.S. 19 at this location extends 100 feet east and west of the centerline of U.S. 19 and 50 feet from the west side of the pavement. The sign was located 32 feet from the edge of the pavement on the west side of U.S. 19 some 18 feet inside the right-of-way line. The location of the DOT right-of-way is not readily determinable by a businessman desiring to erect a sign in front of his establishment. Generally, the power line poles are placed along the right-of-way line; however, this is not always an accurate method of locating the limit of the right-of-way. Here there were two lines of power line poles, and the sign was located between the pavement and the line of poles furthermost west of U.S. 19.
Findings Of Fact On or about July 31, 1987, a DOT sign inspector observed Respondent's sign apparently on the right-of-way of U.S. 19, 1000 feet south of Sunset Road in Pasco County. The right-of-way of U.S. 19 at this location on the east side of U.S. 19 extends 32 feet from the eastern edge of the paved lane. The sign was located 25 feet from the eastern edge of the paved lane. Respondent admitted that the sign was in the right- of-way the day the inspector was there, but was relocated there without their knowledge or consent by the contractor paving the parking lot. Davis Center gave Respondent permission to place their sign (Exhibit 2 and 3) on its property. The center is in the process of repaving its parking area in stages so as not to block off all parking at one time. To clear the area for the paving equipment the contractor moved Respondent's sign to the grassy area alongside the parking lot. As soon as Respondent learned its sign had been placed on the right-of-way, it removed the sign from the right-of-way.
Findings Of Fact On or about January 11, a DOT sign inspector observed two signs owned by Respondent on what appeared to be the right-of-way of U.S. 19 in the vicinity of C.R. 576 in Pinellas County. The right-of-way of U.S. 19 at this location extends 100 feet east and west of the centerline of U.S. 19 and 50 feet east and west of the edge she paved surface of U.S. 19. U.S. 19 is a Federal Aid Primary Highway and part of the State Highway System Measurements were taken on the distance from the edge of the paved surface of U.S. 19 to the signs. The sign located 500 feet south of C.R. 576 was 35 feet from the edge of the pavement, and the sign 0.1 mile south of C.R. 576 was 38 feet from the edge of the pavement. On or about January 27, 1988, the DOT sign inspector observed a sign 0.75 mile south of C.R. 592 owned by Respondent on what appeared to be the right-of-way of U.S. 19 in Pinellas County. The right-of-way of U.S. 19 in this location is the same as in Finding No. 2 above. Measurements taken of this sign from the edge of the pavement showed the sign to be 38 feet from the edge of the paved surface of U.S. 19, placing the sign some 12 feet inside the right-of-way boundary. Respondent submitted photographs of other signs which appeared to be on the right-of-way of U.S. 19 in the vicinity of Respondent's signs which were not cited for being on the right-of-way. However, during the past year some 2,000 violations have been issued citing signs, principally along U.S. 19, with being located on the right-of-way.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Transportation ("Respondent"), has demonstrated that Petitioner, Frank C. Kunnen, Jr., d/b/a U.S. 19 Commerce Center's ("Petitioner"), right-out driveway to U.S. Highway 19 will present a safety and operational problem following Respondent's reconstruction of Highway 19. Whether Petitioner's access to the state highway system will be reasonable if Petitioner's existing right-out driveway is closed. Whether Respondent is legally entitled to administratively close Petitioner's driveway, pursuant to Rule 14-96.011, Florida Administrative Code, and applicable Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of real property located within the city limits of Clearwater, in Pinellas County, Florida, which property abuts U.S. Highway 19 (State Road 55). It has a right-in and right-out driveway connection to U.S. Highway 19. Petitioner's current right-in, right-out driveway does not create a safety or operational problem with the existing configuration of U.S. Highway 19. Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida created pursuant to Chapter 20, Florida Statutes. Respondent regulates access to the state highway system. Respondent initially cited Rule 14-96.011, Florida Administrative Code, in the Notice as authority for the intended agency action. This Rule pertains to closure or modification of permitted driveways. At hearing on March 20, it was discovered that Respondent had intended to cite Rule 14-96.012, Florida Administrative Code, which pertains to closure or modification of unpermitted driveways that had been in existence since before July 1, 1988, the effective date of the State Highway System Access Management Act. The Rule refers to these driveways as "grandfathered." As of March 20, Respondent was not aware that Petitioner's driveway might have been permitted. In order to provide Petitioner all due process to which he was entitled, Respondent requested that the hearing be continued. After reviewing its files, Respondent indicated to Petitioner on June 28, 2001, that Respondent would be requesting an additional continuance to conduct an engineering study pursuant to Rule 14- 96.011, Florida Administrative Code.¹ Petitioner agreed to both continuances. The study was dated August 20, 2001, and was delivered to Petitioner's counsel just after that date. This study was presented as Respondent's Exhibit 5 at the resumption of the hearing on September 20, 2001. The Study sets out the essential safety and operational bases for Respondent's agency action in this case and was signed and sealed by a professional engineer registered in the State of Florida. Prior to the reconvened hearing, Petitioner did not seek to depose the author of the engineering study nor did he request documents utilized in creating the study. Petitioner decided to wait until the hearing and make a series of objections to the study's admissibility. Prior to and after the study was admitted into evidence, Petitioner's counsel conducted extensive cross-examination of the engineer who signed and sealed the study, Vibert Griffith, P.E., and his assistant in the creation of the study, Julian Parsons. Petitioner did not present any evidence of prejudice resulting from the timing of the creation of the study. Any prejudice which may be presumed was cured by Respondent's requesting a continuance specifically to search its records for evidence of a permit; Respondent's requesting another continuance to create that study; Petitioner's agreeing to both continuances; and Respondent's producing the study approximately one month prior to hearing. This gave Petitioner time to conduct discovery regarding the study, not to mention sufficient time to prepare for the hearing itself. The Notice did not state whether mediation was available in this case. However, the lack of mention of mediation in the Notice was of no prejudice to Petitioner in light of the fact that that Petitioner proposed several alternative driveway designs to Respondent, and that these alternatives had been closely studied and considered. Petitioner did not present any evidence that he had asked whether mediation was available or was denied an opportunity to mediate this case. Accordingly, any error in the lack of information regarding mediation in the Notice was harmless, and any prejudice was cured. Petitioner elicited testimony with respect to a third procedural point in this case. Rule 14-96.011(1)(e), Florida Administrative Code, states that if Respondent seeks to close a driveway, Respondent will offer to meet with the property owner or his representative on-site. As Petitioner's counsel stated during his opening remarks, however, there is a long history of litigation between Petitioner and Respondent, including two pervious mediations. Again, the unrebutted testimony at hearing was that over the last several years Respondent evaluated three alternative designs submitted by Petitioner for access to U.S. Highway 19. Petitioner did not present any evidence of prejudice in not being able to meet on-site with Respondent in this case. Any error in relation to this issue was harmless. U.S. Highway 19 runs north-south through Pinellas County, Florida and is a part of the Florida Intrastate Highway System. In the vicinity of Petitioner's property, U.S. Highway 19 has three lanes of traffic each for northbound and southbound traffic (total of six lanes). As part of the reconstruction of U.S. Highway 19, Respondent has plans to create "grade separated intersections" or "urban interchanges" at the cross street to the south and north of Petitioner's property. The cross street to the south is Drew Street, and the cross street to the north is Coachman Road. Also, just to the north of Petitioner's property, U.S. Highway 19 is elevated over railroad tracks, and will continue to be so elevated after reconstruction. In its reconstructed state, vehicles will reach mainline U.S. Highway 19 by a series of frontage roads and on and off ramps. Vehicles that stay on mainline U.S. Highway 19 will not have to stop for signals at intersections with cross streets because the mainline will travel over the cross streets. The effect of U.S. Highway reconstruction will be to create a more efficient transportation facility by improving safety and capacity. The overall improvements to U.S. Highway 19 are necessary. Although Respondent is closing Petitioner's right-out driveway to mainline U.S. Highway 19, Respondent is not acquiring any property from Petitioner. Accordingly, Respondent provided Petitioner with notice of the intended agency action and right to an administrative hearing (the "Notice"). Respondent's Proposal Respondent proposes, as part of its planned improvements to U.S. Highway 19, to provide Petitioner a right- in only entrance from a frontage road running adjacent to and parallel to U.S. Highway 19. Respondent also proposes to build a new two-way road, referred to as Access Road A, which runs north-south, parallel to U.S. Highway 19, intersects Drew Street, and from that point provides vehicles the option of traveling either north or south on mainline U.S. Highway 19, or east or west on Drew Street. Petitioner's northerly neighbor, a maintenance yard owned by Pinellas County, would also send all of its traffic, including large trucks and emergency vehicles, out Access Road A to Drew Street. Other properties, including several car dealerships, to the south of Petitioner's property would also have access to Access Road A. No other property owner, including Pinellas County, objected to Respondent's proposed access system. It is undisputed that Respondent has all of the right-of-way necessary to construct Access Road A to Petitioner's property line. During construction, the City of Clearwater will install a temporary traffic signal at the intersection of Access Road A and Drew Street. Based on a traffic study conducted by the Pinellas County MPO and endorsed by the City of Clearwater and Pinellas County, the traffic light will become permanent when construction is completed. Even if the temporary light is removed after construction, Access Road A will function properly for right turns onto Drew Street which will provide access to the northbound and southbound mainline lanes of U.S. Highway 19. This is true, even assuming that all of Petitioner's neighbors send all of their traffic out Access Road A. In addition, Petitioner's neighbors to the south have several alternate means of access to travel west on Drew Street and either north or south on U.S. Highway 19. Respondent is closing Petitioner's right-out driveway to U.S. Highway 19 because, post-construction, the driveway would be located on an on-ramp. The frontage road and on-ramp, as currently designed by Respondent, would prevent placement of a right-out driveway in such a location. It is Petitioner's position that Respondent could have designed the frontage road and on-ramp in front of Petitioner's property in such a way as to allow the safe operation of a right-out driveway in the approximate location of Petitioner's current right-out driveway. Petitioner's Proposal In support of his contention that Respondent could have designed a right-out driveway, Petitioner offered an aerial map and overlay (Petitioner's Exhibit 3), which purported to show that Respondent could have designed an on-ramp from Drew Street and an off-ramp to Coachman Road to the north in such a way as to allow Petitioner a right-out driveway. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 was a concept based upon what was referred to as the "Lochner Study" at hearing. The "Lochner Study" was a study performed by the engineering firm H. W. Lochner, and showed a right-in, right-out driveway from Petitioner's property onto a frontage road/on-ramp in approximately the same location as Petitioner's current driveway. In the past Petitioner had proposed other alternatives for access to U.S. Highway 19. Petitioner withdrew from consideration at this hearing all other alternative designs for a right-out driveway for Petitioner. The Lochner Study was undertaken with the specific purpose of determining whether needed improvements to U.S. Highway 19 could be safely constructed within right-of-way already owned by Respondent. The Lochner Study concluded that placing a driveway for Petitioner in the location shown in the study would provide "substandard operation and is very undesirable from a safety stand point." The primary reason for this conclusion was that the physical separation of northbound mainline U.S. Highway 19 and the frontage road ended south of the driveway's location. This lack of physical separation would allow vehicles on northbound mainline U.S. Highway 19 to cross over the frontage road and enter Petitioner's property, creating unsafe traffic movements. Petitioner's witnesses agreed that this lack of separation would be a safety problem. Petitioner's Exhibit 3, prepared and testified about by Reginald Mesimer, attempted to alleviate this admittedly unsafe aspect of the Lochner plan by extending the physical separator between northbound mainline U.S. Highway 19 and the frontage road/on-ramp to a point just beyond the location of where Petitioner's driveway would be. The area of physical separation is the "gore" area. In effect, this extension also would shift the beginning of the on-ramp to the point of Petitioner's driveway. Thus, the issue raised was whether the location of the on-ramp could be safely designed to co-exist with the location of the off-ramp for the next interchange at Coachman Road. The standards for determining whether this design is safe are set by the American Association for State Highway and Transportation Officials ("AASHTO"), who publish these standards in the "Green Book," known as the "Bible" of transportation engineers. In examining Petitioner's Exhibit 3, as well as the requirements of AASHTO submitted in this case, it is clear that the requirements for an on-ramp followed by an off-ramp are: (1) an acceleration area for the on-ramp; (2) a weaving area for vehicles going from the on-ramp to mainline, and for vehicles going from mainline to the off-ramp; (3) a deceleration area for the off-ramp, and (4) a queue area for vehicles at the terminus of the off-ramp. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 shows the start of the acceleration area for the on-ramp at the location of Petitioner's right-out driveway, which indicates that the on- ramp for vehicles leaving Petitioner's property would begin at his driveway. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 shows a 2,000-foot weave area, also beginning at the location of Petitioner's right-out driveway. Placing the start of the acceleration area and the weave area at the same point on an on-ramp is contrary to AASHTO design standards. The beginning of the weave area should be near the end of the acceleration area, which, on Petitioner's Exhibit 3, is supposed to be where vehicles on the on-ramp are traveling at the design speed of the highway they are attempting to enter. AASHTO places the beginning of the weaving area where the outside lane of the mainline and the inside lane of the on- ramp are separated by two feet. The weave area extends to a point where there is a twelve-foot separation of the mainline and off-ramp lanes at the next interchange. The design speed of U.S. Highway 19 is 55 miles per hour. It is uncontested that vehicles leaving Petitioner's property will be in a stopped condition prior to entering the on-ramp. Thus, looking at Petitioner's Exhibit 3, the beginning of the weave area should be placed approximately 965 feet to the north of the current location shown on Petitioner's Exhibit 3. In turn, this forces the deceleration area for the off-ramp to Coachman Road shown on Petitioner's Exhibit 3 to be shifted 965 feet to the north. Petitioner's expert testified that the off- ramp deceleration area at Coachman Road could be shifted between 300 and 400 feet to the north. Assuming this to be correct, this places the start of the off-ramp deceleration area approximately 965 feet to the north of its current location, which is 565 to 665 feet beyond the farthest point Petitioner's expert testified it could be moved. Respondent's experts also examined Petitioner's Exhibit 3 under the dictates of AASHTO. Unlike Petitioner, Respondent assumed a design speed of 50 miles per hour, and assumed that shorter distances for acceleration, weaving, and deceleration could be applied in this situation under AASHTO. Respondent's findings demonstrate that under the "Petitioner's best case scenario" the off-ramp at Coachman Road would still have to be moved approximately 600 feet to the north, which is at least 200 feet past the farthest possible shift testified to by Petitioner's expert. Moving the off-ramp would obviously require redesign and delay of the Coachman Road project to the north, already designed and funded for construction. Further, Petitioner's Exhibit 3 also did not take into account any need for increased acceleration distance on the on- ramp due to the grade of the road. For certain portions of the acceleration area of the on-ramp in Petitioner's Exhibit 3 the grade is steeper that 3 percent, and averages over 2 percent. AASHTO does not require an increase in acceleration distance where the grade is "less that two percent." AASHTO requires an increase when the grade is more than 3 percent. This is, according to Petitioner's witness, a "gray area" in AASHTO. In this situation, while AASHTO may not require a multiplier be applied to the entire acceleration distance, it would be safer for the traveling public to apply the multiplier at least to the portions above 3 percent and perhaps to the entire acceleration distance, and to acknowledge that the grade of the road militates against application of strict minimum AASHTO standard distances. Adjusting at all for grade would result in a longer on-ramp and require pushing the off-ramp at Coachman even further north, which makes Petitioner's Exhibit 3 alternative even less viable. Another factor that Petitioner's Exhibit 3 did not take into account was that a significant amount of traffic leaving the proposed right-out driveway would be fully-loaded heavy trucks both from Petitioner's property and the Pinellas County maintenance yard. The AASHTO acceleration distance of 965 feet shown in that Exhibit is for automobiles. Knowing that heavy, fully loaded trucks would be utilizing this driveway on a regular basis, the acceleration distance for such trucks reaching 55 or even 50 miles per hour would be longer than for a normal passenger vehicle. Petitioner's alternative proposal was fatally flawed in its misplacement of the weave area, and was defective in other respects such as not considering the slower heavy truck traffic or the grade of the road. Thus, it is apparent that under any interpretation of the AASHTO standards, Respondent could not safely design an on-ramp from the Drew Street area and an off-ramp to the Coachman Road interchange and provide Petitioner a right-out driveway in the approximate location of his existing right-out driveway. Based upon all the evidence presented at hearing, Respondent demonstrated that AASHTO standards preclude moving the on-ramp to the location proposed by Petitioner. Therefore, closing Petitioner's right-out driveway to reconstructed U.S. Highway 19 is mandated for safety and operational reasons. Access-Reasonableness Issues Following the reconstruction of U.S. Highway 19, the access proposed by Respondent for Petitioner's property is reasonable. An objective comparison of the alternative proposed by Petitioner and Respondent's proposal reveals that Respondent's design results in safer and more efficient access to the state highway system for Petitioner and direct access to east and west travel on Drew Street. One measurable point of comparison is the relative distance a vehicle would have to travel to reach the state highway system under Respondent's proposal versus Petitioner's. Prior to Petitioner's withdrawing from consideration all alternatives other than what was represented in Petitioner's Exhibit 3, Respondent presented testimony regarding two of Petitioner's earlier alternative concepts. These previous alternatives were referred to as Proposal One and Proposal Two. Proposal One was basically a right-out driveway in the form of an on-ramp that would have tied in to mainline U.S. Highway 19 prior to the railroad tracks. Proposal Two was a right-out driveway/on-ramp that tied into the off-ramp for Coachman Road. As far as comparing relative travel distances, both Proposals One and Two are similar to the alternative in Petitioner's Exhibit 3. For vehicles to travel north from Petitioner's property on U.S. Highway 19 in Respondent's design, vehicles travel south on Access Road A, west on Drew Street, and then south on the frontage road/on-ramp. This is a distance of .44 miles. To reach the same point using the access provided in Proposal One, Proposal Two, or Petitioner's Exhibit 3, a vehicle must travel north to the Coachman interchange, and double back south, a distance of approximately 1.45 miles. Thus, when added together, the distances for vehicles to travel north and south on U.S. Highway 19 in Respondent's design total 1.12 miles, or .33 miles less than the 1.45 miles to reach the same points using any of Petitioner's alternative driveway proposals. In addition, for vehicles that wish to travel east or west on Drew Street from Petitioner's property, Respondent's alternative is much shorter. It is .32 miles to reach Drew Street along Access Road A, and 1.6 miles to reach Drew Street from Proposal One, Proposal Two, or Petitioner's Exhibit 3. Another measurable point of comparison are conflict points, places such as intersections and merge areas where vehicles can be expected to change lanes. In Respondent's design, there are four or five conflict points to travel north on U.S. Highway 19, three or four to travel south on U.S. Highway 19, and one to travel east or west on Drew Street. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 shows two conflict points to travel north (right-out turn to on-ramp and merge to mainline), six or seven to travel south on U.S. Highway 19, and seven or eight to travel east or west on Drew Street (same as south on U.S. Highway 19 plus turn from off-ramp). For vehicles traveling north and south on U.S. Highway 19 from Petitioner's property, the number of conflict points in either Respondent's design or Petitioner's alternative are essentially even, but when travel on Drew Street is included in the comparison Respondent's design is clearly safer. A third point of comparison is that Petitioner's alternative provides one way in and one way out. Respondent's design provides two ways in and one way out. Respondent's design provides reasonable access to Petitioner's property. In comparison to Petitioner's alternative, Respondent's design provides for shorter combined travel distances. In regard to conflict points, Respondent's design is as safe as Petitioner's alternative, and safer if travel on Drew Street is included in the comparison. Finally, Respondent's design provides an additional point of ingress. Both witnesses called by Petitioner opined that the access proposed by Respondent was not reasonable, primarily because the access is not "direct." The basis of that opinion was limited to their belief that a "better" access plan, the alternative shown in Petitioner's Exhibit 3, was viable. Neither of Petitioner's witnesses knew the relative travel distances, nor did either witness testify about actual conflict points or any other possible objective points of comparison. Petitioner's witnesses' view are flawed because the alternative shown in Petitioner's Exhibit 3 is not viable. Assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner's Exhibit 3 reflected a safe design, and assuming that this access is reasonable, it would be contrary to logic to conclude that Respondent's design results in unreasonable access. The only "advantage" in Petitioner's Exhibit 3 versus Respondent's proposal is a right-out "direct" connection to U.S. Highway 19 via the on-ramp. However, comparing travel distances, conflict points, and points of ingress, Respondent's design is comparable if not superior, and thus, reasonable. Petitioner stressed that all other property owners along the U.S. Highway 19 corridor have right-in and right-out driveways on frontage roads, and that Petitioner is the only property owner required to use a facility like Access Road A for egress. Even if true, this circumstance does not in and of itself change Respondent's designed access for Petitioner's property into unreasonable access. Based upon objective criteria, Respondent's design is comparable or superior to Petitioner's alternative, and Respondent's design is comparable or superior to the access enjoyed by all other property owners in this vicinity. Engineering Study Pursuant to Rule 14-96.011, Florida Administrative Code, Respondent conducted an engineering study to examine the closure of Petitioner's right-out driveway. Normally, an engineering study is prepared prior to Respondent serving its Notice of Intent to close or alter a permitted driveway connection. The engineering study documents that there is a safety or operational problem with a particular driveway connection, and ensures that Respondent has an engineering basis to seek closure or alteration of the driveway. However, at the time this case came to hearing on March 20, 2001, Respondent was not aware that Petitioner's driveway may have been permitted. That is the reason the study was conducted during a continuance of this case and delivered to Petitioner on or around August 17, 2001. Petitioner agreed to the continuance for Respondent to conduct the study, and Petitioner had adequate time to conduct any further discovery in this case after receipt of the study. Thus, any procedural error in the timing of the study was waived by Petitioner and/or cured by Respondent. The Study does provide safety and operational bases for Respondent's agency action in this case. The study summarizes the history of the U.S. Highway 19 improvement project, discusses the current conditions, explains the proposed improvements, and reviews the safety and operational issues specific to Petitioner's right-out driveway in the post construction condition. The study also explains why two alternative right-out driveway configurations were not acceptable to Respondent. The study contains exhibits showing traffic patterns in the existing and possible future post construction conditions. The study was signed and sealed by a professional engineer registered in the State of Florida. The study did not discuss the Petitioner's alternative advocated at hearing. The reason the study did not address this concept was that at the time of its creation, Respondent did not have Petitioner's Exhibit 3. One other item not addressed was traffic accident data. Since the improvements of U.S. Highway 19 have not been constructed, there is no accident data for the right-out driveway in the post construction condition. Respondent stipulated that Petitioner's existing right-out driveway is safe, so any accident data relating to current conditions is not relevant.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Transportation enter a final order approving the closure of Petitioner's right- out driveway as part of the future constructed improvements to Highway 19 and the construction of Access Road A. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 2001.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner owned property including structures used for his dwelling and for his business which was located within the right-of-way of an interstate highway being constructed by the Respondent, Department of Transportation. The Petitioner and the Department negotiated with respect to the amount of compensation that Petitioner was entitled to receive. The Department located a residential dwelling which it contended was comparable to Petitioner's. Petitioner accepted the dwelling located by the Department as comparable for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation that Petitioner was entitled to receive. Petitioner elected, however, to construct a new dwelling on other property that he owned. Petitioner was compensated as if he had purchased the comparable dwelling and was compensated an additional $829 for "incidental expenses" beyond the replacement value as established by the comparable dwelling. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to be compensated for the cost of a "origination fee" which resulted from Petitioner's having to arrange financing. Although improperly labeled, it appears that Petitioner did receive adequate compensation for the loan origination fee. Petitioner received a check from the Department for a "replacement housing payment" which included the origination fee which Petitioner contends he was entitled to receive. While the replacement housing payment was not broken up so as to reflect these fees, it was calculated to include them. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to receive incidental expenses beyond those that he has already received in the amount of $2,068.23. Petitioner has received a payment for incidental expenses in the amount of $829, which includes expenses for a survey, sketch and description, loan application fee, title insurance, attorney's fees, and recording fees. Petitioner actually incurred incidental expenses beyond those for which he was compensated. These additional fees resulted, however, from the fact that Petitioner elected to construct a new residence rather than to accept the comparable residence located by the Department. Because Petitioner was constructing a new residence, it was necessary for him to incur some expenses which would not have been incurred had he accepted the comparable dwelling located by the Department. These expenses included costs of obtaining a rezoning of his property, costs of various construction permits, the cost of obtaining a construction loan, and the cost of a builder's risk insurance policy. While the Petitioner actually incurred these costs, they were costs that he would not have incurred if he had elected to accept the comparable dwelling located by the Department. Petitioner did accept the comparable dwelling for the purpose of setting the amount of benefits that he was entitled to receive.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Transportation denying the application of the Petitioner, John D. Lawrence, for additional relocation assistance benefits. RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of August, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Assistant Director Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. John D. Lawrence c/o Manatee Tropical Foliage Post Office Box 206 Parrish, Florida 33564 Charles G. Gardner Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Paul N. Pappas Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Two signs are located 0.8 mile west of State Road, 79 on Interstate 10, and 0.8 mile east of State Road 79 on Interstate 10. Both signs do not have permits attached to them. Both signs bear messages which are visible from the traveled way of Interstate 10. Neither sign is located within an incorporated municipality or town. Both signs advertise in part Simbo's Restaurant. Mr. Jim Williams, Outdoor Advertising Inspector for the Department of Transportation, testified that he had spoken with Mr. Simms on June 28, 1978. Williams stated that he asked Simms if Simms would remove the signs; however, Williams did not identify the signs to which he was referring. According to Williams, when Simms was asked if he would take the signs down, Simms stated he would leave them up and go to court. There was no substantial and competent evidence introduced that Simms was referring to the signs in question in this case. Both signs were measured by Charles Averitt, a surveyor with the Department of Transportation, and the sign 0.8 mile west of State Road 79 on Interstate 10 was determined to be 16 feet from the edge of the right-of-way of Interstate 10. The sign 0.8 mile east of State Road 79 on Interstate 10 was determined to be 16.5 feet from the edge of the right-of-way of Interstate 10. Gene Simms testified that he was the owner and operator of Simbo's Truck Stop and Restaurant. Simms testified the signs in question were the property of Simms' Enterprises, Inc., and had been at all times pertaining to this complaint. Simms stated that he owned 50 percent of the stock in Simms Enterprises, Inc., and the remainder was owned by his brother, Jimmy Simms. The notice of violation in this cause names Gene Simms as the Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Department of Transportation take no action regarding the subject DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Phillip S. Bennet, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Richard C. Hurst, Administrator Outdoor Advertising Section Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mr. Gene Simms Simbo's Auto-Truck Stop and Restaurant Route 1, Box 186 Bonifay, Florida 32425
Findings Of Fact The sign in issue in these proceedings is mounted on the bed of a pick- up truck which is generally parked opposite Respondent's business. The vehicle is moved daily, sometimes several times per day. On August 5, 1987, a DOT sign inspector observed Respondent's sign in an area appearing to be on the DOT right-of- way of SR 52 in Pasco County. Measurements were taken to locate the sign with respect to SR 52. The DOT right-of-way along SR 52 at this location extends 50 feet north and south of the centerline of SR 52, and 38 feet from the edge of the pavement of SR 52. On August 5, 1987, the DOT sign inspector using a steel tape measure found Respondent's sign to be located 12 feet from the edge of the pavement, thus clearly on the right-of-way.
The Issue Whether subject signs violate state and federal laws and should be removed.
Findings Of Fact The following described signs are located in agriculture zones and violate set-back requirements, each being closer than 660 feet from the nearest edge of the road right of way. Copy on each sign advertises the Camp-A-Wyle Lake Resort. U.S. 19 5.29 miles South of Hernando/Citrus City Line U.S. 19 2.61 miles North of State Road 50 U.S. 19 6.04 miles South of Hernando/Citrus City-Line U.S. 19 8.83 miles South of Hernando/Citrus City Line Notice of violation regarding subject signs was properly sent by Complainant and received by Respondent. No application was made or permit for erecting subject signs issued and the signs have no permit tags placed on them.
The Issue Whether a sign owned by Respondent and located on the northbound side of 27, at 853 U.S. 27 South, Lake Placid, Florida, is located in the road right-of-way, and must be removed.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) is the state agency charged with the duty to administer and enforce the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, which regulates outdoor advertising structures along the state highway system. U.S. 27 in Highlands County, Florida, is a part of the state highway system, and title to the right-of-way for said highway is held in the name of the State. Respondent is the owner, and maintains a two sided sign structure (sign) located at 853 U.S. Highway 27 South, Lake Placid, Florida, in Highlands County, which has been erected in the DOT right of way of U.S. Highway 27, inventory section 44, approximately 300 feet South on the North bound side of the highway. The sign is approximately 8 foot by 8 foot made of wood with wooden poles, and contains the advertising copy: "Mrs. CLAIR Psychic...Tarot...Palms...(Se habla espanol)", followed by a telephone number. On March 22, 1991, Respondent was served with a Notice of Violation from the DOT concerning said sign, and was advised that said sign was erected in violation of Florida law, and must be removed within ten working days of the notice. Said sign is presently standing in the DOT right-of-way, as of the date of the formal hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's request for an exemption from the provisions of Section 479.11(8), Florida Statutes, be DENIED and that Respondent be ordered to remove said sign from the DOT right of way, in accordance with the provisions of Section 479.107, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 1991. Copies furnished: Jay O. Barber, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Laura Uwanawich Mrs. Clair 853 U.S. 27 South Lake Placid, FL 33852 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. #58 Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact Union Street at its intersection with Jefferson Avenue in Jacksonville, Florida, is also known as US 23 and is a federal-aid primary highway. It is a one-way street for east-bound traffic and is located within the corporate limits of Jacksonville. The proposed sign would be located on the north side of Union Street 20 feet west of the intersection with Jefferson Street and would face west to be viewed by the eastbound traffic on Union Street. Zoning at the proposed location is commercial/industrial. Criterion Advertising Company has been issued permits for two signs near the intersection of Union Street and Jefferson Avenue (Exhibits 5 and 6). These signs are on the south side of a building on the northeast corner of this intersection, thus making them parallel to Union Street 14 feet and 20 feet respectively east of the Jefferson Avenue pavement. Jefferson Avenue is not a federal-aid primary highway. In their inventory the Department of Transportation (DOT) carries the Criterion signs as facing westerly because they can be seen by the eastbound traffic on US 23. There are only four blocks on an application for a sign permit in which to mark the direction in which the sign faces. These are the four cardinal points of the compass. Highways in Florida, as well as the streets in most cities in Florida, run generally in a north/south or east/west direction. Signs alongside a federal-aid primary highway that are intended to be seen by northbound traffic are carried in DOT inventory as southerly facing signs whether they actually face in a southerly compass direction or not. Advertising signs, the face of which are parallel to the highway from which they are viewed, are not as saleable as are signs at right angles, or nearly so, to the highway.
