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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. IRVING Z. MANN, STANLEY M. ROBBINS, ET AL., 78-000976 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-000976 Latest Update: Sep. 05, 1978

Findings Of Fact I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation was at all times material to this proceeding a corporation registered as a real estate broker with the Commission, with its principal business address at 240 North Washington Boulevard, Sarasota, Florida, 33577. Irving Z. Mann was at all times material to this proceeding a real estate broker registered with the Commission, and the holder of two registration certificates: one as an individual broker with an office at 2197 Princeton Street, Sarasota, Florida 33577; and the other license as president and active broker of I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation. Stanley M. Robbins was at all times material to this proceeding a registered real estate salesman in the employ of I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation. At all times material to this proceeding Fritz K. Grolock was a registered real estate salesman, and from April 12, 1972, to February 2, 1976, he was registered with the Commission as a real estate salesman in the employ of I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation. From February 2, 1976, to November 29, 1976, Mr. Grolock was registered with the Commission as a real estate salesman in the employ of I.Z. Mann & Associates, Inc. At all times material to this proceeding Irving Z. Mann was president, and Stanley M. Robbins was vice president, assistant secretary, treasurer and general sales manager of I.Z. Mann & Associates, Inc., a Florida corporation which was the owner and developer of the Palma Sola Harbor condominium development in Sarasota County, Florida. On or before February 4, 1976, Mr. Grolock and Mr. Robbins had agreed that Mr. Grolock would receive for his services as a real estate salesman for I.Z. Mann & Associates, Inc. a three percent commission based upon the sales price of individual condominium units sold at Palma Sola Harbor. Commissions were to be paid to Mr.Grolock at the end of the month in which the sale of each such unit was consummated. Mr. Robbins explained to Mr. Grolock at the time of this agreement that I.Z. Mann & Associates, Inc. was short of cash, and that should Grolock make any sales, he might have to wait for some indefinite period of time to receive his commission. Mr. Grolock indicated his willingness at the time to proceed on that basis. No testimony was adduced, and no documentary evidence was offered to establish that Mr. Grolock was employed by I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation, Inc., at any time material to the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint. During the course of his employment as a real estate salesman with I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation, Inc. Mr. Grolock solicited and obtained a real property sales contract between Elmer C. Sutter and Ruth W. Sutter, as purchasers, and I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation, Inc., as seller, for a condominium unit in the Palma Sola Harbor project. The purchase price of the unit was $26,450, and the evidence established that Mr.Grolock is due, and has not been paid, a commission of $793.50 for that sale. During the course of his employment as a real estate salesman with I.Z. Mann & Associates, Inc., Mr. Grolock solicited and obtained a real property sales contract between Martin G. Tepatti and Dorothy L. Tepatti, as purchasers, and I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation, Inc., as seller, for a condominium unit in the Palma Sola Harbor project. The purchase price of the unit was $37,450, and the evidence established that Mr. Grolock is due, and has not been paid, a commission of $1,123.50 for that sale. During the course of his employment as a real estate salesman with I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation, Inc., Mr. Grolock solicited and obtained real property sales contract (Petitioner's Exhibit #1) dated April 29, 1976, between Donald F. Brown and Barbara S. Brown, as purchasers, and I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation, Inc. as seller, for a condominium unit in the Palma Sola Harbor project. The purchase price of the unit was $37,450, and the evidence established that Mr. Grolock is due, and has not been paid, a real estate commission of $1,123.50 for that sale. Mr. Grolock did not attend the closing of any of the three transactions referenced above and described in the Administrative Complaint. However, the only evidence of record establishes that these transactions resulted in "negative closings" that is, after deductions of amounts due on the pre-existing construction mortgage, charges for documentary stamp taxes, tax pro-rations and the like, no funds remained for disbursement to I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation, Inc. for payment to Mr. Grolock as a commission. Neither Mr. Mann, Mr. Robbins, I.Z. Mann Realty Corporation, nor I.Z. Mann & Associates, Inc. received any funds at the closing of these transactions. Some time after the closings of the three transactions described in the Administrative Complaint, Mr. Grolock spoke with Mr. Robbins concerning non- payment of his commissions. Mr. Robbins explained t6hat the three transactions had resulted in "negative closings," but that if Mr. Grolock would be patient he would be paid his commissions in due course. Mr. Robbins discussed the commissions once or twice thereafter with Mr. Grolock, each time explaining that the company was short of money but that Mr. Grolock would be paid eventually. Because of poor market conditions in the condominium industry, I.Z. Mann Realty & Associates experienced financial problems which ultimately resulted in the company's insolvency. The company eventually voluntarily relinquished its assets to creditors, or had its interest in those assets foreclosed, and at the present time is no longer actively engaged in business. By letters to Mr. Robbins dated December 7, 1976, and January 19, 1977, (Petitioner's Exhibit #2) Mr. Grolock demanded that some arrangements be made for payment of his past due commissions. When he received no reply to these letters, Mr. Grolock sent a letter (Petitioner's Exhibit #2) to Mr. Mann dated April 25, 1977, listing the transactions which resulted in $3,040.50 being owed to him for real estate commissions. Shortly after receiving this letter, Mr. Mann telephoned Mr. Grolock, on May 5, 1977, and told him ". . . the company had been inactive for a long time, but that I would see to it that he would get paid eventually. Just give us a chance to get some money to do it." (Transcript, p. 63). Mr. Grolock agreed at that time to wait for payment of his commissions. Some time after his May 5, 1977, telephone conversation with Mr. Mann, Mr. Grolock filed a complaint with the Commission ". . . [b]ecause I found no other recourse. . . [t]o obtain my commission . . . ." (Transcript, p. 26).

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. STEVEN R. HALL AND J. ARNOLD AUSLEY, 85-002914 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-002914 Latest Update: Aug. 01, 1986

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Steven Hall, at all times pertinent hereto, was a licensed real estate salesman and broker. Upon February 15, 1984, he became licensed as a broker. The Respondent was registered with and employed by J. Arnold Ausley Realty from March 31, 1983 to February 15, 1984. J. Arnold Ausley was a licensed real estate broker and operated as Ausley Properties during times pertinent hereto. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating the licensure and practice of realtors in the State of Florida and enforcing the practice standards for realtors embodied in Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. On February 4, 1984, the Respondent, in his capacity as a licensed salesman for Ausley Properties, arranged a contract between Champak Bhoja and Kishor Patel, as purchasers of a certain piece of real estate owned by one John D. Gilbert. In connection with that contract the Respondent obtained a $2,000 check as a deposit from Mr. Patel. At Mr. Patel's request the Respondent held this check without negotiating it awaiting Patel's instruction that sufficient funds were on deposit to honor the check. The Respondent waited four weeks and received no such instructions from Mr. Patel. The Respondent therefore contacted Patel, who was in Nebraska at the time, to tell him that he felt legally obligated to deposit the check. The check was deposited and was returned for insufficient funds. On March 19, 1984, Mr. Patel gave the Respondent a replacement check in the amount of $2,000. Mr. Hall asked Mr. Patel to make the check out to him since he had in the meantime become a broker and wanted credit for this transaction in his own business. He also informed Mr. Patel that he would need to use the money for his own personal expenses, in the nature of a "loan." Mr. Patel, however, made the check out to the "Ausley Properties Escrow Account." The Respondent and Mr. Patel had been involved in other business ventures together during the course of which Mr. Patel had already lent the Respondent, on different occasions, a total of approximately $4,000. This course of dealing was continued in the present instance, from the Respondent's viewpoint, when the Respondent informed Mr. Patel that he needed the $2,000 for personal expense purposes and would pay it back as a loan. He believed Mr. Patel assented to that arrangement at the time. The sales contract at issue ultimately failed to be consummated due to Mr. Pate1 and Mr. Bhoja not meeting the required contingency regarding debt financing. Approximately fifteen days after the contract's closing date passed, Mr. Patel made a demand upon the Respondent for the return of the $2,000 deposit. The Respondent failed to return it at that time but assured Mr. Patel that he would repay the money and needed more time to obtain the necessary funds. The Respondent had not deposited the check in the Ausley Properties Escrow Account because such an account did not exist, although the Respondent had urged Mr. Ausley on a number of occasions to set up such an account. The Respondent rather cashed the $2,000 check and used the proceeds for his own benefit, as he had informed Patel he would do. He used the money to meet certain operating expenses and personal expenses, being in severe financial straits at the time. Pate1 knew he was experiencing financial difficulties and had lent him the previously mentioned $4,000 to help him with operating expenses and personal expenses during the pendency of the closing of their various other real estate ventures. The Respondent informed Patel he would use the subject $2,000 for similar purposes, however, the record does not clearly reflect that Patel consented to this, as opposed to his intent that the money be placed in an account as his deposit of consideration for the contract. His testimony to this latter effect is borne out by the fact that in spite of the Respondent's request that the check be made out to him personally, instead Patel made it out to the "Ausley Properties Escrow Account." That account did not exist but the method of drafting the check reveals his intent that the money was to be used as a deposit. In any event the Respondent made no misrepresentation to Mr. Patel as to what he intended to do with the money, but at the same time he did not deposit it in an appropriate account to be held as a deposit toward the purchase of the property involved in the sales contract. Patel made numerous demands for the money and each time Respondent acknowledged this and the other debt to Patel and promised to pay. He ultimately began paying back a small portion of the indebtedness to each of his creditors starting out at a rate of $10 per month. Ultimately, the Respondent paid the entire $2,000 predicated on receipt of his 1985 income tax return.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Petitioner finding that the Respondent has violated Section 475.25(1)(b),(d,)(e) and (k) only to the extent delineated in the above conclusions of law and that his real estate broker's license be subjected to a six months suspension. DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of August, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Mitchell, Esquire Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Steven R. Hall 8880 Old Kings Hwy., Apt. 30-W Jacksonville, Florida 32217 Michael Sheahan, Esquire Two South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wings Slocum Benton, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Harold Huff Executive Director Florida Rea1 Estate Commission 400 W. Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 APPENDIX Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Rejected, although the evidence establishes that Patel intended the funds to be escrowed. Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Rejected as not comporting with the charges in the Administrative Complaint. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact:* Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted, but irrelevant to the charges. Accepted Accepted Accepted as to the first sentence only. The second sentence concerning Patel's response is not clearly supported by record evidence. Accepted Accepted Accepted * Although Respondent is proposed findings are accepted, some are inculpatory, some are not material and some support the conclusion that no fraudulent conduct was committed.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.25475.42
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. ALLAN R. HEUTON, 81-002994 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002994 Latest Update: Oct. 04, 1982

The Issue The issues in this case are as follow: Did Respondent violate Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by representing to Laverne Hahn that he would rent his house to her if she sold her house, representing to Ms. Hahn that he would deliver certain papers to her attorney, and representing to Ms. Hahn that the closing on her house would not occur until after February 15, 1981? Did Respondent violate Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, by failing to deliver survey, abstract and title insurance policy documents to Ms. Hahn or her attorney?

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, the Respondent, Allan R. Heuton, held real estate salesman license #0313305 Assued by the Board of Real Estate (now Florida Real Estate Commission). At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was registered as a salesman with Hugh Anderson Real Estate, Inc., at 2631 East Oakland Park Boulevard, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33339. Respondent listed with his employer, Hugh Anderson Real Estate, Inc., Laverne Hahn's offer to sell her residence and advised Ms. Hahn at that time that upon the sale of her residence she could rent his residence for a period of six months at the rate of $300 per month. In reliance on Respondent's statement, Ms. Hahn proceeded to sell her residence and made no other arrangements for a place to live, expecting to move into Respondent's house upon closing as per their agreement. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Pages 5 and 8.) Respondent testified to the events surrounding the transaction which gave rise to the Administrative Complaint. The Board presented the deposition of Ms. Hahn taken in Lakeland, Florida. Respondent admitted that he had advised Ms. Hahn it was not unusual to have closings delayed 60 days, and did offer and stood ready to rent his house to Ms. Hahn. Respondent testified that he did not recall picking up any documents from Ms. Hahn, but that had he done so it was his normal business practice to immediately deliver the documents to the attorney handling the closing. Ms. Hahn's deposition reflects that she could not locate the Respondent although she attempted to contact him through his broker's office. This was the reason she could not rent his house. Respondent testified that Ms. Hahn never asked to rent his house. Respondent testified that on January 14, 1981, the day after his birthday, he was suddenly taken ill and had to have emergency surgery in the early morning hours of that day. Respondent's testimony was corroborated by the testimony of Sheilah Kirk, who testified that she visited Respondent in the hospital on January 14 or 15, 1981, and that he was recovering from surgery at that time. Respondent testified that he was hospitalized for more than one week. Respondent testified that he was visited by the manager of the brokerage office for which he worked. It is hardly credible that Ms. Hahn could not find a man who was sick in a hospital for more than one week and whose whereabouts were known to his brokerage office. Wherefore, the Hearing Officer disregards the deponent's testimony and accepts the Respondent's testimony as the more credible concerning the rental of his house Ms. Hahn's deposition reflects that Respondent told her she would not have to move out until February of 1981. Respondent admits he told Ms. Hahn that closings were frequently delayed 60 days or more. The contract for sale originally provided for closing on December 29, 1980, a time which was changed to January 15, 1981, by persons unknown on a date unknown. The contract was signed by Ms. Hahn, who is presumed to have known its terms. Notwithstanding Respondent's statements as to delayed closings, Ms. Hahn had no basis for using such statement as a basis for planning in light of the contract which she signed. Again, Respondent's testimony is deemed to be more credible in light of the closing date provided in the contract for sale. A further conflict exists between Ms. Hahn's deposition and Respondent's testimony regarding the allegation that Respondent picked up certain documents from her but failed to deliver them. Respondent's statement that he had no recollection of the events, but that his regular practice was to deliver such documents immediately, and that since the time in question he has not discovered any such documents in his papers, is deemed credible.

Recommendation Having found that the allegations against the Respondent, Allan R. Heuton, were not proven, it is recommended that the Administrative Complaint against Respondent be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of July, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Allan R. Heuton 6891 Forrest Street Hollywood, Florida 33024 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs JALENE L. CLAYTON, 97-000950 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:South Daytona, Florida Mar. 05, 1997 Number: 97-000950 Latest Update: Oct. 22, 1997

The Issue Should Petitioner discipline Respondent's real estate sales- person's license for alleged conduct evidencing fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes?

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. In particular, Petitioner carries out its duties in compliance with Chapters 20, 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes and the rules promulgated under authority set forth in those statutes. At times relevant to the inquiry, Respondent was, and is now, a licensed Florida Real Estate salesperson. Her license number is 0591902. That license was issued in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. At times relevant to the inquiry, Respondent worked as a licensed real estate salesperson for Ideal Real Estate Central Florida, Inc., t/a Coldwell Banker Ideal Real Estate in Orange City, Florida (Ideal). The broker for that firm was John S. Chinelli. On April 13, 1993, Respondent listed an exclusive right of sale for property owned by Jason and Kelly Foster at 2853 Sweet Springs Avenue, Deltona, Florida. That listing contemplated that Ideal would earn a real estate commission of 7 percent of the gross purchase price. The listing price in the exclusive right of sale was $69,900. In arriving at the sales price, Mr. Foster relied upon Respondent's advice. That advice included a consideration of the price received for the sale of comparable homes. The establishment of comparable prices as a means to arrive at the listing price for the Foster property involved the use of the Coldwell Banker buyer/seller presentation booklet, as well as a marketing analysis. The price $69,900 was chosen to attract those buyers who were looking for homes that cost less than $70,000. That choice was designed to garner more interest in the home. While the Foster home was being advertised, it was available through the multiple listing pool. Respondent showed the house two times between April 13, 1993, and May 14, 1993. This did not involve a showing to any prospective buyers. Other brokers or salespersons showed the house twice to prospective buyers, but no offers were generated from those showings. Subsequently, Respondent suggested to Mr. Foster that the Foster residence might be appropriate for her use. Respondent offered to buy the Foster property for $65,000. On May 14, 1993, Respondent and Mr. Foster entered into a contract for sale and purchase of the Foster residence. The purchase price was $65,000. Respondent deposited $500 into the escrow account managed by Ideal in furtherance of her interest in the property. The earnest money deposit was placed with Mr. Chinelli pending the closing of the sale. The contract called for Respondent to assume an existing mortgage of $63,556. The contract identified that the Respondent was a licensed real estate agent in Florida, but the purchase was not being made through Ideal. Under this contract, the real estate commission that had been contemplated initially would not be paid to Ideal and Respondent. When Respondent entered into a contract to buy the Foster property, she did not tell Mr. Foster that she would no longer be representing him as a real estate salesperson. The contract between Respondent and Mr. Foster called for a closing date on or before June 30, 1993. In entering into the agreement for Respondent to purchase the home, Respondent told Mr. Foster that she intended to personally occupy that property. Respondent never told Mr. Foster that she entered into the contract to purchase his home with the intent to sell the home to another person. Originally that was not her intention. Respondent held to the view that in the event that her purchase of the home was not concluded, Respondent would still represent Mr. Foster in his desire to sell the home. This is taken to mean that she would be representing Mr. Foster as a real estate salesperson. Sometime around June 20, 1993, Kai and Denise M. Hansen, husband and wife, contacted Ideal to show the Hansens property in the Deltona area. Respondent assisted the Hansens in this pursuit, acting as a real estate salesperson. There was no written agreement between Respondent or her firm signed with the Hansens to represent them in their attempt to purchase a home. Respondent showed the Hansens 8 to 12 homes in the Deltona area. The Hansens were not interested in purchasing those homes. At that point, Respondent suggested that the Hansens look at the home that she was purchasing from Mr. Foster. Respondent told the Hansens that Respondent was buying the Foster house from the Fosters who were moving out of town and that Respondent was helping the Fosters "out of a bind." Respondent told the Hansens that the home might be "too big for her anyway." Respondent told the Hansens that if she could help the Hansens out she would sell the Foster home to the Hansens if the Hansens liked that property. If a suitable home had been found through a real estate listing, other than the Foster residence, a commission would have been paid from the seller of the hypothetical house to the broker for Ideal. In that circumstance, the Hansens would not be responsible for paying a commission to the Respondent or Ideal. The properties other than the Foster property which Respondent was showing the Hansens were shown by Respondent as a sub-agent for the sellers. Respondent showed the Hansens the Foster residence during the week of June 20, 1993. On June 24, 1993, Respondent entered into a contract with the Hansens for sale and purchase of the Foster property. An addendum to that contract indicated that "this contract is contingent upon seller obtaining clear Title on 2853 Sweet Springs, Deltona, FL." The Hansens paid a $1,000 earnest money deposit toward the purchase of the Foster property. That deposit was placed in the escrow account for Ideal. That deposit was to be held until the closing date scheduled for July 16, 1993. Again, it was not contemplated that a real estate commission would be paid to Respondent and Ideal. The price arrived at between Respondent and the Hansens to purchase the Foster property was $72,500. Initially, Respondent had offered to sell the property for $73,000. The Hansens counter-offered to pay $72,000 leading to the final purchase price of $72,500. The contract between the Respondent and the Hansens called for an assumption of a mortgage in the amount of 63,500. Although Respondent had advised the Hansens that the property was being purchased from the current occupants, the Fosters, Respondent did not advise the Hansens of the price the Respondent was paying the Fosters to purchase that property. Respondent never advised the Fosters that the Hansens had sought to purchase the Foster home and that Respondent had entered into a contract with the Hansens for the Hansens to purchase that property. On June 29, 1993, the closing occurred between Respondent and the Fosters and a warranty deed was prepared noting the change in ownership. At the closing Respondent told the Fosters that she still intended to occupy the home. On July 16, 1993, the closing occurred between the Respondent and the Hansens and a warranty deed was drawn conveying the property from the Respondent to the Hansens. As established by Mark A. Carper, a real estate appraiser, the value of the Foster property on April 13, 1993 was between $65,000 and $72,500. In anticipation of moving into the Foster home, Respondent had made arrangements to move out of the residence where she had been living by giving notice that she intended to move.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED That a Final Order be entered which dismisses the administrative complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day of July, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Christine M. Ryall, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 William A. Parsons, Esquire Woerner & Parsons 2001 South Ridgewood Avenue South Daytona, Florida 32119 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57455.227475.25 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61J2-24.001
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. CHERYLYN STOPPLER, DOROTHY DIANE OWENS, AND ESCAMBIA REALTY, INC., 86-003982 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-003982 Latest Update: May 28, 1987

Findings Of Fact Respondent Cherylyn Stoppler, at all times pertinent hereto, was licensed as a real estate saleswoman in the State Of Florida, holding license No. 0467803. Her last and current license was issued authorizing practice at Escambia Realty, Inc., 310 South Pace Boulevard, Pensacola, Florida 32501. Respondent Dorothy Diane Owens, at all times pertinent hereto, was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding license No. 0380831. Respondent Escambia Realty, Inc., at all times pertinent hereto, was a licensed corporate real estate brokerage holding license No. 0232503. Its address is 310 South Pace Boulevard, Pensacola, Florida 32501. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing the provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, related to the licensure of real estate brokers and salesmen, the real estate professional practice standards embodied in that chapter and with prosecuting alleged violators of those standards. On April 13, 1986, Kenneth and Linda Williams, also known as Linda Brewer, requested that Cherylyn Stoppler show them rental property consisting of a single family residence located at 6853 Lake Charlene Drive in Pensacola. They had observed the Respondent corporate broker's sign on the front of that premises, advertising it for rental. Respondent Stoppler, Respondent Owens and the Escambia Realty, Inc. represented the owners of the property. Kenneth and Linda Williams examined the property and decided that they wanted to rent it. In their discussion with Cherylyn Stoppler concerning the terms of the rental arrangement, they requested that they be allowed to paint the premises and that the garage door be repaired. Respondent Stoppler agreed to this and indicated the owners would supply two gallons of paint and the prospective tenants, the Williamses, could do the painting with the owners ensuring repair of the garage door. Respondent Stoppler and the Williamses agreed to those terms and to the rental amount of $625 per month. They also agreed to pay Respondent Stoppler a $400 deposit, on behalf of the owners. Ms. Stoppler informed the Williamses that if they did not consummate the lease arrangement, upon which they had verbally agreed, the $400 would be retained and remitted over to the owners of the property. The Williamses agreed to this arrangement. The Williamses and Ms. Stoppler returned to Ms. Stoppler's office and she noted these terms on a lease agreement form with the additional term that the owner would steam clean the carpet in the house. The lease terms also provided that the premises would be used by no more than two adults and "zero" children, but the lease agreement has the "zero" stricken through indicating that that term was to be deleted. The striking of the zero on the term concerning the number of children to occupy the premises appears to have been executed with the same pen, inasmuch as the ink is the same color as the rest of Mrs. Stoppler's handwritten terms on the lease form. In any event, the Williamses were anxious to return to their home in Louisiana directly from the Respondent's office that same afternoon and to accommodate them Ms. Stoppler agreed to mail the lease form to them to be executed, urging them to send it back immediately. When they left the premises that day, Respondent Stoppler removed her firm's sign from the front of the premises and also told the Williamses that the property would be off the market as of that day, hence her admonishment to them to waste no time in returning the executed lease since the property would be off the market during the interim on the strength of the verbal agreement. The Williamses did not inform Ms. Stoppler that Mr. Williams had two children who might visit them from time to time or live with them at the premises. The Williamses returned to Louisiana and the lease was mailed to them by Ms. Stoppler. The Williamses decided not to execute the lease and to not consummate the rental arrangement. They informed Ms. Stoppler of this by phone on April 24, 1986, as well as communicating on that day with Respondent Owens. They indicated they did not desire to rent the premises and one reason given was that they felt that the two children were precluded by the lease terms from living on the premises for any period of time with them. In fact, the Williamses had never mentioned that they had any children and had sought to negotiate a reduction in the rent when they originally discussed the matter with Ms. Stoppler on the basis that only the two of them would live in the premises. The terms and conditions of the rental arrangement were those given to Ms. Stoppler by the Williamses themselves. When they conferred with Ms. Owens and Ms. Stoppler, they were again informed that the $400 would be retained and transmitted to the owners, to which they did not then object. In fact, they never did make any demand upon the Respondents for return of the $400 which was actually communicated to the Respondents. There is a letter in evidence (Petitioner's Exhibit 6) which the Respondents never received, as is shown by the certified mail receipt card and by Respondents' and Ms. Celano's testimony. The Williamses objected to consummating the lease because they contended that Ms. Stoppler had assured them that they could 1ive in the premises rent- free from the beginning of the lease, April 26, until May 1, during the time in which they would be painting the house and instead they were being charged $84 for those days. Mrs. Williams' testimony is somewhat equivocal in this regard in that she exhibited an incomplete memory regarding certain critical dates in the transaction, for example, the date she allegedly called Mrs. Stoppler to inform her of their refusal of the rental and the date she believed the lease was to commence. Mrs. Stoppler's testimony was corroborated by that of Ms. Owens, and was not refuted by the Williamses. It is accepted over that of Mrs. Williams in establishing that indeed the lease period and the rental there for was to commence on April 26. The Respondents' testimony shows that the house was off the rental market from April 13, when the verbal agreement with Ms. Williams was entered into and the sign was removed from the property and that both Respondents informed Mrs. Williams on two occasions that the $400 was not refundable but would be remitted to the owners of the property. The Respondents also established that Escambia Realty, Inc. followed a consistent policy of retaining deposit monies and remitting them to the owners without refund to prospective tenants when the tenants agreed to lease the premises after being informed that the deposit would be retained and the property taken off the market, when such tenants elect of their own volition to negate a lease or rental agreement. The Williamses additionally maintained that they did not want to consummate the lease arrangement because, in their view, the Respondents and the owners would not permit any children unrestrictedly visit or to live on the premises. That was established not to be the case. They also objected because they would not be allowed to live in the premises rent-free for several days during the time in which they were painting the premises. Additional objections involved various inconsequential technical deficiencies, such as misspellings, in the content of the lease. The employment position Mr. Williams was to have taken in the Pensacola area, and which was in large measure their reason for moving to Pensacola and renting the subject premises, failed to materialize. Ultimately, however, the Williamses moved to Pensacola and rented a different house at the lower rate of $600 per month. In short, the complaining witnesses contend that they did not want to execute the lease because of the problem of the $84 prorated rent required of them by the Respondents and the owners for the days when they thought they would live rent-free while painting the premises, because they felt that Mr. Williams' children by a previous marriage were precluded from unrestricted visits at the rental premises and because they felt that the proffered lease did not contain the proper initial date of tenancy. Thus, the Williamses breached the agreement because the Respondents refused to "correct" the lease according to the Williamses' desires. Those desires were not communicated to the Respondents until, at the very earliest, the phone conversations of April 24, 1986, some twelve days after the verbal agreement to rent the premises to the Williamses had been entered into and the $400 deposited with the Respondents on behalf of the owners. During that time, and longer, the property was taken off the rental market and the Respondents and the owners forbore the opportunity to secure other tenants. The Williamses themselves acknowledged that the letter by which they sought return of the $400 deposit was never actually received by the Respondents. Further, Ms. Williams in the telephone conversation on April 24, 1986, acknowledged that the owners were entitled to the $400 deposit. Even so, Ms. Owens waited approximately 25 days before remitting the funds over to the owners. Thus, no dispute as to the deposit was ever communicated to the Respondents, and the Respondents never misrepresented to either Mr. or Mrs. Williams the manner of disbursement of the deposit funds. It is noteworthy that Mrs. Williams is a licensed realtor herself and had some experience in similar real estate transactions. The Respondents carried out their portion of the bargain. Finally, it has been demonstrated that Respondent Owens is a well- respected real estate practitioner in the Pensacola area, having served as an officer and director of her local board of realtors and having been accorded a number of honors and certifications in connection with her professional performance as a realtor and her securing of advanced training in the field of real estate brokerage. Ms. Stoppler is relatively new to the profession, but neither she nor Ms. Owens have been shown to have ever engaged in any questionable practice or conduct in the course of their practice and neither have been shown to have been the subject of any other complaint of any nature resulting from a real estate transaction.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint against Respondents Cherylyn Stoppler, Dorothy Diane Owens and Escambia Realty, Inc. be dismissed in its entirety. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3982 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-4. Accepted. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Rejected as to its material import. 7-9. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 10-11. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Accepted. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import. 17-18. Accepted. 19. Rejected as to its material import. 20-21. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as to its material import. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import. Accepted, but rejected as to its material import. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import. 29-30. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 31. Accepted, but not as to its material import. 32-35. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as to its material import. Accepted, but not to the effect that a demand for refund was made. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 39-41. Rejected. Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact: Specific rulings are not separately made here because Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact are inseparably entwined with legal argument and recitations of, and arguments concerning, the weight and credibility of testimony and evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Cherylyn Stoppler Dorothy Diane Owens Escambia Realty, Inc. 310 South Pace Boulevard Pensacola, Florida 32501 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. JOHN T. HALKOWICH, 76-000459 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-000459 Latest Update: Jun. 22, 1977

Findings Of Fact In November and December, 1974 John T. Halkowich was a registered real estate salesman with the brokerage office of Ayers F. Egan. Exhibit 2, Return Receipt for Registered Mail, was admitted into evidence to show that Halkowich acknowledged receipt of the Notice of Hearing. When Halkowich applied for registration as a real estate salesman, Egan was one of his sponsors. Upon his successful completion of the requirements for registration Egan agreed to hold Halkowich's license for him in Egan's office, but because business was slow he could not allow Halkowich any floor days. He agreed to allow him to sit on houses that neither Egan nor Egan's associate wanted to hold open. During the period of 1974, when little real estate was selling on the Florida Keys, the housing development project owned by Vogler and Snowman was running on hard tines and the developers were anxious to "get out from under" the property. John Vogler, Jr., the father of the Vogler partner in the project, went to Egan to seek help with the sales. Since Egan had no work for Halkowich he suggested that perhaps the developers could make a deal with Halkowich. The developers needed someone on the property at all times to act as watchman, show prospective buyers around, keep the grass trimmed, and supervise the completion of the project. Halkowich was provided an apartent on the site to live in, complete with utilities, in consideration for performing those services. For each unit of the project that was sold the developers agreed to pay Halkowich $2,000. One of the purchasers who appeared at the hearing had stopped by the development, was shown around by Halkowich, and thereafter made an offer directly to the developers to purchase a unit. A contract was subsequently executed between the developers and the buyer and referred to the developers' attorney who performed the closing. After the closing Halkowich was paid $2,000. When Egan learned that sales had been made and that Halkowich had received compensation from the developers he demanded his commission from Halkowich. When the latter advised Egan he couldn't pay him Egan told him he was in violation of the real estate license law and that he, Egan, would report him to the Florida Real Estate Commission if he didn't pay. Thereafter Egan piously reported Halkowich's transgressions to the Commission and this Administrative Complaint ultimately followed.

Florida Laws (2) 475.25475.42
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. PRESTIGE REALTY, INC., AND ANTHONY C. CAPPELLO, 79-000392 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-000392 Latest Update: Jun. 22, 1979

Findings Of Fact Prestige Realty, Inc. and Anthony C. Cappello were at all times here relevant registered with the FREC as alleged. Mrs. Cappello, wife of Respondent, is a salesperson with Prestige Realty, Inc. Prestige Realty, Inc. is an Electronics Realty Associates (ERA) franchisee and actively promotes the ERA Homeowners warranty Plan which will, for a fee, warrant to pay for repairs to structure and equipment within the first year of purchase all costs over the minimum for which the policy is written. While showing prospective purchasers William and Dora Keys various properties, Mrs. Cappello told them about the ERA Buyers Protection Plan (BPP) and the Keys expressed an interest in having same, particularly if the seller would pay for it. Mrs.. Cappello has worked with the Keys for several months showing them various properties for sale. Thomas Hanrahan listed his home for sale with B & M Real Estate as listing agent at a price of $52,000 on 31 January 1977. On April 28, 1977 Mrs. Cappello obtained an offer from William and Dora Keys to purchase Hanrahan's house for $49,000. Keys had inherited some money, and after seeing the Hanrahan house which they liked, made an offer to purchase the property for $49,000 including the drapes and BPP. Inclusion of the BPP in the offer was suggested by Respondent Cappello and/or Mrs. Cappello. The fact that an offer had been received was communicated to the listing salesperson and the listing agent met the Cappellos to present the offer to Hanrahan. Respondent Cappello, who had accompanied his wife to present the offer, first discussed the contract conditions, including drapes and BPP, before revealing the offering price to Hanrahan and the listing broker's agent. When Respondent revealed the $240 premium for BPP Hanrahan remarked it was a "rip- off"; however, Respondent Cappello emphasized that the seller shouldn't mind paying this premium if the selling price of the home is right. After obtaining Hanrahan's agreement to the BPP "if the price is right', Respondent disclosed the offering price of $49,000. Hanrahan refused this offer and made a counter offer of $51,000, which was communicated to the buyers who re-countered with a $50,000 offer. At no time during these negotiations did Respondents advise Hanrahan that Prestige Realty would receive 25 percent of the premium the contract provided the seller would pay for the ERA BPP. Of the $240 premium paid for the BPP, $C0 was retained by Respondent, Prestige Realty, and the remaining $180 was forwarded to ERA. When the offer of $50,000 was presented to Hanrahan by Respondent Cappello, it was represented to be the buyers' final offer, that the ERA BPP was an essential element of the offer, and if not accepted by the seller they would find the buyers another house. The Keys never insisted to Cappello that the BPP be included in their offer, and both William and Dora Keys testified they would have paid $50,000 for the Hanrahan home without the BPP. Attempts by Hanrahan to share the cost of BPP with the buyers or discourage their insistence upon having this policy provided were rebuffed by Respondents. Following the closing the Keys were offered the option of taking a lower deductible on the BPP than $100, but after being advised the additional cost to them for a lower deductible, it was declined. Respondents and other ERA franchisees consider the BPP to be a good selling tool in the conduct of their business. In addition to the BPP, ERA offers a sellers protection plan which, if the seller lists his house with an ERA franchisee and agrees to pay for a BPP when the house is sold, will insure the seller from failure of certain equipment (less a deductible) during the period the house is listed before sale.

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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