The Issue The issue is whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2002), by unlawfully soliciting a woman to commit prostitution, in violation of Section 796.07(2)(f), Florida Statutes (2002).
Findings Of Fact Respondent has been a certified correctional officer since 1990. He holds Correctional Certificate Number 53627. On December 8, 1999, Respondent was operating his motor vehicle in a light rain in the vicinity of 68th Avenue and 17th Street at approximately 8:45 p.m. He saw a young female standing alongside the road. Respondent stopped his car and rolled down the passenger side window. He asked the woman if she needed a ride. She replied, "Do I ride?" This response implied to Respondent that she would assume the superior position in any sexual activity. Respondent repeated his initial question, and the woman replied with the same answer. The woman was a police officer who was conducting a prostitution sting operation with other officers, who were not visible to Respondent. The woman did not testify, and the other officers did not hear the conversation that took place between the woman and Respondent, so the sole source of the conversation is Respondent, who testified at the hearing and gave a statement to investigators. The conversation as described in these findings of fact is derived entirely from Respondent. Respondent replied to the woman, "I got $20." The woman asked, "For what?" Respondent answered, "For a fuck." The woman asked Respondent would he give her a ride back to their current location, and Respondent assured her that he would. The woman then turned away, explaining to Respondent that she was getting her pocketbook, but actually signalling to her fellow officers to take down Respondent. Respondent had felt that something was wrong and had started to drive away, but the officers quickly apprehended him. Following his arrest, Respondent was charged with soliciting a prostitution. However, he completed a pretrial diversion program, and the State Attorney's Office dismissed the case.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of failing to maintain good moral character and revoking his correctional officer certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of November, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Laurie Beth Binder Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 William Chennault Chennault Attorneys & Counsellors at Law Post Office Box 1097 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302-1097
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact Respondent Henry A. Faircloth holds certificates as a correctional officer, No. 05-83-599-01, and as a law enforcement officer, No. 16-89-222-03, both issued by petitioner Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission; and has held them at all pertinent times. In the spring of 1988, he worked for the Florida Department of Corrections at Holmes Correctional Institution, where he held the rank of major. On May 25, 1988, he was in a meeting about ongoing construction at the prison, when Glenda Parmer told him he was needed in his office, elsewhere in the same building. She had seen James T. Watson and Charles W. Pumphrey, correctional officers who worked as sergeants at Holmes Correctional Institution, escorting Samuel Collier, an unruly and, as it turned out, intoxicated inmate toward the security complex. After Ms. Parmer, a correctional officer who worked as an administrative lieutenant, recounted events to Major Faircloth and told him "that we had some problems," (T.224) she accompanied him on the walk back toward his office. Before they reached the hall onto which Major Faircloth's office opened, they encountered the obstreperous inmate, his hands in handcuffs behind him, (T.234) a sergeant on either side. Although she came within three or four feet of the inmate, Ms. Parmer did not observe any injuries. T.220. The mail room officer, who was also within three or four feet of the inmate about this time, saw no injuries on the inmate's face, either. T.233-4. Neither did Sergeant Pumphrey, at this point. T.541. Major Faircloth, both sergeants and the inmate started down the hall and Ms. Parmer "stepped out of the way so they could go down the hallway." T.220. As he walked by them, Major Faircloth turned to Sergeants Michael Sheppard and William Paul and Inspector William T. Nobles, who were in a group talking, and told them "to wait right there, [and not to] let any inmates come down" (T.66) the hall toward Major Faircloth's office. After he had given this order, Respondent Faircloth entered his office and closed the door. T.43. Messrs. Collier, Watson and Pumphrey had preceded him through the door into the office. From outside the office, the inmate was heard interrupting Major Faircloth, cursing loudly "and raising sand." Id. During the three or four minutes that elapsed before Major Faircloth came back out of his office, four to six noises that "sounded like licks being passed," (T.44) were audible through the closed door at intervals of 30 seconds to a minute. "It sounded like flesh meeting flesh." T.150; T.178. The inmate yelled, "[D]on't hit me anymore." T.235. Major Faircloth emerged from his office without the inmate or Sergeants Pumphrey and Watson, reentering the hall where Sergeants Sheppard and Paul and Inspector Nobles still stood. Sergeant Sheppard noticed spatters of blood on Major Faircloth's shirt, although Major Faircloth was not bleeding, as far as he could see. T.46. Ms. Hutching, the mailroom officer, told Major Faircloth he needed to change shirts, "[b]ecause he had blood spattered all over his shirt." T.238. Sergeant Paul was asked "to go get three shirts . . . two white shirts and one brown shirt . . . [o]fficers' uniform shirts." T.151. Major Faircloth walked toward the control room, then stopped in front of the mailroom and flexed his right hand. When the mailroom officer inquired about his swollen knuckles, Major Faircloth responded, "I knocked that son of a bitch's tooth out." T.238. Frederick Terrell Kirkland, a classification supervisor who is not related to the assistant superintendent, saw Major Faircloth that day and noticed his hand and his blood-spattered shirt. Deposition of Kirkland. When assistant superintendent Kirkland arrived, he spoke to respondent Faircloth, then accompanied him as he went back into the office where the inmate and sergeants Pumphrey and Watson remained. At some point Lieutenant Benny Chesnut entered Major Faircloth's office. After a few minutes, Mr. Kirkland, opening then closing the office door behind him, left to go down the hall to the bathroom. When he returned, Sergeant Sheppard opened Major Faircloth's office door to let the assistant superintendent back in. As he opened the door for Mr. Kirkland, Sergeant Sheppard "saw Major Faircloth slap the inmate in the face." T.482. Samuel Collier was seated in a chair at the time, his hands still behind him in handcuffs. Standing behind Mr. Collier, Sergeant Pumphrey rested his hands on the inmate's shoulders, facing Major Faircloth, who stood in front of inmate Collier. Sergeant Watson stood by the office door. Nothing obstructed his view of Major Faircloth's striking Samuel Collier, although he turned his head and looked at Sergeant Sheppard when the door opened. T.51. "[D]id you see the son of a bitch kick me?" Major Faircloth asked the assistant superintendent. T.83. He later apologized to Mr. Kirkland for hitting the inmate in front of him. T.330, 343. After Samuel Collier had been taken away, Major Faircloth asked William Paul "to get an inmate to go clean the blood up out of his office. But then he said, no not to get the inmate, that the inmate didn't need to see that mess, for [Paul] to clean it up [him]self." T.153. In order to place Samuel Collier in solitary confinement, which was the course decided upon, he had to be sent elsewhere, because appropriate facilities were not then available at Holmes Correctional Institution. Karen Roberts, a nurse who worked at Holmes Correctional Institution, was summoned. After she drew blood, took the inmate's temperature and pulse, and made notes recording his vital signs, Mr. Collier was driven in a van to Okaloosa Correctional Institution. When Michael G. Foley, M.D., chief health officer at Okaloosa Correctional Institution, saw him shortly after lunch on May 25, 1988, Samuel Collier still had "alcohol on his breath." The parties stipulated that laboratory tests on the blood Ms. Roberts took from the inmate "revealed a .17 blood alcohol content." T.10. He had reportedly been drinking "buck," a home brew concocted from prison foodstuffs. Ms. Roberts had noticed a laceration of the upper lip which she felt "did not need suturing" (T.111) and swelling around the eyes, which she testified she attributed to the fact that Mr. Collier was crying. She "[w]anted to put ice on his eyes . . . [but] it was impossible to keep ice" (T.113), or so she testified, so she did not try it. Samuel Collier's injuries, including loose teeth Ms. Roberts overlooked, are consistent with blows received in a fight and could not have been caused by a fall against a fence post coupled with a fall out of a chair onto the floor. T.188. Samuel Collier's injuries resulted at least in part from blows Major Faircloth administered. T.188, 196. When Dr. Foley examined Mr. Collier, both of the inmate's upper eyelids were swollen. An area of his scalp was swollen. There was "a massive hematoma to the upper lip, which is a massive swelling" (T.186) that made it protrude. He "had tenderness, abrasions and contusions to both cheeks. . . [and] some loose upper incisors." T.187. Dr. Foley ordered x- rays "to make sure there w[ere] no fractures." T. 184. The radiologist concluded that no bones were broken, according to Dr. Foley. Meanwhile, Major Faircloth told some correctional officers that they "were supposed to say that he had hurt his hand doing yard work." T.294. When Sergeant Sheppard asked about filing a report, Major Faircloth told him not to "worry about it, you didn't use force," (T.58) "you're not on the duty roster, they don't even know you were here" (T.94) or words to that effect. Major Faircloth's directive contravened Department of Corrections policy, which requires any correctional officer observing force being used against an inmate to prepare a "use of force report . . . and forward it to the Inspector General's office." T.59. The next day, Major Faircloth filed a written report, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 9, reciting that Sergeants Watson and Pumphrey and Lieutenant Chesnut had used force against Samuel Collier, but omitting any mention of the force he himself had used. On June 28, 1988, while he was interrogated by Inspector G. L. McLain, he falsely denied under oath that he had hit Samuel Collier and injured his own hand. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. Inspector McLain had authority to administer the oath in the course of his official duties, and did so to respondent before interrogating him on June 28, 1988, and on July 6, 1988. On July 6, 1988, respondent again answered questions under oath and falsely answered affirmatively when asked whether he had been truthful during the earlier interrogation.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner revoke respondent's certificates both as a correctional officer and as a law enforcement officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 92-1395 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 4-15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24-30 and 32-47 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 2, 3 and 31 are immaterial as to respondent Faircloth. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 16, it was not clear that a fence and gate were in place at the time. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 19, Major Faircloth first joined the group before they reached his office. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 23, the evidence did not clearly and convincingly establish the exact number of times respondent hit Collier. Sergeant Sheppard saw respondent slap Collier only once. But the evidence clearly and convincingly showed that respondent landed additional blow(s), causing his knuckles to swell. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 22 and 23 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 5, it was not clear that a fence was up and that there was a need to pass between those two posts. That Collier hit or fell into a post was not established by the weight of the credible evidence. With respect to respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 6 and 7, the weight of the credible evidence did not establish that Collier was bleeding when he reached the security complex. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 10, credible evidence did not establish that Collier leapt from the chair and fell, striking a desk and the floor. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 13, the nurse's testimony that she thought Collier's eyes were swollen because he had been crying has not been credited. With respect to respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 16 and 17, the nurse's findings were not "totally inconsistent." She apparently did not examine the inmate's teeth. Some of the swelling she anticipated evidently occurred. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 18, Sheppard's testimony has been credited. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 19, when Sheppard saw Faircloth slap Collier he might have been looking through the clear glass window. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 20, the weight of the evidence did not establish that nobody saw Collier's injuries before he left HCI. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 24 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED TO: Joseph S. White, Esquire Gina Cassidy, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Roy M. Kinsey, Jr., Esquire Kinsey, Troxel, Johnson & Walborsky 438 East Government Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Department of Corrections, the employer and Respondent herein (Department, Respondent) engaged in a discriminatory employment action against the Petitioner by terminating her allegedly on account of her age.1/
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was hired as a Correctional Officer at the Hernando Correctional Institution (HCI) on or about December 20, 1996. HCI houses youthful and adult female inmates. Inmate Gaspar Incident Lieutenant Laura Reed was the dayshift officer in charge at HCI on March 22, 2005. At that time, at approximately 12:09 p.m., she ordered Officer Donald Langdon to perform a security inspection of a holding cell area. Lt. Langdon entered through the building's exterior door which opens to a vestibule in a holding cell area. The vestibule has two other solid doors; the steel door leading to the holding cell area is located a few feet from the exterior door, and there is a door at the far end of the vestibule that leads to administrative offices. There is an officer's desk and storage lockers in the vestibule. The three holding cells are typically used at HCI to house disruptive inmates. Each is a 12-by-12 square with a 10- foot ceiling. The side walls are of cement and the front and back walls are constructed of bars that are covered by a clear wall of lexan, a material similar to Plexiglas. Officer Langdon checked to make sure that nothing in the cells was broken and he searched the cells for contraband. He filled out a form indicating nothing was broken in the first and third cells and that he had not found any contraband and notified Lt. Reed of his findings. He then left the holding cell area. At about 12:10 p.m. Lt. Reed asked Officer Donna Jaje to help escort inmate Anita Gaspar to the holding cell because she was being disorderly and "acting out." Thereafter, Lt. Reed and Office Jaje arrived at the holding cell area where they strip searched the inmate but found no contraband. During the strip search the inmate commented that she "was not going to stay on this earth." The inmate's comment concerned the two officers because it indicated that she might be considering injuring herself. The inmate was placed in the first holding cell and Reed ordered Officer Jaje to remain with the inmate until relieved. Officer Jaje maintained a constant vigil observation of the inmate, and Lt. Reed left to advise a psychological specialist concerning inmate Gaspar and her comment. The psychological specialist determined a few minutes later that the inmate might have the potential to injure herself and put her on a "one-to-one observation," which requires constant visual observation based upon a fear of suicide. Suicidal inmates are not common at HCI, thus when an inmate is determined to be suicidal, since the institution does not have appropriate facilities, the procedure is to maintain a constant visual observation of the inmate until the inmate can be transferred to Lowell Correctional Institution (Lowell CI). Lowell CI does have appropriate facilities for such inmates. The Petitioner was assigned to work as a medical officer on the day in question. Lt. Reed instructed the Petitioner to relive Officer Jaje at inmate Gaspar's holding cell and told her to stay with that inmate. Prior to the Petitioner's arrival, Officer Jaje had maintained constant visual contact with the inmate. When Petitioner Lawhorn arrived at the holding cell to relieve Officer Jaje, around 12:45 p.m., Lawhorn sat in a chair directly in front of the inmate's holding cell. Jaje told Lawhorn that the inmate was on SOS and gave Lawhorn the keys to the holding cell. Petitioner Lawhorn asked for the "observation form" and Officer Jaje went to the medical unit and returned with the observation form. When an inmate is on SOS status, an observation form must be completed at 15 minute intervals. The officer observing the inmate must document on the form all the inmates activities such as sitting, lying down, talking, eating, etc. Constant visual observation is a different procedure than that used for typical inmates being incarcerated in a holding cell for disciplinary reasons. In that instance the correctional officer is only required to check on the inmate and observe every 15 minutes. Because constant visual observations are not required between those 15-minute, checks the officer may then perform other duties. The Petitioner had been trained to know the difference between these two procedures. About 1:30 p.m. Officer Langdon escorted a different inmate to the holding cell area. He knocked on the exterior door and received no answer and tried the door which was unlocked, although it should have been locked. When he entered the vestibule, Petitioner Lawhorn opened the door to the holding cell area as if answering Langdon's knock, but then returned to the holding cell area. Langdon is a male officer and therefore cannot strip search a female prisoner. He requested assistance in carrying out the required strip search of the inmate he had escorted to the holding cell area, but received no response to his radio request. After waiting some ten minutes he apparently discussed the matter with Petitioner, not knowing that the Petitioner was assigned to maintain constant visual observation of Inmate Gaspar. The Petitioner volunteered to strip search the other inmate for him. Langdon suggested that she strip search that inmate in cell three while he kept an eye on the inmate in cell one. The Petitioner refused that request, apparently because the other inmate was not dressed. She closed the door between the vestibule where Langdon was and the holding cell area where she carried out the strip search. Several minutes later Lawhorn opened the door to the holding cell area and placed the inmate's property in a locker and then returned to the holding cell area. Officer Langdon then reported to the control room that the inmate he was charged with had been placed in the third holding cell and he left the area. At about 2:30 p.m. Lt. Moffitt was in his office located in the same building as the holding cell area. He heard yelling, screaming, and a commotion emanating from the holding cell area. He and Officer Holley went to the holding cell area to determine the cause of the disturbance. When Lt. Moffitt entered the vestibule area he observed the Petitioner sitting at the officer's desk. The solid steel door to the holding cell area was closed. As he passed the Petitioner he told her he thought that she was supposed to be watching inmate Gaspar. The Petitioner replied that she was watching the inmate. Lt. Moffitt opened the door to the holding cell area and talked to Inmate Gaspar. She told him that she did not want to be transported to Lowell CI and that she would resist being transported. As Moffitt left the holding cell area he directed the Petitioner to watch the inmate and the Petitioner placed a chair in front of the holding cell of Inmate Gaspar in order to watch her constantly. About 2:35 p.m. the Petitioner needed a restroom break. There was no telephone at the officer's desk in the vestibule. She therefore went to the laundry area and informed a Sergeant there that she needed a restroom break. A few minutes later Officer Black came and relieved the Petitioner. Officer Black maintained a constant visual observation of Inmate Gaspar until the Petitioner returned, about 20 minutes later. About 3:45 p.m., Lt. Moffitt returned to the holding cell area. The Petitioner was then complying with his instructions by sitting in the chair and watching Inmate Gaspar. The shift changed at 4:00 p.m. and Lt. Moffitt conferred with Lt. Oudshoff, the oncoming shift supervisor. Moffitt told Lt. Oudshoff that an inmate in the holding cell area had stated that she was going to resist being transferred that evening. He and Lt. Oudshoff went to talk with Inmate Gaspar and were able to convince her not to resist the transfer to Lowell CI. During the course of that conversation both Lt.s were surprised when inmate Gaspar offered to give them "her weapon," as she termed it, whereupon she produced a 5-by-7-inch piece of lexan. The inmate was apparently asked how she was able to obtain the piece of lexan while under direct supervision. The inmate purportedly replied that Petitioner Lawhorn had left the cell several times throughout the day, leaving her unsupervised. The inmate did not testify, (although her account is in documentary evidence) but whether or not her version of events concerning the Petitioner leaving the cell several times a day, giving her the opportunity to break off a piece of lexan, is true, it was demonstrated to have been the motivation for the disciplinary action taken against the Petitioner. The appropriate supervisors were informed of the details of this incident as Lt. Moffitt knew them and an investigation ensued. Ultimately, disciplinary action was determined to be appropriate and the Petitioner was terminated from employment with the Department based on this incident, as the culmination of other disciplinary incidents on the Petitioner's employment record. Officer Langdon was also disciplined concerning the incident. His discipline was lesser as he was accorded a reprimand and was not terminated. Officer Langdon is younger than the Petitioner but Officer Langdon also had no disciplinary incidents or entries on his employment record whatever until the subject incident. That was the reason he was accorded lesser discipline than that meted out to the Petitioner. Thus, although the discipline imposed upon the Petitioner and Langdon was disparate, Officer Langdon was not proven to be a similarly- situated employee because his discipline related to a previously unblemished disciplinary record and the Petitioner had had at least four other disciplinary incidents and disciplines imposed on her employment record, from 2003 forward. On December 23, 2004, the Petitioner was working in the medical department at HCI. She was the medical officer and responsible for ensuring that inmates arrived for their appointments on time and for monitoring inmates awaiting medication in the "pill line." She was issued keys when she arrived at work that day and on December 23 was issued key ring number 219. The Petitioner left her observation post at the pill line on that occasion in order to allow other inmates into a gate to the adult canteen. While the Petitioner was unlocking that gate, key ring 219 broke off her keychain which was attached to her belt and remained in the adult canteen gate lock. The Petitioner let those inmates through the gate and went back to her post. She was in a hurry because Nurse Barras, who was working in the medical department, was screaming at her. She became distracted and did not notice that the key ring remained hanging in the canteen gate lock. A few minutes later another correctional officer saw an inmate pulling the key ring out of the canteen gate lock. The Petitioner was not aware the key ring was missing until that officer confronted her with the keys that he confiscated from the inmate. In any event, the Petitioner was not paying sufficient attention to her duties in opening the lock to the adult canteen and allowed herself to become distracted by the nurse's behavior and thus negligently left her key ring in the lock. If she had been paying due care to her surroundings and to her duties, she would have been aware that the key ring had broken off the key chain on her belt and would have observed the inmate pulling the key ring out of the lock. The Petitioner was accorded a five- day suspension for this commission of negligence, an infraction of the Department's rules. That suspension was upheld by the Public Employees Relations Commission. An incident also occurred on March 28, 2005, which was taken into account in the decision to terminate the Petitioner. That incident involved an inmate who yelled at the Petitioner and who was therefore being counseled by the Petitioner. During the course of their conversation, the inmate "declared a psychological emergency," whereupon the Petitioner called on her radio for assistance. She then wrongfully allowed the inmate to leave her custody and control in the immediately area instead of handcuffing the inmate. She then failed to assist the other officer or officers who responded to her call for help in calming the inmate. This was a violation of Department rules and was a factor in her termination. In addition to the above disciplinary actions the Petitioner received a written reprimand for negligence on June 30, 2004. On May 7, and August 20, 2003, she received written reprimands for failure to follow oral or written instructions. On June 10, 2003, she received a written reprimand for failure to truthfully answer questions. In her charge of discrimination, and at hearing, the Petitioner contended that she was subjected to discrimination based upon her age. She did not adduce preponderant evidence, however, which would show that any person outside her protected group, as for instance, persons under 40, or persons younger than she, were treated any differently, discipline-wise or otherwise, while being similarly-situated, comparative employees. The only evidence in this regard that she adduced was to the effect that Officer Langdon, who is younger than the Petitioner, was subjected to lighter discipline. Officer Langdon, however, was not a similarly-situated employee because, although younger, his employment and disciplinary record was unblemished until the incident involving the processing of Inmate Gaspar in the holding cell area. He had been employed substantially longer than the Petitioner's nine years. Thus, although he was disciplined less severely, he was not shown to be a similarly-situated employee because of the disparate nature of his, versus the Petitioner's, employment disciplinary records. Aside from this incident involving Officer Langdon, no other preponderant evidenced was adduced that any other employees were treated differently or better based upon their age or that the Petitioner was treated in a worse manner because of her age. The Petitioner contends that she was subjected to disparate treatment and harassment based upon her age (and, at hearing, based upon her gender, although that was not plead in the Petition or in the Charge of Discrimination). This amounted to vague testimony to the effect that she was constantly harassed by her superiors, and subjected to unwarranted discipline, particularly by Lt. Moffitt after he became her supervisor. She attempted to advance this claim by testimony that her medical problems involving anxiety and chest pain began after Lt. Moffitt arrived at the facility in 2003. This is belied by the fact, however, that other evidence in the record shows that these medical complaints actually began in 1999, some years before Lt. Moffitt became employed at the facility and became the Petitioner's supervisor. There is no preponderant proof that the Petitioner was subjected to altered terms or conditions of employment based upon her gender, or due to any comments or conduct of a sexual nature. For instance, there is absolutely no evidence that any demands for sexual favors were made upon her and that her terms and conditions of employment were conditioned upon compliance therewith. Moreover, there was no preponderant evidence that she was treated in a different way, such as being exposed to more disciplinary actions or more severe disciplinary measures than were her male counter-parts. Her testimony that male employees were subjected to less severe discipline or no discipline was not persuasive. This is because, for the most part, they were not identified, and no evidence was adduced to show that they were truly similarly-situated male employees in terms of the positions they held, the circumstances of their employment and more particularly the circumstances surrounding their disciplinary actions, in terms of being disciplined based upon similar facts and circumstances. Moreover, the discipline meted out to them was not shown to be disparate in relation to that given the Petitioner because there was not showing by the Petitioner that their employment records and disciplinary records were otherwise similar to her. Rather, the only evidence concerning this is that Officer Langdale's employment disciplinary record was unblemished and therefore substantially different from the Petitioner's, when he was accorded less severe discipline than the Petitioner arising out of the same incident. His better record was the reason for the less severe discipline. Additionally, there is the Petitioner's uncorroborated testimony concerning an incident involving preparing an inmate for transport to another facility in the prison van. She firmly demanded that the inmate be re-buckled in a seat belt. A verbal altercation inferentially ensued with Sergeant Moynihan. The Petitioner claims he cussed at her and was not disciplined, while she was "written up" for allegedly calling him a liar. There was insufficient credible evidence to show enough facts concerning this event so that a judgment could be made if it occurred; whether the two employees were similarly-situated in terms of their conduct and their disciplinary records; and whether there was disparate treatment of one versus the other. There was no showing that the Petitioner was subjected to abusive language or other abuses related to her gender or to any sexually discriminatory motive in her working environment. There was no evidence of any unwelcome sexual harassment or other conduct of a sexual nature which was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of her employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment.2/ In summary, the above Findings of Fact do not reveal that any of the disciplinary action, including the termination at issue, was meted out by the Respondent Department for any discriminatory motives regarding the Petitioner's age or that of other employees. Moreover, complaints regarding gender discrimination were not made until the Petitioner's testimony at hearing. Therefore, under generally accepted principles of notice pleading and due process of law they can not be addressed and decided in this proceeding because the Respondent has not had an opportunity to prepare a defense against them. Parenthetically, however, the evidence adduced by the Petitioner does not demonstrate any discriminatory motive or action taken by the Respondent Employer based upon reasons of gender or of any sexual nature. There has been no showing that any comparative employees, male or female, were treated in a disparate way and more favorably than the Petitioner based upon their age. Moreover, even if such had been demonstrated, the Respondent has come forward with preponderant, persuasive evidence that the employment action at issue, the Petitioner's termination, occurred as a result of progressive discipline imposed in accordance with the Respondent's written policies and rules. It was imposed as a result of the Petitioner's deficient performance and her deficient and more extensive record of disciplinary actions imposed against her for her lapses in performance, as compared to other similarly-situated employees.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witness, and the pleadings and arguments of the party, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2007.
Findings Of Fact On February 6, 1992, Respondent received Petitioner's application for a Class "D" Security Officer License. In processing the application, Respondent conducted a criminal background check on Petitioner and received his criminal history as compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). By letter dated July 24, 1992, Respondent informed Petitioner of its intent to deny his application for licensure based upon grounds cited in the letter. On August 17, 1992, Respondent received Petitioner's request for a formal hearing and his explanation for the various arrests cited in the denial letter. On August 14, 1992, Respondent mailed Petitioner an amended denial letter citing additional grounds for the denial of his application. Respondent asserts that it is within its discretion to deny Petitioner's application because his criminal history reflects a lack of good moral character. All other grounds for denial of licensure of Petitioner were abandoned by Respondent at the formal hearing. The following arrests are cited by Respondent as justifying its denial of licensure to Petitioner. CHARGE ONE On August 21, 1968, Petitioner was arrested on charges of aggravated assault and forgery in Dyersburg, Tennessee. In 1968, Petitioner was discharged from the Army after having served in Viet Nam. He accompanied a friend he had met in the Army to Dyersburg, Tennessee, where he became involved in an altercation with someone who tried to run him off the road while he was riding his motorcycle. The person who tried to run Petitioner off the road stopped and attempted, without success, to hit Petitioner with a tire iron. Petitioner took the tire iron away from this person and hit the person on the head with the tire iron. Petitioner was arrested for aggravated assault and placed in the county jail. At the same time, he and two companions were charged with forgery for purchasing beer with worthless bank checks. Petitioner was told that he would not be tried until after the grand jury convened, and that he would have to wait in the county jail in the interim, a period of four months. Petitioner escaped from the county jail with the help of two other inmates and made his way to Chicago, Illinois. He was subsequently arrested and returned to Tennessee after he waived extradition. Petitioner was thereafter tried and convicted of aggravated assault, forgery, and grand theft and sentenced to three years imprisonment. On January 30, 1970, Petitioner's grand larceny conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor charge of attempt to commit a felony. His three year sentence was commuted and he was granted parole and immediately released after having served eighteen months in jail. Petitioner received a pardon from the governor of Tennessee for the felony convictions resulting from the 1968 arrests. CHARGE TWO In 1973, Petitioner was arrested and convicted of drunk driving in California and placed on probation. On August 2, 1974, in Palm Springs, California, Petitioner was arrested and charged with suspicion of burglary, a violation of California Penal Code 459. His probation from the 1973 conviction was violated, and he was sentenced to sixty days in jail and given two years of probation. The charge of suspicion of burglary was reduced to trespassing. Petitioner was intoxicated and was trespassing when arrested in August 1974. Petitioner testified without contradiction that he was not attempting to steal anything. CHARGE THREE In September 1980 in Riverside, California, Petitioner was arrested and charged with possession of a device for arson. Petitioner had been threatened by a gang after he identified a gang member as having stabbed a member of another gang. When three carloads of gang members came to his place of residence to threaten him, Petitioner made a Molotov cocktail and threw it in the street to disperse the gang members and to get the attention of the police. This charge was subsequently dismissed. CHARGES FOUR AND FIVE On May 13, 1988, Petitioner was arrested in Chicago, Illinois, and charged with unlawful use of a weapon and aggravated assault. On July 26, 1988, he was charged with aggravated assault; unlawful use of a weapon/gun; unlawful use of a weapon/tear gas; unlawful use of a weapon/blackjack; and failure to register a firearm. These arrests resulted from Petitioner's attempts to reduce drugs and prostitution in his neighborhood as a pro-active vigilante. On May 13, he fired two warning shots from a .25 caliber pistol into the ground to discourage three would-be attackers. Though the assailants left, an eyewitness filed a complaint with the police which resulted in Petitioner's arrest. On July 26, 1988, Petitioner was arrested while again acting as a vigilante by the same officer who had arrested him on May 13. He had on his person at the time of his arrest an unregistered firearm, a blackjack, and mace. These charges were dismissed when the arresting officer failed to appear in court. CHARGE SIX Petitioner heard threats against himself and his family because of his efforts to cleanup his neighborhood. On February 3, 1989, Petitioner went to a bar which the people who had been threatening him frequented. He confronted these persons and fired four shots from a .357 firearm into the ceiling. Petitioner was charged with criminal damage to property, reckless conduct, and unlawful use of a weapon. The charge of criminal damage to property was dismissed, but he was found guilty on the other two charges. Petitioner was given a conditional discharge and ordered to pay $264.00. The conditional discharge was revoked in June 1990. CHARGE SEVEN On May 18, 1989, Petitioner was arrested in Chicago on a traffic violation and charged with resisting or eluding an officer. Petitioner was intoxicated and was driving around setting off firecrackers in the street when the police attempted to pull him over. Because he could not find a place to stop, he circled the block a few times before stopping the car. He was adjudicated guilty and had his driver's license revoked for three years. REHABILITATION Petitioner is an alcoholic, and his arrests can be attributable, in part, to the influence of alcohol. Petitioner has been an active participant in the Miami, Florida, Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center Substance Abuse Clinic since October 11, 1989, and has consistently abstained from alcohol since September 7, 1989. Since 1989, Petitioner has lived and worked in Florida. Petitioner has no criminal record since moving to Florida in 1989 and enrolling in the VA substance abuse program. Petitioner has worked for Kent Security since January of 1991, and his employer considers Petitioner to be an outstanding employee.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which grants Petitioner's application for licensure as a Class D Security Officer. DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of February, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Division of Licensing The Capitol MS 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Mr. James J. Killacky #206 1660 Northeast 150th Street North Miami, Florida 33181 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, General Counsel The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsections 943.1395(6), 943.1395(7), and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2002),1 and Florida Administrative Code Rules 11B-27.0011(4)(a), 11B-27.0011(4)(c), and 11B-20.0012(1)(f), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, Odom was a correctional officer working as a sergeant at Century Correctional Institution (Century) in Century, Florida. Jarl Johnson (Johnson) is a correctional officer who was employed at Century while Odom was employed there. Johnson went to the dormitory where Odom was stationed to check equipment. He advised Odom that he would do the head count of the inmates, but Odom indicated that he would do the head count instead of Johnson. Odom took two inmates, who were in the officers' station, with him to do the head count, and the inmates carried flashlights with them while doing the head count. Inmates are prohibited from doing head counts and carrying flashlights. Vera Elliot (Elliot) is a correctional officer, who is employed at Century. On February 14, 2003, she was working a double shift. One of her shifts that day was the same shift on which Odom was working. Elliot observed Odom and two inmates do a head count of the inmates. The two inmates came into the officers' station, while Odom was present. At that time, no inmates were allowed in the officers' station. On that same evening, Elliot saw Odom give a white box containing food to the two inmates. Correctional officers are not allowed to give food to inmates. Gregory Gilliard (Gilliard) is a correctional officer, who was employed at Century while Odom was employed at Century. Gilliard observed an inmate and Odom in the laundry room directly behind the officers' station. The inmate was polishing Odom's shoes. Gilliard also observed another inmate in the officers' station. The doors to the laundry room were open, making the dormitory accessible, which is a breach of security. On May 8, 2003, Jeffrey R. Brooker (Brooker), a correctional investigator for the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Corrections, interviewed Odom concerning complaints against staff at Century. While under oath, Odom told Brooker that he never allowed inmates to carry flashlights, never gave food to inmates, never allowed inmates in the officers' station, and never allowed an inmate to polish his shoes. These sworn statements were false. Based on the statements given by Odom to Brooker, it is found that Odom knew that his statements were not true. The Commission alleged in the Administrative Complaint that Odom used excessive or unnecessary force on an inmate. The only evidence presented concerning these allegations was hearsay. Subsection 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2005), provides: "Hearsay evidence may be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence, but it shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions." Therefore, no finding is made that excessive or unnecessary force was used by Odom.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Richard L. Odom violated Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and revoking his certification as a correctional officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2006.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was certified as a law enforcement officer on April 6, 1984, and has been continuously so certified since that time. After the Tampa police arrested Doug Jernigan in August, 1986, on charges of armed robbery committed between January and July, 1986, including bank robberies, the Tampa police learned that on July 18, 1986, Jernigan rented a limousine and visited several bars with one of his companions being a police officer. When this information was passed to the Bureau of Internal Affairs, an investigation was started, and it was learned that Respondent was the police officer involved with Jernigan on the evening of July 18-19, 1986. Thereafter, the investigation centered on Respondent's knowledge of Jernigan and any criminal offenses of which Respondent may have been aware. During this investigation, Respondent cooperated fully with the investigators, including the taking of a polygraph test, and two or more taped interrogations. In addition, the investigator interrogated the chauffeur of the limousine, Jernigan, and at least one other passenger who was in the limousine on July 18, 1986. All of these witnesses denied that any drugs were used in Respondent's presence, stated that the party continued for several hours during which time the four people involved consumed a large quantity of alcohol, and that all were quite intoxicated. Respondent was only casually acquainted with Jernigan who he had seen as an employee of the Temple Terrace Bar on previous occasions. On July 18, Respondent encountered Jernigan at the Temple Terrace Bar as a patron who told Respondent that he had hired a limo for the evening and invited Respondent to join him for some drinks. Jernigan had a large roll of bills which he told Respondent he had won at the gambling table at Atlantic City. Respondent joined Jernigan, and they proceeded to another bar where a third and perhaps fourth companion was picked up. The limo then drove the new companion (McGahee) to his residence to change clothes, and while McGahee and Jernigan were let off, the driver took Respondent to Respondent's apartment to change clothes, waited for him, returned to pick up Jernigan and McGahee, and then they proceeded on the bar hopping escapade. The investigation by the Internal Affairs Division disclosed that Respondent had no knowledge of the crimes Jernigan had committed between January and July, 1986. During a second interrogation of Respondent which continued for two hours by an experienced investigator, Respondent was repeatedly told that the other occupants of the limo had acknowledged use of drugs during the night of July 18-19, and that the polygraph exam showed Respondent was not telling the whole truth about his knowledge of Jernigan's criminal activities and of the use of drugs on July 18. Respondent, after earlier denying that any drugs were used in his presence, finally acknowledged that maybe a joint (of marijuana) was passed around in the limo, but that he never took a puff. Once Respondent acknowledged during this two hour interrogation that maybe marijuana was smoked that evening, this became a fact in all further questioning of Respondent regarding his knowledge of Jernigan's criminal activities and further questioning regarding the use of cocaine on that evening. Respondent steadfastly denied any knowledge of any other activities of Jernigan or that he ever saw anyone use cocaine on July 18-19, 1986. James McGahee was one of the passengers in the limo July 18-19. Either he or Jernigan had some that evening, and when they were dropped off at McGahee's apartment for McGahee to change clothes, they ingested some cocaine. McGahee does not smoke marijuana, and to his knowledge, no marijuana was used in the limo that evening. McGahee operated a heavy duty wrecker and had seen Respondent on several occasions at the scene of an accident to which McGahee and his wrecker had been called. He had never socialized with Respondent prior to or since July 18- 19, 1986. Respondent denies that, to his knowledge, any marijuana or other drugs were used in his presence on the evening of July 18-19, 1986, and that his sworn statement taken during his two hour interrogation that a joint had been passed around in the limo was not true. He gave the statement because the interrogator had convinced him the other passengers had admitted using drugs, and he assumed they had done so. To Respondent marijuana was deemed less serious than cocaine.
Findings Of Fact Since July 1, 1981, Respondent had been a certified correctional officer, holding certificate number C-3285. Currently, Respondent is no longer employed as a correctional officer. However, on January 10, 1987, Respondent was employed as the arsenal officer at the Union County Correctional Institution. Prior to and including January 10, 1987, Respondent had been experiencing a great deal of marital difficulty with his wife, Candy. Sometime around January 10, the Raulerson's decided to part company. On January 10 at about 5:15 p.m., Candy Raulerson asked Sheriff Deputy Joseph Guyott to accompany her to the marital residence in order to pick up some of her things. Upon arriving Deputy Guyott observed a sign on the door warning persons to enter at their own risk. No one appeared to be at home. He, also, observed a shotgun shell attached to the door and a fishing line attached to the door handle at one end and to a buried beer can at the other end. The shell could be clearly seen. Ms. Raulerson's things had been placed outside the home in the rain. Upon observing the shell arrangement at the front door, Deputy Guyott secured the area and called the Sheriff. Once the Sheriff arrived, he began to investigate the area around the residence. At the back door of the residence the Sheriff discovered a tear gas or smoke canister 1/ attached to a line at one end and tied to the back door at the other end. The line had so much slack in it that nothing would happen when the door was opened. More importantly, the canister had been rendered inoperable by bending over the firing pin and taping the spoon. The canister was neither explosive nor poisonous. Petitioner, therefore, failed to prove any violation of Section 790.161, Florida Statutes. Upon entering the residence through the back door the Sheriff walked to the front door. He observed that the shotgun shell had been attached to an electric cord. The cord was attached to the brass end of the shell. However, the Sheriff could not remember whether the cord was attached to the shell's primer. The cord was run behind the sofa, but was not plugged in. No evidence was presented by Petitioner as to the explosive potential, if any, of this arrangement. Petitioner, therefore, failed to prove that Respondent had violated Section 790.161, Florida Statutes. More importantly, however, is that the evidence is clear that Respondent had absolutely no intent to harm anyone, 2/ but only wished to scare off any person attempting entry. The Sheriff admitted that after seeing the front and back door arrangements that it was apparent that Respondent did not intend to hurt anyone and neither arrangement was rigged to do any damage. Petitioner's evidence only demonstrates that Respondent was defending his property from his wife's meddling during a time when they were experiencing a great deal of marital difficulty. Respondent utilized a scare tactic that was not dangerous and not intended to hurt anyone, but only to keep someone out during his absence. Respondent did not commit any crime by rigging the canister and the shell in the manner he did. Moreover, Respondent's actions do not demonstrate any lack of good moral character on his part.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the administrative complaint against Respondent be DISMISSED. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1988.
The Issue Whether petitioner should suspend or revoke respondent's certification as a correctional officer for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact Respondent Edward L. Bonifay, III has held a correctional officer's certificate at all pertinent times. From October 1, 1980, till November 3, 1982, he worked for the Escambia County Sheriff's Department. When he left, his certificate automatically became inactive. (Testimony of Frick) Except in emergency circumstances not pertinent here, the Escambia County Sheriff's Department has a firm, written policy against male correctional officers entering the female housing area in the Escambia County Jail unless accompanied by a female correctional officer. The Jail Operations Manual, which Mr. Bonifay purported to have read more than once, states the policy. He was told about it. Everybody who works at the jail is aware of the policy. (Testimony of Eddings) The Jail Operations Manual also stated the requirement that any escape attempt be reported in writing. Nell Vaughn shared a cell with several other women at the Escambia County Jail in September of 1982, at a time when Minnie Squires had the adjacent cell to herself. On several occasions, including at least two in September of 1982, Ms. Squires asked other inmates to summon respondent Bonifay. At least twice in September of 1982 he arrived at her cell door alone and touched her when she came to the door undressed. Ms. Vaughn, who sometimes monitored events next door through a peephole, observed this. Bonifay admitted as much to two fellow officers, although he claimed, in one rendition, that she was trying to escape and that he was obliged to grab her breast to prevent the escape, although, he conceded, maybe he did leave his hand on her breast "too long" and maybe his hand did "slide down her stomach." To Nell Vaughn it looked like he was fondling her breasts while they were both inside the cell, after any conceivable risk of escape must have been well past. Nor does the escape hypothesis explain why Ms. Vaughn saw his hand in Ms. Squires' crotch. Respondent Bonifay never made any written report of an escape attempt on Ms. Squires' part, and made no written report of having visited a woman prisoner's cell unaccompanied by a female correctional officer. Once the events of September came to light, his superiors lost confidence in him and he was unable to function as a correctional officer in the jail. His credibility was called into question and his effectiveness was lost. (Testimony of Eddings, Jones) Petitioner filed its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the proposed findings of fact have been adopted, in substance for the most part. To the extent they have been rejected, they have been deemed immaterial, cumulative, subordinate or unsupported by the weight of the evidence.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner revoke respondent's certification as a correctional officer. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis S. Valente, Esquire Post Office Fox 1849 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Edward L. Bonifay, III 228 Cordoba Street Gulf Breeze, Florida 32561 Robert Dempsey, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent used excessive or unnecessary force on Stephen Cody Kester on July 15, 2000, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Victor Bosch, is a certified Law Enforcement Officer in the State of Florida. He was issued Law Enforcement Certificate Number 170035 on February 26, 1997. He was also issued Auxiliary Law Enforcement Certificate Number 163915 on June 27, 1996, and Correctional Officer Certificate Number 160836 on March 27, 1996. On June 15, 2000, Respondent was employed by the Charlotte County Sheriff's Department as a Deputy First Class. On July 15, 2000, Stephen Cody Kester, a seventeen- year-old juvenile, was in attendance at a teen dance conducted by the Charlotte County Parks and Recreation Department at the Tringali Center located in Englewood, Charlotte County, Florida. During teen dances at the Tringali Center, it is common practice for teenagers to step outside of the center, with permission of the adult sponsors, to use wireless phones due to the volume of music, if they stand near the Deputy on security duty by the front door. Rules regulating the dances conducted at the Tringali Center are not written or posted in any manner, but left to the discretion of individual counselors. However, teenagers who leave the premises during a dance, without permission, are not permitted to return to the dance. Kester had asked and was given permission to go outside of the center to use his wireless telephone. Upon leaving the center, Kester informed Respondent that he had permission to use his wireless phone. Kester stepped several feet away from Respondent, and out from under the overhang at the Tringali Center, but within clear sight of Respondent. Respondent became upset that Kester moved away from him. He also refused to accept Kester's statement that he had permission to be outside in order to use his wireless phone and then return to the dance. When Kester tried to re-enter the center, Respondent placed Kester in an arm lock, told him he could not re-enter the premises, and forced him to leave the area. Kester was not a threat to Respondent, nor was he placed under arrest. As a result of the arm lock placed on Kester, he was taken to an emergency room by his mother and subsequently diagnosed with an acute strain, left shoulder. At the time of the incident in question, Kester suffered from a brain tumor that was life threatening, and any sudden movement or trauma to the head could have resulted in dire consequences. The Tringali Center had no hard and fast rules concerning leaving the building to use a wireless phone. As long as the individual stayed in the area of the overhang and the deputy outside was informed that permission had been granted, then it was acceptable for the teenager to return to the dance. The amount of force used by Respondent to restrain Kester was excessive and unnecessary. Respondent's explanation that the arm lock technique he used was acceptable practice in the law enforcement community and that the level of force used was not harmful to Kester is not credible, nor persuasive. Prior to this incident, Respondent was employed in law enforcement for seven years and had no prior disciplinary incidents.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED as follows: Respondent be found guilty of failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes. Respondent's certification be suspended for six months and successful completion of such training or retraining deemed appropriate by the Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Victor Bosch 3394 South Sumter Boulevard North Port, Florida 34287 Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issues in the case are whether the allegations set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent are true, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility for certification of correctional officers within the State of Florida. Respondent holds Correctional Certificate No. 242571, issued to him by Petitioner. On July 16, 2005, Respondent was involved in an altercation with Chelsey Traband, the woman he lived with in Cape Coral, Florida. In the course of the altercation, items were thrown around the interior of the house, Respondent damaged a closet door and window, and clothing was thrown into the front yard. These actions, and perhaps associated noise, caused a neighbor to call the Cape Coral Police Department, and two police officers went to the scene to investigate. The officers observed bruises on Ms. Traband's left arm, a minor scratch on her right arm, and three parallel scratches on the top of her right breast, one of which was relatively deep. In a statement made to Officer Frank Antos, Ms. Traband stated that the bruises and scratches were inflicted by Respondent. At the hearing, Ms. Traband attempted to recant the statements she made to Officer Antos on July 16, 2005, claiming that he told her what to say and threatened to arrest her and take her to jail if she did not make the statements. Much of Ms. Traband's testimony was evasive and lacking in credibility. She had a motive for lying, because she still lives with Respondent and does not want him to be disciplined. Sorting Ms. Traband's credible statements from her lies, it is found that Ms. Traband started the aggression by slapping and hitting Respondent. However, at some point, Respondent straddled Ms. Traband while she was on her back on a bed, grabbed her breast and twisted it violently. Although both Respondent and Ms. Traband testified under oath at the hearing that the marks on her breast were caused when Respondent pushed Ms. Traband away from him in self defense, the testimony was not credible. It contradicts the statement Ms. Traband made on July 16, 2005, and her former statement is consistent with the marks on her breast as depicted in the photographs. On the day of the incident, Ms. Traband told Sergeant Allan Kolak that Respondent had been smoking marijuana earlier that day, and she had thrown the pipe he had used to smoke the marijuana into the field behind the house. She showed Officer Antos where to find the pipe, and he found a small wooden pipe. Sergeant Kolak testified that the pipe was the kind used to smoke marijuana, it was not the kind of pipe used to smoke tobacco, and it had a smell that he knows from his training and experience is the smell of burned marijuana. After reading Respondent his Miranda rights, Sergeant Kolak questioned Respondent about the pipe, and Respondent volunteered that he had tried to smoke the marijuana residue in the pipe earlier that day.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, enter a final order finding that Respondent Rozell L. Hester failed to maintain good moral character and ordering that his certification as a correctional officer be suspended for one year. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 2007.
