The Issue The issues for consideration in this case concern the petition and challenge to the validity of Rule 7D-32.001(4); Rule 7D-32.003 and Rules 7D- 32.004(1) and (2), Florida Administrative Code. The basis for the challenge is premised upon an alleged vagueness, inadequacy in the establishment of standards for agency decisions, the vesting of unbridled discretion in the agency and the contention that the rules are arbitrary and capricious.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of Lake Waldena Resort, a mobile home park located in Marion County, Florida. That park is regulated under the provisions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a mobile home park owner within the definition set out in Section 723.003(7), Florida Statutes. In addition, Petitioner is presently charged, through a notice to show cause/administrative complaint, with violating Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes and Rule 7D- 32.004(1), Florida Administrative Code, by his alleged refusal to meet with a designated homeowners' committee within 30 days of the giving of notice of a proposed increase of lot rental. That disciplinary case was heard on the same date as the present case and is awaiting disposition through a recommended order. If Petitioner is found to have violated provisions within Chapter 723, Florida Statutes and Chapter 7D-32, Florida Administrative Code, he may be subjected to a civil penalty or have other administrative sanctions imposed. The rules that are under challenge are related to the formation of the homeowners committee; the activities of that committee in ascertaining the basis for the park owners' reason for a lot rental increase; the obligation of the park owner to meet with the committee and the opportunity of the park owner to request certification of the committee's selection to participate in the meeting envisioned by Section 737.0037(3), Florida statues. Respondent by the authority set forth in Section 732.006(6), Florida Statutes, is authorized to promulgate rules which it deems to be necessary to implement, enforce, and interpret the provisions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. In accordance with that authority and the authority set forth in Section 723.037, Florida Statutes, it enacted the rules which are the subject of this dispute. Intervenor is a Florida non-profit corporation which represents over 150,000 mobile home owners and tenants in Florida and has as its purpose the representation of those mobile home owners in various activities, to include legal issues. The Petitioner and Respondent and the mobile home owners whom the Intervenor represents are substantially affected by the decision concerning the validity of the aforementioned rules.
The Issue Whether the amount collected from the tenants of Corley Island Mobile Manor by the Respondent for improvement and repairs to its sewage treatment plant was a "pass-through charge" as defined in Section 723.003(10), Florida Statutes, or was it collected as a matter of custom between the mobile home park owner and the mobile home owner or disclosed prior to tenancy in accordance with Section 723.031 (6), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Petitioner is the state agency governing the landlord tenant relationship in mobile home parks subject to Chapter 723, Florida Statute. The Park is, and at all times pertinent to this proceeding, has been a mobile home park subject to Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. The Park is owned equally by Respondents, Dale B. Downing, R. E. Downing and H. W. Whitcomb. The Park is operated under the name of Corley Island Mobile Manor. The Park's wastewater is handled through a package treatment plant owned and operated by the Respondents (the WWTF). Under its original configuration, wastewater entered the WWTF through an aeration tank. The Park utilized two separate aeration tanks where the wastewater was agitated and allowed to come in contact with oxygen and enzymes. This started the treatment process. After the wastewater flowed through the first and the second aeration tanks, it spilled into a clarifier. The clarifier is a quiet tank where solids are allowed to settle into a hopper shaped bottom for removal or additional treatment. The clear wastewater at the top of the clarifier flows into a chlorine contact chamber and then out to percolation ponds which allow the wastewater to filter into the ground water through the bottom of the ponds. Prior to November of 1987, the Park was experiencing increased flows of wastewater through the WWTF. The Respondents first investigated the collection system for the infiltration of ground water into the system. The Park also inspected the mobile homes and fixed any leaky faucets, toilets, etc. The Respondents retained Altair Maintenance to examine the collection system using television cameras and to make necessary repairs. On July 8, 1983, Altair Maintenance invoiced the Park for $3,450.00 for these services. Altair Maintenance was called back for additional work in December of 1985 for the repair of manholes at a total charge of $4,124.25. Altair was again called on July 1, 1992 for maintenance of the WWTF at a cost of $1,898.75. Extensive repairs to the manholes and other parts of the WWTF were completed by Roto-Rooter Plumbing. Roto-Rooter was paid $24,090.00 for a May 13, 1983 invoice and $5,891.50 for a July 22, 1983 invoice. Even further repairs to the Park's WWTF were made by Superior Asphalt. It was paid $3,413.00 for replacement of a manhole. The above-described sums were not charged to the residents of the Park. In spite of the maintenance activities described above, the Park continued to experience problems with increased wastewater flows into the WWTF. During peak flow hours (approximately 11:00 A.M.) the normally clear wastewater flowing out of the clarifier into the chlorine contact chamber would become cloudy. This wash through of solids resulted from increased flows during peak flow hours. Wastewater would not remain in the clarifier for a sufficient period of time for the solids to settle out. These solids would spill out of the clarifier or "wash through" causing the wastewater flowing into the chlorine contact chamber to become dark due to the heavy solids content. The agency of state government having jurisdiction over the permitting and operation of wastewater treatment facilities is the Department of Environmental Regulation ("DER"). On November 3, 1987, the DER issued a warning notice to the Park because of an abnormally high amount of solids content and a high BOD level in the wastewater flowing from the WWTF. The DER issued a notice of violation on the same grounds on December 1, 1987. The agency of local government having jurisdiction over the WWTF is the Lake County Pollution Control Department. Respondent, Dale Downing, spoke with an employee of the Lake County Pollution Control Department, Roy Green, to determine the measures necessary to resolve this "wash through" of solids. Green told Dale Downing that he would not be able to make the plant perform unless the Park modified the WWTF by adding a digester and surge tank. A digester is a holding tank for solids, a by-product of the treatment process. Solids remain in the holding tank until removed by a removal service. A surge tank is a large tank placed at the front of a wastewater treatment facility which catches the initial inflow of wastewater. Regardless of the rate of flow into the surge tank, pumps release the wastewater from the tank at a uniform rate. A surge tank allows an operator to balance the flow of wastewater through the WWTF eliminating these peak flow problems. The DER permit for the Park's WWTF was due to expire in January of 1988. The Respondents applied for a new permit but were told that the standard five year operating permit could not be issued because of the warning notices and notices of violation the Park had received because of high suspended solids and BOD levels in the effluent. The DER suggested that the Park get a temporary permit while corrections were being made to bring the plant up to performance standards. Respondent, Dale Downing, traveled to the DER's office in Orlando for a meeting with its permitting supervisor, Lee Miller. Miller confirmed that the Park's only options to alleviate its WWTF problems were a connection to the City of Leesburg's municipal system or the addition of a surge tank and digester to the existing plant. The Park's engineer, Richard Newman, prepared plans and specifications for the addition of a surge tank and digester to the WWTF which were submitted to the DER for approval. The DER accepted the modifications on the condition that the Park eliminate its single-cell percolation pond and construct a two-cell percolation pond system. The modifications were completed by the Respondents. As a result, the DER issued a standard five year permit. The WWTF has been trouble free since the modifications were placed in service. The actual expenses necessary for the plant modifications and the construction of the two-cell percolation ponds were passed through to the Park residents. The total costs of these improvements were divided by the Park's 151 lots and charged to each resident on a pro rata basis ($61,644.31/151= $408.24). The Respondents considered this charge as a "pass-through charge". The maintenance, or lack of maintenance, of the Park's WWTF had no impact on the need for the modifications (capital improvements) to the Park's WWTF. There is competent substantial evidence to establish facts to show that the capital improvements, including the two-cell percolation pond, made to the Park's WWTF by the Respondents were governmentally mandated in that DER would not have granted a permit to the Respondents for the operation of the Park's WWTF without these minimum capital improvements. And, the costs of such capital improvements come within the definition of "pass-through charges" as defined in Section 723.003(10), Florida Statutes. The prospectus for the park discloses in Article VIII that each resident's lot rental amount could be increased to recover the cost of the modifications to the WWTF.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a final order dismissing the Notice To Show Cause filed in this case and any enforcement action against the Respondents. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of June, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5692 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed Findings of Fact 1 through 4, 8 through 13 and 15 through 21 are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order, except where they may be subordinate, cumulative, unnecessary, irrelevant or immaterial. Proposed Findings of Fact 5 through 7 and 14 are rejected as not being supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed Findings of Fact 1 through 26 and 28 through 35 have been adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order, except where they may be subordinate, cumulative, unnecessary, irrelevant or immaterial. Proposed Findings of Fact 27 and 28 are covered in the Preliminary Statement and Conclusions of Law, respectively. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Harper Field, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 J. Allen Bobo, Esquire LUTZ, WEBB, PARTRIDGE, BOBO & BAITTY, P. A. Suite 504, One Sarasota Tower Two North Tamiami Trail Sarasota, Florida 34236 Janet Ferris, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Henry M. Solares, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums And Mobile Homes Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Donald D. Conn, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000
The Issue Whether Rules 7D-30.04, 7D-30.06, 7D-31.01(2), 7D-31,01(4), 7D-31.01(5), 7D-31.01(12), 7D-32.01 and 7D-32.02, Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority and are arbitrary and capricious?
Findings Of Fact The following findings of fact were stipulated to and are hereby adopted: The following is a Florida non-profit corporation, whose address is 115 N. Calhoun Street, Tallahassee, Florida. The FMHA is organized and maintained for the benefit of its members, which includes approximately 950 mobile home park owners and operators. A substantial portion of these members own or operate parks which contain 10 or more lots and therefore are subject to regulation by the Division of Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, Department of Business Regulation. The Division of Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, Department of Business Regulation is delegated the authority pursuant to Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, to regulate mobile home parks, including the powers to enforce and ensure compliance with the provisions of the Chapter and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, including the authority to impose a civil penalty against a mobile home park owner for any violation of the Chapter, or a rule or regulation of the Division. Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, was enacted by the Florida Legislature as Chapter 84-80, was signed by the Governor and filed in the office of the Secretary of State on June 4, 1984. Rules 7D-30, 7D-31, and 7D-32, Florida Administrative Code, are rules of the Division of Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, Department of Business Regulation, which were properly adopted in accordance with Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner is a trade association the members of which are engaged in business in the mobile home industry in the State of Florida. The Petitioner has members who are mobile home manufacturers, retailers, equipment suppliers and servicers, owners and operators of mobile-home rental parks, developers of mobile home parks and subdivisions, insurance firms and lending institutions. The Petitioner has 1,020 members who develop mobile home parks and subdivisions or are owners and operators of mobile home rental parks. As stipulated to by the parties, approximately 950 of the Petitioner's members are owners and operators of mobile home rental parks. The Petitioner's members are involved in the rental of between 300,000 and 350,000 mobile home spaces. A substantial number of the Petitioner's members are subject to regulation by the Respondent pursuant to Chapter 723, Florida Statutes (1985), the "Florida Mobile Home Act." In July of 1984, subsequent to the effective date of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes (1985), the Bureau of Mobile Homes was created as a part of the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes. Dr. Faye Mayberry has been, and continues to be, the Chief of the Bureau of Mobile Homes. Following the enactment of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes (1985), the Bureau of Mobile Homes concluded that there was a need to clarify certain portions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes (1985), and a need to establish procedures necessary for the filing of prospectuses and other documents. Therefore, the Bureau initiated a process to determine what rules needed to be adopted. The Bureau also received numerous inquiries from mobile home owners and mobile home park owners concerning Chapter 723. The Bureau first looked at Chapter 723 in-house and looked at the nature of inquiries it had received and then drafted a conceptual approach to part of the rules. The conceptual draft, at the invitation of the Bureau, was reviewed by representatives of the Petitioner and the Intervenor. A meeting was held with the Respondent to discuss the conceptual approach. The Respondent left the meeting with the impression that the conceptual approach was not that far off. Following its discussions of the conceptual approach with the Petitioner and Intervenor, the Respondent drafted rules pursuant to Chapter 723. Four workshops, in three locations in Florida, were conducted to receive public input on the draft rules. Advance notice of the workshops was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly. Representatives of the Petitioner had notice of, and participated in, the workshops. Subsequent to the public workshops, in October of 1934, the Respondent published proposed rules under Chapters 7D-30 and 7D-31, in the Florida Administrative Weekly. In November of 1984, the Respondent published proposed rules under Chapter 7D-32. After publication of the proposed rules in the Florida Administrative Weekly, requests for a public hearing were received by the Respondent and public hearings were held. Representatives of the Petitioner attended these hearings and had an opportunity to provide input on the content of the proposed rules. Revisions were made to the proposed rules based upon suggestions from the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee and comments made by the public during the hearings held by the Respondent. The revisions were published in the Florida Administrative Weekly in January of 1985. As revised, the rules contained in Chapters 7D-30 and 7D-31, Florida Administrative Code, became effective on January 10, 1985. The rules contained in Chapter 7D-32. Florida Administrative Code, became effective on February 6, 1085. The Joint Administrative Procedures Committee did not file any challenge to the rules after they became effective. A substantial amount of input and work went into adopting Chapters 7D-30, 7D-31 and 7D-39, Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioner had notice of the promulgation of the rules at issue and has been involved in the development and distribution of information it believed was necessary to assist its members in complying with the requirements of Chapter 723. The Petitioner has distributed memoranda, conducted seminars, distributed prospectuses and communicated with representatives of the Respondent in an effort to assist its members in complying with the requirements of Chapter 723. The Petitioner provided definitions of terms for use in prospectuses and notices required by Chapter 723 and for use in complying with the Respondent's rules. The Petitioner has attempted to assist its members in preparing a prospectus which could be filed with the Respondent and would meet the requirements of Chapter 723. Toward this end, the Petitioner prepared a sample or model prospectus and conducted a seminar on the model prospectus on December 17, 1984. The seminar was conducted in Orlando, Florida, and was attended by over 600 people. In the model prospectus the Petitioner provided three alternative methods of providing for future rental increases to be included in a prospectus. The model prospectus discussed at the December 17, 1984 seminar was for use by those mobile home parks with 100 or more rental spaces. The Petitioner also prepared a model prospectus for mobile home parks with 26 to 99 rental spaces which it distributed in June of 1985. This model prospectus was sent to all members of the Petitioner. A large number of the Petitioner's members used the model prospectus prepared by the Petitioner. Information provided to members by the Petitioner was developed by the Petitioner based in part upon its discussions with the staff of the Respondent. The Petitioner received questions from its members concerning certain aspects of the Respondent's rules and Chapter 723 which the Petitioner attempted to answer. A substantial number of the Petitioner's members advertise their mobile home parks. Mr. Neil Kullman is a member of the Petitioner and is the President of Florida Leisure Communities. Florida Leisure Communities owns and operates 3 mobile home parks in Florida. Florida Leisure Communities waits for the Respondent to approve advertising materials it files with the Respondent because it has decided that it does not want to risk using an advertisement which may be found to be defective by the Respondent. Florida Leisure Communities does not wait for approval of its advertisements by the Respondent because it believes that it is required to do so by the Respondent's rules. Time delays have been experienced in getting advertisements approved. A substantial number of the Petitioner's members have rental agreements in existence at mobile homes parks which have anniversary dates or renewal dates which would allow increases in rent. Most of the rental agreements have renewal dates or anniversary dates of July 1 or January 1. The Petitioner provided information to its members in March of 1985 and August of 1985 concerning the Petitioner's understanding of what constitutes an effective notice of lot rental increase. In explaining how members can provide a concise explanation of the reason for a proposed lot rental increase, the Petitioner told its members the following in a memorandum distributed in March of 1985: You need only to provide a concise explanation of the reason for the proposed change. Be brief! You should only include a list of factors (for rent increases), or a short plain statement for the change in services or rules or regulations. Important! As for rent increases, the rule limits the factors you may consider to those specifically identified in the prospectus. If the homeowners go to mediation or arbitration, or to court, then only those factors identified in the prospectus can be used to justify the reasonableness of the increase. Also, you should only place on the notice of increase the category of factor used to determine the rent increase level. For example: Operating costs; Prevailing market rent; Prevailing economic conditions; or Consumer Price Index (CPI). Be sure to list only those factors which are necessary to fully justify the rent increase. In August of 1985 the Petitioner provided the following guidance to its members with respect to how to provide a concise explanation of the reason for a lot rental increase: 4. You need only to provide a concise explanation of the reason for the proposed increase. Be brief! You should only include a list of factors, or a short plain statement of the reason or reasons for the increase. For example, a response might be: "The reasons for the increase are increased operating costs, prevailing market rent, and prevailing economic [sic] conditions, as set forth in the prospectus." You need not to go [sic] into great detail as to the specific costs which may have increased during the course of the year which you may want to take into consideration, or do you need to explain what is intended to mean [sic] by prevailing market rent or prevailing economic conditions. You need only to include a concise explanation of the reasons for the increase. The recommendation of the Petitioner to its members concerning how to provide a concise explanation of an increase in lot rental was basically that the member refer to factors which might cause a rental increase as provided in the member's prospectus. In the model prospectus recommended by the Petitioner to its members in June of 1985, the Petitioner recommended that the following explanation of the manner in which lot rental could be increased should be used by its members: is as follows: Increase in Lot Rental The manner in which lot rental will be increased, Definitions. As used in this Section VIII: "Lot rental" means all sums paid or to be paid by the mobile home owner in consideration of leasing or renting a mobile home lot or lots in the Park. Such sums include any and all rents, special use fees, pass-through charges, installation and set-up charges, and other fees, charges and assessments imposed by the Owner. "Special use fees" mean those separately itemized amounts for specific services or privileges which are charged in addition to rent, including, but not limited to, such charges as guest fees, pet fees and entrance fees. "Pass-through charges" are defined as those amounts, other than special use fees, which are itemized and charged separately from the rent and which represent the mobile home owner's share of costs charged to the Park Owner by any state or local government or utility company. Notice of Increase. The mobile home owner shall be notified of any increase in the lot rental at least 90 days prior to the effective date of such increase. Lot Rental-Increases. General. The lot rental and each of the categories of charges current Iv or hereafter comprising a part of the lot rental are subject to periodic increases by the Owner. However, except for increases resulting from the imposition of pass-through charges, the lot rental will not be increased more frequently than annually, except for initial tenancies which commence after the beginning of the annual rental term. Factors Affecting Increases. Factors which may affect the level of increases in lot rental are as follows: Increased costs, which refers to any increases experienced by the Owner since the delivery of notice of the last increase in the lot rental in the total costs arising out of the ownership, operation and management of the Park. Prevailing Market Rent--Refers to the lot rental imposed in mobile home parks comparable to this Park, or the lot rental willingly paid from time to time by new residents of this Park. A park will be deemed comparable if it is located in the same general vicinity as this Park, and offers similar densities, amenities and services. Prevailing Economic Conditions--are intended to refer to those factors which bear on the economic viability of a real estate investment and which would be considered by a prudent businessman in establishing the base rent and other charges or any increase in the amount thereof. These factors may include: the costs attendant to the replacement of this Park in the economic environment existing at the time of any rental increase, including land acquisition costs, construction costs, and losses associated with the operation of a park prior to full occupancy, and the level at which the lot rental must be established in order that the Park Owner will realize a reasonable return on the costs referred to in this clause (1); the level of interest rates and other financing charges associated with construction, interim and permanent financing; (3) the availability of alternative forms of real estate investment capital; (4) the levels of the Consumer Price Index, defined as the United States Department of Labor, Consumer Price Index, U.S. City Average--All Urban Consumers, 1967 100, or, in the event of the discontinuation of publication of the Consumer Price Index, then an alternative index which has been reasonably related to the Consumer Price Index in evaluating economic conditions, and which has been, or can reasonably be expected to be, generally accepted as a replacement index for the Consumer Price Index; (5) the level at which the lot rental must be established in order that the Owner will realize a reasonable return on the "Owners's Equity"; for this purpose, the "Owner's Equity" refers to the fair market value of the Park from time to time, less existing mortgage indebtedness; (6) other economic factors which might reasonably be expected to affect-either the value of the Park, the rate of return available to the Owner of the Park at the existing level of rent, the present value of the real estate investment in the then current economic conditions, and which would be taken into consideration by a prudent businessman in considering the amount of rental increase required in the Park in order -to realize a rate of return similar to other at risk real estate ventures from the then current value of the Park. To the extent permitted by law, the mobile home owner may also be required to bear, in the form of increases in the lot rental, the costs incurred by Owner in installing capital improvements or performing major repairs in the Park. Additional Considerations The reasons for the increase in lot rental or other fees and charges will be set forth in the notice of increase. Only those factors set forth in the notice will be relied upon by the Park Owner as justification for the rent increase. The Park Owner reserves the right to amend this Prospectus or any Exhibit thereto from time to time to the extent permitted by law to conform with changes in relevant statutory provisions or changes in relevant rules of the Department of Business Regulation, or any other agency having jurisdiction over the operation of this mobile home park. An increase in one or more of the above- described factors may result in an increase in the mobile home owner's rent or other charges. Tenants assuming the remaining portion of a tenancy as prescribed by Section 723.059(3), F.S., are hereby notified that upon the expiration of the assumed tenancy, the Park Owner expressly reserves the right to increase lot rental amount in an amount deemed appropriate by the Park Owner with such increase being imposed in the manner disclosed in the Prospectus delivered to the initial recipient. A number of the Petitioner's members used the notice of lot rental increase recommended by the Petitioner and the portion of the prospectus quoted in finding of fact 33. The Respondent advised some of the Petitioner's members that the notice recommended by the Petitioner was deficient under the Respondent's rules. The notice was deficient because the Respondent determined that the notice did not provide a concise explanation of the reason for a lot rental increase. The notice used by several members of the Petitioner stated that the reason for the increase was "prevailing market conditions and economic conditions." The Respondent notified members that used this explanation that it was deficient. The Respondent also told those members that "the explanation must include the specific changes in the factors described in the prospectus under prevailing market conditions and economic conditions which were the reasons for the change." The Petitioner challenged the Respondent's interpretation of its rules concerning notices in Leon County Circuit Court. The Court advised the parties to work things out following a preliminary injunction hearing. Representatives of the Petitioner and the Respondent met and discussed the problem with the Petitioner's notice and the Respondent subsequently indicated that several examples of a concise explanation for lot rental increases proposed by the Petitioner were acceptable. The method of increasing rent provided in existing rental agreements at various mobile home parks varies. Because existing tenants have different anniversary dates or renewal dates, if notice of a lot rental increase affecting some tenants is given to all tenants of a park, it is more costly to the park owner. It is possible, however, to mail one notice of rental increase to all tenants of a park at the beginning of each year. Florida Leisure Communities has filed a prospectus for all three of its mobile home parks in Florida. The prospectuses have been approved by the Respondent. At the Colonnades, a Florida Leisure Communities park, 156 lots have been completed and 19 of those lots have been occupied. Improvements to be made by Florida Leisure Communities are specified in the prospectus for the parks. In order to keep pace with market conditions and provide different improvements, a new prospectus has to be filed with the Respondent. At Brittany Estates, another Florida Leisure Communities park, after a prospectus had been distributed to all tenants, a tornado destroyed 50 mobile homes. Most of the tenants of the 50 homes voluntarily terminated their leases. Mr. Bernie Covington is vice-president and director of the parks of Angeles Real Estate Management Company (hereinafter referred to as "Angeles"). Angeles owns and operates 13 mobile home parks in Florida. Angeles has filed a prospectus for Heritage Village, a 436 site park. The prospectus had not been approved or distributed as of the date of the hearing of these cases. Heritage Village owns and operates its own sewage treatment plant and water system. Heritage Village will be required, however, to tie into the County's water and sewage system at substantial costs. Existing leases with tenants of Heritage Village allow the park to pass the impact fees ($1,250.00 for sewage and $1,149.00 for water, per site) and the cost of tieing into the force main ($30,000.00 to $35,000.00) on to the tenants. The cost of tieing into the force main may not be passed on to the tenants under the Respondent's rules, however. Angeles has also filed a prospectus for Pleasant Living Mobile Home Park which has 218 tenants. The prospectus had not been approved or distributed as of the date off the final hearing of these cases. Angeles would now like to provide a secure area for storage of boats, RVs and cars and charge a fee for this service. The prospectus being reviewed by the Respondent, however, does not indicate that a secure area will be provided.
The Issue The issues in this case concern the attempt by Petitioner to collect $11,684.62 in attorneys fees and costs associated with the defense of the case of State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, Petitioner, vs. Donald L. Hilgeman and Marilyn Hilgeman, d/b/a DLH Enterprises; and Pat Montgomery, as park owners of Lake Waldena Resort, Respondents, DOAH Case No. 89-4100, and $931.50 in attorneys fees and costs attributable to the pursuit of the present case to collect those attorneys fees and costs attributable to the defense of the administrative prosecution. See Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this inquiry Petitioner was a mobile home park owner as defined by Section 723.003(7), Florida Statutes (1987). Petitioner, Marilyn Hilgeman, his former wife, and Pat Montgomery had administrative charges brought against them through a notice to show cause. In that notice to show cause those three individuals were identified as park owners of Lake Waldena Resort in Silver Springs, Florida. In particular the present Respondent charged the Petitioner and the others with violating Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987) for having refused to meet with a designated mobile home owners committee within 30 days of giving notice of a lot rent increase and having been requested to conduct that meeting for purpose of discussing the reasons for the increase in the lot rental amount. The accused sought a formal hearing as envisioned by Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. That hearing was conducted by the undersigned and a recommended order entered on April 18, 1990, in the aforementioned DOAH Case No. 89-4100. For reasons set out in the conclusions of law found within the recommended order, the suggested disposition of that case was one which found the several Petitioners innocent of any wrong doing and called for the dismissal of the administrative prosecution. On July 25, 1990 the prosecuting agency entered its final order in DOAH Case No. 89-4100. It accepted the fact-finding in the recommended order; however, it modified the conclusions of law and recommended disposition. Unlike the recommended order, the final order in its conclusions of law specifically found that the present Petitioner and the others accused had violated Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes, wherein at page 17 it was held "Therefore, it is concluded Respondent violated Sections 723.037(3), Florida Statutes." The conclusions of law in the final order went on to say that in mitigation of the violation the prosecuting agency had considered the apparent confusion of those Respondents regarding the affect of Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code, as it might influence the actions of the accused and in particular, the present Petitioner. In the final order concerning the mitigating affects of Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code, it was decided that notwithstanding any misunderstanding the accused had as to the significance of the Rule it could not alter the statutory requirements of having a meeting within 30 days of the notice of lot rental increase as described in Section 723.037(3), Florida Administrative Code (1987). The language within Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code, stated: If requested to do so by the park owner or subdivision developer, the committee shall certify that it has been selected as described in Rule 7D-32.003, Florida Admin- istrative Code. This certification shall include a certificate of all members of the committee attesting to its proper formation under the statute and these rules. For reasons expressed in the recommended order that rule was seen as tolling the 30-day requirement for meeting expressed in Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987) on the facts found in both the recommended and final orders. This was based upon a recognition that the present Petitioner had employed the rule in an attempt to gain a certification from the committee of mobile home owners prior to the conduct of a meeting to discuss the increase in lot rentals. Again, this belief that the rule tolled the requirement for conducting the meeting within 30 days of the notice of lot rental increase expressed in the recommended order was rejected in the final order. The final order controls absent further relief by resort to the appellate court process. In describing the reasons why the prosecution maintained that the rule could not alter the statutory requirement for holding a meeting within 30 days, the final order states that there are policy considerations that make it important for the committee and the park owner to meet within 30 days and those reasons concern the fact that the rent increase becomes effective within 90 days over the notice, the informational value of having the reasons explained for the lot increase as a prelude to any request to having a dispute about lot rental increases submitted to mediation within 30 days following the scheduled meeting. The final order goes on to describe, through its conclusions of law, that the meeting to discuss lot rental increase was not held until November 14, 1989 over a year after the notice of lot rental increase. That statement comes immediately before the conclusion of law that the present Petitioner had violated Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes. In the conclusions of law set out in the final order the prosecuting agency in its paragraph describing the mitigating circumstances acknowledges the possible confusion on the part of the accused as well as the mobile home owners committee when it describes, as did the recommended order, the filing of a complaint by the committee as a means of ostensibly preserving the right to have the meeting envisioned by Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987), when taken against the background of the opportunity to have a credential check of mobile home owners committee members as envisioned by Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code. This refers to the issue of whether a meeting could be held after 30 days from the notice of intended lot rental increase absent such a complaint. In the statement on mitigation the final order recognizes that the administrative prosecution was penal in nature and that Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987) and Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code needed to be read in context and should be strictly construed with ambiguities favoring the accused. The final order cites to State v. Pattishall, 99 Fla. 296, 126 So. 147 (1930) and Davis v. Dept. of Professional Regulation, 457 So.2d 1074 (Fla. 1DCA 1984). The treatment of those cases and the resolution of the dispute through final order is one which finds the accused in violation of Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987), but mitigates the disposition in the way of the penalty based upon the reading given Pattishall and Davis, supra. That factual impression is given when the order in disposition is examined wherein it is stated through the final order, "Based upon the consideration of the facts found, the conclusions of law reached, and the mitigation evidence, it is ordered that the notice to show cause is hereby dismissed." On August 22, 1990, the present Petitioner noticed an appeal of the final order in the administrative prosecution but later abandoned that appeal before the court had the opportunity to speak to its merits. On October 22, 1990, the present Petitioner filed a petition for collection of attorneys fees and costs spoken to in the statement of issues. The petition for attorneys fees and costs were subjected to a motion to dismiss based upon a claim of untimeliness and that motion was denied by order of December 10, 1990. The present Respondent requested an evidentiary hearing as contemplated Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and Rule 22I-6.035, Florida Administrative Code, and the evidentiary hearing was conducted on the date described before. When the present Petitioner abandoned his appeal to the District Court, he necessarily was placed in the position of arguing that the final order drawn by the prosecuting agency constituted the basis for the claim that he was a small business party who had prevailed in the dispute related to DOAH Case No. 89-4100. See Section 57.111(3)(c)1, Florida Statutes. Contrary to his assertion the final order as described in these facts did not favor the present Petitioner. Although the prosecuting agency did not choose to impose a penalty against the present Petitioner based upon its assessment of matters in mitigation and dismissed the case without exacting a penalty, it had found the present Petitioner in violation of a substantiative provision of law, i.e. Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987). Thus, the disposition cannot be said to favor the present Petitioner. Having decided this mixed question of fact and law against the present Petitioner, it is not necessary to make findings of fact concerning whether the present Petitioner is a small business party as defined at Section 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes and whether the present Respondent was substantially justified in this administrative prosecution related to law and fact as contemplated by Sections 57.111(3)(e) and (4)(a), Florida Statutes, or to examine whether special circumstances exist that would make the award of attorneys fees and costs unjust.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents imposed upon mobile home owners an invalid "pass-through" charge to pay for the cost of work on the park's electrical distribution system, in violation of Section 723.031(5), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Tanglewood Mobile Home Park, Inc., owns the Tanglewood Mobile Home Park located at 345 Weatherbee Road, Fort Pierce, St. Lucie County, Florida (Tanglewood). The Patricia Yu Irrevocable Trust owns Tanglewood Mobile Home Park, Inc. Respondents Chester Yu and Ronald Yu are the trustees of the trust; Respondent Carol Yu is not a trustee. References to "Respondents" shall include only Chester Yu and Ronald Yu. Tanglewood was developed in 1969. The park was originally owned and operated for many years by Respondents' father. An undated prospectus for Tanglewood Mobile Home Park (Prospectus) contains several provisions that have some bearing on this case. Prospectus Section VI.A.1 requires each mobile home owner to bear the expense of "electrical connections." Prospectus Section VI.A.2.a states that, "to the extent permitted by law, the mobile home owner may also be required to bear, in the form of increases in the lot rental, the costs incurred by Owner in installing capital improvements or performing major repairs in the Park." Prospectus Section VIII.3 states that the Owner may assess, on a pro rata basis, "pass-through charges" as rent increases. Prospectus Section VIII.3.a prohibits more than one increase in lot rental annually, except for "pass-through charges." Section VIII.1.c defines "pass-through charges" as "those amounts, other than special use fees, which are itemized and charged separately from the rent and which represent the mobile homeowner's share of costs charged to the Park Owner by any state or local government or utility company." Section VIII.3.b.4 states: "To the extent permitted by law, the mobile home owner may also be required to bear, in the form of increases in the lot rental, the costs incurred by Owner in installing capital improvements or performing major repairs in the Park." The Prospectus states that Tanglewood has 158 lots. In reality, only 148 lots are improved and available for rent. One of these lots is the park office. At present, 139 lots are leased. In October 1999, Hurricane Irene caused flooding in Tanglewood. After the flooding had receded, the power company restored power to the area, but a submerged transformer blew out and damaged part of the Tanglewood's electrical distribution system, leaving 16 mobile homes without power. After repairing or replacing the transformer, the power company employee responsible for reconnecting Tanglewood's electrical distribution system reenergized eight mobile homes, but refused to reenergize the remaining eight due to the deteriorated condition of their meter bank. Meter banks are located in groups at various points in the park. Power enters the park either above- or below-ground and is fed into individual meters for each mobile home. Each meter bank typically contains eight meters, and each meter typically has a junction box and a disconnect box. The concern of the power company employee was that the mechanical force required to reconnect power to one meter bank could possibly be too great for the deteriorated supports to withstand. As was typical of many meter banks at Tanglewood, the meter bank for these eight lots was poorly supported due to the deterioration of its support structure. Most supports at Tanglewood were made of wood, which required close monitoring and careful maintenance. Exposed to the elements, wood suffered considerable damage over time from wood rot. If the support failed, a meter bank would fall over to the ground, exposing live electrical lines in close proximity to the mobile homes and their occupants. Many meter banks throughout Tanglewood also suffered from deteriorated supports. Many meter banks were deficient because of the use of plumbing-grade PVC pipes as conduit, which are of a decreased thickness, when compared to PVC pipes approved for outdoor electrical use and, when exposed to sunlight, tend to deteriorate faster than the type of PVC pipes approved for outdoor electrical use. The use of plumbing-grade PVC pipes may not have been legal at the time it was used. Other meter banks also suffered from rusted and missing components, which might allow rainwater to enter the system and damage the parts. Some of the larger missing components left gaps large enough to allow a child's finger to penetrate and touch a live wire. Meter cans were damaged, masts (for above-ground supply lines) were inadequately supported, and drop wires (for above-ground supply lines) were too low. Confronted with the problem of eight lots without electrical service, Respondents contacted a local electrical contractor, who replaced the meter bank and its supports, using new pressure-treated wood. He also increased the service for these eight meters from 100 amps to 150 amps. The power company promptly restored electrical service after these repairs were completed. Respondents did not try to assess the mobile home owners a pass-through charge for this work. Instead, on January 28, 2000, Respondents sent the mobile home owners a notice that their monthly rent would increase by $15 (net, $12, after relieving the tenants of the obligation to pay a $3 monthly administration fee for water and sewer). The notice states that the rent increase is effective May 1, 2000, which may reflect a common commencement date on all lot leases. The letter notes that the park owner "has expended and will expend substantial sums for improvements and upgrades in the park," but warns that the park owner does not know if "any additional tax, utility or assessment prorations will be necessary." The rent increase covered, among other things, the cost of the work to restore electrical service to the eight lots whose meter bank required replacement. On February 12, 2000, the St. Lucie County Building Inspector inspected the electrical distribution system at Tanglewood. He noted the conditions described above and issued numerous citations, which were submitted to the St. Lucie County Code Enforcement office. In 1998, St. Lucie County adopted the National Fire Protection Association code, which is based on the 1996 National Electrical Code. The new code requirements prohibit a wood support system, require the placement of meters within 30 feet of the mobile home, and require underground wiring, but do not require service above 100 amps, which was the minimum level of service at Tanglewood prior to any electrical work following Hurricane Irene. On May 25, 2000, the County Code Enforcement Officer issued a notice of citations to Respondents for unsafe electrical equipment. The officer required the replacement of the remainder of the electrical distribution system. When work stopped at Tanglewood, the County Code Enforcement Officer issued other notices of citations in June 2000. Respondents responded to these demands from the County by undertaking extensive work to Tanglewood's electrical distribution system. The result was a modern electrical distribution system--at a cost of $161,912, plus $28,977.76 in finance charges, for a total of $190,889.76. By Notice of Pass-Through Charge dated August 14, 2000, Respondents advised the mobile home owners of a monthly pass-through charge of $28.61 per lot from December 1, 2000, through November 1, 2004. The notice discloses that the reason for the pass-through charges is the electrical distribution system upgrade that had recently been completed. The evidence is clear that, except for the upgrade to 200-amp service, the electrical work done in this case was governmentally mandated. This finding is supported by the reluctance of Respondents to attend to the electrical system unless a mobile home was without electricity. Despite Respondents' electrical invoices, their park-management policy obviously deferred maintenance, at least with respect to the electrical distribution system. The closer question in this case is whether the work was a capital improvement or a repair. The addition of 50-100 amps of service was a capital improvement, but it was not mandated by the government. So the capital improvement versus repair question applies to the remainder of the work. In their proposed recommended order, Respondents contend that the electrical distribution system was "completely functional" prior to the inspection and citations. This is true as to the function of conducting electricity; this is untrue as to the function of conducting electricity safely. Weakened and sometimes nonexistent supports, rusted holes, holes from missing components, and occasionally exposed wiring substantially undermined the safety of the electrical distribution system at Tanglewood. Respondents argue that new code requirements forced them to relocate disconnects closer to the mobile homes, use four-wire (not three-wire) feeder line to all mobile homes, use electrical-grade conduit, and use metal supports for meter banks. However, these are subsidiary costs of repair, not capital improvements. As contrasted to the expansion of service, the remaining work does not enlarge the capacity of the electrical distribution system. The remaining work repairs the system to make it safer, with some additional work required to meet current code requirements. Respondents argue that the work increases the value of the land. The record does not support this assertion. Even if such evidence were present in this case, it would not be determinative. Although a capital improvement normally adds value, a residential safety hazard subtracts value, so its elimination would have the appearance of adding value. Respondents argue that the work substantially extends the life of the electrical distribution system. This argument would be more appealing in the presence of an effective preventative maintenance program covering such basic needs as replacing wooden supports and metal covers when needed. However, the nature of the work, other than raising the service from 100 amps, is more retrospective than prospective; the work is really only catching up on preventative repairs and maintenance that was not done for years. Once Respondents allowed the system to fall into such a state of disrepair, the secondary costs of bringing the system up to code, such as adding four-wire feeds and relocating disconnects, do not change the nature of the expenditures; they are repair expenses, not capital improvements. Respondents have proved that a portion of the work was clearly the responsibility of individual mobile home owners. For instance, about two-thirds of the mobile homes required $150-$200 of work to separate the grounded conductors from the grounding conductors. However, it is unclear that any of such work, for which individual mobile home owners were directly responsible, was performed on all lots. Even if this work were a capital expenditure, which it is not, it could not be passed "proportionately" among all of the mobile home owners, if only some of them required the work. Respondent contends correctly that the pass-through charges are a minor violation, as defined in Section 723.006(9), Florida Statutes. Respondents fully disclosed the pass-through charges prior to assessing them. The pass-through charges did not endanger the health, safety, or welfare of the mobile home owners; to the contrary. The charges arose from a substantial expenditure by Respondents to enhance the health, safety, and welfare of the mobile home owners. The pass-through charges caused no economic harm to the mobile home owners because Respondents were authorized by the Prospectus to raise the rent by a sufficient amount to compensate for the entire cost of the work on the electrical distribution system. For these reasons, alone, neither a penalty nor a refund is appropriate; a cessation of the assessment of further pass-through charges and the imposition of the maximum civil penalty for a minor violation are sufficient. An order requiring a refund of any portion of the collected pass-through charges may have a disproportionately disturbing effect on Respondents and the mobile home owners. Respondents borrowed the full cost of the work on the electrical distribution system, and this note is payable in 48 equal monthly instalments ending on August 4, 2004. An order requiring a refund of any portion of the monies already collected may result in a significant disruption in the anticipated cash flow to Respondents, necessitating an even greater increase in rent to cover the loss of these funds. Mobile home owners who have left the park between the time of the electrical work and the time of the rent increase would unfairly be relieved of their proportionate share of the cost of this work, and mobile home owners coming to the park after this rent increase would unfairly be imposed with a disproportionately larger share of the cost of this work.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes enter a final order dismissing the Amended Notice To Show Cause against Respondent Carol Yu. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes enter a final order finding that Chester Yu and Ronald Yu have assessed a pass-through charge in violation of Section 723.031(5), Florida Statutes; that Chester Yu and Ronald Yu shall cease and desist from assessing this pass-through charge upon the effective date of the final order; that the violation is a minor violation and no refund is appropriate under the circumstances; and that Chester Yu and Ronald Yu shall pay a single civil penalty of $250, for which they are jointly and severally liable. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Ross Fleetwood Division Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Hardy L. Roberts, III General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Janis Sue Richardson Attorney for Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Bernard A. Conko Attorney for Respondent Cohen, Norris, Scherer, Weinberger & Wolmer 712 U.S. Highway One Fourth Floor North Palm Beach, Florida 33408
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in prohibited discriminatory conduct against Petitioners, Irene Cassermere (Ms. Cassermere) and Milagross Diaz (Ms. Diaz), within the terms and conditions, privileges, or provisions of services or facilities in the sale or rental of real property in violation of Section 760.23, Florida Statutes (2002).
Findings Of Fact Ms. Diaz is a female of Hispanic ethnicity with a physical disability that limits one or more of her major life activities. At all times material, she lived in the State of New York. Ms. Diaz was in Florida during the month of February 2002. On February 20, 2002, she completed an application for lot rental in the Sherwood Forrest Mobile Home Park (Sherwood Forest) with the intent to purchase a mobile home located on a rental lot at 216 London Drive, Kissimmee, Florida, owned by Beth Koze (Ms. Koze), who did not testify. Respondent informed Ms. Diaz that her credit check would be completed within a couple of days to ascertain her income and credit history. It was her understanding that Respondent had no interest in the potential purchase transaction between her and Ms. Koze. However, Respondent explained to Ms. Diaz, that ownership of a mobile home at the time of application was not required in order to be approved. According to Ms. Diaz, Respondent eventually informed her that due to insufficient income shown on her application she had been disapproved for lot rental. Ms. Diaz testified that Respondent informed her that she needed approximately twice the amount of her reported monthly income to qualify for lot rental approval. Thereafter, Ms. Diaz submitted a second lot rental application to Respondent. On the second application, Ms. Diaz included a co-applicant, Ms. Cassermere, who intended to relocate to Florida with her when the mobile home purchase and the lot rental application were completed. No monthly income for Ms. Cassermere was included on the lot rental application. On the second lot rental application, Ms. Diaz testified that she listed her "Occupation of Applicant" as "disabled." In the column regarding "income," she included her income and listed a Mr. LaRosa as a source of monthly income of $400.00, the amount she claimed Respondent previously informed her she needed to qualify for lot rental. According to Ms. Diaz, Respondent received her second lot rental application and called her to discuss the matter. During the conversation Respondent asked "[W]hat she was doing for Mr. LaRosa that he would put out $400.00 on her behalf." Ms. Diaz testified that she was offended by the tone of Respondent's voice and the implications that she believed prompted the question. She believed the question to have been irrelevant and did not answer. Ms. Diaz testified that in the "Assets and Income" column of her second lot rental application, she listed the amount of $10,000. When asked by Respondent the source of the $10,000, which apparently was not initially included on her first lot rental application, she explained to Respondent she intended to make a cash purchase of the mobile home from Ms. Koze for $10,000. When asked by Respondent the source of such a large sum, when her monthly income was insufficient to qualify for lot rental, she explained that she was to receive a lump sum, five years' retroactive social security benefit payment. Ms. Diaz testified that approximately one month after submitting her second rental lot application to Respondent and having received no response, she called Ms. Koze to ascertain the status of the mobile home sale. Ms. Diaz also testified that Ms. Koze advised her to call Respondent to find out what was holding up her second lot rental application. Believing the lot rental approval was a condition precedent to the mobile home sale, Ms. Diaz testified that at no time during her conversation with Ms. Koze did Ms. Koze advise her that she intended to take the mobile home off the market. Ms. Diaz then called Respondent and spoke with Andy Windfelder (Mr. Windfelder) about the rental lot application status. Mr. Windfelder told her to call Ms. Koze. Ms. Diaz's recollection of the telephone conversation between her and Ms. Koze follows: [A]t this point it's just too much trouble, that at this point she was going to keep the house. . . for a family member--So I told her at this point, she's been patient and she's been holding up with me for that whole time that we were waiting on this credit report, which is four weeks, that I'm not going to put her on the spot of going against them and tell me what transpired in that conversation for them to convince her not to sell to me. I told her that at that point I have no alternative but to tell her that I was going to go file a housing complaint, and I'm sorry that I would have to involve her, but that we had a contract and I gave her a deposit. So at that point she took my name and address and she mailed me my deposit back on a check, and at that point, I didn't contact Sherwood--I contacted Sherwood Forest only to tell them right after that that I filed this housing complaint, that I was going to file this housing complaint . . . As stated, Ms. Diaz filed her discrimination complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations and no longer communicated directly with Respondent regarding the matter. The core of Ms. Diaz's complaint is Respondent's failure, or refusal, to contact her by mail or by telephone about the result of her second lot rental application. Further, Ms. Diaz opined that Respondent pressured Ms. Koze not to sell her mobile home to her, which caused Ms. Koze to return Ms. Diaz's purchase contract deposit money. Ms. Diaz argued that Respondent's conduct, unreasonable delay in acting upon her lot rental application and pressure on Ms. Koze not to sell, had two direct effects: (1) she lost the opportunity to purchase the mobile home located on the rental lot at 216 London Drive, Kissimmee, Florida, and (2) she was denied the right to reside in Respondent's facility because she was a dark, disabled, Hispanic female. At all times material, Jeff Leeds (Mr. Leeds) was general manager of Sherwood Forest in Kissimmee, Florida. In that position, Mr. Leeds supervised a staff of 28 persons, of whom many were Hispanic. The park consisted of approximately 1,600 rental sites. According to Mr. Leeds, approximately 30 percent of Sherwood Forest residents were Hispanic, and he had never met Ms. Diaz. According to Mr. Leeds, Ms. Diaz's background check reflected insufficient income that raised an alert. Her second application, based upon his conversation with Ms. Diaz, would include her sister, Ms. Cassermere, as co-applicant. Ms. Diaz was unaware that in October 2003, Ms. Koze placed her mobile home back on the market and was willing to sell to her. This information was made available to Ms. Diaz by and through Respondent through the report provided to Respondent by the Commission's investigator. Based on the evidence of record, Ms. Diaz failed to present any credible evidence to substantiate her claim of discrimination. Ultimate Factual Determinations Respondent rejected Ms. Diaz's initial lot rental application, not because of her handicap or her Hispanic ethnicity, but because through a reasonable process of credit check references, it was discovered that Ms. Diaz's disability income was insufficient to meet Respondent's requirements for lot rental. The additional income of $400.00, an apparent loan from her friend, entered on her second rental lot application raised reasonable concerns; and, when inquiry was made, she refused to respond. There is no credible, competent evidence that Respondent attempted to influence and/or pressure the mobile home owner, Ms. Koze, to take her mobile home off the market and/or cancel her contract for sale with Ms. Diaz. Ms. Koze voluntarily returned Ms. Diaz's deposit money. There is no credible, competent evidence that Respondent intentionally delayed processing Ms. Diaz's second lot rental application with the intent or for the purpose of denying her approval because of her disability, gender, or her Hispanic ethnicity. In short, Respondent did not unlawfully discriminate against Ms. Diaz; rather, the delay caused by her second lot rental application to Respondent was for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and was not proven to be the reason Ms. Koze took her mobile home off the market.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing Petitioners', Irene Cassermere and Milagross Diaz, Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Lake Waldena Resort is a mobile home park as defined by Section 723.003(6), Florida Statutes. It is located at Route 4, Box 300, Silver Springs, Florida 32688. The mobile home park is subject to regulation pursuant to Section 723.002(1), Florida Statutes. That law is administered by the Petitioner. All Respondents are mobile home park owners as defined by Section 723.003(7), Florida Statutes. The Hilgemans are park owners and have been at all relevant times for this dispute. At the times relevant to the inquiry Pat Montgomery was the park operator, which equates to park owner under the terms of the statute. Pat Montgomery concluded her affiliation with Lake Waldena Resort in May 1989. Pat Montgomery, as the park operator, who had been employed by Donald L. Hilgeman, collected the rent from the mobile homeowners who had lots within the park. She attended any problems that the mobile homeowners confronted her with. She ordered supplies for the operation of the mobile home park. She sold mobile homes for use in the park and ordered them for sale. She was involved with the provision of carports and screen rooms associated with mobile homes in the park. She was responsible for the payroll and basically everything that transpired in the day-to- day operations in the mobile home park. The Hilgemans had limited affiliation with the park. Mr. Hilgeman was involved with doing physical labor at the park and was Montgomery's employer. On July 26, 1988, a notice of lot rental increase was mailed to all tenants in the Lake Waldena Resort Mobile Home Park. This notice was provided in accordance with Rule 7D-32.002(1), Florida Administrative Code. The basis for this increase was associated with the economic pressures on the park owner brought about by increases in real estate taxes, insurance costs, sanitation fees, other fees payable to the Petitioner, and wage increases. An exemplar of the form notice which had been sent out to each mobile home owner may be seen in Respondents' Exhibit 5 admitted into evidence. All notices were dispatched by U.S. Mail. As contemplated by Rule 7D-32.002(4), Florida Administrative Code, official notice was considered to have been made within five days of July 26, 1988, which corresponded to July 31, 1988. A meeting within 30 days of the provision of notice as described in Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes, would equate to August 30, 1988. The proposed lot increase was from $78 to $88. At the time of notification of the lot increase Lloyd Carter was the vice president of the homeowners' association at Lake Waldena Resort. He was residing in the mobile home park. Gordon Gibson was the president of the homeowner's association who, at the moment of the lot increase, was residing in Minden, Ontario, Canada. Mr. Carter picked up a copy of the notice of lot rental increase from the office at the mobile home park shortly after the notice had been prepared on July 26, 1988. He then called Mr. Gibson in Canada and explained the particulars of that notice. At that time, Mr. Carter stated no concerns to Mr. Gibson about the notice of lot rental increase. He merely informed Mr. Gibson of the pendency of the lot rental increase. Under ordinary circumstances the' expected time for delivery of mail dispatched from the United States to Canada was in the neighborhood of five to seven days; however, in August 1988, the Canadians were undergoing a postal strike which delayed matters. Nonetheless, Mr. Gibson received his copy of the notice and on August 4, 1988, he wrote Mr. Hilgeman. A copy of that correspondence may be seen as Respondents' Exhibit 6 admitted into evidence. Mr. Gibson informed Mr. Hilgeman in that correspondence that he wished to have a meeting to discuss the lot rental increase. The meeting would be attended by a committee of not more than four persons under the direction of Mr. Carter. He asked that the meeting be held at a convenient time prior to August 26, 1988. The basis for Mr. Gibson's action in which he requested a meeting with the park owner was through the process of discussion with his board of directors in independent conversations in which it was decided that a meeting was desired. A meeting to discuss the reasons for the lot rental increase was not held before August 26, 1988, or before August 30, 1988. When Mr. Gibson sent his August 4, 1988 correspondence he was aware of the problems of the postal strike in Canada and the delay that this might promote in the receipt of his letter by the park owner. He had not instructed Mr. Carter to make any contact with the park owner prior to the park owner's receipt of the correspondence which outlined the fact of Mr. Carter's duties as chairman of the committee. The return receipt correspondence from Gibson to Hilgeman dated August 4, 1988, was received by, Pat Montgomery in mid August 1988. By correspondence of August 22, 1988, addressed from Mr. Hilgeman to Mr. Gibson, a copy of which may be seen as Respondents' Exhibit 7 admitted into evidence, Mr. Hilgeman demanded of Mr. Gibson that he confirm that a majority of the Lake Waldena residents had in fact selected Mr. Gibson to represent them. Reference is made in that letter to section 723.078(2)(b), Florida Statutes, having to do with the requirements for bylaws in homeowners' associations. This request of Mr. Gibson is not a prerogative of Mr. Hilgeman as park owner in dealing with the issue of the conduct of the meeting. Nor is it available to Mr. Hilgeman to remind Mr. Gibson that he had to comply Section 723.037(1), Florida Statutes or Section 723.076(1), Florida Statutes. To the extent that those provisions have any relevance to the homeowners' association, the former pertains to standing to challenge increases in such things as the lot rental amount through the homeowners' association, something that the park owner is not called upon to advise the homeowners' association about. This question of standing does not enter in to the matter of the ability to represent mobile home owners at a meeting pursuant to Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes, for purposes of discussing the lot rental increase. Likewise, the latter statutory reference that describes the idea of incorporation of a homeowners' association and the need to notify the park owner is not associated with the meeting to discuss the purposes of the lot rental increase. On the other hand, when Mr. Hilgeman referred to Rules 7D-32.003(1) and 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code, those are provisions which have some significance in considering the matter of a meeting to discuss a lot rental increase. Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Codes, states: If requested to do so by the park owner or subdivision developer, the committee shall certify that it has been selected as described Rule 7D-32.003, Florida Administrative Code. The certification shall include a certificate of all members of the committee attesting to its proper formation under the statute in these rules. Significantly, that provision does not describe the relationship of such a request to the obligation of the park owner to meet within 30 days of notice of lot rental increase as contemplated by Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes. None of the principals, given the statutory scheme and rules that were designed to effectuate the purposes of the statute, could have reasonably understood on what terms the park owner was entitled to make this request taking into account the complications of corresponding back and forth between the United States and Canada in the midst of a mail strike, the consequence of which made it unlikely that the meeting would take place on or before August 30, 1988. In the conclusions of law a discussion is made of the effect of the request for certification and whether it tolls the time for conducting the informational session to discuss the reasons for the lot rental increase. The envelope for the August 22, 1988 correspondence was stamped in the United States on August 23, 1988, in Bradenton, Florida. It also bears a date of August 29, 1988, which is seen as a part of the verification of receipt of that letter in Canada. Mr. Gibson received the Hilgeman correspondence of August 22, 1988 on August 29, 1988. Mr. Carter also received a copy of the August 22, 1988 correspondence by Mr. Hilgeman and had a discussion with Mr. Hilgeman about that letter sometime around August 23 or August 24, 1988. That conversation took place in the mobile home park. This did not lead to the resolution of the certification request made by Mr. Hilgeman to the homeowners' association. It was left to Mr. Gibson to take care of the response to the request for certification. In the conversation being described, between Hilgeman and Carter, Carter made it known that he intended to complain to the Petitioner about the park owner not meeting with the homeowners' committee within 30 days of notice. A complaint was made as may be seen in a copy of that complaint which is Respondent's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. That complaint was sent out on August 26, 1988. The basis for the homeowners' association complaining to the Petitioner was related to their concern that they preserve their right to have the meeting even if it transpired beyond the 30 days contemplated in the statute. Notwithstanding the complaint's existence, Mr. Gibson went forward with his attempts to try to satisfy Mr. Hilgeman concerning certification and did so with the assistance of Victor Davis a member of the board of directors of the homeowners' association. Mr. Gibson's attitude about this was to the effect that the request by Mr. Hilgeman was a legitimate request that should be complied with. A discussion had also been held between Carter and Hilgeman on August 18, 1988, in which Mr. Hilgeman gave advance notice of the fact that he needed several questions answered and that there would be a delay in the meeting. The indication was made that a letter would be sent to Mr. Gibson to have those questions answered. That eventuated in the August 22, 1988 correspondence from Hilgeman to Gibson. Upon making these matters known to Mr. Carter on August 18, 1988, Mr. Carter's only remark was that this would be "fine." On September 9, 1988, a letter was written from Ralph B. Murray, Jr., Specialist Enforcement Section, Bureau of Mobile Homes within the Petitioner's department which was sent to Mr. Hilgeman reminding him of the necessity to respond to allegations that had been made by the Lake Waldena Resort Homeowners' Association concerning the claim that Mr. Hilgeman had refused to meet with those mobile homeowners in the statutorily prescribed time as announced at Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes. A copy of this correspondence may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 9, admitted into evidence. On September 13, 1988, by correspondence, a copy of which may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 10 admitted into evidence, Mr. Hilgeman offered his reply. He tells Mr. Murray that he is not sure whether the homeowners' association is legitimate and that they had not responded to his August 22, 1988 correspondence to Mr. Gibson which he enclosed in his letter to Mr. Murray. He spoke of delays in the mailing time for mail coming from Canada. He makes mention of the fact of having informed Mr. Carter that the manager, who was Ms. Montgomery was on vacation and would not return until August 30, 1988. In fact, Ms. Montgomery was not available to meet with the homeowners' association in the period August 18 through August 30, 1988. This would not have relieved Mr. Hilgeman of the necessity to meet with the homeowners' association on or before August 30, 1988, had they complied with his request for certification prior to that date. They did not. Compliance with the certification process was achieved by correspondence of September 12, 1988 from Gibson to Hilgeman in which he sets out the explanation of certification of the credentials of the homeowners' association to form a committee and meet with the park owner. That was received by the park owner on September 19, 1988, in the person of Pat Montgomery. A copy of this correspondence and the certification of receipt may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 11 admitted into evidence. After receipt of the information concerning the certification of the homeowners' association committee, Mr. Hilgeman sent a letter to Mr. Carter on September 29, 1988, to establish a meeting. A copy of that correspondence may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 13 admitted into evidence. It outlines the fact that Mr. Hilgeman is sufficiently satisfied concerning the certification to have the meeting and offers a meeting prior to October 4, 1988 or after October 9, 1988, and invites Mr. Carter to consult with Pat Montgomery to establish a mutually convenient time for the meeting. A meeting was held between Mr. Murray and Mr. Hilgeman in October, 1988, in which a discussion ensued concerning whether or not Mr. Hilgeman himself would meet with the homeowners' committee. Mr. Hilgeman held firm in his attitude that his manager Pat Montgomery would be available to meet with the homeowners' committee, but that Mr. Hilgeman would not be meeting with them. As explained in the correspondence of October 14, 1988, addressed from Mr. Carter to Mr. Murray, a copy of which may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 14 admitted into evidence, contact was made between Carter and Montgomery and Carter was told on October 11, 1988 that a meeting would be held at 10:00 a.m. on October 14, 1988, between Montgomery and the committee. She was told by Carter that this meeting would not be acceptable unless Mr. Hilgeman was in attendance. Based upon conversations with Mr. Murray, the homeowners' association had been persuaded that it was only appropriate to meet with Mr. Hilgeman. Consequently, by this logic it was not appropriate to meet with Ms. Montgomery. A copy of this correspondence of August 14, 1988 was made available to Mr. Hilgeman. On June 7, 1989, the Petitioner brought an action against the Respondent and he sought a formal hearing which was conducted on February 22, 1990. Prior to that hearing the homeowners did have their meeting with Mr. Hilgeman on November 14, 1989, in which they were made aware of the reasons for the lot rental increase. The homeowners accepted the explanation and the idea of the increase and do not desire to pursue the present complaint against the Respondents. When Mr. Hilgeman sought certification of the credentials of the committee assigned by the homeowners association he was acting in good faith. In addition, he was entitled to look to Pat Montgomery as park operator and by consequence park owner under the definition of Section 723.003(7), Florida Statutes, to speak for him in the course of the meeting to discuss the lot rental increase. The misconception of the committee of mobile home owners concerning the necessity to meet with Mr. Hilgeman and not with his park operator, as fostered by the remarks of Mr. Murray, who lead those mobile homeowners to believe that they could only meet with Mr. Hilgeman, caused a delay in arranging the meeting. Mr. Hilgeman should not be hold accountable for that delay.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered that dismisses these actions against the Respondents. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of April, 1990. APPENDIX CASE NO. 89-4100 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed facts of the parties. Petitioner's Facts Paragraphs 1-9 are subordinate to facts found. Although Paragraph 10 is an accurate portrayal of the meeting of August 24, 1988 between Mr. Carter and Mr. Hilgeman, it should be stated that any meeting to discuss lot rental increase was contingent upon the response to the certification request made by Mr. Hilgeman and replied to by Mr. Gibson on a date beyond the 30 day period. Paragraphs 11 and 12 are subordinate to facts found. Concerning Paragraph 13, whatever Mr. Hilgeman perceptions would be about the role of Ms. Montgomery, whether she was considered to be the same as an attorney representing or in some other capacity, in law she was a park owner and entitled to act in behalf of the park owners at the meeting. Concerning Paragraph 14, the effect of failing to respond to the request for certification within the 30 day period was tantamount to a waiver or agreement to meet at a time later. Paragraph 15 is subordinate to facts found. Concerning Paragraph 16, to the extent this paragraph suggests that the length of the meeting or breadth of detail in the explanation made by Mr. Hilgeman was inadequate, that idea is rejected in that sufficient explanation was given to comply with the requirements of law. The comments in Paragraph 17 are not relevant. The accommodation that was made between counsel was not a necessary arrangement to mitigate the circumstance in an instance where Respondent Donald L. Hilgeman had violated Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. This meeting was beneficial to the homeowners and park owners alike, but came at this late date based upon the failure of the homeowners to meet with Pat Montgomery over a year earlier. Respondents' Facts Paragraph 1 is subordinate to facts found Paragraph 2 is not necessary to the resolution to the dispute. Paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found with the exception of those two sentences that come before the last sentence in that paragraph. Paragraphs 4 and 5 and all sentences save the last of Paragraph 6 are subordinate to facts found. That sentence is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 7 through 11 with the exception of the second sentence in Paragraph 11 are subordinate to facts found. The second sentence is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 12 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 13 is misleading in that it intimates that Mr. Carter was derelict in his duties to make contact with Mr. Hilgeman to establish a meeting; however, the contacts that were made were in accordance with the expectations of Mr. Hilgeman and Mr. Gibson who were controlling the timing of that meeting. Paragraphs 14 through 16 with the exception of the last sentence to Paragraph 16 are subordinate to facts found. The last sentence to Paragraph 16 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 17 is subordinate to facts found with the exception of the last sentence which is not necessary to the resolution of this dispute. Paragraphs 18 and 19 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 20 is subordinate to facts found with the exception of the last sentence which is not necessary to the resolution of this dispute. Paragraph 21 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute and is an inaccurate portrayal of the requirements of law as to gaining the approval of the majority of homeowners before representing them in the course of a meeting to discuss lot rental increases. Paragraphs 22 through 25 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen R. MacNamara, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 Joseph A. Sole, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 David D. Eastman, Esquire Parker, Skelding, Labasky & Corry Post Office Box 669 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Susan C. Marvin Pamela Leslie Assistants General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL, 32399-1007
The Issue Whether the Agency for Persons with Disabilities (APD) properly denied the application for licensure renewal sought for the group home facility license held by Tracy Court Group Home, owned and operated by V-Agape, LLC.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the licensing and operation of foster care facilities, group home facilities, and residential habitation centers pursuant to section 20.197 and chapter 393, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this complaint, Respondent held foster or group home facility licenses issued by APD. The current group home license issued for V-Agape, LLC, located at 19103 Tracy Court, Lutz, Florida 33548, is owned by Tonya Nelson, the sole managing member. Respondent has contracted with APD to provide the residents with Medicaid waiver developmental disability residential habitation services. HCSO conducts investigations of reports of abuse, neglect, abandonment, and threats of harm to children on behalf of DCF. Investigations of abuse, neglect, abandonment, and threats of harm are initiated by reported incidents through the Florida Abuse Hotline. Karen Gonzalez is the supervisor of the Specialized Investigating Unit. She supervises the CPIs who perform the abuse hotline investigations. Ms. Gonzalez supervised Robert Hoon and Jennifer Campbell, both CPIs. A report was made to the Florida Abuse Hotline on January 24, 2014, that a minor female resident of Respondent’s Tracy Court Group Home sustained bruising and a red mark on the back of her hand from being struck on her hands by Tonya Nelson. The resident is non-verbal and intellectually disabled. The subsequent investigation by CPI Hoon, on behalf of DCF, was ultimately closed with verified indicators for physical injury upon the minor resident living in the Tracy Court Group Home, but did not identify the caregiver responsible. CPI Hoon reviewed and discussed the investigation with Supervisor Gonzalez before he prepared the Investigative Summary (IS). When conducting investigations, the CPI reviews the prior history of incidents reported on a group home and its owner/operator. In subsection “D. Prior Reports and Service Records Implications for Child Safety,” CPI Hoon reported that: There are prior reports on the facility that include concerns for physical discipline in the foster home and to her o[w]n children. There is a verified report in 2012 for physical injury and the aps [adult perpetrators] where [sic] Tonya Nelson and the aunt as it is unknown who caused the injuries. Ms. Gonzalez testified that prior reports are reviewed in conducting their investigations to determine whether a pattern of concern for the health and safety of the children placed in that home and for the caretakers caring for the children in the home exists. The CPIs utilize DCF Operating Procedure (CFOP) 175-28, Child Maltreatment Index, as a guideline in conducting their investigations. A “verified finding” is made when a preponderance of the credible evidence results in a determination that the specific harm or threat of harm was the result of abuse, abandonment, or neglect. CPI Campbell explained the application of CFOP during an investigation: [I]t . . . breaks down the different maltreatments that are investigated under the umbrella of abuse, neglect, and abandonment, and it provides a guideline for the definitions of what the different maltreatments are, and the different types of supporting evidence and documents that may be needed when supporting a maltreatment when the investigator comes up with the findings. It’s basically a guideline for investigations, because when a report comes in it may not be just one maltreatment, there may be a number of different maltreatments; or an investigator may identify a maltreatment during the course of an investigation, and so this provides a guideline for the investigator. On May 20, 2014, a report was made to the Florida Abuse Hotline about a minor resident of Respondent’s Tracy Court Group Home. An investigation was commenced concerning unexplained bruises observed on the resident, a vulnerable minor. CPI Campbell completed the investigation and prepared the IS. She discussed the verified findings with Supervisor Gonzalez. CPI Campbell is an experienced investigator, having had 11 years of service with HCSO following five years’ experience as a CPI in Michigan. The report of May 20, 2014, was a “Supplemental” report since, according to Supervisor Gonzalez, it came in right after the initial risk sequence. Rather than creating an entire new report, this one became supplemental to the prior one. The IS stated that the resident had a large bruise on her left thigh and bruises on her left arm and the back of her leg. Ms. Nelson was not able to explain how the minor resident sustained the bruises on her leg and arm. CPI Campbell became involved with Ms. Nelson and the investigation of the group home when Supervisor Gonzalez gave her the task of completing the investigation initiated by CPI Krisita Edwards. At the time CPI Campbell took over the investigation, CPI Edwards had been assigned to other duties. CPI Campbell explained that it was not unusual for a second investigator to complete work begun by another since all their notes are kept on a central database known as the Florida Safe Families Network (FSFN), where all contacts are noted, as well as the investigative summary. CPIs Edwards and Campbell collaborated on the investigation in this case. CPI Edwards entered her initial findings in the FSFN, which was picked up and continued by CPI Campbell when she took over the case. The two CPIs have collaborated on other cases in a similar fashion. The initial documentation by CPI Edwards was performed within 48 hours of the call coming into the abuse hotline as required. CPI Campbell’s completion of the report and investigation occurred after she had spoken with CPI Edwards and discussed the matter with Supervisor Gonzalez. The result of the investigation concerning the bruises on the minor resident was that the bruises were “indeterminate for physical abuse” and “indeterminate for supervisory neglect” due to the fact that a specific cause of the injuries could not be determined. Further, since the minor resident had been removed to another group home, the report concluded that there existed no continuing threat to the resident’s well-being. Even though the resident had been removed from the Tracy Court Group Home and, therefore, was not in any danger of being further harmed, CPI Campbell continued to have serious concerns about the care of residents in the group home. She believed that several allegations of the same type of harm were being made in the group home and that they could not ask the resident how she received her injuries since she was non-verbal. Myra Leitold, an APD residential licensing supervisor, had monitored the Tracy Court Group Home for the previous nine and one-half years. On December 28, 2012, she observed that a door lock to the office and bedroom was keyed so that it could be readily opened from the inside which, she believed, created a safety hazard. Between December 2012 and August 2014, the group home was cited for ten violations of Medication Administration Procedures. On one of her visits, in December 2012, Ms. Leitold noted that no current prescription was present for one of the residents, and that the label on the prescription bottle did not match the prescription drugs inside the bottle. Additionally, she found that the accounting for one of the resident’s finances was not current and that the temperature inside the group home was a chilly 65 degrees Fahrenheit. Mitchell Turner, human services program specialist for APD, recorded numerous medication administration violations at the group home. He noted on May 30, 2013, that the medication prescriptions and instructions for the Medical Administration Record (MAR) did not match. On June 18, 2013, he discovered that the wrong dosage of prescription was being given to a resident, and Ms. Nelson admitted this mistake. Mr. Turner grew so concerned about the prescription irregularities that he requested Pamela Lassiter, a medical case management registered nurse, to review the group home. Nurse Lassiter was sent to the home where she discovered and cited the home for three additional prescription violations. Even following Nurse Lassiter’s visit, on another trip to the group home on April 9, 2014, Mr. Turner cited an additional MAR violation. He believed these violations posed a health and safety risk to the residents affected and exhibited a pattern of neglect by Respondent to the health and safety of vulnerable children. During the period when prescription and other violations were noted, on January 11, 2013, Ms. Nelson exceeded the maximum licensed capacity of three in the group home when she accepted a fourth resident. She did not have prior written approval from APD to exceed her licensed capacity of residents. On September 25, 2013, Mr. Turner issued a Notice of Non-Compliance (NNC) because Ms. Nelson again exceeded the licensed capacity for the number of residents in the group home without prior written approval from APD. Mr. Turner expressed his concerns over the repeated violations by Respondent. Ms. Nelson testified that she had received verbal approval for the placements in excess of the home’s licensed capacity from Meisha Stewart, residential placement coordinator for APD, and that on a prior occasion in 2012, she had accepted a resident after receiving verbal approval. This testimony was rebutted by both Geraldine Williams, the former regional operations manager for APD’s Suncoast Region, and Ms. Leitold, who testified she had never known APD to give verbal approval for a placement of a resident in a group home. With the high volume of referrals APD makes to group homes, they cannot operate in a system where verbal placements occur. All placements must be made in writing. When a provider receives a NNC, the provider is required to submit and successfully complete a Corrective Action Plan (CAP). Mr. Turner testified that Ms. Nelson did not submit or successfully complete a CAP for the MAR violations. On January 17, 2013, Ms. Leitold visited the group home and observed the following violations: volatile materials were not stored in approved metal containers and three prescriptions for a resident’s medications were not present. The gasoline, charcoal, and lighter fluid found by Ms. Leitold were required to be stored in approved metal containers. Keeping these materials in the open posed a safety hazard for the minor residents by giving them access to volatile materials. On November 4, 2014, Ms. Nelson sent an email to Meisha Stewart advising her she intended to accept a non-APD client for placement in the Tracy Court Group Home without APD’s prior approval. Ms. Nelson testified that since that same resident had been placed in the Tracy Court Group Home for a six-month period in 2013, she believed she did not need a new approval in 2014.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order denying V-Agape, LLC, d/b/a Tracy Court Group Home’s application for license renewal. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of November, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of November, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian F. McGrail, Esquire Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Lindsey Ann West, Esquire The Plante Law Group, PLC 806 North Armenia Avenue Tampa, Florida 33609 (eServed) Gerald D. Siebens, Esquire Agency for Persons with Disabilities 1313 North Tampa Street, Suite 515 Tampa, Florida 33602-3328 (eServed) Barbara Palmer, Executive Director Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) David De La Paz, Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Michael Weiss is part owner of Suncoast International, Inc. and general manager of the corporation's only business, a trailer park in Flagler County known as Flagler by the Sea Mobile Home Park. At all pertinent times, the park has leased or offered for lease a total of 44 mobile home lots. In mid-1985, Mr. Weiss received a letter from petitioner Department of Business Regulation (DBR) informing him that park owners were required by law to prepare and distribute prospectuses to mobile home tenants. Efforts to draft a prospectus meeting petitioner's approval began in August of 1985. After several revisions, the petitioner approved a prospectus on June 13, 1986, No. 1802171P, for all lots. Mr. Weiss received written notice of approval, together with a copy of the prospectus to which it pertained, with attachments, on June 26, 1986; and promptly arranged for a copier to produce 50 uncollated copies of everything received from the petitioner, see Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, including the cover letter. With the assistance of Mr. and Mrs. Whaley, who worked for the company at the park, he tried to assemble at least 44 complete sets of these materials. In late May of 1986, Mr. Weiss had given all tenants notice by registered mail of his intention to raise rents, effective September 1, 1986. Realizing he needed to distribute prospectuses before any rent increase, he had simultaneously informed tenants that a then current (but unapproved) version of the prospectus was available for inspection. Respondent's Exhibit No. 5. Hand Delivery As instructed, Ms. Whaley encouraged tenants to pick copies of the prospectus up when they paid their rent. She kept a list of persons to whom she distributed copies of the prospectus. Part of the list survived and has been received in evidence. Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. One tenant, Mary Oetken, received a copy of the approved prospectus on July 29, 1986. But the prospectus given to Ms. Oetken did not contain rules and regulations, a copy of the lot rental agreement, a lot layout plan, or the number of her lot. Ms. Oetken already had a copy of her lot rental agreement, and park personnel customarily distributed copies of rules and regulations to each tenant, before tenancies began. On August 29, 1986, another tenant, Betty Marinoff, wife of Peter, received a copy of an approved prospectus. Before September 1, 1986, Ms. Whaley hailed Mr. Philip H. Bird, and handed him a copy. Whether these copies of the approved pro-spectus included all attachments the evidence did not disclose. Robert Onusko, who has leased a lot in Flagler by the Sea Mobile Home Park continuously since August of 1981, has had a copy of the park's rules and regulations since he moved in. As did all other tenants, he paid increased rent beginning September 1, 1986. Although Mr. Onusko himself received no copy of an approved prospectus until January of 1989, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7, Angela Whaley gave his daughter Marilyn a copy of the prospectus when Marilyn paid rent in July or August. Taped to Doors Not all tenants were then in residence at the park. About half lived there full time. (T.127) With respect to lots whose lessees were away, Mr. Weiss directed Mr. and Mrs. Whaley to tape copies of the prospectus on trailer doors. "That was common procedure with late payments or whatever . . . " T.112. In mid-August of 1986, Ms. Whaley told him that prospectuses had been distributed for each lot, either by delivery to a tenant or by posting. Clarence Rainey leased a lot from 1977 to 1989 at Flagler by the Sea Mobile Home Park, where he lived part of the year, returning to Illinois in the summer. Told by a neighbor that they were available, he asked for and received a prospectus in November of 1986. He had not received one earlier. With her husband Roger, Madeline DuJardin resided at Flagler by the Sea from February of 1979 until February of 1988. She did not get a copy of the approved prospectus before the rent increased on September 1, 1986, from $125.00 to $150.00 per month. Neither Mr. and Mrs. Rainey nor Mr. and Mrs. DuJardin received copies when they were originally distributed. Their trailers were among those to which copies were taped, weeks or months before their return in cooler weather. Charles A. Bond, who shared a trailer with a half-brother, resided at Flagler by the Sea from November 21, 1985, until December 31, 1988. While he lived at the park he never received a prospectus. Brothers surnamed Karcher each leased lots from respondent. Ms. Whaley gave one Mr. Karcher a copy of the approved prospectus, before September 1, 1986. But Richard Karcher, who in those days only spent a week at a time in the park, at intervals of several months, did not receive a copy of the approved prospectus before the rent increased. Richard Karcher had obtained a preliminary draft of the prospectus, but it differed in important respects from the draft which was eventually approved. In June of 1988, he obtained another copy of the prospectus, the copy, he testified, which he gave DBR's investigator, which also differs in important respects from the approved version. Attached to the copy Mr. Karcher gave DBR's investigator was a set of the park rules and regulations. It is not clear whether Ms. Whaley told Mr. Weiss that she had taped an approved copy to Mr. Richard Karcher's door. (T. 126, 128) Change of Law Effective July 1, 1986, statutory changes altered prospectus requirements. Petitioner mailed advice concerning the new requirements when it sent out annual fee statements to mobile park owners. Mr. Weiss did not personally receive this advice nor any written notice of the nine workshops petitioner conducted in August of 1986 to acquaint park owners with the statutory changes. Although approved a few days earlier, respondent's prospectus did not conform to all the new requirements. In early 1988, Mr. Weiss heard from Gloria Thompson, a DBR employee in its Tampa office, in connection with a complaint filed by Charles Jagde, the same person whose complaint led to the investigation that gave rise to the present proceedings. Ms. Thompson found no violation on the original complaint. Respondent's Exhibit No. 6. Eventually Mr. Weiss learned that revisions to prospectus No. 1802171 were necessary. On November 18, 1988, he filed another proposed prospectus with petitioner. After its approval on January 30, 1989, park personnel distributed the revised, approved prospectus, No. 1802171P86, to the tenants.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That DBR enter an order requiring respondent to send complete copies of currently approved prospectuses by registered mail to all tenants who have not received such copies personally and signed receipts so stating. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 6, 9, 11 through 14 and 16 through 19 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7, the evidence did not establish the contents of the copy of the prospectus the Miranoffs received. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 8, Mr. Onusko's adult daughter Marilyn received a copy of the prospectus before the rent increased. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 10 pertains to subordinate matters only. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 15, Mr. Karcher so testified, without contradiction. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 5, 7 through 10, 12 through 19, 21, 22, 24, and 27 through 30 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 6, the prospectus had not been approved at that time. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 11, she did not personally deliver prospectuses to all tenants. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 20, the differences were material. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 23, 25 and 26 are immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: Donna H. Stinson, Esquire Moyle, Flanigan, Katz, Fitzgerald & Sheehan, P.A. The Perkins House, Suite 100 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Debra Roberts, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 Joseph A. Sole General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000 Paul Martz, Esquire Martz & Zimmerman 3 Palm Row St. Augustine, FL 32084 Stephen R. MacNamara Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Respondents are James Brown and Bianca Brown, his wife. At all times pertinent to these proceedings, Respondents were owners of the mobile home park known as "Carefree Cove Club" located in Hypoluxo, Florida. They have owned the park since 1957. On or about December 28, 1984, Respondents, as operators of the park, filed a prospectus with Petitioner as required by Section 723.011, Florida Statutes. Petitioner approved the prospectus on March 27, 1985. At that time, 195 lots were being offered in the park for lease or rent. The number of lots and approximate sizes were set forth in the prospectus. The prospectus was delivered by Respondents to tenants shortly after notice of approval was received from Petitioner. On or about June 5, 1986, Respondents, pursuant to Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, sent a notice of eviction to tenants residing in the park. The park took no new tenants and was virtually closed after January 1, 1987. Most of the tenants had voluntarily vacated the park with exception of four residents by December 1, 1987. On December 16, 1987, Respondents forwarded notices to the remaining four tenants of an intent to impose "pass through" charges resulting from the park's increased real property taxes. Provision for "pass through" of such charges is made in the prospectus. The taxes which were the subject of the "pass through" were levied on three parcels of property belonging to Respondents. All of the parcels are contiguous. Two of the parcels are divided into lots and are a part of the park as described in the prospectus. The record is unclear as to whether the third parcel was completely or partially platted into lots, but it is established that this property, while not explicitly described in the prospectus, was used for recreational purposes by tenants and parking of recreational vehicles. Further, the property was landscaped and is found to be a part of the park. Respondents' intention to pass the increase in property taxes on to the tenants was consistent with the prospectus and Respondents' previous practice in 1986, when a refund was given to park tenants as the result of a property tax reduction. Respondents' subsequently abandoned their intention, however, and no "pass through" charges were collected from the tenants. Currently, no mobile home tenants reside in the park. Items, including real estate taxes, normally considered as "pass through" charges were customarily included in rental charges to tenants prior to June 4, 1984, as "operating expenses" and not otherwise denominated on rental documents. After the legislative enactment creating Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, Respondent prepared the prospectus which sets forth separate "pass through" charges. Respondents experienced periodic episodes of vandalism of the facilities of the park as the number of residents decreased in 1987. The tenants maintained alternate residences in the northern part of the United States and none were in residence at the park in the summer of 1987, when Respondents locked the clubhouse to prevent vandalism of the facility. As the tenants returned, each of them were informed that a key and access to the clubhouse was available upon request. A written notice dated March 24, 1988, codifying this policy, was sent to club members by Respondents. Closure of the facility by Respondents was in accordance with the prospectus previously distributed to the tenants. The prospectus notes that the facility's hours are from 9:00 a.m. to 9:30 p.m., and that it may be closed earlier if there are no activities. Use of the facility for all activities and all meetings requires advance reservation and written approval of the club management. It is the position of Petitioner that Section 723.002, Florida Statutes, requires the application of the provisions of Chapter 723 to Respondents' park although less than 10 lots were rented or available for rent at the time of Respondents' alleged offenses. Petitioner's policy is that mobile home parks operating under provisions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, and having 10 or more lots offered for rent or lease when the tenancy is created, continue to be governed under those statutory provisions as to that tenancy even when the total number of tenants becomes less than the statute's threshold of 10 tenancies. Petitioner's policy also consistently holds that tenancies created prior to the enactment of Chapter 723 in June of 1984, and consequently prior to the requirement of an approved prospectus, continue to be governed for the remainder of the term of that tenancy by the previous understanding or custom established by the rental agreement between tenant and landlord and applicable provisions of law existing at the inception of the agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the charges set forth in the Notice To Show Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-2549 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 1.-3. Addressed with the exception of the last sentence of finding number three, which is unnecessary to conclusion reached. 4.-5. Addressed. Addressed in part, remainder unnecessary to result reached. Addressed. Addressed in part, remainder unnecessary to result. Addressed. 10 Addressed. RESPONDENTS' PROPOSED FINDINGS Respondents' findings consisted of five unnumbered paragraphs. Numbers 1 through 5 have been assigned to those paragraphs and they are treated as follows: 1.-2. Addressed. Addressed in part. Remainder unnecessary. Addressed. Addressed. COPIES FURNISHED: Debra Roberts, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Alan S. Zangen, Esquire 1601 Belvedere Road, Suite 112 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 E. James Kearney Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Van B. Poole Secretary Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000
