The Issue At the hearing, DPR dismissed Count II, alleging a violation of subsection 458.331(1)(h) Florida Statutes. The remaining issues for resolution are whether, as alleged in Counts I, III, IV and V, Dr. Robinson violated subsections 458.331(1)(n),(q), and (t) Florida Statutes by failing to maintain adequate records, by inappropriately prescribing controlled substances, and by failing to properly evaluate and treat multiple medical problems.
Findings Of Fact Jerry Mason Robinson, M.D., has been continually licensed (license number ME 0011811) as a physician in the State of Florida since 1965. He was Board-certified in Family Practice in 1973 and was recertified in 1979 and 1985. He has continually practiced medicine since 1967 in Deltona, Florida, as a sole practitioner in family practice. Patient Fleming Dr. Robinson began treating Jesse Fleming when he came to his office on March 14, 1979, with complaints of being unable to breathe, a feeling of suffocation, and inability to sleep. The patient was found to be suffering from refractory heart failure and was admitted that same day to Seminole Memorial Hospital. Jesse Fleming was discharged as improved on March 23, 1979. His final diagnosis, reflected on the discharge summary, was: refractory heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and Pickwickian's syndrome. The notation "Pickwickian Syndrome" also appeared on the first clinical data sheet, dated March 14, 1979, in Dr. Robinson's office records for this patient. Pickwickian Syndrome, in lay terms, is a condition occurring in obese individuals wherein the abdominal fat presses on the diaphragm, cutting off the breathing and causing sleep at odd and inappropriate times. While Dr. Robinson initially felt that the condition was Pickwickian Syndrome, after the patient lost substantial weight in the hospital, he felt the proper diagnosis should be narcolepsy, a similar condition. He started him in the hospital on Dexedrine tablets, 5 mg. each morning, to increase his alertness. Narcolepsy is a very rare disease characterized by periods where the patient falls asleep uncontrollably many times during the day. The patient also has cataplexy, which is episodes of collapse that occur intermittently with emotional stress, laughing, giggling and fear. Another aspect of narcolepsy is called hypnagogic hallucinations, where an individual has vivid dreams. And the fourth part is called sleep paralysis where the patient cannot move on occasion without being touched. While there is no single test available to unconditionally diagnose a case of narcolepsy, the competent experts agree that a complete history and physical examination is required. The patient should be asked about sleeping patterns and about the symptoms described above. Testing through an electroencephalogram (EEG) and polysomnography is helpful. It is also important to specifically eliminate other causes of somnolence such as medications or other physical conditions, such as thyroid disorders or anemia. Dr. Robinson's records for Jesse Fleming are void of any documentation of the basis for his diagnosis of narcolepsy. The hospital discharge summary of his course in the hospital mentions only that the patient was found to be somnolent and sleeping all the time. He was on Valium in the hospital, 2 mg., 4 times a day to reduce anxiety. Valium is considered to be a central nervous system depressant and has drowsiness as one of its components. There is another notation on the records, on the occasion of an office visit, that the patient fell asleep in the office. This alone, does not indicate a case of narcolepsy. Although Dr. Robinson continued Mr. Fleming on Dexedrine or similar drug, Eskatrol, from the time that he was discharged from the hospital in March 1979, the first notation of a diagnosis of narcolepsy does not appear until March 20, 1981. The term appears intermittently as a diagnosis thereafter, but without description of any symptoms. Dexedrine is a Schedule II controlled substance. It is generally considered one of the amphetamines, a central nervous system stimulant. It has a high liability for habituation, or psychological dependence and overwhelming desire to continue to use the medication. It should not be used in those conditions in which it causes unnecessary stress on the vital organs of the body. It increases the demand of the heart for oxygen and can compromise an already failing heart. It is dangerous to give Dexedrine with thyroid hormones because the hormones make the heart more sensitive to Dexedrine and to the body's own form of Dexedrine, which is adrenalin. If given at all with Digoxin or Digitalis, Dexedrine should be given only with great care because these drugs slow the heart rate, an opposite effect of Dexedrine. In the past amphetamines were widely used to assist in weight control. That use was restricted and the treatment of narcolepsy is one of the remaining legitimate uses. And at least one expert in this proceeding, Jacob Green, M.D. would designate Ritalin, or a similar sympathomimetic drug as the treatment of choice for narcolepsy. In late 1981, Eskatrol was no longer available and Dr. Robinson began prescribing Dexedrine spansules, 15 mg., 200 or 100 at a time, at approximately monthly intervals. The patient has continued on this medication through 1985 and up to the time of the hearing. Around June 1979, Dr. Robinson began to prescribe Synthroid, a thyroid hormone, for Fleming's hypothyroidism at the same time that the patient was taking the amphetamine. On one occasion when the patient complained that he could not sleep, Dalmane, a sleeping medication was prescribed. Dexadrine spansules are a time-release medication which allows the effects of the drug to remain in the body for a longer period, including night time, when sleep is appropriate. Also while Fleming was on Eskatrol or Dexedrine, Dr. Robinson intermittently prescribed Brethine (a stimulant) for his lung problems, and on an on-going basis, Digoxin, for his heart condition. Assuming without the medical record basis to substantiate it, that the narcolepsy diagnosis was accurate, the prescription of Dexedrine to Jesse Fleming was dangerous and inappropriate. The patient records for Fleming are replete with references to irregular heart beats. On some occasions the nurse recorded "very irregular" apical pulses. These irregularities are sometimes a harbinger of heart failure and can occur in, or be exacerbated by, amphetamine therapy, especially in combination with thyroid hormones. In his testimony at hearing, Dr. Robinson stated that when he observed the notation of an irregular pulse he would check the patient himself to assure that the patient was alright. However, these observations are not reflected in the chart, except on one occasion when an EKG was taken and was found to be within normal limits. Good medical record-keeping is an essential aspect of a reasonable prudent physician's practice. Records are the mainstay of communications between physicians and provide a reminder to the physician with a busy practice. The records should provide objective findings and, from the patient, subjective findings. They guide the physician into what he was thinking previously and what needs to be done in the future. In a mobile society, when patients move from doctor to doctor, when specialists are brought in for consultation, when a regular doctor is absent, it is essential that another physician be able to view what has happened in the case from the medical records. Everything that is done needs to be justified in and documented in the records. The absence of a notation leads to the justifiable conclusion that the treatment was not undertaken or the test was not performed. Dr. Robinson failed to maintain adequate records to support his treatment of Jesse Fleming. The bases for his diagnosis of narcolepsy was utterly lacking, as was the basis for the decision to persist in prescribing Dexedrine under dangerous and potentially life-threatening conditions. Patient Kipp Fred Kipp was first examined by Dr. Robinson on June 8, 1978. He came to the office to get some prescriptions for medication that he was already taking. He had angina and a bad cold and was getting ready to return to Ohio, his summer residence. The history given by the patient on that first visit indicated that he had undergone two hip operations and an operation on his cervical spine for fusion. He had two aneurysm operations on his aorta, he had a hemorrhoidectomy and an amputation of his left second finger. At various times in the past he had been treated for severe arthritis in his back and foot, angina, hypertension, diabetes, pneumonia and hepatitis. His medications were Naprosyn for arthritis, Isordil for angina, Diabinese for diabetes, Hydrodiural for his hypertension, Percodan for his pain in his back, and Nitroglycerin for his angina. Dr. Robinson examined the patient and refilled his Naprosyn and Isordil. He told him to come back to see him in the fall when he returned to Florida. Fred Kipp returned to Dr. Robinson's office on December 7, 1978, complaining of chest pain. He was admitted to Seminole Memorial Hospital for pre-infarction angina and was discharged on December 11, 1978, with diagnoses of angina pectoris and coronary artery disease. From December 1978, until present, Dr. Robinson has been Fred Kipp's regular family physician. During this time he has treated him for angina or coronary artery disease, arthritis, hip problems, diabetes, back pain, shingles, vascular problems and chronic severe pain associated with all of these conditions. During this period the patient was hospitalized at least six times, primarily with heart trouble, but also for uncontrolled diabetes and impending gangrene. During a September 1984 admission to Central Florida Regional Hospital (formerly known as Seminole Memorial Hospital), the patient was diagnosed as having severe ankylosing spondylitis, a progressive spinal disease where the vertebrae ultimately become fused. The initial diagnosis was based on the patient's statement of his prior history, but the diagnosis was later confirmed by Dr. Robinson with an x-ray and CAT scan. The condition is very painful. During the course of his treatment of Fred Kipp, Dr. Robinson has kept the patient on Percodan for pain, in addition to his various medications for his multiple problems. Percodan is a Schedule II controlled substance containing oxycodone and aspirin. It is an analgesic with opium-like properties and is useful for moderate to moderately-severe types of pain. Because of the nature of the drug it has a potential for habituation and dependency, particularly when used on a regular long-term basis for chronic, as opposed to acute (temporary) pain. In order to avoid the habituation and dependency, less-addictive modalities should be tried before Percodan is selected as the treatment of choice. Dr. Robinson's office records for Fred Kipp do not reflect the consideration of alternatives. However, Dr. Robinson was aware that alternatives such as non-steroidal and anti- inflammatory agents were tried by consulting physicians, including by Dr. Broderick with Seminole Orthopaedic Associates. Fred Kipp is a very large man, approximately six feet, eight inches tall and weighing from 247 to 281 pounds. The dosages of Percodan prescribed for him by Dr. Robinson were not excessive, given the patient's size and physical problems. He has received between 200 and 300 Percodan per month for the last six years. At no time did he ever claim to have lost his prescription in order to get more drugs. Although the use of a strong narcotic with a chronic pain patient is the last resort of a reasonable, prudent physician, the use of Percodan was necessary and appropriate in Fred Kipp's case to allow him to maintain a reasonable quality of life. This finding is based not upon Dr. Robinson's office records, but rather on the competent expert testimony of his witnesses, who examined the patient and his records, and on the hospital records and consulting physicians' records in this case. Dr. Robinson's office records are deficient as to documented analysis of the patient's pain (subjective and objective observation) and efforts with less addictive modalities. While Dr. Robinson claimed that he requested Fred Kipp's records from his prior treating physician, his own records do not reflect that fact, nor was the attempt repeated when the first request was unproductive.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings: During times material hereto, and particularly from January 1, 1983 through December 31, 1985, Respondent, Eusebio Subias, M.D., was a licensed medical doctor in Florida, board certified in Psychiatry and an eligible Medicaid provider of psychiatric services pursuant to the Medicaid contract he is party to with DHRS dated October, 1982. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). Medicaid regulations and guidelines require physicians to meet board certification in psychiatry before they may provide reimbursable psychiatric services to Medicaid eligible recipients. As part of his agreement to participate in the Medicaid Program, Respondent agreed to keep such records as are necessary to fully disclose the extent of services provided to individuals receiving assistance in the state plan. Respondent also agreed to abide by the provisions of pertinent Florida administrative rules, statutes, policies, procedures and directives in the manual of the Florida Medicaid Program. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). During 1986, the Surveillance & Utilization Review System unit of the Medicaid Office indicated that the amount of Respondent's medicaid billing greatly exceeded that of his peers. Based on that indication, the Office of Program Integrity asked Respondent to provide them with copies of certain medical records for the year 1982. Respondent provided the Department with those records as requested. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3). Those records were forwarded to the peer review committee for evaluation. The records were reviewed by both the local and state peer review committees. The 1982 records contained inadequate information for the peer review committee to document or otherwise justify the number of office visits per patient. The records did not contain reasons for treatment, reasons for frequency of visits or what specific services were rendered to patients. (Petitioner's Exhibits 16 and 17, Pages 3 and 4 and Composite Exhibit 3). On April 21, 1986, Petitioner notified Respondent that it determined that he overbilled Medicaid in the amount of $17,820.09 for the calendar year 1982. Respondent was then notified that a similar review would be conducted for the period January 1, 1983 through December 31, 1985. That review and the results thereof are the subject of this proceeding. The Department subsequently requested, and Respondent provided medical records for 85 specific recipients which were selected by means of the "Disproportionate Stratified Random Sampling" (DSRS). (Petitioner's Exhibit 7). Respondent's 1983-85 records contain substantially more details than the records he provided Petitioner during the 1982 review period. Petitioner had its medical consultant, Dr. Forsthoefel, review the 1983-85 records. He was a member of the peer committee which made the peer review determination in 1982 which was used as a guide for the degree of overutilization. Forsthoefel denied those office visits that he determined were not supported by documentation in the medical records and concluded that the visits were not medically necessary. As a result, Petitioner sent Respondent a letter advising that he had overbilled medicaid in the amount of $79,093.05 for the years 1983-1985. (Petitioner's Exhibits 9 and 13). By letter dated September 5, 1986, Respondent requested a meeting to discuss the Department's proposed action and such a meeting was granted on October 31, 1986 at 1:30 p.m. Dr. Forsthoefel, Dr. Conn, Petitioner's Chief Medical Consultant in 1982, Millie Martin, and Respondent attended the October 31 meeting. During the meeting, Respondent attempted to individually review each of the approximately 3200 medical records for patients he treated during the years 1983-85 such that he could explain and document the medical necessity of each of the patient's office visits. He also requested that Petitioner have the records reviewed by a psychiatrist. Neither Dr. Conn nor Dr. Forsthoefel are psychiatrists. Dr. Conn left soon after the meeting began. Dr. Forsthoefel, unable and unwilling to comply with Respondent's request that each medical record be individually reviewed, concluded that continuing the meeting would not be productive and left after approximately 2 hours. The Department again denied those visits which it had early concluded were not medically necessary based on the review by its medical consultants. By letter dated November 10, 1986, Petitioner again advised Respondent that the Department would seek a $79,093.05 overpayment for the years 1983-85 and advised him of his rights to a formal hearing. Drs. Mutter and Tumarkin were commissioned by Petitioner to review the medical records under scrutiny with each doctor reviewing one half of the records. Based on their review, Respondent was denied reimbursement for even more office visits based on their opinion that the records did not contain sufficient documentation or notations that would indicate continued office visits were medically necessary. (Petitioner's Exhibits 17a and 18). Dr. Tumarkin made his comments on Respondent's medical records in green ink. Those records which did not contain green marking were records numbered 3 and 27 resulting in the Department's overstating the overpayment claim by $125.01. Respondent introduced information regarding Medicaid's denial of claims which should have been billed to Medicare. During the period from May 1985 through December 31, 1985, certain denials fall within the 1983-85 review period and since the Department never paid such claims, the Department agreed at hearing to reduce its overpayment amount by $6,421.44. Also at hearing, Petitioner determined that it made an error in its computation of the figures stated in the November 10, 1986 letter and was now seeking $78,661.93 minus $6,421.44 for the amount claimed to be overbilled by Respondent as $72,240.49. Respondent, who is of hispanic origin, treats a substantial number of Spanish speaking patients. Respondent graduated from medical school in Cuba at the age of 22 and participated in a rotating internship at Mercy Hospital in Hampton, Ohio. He came to Florida in 1963 and was licensed in 1964. In April, 1963, Respondent was employed at Hollywood Memorial Hospital. Respondent was the third Spanish speaking doctor to practice in South Florida and was the first to be promoted to a chairmanship at Hollywood Memorial Hospital. Respondent was the first clinical director at Coral Reef's Hospital. He is a member of several medical societies and was involved in the development of several psychotic drugs, including Elavil. Respondent is board certified in psychiatry. Respondent has staff privileges at Hollywood Memorial Hospital and three other area hospital. He has practiced psychiatry for more than 25 years in the United State and is accomplished in the treatment of severe psychotic patients. Respondent was tendered and received as an expert in psychiatry. Southeastern Florida was inundated during the early 1980's with mentally ill refugees during the Mariel Boat Lift. That area has a uniquely high need for psychiatric services due to its characteristic as a metropolitan area with a large homeless population. The Marlowe Study which was commissioned by Petitioner to review the need for psychiatric services in Dade County during the period which coincided with the Respondent's 1983-1985 office practice here under review, concluded that insufficient resources were earmarked for the treatment of mentally ill residents of Dade County, Florida. Respondent prefers to treat severely psychotic patients on an outpatient basis. He has been very successful in utilizing this method of treatment and it has resulted in substantial public benefit in the form of substantial financial savings that would have otherwise been required to hospitalize such patients for treatment. Respondent is paid $35.01 for a 45 minute session for each Medicaid patient whereas the average cost for inpatient treatment at an area hospital is approximately $400.00 per day. Respondent modified his record keeping practice in 1982 so that his medical records for 1983-85 contained the minimum requirements for medical records necessary to support Medicaid billings as specified in Rule 10C- 7.030(1)(m) and 10C-7.062(1(n) Florida Administrative Code. All of the medical experts testified that Respondent's records for the period at issue here met the minimum requirements specified in the required regulations and DHRS's procedure manuals. Those requirements are: dates of services; patients name and date of birth; name and title of person performing the service, when it is someone other than the billing practitioner; chief complaint on each visit; pertinent medical history; pertinent findings on examinations; medications administered or prescribed; description of treatment when applicable; recommendations for additional treatments or consultations; and tests and results. Petitioner presented testimony through Ms. Martin to the effect that Respondent had admitted during his October 1986 meeting with the medicaid consultants that he had, from memory, gone back and recreated his medical records for 1983-85. Respondent denied this at hearing and credibly testified that based on the deficiencies found in the latter part of 1982 concerning his medical records, he commenced to prepare a complete medical record for each patient visit. Respondent's testimony in this regard is credited and none of the medical professionals, save Ms. Martin, presented any evidence which would call into question the accuracy of Respondent's records during the period 1983- Ms. Martin's testimony to the contrary is rejected. Dr. Forsthoefel candidly admitted that he is not qualified to render an opinion with respect to medical necessity and appropriateness of specialized psychiatric services. Respondent is the first psychiatrist reviewed by the Medicaid officials of Petitioner for over-utilization as Petitioner's officials were unaware of any other psychiatrist who had been reviewed prior to Respondent. The peer review process for determination of over-utilization and mis- utilization of Medicaid services is designed so that the physician being reviewed may discuss individual patient records and cases with the Committee, as well as the Medicaid consultants who later apply peer review findings, and such discussion will be considered in arriving at a final determination. (Peer Review SOP, April, 1987, Respondent's Exhibit 12). An integral part of peer review for the physician being reviewed is to be able to discuss individual cases with the reviewer prior to a final determination being made concerning medical necessity and appropriateness. Such interplay and explanations regarding certain aspects of a case can lead to a more detailed determination concerning an overpayment issue. Respondent's October 1986 review should have been a complete new review of individual records affording him an opportunity to discuss specific cases with the physician consultants, provide him an opportunity to substantiate certain treatments based upon his recollection and justify the treatment modality he utilized for the 85 patients which comprised the random sampling. 2/ Respondent was not permitted to meaningfully discuss those individual cases even though he requested an opportunity to do so. This is so despite Petitioner's consultant's admission that such a consultation would have aided them and perhaps changed their opinion with respect to medical necessity and appropriateness of specific treatments rendered by Respondent. (Testimony of Conn, Forsthoefel, Tumarkin and Whiddon). While some experts would treat severely psychotic patients on a less frequent basis than Respondent and hospitalize them sooner, Respondent's method of treatment is well accepted among qualified board certified psychiatrists. Dr. Tumarkin's different treatment philosophy wherein he favored inpatient treatment for severely psychotic patients while Respondent showed a preference for outpatient treatment, is in no way indicative of inappropriateness by Respondent's method of treatment since his method was proven to be successful. Additionally, one expert, Dr. Tumarkin would have allowed more visits as being medically necessary and appropriate had he been advised by Petitioner's representatives that he should apply the community standard for medical necessity and appropriateness of psychiatric services. A Medicaid provider of psychiatric services is required to provide services equivalent to that of their peers. Had Dr. Tumarkin consulted with Respondent, his opinion concerning medical necessity and appropriateness would have been affected and he would have requested such had he known that he was allowed to. This is especially so based on the fact that his treatment preference is more hospital oriented. It is thus concluded that Respondent was not given a fair opportunity to present circumstances relevant to the overpayment amount in question here, despite his request to do so. (Petitioner's Exhibit 14). A review of a Peer Comparison Analysis with Respondent's practice respecting the number of office procedures per patient performed by him in contrast to other medicaid psychiatrists, indicates that Respondent saw his patients, on average, less than the average for other psychiatrists in Dade, Monroe and Broward Counties between the years 1983-85. (Petitioner's Exhibit 22). Dr. Stillman is board certified in psychiatry and has been practicing for more than 30 years. He reviewed, as Respondent's expert witness, all of the 85 patient charts in question. Dr. Mutter rendered a specific report about the even numbered charts that he reviewed. His reports indicates, with respect to many charts, that he was unable to find specific documentation supporting the reasons and medical necessity for treatment. This testimony was sharply contradicted by that of both Dr. Stillman and Respondent who easily located specific record documentation which indicated the medical necessity and reasons for services provided to patients by Respondent. Examples of over-utilization from Dr. Mutter's report were inquired about and on each occasion, Respondent and Dr. Stillman were able to identify documents not referred to by Dr. Mutter that substantiated the medical need and reasons for treatment. Drs. Subias and Stillman's testimony was not contradicted by Petitioner. Without going through each patient's records, a review of the findings concerning several patients is illustrative and will be herein discussed. Patient number 85, S. T., Jr. 3/ was a schizophrenic, suffering from epilepsy with borderline intellectual functioning. He was a very psychotic patient who was, during his early years, treated in an institution. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 5). He was obese, apprehensive, disoriented, suffered from impaired insight and judgment, a depressed mood, flat affect and a constant feeling of rejection. Respondent commenced treating patient number 85 twice weekly as an outpatient and as his condition improved, he was seen once a week and office visits were reduced further as his condition continued to improve. Without this intense continuity of treatment, patient number 85 would have decompensated and would have required an extensive institutionalization. Respondent provided substantial documentation as to the need for each of S. T.'s visits. Patient number 83, C. C., was a schizophrenic who suffered from depression, was delusional with a flat affect, poor reality contact and went through extended periods of depression on a monthly basis. Respondent prescribed benadryl to counteract patient C. C.'s delusional symptoms and otherwise justified his method of treatments, frequency and reason for each visit. Respondent substantiated that it was medically necessary to treat patient C. C. on each occasion where treatment was provided. Respondent's medical records provided the documentation for treatment in each instance. Patient number 81, F. D., was a schizophrenic who suffered severe mental depression. His condition had deteriorated to the point whereby family therapy sessions had to be scheduled by Respondent. Respondent was able to keep F. D. out of the hospital, he remained with his family and his condition improved to the point where the frequency of visits were reduced. Respondent's records justified the medical necessity and reasons for the treatment he provided patient F. D. Respondent testified as to his method of treatment as to patients 88, 78, 77, 52, 56, 48, 46, 38, 40, 60, 68 and as to each of those patients, Respondent's records document that the patients treatment and visits were medically necessary and appropriate. Dr. Stillman demonstrated that on each occasion, there was substantial record documentation which supported the necessity for the treatment as provided by Respondent. Based upon the inconsistent evidence presented by Petitioner respecting its claim that Respondent failed to document the medical necessity for the treatment he provided to the patients during the years 1983-85 and the direct evidence presented by Respondent which established that all of the services rendered by him to Medicaid recipients were medically necessary and appropriate under the circumstances, it is concluded that Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the treatments here in dispute were unnecessary, inappropriate or were not otherwise documented by the medical records under review. Moreover, all of the experts agree that the treating psychiatrist is best able to determine the medical necessity and appropriateness of specific treatments to render to a patient as that psychiatrist has direct contact with, and is best able to fully apply his or her training and experience. Respondent amply demonstrated that the services here at issue were medically necessary, appropriate and was of clear benefit to the patient. Petitioner has failed to meet its burden of establishing any basis for an overpayment as claimed. 4/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of- Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order finding that there was no overpayment to Respondent during the years 1983- 85. Respondent is entitled to a refund of all monies held pursuant to the overpayment calculation by the Department in this cause together with 10% for annual interest pursuant to Rule 10C-7.060(12), Florida Administrative Code. DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 1988.
The Issue The issues in these consolidated cases are whether Respondent committed the violations charged in four Administrative Complaints and, if so, what is the appropriate discipline.
Findings Of Fact The Department has regulatory jurisdiction over licensed chiropractic physicians pursuant to section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 460, Florida Statutes. In particular, the Department is authorized to file and prosecute an administrative complaint against a chiropractic physician after a probable cause panel (PCP) of the Board determines there is probable cause to suspect a licensee has committed a disciplinable offense, and provides direction to the Department on the filing of an administrative complaint. At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaints, Dr. Aderholdt has been licensed to practice chiropractic medicine in Florida, having been issued license number CH 7814. He was first licensed on January 6, 2000. He practices in an office in Bradenton, Florida. Vax-D Therapy Three of the four Administrative Complaints involve patients of Dr. Aderholdt who received Vax-D therapy. The complaints are not directed to the provision of Vax-D therapy itself, or to any other treatments provided by Dr. Aderholdt. In all four cases, the patients generally spoke well of the chiropractic care they received from Dr. Aderholdt and the manner in which they were treated by him and his office staff. Vax-D therapy is a modality using the Vax-D model for decompression of the spinal discs and spinal structure. It is used to treat a range of issues associated with low back pain, including herniated, degenerated, and bulging discs. The Vax-D model is the originator of this technology; it was the first spinal decompression device. It is a large computerized moving table. It can be programmed to provide specific axial or distractive loading. The table moves in and out, pumping nutrients at the discs. Some research shows that it can actually pull discs away from where they are causing irritation on nerves and the spinal cord. The Vax-D model is FDA-cleared for use, and the literature supports its efficacy. The Vax-D model is an expensive piece of equipment. The price range for the initial purchase is between $100,000 and $150,000, with ongoing expense thereafter for maintenance and updates. Vax-D therapy is one of the most expensive forms of therapy, if not the most expensive, in the chiropractic profession. Other models coming out after Vax-D, as well as other tools, arguably can be used for similar purposes. However, as Petitioner’s expert readily acknowledged, Vax-D is the “Rolls Royce. It’s a really nice tool.” Vax-D spinal decompression is not covered by Medicare. In fact, when it comes to chiropractic care, Medicare has never covered anything besides spinal adjustments. Coverage for Vax-D treatment by private insurance companies is rare. In 2012, Dr. Salvatore LaRusso presented a study on spinal decompression to the profession, before the Federation of Chiropractic Licensing Boards, to inform state regulators of issues associated with Vax-D therapy. The one regulatory concern he reported was that some physicians were improperly billing Vax-D as a surgical decompression procedure, when it is plainly not surgery; it is an alternative to surgery, properly billed as a non-surgical decompressive tool or traction device. Dr. LaRusso’s study also made findings on the common methods of packaging and selling the service, and the range of charges observed. He found that most practitioners providing Vax-D therapy were selling the service as a cash item in their practice, with payment up front often required. The common model was to sell a package with a certain number of visits, with or without additional services included. Dr. LaRusso found that the per-visit charges ranged from $150 to $450, depending on the ancillary services added to the decompression. Dr. Shreeve does not have any issue with the use of or charges for Vax-D therapy. Dr. Aderholdt offers Vax-D therapy pursuant to a Vax-D Therapy Payment Plan agreement (Vax-D Agreement), which is comparable to the multi-visit packages that Dr. LaRusso’s study found to be common. After initial consultation, with intake forms, patient history, x-rays, evaluation, and examination, if a patient is determined to be appropriate for Vax-D therapy, Dr. Aderholdt will give his treatment recommendations and then turn the patient over to his office staff to address the financial aspects. If the patient wants to proceed with Vax-D therapy, the Vax-D Agreement will be reviewed and signed. Patients A.M., R.O., and P.D. each received Vax-D therapy, pursuant to signed Vax-D Agreements. The terms of the Vax-D Agreements for the three patients were the same. Patient B.O. wanted Vax-D therapy, but she was determined to not be an appropriate candidate for it. The Vax-D Agreements in evidence for Patients A.M., R.O., and P.D. provided that the named patient committed to 25 to 28 Vax-D therapy sessions, for $250.00 per session. The total amount that the named patient agreed to pay Dr. Aderholdt for 25 to 28 sessions was $5,500.00, which computes to an actual per-session cost of between $196.43 (for 28 sessions) and $220.00 (for 25 sessions). For the agreed price for 25 to 28 sessions, the Vax-D Agreement provided the following treatment package: at each session, the patient would receive 30 minutes of Vax-D therapy, 30 minutes of full range interferential electrical muscle stimulation (EMS), 15 minutes of hydro-massage therapy, and manipulation (adjustments) by the doctor if needed. The first set of x-rays was also included. Dr. Aderholdt requires an up-front payment for the Vax-D therapy package. For patients who want Vax-D therapy but need help coming up with the funds, Respondent’s office staff has put the patients in touch with Care Credit, which is a medical credit program. If a patient applies and is accepted, Care Credit will finance the cost without charging interest to the patient if the loan is repaid within one year. Care Credit apparently charges a fee to Respondent when credit is extended, similar to the fees charged to merchants by credit card companies for credit card purchases. No evidence was presented regarding Care Credit’s approval criteria or how widely this method is used. All that is known about Care Credit from the record evidence is that two patients who received Vax-D therapy applied for Care Credit and were approved. The other Vax-D patient charged half of the agreed price on a Visa credit card the first day of treatment, and charged the other half after 15 treatment sessions. Patient A.M. From the end of July 2013 to early February 2014, Dr. Aderholdt treated Patient A.M., then a 66-year-old female, for lower back pain and hip pain. Patient A.M. had tried other treatments and had seen chiropractors before, but reported that her pain kept getting worse. As shown by A.M.’s medical records, A.M. was first seen by Respondent on July 29, 2013. That day, A.M.’s intake form, patient history, and x-rays were taken and evaluated, and A.M. was examined by Respondent. Respondent then formulated A.M.’s initial treatment plan. Respondent recommended Vax-D therapy, along with chiropractic adjustments, EMS, and hydrotherapy. The initial treatment plan specified a two- session per day protocol for the first two to three weeks. On July 30, 2013, A.M.’s husband, J.M., signed the Vax-D Agreement (in the space for Patient Signature). J.M. did not remember signing the Vax-D Agreement, but both he and A.M. identified his signature on the Vax-D Agreement. A.M. was named in the agreement as the patient who committed to 25 to 28 Vax-D therapy sessions and agreed to pay $5,500.00 for those sessions. Respondent did not require full payment of the agreed price prior to treatment. Instead, he accepted payment of one- half ($2,750.00) of the Vax-D therapy package price, which was charged on A.M.’s or J.M.’s Visa credit card on July 30, 2013. In accordance with the initial treatment plan, Patient A.M. received two treatment sessions per day beginning July 30, 2013, in the morning and afternoon, for nearly three weeks. After 15 treatment sessions--more than half of the 25 to 28 sessions covered for $5,500.00--the balance of $2,750.00 was charged on A.M.’s or J.M’s Visa credit card. Between July 30, 2013, and February 3, 2014, Patient A.M. had more than 60 Vax-D therapy sessions--approximately 64 total sessions. A.M. initially testified with a fair degree of confidence that she thought she had about 30 treatment sessions, until she reviewed her prior statement made to Petitioner. A.M. testified that at every session, she received Vax-D decompression therapy, hydrotherapy, adjustments “up and down” her spine, and ice packs. She left every session feeling better, with relief from her pain. The relief was temporary, however; she said the pain would come back after a few hours. After 29 sessions, having received all of the treatment sessions covered by the Vax-D Agreement, A.M. started paying additional amounts for more Vax-D therapy and the other ancillary services that she continued to receive. For approximately 35 additional treatment sessions beyond those covered by the Vax-D Agreement, A.M. made seven additional payments in the total amount of $2,226.00. In all, A.M. paid $7,726.00 for approximately 64 Vax-D therapy sessions. Rounding down to an even 60 sessions, she paid an average of $128.77 per session. A.M. was covered by Medicare at the time of her treatment. She did not have any private “Medicare supplement” health insurance. At some point, the subject of Medicare coverage came up. The details of what was said, when, and to whom were not clearly established. The only fact clearly established was that Dr. Aderholdt did not bring up the subject. Patient A.M. testified that Dr. Aderholdt did not talk to her about payment when she first visited, but that she and J.M. asked him, “Does Medicare cover this,” and he said, “Yes.” J.M. said that Dr. Aderholdt did talk to them about payment, saying “we need to do so many treatments and we should pay so much money.” J.M. said that they asked, “Will Medicare take care of it?” Dr. Aderholdt answered, “Yes, we will bill Medicare.” J.M could not say whether he asked about billing Medicare before or after he signed the Vax-D Agreement, since J.M. did not remember signing the Vax-D Agreement. When Dr. Aderholdt was asked if he told A.M. her treatments would be covered by Medicare, he answered, “No, I don’t believe I did, no.” As an interesting contrast, Patient R.O. testified that Dr. Aderholdt told him Medicare would not cover treatment under the same Vax-D Agreement; Dr. Aderholdt does not believe he made that statement, either. In the middle of the spectrum, Patient P.D. testified that Respondent never said anything to her about insurance coverage or financial arrangements. He would only talk about treatment, turning P.D. over to the office manager or billing person to address the financial issues. This version is consistent with Respondent’s testimony that he does not address “the money thing” with patients. Instead, he said he assesses x-rays, takes patient histories, performs the evaluation and examination, and ultimately formulates the recommended treatment plans, whether Vax-D or something else. Then he turns the treatment plans over to his staff to address the financial issues with the patients. A.M. and J.M. did not demonstrate a clear and certain recollection of what they asked Dr. Aderholdt or exactly what he answered. Indeed, both J.M. and A.M. could not remember most every other detail about A.M.’s treatments, often confidently stating details that were shown to be wrong by more than a little, including how many treatment sessions, and how much was paid. For example, Patient A.M. initially reported that she had paid $13,179.00 to Dr. Aderholdt, when the total was $7,726.00. The undersigned cannot find--without hesitancy--that Dr. Aderholdt made any representation to J.M. and A.M. regarding Medicare coverage before J.M. signed the Vax-D Agreement by which A.M. committed to the Vax-D therapy package. Dr. Shreeve made the point well that it is difficult to resolve this kind of he said-she said conflict, although he made the point while confusing Patient A.M. (who claimed Respondent said there would be Medicare coverage) with Patient R.O. (who claimed Respondent said there would not be Medicare coverage), in the following exchange: Q: With Patient RO, what’s your understanding of what Dr. Aderholdt told him regarding Medicare reimbursements? A: Counselor, I’m going to tell you that the investigative record shows that the patient stated that Aderholdt told him that they would be paid, is what my recollection is. And, yet, that’s not something that weighs heavily on my mind because I wasn’t there. This becomes a “he said, she said.” He said he didn’t; he said he did. I can’t get into that fight. That’s not an issue for me. (Jt. Ex. 12 at 35). (emphasis added). Respondent (or his staff) may have told A.M. and J.M., when they asked about Medicare, that the office would complete and submit the Medicare claim forms. Respondent (or his staff) may have told A.M. and J.M., when they asked, that Medicare proceeds paid on the Vax-D therapy package would be refunded. But it would be unreasonable, on this record, to find that Respondent misrepresented that Medicare would provide full coverage, or that Respondent schemed to induce A.M. and J.M. to sign up for Vax-D by guaranteeing that Medicare would pay back everything, when Respondent did not even bring up the subject.8/ The Administrative Complaint alleges that on one or more occasions, Respondent did not submit Medicare claims for Patient A.M.’s treatment. Petitioner has apparently abandoned this allegation; its PRO has no proposed finding identifying any dates of service for which claims were not submitted. The Medicare claim forms for Patient A.M. were compiled by Petitioner’s counsel for use in taking Respondent’s deposition, and are attached as deposition exhibit 2. The evidence is difficult to cull through, as there are 84 separate pages of claims and they are not in chronological order; they start out in chronological order, but then jump forward two months, then continue jumping around on dates, back and forth and back again. As best can be determined, all service dates shown in Patient A.M.’s medical records appear to be accounted for by corresponding claim forms. It appears that one claim form may have a clerical mistake, identifying the date of service as August 3, 2013, when there was no treatment session that day; the actual service date may instead be September 4, 2013, which is the date the claim form was submitted. The Medicare claim forms in evidence demonstrate that claim forms for A.M.’s treatments were regularly submitted, either on or very shortly after the dates of service. The evidence is insufficient to prove that Respondent did not submit Medicare claims for Patient A.M.’s treatment.9/ The Administrative Complaint contains no allegations regarding the disposition of the Medicare claims, although it does allege that Patient A.M. received no reimbursement from Respondent for Medicare payments. Petitioner’s expert seemed to be under the impression that Respondent received Medicare payments, because he criticized Respondent for not providing reimbursement to Patient A.M. Respondent testified that he has received no payments from Medicare for A.M.’s treatments, and Petitioner acknowledges in its PRO that Medicare has not made payments to Respondent. Acknowledging that the Administrative Complaint allegation has not been established, Petitioner instead proposed a finding (not alleged in the Administrative Complaint) that all of A.M.’s Medicare claims submitted by Respondent were rejected and payment was denied. No evidence was offered to prove the actual disposition of the 84 pages of Medicare claims submitted for A.M.’s treatments. Instead, the only record evidence of Medicare adjudications on any claims for A.M. is a group of explanation of benefits forms (EOBs) attached to a March 6, 2014, letter from Patient A.M. to Petitioner’s investigator, which is a deposition exhibit. Patient A.M. identified the small handful of EOBs attached to the March 6, 2014, letter as EOBs she had at that time, reporting on the disposition of Medicare claims submitted by other providers during the same time period as her treatments with Respondent. The EOBs reported, as to each claim, whether the claim was covered in whole or in part; and, if covered, what amount was paid, or, if not, why not. There were no EOBs for claims submitted by Respondent’s office. Patient A.M. was not asked for, and did not offer, any additional EOBs at her deposition. If, in fact, all of the Medicare claims submitted by Respondent were rejected and payment denied, then there would be a stack of EOBs explaining why each claim was denied. On this record, the evidence is insufficient to make any finding as to the outcome of the Medicare claims submitted for Patient A.M.’s treatment. There is no evidence proving whether the claims were denied, approved, or simply never acted on by Medicare. A separate allegation in the Administrative Complaint is that Patient A.M. requested copies of the Medicare claim forms submitted by Respondent’s office for her treatment. Patient A.M. said that she made verbal requests to Respondent’s office staff for the Medicare claims on more than one occasion, and the parties stipulated that Patient A.M. made these requests. Respondent’s office should have responded by giving Patient A.M. copies of the Medicare claims. Dr. Aderholdt said that he was not aware that Patient A.M. had requested copies of her Medicare claim. But it is his responsibility to ensure that his staff promptly responds to requests by patients for insurance claim forms. In the course of Petitioner’s investigation, the Medicare claim forms for Patient A.M. were provided to Petitioner (according to the investigator’s report, on May 16, 2014). It is unknown whether a set of the claim forms was provided to A.M. at that time. She is entitled to a copy of the claim forms if she has not already been given a set. Respondent should have verified that Patient A.M. has received the claim forms she requested, or, if not, provided them to her. Finally, the Administrative Complaint alleges that on the Medicare claim forms for A.M.’s treatments on August 6, 2013, and December 11, 2013, Respondent utilized Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) code 98941, which is the code for adjustments to three or four regions of the spine. However, Respondent’s Subjective, Objective, Assessment and Plan notes (referred to as SOAP notes) for those dates identify spinal adjustments to L3, L4, and L5, which are in a single region--the lumbar region. Beyond the SOAP notes, however, Dr. Aderholdt’s notes for Patient A.M.’s morning session on August 6, 2013 (there were two sessions that day), show multiple adjustments, not only to the lumbar region, but also, to the sacrum and ilium. Dr. Aderholdt’s notes for December 11, 2013, show multiple adjustments to the thoracic, lumbar, and sacrum regions. At hearing, Dr. Shreeve identified the five spinal regions as follows: “a region would be considered cervical, thoracic, lumbar, sacrum, ilium.” (Tr. 106, lines 21-22). Based on his testimony, and considering all of Patient A.M.’s medical records, there were multiple adjustments to three spinal regions on both days identified in the Administrative Complaint.10/ The Administrative Complaint has no other factual allegations regarding CPT code issues in connection with Patient A.M.’s treatment. The complaint pointedly identified one specific CPT code that was used on two specific dates, but was allegedly not supported by SOAP notes for either date. At hearing, Dr. Shreeve attempted to expand the factual allegations regarding CPT coding issues by questioning other CPT codes shown on A.M.’s patient ledger. Dr. Shreeve’s criticism was improper, not only because he strayed beyond the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, but also, because the criticism was based on his misunderstanding of what Dr. Aderholdt’s patient ledgers portray. In particular, Dr. Shreeve was critical of CPT code 99212 entries (for focused patient examinations) on A.M.’s patient ledger, without use of modifier code -25. He said that these repeated entries of CPT code 99212 were inappropriate without use of modifier code –25, to indicate they should not be considered for payment, because they are redundant with other CPT treatment codes that include examination. Dr. Shreeve should have reviewed the actual Medicare claim forms to look for the modifier codes, because the CPT code 99212 entries do, in fact, add a modifier of -25. The modifier code conveys information to the third-party payor, as Dr. Shreeve acknowledged, regarding whether or how payment should be made. The modifier codes need to be used, when appropriate, on the Medicare claim forms, and they were used just as Dr. Shreeve said was appropriate. The modifier codes do not appear on Dr. Aderholdt’s patient ledgers because they are not claim forms sent to third- party payors, nor are they bills sent to patients. Instead, a patient ledger, as used in Respondent’s practice, is an internal practice management tool to account for and track everything associated with treating patients: how many examinations, how many adjustments, how many Vax-D treatments, how many ice packs, and so on. Dr. LaRusso explained that this is a perfectly reasonable use of patient ledgers, and is a common practice among physicians. The usage statistics are analyzed for practice management, for such purposes as making changes in the services or treatments and stocking supplies. Dr. Shreeve admitted that he assumed Respondent’s patient ledgers reflected the exact CPT coding used on insurance claims and bills sent to patients. The evidence refuted that assumption. Modifier codes were used on the Medicare claims. And Dr. Shreeve admitted he saw no evidence that Respondent’s patient ledger for A.M. was ever sent to her as a bill, or that any patient ledgers were ever sent to any patients as bills. Dr. Shreeve also admitted that there is no standard for patient ledgers, much less a regulation mandating the contents and use of patient ledgers. As he put it, he could go to 1,000 chiropractic offices and find 1,000 different variations in what is called a patient ledger. Dr. Shreeve would like to see a standard adopted for “patient ledgers,” but his aspiration simply underscores that there is no standard now; Respondent’s practices cannot be judged against or held to conform to a non-standard, non-regulation.11/ In somewhat stream-of-consciousness fashion, untethered from the Administrative Complaint, Dr. Shreeve interjected a number of other comments about Dr. Aderholdt’s practices related to Patient A.M., such as the adequacy and legibility of his medical records and the quality of x-rays. He raised questions about Dr. Aderholdt’s compliance with trust accounting requirements in connection with payments for A.M.’s Vax-D therapy, and Dr. Aderholdt’s compliance with obligations in connection with Petitioner’s investigation. None of these factual matters were alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and none of the corresponding statutory or rule provisions implicated by Dr. Shreeve’s open-ended commentary were charged in the Administrative Complaint. No findings can be made on matters not alleged, and violations not charged, in the Administrative Complaint. Moreover, there is no competent evidence fleshing out any of these matters, because they were not alleged, charged, or identified in the Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation as issues of fact or law to be litigated. Patient B.O. Between April and June 2013, Respondent treated B.O., then a 78-year-old female, for back and neck pain. B.O. is married to R.O. They both went to Respondent’s office on the same day for their initial consultation. B.O. completed intake forms, had x-rays and patient history taken, and was examined by Respondent, similar to R.O. Whereas R.O. was determined to be a candidate for Vax-D therapy, B.O. was not. Unlike for the Vax-D therapy plan, there was no protocol calling for a certain range of sessions needed and no set payment correlated to a planned number of sessions for B.O.’s recommended treatment plan that called for adjustments, hydrotherapy, and ice packs. At the time of her treatment, B.O. had Medicare coverage and a “Medicare supplement” insurance policy through Horizon Blue Cross and Blue Shield of New Jersey (Horizon). As was his practice, Respondent had B.O. address the financial aspects of the treatment he recommended with his office staff. Upon review of B.O.’s insurance coverage, B.O. was informed by Respondent’s staff that Horizon would probably cover the cost of her treatment that exceeded her copay. The staff determined that, although it was possible Horizon would apply its lower in-network copay of $15.00 per visit, there was no guarantee that Horizon would not consider Respondent out-of- network, with a copay of $25.00 per visit. Therefore, B.O. was charged $25.00 per visit. She paid that amount per visit, although sometimes she did not pay at all on one or more visits, and would catch up at a subsequent visit. B.O. received treatments on 23 occasions. B.O. experienced some relief from her pain as a result of those treatments.12/ For those 23 visits, B.O. paid a total of $575.00 in copays. After B.O. had stopped going to Dr. Aderholdt for treatment, Horizon determined that its lower in-network copay of $15.00 per visit applied. The total copay amount should have been $345.00 for 23 visits. The difference is $230.00. The Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent “overcharged” B.O., misrepresenting that her copay was the out- of-network charge, to exploit her for financial gain. This allegation was not proven. Respondent made no representation. The representations of his staff, as described by B.O., were not shown to be the product of anything other than a good faith attempt to determine the undeterminable details of insurance coverage. There is no evidence to support the allegation that B.O. was intentionally charged more than she should have been charged, based on the information available at the time. On this point, the expert testimony was in lockstep: figuring out insurance coverage details is a “nightmare.” It is virtually impossible, according to both experts, to obtain sufficient information to make a correct determination for a new patient on such issues as in-network versus out-of-network, because, as they agreed, the insurance coverage details keep changing. “Now, you can be in network today and they can decide you’re out of network tomorrow. And then you can be out of network and then they decide you’re in network, and they don’t tell you.” That’s--that makes no sense.” (Dr. Shreeve, Tr. 131). In fact, when asked how he determines if a patient is out-of-network, Dr. Shreeve responded: “Counselor, I don’t. I leave that to the patient. I run a cash practice. I give them a bill. We’ll help them fill out a health insurance claim form, if they need it. But they pay us when they receive the service.” (Tr. 130). The Administrative Complaint also alleges that Respondent billed Horizon for medical visits by Patient B.O. that did not occur. There is no credible evidence of this allegation; the evidence is to the contrary. Petitioner contends in its PRO that Respondent billed B.O. for treatments received on June 3, 7, 11, and 14, 2013, when B.O.’s appointments were cancelled on those days. The record citations offered by Petitioner fail to support this proposed finding. Instead, B.O.’s bank records directly refute the proposed finding, and corroborate Dr. Aderholdt’s treatment notes and the SOAP notes that detail B.O.’s treatment on those four days.13/ In addition to B.O.’s bank records, B.O.’s patient records include the “merchant copy” receipt for a debit card payment on June 14, 2013. The receipt shows that a $50.00 payment was made at Dr. Aderholdt’s office on June 14, 2013, and it bears the clear signature of B.O. B.O.’s accusation that she did not go to Respondent’s office for treatment on these four days is belied by the documentation that she personally went there and paid the copay charges for her treatments on those four days ($50.00 check on June 7 for two copays; $50.00 debit card payment on June 14 for two copays). Petitioner’s own expert, Dr. Shreeve, conceded that this evidence refutes B.O.’s accusation that her insurer was billed for treatment on four days when she did not go to Respondent’s office for treatment. A separate problem proving this allegation (besides B.O.’s false accusation) is that there is no evidence to prove what was billed to Horizon for B.O.’s treatments. There is no evidence in the record of claims submitted by Respondent’s office to bill Horizon for B.O.’s treatment. In pre-hearing discovery proceedings, shortly before hearing, Petitioner sought to compel production of Medicare claim forms or Horizon claim forms submitted by Respondent’s office. However, Petitioner declined an Order compelling production that was offered along with additional time to pursue this evidence. Instead, Petitioner chose to go forward with the hearing on the basis that there were no such records (as Respondent represented). Another allegation in the Administrative Complaint is that B.O. was not given a copy of her medical records upon request. B.O. testified that she made several verbal requests to two staff persons at Respondent’s office, Lisa14/ and Amanda, for her medical records. She said she was given a copy of her patient ledger, but nothing more. B.O. and R.O. then mailed a letter addressed to Respondent that they jointly wrote on December 31, 2013, requesting their medical records and updated patient ledgers. Respondent said that he was never informed of any verbal requests for records, nor did he believe he ever saw the letter that was mailed to him. Indeed, B.O. handwrote on her file copy of the letter, provided to Petitioner’s investigator: “Letter to Dr. who probably didn’t see – no response to date.” The evidence is clear and convincing that Respondent has failed in his obligation to promptly respond to B.O.’s requests for medical records. However, there is no evidence that Respondent was aware of the requests before the investigation and intentionally refused to comply, or that he ever instructed his office staff to ignore such requests. But even though the evidence only establishes that Dr. Aderholdt’s staff failed to promptly respond to requests for medical records, the obligation to ensure these patient requests are promptly addressed remains Dr. Aderholt’s responsibility. It is clear that his office procedures require serious overhauling, as both Dr. Aderholdt and his expert acknowledged. It is unknown if B.O.’s medical records were provided to her when they were produced by Respondent’s counsel during the investigation.15/ In her deposition, when B.O. was asked if she had gotten the records from Respondent’s office yet, she said “not from them.” Among other remedial steps in the aftermath of this proceeding, if B.O. and R.O. do not already have copies of their medical records and updated patient ledgers as they requested long ago, Respondent must provide them. It is concerning that he did not come to this hearing with proof that he had provided B.O. and R.O. with the records they had requested or confirmed that they already had a copy. Lastly, the Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent received payment from Horizon for B.O.’s treatment, but has not provided a refund. There is insufficient evidence to determine whether B.O. is entitled to a refund. The only information regarding the extent to which Horizon covered B.O.’s treatment is the information in the EOBs issued by Horizon after B.O.’s treatment ended, identifying amounts that would be covered and reporting payments to Respondent. For B.O.’s treatments, Horizon paid $1,770.00 to Respondent. What is unknown is whether B.O. owed more for her treatments than what Horizon paid. Dr. LaRusso reasonably opined that the receipt of an insurance payment would not generate an obligation for a patient refund if the payment is applied to a balance due by the patient. No evidence, methodology, or calculation was offered to prove that after Horizon’s payment was applied, a refund was owed to B.O. As noted previously, Respondent’s “patient ledger” is an internal practice management tool that does not function as an accounting of what a patient or insurance company owes. However, the patient ledger for B.O. reflects a total amount of $5,575.00 in services provided to B.O. Application of the Horizon payments of $1,770.00 and B.O.’s payments of $575.00 would reduce the patient ledger amount by less than half. Again, this is not to say that Patient B.O. owes the remaining patient ledger amount, but it is at least a point of reference suggesting the possibility that the Horizon payment did not cover all of B.O.’s treatment costs. Viewed another way, all B.O. paid for 23 treatment sessions was $25.00 per visit. B.O. was informed at the outset that she would not be charged for the full treatments she would be getting, because Horizon would “probably” cover her treatment except for the copay. Although she paid $230.00 more than the amount Horizon ultimately applied as copays, if B.O. owed $230.00 or more for treatment provided that was not covered by Horizon’s payment, then no refund would be due. Patient R.O. As noted previously, Patient R.O. is Patient B.O.’s husband. Like B.O., R.O. was treated by Respondent from April through June 2013. R.O., then a 64-year-old male, sought treatment for severe back pain. R.O. completed the intake form, had x-rays and patient history taken, provided detailed records of recent treatments and surgeries (including back surgery), and was evaluated and examined by Dr. Aderholdt. Dr. Aderholdt determined that R.O. was a candidate for Vax-D therapy. Respondent’s then-office manager, Lisa, took over to address the financial aspects of the recommended treatment. R.O. informed Respondent’s staff that he could not afford to pay $5,500.00 up front. R.O. was given contact information for Care Credit. He called Care Credit, then submitted an application. R.O.’s application was approved, and Care Credit agreed to finance the cost of Vax-D therapy without charging interest if the amount was paid off within one year. R.O. accepted the loan, and the result was that Care Credit paid Respondent $5,500.00 minus a fee absorbed by Respondent, similar to fees by credit card companies charged to merchants for sales using their credit cards. R.O. testified that he has paid off the Care Credit loan. R.O. signed the Vax-D Agreement, by which he committed to 25 to 28 Vax-D therapy sessions at $250.00 per session, for a total payment amount of $5,500.00. His Vax-D Agreement included the treatment package detailed in paragraph 13 above. R.O. testified that during the time of his treatment by Respondent, he had health insurance coverage with Medicare and Horizon (the private Medicare supplement insurance coverage that B.O. also had). He also had Tricare for Life, but said that that coverage would not have been applicable. R.O. recalled that Respondent told him that none of his insurance plans would cover the Vax-D therapy. As previously noted, Respondent does not believe he discussed insurance coverage with R.O., as that is not his standard practice. Regardless, R.O. had no expectation of insurance coverage. R.O. found the Vax-D therapy helpful in relieving his pain. He felt better after every treatment and wanted to continue. Rather than stopping after the 25 to 28 sessions included in the Vax-D Agreement, R.O. had a total of 40 treatment sessions. However, at some point, Respondent’s office manager informed R.O. that he needed to pay for additional sessions. R.O. said he could not afford to pay more, and discontinued treatment. After R.O. discontinued his treatments, he received an EOB from Horizon, stating that Horizon had paid a total of $5,465.84 in claims for both R.O. and B.O. According to the EOB summary, as noted above, $1,770.00 was paid to Respondent for treatments to B.O. The rest--$3,335.84--was paid to two providers for services to R.O. (A minor discrepancy is noted, in that Petitioner’s PRO stated that $3,335.00 was paid to Respondent for treatments to R.O.; however, the EOB reports that $10.84 was paid to a different provider (“Ga Emergency Phys”) for services provided to R.O. Thus, the actual total payment to Respondent for R.O.’s treatment was $3,325.00). The total amount paid to Dr. Aderholdt for R.O.’s 40 Vax-D therapy sessions, including Horizon’s payments, was $8,825.00, an average of $220.63 per session. R.O. believes the insurance payment should be paid to him as reimbursement for part of the $5,500.00 he paid. But that payment was for 25 to 28 sessions. The insurance payment was reasonably applied to the additional amounts due for R.O.’s sessions that were not covered by the $5,500.00 payment. No reason was offered as to why Dr. Aderholdt should not have applied the insurance payment to charges owed for the 12 sessions that were not covered by the Vax-D Agreement. Chiropractic physicians are not required to provide free care. Dr. Shreeve admitted that he does not provide chiropractic care to patients for free. As found above with respect to Patient B.O., R.O. joined B.O. in submitting a written request to Respondent for their medical records and updated patient ledgers by letter dated December 31, 2013, although Respondent said that he did not see the letter that was mailed to him. The findings above with respect to B.O., as one party to the joint written request, apply with equal force to R.O. as the other party to the joint written request. The Administrative Complaint also included an allegation that Respondent failed to practice chiropractic medicine at an acceptable level of skill, care, and treatment, charged as a violation under section 460.413(1)(r). This was the only charge in any of the Administrative Complaints that was based on the care provided by Dr. Aderholdt. The allegation was that adjustments indicated as having been performed on R.O. were physically impossible. However, at hearing, Petitioner’s expert retreated from the allegation, agreeing that the procedure in question was plausible. As a result of his concession, Petitioner’s PRO abandoned the charge, stating, “Petitioner is no longer pursuing discipline for the alleged violation of section 460.413(1)(r).” Pet. PRO at 4. Patient P.D. In March and April 2013, Respondent treated Patient P.D., then a 62-year-old female, for back pain. After completing intake forms and patient history, Patient P.D. was x-rayed, then examined and evaluated by Dr. Aderholdt, who determined that P.D. was a candidate for Vax-D therapy. Dr. Aderholdt turned P.D. over to his then-office manager, Lisa, to address the financial aspects of his recommended treatment plan. P.D. confirmed that Dr. Aderholdt never discussed financial issues or insurance with her. P.D. signed the Vax-D Agreement on March 8, 2013, the same day that she completed a Care Credit application that was approved for $5,500.00. P.D. paid off the Care Credit loan in 11 months, at $500.00 per month, so the loan was interest-free. At the time of the treatments, P.D. was not yet eligible for Medicare. She had insurance coverage through Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (Blue Cross). P.D. said that Lisa, the office manager, told her that she would file claims with Blue Cross. Thereafter, P.D. had 33 Vax-D therapy sessions. P.D. was pleased with the Vax-D therapy. She found it effective in relieving her pain. P.D. learned at some point from Blue Cross that several months after her treatment ended, Blue Cross paid Respondent for a portion of P.D.’s treatment. No evidence was offered to prove the details of the Blue Cross coverage, such as EOBs explaining what was covered and what was not. P.D. said that she contacted Respondent’s office and spoke with staff multiple times before Respondent provided her reimbursement in the full amount of the Blue Cross payment. Respondent refunded $946.45 on April 8, 2015, and $1,046.45 on April 10, 2015, for a total of $1,992.90. P.D. acknowledged that she has been fully reimbursed and is owed nothing further. The Administrative Complaint includes an allegation that Respondent improperly utilized CPT “billing codes” 99204 and 99212 for P.D.’s first session on March 6, 2013. Dr. Aderholdt admitted that for March 6, 2013, P.D.’s patient ledger incorrectly lists both CPT code 99204 (for a comprehensive examination for a new patient), and CPT code 99212 (for a focused examination for an established patient). The first CPT code should have been the only one entered on this day. The second code was entered by mistake. Although Dr. Aderholdt admitted the error made in the patient ledger, there is no evidence that the erroneous CPT code was “utilized” for billing purposes. No evidence was presented that both CPT codes were submitted by Respondent in a claim for payment to Blue Cross (and Petitioner did not charge Respondent with having submitted a claim to P.D.’s insurer for a service or treatment not provided). No evidence was presented of the actual claims submitted to Blue Cross. No evidence was presented to show that P.D. was ever sent a bill utilizing the referenced CPT codes. The error recording an extra CPT code on P.D.’s patient ledger might throw off Respondent’s internal practice management statistics, but there is no evidence that the admitted CPT coding mistake on the patient ledger was repeated in any claim or bill submitted to anyone. Expert Opinions Considering All Four Cases Both Dr. Shreeve and Dr. LaRusso offered their overall opinions, taking the four cases as a whole. Dr. Shreeve’s Oinions Dr. Shreeve testified that, while he might be more understanding of issues he saw in each individual case, “I’ve got four cases that I reviewed together. I received them all at once. So my view on each individual case might be seen as a little more tolerant of something I saw. But when it becomes repeated, it becomes less understanding [sic].” (Tr. 109). In forming his opinions, Dr. Shreeve relied on allegations that have not been proven, his own extension of the Administrative Complaint allegations to add other concerns about use of CPT codes (which were also shown not to be valid concerns), and his observations about a litany of matters nowhere mentioned or charged in the Administrative Complaints. Dr. Shreeve made clear that he elevated his opinion from concerns about sloppy office practices to fraud, misrepresentation, and patient exploitation, because of matters that were either unproven, not alleged or charged, or both. For example, he injected the concern, shown to be based solely on patient ledgers, that CPT code 99212 appeared many times without the -25 modifier when used in conjunction with an adjustment CPT code. Starting with A.M.’s case, he complained of the repeated use of CPT code 99212 without a -25 modifier, when CPT code 98941 (adjustments) was used for the same office visit. He said, “If we were going to bill 99212, an E/M code with that, we would use a modifier of -25.” (Tr. 110). As previously found, however, Dr. Aderholdt did use the -25 modifier with every entry of CPT code 99212 in the Medicare claim forms. In explaining how his opinion was affected by his misimpression from the patient ledgers that CPT code 99212 was not used with the -25 modifier, he said: This is repeated over and over during the record. If it were one off, it occurred in one place in the ledger or on a form, you know, everybody is human. They can make a mistake. If it is the trend, that becomes not a mistake. That becomes, I’m doing the wrong thing. And if I’m doing it over and over again, and I’m then billing for one service two times, two different ways, and I’m – I hope to get paid for it. Then that’s where I start to see the trend of exploiting the patient for financial gain. (Tr. 111). Dr. Shreeve further elevated the significance of not seeing modifiers with the evaluation codes in the patient ledgers, when he spoke about R.O.’s case: If [Dr. Aderholdt] did both codes [for evaluation and adjustments] every visit, if he did, which is not normal, we would have to have a modifier, the -25, to tell us it’s a reduced service because it’s duplicative. A modifier was never present in any record I saw on this patient or any other patient of the records of Dr. Aderholdt. So misusing the codes. This is not standard of care that we expect, and this appears to me exercising influence on the patient to exploit them for financial gain. That’s what it looks like to me. By the time we’re through with the third case that’s what I see. (Tr. 148). Not only was this CPT coding issue not alleged in any of the four Administrative Complaints, but it is a false accusation. If Dr. Shreeve did not see a single use of CPT code 99212 with the -25 modifier in any record he saw, then he did not look at the records very carefully. As found above, the only evidence of actual claims submitted to any third-party payor--the Medicare claim forms for Patient A.M.--shows that CPT code 99212 was never used without the -25 modifier. But Dr. Shreeve only looked at the patient ledgers for modifiers. As also found above, the only two CPT coding issues that were alleged (improper use on two specified dates of CPT code 98941 for adjusting three or four spinal regions for Patient A.M.; and improper use on Patient P.D.’s first day of service of two patient examination CPT codes for billing purposes) were not proven. Dr. Shreeve also relied on the allegation that Patient B.O.’s insurance carrier was billed for treatment that was not provided. He pointed to “notes” written (by B.O.) on the patient ledger stating that the patient cancelled, but CPT codes were entered for treatments that day. He concluded: That’s blatant. I don’t have a way to explain that away. To me that absolutely says, I billed for something that I didn’t do. That’s fraud. Because that’s with intent. That’s not an accident. (Tr. 137). When Dr. Shreeve was shown the $50.00 debit card receipt signed by Patient B.O. on June 14, 2014, he quickly retreated: “That would indicate that they were there, even though they said they were not. So my apologies for that. It’s good to clear that up.” (Tr. 183). Later, he added that the June 14, 2013, payment of $50.00 was for that visit and the prior visit on June 11, 2013. He explained that this was consistent with Respondent’s daily notes, which identified treatments for each visit and also logged the copay charges by visit and B.O.’s periodic payments. Dr. Shreeve did not explain how he would alter his overall opinion after conceding that what he characterized as blatant fraud by Dr. Aderholdt was actually a false accusation by the patient. In formulating his overall opinion that what otherwise might be viewed as mistakes or sloppy office practice were elevated in his mind to fraud and exploitation, Dr. Shreeve also relied heavily on matters that were neither alleged nor charged in the Administrative Complaints, and, as a result, were not fleshed out with competent evidence in the record. Dr. Shreeve repeatedly alluded to issues regarding trust accounting requirements in statute and rule. The four Administrative Complaints that were issued as directed by the PCP on June 19, 2018 (as noted on the Administrative Complaints), contain no allegations related to trust accounting practices. The PCP-authorized Administrative Complaints do not charge Dr. Aderholdt under the trust accounting statute, section 460.413(1)(y), or the trust accounting rule, Board rule 64B2- 14.001. To the extent Dr. Shreeve’s perception of trust accounting issues contributed to his opinion that these four cases rise to the level of fraud and patient exploitation, that was error, and his opinion must be discounted accordingly. Likewise, Dr. Shreeve gratuitously offered critiques of Dr. Aderholdt’s medical records, including complaints about the handwriting, complaints about x-ray quality, questions about the adequacy of justifications for the course of treatment, and suggestions regarding how he would rewrite SOAP notes. Again, the Administrative Complaints are devoid of allegations directed to the quality or adequacy of Respondent’s medical records, and they are devoid of charges under the medical records provision in section 460.413(1)(m) and the corresponding medical records rule, Board rule 64B2-17.0065. To the extent these critiques contributed to Dr. Shreeve’s opinion that these four cases rise to the level of fraud and patient exploitation, that, too, was error, and his opinion must be discounted accordingly. Dr. Shreeve also relied on what he characterized as Respondent’s failure to respond, or failure to respond quickly enough, to investigative subpoenas. He made it clear that his opinion was greatly influenced by his perception that Respondent intentionally failed to meet his obligations in responding to the investigations: I think this is absolute fraud. The doctor is not wanting to do the right thing, has flagrant disregard for the law, and the statutes and the rules for the profession, for the Department of Health by not responding. (Tr. 153). Despite Dr. Shreeve’s view that he thinks it is “very clear” that Dr. Aderholdt did not respond timely during the investigation, the timeline and details of the investigation were not established by competent evidence; there is only hearsay evidence addressing bits and pieces of that history, with huge gaps and many questions about the reasons for those gaps (if the reasons why investigations were so protracted was relevant). But the details of the investigations are not laid out in the evidentiary record because the Administrative Complaints do not contain factual allegations related to Dr. Aderholdt’s actions or inactions during the investigation process, nor are there any charges predicated on what was or was not done during the investigation process. Either these matters were not presented to the PCP in June 2018 for inclusion in the Administrative Complaints, or they were presented and not included. Either way, Dr. Shreeve’s perception regarding whether Dr. Aderholdt met his legal obligations in responding to the investigations cannot be injected now. It was improper for Dr. Shreeve to consider, and give great weight to, circumstances that were neither alleged nor charged in the PCP-authorized Administrative Complaints. As found above, the proven allegations are that Respondent failed to provide Patient A.M. copies of the claims submitted to Medicare for her treatment (although she may have them now); and Respondent failed to provide copies of the medical records of Patients R.O. and B.O. upon their joint written request (although they may have them now). Only by considering allegations that were not proven and by injecting matters not alleged or charged was Dr. Shreeve able to characterize these four cases as involving the same problems again and again. In terms of the proven allegations, however, the only duplicative finding is with respect to the husband and wife team, in that Respondent did not meet his obligation to promptly respond to their joint request for medical records and updated patient ledgers. The matters considered by Dr. Shreeve beyond the allegations and charges in the Administrative Complaints were also improperly used by Dr. Shreeve to buttress his view that two disciplinary actions against Dr. Aderholdt based on facts arising in 2005 and 2006, raised “the same or similar” issues. Dr. Shreeve’s attempt to draw parallels between the prior actions and these four cases was unpersuasive. Dr. LaRusso disagreed with the characterization of the two prior actions as similar to the issues presented here. Dr. LaRusso’s opinion is credited. A comparison of the allegations, ultimately resolved by stipulated agreement in two 2008 Final Orders, confirms Dr. LaRusso’s view in this regard. The first disciplinary action was based on Respondent’s treatment of one patient in February 2005. An administrative complaint alleged that Respondent failed to complete intake forms, take the patient’s history, and conduct a sufficient examination to support the diagnosis. Respondent was charged with violating section 460.413(1)(m) by not having adequate medical records. The same facts gave rise to a second count of violating section 460.413(1)(ff) (violating any provision of chapters 456 or 460, or any rules adopted pursuant to those chapters), through a violation of rule 64B2-17.0065, which elaborates on the requirements for adequate medical records. There is no repetition of these statutory and rule violations charged in any of the four Administrative Complaints at issue here. The prior administrative complaint also alleged that Respondent billed the patient he saw in 2005 for neuromuscular reeducation and therapeutic exercises, when neither Respondent’s notes nor the SOAP notes reflected those services. In these cases, the only allegation regarding discrepancies between billing records and physician/SOAP notes is the allegation as to Patient A.M. that on two dates, Respondent used the CPT code for adjustments to three or four spinal regions, whereas the SOAP notes reflected adjustments to only one region. The prior disciplinary action supports the findings above that Respondent’s notes must also be considered, in addition to the SOAP notes, to determine what services A.M. received on those two days. A different kind of billing discrepancy allegation in Case No. 18-4485 is the claim that Respondent billed B.O.’s insurer for treatment on days on which services were allegedly never provided. This allegation was not proven, as found above. B.O.’s accusation that Respondent falsely charged for treatment on several days when no treatment was provided was itself proven to be a false charge. Perhaps Dr. Shreeve was thinking of this allegation, based on B.O.’s false charge, when he characterized the 2005 incident as involving the same or similar problems that he saw here. The allegation in the prior complaint was that the patient was actually billed for services not provided, and a refunded was ordered. At first, Dr. Shreeve believed the same was true in B.O.’s case. However, he later retreated and acknowledged that B.O. had not been truthful in her accusation. The only other allegation of a billing discrepancy in any of the four cases at issue was not a billing discrepancy at all, but rather, a CPT coding error on P.D.’s patient ledger that was not billed to anyone. As Dr. Shreeve noted, in the prior disciplinary action, Respondent agreed to be put on probation with a requirement that he practice with a monitor. Dr. Shreeve explained that the monitor would have worked with Respondent “to help this doctor not do the same behaviors that got them into trouble.” In his view, these four cases show that Dr. Aderholdt did not learn his lesson from the monitor “not to do the same problems again.” As he put it, “That really flips me rather quickly to think there’s a question of fraud.” (Tr. 152-153). To the contrary, whereas Respondent was faulted for not having intake records, patient histories, and appropriate examinations to support his diagnosis and recommended treatment plan in February 2005, no such issues were raised in these Administrative Complaints. Dr. Aderholdt did learn his lesson. The medical records for the four patients at issue include patient intake forms, patient histories, evaluations, and examinations that were not alleged to be inadequate. Nor was there any repetition of the problem with billing a patient for treatment or services that were not documented in the medical records taken as a whole, including Dr. Aderholt’s notes. The other disciplinary action resolved by settlement in a 2008 Final Order involved an advertising issue. The Department alleged that Respondent improperly advertised as a specialist in Vax-D disc therapy when the Board does not recognize any such specialty. The Department also found fault in the failure of the advertising to disclose the usual fee. The Department also critiqued an advertisement for identifying a different practice location than Respondent’s practice address of record. The charges were under section 460.413(1)(d), (cc), and (ff); rule 64B2-15.001(2)(e) and (i); and rule 64B2-10.0055. Quite plainly, this prior action bears no similarity to the four Administrative Complaints at issue here. No such allegations or charges were raised here. Dr. Shreeve did not contend that this prior action bears any similarity to the four cases here. Dr. Shreeve was never asked for his opinion as to the type or level of discipline he believes is warranted in these cases. However, his “flip” to “fraud,” due to the perceived repetitive nature of the issues in the four cases (whether charged or not)--which he characterized as the “same problems” in 2005 that resulted in discipline--was the basis for Petitioner proposing the most severe penalty available: license revocation, plus substantial fines and assessments of fees and costs. Dr. LaRusso’s Opinions Dr. LaRusso served as a Board member for multiple terms, and is a past-chair. After leaving the Board, he continued to serve on probable cause panels as recently as 2017. Having reviewed and been involved in thousands of disciplinary matters, he was of the strong opinion that nothing in the four Administrative Complaints warrant discipline at the level being sought here. Imposing a severe penalty in these four cases would be out of line with the Board’s prior practice in disciplinary matters. Dr. LaRusso’s studied review of all of the depositions and records in this case led him to opine that there is no evidence that Dr. Aderholdt deceived his patients, committed fraud, or engaged in double-billing or overbilling. Instead, Dr. LaRusso saw evidence of sloppy office practices, which he attributed to Dr. Aderholdt’s poor management skills. He has seen many doctors like Dr. Aderholdt over the years who just want to deal with taking care of patients. They do not want to have anything to do with administrative and clerical responsibilities. Instead, they leave everything besides patient care to their office manager and staff. In Dr. LaRusso’s view, Dr. Aderholdt’s office protocols and procedures require serious fine-tuning. He believes that Dr. Aderholdt would benefit from re-education in billing and collection practices, as well as laws and rules. He needs to ensure that procedures are in place, and followed, for prompt responses to patient requests for medical records or for claims sent to third-party payors. At the same time, however, Dr. LaRusso reasonably characterized the four cases as involving billing, clerical, communication, and correspondence issues. It bears emphasis that Dr. Aderholdt’s patient care is not in question. There are no issues of endangering the public, where a doctor is doing things that will hurt people, doing something dangerous or sexually inappropriate. Those are the cases where it is appropriate to go after someone’s livelihood, when the person does not belong in the profession. Dr. LaRusso observed that, rather than endangering the public, Dr. Aderholdt was helping his patients by relieving their pain, according to their own testimony. Dr. LaRusso agreed to become involved in this case because he found it so incongruous that the Department would be pursuing this action apparently to try to take Dr. Aderholdt’s license. Dr. LaRusso noted that the four investigations against Dr. Aderholdt were originally being spearheaded by a prior prosecutor for the Department (to whom Respondent’s counsel mailed CDs of patient records in 2014), and that the cases were assigned to Dr. Willis, who was a favored expert witness for the Department. Dr. LaRusso alluded to “inappropriate issues” with the prosecutor and expert that led to the Board having to pay a large award of attorneys’ fees and costs for pursuing discipline against Dr. Christian. According to Dr. LaRusso, those issues ultimately led to the prosecutor and expert being discharged from these cases. There is no evidence as to when or why Dr. Willis was replaced with Dr. Shreeve. Dr. Willis apparently was involved long enough to prepare an expert report. But then, according to Dr. LaRusso, the cases went dormant for a long period of time. The bits and pieces of hearsay evidence in the file comport with this understanding: there were four investigations that began upon complaints in 2014 by the four patients about billing and records issues; documents were collected from Respondent and from the patients; and Investigative Reports were issued, all before 2014 was over. It is unknown when Dr. Willis was involved, when he prepared his expert report, or when he was discharged from the cases. It is unknown when Dr. Shreeve was retained, but there was plainly some duplication of work, in that Dr. Shreeve prepared his own expert report. Neither expert report is in evidence. There is no evidence of any additional investigation or follow-up documentation from the patients or otherwise. There is no evidence of what was presented to the PCP--just that the panel met on June 19, 2018, and authorized the four Administrative Complaints issued on June 20, 2018. While this background is a bit of a curiosity, without impermissible speculation, the most that can be said about this history is that the protracted period of time from investigation to the PCP submission that resulted in issuance of the Administrative Complaints is apparently due, at least in large part, to the turnover in the prosecution-expert witness team assignments. Dr. LaRusso did not persuasively demonstrate grounds to cast nefarious aspersions on the Department for continuing forward with its investigation. One might reasonably question whether the Department dropped the ball, so to speak, in not updating its investigation, given the extended period of dormancy. For example, the Administrative Complaint in Case No. 18-4487 incorrectly alleged that P.D. was not reimbursed, when any cursory check with P.D. would have revealed the “news” that she had been repaid in April 2015, more than three years before the Administrative Complaint was authorized by the PCP. Dr. LaRusso may reasonably debate, as he did, whether the charges lodged against Respondent are inappropriate. And Dr. LaRusso may certainly question, as he did in convincing fashion, whether the discipline apparently being sought is unduly harsh, uncalled for, and way out of line with Board practice. But there is no basis in this record for attributing bad motives to the Department for prosecuting the Administrative Complaints. Dr. LaRusso’s opinions regarding the nature of the violations proven and the appropriate discipline in scale with those violations were more persuasive that Dr. Shreeve’s opinions. Dr. LaRusso’s opinions are credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Board of Chiropractic Medicine: In Case No. 18-4484PL: Dismissing Counts I, II, and IV; and Finding that Respondent violated section 460.413(1)(aa), as charged in Count III; In Case No. 18-4485PL: Dismissing Counts I, III, and IV; and Finding that Respondent violated section 460.413(1)(i), through a violation of rule 64B2-17.0055(1), as charged in Count II; In Case No. 18-4486PL: Dismissing Counts II, III, and IV; and Finding that Respondent violated section 460.413(1)(i), through a violation of rule 64B2-17.0055(1), as charged in Count II; In Case No. 18-4487PL, dismissing Counts I and II; Placing Respondent on probation for a period of three years, with conditions deemed appropriate by the Board; Imposing a fine of $3,000.00; Requiring continuing education deemed appropriate by the Board; and Requiring payment of the costs of investigation and prosecution of the charges on which violations were found. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2018.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Thomas P. Elliott was licensed in Florida as an osteopathic physician having been first licensed in Florida in 1977 and issued Certificate No. 0003751. He graduated from an accredited osteopathic school of medicine in Kirksville, Missouri in 1952 and was duly licensed in Missouri where he practiced for some 23 years before entering the U.S. Air Force medical corps for two years. He was assigned to Tyndall AFB in Panama City, Florida. Upon his release from the USAF and licensure in Florida, he moved to Largo, Florida in 1977 where he set up a general practice as an osteopathic physician. Jack Bianco was first seen by Respondent on 12/19/B3 complaining of constant back pain. Examination and x-rays showed the degeneration of lower spine which could result in some pain. Bianco gave a history of an accident while in the military in 1966 which required extensive surgery and use of a brace for several years. Respondent acknowledged that if a patient said he had pain, he was given the benefit of the doubt. Although Bianco had received treatment at VA facilities those records were never asked for nor obtained by Respondent. Bianco stated he was allergic to Codeine and refused prescriptions for anti-inflammatory drugs. On this initial visit he was treated by manipulation, high frequency pulse and given a prescription for Dilaudid. Bianco remained a patient of Respondent until September 1984. At each visit, which occurred at approximately one week intervals, Bianco was treated with manipulation, high frequency pulse therapy and issued a prescription for Dilaudid. During the nine months Bianco was a patient he was given prescriptions for 374 Dilaudid, 4 mg. Dilaudid is the brand name for Hydromorphone Hydrochlorite. It is the strongest form of morphine available for oral ingestion and is a Class II controlled substance because of its highly addictive attributes. Extended use of Dilaudid (beyond two or three weeks) is generally deemed suitable only for terminally ill patients suffering from a painful malady such as cancer. Respondent recognized that Bianco was coming for treatment principally to get Dilaudid but he nevertheless continued to prescribe Dilaudid and never referred Bianco to a drug treatment facility. In March 1984, Respondent reduced the number of Dilaudid prescribed at one time to 8 but in July 1984 increased the number to 10. Respondent testified he attempted to take Bianco off the Dilaudid and Bianco did not return for treatment after receiving his last prescription from Respondent September 6, 1984. However, as noted below, Bianco's records (and others) were seized by the Sheriff's Office September 11, 1984. Records maintained by Respondent on Bianco fail to record results of the treatment given. On nearly every visit the same treatment was given followed by the prescription for Dilaudid. Although Respondent testified + + + + shown on the patient record showed that response to the treatment was first class, there is no record that Bianco's condition was improving, remaining constant or getting worse, or that any effort was made to change the medication to a less addictive drug. Respondent was never registered to participate in a detoxification program. Without such registration it is illegal for a practitioner to prescribe maintenance drugs to an addict. Between 1979 and 1984, Respondent also treated Stanley Berry, Lawrence Brainard, Cheryl Morelli, Michael Morelli; Donald Murray, Nicholas Spano, Linda Valentine, Paul Broussard, Lee Coryell, Arthur Gray, Sherri Gray, Raine Troupe, Bruce Flood, Debora Bolte, Leon Clifford, Gail Outlaw, William Ellmore, Horace Maybee, William Noble, Irene Morelli and Ernest Pingatore, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. All of these patients complained of pain, generally back pain, on the first visit. Most reported having been involved in an earlier accident and reinjuring the back recently. The examinations given by Respondent consisted of checking the x-rays if the patient presented one to see if there was any skeletal problem that could cause pain. Otherwise he would palpate the patient to find a potential cause of pain. On these initial visits and throughout the period the patient was treated by Respondent, vital signs (blood pressure, temperature and pulse) were rarely, if ever, taken by Respondent or anyone else at his office. Most of these patients were given manipulation, heat or high pulse frequency treatment and prescriptions for Dilaudid on the first visit. Those who presented records showing they had been given Demerol or Percodan were usually given prescriptions for Demerol or Percodan and a muscle relaxant. Both Demerol and Percodan are Class II controlled substances. These patients' charts, like the chart on Bianco, failed to record what, if any, progress was made as the treatment progressed. Petitioner's expert witnesses, who reviewed the patient records and testified in these proceedings, could not decipher some of the notations made by Respondent on these charts as he used abbreviations, pluses, etc. While it would be very important for a doctor to read the patient record of a patient who had been treated by another physician, there is no specific format or specified abbreviations for maintaining patient records. All of these patients were given prescriptions for Class II drugs with inadequate documentation to justify the use of such drugs in the patient records. They were also given these prescriptions for a much longer time than was indicated for the physical symptoms which could easily lead to addiction, assuming the patient was not already addicted. Many of these patients were referred to Respondent by other patients above named. Those patients with the same surnames were from the same family, generally husband and wife. Respondent testified he gave no significance to the fact that he was prescribing large quantities of Class II drugs to two members of the same family. Frequently drug addicts refer other addicts to a doctor from whom the referrer is able to obtain drugs. Some of these patients were recognized as addicts by Respondent. Nevertheless, he would discuss their dependency with them, continue to prescribe controlled substances for them and never referred any of his patients to a detoxification center. Some of Respondent's patients listed above were given prescriptions for sufficient quantities of Schedule II drugs that they disposed of these drugs on the street. Approximately of those patients above noted were arrested by police for drug related offenses. These practices constitute prescribing controlled substances not in the course of Respondent's professional practice. Donald Murray was a patient of Respondent's from July 1979 through July 1984. During this period he received 198 prescriptions for Dilaudid, 240 prescriptions for Percodan, 16 prescriptions for Tuinol, as well as prescriptions for Tylox and Desoxyn (for narcolepsy). No entry in the patient record justified a diagnosis of narcolepsy for this patient. During the 28-day period between May 18, 1982 and June 28, 1982, Murray was given prescriptions for 72 Dilaudid, 4 mg. and 74, Percodan. In April 1983, Murray was given prescriptions by Respondent for 240 Percodan in less than a 30-day period. Respondent testified Murray needed the drugs to maintain his law practice. Nicholas Spano was a patient of Respondent from July 10, 1980 until September 7, 1984. Between July 19, 1982 and September 7, 1984, Spano received prescriptions for more than 2700 Percodan and prescriptions for 424 Tylox, another Class II drug. At the time these prescriptions were given to Spano, Respondent was aware of a psychiatric report by Dr. Joye dated 3/23/81 that Spano was believed to have a narcotic dependence on Percodan, of Joye's recommendation to discontinue Percodan, and of a report by Dr. Adams dated March 31, 1981 that Spano had been a chronic user of Percodan. In 1982, Detective William Logan in the vice and narcotic squad of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office contacted Respondent regarding a forged prescription to one of his patients. At that meeting they discussed how not to get involved with drugs. Subsequent thereto Logan received complaints from pharmacies in Largo regarding what appeared to the pharmacist as excess prescriptions for narcotics written by Respondent and an investigation was commenced. On March 6, 1984, Respondent telephoned Logan to say he had read that two of his patients had been arrested, viz. Raine Troupe and Bruce Flood. Respondent acknowledged to Logan that he knew these men were addicts and that he was taking them off slowly. Respondent also admitted having other patients who were questionable. By this time Respondent had become a suspect in the criminal investigation and further telephone calls from Respondent were not returned by Logan. Respondent's office was searched on September 11, 1984, pursuant to a subpoena and patient records of the 23 patients above noted were seized. Respondent was subsequently brought to trial in Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County, entered a plea of nole contendere, and on August 25, 1985, adjudication of guilt of unlawful delivery of controlled substance was withheld, Respondent was placed on probation for three years, ordered to pay certain costs, and prohibited from prescribing Schedule II drugs.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the Administrative Complaint, Dr. Turner has been licensed as a chiropractor in the State of Florida, holding license CH 1454. He has maintained offices as a chiropractic physician at 7650 South U.S. Highway One, Fort Pierce, Florida 34952 since May 19, 1985. Prior Discipline The Board of Chiropractic Examiners has maintained other prosecutions against Dr. Turner. On August 28, 1972 a Final Order was entered revoking Dr. Turner's license for solicitation for prostitution and giving oral medication and injections to a person, but his licensure was reinstated by Order dated September 11, 1974. Thereafter, on July 14, 1977, his licensure was revoked for a second time. Although the Administrative Complaint which had been filed in the second prosecution had alleged sexual misconduct towards patients and staff, those charges were not sustained. The revocation was imposed for obtaining prescriptions for narcotics, stimulants or habit-forming drugs under false pretenses from medical doctors and dentists in an amount so large as to show either drug abuse by Dr. Turner or the offering and administration of drugs to patients, employees, or other persons without lawful authority to do so. Ultimately, Dr. Turner was relicensed, and reestablished his practice in 1985. Alteration of Records The applicable paragraph of the Administrative Complaint alleges that On or about October 25, 1989 a former employee of the Respondent issued a sworn statement, to the State Attorney's Office. In her statement the former employee stated that the Respondent had her change her therapist's notes on a patient to reflect that certain treatments were not being used. The former employee also stated in this interview that the Respondent frequently had her and "other employees" change patient notes in order to mislead future "attorneys" reviewing said notes. Turner hired Debbie Corderre as a therapist and staff member in 1987, and she remained in his employ into 1989. One of the patients to whom she provided therapy was patient E.M. The physical therapists in Dr. Turner's office are not persons who are graduates of a physical therapy school approved for the educational preparation of physical therapists by an accrediting agency recognized by the Council on Post-Secondary Accreditation or who have passed an examination administered by the Department of Professional Regulation to determine fitness to practice as a physical therapist. See Section 486.031 Florida Statutes (1989). Rather, they are persons who have received brief on-the-job training of two weeks or so to provide such therapy as might be ordered by Dr. Turner as part of his office practice. Ms. Corderre testified that Dr. Turner had ordered her to alter the medical records of E.M. to remove diathermy as a therapy given. Diathermy is the heating of body tissues due to their resistance to the passage of high- frequency electromagnetic radiation, electric currents, or ultrasonic waves. (Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 26th Edition 1985). The office therapies included massage, traction, electric muscle stimulation, the use of hot packs and ultrasound treatment. Electric muscle stimulation and ultrasound treatment involved the use of a machine with pads; gel was put on the patient and the pads were attached. Ultrasound was performed using the same machine; lotion was placed on the patient and an instrument attached to the machine was rubbed over the body part being treated. How these treatments differ from diathermy, or what constituted diathermy at Dr. Turner's office, was never adequately explained at the hearing. The office notes maintained for Dr. Turner's patients were broken into four sections, each of which were identical, and permitted notes to be made for four separate visits on one sheet. The notes for each individual visit was made up of five parts. The first included a space for the date and abbreviations for the different therapies next to which a check mark could be placed. These spaces were checked off by therapists for billing purposes. None of these spaces ever were checked in any of the extant records for patient E.M. Below the abbreviations was a larger space for therapists notes, in which the therapist would write the therapy provided to the patient during that visit. Below the therapist's note area was a space of equal size containing the acronym SOAP, in which Dr. Turner would make his notes when he saw the patient, after his therapist had already completed the therapy. The fourth portion of the record of a visit is a line to note any material dispensed to the patient during the visit, and the fifth portion is a line to note any X-rays that may have been taken. In none of the records for patient E.M. have any of the abbreviations for any of the different types of therapy been checked off, even though Dr. Turner maintains that these notes are the source of billing information (Tr. 240-41). It is incomprehensible that from the period October 27, 1987 through April 12, 1988, over a total of 59 visits, that a therapist never correctly filled out the portion of the patient record which another employee would need in order to render a bill for the service provided that day. By way of contrast, however, the records for another patient entered into evidence, B.S., do for the most part, have check marks in that portion of the record for a visit which would be useful for billing. The inference which is drawn from the absence of any billing entries in the records for patient E.M. over so long a period of time is that the records which purport to be the contemporaneous records for E.M. are in fact records generated after the fact by the therapist, Debbie Corderre at the instruction of Dr. Turner. Dr. Turner's contention that Ms. Corderre failed to keep appropriate records is rejected. Ms. Corderre testified that Dr. Turner had instructed her to remove reference to diathermy given to patient E.M. Dr. Turner counters by noting that the insurance claim forms submitted by his office on behalf of patient E.M. to the Workers Compensation insurance carrier for E. M.'s employer never showed that diathermy was administered. Dr. Turner argues that Ms. Corderre's testimony must be wrong, for the insurance billings would have shown a charge for diathermy, if the testimony of Ms. Corderre were correct. Dr. Turner's point is well taken, but it does not negate the core of Ms. Corderre's testimony. Ms. Corderre had told the State Attorney's office before the hearing that she thought Dr. Turner had instructed her to change the records to remove any reference to having provided patient E.M. with ultrasound therapy. Based upon all the evidence I find that the records for patient E.M. were changed by Ms. Corderre in some significant way at the direction of Dr. Turner. Because the original records were necessarily lost, and all that remains are revised records, it is not possible to determine with certainty in what way the records were altered. On this aspect of her testimony the recollection of Ms. Corderre is faulty. Her testimony that she changed all records for patient E.M. is persuasive, and the absence of any entry in the portion of the records used for billing reinforces this conclusion. Why Dr. Turner wanted to have the records changed and the manner in which he told Ms. Corderre to change them are not particularly significant. Dr. Turner regarded the change as sufficiently important to have Ms. Corderre spend almost a full day of filling out the newly created records. He then manufactured what are supposed to be contemporaneous entries of his own in the portion of the records which are his notes (the SOAP notes). Improper Sexual Touching of a Patient Dr. Turner employed Brenda Stanley, who later became Brenda Sika by marriage, during the period August 1988 to 1989. She was trained as a physical therapist at the office. About a month after she was employed, in September 1988, Brenda Sika was injured in an automobile accident, and had gone to the hospital emergency room. She discussed her condition and her need for treatment with Dr. Turner, who agreed to examine her and treat her. Dr. Turner first saw Brenda Sika as a patient on September 13, 1988. Ms. Sika's principle complaints included back pain over the whole back, but which was worse in the lower back; neck pain, and ankle pain, all of which had resulted from the automobile accident. She also had bruising and tenderness of her chest due to the action of her seat belt in the accident. Ms. Sika contends that while she was lying on her stomach in a treatment room on several occasions Dr. Turner had placed his hand on her ankle, and slid it up until his hand was on her buttocks, and that on one occasion he had placed his hands between her legs while she was lying face down, with the inside of his hands on the inside of her legs and his thumb on the outside. She also alleged that on the Sunday following the initial visit on September 13, she sought additional treatment from Dr. Turner, and in the course of that treatment he requested her to remove her bra, remained in the room while she undressed, and afterwards asked her to stretch out her arms, after which he felt her breasts, including placing his hand around the fleshy part of her breasts. Finally, Ms. Sika alleges that while in the X-ray room, Dr. Turner asked to check if her groin muscle had been pulled, and in the process used his thumb and index finger to squeeze or grip her in the groin. It is difficult to accept the contention that Dr. Turner had engaged in inappropriate and unwarranted sexual touching of Ms. Sika's breasts, buttocks or groin area, in view of the continuing employment relationship. Ms. Sika had only recently been hired when she was injured. It seems unlikely that she would have remained in the employ of someone who had engaged in lecherous touching while she was supposedly being treated. She remained an employee of Dr. Stanley for a substantial amount of time, and only left that employment when she went to Michigan for her wedding. What is more significant, however, is that after she returned to Florida following her wedding, she decided to return to employment with Dr. Turner (Tr. 75). Ms. Sika did not tell other employees such as Deborah Coderre or Tammy Prescott that Dr. Turner had engaged in unwarranted sexual advances or made sexual innunendoes to her at the office. With respect to the accusation of fondling of a breast, after the accident Dr. Turner had conducted an examination which included palpation in the area of the rib cage underneath the breast, where there was a bruise caused by the seatbelt in Ms. Sika's car. That sort of touching in an area of complaint is appropriate. The charge with respect to running Dr. Turner's hands from the ankle to the buttocks is unconvincing. Attempting to determine whether there was involvement of a groin muscle would be appropriate, but the description of the examination given by Ms. Sika would have constituted inappropriate conduct, had the examination occurred as described. As stated above, given her continued employment, and reemployment after she had left work with Dr. Tuner at the time of her wedding, the evidence of sexual misconduct is not convincing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Chiropractic enter a final order revoking the licensure of Dr. Turner, without right of reinstatement or relicensure. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 9th day of November, 1990. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 90-5707 Rulings on the proposed findings by the Department: Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 4. Adopted in Finding 4. Adopted in Finding 9. Recounted in Finding 6, but the testimony that the alteration was to remove diathermy is not accepted. Rejected as unnecessary, because not within in the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Rejected as unnecessary, because not within the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Rejected as unnecessary, because not within the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Rejected as unnecessary, because not within the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Rejected as unnecessary, because not within the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Rejected because the testimony was not sufficiently specific to establish that other medical records were altered. The testimony with respect to patient E.M. is sufficiently specific. Rejected because the testimony was not sufficiently specific with respect to alteration of records other than those of E.M. Moreover, the charge made in paragraph 3 is not one with respect to purposeful mis-billing. See, Finding 3. See, ruling on Finding 13. Adopted in Finding 12. Adopted in Finding 13. Adopted in Finding 13. Adopted in Finding 14. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony recounted in Findings 19-27 is rejected for the reasons stated in Finding 16. Included in Finding 14. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant to the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Adopted in Finding 2. Rulings on findings proposed by Dr. Turner: Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 1. Rejected as unnecessary, because Dr. Turner's skills are not at issue. Rejected as unnecessary, because Dr. Turner's skills are not at issue. Rejected as unnecessary, because Dr. Turner's skills are not at issue. Rejected as unnecessary, because Dr. Turner's skills are not at issue. Adopted in Finding 12. Adopted in Finding 13. 9 and 10. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary. Generally accepted for the reasons given in Finding 16. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 16. Adopted in Finding 17. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. To the extent necessary, adopted in Finding 17. Generally adopted in Finding 17. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. To the extent persuasive, these arguments are covered in Findings 16 and 17. Accepted in Finding 17. Adopted in Finding 4. Generally rejected as a recitation of testimony, and because the argument that Dr. Turner had not required Ms. Corderre to change records of diathermy is accepted, but the argument that Dr. Turner did not instruct Ms. Corderre to make some significant changes in E. M.'s record is rejected. The testimony is recounted in Finding 10. Rejected as unnecessary. What is significant is that Ms. Corderre changed records at the direction of the doctor, the exact nature of the change is not essential. See, Finding 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary; any motivation Ms. Corderre might have had to be untruthful has been considered in evaluating her testimony. Rejected as unnecessary, any motivation Ms. Corderre might have had to be untruthful has been considered in evaluating her testimony. Rejected as unnecessary, any motivation Ms. Corderre might have had to be untruthful has been considered in evaluating her testimony. Accepted in that the only findings made with respect to Dr. Turner's conducts are made with respect to the records of E.M. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected. I have accepted most of the testimony of Ms. Corderre. Rejected as unnecessary. No "Taylor" case is at issue here. Rejected. See, especially Finding 9. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia Guilford, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Board of Chiropractic 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Kenneth E. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Michael A. Mone', Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Elizabeth R. Alsobrook, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Harold M. Braxton, Esquire 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Suite 400 Miami, FL 33156-7115 Donald C. Dowling, Esquire 501 East Atlantic Avenue Delray Beach, FL 33483
