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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs RONALD PULEO, 12-003524 (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Oct. 31, 2012 Number: 12-003524 Latest Update: May 16, 2013

The Issue The issues in this permit enforcement proceeding are whether Respondent violated the conditions of a general use permit, authorizing use of a designated portion of the Department of Transportation's right-of-way property, and, if so, what remedy is appropriate and authorized?

Findings Of Fact Ronald Puleo owns property that fronts on U.S. Highway 41, South Tamiami Trail, in Sarasota, Florida. He purchased the property in 1989 and has used the property to operate a business called Sarasota Auto Rentals. A commercial building on Mr. Puleo's property faces east, toward Tamiami Trail. The building houses not only Mr. Puleo's auto rental business, but also several other commercial tenants who operate businesses that serve the public. According to signs in front of the building, these tenants have included a window-tinting business and Scoot, Inc., apparently involving the sale and/or rental of motor scooters. Pictures in evidence of Mr. Puleo's property and the vicinity, taken during the relevant time of this controversy,3/ portray a fairly busy, established commercial area, as witnesses confirmed. The property to the south of Mr. Puleo's property is occupied by Enterprise, another rental car business. Further south, there is a solid line of establishment after establishment, a mixture of buildings, signs, and parking areas as far as the eye can see. To the north of Mr. Puleo's property, there is a large car dealership with visible logos for Volkswagen and Audi. Tamiami Trail is a major north-south roadway through Sarasota. In front of Mr. Puleo's property, the road is six-laned, with three lanes in each direction separated by a median. Outside of the solid white lines marking the road's outer edge, the area adjacent to the roadway is finished with concrete gutters with intermittent drainage grills, raised curbs, and then a sidewalk flanked on either side by grass. At the interspersed access connections that allow ingress and egress to and from the various business properties, the curb and sidewalk flatten to street level, and there is pavement instead of grass. Standing on the grassy strip on the interior side (i.e., the side farther from the street), there is a row of intermittent tall poles with street lights. After the interior grassy strip (moving away from the street), there appears to be mostly asphalt paving in front of the businesses. On Mr. Puleo's property, in particular, there is one access connection near the north end of the property. To the north of the access connection, a single street light pole stands on the interior grassy patch to the west of the sidewalk. On the south side of the access connection, there is a small grassy strip to the right of the sidewalk. The rest of the space in front of Mr. Puleo's property is paved with asphalt. Directly in front of Mr. Puleo's building, the asphalt is painted with white stripes, designating parking spots perpendicular to the building. The parking spots have concrete parking bumpers at the front edges, which are very close to the front of the building itself; perhaps there is enough room for a person to walk in front of a parked vehicle to go into the building, but no more than that. In addition to the designated parking spots, other parts of the asphalt pavement in front of Mr. Puleo's building are used, and historically have been used, for parking vehicles. Running east to west along the north property line, from the edge of the interior grassy patch, Mr. Puleo uses the pavement to park a row of rental cars. These cars are backed in either due south- to-north, or diagonally southeast-to-northwest, so that the car fronts face south (towards the asphalt in front of Mr. Puleo's property) or southeast (angled towards Tamiami Trail). These parked cars along the north property edge often have small "Rent Me" signs in the front windows. In addition, historically, Mr. Puleo, his customers, his tenants, his tenants' customers, and sometimes customers or visitors of nearby businesses have parked vehicles along the east edge of the asphalt pavement in front of Mr. Puleo's building and along the south edge of the paved area in front of the building. Historically, Mr. Puleo and others also have parked vehicles on an area to the south of Mr. Puleo's southern property line, in front of what is now the Enterprise rental car business, where there used to be asphalt pavement to the west of the sidewalk and interior grassy strip. Lance Grace has been the operations engineer for the Department's Sarasota Operations Center since 2003. Mr. Grace first became familiar with Mr. Puleo's property and the property to the south in 2004, when Mr. Puleo's neighbor to the south was an exotic car dealer. According to Mr. Grace, there was competition between the two neighboring businesses to park on the asphalt-paved area that was to the south of Mr. Puleo's property line, and Mr. Grace was asked to get involved. Mr. Grace did not identify by whom he was asked to get involved, but the impression given was that it may have been the exotic car dealer. Mr. Grace testified that the exotic car dealer did not like Mr. Puleo parking on the asphalt to the south of his property line, because it blocked the view to the exotic car dealer's property. At that time, the Department asserted the right to all of the Tamiami Trail frontage as its right-of-way westward from the roadway, past the sidewalk and grassy strips, all the way to a line that runs north-south, very close to Mr. Puleo's building--so close that the line actually bisects the designated parking spaces in front of Mr. Puleo's building so that half of the parking spaces are within the right-of-way. This right-of- way line is 40 feet to the west of the interior grassy strip. Therefore, the asphalt-paved area in front of the exotic car dealer's business was included in the Department's right-of-way. Mr. Grace said that when he was asked to get involved in 2004, he tried to let the property owners work it out among themselves, although he did tell them that "all this parking within the right-of-way is illegal" and that if they continued to have issues, then he would have to get involved to "deal with it from a statutory point of view." At the hearing, Mr. Grace explained: "There is a Section 337 [in the Florida Statutes] that deals with unauthorized use within the right-of-way, and it is specifically written to prevent the parking and display of items within the right-of-way for safety and efficient use of the roadway." Mr. Grace testified that it was, and is, the Department's position based on the statute to which he alluded that parking is not allowed on its right-of-way. Nonetheless, the parking continued on the paved area to the south of Mr. Puleo's property in front of the neighboring business. Mr. Grace testified that at some point, when there continued to be issues with parking there, the decision was made to have the asphalt removed and replaced with grass to discourage parking in that portion of the right-of-way. Mr. Grace's recollection was that a portion of that asphalt "may have" been removed by the Department, but that at least part of the asphalt on the right-of-way was removed by Mr. Puleo's neighbor, who did not like the parked vehicles blocking the view of his business. The pictures in evidence show the rectangular area south of Mr. Puleo's property where grass was placed to discourage parking in response to the dispute between Mr. Puleo and his neighbor to the south. However, in front of Mr. Puleo's property and elsewhere on both sides of Tamiami Trail, areas claimed as Department right-of-way remain paved between the interior grassy strips and the fronts of buildings. Mr. Puleo credibly testified that historically, as long as he has owned the property, persons working at or visiting other establishments in the vicinity on both sides of Tamiami Trail have used the right-of-way similarly by parking vehicles on the area between the interior grassy strips next to the sidewalks and their buildings. Mr. Puleo's testimony was further corroborated by the pictures in evidence. For example, the Department offered in evidence an aerial picture with the legend "Sarasota County Property Look- Up," on which tan lines are superimposed to demonstrate the Department's right-of-way boundary. This aerial picture (Petitioner's Exhibit 2) shows the lineup of cars parked along the northern boundary of Mr. Puleo's property described above. The same aerial view also shows that other businesses in the vicinity use Department right-of-way property for parking. The property in the bottom left corner of the picture, on the other side of Tamiami Trail and a little to the south of Mr. Puleo's property, illustrates this usage. Just inside of the sidewalk and interior grassy strip, two cars are diagonally parked on a paved area facing Tamiami Trail. According to the tan right-of- way line, these two cars and the asphalt paving on which they are parked are wholly on right-of-way property. On the same parcel, the right-of-way line bisects a number of vehicles parked on paved areas that appear to be designated parking spaces, much like the right-of-way line in front of Mr. Puleo's building bisects his parking spaces. The aerial photo also shows that on the property two parcels to the south of Mr. Puleo's property, several vehicles are parked perpendicular to the roadway with the front bumpers very near the sidewalk; one of the cars is so close that the edge of its front bumper might even protrude a bit over the edge of the sidewalk. These cars are wholly within the right-of-way. Other pictures in evidence present similar images, such as the color photos that are part of the 2009 permit, which were taken by Mr. Rosenstein. Mr. Grace acknowledged that Mr. Puleo's historic use of the right-of-way was not unique to his property, but rather, was fairly common in the general area, as shown in the pictures. According to Mr. Grace, "the first real major effort" to try to prevent parking within the right-of-way in this vicinity occurred in 2005. This "major effort" involved him sending "several letters" to Mr. Puleo and several other businesses in the vicinity advising that "selling of items and parking in the right-of-way" was illegal. Mr. Grace noted that Mr. Puleo has not ever stopped parking vehicles in the right-of-way in front of his property, despite the 2005 letter described by Mr. Grace. The pictures in evidence (bearing dates in and after 2009) show that others in the vicinity similarly continued parking vehicles in the right-of-way after 2005. Mr. Grace was asked what enforcement authority he has with regard to the problem he has perceived of parking and advertising items for sale in the right-of-way. He candidly admitted that he does not have law enforcement authority; he said that he can only inform property owners that there is a statute that applies to this situation and it is illegal. Mr. Grace testified that, if necessary, he can request assistance from law enforcement and that when he sent letters to property owners in 2005, he sent copies to the Florida Highway Patrol. Throughout Mr. Grace's involvement in right-of-way matters with Mr. Puleo, dating back to 2004, no citations have been issued by the Florida Highway Patrol or any other law enforcement authority for what Mr. Grace testified was Mr. Puleo's illegal use of the right-of-way. When asked whether he has asked for enforcement assistance in Mr. Puleo's case, Mr. Grace said that he did so once. As Mr. Grace described the occasion, the Department was poised with a crew in place to remove asphalt from the right-of- way in front of Mr. Puleo's business. Apparently, Mr. Grace sought approval from the Florida Highway Patrol to authorize the crew to proceed. From what Mr. Grace recalls, Mr. Puleo may have gotten an attorney involved, because the Florida Highway Patrol "backed down at that point," telling Mr. Grace that they were "not sure about this whole right-of-way issue." Mr. Grace did not say when this incident occurred, except to note that it was before "the lawsuit." In 2007, the Department filed a complaint in circuit court for ejectment against Mr. Puleo and his business, seeking to eject them from the Department's right-of-way. Michael Hope is the Department attorney who prepared the ejectment complaint. Both Mr. Hope and Mr. Grace acknowledged that the purpose of this lawsuit was to stop Mr. Puleo from parking and advertising on Department right-of-way. Mr. Puleo and his business counterclaimed. A twist in the controversy arose when title work revealed that the 90 feet of Tamiami Trail frontage in front of Mr. Puleo's property, from the roadway to a line bisecting the parking spaces in front of Mr. Puleo's building, did not all belong to the Department as right-of-way, as believed. Instead, more than half of the frontage--50 feet--actually was owned entirely by Mr. Puleo in fee simple. This twist changed the dynamics of the dispute between the parties. The Department was put into the position of having to secure permission from Mr. Puleo to use his property for drainage and underground utilities traversing 50 feet of Mr. Puleo's property. And in an ironic twist, it was suddenly the Department having to make amends for its prior unauthorized use of Mr. Puleo's property. Meanwhile, although Mr. Puleo's bargaining position certainly had changed, his objective remained unchanged; he wanted to continue his admitted historic use of the paved portion of the other 40 feet of Tamiami Trail frontage, which was Department right-of-way up to the line bisecting the parking spaces in front of Mr. Puleo's building. In addition, Mr. Puleo wanted an asphalt strip restored on the right-of-way south of Mr. Puleo's property line, where it had been removed and planted with grass to discourage his historic use of that right-of-way. Protracted negotiations ensued, and the parties ultimately reached a settlement agreement in July 2009. The settlement agreement is set forth in a pleading that bears the caption of the circuit court case, entitled "Stipulation for Dismissal of All Claims and Counterclaims," signed by both parties on July 10, 2009. Although the settlement agreement in evidence does not indicate approval by the circuit court, the parties acknowledge that it was, in fact, approved by the court. As suggested by the title, the settlement agreement resulted in the dismissal of all claims and counterclaims (subject to the right reserved in paragraph 12 of the settlement agreement to reopen the case for the purpose of enforcing the agreement). Both parties agree that two paragraphs of the settlement agreement provide background germane to this administrative enforcement action, as follows: [The Florida Department of Transportation, FDOT] acknowledges that the 40 foot portion of Parcel 106 that is proximate to the PULEO frontage is PULEO's historic driveway, for driveway usage for the PULEO property and that such driveway shall not be changed, except as provided herein, or in accordance with FDOT Access Management standards and procedures, with PULEO retaining rights to procedural redress under Chapter 120 of the Florida Statutes. FDOT has issued a permit (permit #2009- K-194-36), Exhibit C, and thus agrees that PULEO may construct a 15 foot deep asphalt "turn out" for driveway usage for PULEO's property; such driveway "turn out" shall not be changed except in accordance with FDOT Access Management standards and procedures, with PULEO retaining rights to procedural redress under Chapter 120 of the Florida Statutes. Paragraph 7 of the settlement agreement addresses Mr. Puleo's use of the Department's right-of-way on the 40-foot portion of the Tamiami Trail frontage that is not owned outright by Mr. Puleo. As confirmed by both parties' witnesses, this right-of-way area is shown on Respondent's Exhibit 1 as the square outlined in pink. On Petitioner's Exhibit 2 (the aerial picture), it is the square area immediately north of the green-yellow- highlighted rectangle designated right-of-way parcel 196, east of the tan line bisecting five parking spots in front of Mr. Puleo's building and south of the tan line protrusion that extends eastward to the roadway, then north to Mr. Puleo's northern property boundary. The tan line protrusion marks the 50-foot frontage owned by Mr. Puleo; this area is shown on Respondent's Exhibit 2 as the larger blue rectangle next to the pink square. Paragraph 8 of the settlement agreement addresses Mr. Puleo's use of the right-of-way to the south of Mr. Puleo's property, which previously had been paved and used by Mr. Puleo. The Department issued the 2009 permit identified in paragraph 8 on July 9, 2009, the day before the settlement agreement was executed. The 2009 permit is part of the settlement agreement, as Exhibit C thereto.4/ Issuance of the 2009 permit allowed Mr. Puleo to repave (at Department expense) and use a designated portion of the right-of-way to the south of Mr. Puleo's property. Department attorney Michael Hope reviewed and signed the settlement agreement, with the 2009 permit attached. Before the settlement agreement was signed, Mr. Hope gave the instructions to Mr. Rosenstein to prepare the permit. Mr. Rosenstein has primary responsibility within the Sarasota Operations Center for issuing permits, although occasionally Mr. Grace, to whom Mr. Rosenstein reports, gets involved in issuing permits. When the matter of preparing a permit for Mr. Puleo arose, Mr. Grace was on vacation. The issuance of the 2009 permit to Mr. Puleo was unusual for several reasons. First, it was issued as part of a settlement agreement, instead of by the normal procedure of an application being filed by someone requesting a permit. Second, Mr. Rosenstein was asked by Mr. Hope to prepare and issue the permit and deliver it to Mr. Puleo, all in a single day, which is highly unusual. Mr. Rosenstein had to drop everything and immediately go to Mr. Puleo's property to take pictures from several angles of the adjacent right-of-way to the south. He marked the pictures to describe and outline the area of right-of- way that Mr. Puleo would be allowed to pave and use. Mr. Rosenstein then had to fill out the permit, cross-referencing the marked pictures. He had to add the appropriate form pages containing the Department's standards for the paving activity adjacent to Tamiami Trail, addressing such matters as requirements for signs alerting traffic to the work and procedures for lane closures, if necessary. Mr. Rosenstein then had the completed permit reviewed and approved by the permits coordinator who signed the permit along with Mr. Rosenstein. He then delivered the completed permit to Mr. Puleo.5/ Mr. Rosenstein testified that the 2009 permit is a "general use permit." According to Mr. Rosenstein, a general use permit is considered a residual category to allow an activity on right-of-way that does not fall within any other permit category. He identified the other permit categories as drainage permits, utility permits, landscape permits, and access connection permits to make a connection to access a state road. The 2009 permit is not an access connection permit, as the asphalt pad authorized by the 2009 permit stops at the inside end of the interior grassy strip and does not extend to the roadway; a vehicle cannot drive directly from the asphalt pad onto Tamiami Trail. The 2009 permit, as completed by Mr. Rosenstein, states that the permittee, Mr. Puleo, requests permission from the Department "to construct, operate and maintain: INSTALL ASPHALT PAD AS SHOW [sic] IN PICTURE." Mr. Rosenstein attached two pages with pictures of the site. The first page has a single picture on which Mr. Rosenstein put the following description: "Extend Parking Area with Asphalt 15 x 40 feet." He marked the outline of the designated rectangle in red. As designated, the area extended the pavement that was in front of Mr. Puleo's property to the south, adding 15 feet of Tamiami Trail frontage to the south. The 40-foot length of the rectangle extended from the edge of the interior grassy strip west of the sidewalk to the end of the Department's right-of-way. This means that the west end of the new asphalt pad would be even with the midpoint of the parking spaces in front of Mr. Puleo's building, where they are bisected by the Department's right-of-way line. Mr. Rosenstein acknowledged that he did not add any special conditions to the permit to specify or restrict the usage of the approved asphalt pad. There was no evidence to suggest that Mr. Rosenstein was given instructions to include special permit conditions to specify or restrict the usage of the asphalt. In the space on the permit form for special conditions, the only condition put on the 2009 permit required Mr. Puleo to "sod all areas of disturbed right-of-way." Mr. Rosenstein gave conflicting testimony regarding his understanding of the 2009 permit that he was instructed to prepare. At first, he testified that he had no information at the time regarding the purpose of the asphalt pad or its intended use. However, he stated later that he understood at the time that the purpose of the asphalt pad was to allow cars to turn around. According to Mr. Hope, he instructed Mr. Rosenstein to prepare a permit "for a turn-out area for driveway purposes over a portion of the right-of-way." Mr. Hope testified that the asphalt pad was intended to be used only as a "turn out," in which cars pulling out of the parking spaces in front of Mr. Puleo's building could back into the newly paved area and then drive forward to exit onto Tamiami Trail at the access connection. Mr. Hope said that the "turn- out" area was needed primarily for cars parking in the two southernmost parking spaces in front of Mr. Puleo's building. Although this turn-out use might explain one of the reasons for the asphalt pad authorized by the 2009 permit, that use alone would not explain authorizing a 40-foot-long asphalt pad that extends parallel to the parking spaces. Cars would not back out of parking spaces and then back up while turning 180 degrees before pulling forward to exit Mr. Puleo's business. Mr. Rosenstein did not recount the instructions he received from Mr. Hope for preparing the permit. Neither Mr. Rosenstein nor Mr. Hope explained why the authorized asphalt pad extend for 40 feet, all the way from the interior grassy strip to the west end of the Department's right-of-way. Mr. Rosenstein did not explain how he knew to mark the pictures to designate the site for the asphalt pad or where the dimensions came from. Mr. Rosenstein claimed that he was focused on giving instructions to the contractor that would be installing the asphalt pad, not on the use of the new paved area after construction. Nonetheless, he admitted that general use permits are intended to address not only construction, but also the subsequent operation or use of what is constructed. Mr. Rosenstein conceded that since the 2009 permit did not address the ultimate usage, then the ultimate usage would be determined by the permittee. Actually, the 2009 permit does address the usage of the new paved area by the description "extend parking area." The 2009 permit, thus, identifies the paved right-of-way on Mr. Puleo's property as a "parking area" and authorizes asphalt paving to "extend" that "parking area" to add another 15 feet of Tamiami Trail frontage for the entire length of the right-of-way. Based on the credible evidence of record, the reasonable meaning of the description "extend parking area," placed by Mr. Rosenstein on the picture that became part of the 2009 permit, is to indicate that the paved area in front of Mr. Puleo's building was, in fact, used as a parking area and that the new asphalt was being authorized as an extension of that area and of that use. Neither Mr. Rosenstein nor any other witness offered a different credible interpretation of the "extend parking area" description in the 2009 permit. Mr. Hope testified that he discussed the subject of parking and the other historic uses with Mr. Puleo in a single face-to-face settlement negotiation meeting with Mr. Puleo and his attorneys. According to Mr. Hope, at that meeting, Mr. Puleo asked Mr. Hope whether he would be allowed to park vehicles or put signs on the new paved area; Mr. Hope said that he told Mr. Puleo no, that the new paved area was a turn-out area to be used for driveway purposes only, by which he meant for moving vehicles from one area to another. Mr. Hope conceded that this single face-to-face settlement meeting occurred many months before the settlement agreement was reached. Mr. Puleo testified that the meeting he attended with Mr. Hope took place nine months before the 2009 permit was prepared and the settlement agreement was finalized. Mr. Puleo testified that he did not ask Mr. Hope at that meeting whether parking would be allowed on the right-of-way and does not recall Mr. Hope addressing that subject, either. However, Mr. Puleo did recall subsequent protracted negotiations in which he understood that the Department did not want to give Mr. Puleo the right to use the new asphalt pad for parking. Mr. Puleo credibly testified that since this was important to him, he refused to agree on those terms. Mr. Puleo testified that the Department ultimately agreed to settle on his terms by issuing the 2009 permit that authorized him to "extend [his] parking area" and by making that permit a part of the settlement agreement. Mr. Hope's recollection of what was said at a settlement conference nine months before the 2009 permit was prepared and incorporated into the settlement agreement is inconsistent with the description expressed in the 2009 permit. Even if a conversation took place that was anything like his recollection, the credible evidence established that the Department's preliminary position changed between then and the issuance of the 2009 permit. Mr. Hope testified that he reviewed the final settlement agreement document, including the exhibits, before he signed it. He acknowledged reviewing the 2009 permit after it was issued and before he signed the settlement agreement, because the 2009 permit was an exhibit to the settlement agreement. Given that the sole purpose of the ejectment lawsuit he prepared was to stop Mr. Puleo from parking and advertising on Department right-of-way, it is not credible that Mr. Hope would not have insisted on express prohibitions in the 2009 permit against parking and advertising, had he believed that those prohibitions would have been permissible as part of the settlement agreement, of which the 2009 permit was a critical part. It is not credible that Mr. Hope would have agreed to the 2009 permit authorizing Mr. Puleo to "extend parking area" as part of the settlement agreement, unless, as Mr. Puleo testified, that is what was bargained for and what Mr. Puleo required to enter into the settlement agreement. Mr. Puleo's testimony in this regard is accepted as more credible than Mr. Hope's testimony. When Mr. Grace came back from vacation, he was made aware of the permit and the settlement agreement. He testified that "despite the original purpose of the lawsuit, there was parking and advertising continuing to occur within the right-of- way." He conducted surveillance and had pictures taken of the property after the asphalt pad was installed. Pictures were taken of Mr. Puleo's property and the extended parking area on July 27 and 30, 2009, to document that the new asphalt pad was being used for parking. Mr. Grace testified that he called Mr. Puleo to report that he observed parking on the new asphalt. Mr. Puleo told Mr. Grace that he was allowed to park on the new asphalt because his permit authorized him to "extend parking area." Mr. Grace claimed that he had not looked at the permit until then. At that point, Mr. Grace "started discussing the matter with Mike Hope," and they decided that it was time to revoke the 2009 permit and issue a new permit "that would clarify and still support the original intent of the settlement agreement, but clarify the intent." Inexplicably, the Department took no action until May 13, 2010, when Mr. Grace sent a letter by certified mail to Mr. Puleo. The entire text of the letter was as follows: Re: Permit Number 2009-K-194-36 Dear Mr. Puleo: As part of the stipulation agreed to between the [Department] and you the above referenced permit was issued on July 9, 2009. The permit was issued to comply with stipulation number 8 which states "PULEO may construct a 15 foot deep asphalt "turn out" for driveway usage for PULEO's property." The stipulation clearly states that the asphalt turn out is for driveway usage. However, it has been observed on numerous occasions that the asphalt area is routinely being used as a parking area which does not comply with the intent of the agreement. When this issue was previously brought to your attention you referenced a picture which was included with the permit depicting the area for asphalt placement. The picture included verbiage that included "Extend Parking Area". This reference was made in error by a staff member who was not completely familiar with the terms of the stipulation. This permit will be voided and replaced with a new permit to comply with the terms of the stipulation which included the use of the right of way as a driveway and not for parking. The permit referenced above will be voided effective May 21, 2010. A replacement permit will be issued concurrently with the voiding of this permit. Please contact me if you have any questions. Thank you for your cooperation in these matters. (emphasis added). Mr. Grace's statement--that the 2009 permit's authorization to "extend parking area" was made in error by the Department representative--is an admission that the 2009 permit does indeed authorize Mr. Puleo to park on the new asphalt. However, contrary to Mr. Grace's characterization, the 2009 permit cannot be said to have been issued in "error" or not in compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement, because the 2009 permit itself was made part of the settlement agreement. Mr. Grace's description implies that the settlement agreement came first, followed by the 2009 permit, which did not match up to the requirements of the settlement agreement; in fact, the reverse is true--the 2009 permit was issued first and the 2009 permit, as prepared and issued (including the "extend parking area" description), was incorporated into the settlement agreement as an exhibit and an express component of paragraph 8. The only explanation given for revoking the 2009 permit was its purported inconsistency with the settlement agreement. For example, there were no allegations of substantial changes in the use of the right-of-way that would trigger new and different safety concerns. Instead, Mr. Grace's May 13, 2010, letter acknowledged that Mr. Puleo had only continued his historic use of the right-of-way in front of his property, extending that use to the new asphalt extension of his parking area. The May 13, 2010, letter did not inform Mr. Puleo that he had a right to an administrative hearing to contest the Department's intended action to revoke his 2009 permit. Instead of offering Mr. Puleo a window of time in which to request an administrative hearing, only eight days after the May 13, 2010, letter was mailed to Mr. Puleo, Mr. Grace sent a second certified letter to Mr. Puleo. The entire text of this May 21, 2010, letter was as follows: Re: Permit Number 2010-K-194-30 Dear Mr. Puleo: As stated in my May 13, 2010, letter to you permit number 2009-K-194-36 is void and no longer valid. A replacement permit number 2010-K-194-30 is enclosed for your use and meets the terms of the stipulation referenced in my previous letter. Please contact me if you have any questions. Thank you for your cooperation in these matters. The 2010 permit is a general use permit, just as the 2009 permit was. Despite the fact that the asphalt pad that was authorized by the 2009 permit to "extend parking area" had already been installed, the 2010 permit authorized Mr. Puleo to "Install Asphalt Pad as shown in attached photo's [sic]." The 2010 permit in evidence is incomplete, in that no photos are attached. Presumably, the missing photos are different from those included with the 2009 permit. Whereas the 2009 permit had a single "special condition" requiring the replacement of all sod disturbed during the installation of the asphalt pad, the 2010 permit added the following as new special conditions: The asphalt placed in the Department's right-of-way is for the limited use of vehicles as a driveway only. This is limited to maneuvering of a vehicle for ingress and egress only. No other permissions are granted herein. The Department's right-of-way shall not be used for parking, storage of equipment, placement of signs, or any other use not expressly stated within the terms of this permit. Mr. Grace testified that he drafted the special conditions in the 2010 permit. He explained why he believed it was necessary to draft these conditions: In the case of Mr. Puleo, it's been a situation that I have been trying to resolve since 2004, and I felt like it was necessary to clearly state that the permit, while it allows the use of the right-of-way for placement of the asphalt, and it's allowed, per the stipulation, for ingress and egress, I said that, in order for this to be clear to Mr. Puleo, I had to state that parking and display of items for sale were not permitted. Mr. Grace's testimony--that it was necessary to specifically prohibit parking and advertising as conditions in the permit itself because of the history with Mr. Puleo--is an admission that the 2009 permit cannot be interpreted to prohibit those historic uses, because it lacks the necessary express conditions. Mr. Grace has driven by Mr. Puleo's property 100 times between 2004 and the day of the hearing, observing the same kind of parking and advertising activity that Mr. Grace has been trying to stop since 2004. The pictures in Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 10 were described as representative of the alleged violations. As these pictures demonstrate, the advertising activity referred to is the placement of small "Rent Me" signs in the windows of vehicles parked on the pavement in front of Mr. Puleo's property on the right-of-way. Therefore, as Mr. Grace clarified, the advertising on the right-of-way is not a separate activity from the parking on the right-of-way; he considers the parking and advertising to be a single violation. Mr. Grace acknowledged that the special conditions in the 2010 permit, which he found necessary to make clear that Mr. Puleo had to stop the parking and advertising that he has been doing on the right-of-way since 2004, could have been put in the 2009 permit. As found above, the credible evidence establishes that the Department would have expressly prohibited parking and advertising on the new asphalt pad authorized by the 2009 permit, if the Department had been in a bargaining position to insist on those terms, but the Department was not. The Department presented no credible evidence that Mr. Puleo's parking and advertising in the right-of-way ever has endangered the health, safety, and general welfare of the public by causing distractions to motorists, unsafe pedestrian movement, dangerous traffic movement, increased vehicular accidents, motorist injuries, or fatalities. There was no evidence of any safety-related problems of any kind actually caused by Mr. Puleo's historic use of the right-of-way in front of his property or to the south of his property line where the asphalt was installed to extend his parking area. No evidence was offered to prove that allowing Mr. Puleo to use the new asphalt pad for the same parking and advertising activity he has conducted historically would interfere with safety, operation, aesthetics, or maintenance of the State Highway System, utilities, or right-of-way. Instead, the evidence established that Mr. Puleo's historic parking and advertising on the right-of-way have not given rise to any traffic-related or pedestrian-related problems. Mr. Puleo's use of the right-of-way is no more intrusive or distracting than the similar uses of right-of-way evident from the pictures in evidence. Moreover, Mr. Puleo's historic use of the right-of-way is no more intrusive or distracting than Mr. Puleo's lineup of rental cars with "Rent Me" signs in the windows along his northern property line, which Mr. Puleo has every right to do, because he owns that property in fee simple. While in a different case, the Department certainly could have legitimate safety concerns with certain parking on its right-of-way, such as if vehicles parked on the grassy strips on either side of the sidewalk, or straddled the sidewalk itself, or if parked vehicles blocked access connections or interfered with motorist visibility. However, not all right-of-way areas present the same safety concerns. Parking on the right-of-way might, but would not necessarily, impede pedestrian traffic on sidewalks or interfere with ingress and egress or motorist visibility at access connections, depending on where the right-of-way is and how far it extends in from the roadway. These sorts of safety concerns are matters to be proven, and there was no such proof offered by the Department in this case.6/ The Department sought to justify the issuance of the 2010 permit, with its new special conditions, on the grounds that the 2010 permit is more consistent with the terms of the settlement agreement. The Department points to the terms "turn out" and "driveway usage" in paragraph 8, which the Department argues should give rise to a permit restricting usage of the new asphalt to moving traffic only. Mr. Puleo contends that "driveway usage" in both paragraphs 7 and 8 refer to the ordinary meaning of that term, which includes parking. As the parties acknowledged at the outset of the hearing and as the undersigned reiterated throughout the hearing, the nature of this proceeding is a permit enforcement proceeding. Interpretation and enforcement of the settlement agreement are matters for the circuit court. Moreover, as noted above, the settlement agreement incorporates the 2009 permit as one of the settlement agreement's terms, not the other way around. Therefore, while one might want to consider what the 2009 permit says, if one were interpreting the settlement agreement (because the 2009 permit is part of the settlement agreement), the reverse is not true. The 2009 permit stands on its own terms, because it was issued before the settlement agreement was executed. The 2009 permit uses the description "extend parking area" and neither incorporates the settlement agreement by reference, nor uses the terms "turn out" or "driveway usage" that appear in the settlement agreement. Even if the 2009 permit provided that the newly installed asphalt was for "driveway usage" as paragraph 8 of the settlement agreement does, absent a specific definition of that phrase, one would resort to the common, ordinary meaning from dictionaries. The word "driveway" alone is commonly defined as "a private way or road for cars, leading from a street or road to a garage, house, or other building." See, e.g., Webster's New World Collegiate Dictionary (2010); American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 4th Ed. (2010) (both available online at yourdictionary.com). The same online source provides examples of usage of the word "driveway" in sentences and phrases, as follows: Driveway parking. A paved driveway in the property provides ample parking. The property is approached via a block-paved driveway with parking for approximately four vehicles. These examples illustrate that driveway usage includes parking, based on the common, ordinary meaning of the term. The Department offered a specialized meaning of "turn out" and "driveway" from its design standards for access connections that are permitted on right-of-way property. Those standards provide that access connections are to be designed with driveways of sufficient length to allow all vehicular parking and maneuvering to take place beyond the right-of-way, so that driveways and turn outs within the right-of-way are used only for "moving vehicles entering or leaving the highway." That specialized definition makes sense in the context of designing access connections that are permitted uses of a right-of-way. If vehicles are parked or are maneuvering to turn around within the right-of-way that is being used as an access connection, that use would interfere with the movement of vehicles entering or leaving the highway, as the design standard itself makes clear. Here, however, the asphalt extension of Mr. Puleo's parking area does not connect to the roadway and is not proximate to the access connection point on Mr. Puleo's property. Thus, the design standard's specialized usage of the terms driveway and turn out to restrict use of the right-of-way to "moving vehicles entering or leaving the highway" has no application to the facts here. The Department's witnesses established that neither the 2009 permit, nor the 2010 permit at issue in this case, is an access connection permit. Perhaps the clearest indicator that the 2009 permit means what it says and was intended that way is by reference to Mr. Puleo's historic use of the right-of-way in front of his building. The settlement agreement addresses this right-of-way in paragraph 7, stating that the Department acknowledges that Mr. Puleo has used this right-of-way as "his historic driveway." The Department also acknowledges that there are parking spaces on the right-of-way that is Mr. Puleo's historic driveway; part of every vehicle parked in a designated space in front of Mr. Puleo's building is on the right-of-way that is described in the settlement agreement as Mr. Puleo's "historic driveway." Vehicles historically have also parked on other parts of the pavement in front of Mr. Puleo's building, besides the designated parking spaces, on Department right-of-way, also known as Mr. Puleo's historic driveway. Another apt name for Mr. Puleo's historic driveway was suggested by Mr. Rosenstein's 2009 permit description--parking area. The evidence establishes that the two phrases are one and the same for purposes of describing Mr. Puleo's historic usage of the right-of-way in front of his building; he has used his historic driveway as a parking area. The corollary is that the 2009 permit authorized Mr. Puleo to extend the parking area and, thereby, extend his historic use of his driveway as a parking area to the extended driveway/parking area. Nonetheless, after the Department unilaterally revoked the 2009 permit and replaced it with the 2010 permit, the Department issued its Complaint. The Complaint alleged that by parking vehicles and advertising on the new asphalt pad, Mr. Puleo violated the new special conditions of the 2010 permit. Sections 335.181 and 337.406, Florida Statutes, were cited as the statutes under which Mr. Puleo's alleged violations were charged. This time, the Complaint acknowledged that the Department's charges were only intended action and that Mr. Puleo could contest the charges before they became final by timely requesting an administrative hearing. At the hearing, the Department offered no explanation for its failure to follow the same procedure when it notified Mr. Puleo by letter on May 13, 2010, that his 2009 permit would be revoked, effective eight days hence. The Complaint is predicated only on Mr. Puleo's alleged violation of the 2010 permit, by his use of the new asphalt pad for parking and advertising. The Complaint does not charge Mr. Puleo with any improper use of the right-of-way in front of his building. The parties stipulated that Mr. Puleo has been parking and advertising on Department right-of-way.7/ Mr. Puleo credibly testified that he would not have agreed to a settlement of the circuit court litigation with the Department without the 2009 permit authorizing him to "extend [his] parking area." Mr. Puleo reasonably relied on the Department's representations expressed in the 2009 permit and in the settlement agreement incorporating the 2009 permit. The Department's representations recognized that Mr. Puleo's "historic driveway" was used as a parking area; the Department's representations authorized Mr. Puleo to extend his parking area and continue his historic usage of the parking area, as extended by the new asphalt pad. In reliance on the Department's representations, Mr. Puleo changed his position to his detriment by agreeing to a settlement agreement that resulted in the dismissal of the circuit court litigation. In entering into the settlement agreement, Mr. Puleo acquiesced to terms that were of great value and importance to the Department, because Mr. Puleo understood from the Department's representations that he was receiving, in return, the terms that were of great importance to him. The 2009 permit was issued as an inducement to secure Mr. Puleo's agreement to execute the settlement agreement.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order (1) determining that permit number 2009-K- 194-36 remains in full force and effect; (2) determining that permit number 2010-2010-K-194-30 is void and of no effect; and (3) dismissing the Complaint (as deemed amended), based on the failure to prove violations of the 2009 permit under the statutes charged in the Complaint, and based on the established defense of equitable estoppel. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2013.

Florida Laws (15) 120.52120.569120.57120.60334.044335.18335.181335.182335.185335.187335.188337.25337.406775.082775.083
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CAPITAL CITY BANK vs FRANKLIN COUNTY AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 14-000517 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Apalachicola, Florida Jan. 31, 2014 Number: 14-000517 Latest Update: Sep. 08, 2014

The Issue The issue is whether Franklin County (County) has given reasonable assurance that it satisfies all requirements for an after-the-fact permit authorizing the construction of a rock revetment seaward of the coastal construction control line (CCCL) on Alligator Drive, also known as County Road 370.

Findings Of Fact The Nature of the Dispute The origins of this dispute date back a number of years. In short, the County currently has two adjoining revetments seaward of the CCCL on County Road 370 (Alligator Drive) located on Alligator Point in the southeastern corner of the County.1 County Road 370, situated immediately adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico, is a vulnerable structure and eligible for armoring. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62B-33.002(64). The old revetment is permitted; the new revetment is not. Pursuant to a Department enforcement action directed at both revetments, the County applied for an after-the-fact permit to authorize the construction of the new revetment. See Case No. 12-3276EF. The two revetments, totaling around 2,800 feet in length, abut County Road 370 and join near the intersection of Alligator Drive and Tom Roberts Road. The road itself is around 50 or 60 feet from the edge of the revetments. The old revetment extends around 2,000 feet west of the intersection while the new revetment extends 800 feet east of the intersection. There is a curve in the road at the intersection, and at that point the road elevation drops two or three feet for an undisclosed distance. The revetments, however, run in a straight line. There is no beach and dune system in front of the old revetment, while a small amount of exposed sand is located on the far eastern end of the new revetment. Due to storm events over the years, unauthorized debris has been placed on top of the old revetment by the County. Under the terms of the enforcement action, the County is required to remove the debris. This will reduce the height of the old revetment by several feet below its original height of nine feet National Geodetic Vertical Datum (NGVD).2 Where the two revetments join, however, the height differs by only around a foot. The Bank owns property across the street from the old revetment and alleges that, for several reasons, the site and design of the new revetment, coupled with the reduction in height of the old revetment, will cause erosion of the shoreline around the old revetment and expose County Road 370 and the adjacent upland Bank property to erosion. Although the current design and location of the old revetment have been finalized through prior agency action, the Bank has asked that the permit be denied unless the County relocates rock boulders from the new to the old revetment and raises its height back to nine feet NGVD. The County asserts that the Bank's real aim here is to require the County, at taxpayer expense, to reconstruct the old revetment to its original height. Otherwise, the Department will not waive the 30-year erosion control line restriction and allow the Bank to fully develop its property that is seaward of the CCCL. See § 161.053(5)(b), Fla. Stat. The Old Revetment Since the late 1970s, the County has owned and maintained that portion of County Road 370 that is the subject of this dispute. In May 1986, the Department of Natural Resources, which was later merged with the Department, issued to the County CCCL Permit No. FR-204 for the construction of the old revetment, then 1,500 feet long. The revetment was located approximately 350 feet east of Department Reference Monument R-211 to approximately 150 feet west of the Department Reference Monument R-213. In November 1994, the Department issued to the County CCCL Permit No. FR-446 for the re-construction of the old revetment, as well as a 500-foot extension of the eastern limits of the structure with granite boulders. The revetment, as extended, is located approximately 540 feet west of Department Reference Monument R-212 to approximately 140 feet east of Department Reference Monument R-213. The permit did not authorize placement of any construction debris within the revetment. With the extension, the total length of the old revetment is now approximately 2,000 feet. After an application for a joint coastal permit to conduct a beach and dune restoration project was filed by the County in September 2006, a Department site inspection revealed the presence of concrete debris and other debris material stacked on top of the old revetment. A debris removal plan was formulated by the Department, which was intended to be incorporated as a special condition in the joint coastal permit. In May 2011, the joint coastal permit was approved and included a debris removal plan. Because of financial constraints, however, the County did not undertake and complete the work relating to the beach and dune restoration plan or the debris removal plan. In January 2012, another inspection was conducted by the Department to document how much debris was in the old revetment and where it was located. The inspection revealed the presence of a significant amount of concrete debris and other debris material scattered throughout the revetment and continuing eastward. That same month, largely at the urging of the Bank, the Department issued a one-count Notice of Violation (NOV) alleging that after a storm event in July 2005, the County placed unauthorized construction debris and other debris material in the old revetment seaward of the CCCL, and that the debris still remained within the footprint of the revetment. See Case No. 12- 3276EF. (The Bank unsuccessfully attempted to intervene in the enforcement action.) As corrective action, the County was required to remove all debris, seaward of the CCCL, from and adjacent to the footprint of the old revetment no later than 60 days after the end of the hurricane season. That work has not yet been performed, probably because the work on both revetments will take place at the same time. After the debris is removed, the height of the old revetment will vary from between five and eight feet NGVD rather than the original nine-foot height. This was not the relief that the non-party Bank desired in the enforcement action. Instead, the Bank has always wanted the old revetment to be reconstructed to the nine-foot NGVD standard authorized in the original construction permit. Even so, the enforcement action is now final, as no appeal was taken by the County. Except for the unauthorized debris, the old revetment meets all Department standards. The New Revetment Under emergency circumstances, between September 2000 and July 2005 the County placed material, including granite rock boulders and debris material, in a location east of the old revetment, seaward of the CCCL. The construction activity is located approximately 140 feet east of Department Reference Monument R-213 to approximately 80 feet east of Department Reference Monument R-214 and is around 800 feet in length. However, the County did not obtain a permit for the temporary structure within 60 days after its construction, as required by section 161.085(3), Florida Statutes. In July 2005, Hurricane Dennis made landfall in the Florida Panhandle causing damage to the shoreline along Alligator Drive. As an emergency measure after the storm event, the County placed rock boulders that had been displaced back into the new revetment seaward of the CCCL. The County also placed other unauthorized concrete debris and debris material within the footprint of the rock revetment seaward of the CCCL. Again, no timely authorization for this work was obtained by the County. In August 2012, the Department issued an Amended NOV in Case No. 12-3276EF adding a second count, which alleged that the County had failed to obtain a permit for the placement of the rock boulders and unauthorized debris. On April 18, 2013, the Department issued a Final Order in Case No. 12-3276EF. As to Count II, it gave the County two options for corrective action: (a) that the County submit "a complete permit application for a rigid coastal armoring structure located between Department reference monuments R-213 and R-214 that complies with all applicable Department permitting rules and statutes"; or (b) that "the County remove all material placed seaward of the CCCL pursuant to a Department approved debris removal plan[,]" leaving that portion of County Road 370 without a revetment. 2013 Fla. ENV LEXIS 16 at *16. Desiring to protect its infrastructure, the County opted to apply for an after-the-fact permit. The Permit Application In March 2013, the County filed an application for an after-the-fact permit for the construction of the new revetment. As directed by the Department, the County proposes to construct a new revetment located between Department Reference Monuments R- 213 and R-214. The height of the new revetment will be around nine feet NGVD, while its slope will be one vertical to three horizontal. The old revetment is not quite as steep, having a slope of one vertical to two horizontal. The application includes a debris removal plan for the removal of construction debris as well as other debris scattered through the new revetment. Construction debris occupies a large portion of the new revetment and largely appears to be associated with storm damaged concrete sidewalk. All derelict concrete and asphalt material that is located water ward of Alligator Drive and landward of the mean high water line is to be removed. Both the County and its engineering consultant will monitor the work at the project. After reviewing the application, the Department proposed to issue after-the-fact CCCL Permit FR-897. The Bank then filed its Petition, as later amended. Petitioner's Objections As summarized in its PRO, the Bank alleges that the County did not give reasonable assurance that the following statutory and rule provisions have been satisfied: section 161.053(1)(a), which provides that special siting and design considerations shall be necessary seaward of the CCCL "to ensure protection of . . . adjacent properties"; rule 62B-33.005(2), which requires that the applicant provide the Department with sufficient information to show that adverse impacts associated with the construction have been minimized and that construction will not result in a significant adverse impact"; rule 62B-33.005(3)(a), which requires that the Department "[d]eny any application for an activity which either individually or cumulatively would result in a significant adverse impact including potential cumulative effects"; rule 62B-33.0051(2), which provides that armoring "shall be sited and designed to minimize adverse impacts to the beach and dune system, marine turtles, native salt-tolerant vegetation, and existing upland and adjacent structures"; and rule 62B-33.0051(2)(a), which requires armoring to "be sited as far landward as practicable to minimize adverse impacts . . . on existing upland and adjacent structures." See PRO, pp. 16-17. A common thread in these regulatory citations is that a revetment should be constructed in a manner that does not cause adverse impacts on "adjacent property." Except for the above cited provisions, no other permit requirements are contested, and the County's prima facie case satisfied those other requirements. The Bank's odd-shaped property, acquired in a foreclosure proceeding, abuts that portion of Alligator Drive immediately adjacent to the old revetment. The eastern boundary of the Bank's property is at least 300 feet west of the new revetment and extends westward along County Road 370 until it intersects with Harbor Circle. The entire tract is separated from the old revetment by County Road 370, a two-lane paved road. The property was once used as a KOA campground; however, the predecessor owner acquired development rights for a Planned Unit Development, which apparently cannot be fully developed unless the old revetment is raised back to its original height by the County or some other acceptable form of erosion protection is provided by the Bank at its own expense. The essence of the Bank's complaint is that the new revetment, as now sited and designed, will expose the old revetment to a higher rate of erosion, and ultimately accelerate the erosion of its property across the street. The Bank asserts that this will occur for three reasons. First, the removal of construction debris from the old revetment will lower its height, weaken the structure, and create a "discontinuity in height and composition between the revetments," resulting in increased exposure to erosion. Second, the toe of the new revetment (at the western end of the structure) will extend ten feet further seaward than the old revetment, creating a discontinuity and placing the old revetment at higher exposure to erosion. Finally, the Bank contends a discontinuity already exists between the two revetments due to the curved shape of the road at the intersection, causing the western end of the new revetment to extend further seaward than the old revetment. The Bank argues that the discontinuity will amplify the wave action on the shoreline during a severe storm event and eventually cause a breach of the old revetment. In sum, the Bank is essentially arguing that unless the two revetments mirror each other in height and slope, and consist of the same construction materials, the after-the-fact permit must be denied. The Bank's expert, Mr. Chou, a coastal engineer, was employed shortly before the final hearing and made one visit to the site. Regarding the removal of unauthorized construction debris from the old revetment, Mr. Chou was concerned that, while not ideal, the debris offers a degree of shoreline protection. He recommended that if removed, the debris be replaced with boulders comparable to the design standard of the new revetment. However, the record shows that when the loose and uneven debris is removed from the old revetment, the existing rocks will be moved to an interlocking or "chinking" configuration that actually enhances the stability and integrity of the structure.3 The Bank is also concerned that the height and slope of the two revetments differ. Mr. Chou testified that there exists the increased potential for erosion as a result of what he described as a discontinuity, or a difference of characteristics, between the two revetments. He opined that the protective function of the old revetment will be compromised by the removal of the granite boulders, which will lower the overall height of the revetment between two and four feet. According to Mr. Chou, if the new revetment suffers a direct hit by a major storm, i.e., one capable of dislodging the armor, he would "expect damage, significant damage, right next to it." Mr. Chou conceded, however, that if a permit is not approved, and the County elects to remove the new revetment, it could result in a significant adverse impact to property located along Alligator Drive. Mr. Chou further acknowledged that there will be no significant adverse effect on the old revetment during "everyday" winds, waves, and currents. Finally, he agreed that if the toes of the new and old revetments are essentially the same, as the certified engineering plans demonstrate they are, it will "minimize" the discontinuity that he describes. Notably, in 2005, Hurricane Dennis actually caused accretion (an increase in sand) on the Bank property, rather than erosion. While there are some differences in height and slope between the two revetments, no meaningful differences from an engineering perspective were shown. Through the County's coastal engineer, Mr. Dombrowski, who over the years has visited the site dozens of times and worked on a number of major projects in the area, it was credibly demonstrated that the old and new revetments will, in effect, form one continuous armoring structure that will provide shoreline protection along Alligator Drive. In terms of toe, slope, height, and construction material, there will be one continuous and straight revetment along the road, with a "fairly consistent elevation and slope going from one end to the other." If a major storm event occurs, the impacts to both revetments will likely be the same. In any event, there is no requirement that the County construct a revetment that is storm proof or prevents severe storm damage. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the new revetment is consistent with the siting and design criteria in rule 62B-33.0051(2). The design of the new revetment is consistent with generally accepted engineering practice. The new revetment is sited and designed so that there will be no significant adverse impacts, individually or cumulatively, to the adjacent shoreline. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62B-33.005(3). The County has provided the Department with sufficient information to show that adverse and other impacts associated with the construction are minimized, and the new revetment will not result in a significant adverse impact to the Bank's property. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62B-33.005(2). The new revetment should toll erosion – which now occurs on Alligator Point at the rate of five feet per year -- and provide shoreline protection. Finally, the construction of the new revetment will not cause an adverse impact to the old revetment. For all practical purposes, the two revetments have existed side-by-side since 2005. The Bank failed to offer any credible evidence that the new revetment has had a significant adverse impact on the old revetment over the last nine years.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order approving the County's application for after- the-fact permit number FR-897. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 2014.

Florida Laws (6) 120.52120.569120.57120.68161.053403.412
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J. W. C. COMPANY, INC.; D. W. KNAPPEN; ET AL. vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 78-001683 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-001683 Latest Update: Jan. 12, 1981

Findings Of Fact The Florida Department of Transportation is seeking to initiate a project to widen a portion of Gulf Boulevard (State Road 699) on Treasure Island, Pinellas County, Florida. In connection with the project, DOT filed an application for "complex source permit" with DER prior to April, 1976. The Petitioners filed a petition and request for public hearing in connection with that application on April 19, 1976. The matter was forwarded to the office of the Division of Administrative Hearings for further proceedings. DER thereafter attempted to withdraw its complex source permit rule. DOT withdrew its application for permit, and by order entered September 30, 1977, a Hearing Officer of the Division dismissed the case. The effort to repeal the complex source permit rule was later determined to be invalid, DOT re-applied for a permit, and Petitioners renewed their request for a hearing by petition dated April 18, 1978. Proceedings were thereafter conducted before the Division of Administrative Hearings, and a recommended order was entered on December 6, 1978. On December 6, 1976, DOT filed an application for dredge and fill permit with DER respecting the same road-widening project. The permit was issued by the Southwest District Office of DER, which is located in Tampa. Notice of the pendency of the dredge and fill permit application was published in a local newspaper of general distribution. No direct notice, however, was given to the Petitioners. The Petitioners directed an inquiry as to the existence of outstanding permit applications in connection with the project by letter dated October 18, 1977. The Department responded advising the Petitioners as follows: Dredge and fill permits for the installation of culverts have been applied for in our Southwest District Office. The permits are currently pending and the application files. . . are available for inspection daily. Despite the fact that the permit had actually been issued nearly seven months earlier, DER did not advise the Petitioners that the permit had been issued, but only that it was pending. Petitioners apparently made no further inquiry respecting the dredge and fill permit until they learned, in connection with proceedings being conducted respecting the complex source permit application, that the dredge and fill permit had been issued. The Petitioners promptly thereafter initiated this proceeding. A copy of the petition in this proceeding was forwarded to counsel for the Department of Transportation by the Petitioners. At a pre-hearing conference conducted in the complex source permit proceeding, counsel for DOT indicated that it may participate in this proceeding. Counsel for DER discussed this proceeding with counsel for DOT and was advised that DOT would not become a party to this proceeding. DOT has not appeared as a party to this proceeding. No evidence was offered to establish whether DOT has taken any action to complete the work authorized by the dredge and fill permit that was issued.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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ROBERT STOKY AND RUTH STOKY vs MONROE COUNTY, 00-000377DRI (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Key West, Florida Jan. 21, 2000 Number: 00-000377DRI Latest Update: Oct. 12, 2001

The Issue This is an appeal from Resolution No. P60-99 of the Monroe County Planning Commission ("Planning Commission"), in which the Planning Commission approved the decision of the Monroe County Planning Department ("Planning Department") denying two applications for building permits submitted by the Appellants, Robert and Ruth Stoky ("the Stokys"). One application requested a building permit to reconstruct a screened porch and to build an elevated deck in the rear of the Señor Frijoles/Cactus Jack's restaurants, which are located at 103900 Overseas Highway, Key Largo, Florida; this application was assigned building permit number 99-3-857 ("permit number 99-3-857"). The second application requested a building permit to reconstruct a trellis as a separate structure associated with the Sundowner restaurant, also located at 103900 Overseas Highway, Key Largo, Florida; this application was assigned building permit number 99-3-858 ("permit number 99-3-858"). The instant appeal was forwarded by the Planning Commission to the Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to Article XIV, Monroe County Code, the Hearing Officer Appellate Article, and Monroe County ("the County") has appeared as Appellee in this case. In their Initial Brief, the Stokys abandoned their appeal of the decision of the Planning Commission approving the Planning Department's denial of their application for permit number 99-3-858; therefore, the ultimate issue presented in this appeal is whether the Planning Commission's Resolution No. P60-99 should be affirmed, reversed, or modified with respect to the its decision approving the Planning Department's denial of the Stokys' application for permit number 99-3-857.

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JAMES CASTORO AND WINIFRED CASTORO; JELKS H. CABANISS, JR.; ANNE CABANISS; STANLEY GOLDMAN AND GLORIA GOLDMAN; FRANKLIN H. PFEIFFENBERGER; AND KATY STENHOUSE vs ROY PALMER AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 96-000736 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Feb. 08, 1996 Number: 96-000736 Latest Update: Oct. 19, 1998

The Issue The issues in these cases are whether the Respondent, Roy Palmer, is entitled to a Noticed General Environmental Resource Permit, under Florida Administrative Code Chapter 62-341, and a Consent of Use under Florida Administrative Code Chapter 18-21.

Findings Of Fact Procedural History On or about February 13, 1995, the Respondent, Roy Palmer (Palmer), applied for a wetland resource permit to construct a 395-foot boat dock for use at his single-family residence at property he owned on Sarasota Bay, an Outstanding Florida Water. As proposed, this dock was to originate from the northern part of Palmer's property and have a terminal platform with two boat moorings and two boat lifts. On September 1, 1995, the Department of Environmental Protection (the Department or DEP) gave notice of intent to issue a permit for a shorter (370-foot) dock originating from the southern part of the Palmer property. The Petitioners filed a petition for administrative hearing challenging the intended action. DEP referred the petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), where it was assigned DOAH Case No. 95-5311. On or about December 11, 1995, Palmer applied for a noticed general environmental resource permit (ERP) permit for his dock under new DEP rules went into effect on October 3, 1995. This proposal was for the 370-foot dock originating from the southern part of the Palmer property. On or about January 10, 1996, DEP acknowledged receipt of the noticed general ERP (No. 582819483) and informed Palmer that it appeared to meet the requirements of the new rule. DEP also gave notice of intent to grant Palmer's application for consent of use of sovereign submerged lands necessary to construct the dock. (The record is not clear when the application for consent of use was filed.) The Petitioners filed a petition for administrative hearing challenging agency action regarding both the noticed general ERP and the consent of use. DEP also referred this petition to DOAH, where it was assigned DOAH Case No. 96-0736. Palmer withdrew the original permit application and moved to dismiss DOAH Case No. 95-5311. In July, 1996, Palmer applied for a noticed general ERP to build a still shorter (232-foot) dock originating from the southern part of the Palmer property (Permit No. 292583). Apparently, no notice of the application was published or required to be published. It is not clear whether the Petitioners "filed a written request for notification of any pending applications affecting the particular area in which the proposed activity is to occur." Palmer's second noticed general ERP (No. 292583) was amended on or about August 19, 1996, to eliminate one boat mooring and one boat lift. DEP took no action on Palmer's second application for a noticed general ERP No. 292583. On September 23, 1996, Palmer filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Administrative Proceeding in DOAH Case No. 96-0736 because he had withdrawn the previous application for a noticed general ERP for a 370-foot dock (No. 582819483) and was proceeding only on the second noticed general ERP (No. 292583) for the 232foot dock. Palmer's intent was to dismiss only the portion of his prior application regarding the noticed general permit, but not the consent of use. On October 28, 1996, the Petitioners filed a petition for administrative hearing challenging noticed general ERP No. 292583 for the 232-foot dock. This petition alleged that the Petitioners filed a written objection to noticed general ERP No. on September 16, 1996, which requested a written response, and that no response of any kind was received until the Petitioners inquired and were told that DEP did not intend to respond to either the noticed general ERP (No. 292583) or the Petitioners' objection. Proposed Dock at Issue The proposal at issue is for a 227-foot access pier and 20 foot by 5 foot terminal platform with only one boat mooring and one boat lift. The length, location, and design of Palmer's proposed dock was changed in an attempt to satisfy the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP or the Department) and Palmer's neighbors. Palmer's task in this regard was difficult in part because a longer dock with a terminus in deeper water could have less impact on seagrasses (the major environmental concern) but would have a greater impact on the neighbors' views of Sarasota Bay (the major infringement of riparian rights concern.) In the final version, Palmer tried to balance these conflicting concerns. As proposed, neither the terminal platform, boat lift, nor mooring location occurs over submerged grassbeds, coral communities or wetlands. Starting at the mean high water line, the first 75 feet of the access pier for the proposed dock will traverse essentially no sea grasses. In the next 75 feet to 150 feet of the access pier, there will be approximately 80% vegetative cover consisting primarily of the seagrass halodule wrightii. Between 150 feet and 200 feet, there will be approximately 20% vegetative cover consisting of the seagrasses halodule wrightii and thalassia testudinum. Between 200 feet and 232 feet, seagrasses consisted primarily of thalassia testudinum, except that the terminal platform is located in an area of essentially bare sand. Starting at 80 feet from the mean high water line, the access pier for the proposed dock will ramp up to 5 feet above mean high water for the next 20 linear feet and continue at that elevation for the next 112 feet to reduce shading of the seagrasses. Then it will descend stairs for the next 5 linear feet, until it is 3.5 feet above mean high water, and will continue at that elevation for 10 more feet to where it joins the 20 foot by 5 foot terminal platform. In this way, wherever it traverses seagrasses, the access walkway portion of the pier will be elevated 5 feet above mean high water. The access walkway will be only 4 feet wide and will have half-inch wide gaps between its deck boards to allow sunlight through and further reduce shading of the seagrasses. The access walkway also will have handrails that are maintained in such a manner as to prevent use of the access walkways for boat mooring or access. As proposed, the terminal platform and boat lift occurs in a location with minimum depth of 2.2 feet below the mean low water level. There is some water 1.7 feet deep in the vicinity of the terminal platform, but the structure can be used without traversing the shallow water. The structure is designed so that boat mooring and navigational access will be in water at least 2 feet deep. Including access pier and terminal platform, the total area of Palmer's proposed dock over sovereign, submerged land would be 1,008 square feet. There will be no wet bars or living quarters over wetlands or surface waters or on the pier, and there will be no structures enclosed by walls or doors. There will be no fish cleaning facilities, boat repair facilities or equipment, or fueling facilities on the proposed dock. No overboard discharges of trash, human, or animal waste, or fuel will occur from the dock. The only dredging or filling associated with construction of Palmer's proposed dock will be the minimum dredge and fill required for installation of the actual pilings for the pier, terminal platform, and boat lift. Altogether, less than 30 square feet of bay bottom will be disturbed during construction and displaced to accommodate the pilings. Palmer's noticed general ERP is subject to the general conditions set out in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62- 341.427. Among those conditions is the requirement that Palmer implement best management practices for erosion, turbidity, and other pollution control to prevent violation of state water quality standards. The pilings will be jetted, not driven, into place to minimize disturbance of the bay bottom and temporary increases in turbidity. Turbidity barriers will be installed and maintained in a functional condition at each piling until construction is completed and soils are stabilized and vegetation has been established. Used properly, turbidity barriers have proved effective in containing temporary turbidity from dock construction. Based on the expert testimony, it is found that the construction of Palmer's proposed dock will not significantly impact seagrasses. The Petitioners presented expert testimony on seagrasses, but their expert testified only generally based on studies showing that shading negatively impacts seagrasses. He had no prior knowledge of the Palmer dock design, seagrass coverage, or the depth of the water. When apprised of some information concerning Palmer's proposed dock, he admitted that the studies involved far more severe shading conditions than would be caused by the proposed dock. He could not testify that the Palmer dock design would harm seagrasses, with the exception of those actually removed by the installation of the pilings. Accidental boat propeller dredging in using a dock can be a secondary impact on seagrasses from dock construction. But while a dock could perhaps attract a few boats, the dock's presence also might cause boaters to steer clear of the dock or reduce speed in the vicinity of the dock, which could result in a net reduction in the risk of damage to seagrasses from accidental prop dredging. Petitioners Dr. Franklin Pfeiffenberger, James Castoro, and Winifred Castoro jointly own a dock to the south of the Palmer property. This dock, which was built in the 1930's, projects 190 feet into Sarasota Bay and traverses seagrasses. Unlike the proposed Palmer dock, the Pfeiffenberger dock is not elevated, and it terminates in seagrasses. The seagrasses under the Pfeiffenberger dock are the same types as those located in the Palmer dock alignment--a combination of halodule wrightii and thalassia testudinum. The dock has been rebuilt a number of times over the years. Upon physical inspection, apparently healthy and growing seagrasses were found underneath the Pfeiffenberger dock. The proposed dock will not harm wildlife, including manatees (the only endangered species in the area, animal or plant). Manatees use Sarasota Bay in general, but the east side of the bay, where the Palmer property is located, is not a high use area. It is shallow and would not be considered "select" habitat for manatees. The proposed dock would not have any detrimental effect on manatee travel patterns; they could easily swim around the dock. Manatees eat seagrasses and other aquatic vegetation, but the proposed dock will not have significant adverse impact on those resources. Finally, while a dock could perhaps attract a few boats, the dock's presence also might cause boaters to steer clear of the dock or reduce speed in the vicinity of the dock, which could result in a net reduction in the risk of injury to manatees in the area from boat collisions and prop scarring. Except for temporary turbidity during construction, no other water quality parameters will be violated as a result of the construction of Palmer's proposed dock. Palmer's proposed dock and its use will not significantly impede navigability in Sarasota Bay. The bay is approximately 18,000 feet wide at that point, and it is approximately 4,800 feet from Palmer's property to the Intracoastal Waterway. Since the water is shallow near shore in the vicinity of the Palmer property, relatively few boats frequent the area. Those that do are generally smaller boats. These boats easily could navigate so as to avoid the dock; very small boats, such as canoes and kayaks, might even be able to carefully pass under the elevated portion of the dock. Palmer's proposed dock also would not be a serious impediment to other recreational uses of Sarasota Bay in the area. The water is too shallow for swimming. Fishing could improve because the dock could attract baitfish. People could continue to wade-fish by walking around or even under the proposed dock. Palmer's proposed dock is aesthetically consistent with the area in which it is located. All the Petitioners have some sort of man-made structure projecting out into Sarasota Bay from their property. As already mentioned, Dr. Pfeiffenberger and the Castoros have a 190-foot dock projecting straight out into Sarasota Bay. Within the past five years, Dr. Pfeiffenberger has installed a bench to sit on at the end of the dock. To the north of the Palmer property, property owned by Mr. and Mrs. Cabaniss has a yacht basin formed by a sea wall that projects roughly perpendicular to the shoreline out into the bay. Immediately north of the Cabaniss property, there is a boat house on the Goldman property where it abuts the yacht basin. The Goldmans' boat house is approximately 20 feet in length and 10 feet in height from ground level. Immediately south of the Palmer property, Ms. Stenhouse has a small dock (which appears to be located over seagrasses.) As a result, the viewsheds of Palmer and the Petitioners already contain many docks and man- made structures. In addition, the Ringling Causeway and bridge can be seen from all of these properties. Palmer's proposed dock will appear in some views from the Petitioners' properties. Generally, the closer the neighbor, the more will be seen of Palmer's proposed dock. Some of the Petitioners will only be able to see the proposed dock if they go out to the westerly edge of their properties on the bay. While the proposed dock will appear in and alter these views, it will not eliminate any Petitioner's view of Sarasota Bay. Even the closest neighbors will have some unobstructed views around the proposed dock. It also will be possible to see over and under the proposed dock, similar to the way in which many of the Petitioners now enjoy their views. There are tall pine and palm trees on the Cabaniss property between their house and their view of the bay. Most of the other properties in the vicinity appear to have similar viewsheds. Ms. Stenhouse has a large stand of mangroves of the western edge of her property; they cover approximately 60 percent of the panorama from her house, but they are trimmed up so she can see through them. While some people would prefer not to have the Palmer dock there, other people might view the availability of single- family residential docks to be an asset to the properties in the neighborhood. Based on expert testimony, it cannot be found that property values in the area would go down as a result of Palmer's proposed dock. Palmer's proposed dock does little if anything to further the idealistic goals and objectives of the City of Sarasota Comprehensive Plan and the Sarasota Bay Management Plan to restore and expand seagrasses in Sarasota Bay in that the proposed dock will eliminate some seagrasses. However, only approximately 30 square feet of seagrasses will be lost. Otherwise, the proposed dock is consistent with other goals and objectives of the City of Sarasota Comprehensive Plan and the Sarasota Bay Management Plan in that the dock has been aligned and planned so as to minimize impacts on seagrasses while balancing the neighbors' desire to minimize the impact on their views of Sarasota Bay. Palmer's Riparian Rights Palmer and his wife received a Warranty Deed, dated August 27, 1993, from James Kirk, II, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Marie Ferguson. The deed describes Lots 27 and 28 of the Indian Beach subdivision in Sarasota, Florida, with a western boundary "along the shores of Sarasota Bay." Palmer attached this deed to his applications. Since at least November 1992, the mean high water line of Sarasota Bay has been west of a seawall on the Palmer property. The evidence was clear that the seawall has been there since at least 1944 and that Palmer has not filled the area to the west of the seawall or built any structure that influences its existence. The evidence was not clear as to the creation and history of upland to the west of the seawall. From aerial photographs, it appears that at least some upland has existed to the west of the seawall at least from time to time for at least the last 30 years. For reasons no witness could explain, the Palmers also received a Warranty Deed from Kirk, dated September 3, 1993, purporting to convey title only up to the seawall on the Palmer property. Likewise for reasons no witness could explain, a land surveyor named Lawrence R. Weber prepared a boundary survey based on the description in the September 3, 1993, Warranty Deed. Also for reasons no witness could explain, the Palmers received a Quit Claim Deed from Kirk, dated October 20, 1993. This instrument quitclaimed to the Palmers "all of the Grantor's property to the mean high water line of Sarasota Bay, including riparian rights." Except for the mysterious September 3, 1993, Warranty Deed from Kirk, all deeds in the chain of title back to at least 1944 reflect an intention to convey riparian rights. A deed given by Helen and Frederick Delaute to Cecilia and Harold Wilkins, dated April 19, 1944, described the westerly boundary of the property as running northerly along the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced riparian rights. (This deed attached a survey showing the still-existing seawall.) The next deed in the chain of title was from the widowed Cecilia S. Wilkins to Edward and Laura Williams dated December 27, 1954. The metes and bounds description again referenced the westerly boundary as running along the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced foreshore accretions and riparian rights. The next deed in the chain of title was from Edward and Laura Williams to Aidan and Wilma E. Dewey dated June 30, 1958. This deed again defined the westerly boundaries of the property as the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced foreshore accretions and riparian rights. The next deed in the chain of title was from Aidan and Wilma Dewey to Edward and Marie Ferguson dated August 23, 1967. This deed again defined the westerly boundary of the property as the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced foreshore accretions and riparian rights.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order issuing Noticed General Environmental Resource Permit (No. 292583) and Consent of Use (No. 582819483) to Roy Palmer. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Filson, Esquire Filson and Penge, P.A. 2727 South Tamiami Trail, Suite 2 Sarasota, Florida 34239 Thomas I. Mayton, Esquire T. Andrew Zodrow, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 David M. Levin, Esquire Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg Post Office Box 4195 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Alexandra St. Paul, Esquire The Riverview Center 1111 3rd Avenue, West Suite 350 Bradenton, Florida 34205 Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Office of General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 F. Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Office of General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57253.0326.012373.403373.414403.814 Florida Administrative Code (12) 18-21.00118-21.00318-21.00418-21.00518-21.00762-302.30062-341.20162-341.21562-341.42762-343.09062-4.24262-4.530
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FRED BRAID AND JULIE BRAID vs JAMES ROSASCO, CAROL ROSASCO, AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 99-000501 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Viera, Florida Feb. 02, 1999 Number: 99-000501 Latest Update: Jul. 17, 1999

The Issue The issue for disposition in this case is whether the Respondents, James and Carol Rosasco, qualify for a Noticed General Permit pursuant to Rule 62-341.427, Florida Administrative Code, and a Consent to Use pursuant to Rule 18-21.005, Florida Administrative Code, for a single-family dock, on the Indian River in Brevard County, Florida.

Findings Of Fact The Rosascos (James and Carol) own a parcel of real property on the Indian River at 4680 Highway AIA in Melbourne Beach, Brevard County, Florida (4680). The shoreline on the west of the Rosasco's property is more than 65 linear feet. The parcel just south of the Rosasco's property is at 4690 Highway AIA (4690). It was recently owned by a subsidiary of Disney and was used as an executive retreat. There is an existing dock at 4680, approximately 200 feet long, close to the upland boundary of 4680 and 4690, but extending southwest. The prior owner of 4680 and the Disney subsidiary had an agreement that allowed both to use and maintain the dock. The agreement was not renewed when the Rosascos purchased 4680. The Rosascos immediately made plans for a replacement dock and submitted the application that is the subject of this proceeding. Fred and Julie Braid own the parcel just south of 4690, at 4720 Highway AIA (4720). They have an approximate 280-foot long dock which runs straight west from their shoreline. In October 1998, Disney Realty, Inc., advertised 4690 for sale by bids. In December 1998, the Braids purchased the 4690 parcel with knowledge of ownership and configuration of the existing dock at 4680. After DEP issued its intent to grant their Noticed General Permit and Consent of Use for the Rosasco's 325-foot replacement dock. The Braids challenged the decision in January 1999. The Braids' two parcels and Rosasco's property are in a shallow cove area of the Indian River. Long docks are necessary there to provide boat access and to avoid seagrasses that are close to shore. The Braids are primarily concerned that if the Rosascos are allowed to construct their replacement dock there will be no room for the Braids to place a dock on their newly-acquired 4690 parcel. The Braids' Petition for Administrative Hearing and challenge to DEP's intended action is in letter form and raises four basic concerns: the proximity of the proposed dock to 4690; whether the proposed dock would preclude the Braids' placing their own dock on 4690; possible damage to seagrasses; and problems with navigation. In order to address the Braids' concerns, the Rosascos modified their application on March 31, 1999. The revised proposal increases the length of the dock from 325 feet to 500 feet and situates the dock to run north of the existing dock and parallel to that dock (which will be removed). The revised proposal has the new dock terminal starting 25 feet north of the property line and purported riparian line. The revised proposal would result in a minimum of 50 feet clearance between the new dock and the terminal platform of the Braids' existing dock at 4720. The modification did not satisfy the Braids. At the hearing Mr. Braid used strips of paper on a drawing to show hypothetical converging of the proposed Rosasco dock and another long dock extending from the center line of his shore frontage at 4690 where Mr. Braid would like to build. DEP staff have reviewed a signed and sealed survey submitted by the Rosascos which purports to show that both the original proposal and the revised dock proposal will place the new dock at least 25 feet from the riparian rights line between the Rosasco's property and the Braids' 4690 parcel. The riparian line drawn on the Rosasco's survey is configured in the same manner as a riparian line reflected on a survey submitted by the Braids when they sought approval for their now-existing dock at 4720. That is, the surveyor simply extended the upland property line straight into the Indian River. At hearing, the Braids submitted a survey of 4690 into evidence; this one angled the northern riparian line (line between 4690 and 4680) to run parallel to the southern riparian line (line between 4690 and 4720). There are obviously various means of drawing riparian lines, and those lines are particularly complicated in a cove where the shore is curved. Without the testimony of any of the surveyors it is impossible to determine their respective bases for the conflicting depictions. Neither the administrative law judge nor the DEP has any authority to determine riparian rights lines, as this a uniquely judicial function of a circuit court. In reviewing applications for dock permits, DEP does not require a circuit court order determining a riparian rights line as that would be impractical and cost-prohibitive. Instead, DEP accepts a signed, sealed, survey depicting a reasonable suggestion of the riparian rights line. This was the process when the Braids made application for their dock in 1996, and was the process when DEP reviewed the Rosasco's application in 1998. The survey submitted by the Rosascos indicates that the dock proposal, and March 1999 revised dock proposal both situate the replacement dock at least 25 feet from the purported riparian rights line. DEP reasonably relied on that survey. Brian Poole, a former DEP Environmental Specialist II with 25 years experience with the agency, reviewed the Rosascos' first and revised dock proposals. His lengthy experience includes processing and reviewing dock applications in this area of Brevard County and he is very familiar with seagrass habitat, dock placement, and navigation issues. According to Brian Poole, and based on the surveys and aerial photographs, the Rosascos' revised proposal would not preclude the Braids' building a dock on their 4690 parcel. It could be configured, even zig-zagged, between the Braids' existing dock, and the Rosasco's proposed dock. The Rosasco's proposed dock would afford more room than the Rosasco's existing dock which is closer to the 4690 parcel. Mr. Braid testified that some boaters in the Indian River travel close to the existing docks at 4680 and 4720 and that the longer dock proposed by the Rosascos will impede navigation. The Indian River is approximately 8000 feet wide at the project site and the Intracoastal Waterway, which is the main navigational channel of the Indian River, is approximately one mile west of the project site. The proposed 500-foot dock will not come near the Intracoastal Waterway or other navigational channel. There is already at least one other 500-foot dock in the vicinity of the Rosasco's and Braids' docks. There are several other shorter docks in the area. Because the water is shallow, any boaters close to the shore or using the existing docks will have to navigate carefully at idle speed and the docks will not impede their navigation. At the hearing the Braids conceded that seagrasses were not an issue. This is confirmed by Brian Poole whose experience and knowledge of the area confirm that there are no seagrass beds or other submerged aquatic vegetation at the terminal platform or mooring area of the original proposed dock or the revised proposed dock. Seagrasses also do not appear in the aerial photographs beyond 300-feet from shore as poor light penetration inhibits their growth.

Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: The petition challenging the propriety of the general permit for Rosascos' related proposed dock and the related consent of use of sovereign submerged lands be DENIED. The Rosascos' single-family dock project as revised in the March 31, 1999, modification be authorized pursuant to the applicable general permit rules, provided that the revised dock does not exceed a total area of 2,000 square feet, subject to design criteria limitations and other conditions. The Rosascos's application for consent of use of sovereign submerged lands be GRANTED, subject to the general consent conditions quoted above and those imposed by rule. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred and Julie Braid 4720 Highway AlA Melbourne Beach, Florida 32951 James and Carol Rosasco 4680 South Highway AlA Melbourne Beach, Florida 32951 Thomas I. Mayton, Jr., Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Office of General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, M.S. 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 F. Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.5726.012 Florida Administrative Code (4) 18-21.00418-21.00562-341.42762-343.090
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ST. TERESA DOCK ASSOCIATION, INC., AND H. S. OVEN vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 78-002246 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-002246 Latest Update: Jan. 07, 1980

The Issue Whether Bay North Corporation should be issued a permit to construct a domestic wastewater treatment and disposal system at Camp Weed, Franklin County, Florida, pursuant to Chapter 403, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact On February 27, 1978, Lomax Smith, a builder and developer in Tallahassee, Florida, entered into an agreement with the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Florida to purchase some 42 acres of real property and the improvements thereon known as "Camp Weed" which is located in Franklin County, Florida. The purchase price of the property was $725,000, with an earnest money deposit of $20,000, and closing of the transaction to be on or before July 1, 1978. At the time of purchase, eight dormitory and several accessory buildings were located on the property which utilized septic tanks for sewage disposal. An existing deep well is in the northwest portion of the property for a water supply. Smith proposed to develop the property by the sale of lots, remodel some of the existing buildings, and construct new housing units. He employed the engineering firm of Broward Davis and Associates, Inc., Tallahassee, Florida, to prepare the necessary design plans and a state environmental permit application for a proposed domestic wastewater treatment plant to be located on the site. (Testimony of L. Smith, N. Smith, Exhibits 12, 13) On September 6, 1978, Smith filed an application with Respondent Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) for a permit to construct the sewage treatment plant (STP) at Camp Weed. He signed the application as owner of the property although he had not closed the purchase transaction nor acquired legal title at that time. The application and supporting plans were reviewed in the Northwest District Office of the Department of Environmental Regulation after site investigation, and it was determined that construction of the facility would be in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. A construction permit was issued to Smith for the STP on October 10, 1978, subject to certain specified conditions attached to the permit. Notification of the permit issuance was not preceded by a notice of intent to grant the permit, nor were any third parties advised of its issuance. Petitioners St. Teresa Dock Association, Inc. (then St. Teresa Dock Association) and H.S. Oven first learned of the permit issuance when their counsel was informed by Smith's counsel on November 3, 1978, that the permit had been issued. Petitioners thereafter on November 17 filed a petition for hearing with DER. (Testimony of L. Smith, Huff, Exhibits 1, 4-5, 8) Camp Weed is bounded on the north by U.S. Highway 98 and on the south by the Gulf of Mexico. The planned site for the STP is in the northeast corner of the tract which is some twelve feet above mean sea level and approximately 950 feet from the shoreline. The elevation of the property on the northwestern side is about 24 feet and is five feet in the middle. The land slopes generally toward the middle area and drains in a southerly direction to the gulf. The subdivision of St. Teresa where Petitioners' members own summer homes is located immediately west of Camp Weed. The members of the St. Teresa Dock Association, Inc., and Petitioner Hamilton S. Oven use the beach and gulf waters for boating, fishing, and other recreational purposes. About a dozen shallow wells in the St. Teresa subdivision provide drinking water for the residents. They are located over 1700 feet southwest from the site of the proposed STP. There are two ponds north of the St. Teresa area adjacent to U.S. Highway 98. An artesian well is located in the gulf about 25 feet south of the Camp Weed property. (Testimony of Huff, N. Smith, Oven, Sensabaugh, Exhibits 2,7, 9-11, 22, 24) The proposed plant is designed to provide sewage treatment for 132 housing units containing an estimated population of 3 persons per unit. A gravity flow collection system to a pumping station will produce a peak influent rate of 29,700 gallons per day with an estimated biological oxygen demand (BOD) loading of 49.6 pounds per day. A basket strainer on the influent line will remove trash. Plant operation will involve the use of aeration tanks, clarifier, chlorination, sand filter and clear well for discharge to a percolation pond. A polishing pond was originally planned, but was deleted at the suggestion of the DER because it performs the same function as the proposed sand filter. Two percolation ponds for alternate use will be construed so that the pond bottom is twelve feet above sea level. A soil test revealed that a sand layer extends under the shallow surface top soil to a depth of approximately 10 feet before reaching the shallow ground water table and that the effluent will percolate through the sand at the rate of one inch per minute. A five foot soil boring by DER failed to encounter ground water at that level and show that rate of percolation through the sand would be acceptable. The ground water table is subject to an unknown variance indepth during the wet and dry seasons of the year depending on the amount of rainfall. Although tide fluctuations may also have some effect on depth of the ground water table, the tide most likely will be of minimum influence due to the distance of the plant site from the gulf. Percolation of at least three feet through sand before reaching ground water is sufficient to meet DER policy requirements. (Testimony of Huff, N. Smith, Bishop, Exhibits 1, 3, 16-17). Based on the design of the STP, it is predicted by applicant's design engineer that there will be at least 90 percent removal of pollutants after chlorination and prior to passage of the effluent through the sand filter. The engineer predicts that after such filtration, there will be approximately 95 percent removal prior to percolation and that the effluent will then be pure enough to use as drinking water. Further purification will take place during the percolation process. The DER District Supervisor of Domestic Wastewater Permitting, who also is a professional engineer, substantially agrees with those predictions. Actual results of the treatment process can be determined, however, only after tests from monitoring wells are made during actual trial operations of the plant. It is further agreed by those experts that the average chlorine residual content in the effluent will be 0.5 parts per million. The DER supervisor therefore is of the opinion that, if the STP is properly operated, the processed effluent will not degrade ground waters, not adversely affect the wells in the St. Teresa Community or the waters of the gulf. After percolation, there is further dilution and ultimately the ground water which reaches the gulf in eight to ten days will be in a purer form than prior to introduction of the effluent. Although a twenty-year storm criterion was applied in the design of the percolation ponds, a catastrophic storm such as a hurricane was not taken into consideration since it would not be economically feasible to design for such an effect and, in any event, super dilution caused by such a storm would negate the possibility of water quality degradation. (Testimony of Huff, N. Smith, Exhibit 1) The buildup of sludge in the plant's holding tank will require removal about once a year when the plant is in full operation. The applicant will employ a certified individual to operate the plant and to remove sludge periodically to an appropriate place for disposal in an authorized manner. DER regards sludge disposal to be a matter for determination at the time application is made for an operating permit. (Testimony of Huff, L. Smith, McNeill, N. Smith, Exhibit 1) The applicant estimates that the construction of the plant and collection system will cost approximately $1,000 per housing unit for a total of $132,000. It is planned to recover this cost on the sale of lots. A condition of such purchases will be that the sewage system and treatment plant will be operated by a home owners association which is to be activated in the near future. Maintenance cost of the sewage plant will be shared by the individual members. Approximately twenty or twenty-five members are required for economical operation of the plant. (Testimony of N. Smith, L. Smith) The county zoning classification for the Camp Weed area is currently the subject of litigation by the applicant in the Franklin County Circuit Court and the result of that litigation as to permitted density of housing will determine the amount of units to be constructed by the applicant. In any event, if the applicant does not secure a county building permit, any DER construction permit would expire at the termination of the time granted therefor. (Testimony of L. Smith, Huff, Exhibit 24) At the time Intervenor Lomax Smith signed the permit application, Bay North Corporation had not been formed. It was incorporated in November, 1978, in order that Smith could obtain financing to complete the property purchase. The transaction was closed November 6, 1978, and a warranty deed to the property was issued to Bay North Corporation by the Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Florida, Inc. The deed was recorded in the public records of Franklin County on November 7, 1978. Lomax Smith is the president and principal stockholder of Bay North Corporation. Promissory notes secured by mortgages to the Southern Bank of Tallahassee and the Episcopal Diocese of Florida in the amounts of $350,000 and $362,500 respectively, were executed by Bay North Corporation on the same date. Pursuant to a request to DER from Lomax Smith on May 15, 1979, the Northwest District DER Office, on June 29, 1979, purported to transfer the permit to Bay North Corporation and extend the expiration date to September 30, 1980. (Testimony of L. Smith, Huff, Exhibits 6, 14-15, 21) The construction permit issued in October, 1978, was subject to standard and special conditions, including the requirement that the permit holder comply with county and municipal regulations prior to construction. They provided that monthly reports be furnished to the DER prior to issuance of an operation permit setting forth wastewater characteristics during a trial period of plant operation. They also required that the facility meet the treatment requirements contained in Chapter 17-3, F.A.C., including a 90 percent reduction in BOD and suspended solids based on concentration of the influent entering the plant. The conditions further provide that at the time of application for an operation permit, it must be shown that a certified operator under Chapter 17- 16, F.A.C., is retained, together with a copy of any contract for contract operation of the facility. Additionally, the conditions require that two monitoring wells be established upstream and downstream of the ponds and that quarterly ground water samples be analyzed and reported to DER. A further condition provides that a three-foot buffer zone must be maintained between the bottom of the percolation ponds and the maximum elevation of the ground water. (Exhibit 8)

Recommendation That the Department of Environmental Regulation issue the requested permit to Bay North Corporation, subject to the conditions attached to the permit issued on October 10, 1978. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 21st day of November, 1979. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: George E. Lewis, II, Esq. 316 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, FL 32303 William L. Hyde, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32301 Ben H. Wilkinson, Esq. Pennington, Wilkinson, Gary and Dunlap Post Office Box 3875 Tallahassee, FL 32303 Alfred O. Shuler, Esq. Post Office Box 850 Apalachicola, FL 32320

Florida Laws (1) 403.087
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS vs GATOR CREEK CAMPGROUND, INC., AND POLK COUNTY, 92-006913DRI (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lakeland, Florida Nov. 19, 1992 Number: 92-006913DRI Latest Update: Jun. 06, 1996
Florida Laws (4) 120.57380.031380.04380.07 Florida Administrative Code (1) 9J-1.002
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