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DIVISION OF LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs HUGH D. ROWLES, D/B/A SOUTHWINDS MOBILE HOME PARK, 89-004572 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Deland, Florida Aug. 25, 1989 Number: 89-004572 Latest Update: Mar. 06, 1990

Findings Of Fact As of June 4, 1984, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided on the property. Some of those ten or more residents were Beverly Leight, William Daniel, Frank Addison, Keith Hellstrom, Faye Koch, and Helen Sutton. As of May 25, 1986, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided. On May 25, 1986, Johnny Owens owned the mobile home in which he resided on leased Lot 10. As of October 28, 1986, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided. On that date, Charles and Pauline Murphy owned the mobile home in which they resided on leased Lot 26. Upon paying the annual fee for southwinds Mobile Home Park, pursuant to Section 723.007 F.S., for the period of October 2, 1987 through October 1, 1988, Respondent Hugh D. Rowles, the park owner, advised Petitioner agency that he had dropped below ten lots available for rent. Respondent had reached this stage by simply not leasing out lots to new tenants as lots were voluntarily vacated by old tenants, and a natural attrition had occurred. The Petitioner's Fees Section accepted Respondent's word on the matter without further investigation, and Petitioner sent Respondent no more statements for the payment of the annual fee. In its business and public records, Petitioner listed Respondent and his park as not under jurisdiction of Chapter 723 F.S. On December 27, 1988, Respondent Rowles still owned Southwinds Mobile Home Park. As of that date, Beverly Leight, William Daniel, Frank Addison, Keith Hellstrom, Faye Koch, Helen Sutton, Johnny Owens, and the Murphys (8 tenants) were still residing in their respective mobile homes on the lots they were leasing from Respondent in Southwinds Mobile Home Park, as described supra. On that date, Leight, who had sold the park to Respondent in 1980, and Daniel, Addison, Hellstrom, Koch, and Sutton had been residents of Southwinds Mobile Home Park for at least three and a half years each; Owens had been a resident approximately two and a half years, and the Murphys had been residents approximately two years. In the park there were also some mobile homes owned' by Respondent which were rented as units--lot and mobile home together. To those individuals who owned their mobile homes and were leasing lots in Southwinds Mobile Home Park, Respondent sent a letter dated December 27, 1988, which provided in pertinent part: To those of you who own your own homes, I want to give you as much advance notice as possible. Sometime within the next few weeks, you will begin seeing land surveyors, soil testing people and others in the park. There is a VERY STRONG possibility that the property will be sold in JUNE of 1989. If and when the property is sold, there will NO LONGER be a trailer park here. It is STRONGLY SUGGESTED that you start making plans NOW for the removal of your trailer. If there is any way that I can assist you in relocating, I will be glad to help you. Until further notice, everything remains as usua1. After serving the letter f December 27, 1988, Respondent served the mobile home owners in Sothwinds Mobile Home Park with no other notice prior to June 1989. Faye Koch interpreted the letter of December 27, 1988 as requiring her to leave southwinds Mobile Home Park. Beverly Leight, on the other hand, understood it to mean that the park might be sold, but not that it definitely would be sold. In January 1989, Mr. Rowles offered Mrs. Koch $1,000 to leave the park by February 1, 1989. She moved out to a larger, better mobile home, after paying Respondent her overdue rent. Respondent rented the mobile home purchased from Mrs. Koch and the lot it was on, as a unit, to another person foil a short while. Rowles also purchased the mobile home of Keith Hellstrom for $1,000, which he likewise rented to someone else as a unit with his lot for a short time, He purchased Johnny Owens' mobile home for $1,000. Thereafter, Rowles sold each of these mobile homes at a loss. The Koch, Hellstrom, and Owens mobile homes were sold by Rowles for $100, $500, and $100, respectively. In March 1989, Respondent Rowles was contacted by a representative of Petitioner, apparently from the Enforcement Section, who had been contacted by Mrs. Leiht, and who advised Rowles of Petitioner agency's position that the tenancies of the remaining mobile home owners in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were subject to the protections of Chapter 723 F.S. Respondent advised Petitioner's representative that he did not regard his park as covered by Chapter 723 F.S. Respondent also requested Petitioner's representative to show Respond.ent that Chapter 723 FS was applicable to him and his park and advised the agency representative that, if he was subject to the agency's jurisdiction, he would comply. Respondent received no written response from the agency until the Notice to Show Cause was filed on July 18, 1989. On April 6, 1989, Respondent and his wife entered into a contract for the sale of the property comprising Southwinds Mobile Home Park to a third party. An addendum to the contract required Respondent to remove or pay for the removal of all personal property (that is, the mobile homes) located on the parcel upon being given thirty days notice from the third party buyer. The contract c6ntemplated that the property would continue to operate as rental property until the new owners elected to close it down or change its function. The closing on this contract for sale still had not occurred as of the date of formal hearing. The purchasers of the property comprising Southwinds Mobile Home Park have never given Respondent notice to remove any personal property from the park, nor has permitting of the property occurred such as would entitle the buyers to demand removal of such personal property. At the time Respondent entered into the April 6, 1989 contract for sale of Southwinds Mobile Home Park, only four mobile home owners were still leasing lots in the park. It may be inferred from the testimony as a whole that these were month to month tenancies. Respondent attempted to negotiate purchase of those four mobile homes. He did not suggest to any residents that they had any other options besides moving their mobile homes out of his park or selling them to him. Mrs. Leight held out for $2,500 and refused to move. She was joined in her refusal by Mr. Daniel, Ms. Sutton, and a Miss Warnock, all of whom were residing in their own mobile homes on Respondent's lots. On June 1, 1989, Respondent notified the fourmobile home owners remaining in Southwinds Mobile Home Park toremove their mobile homes no later than June 30, 1989. Thisnotification is in accord with the standards of Section 83.03(3)F.S. for month-to-month tenancies. At that point, Leight, Daniel, and Sutton were four-year residents There is noinformation as to Warnock's term of residency at southwindsMobile Home Park. On August 4, 1989, Respondent shut off waterservice to the mobile home owners remaining in southwinds MobileHome Park. As a result of Respondent's action, Beverly Leightwas compelled to move out of her mobile home in order to complywith health department requirements. In so doing, she incurredcosts of 4,486, for which she has not been reimbursed; however,she is one of the four remaining mobile homed owners (Leight,Daniel, Sutton, and Warnock) who left the subject property on orbefore October 30, 1989, pursuant to a stipulation with the Respondent whereby the Respondent deposited $10,000 with their attorney pending a judicial determination as to whether themobile home lot tenancies were governed by Chapter 723 or by Chapter 83, Parts II F.S. The Circuit Court action wherein the stipulation was filed had not yet resulted in such adetermination as of the date of formal hearing.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes enter a final order dismissing the Notice to Show Cause. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of March, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 89-4572 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: Accepted: 1-17, 19. Rejected as mere characterization of testimony and argument of counsel: 18 (with footnote) Respondent' s PFOF: Accepted: 1-3, 5-10, 12 Except for irrelevant, immaterial, subordinate or unnecessary material, the following PFOF are accepted: 4 Rejected as containing a conclusion of law: 11 COPIES FURNISHED: Eric H. Miller Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 F.A. Ford, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box-48 DeLand, Florida 32721-0048 E. James Kearney, Director Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Stephen R. MacNamara, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Joseph A. Sole, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 =================================================================

Florida Laws (9) 120.57120.68723.002723.005723.006723.007723.031723.032723.061
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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs WATER OAK MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, T/A WATER OAK ESTATE, A/K/A WATER OAK COUNTRY CLUB, 89-005626 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 16, 1989 Number: 89-005626 Latest Update: Jun. 22, 1992

The Issue Whether petitioner should rescind its approval of prospectus amendments contained in amended prospectuses petitioner accepted for filing on June 23, 1988?

Findings Of Fact Respondent (Water Oak) manages a mobile home park in Lake County known as Water Oak Country Club Estates (the park). The previous owner envisioned phased development of an eventual total of 1,479 lots, and so stated in the original or "P" prospectus filed with petitioner's Bureau of Mobile Homes (the Bureau). The "P" prospectus contemplated a 587-lot "Golfside Villas" section when phase II of the park was developed. The "P" prospectus disclosed plans to build a separate recreational complex for Golfside Villas, leaving the main recreational complex for the exclusive use of other park residents. But the "P" prospectus stated: Water Oak Estate Mobile Home Park has a clubhouse, swimming pool, tennis courts and a shuffleboard center, which will be available for use by the park residents. The maximum number of lots that will use these shared facilities at the present time is 1,479, which is the total number of lots within the park. The Golfside Villas Section will use these facilities until November 1, 1987, at which time they will use their own facilities, and will no longer use Water Oak Estate facilities except by invitation from the Water Oak Residents' Association, or the Park Management. After Water Oak, Ltd. acquired the park, respondent or its agent filed an amended prospectus ("P86") with the Bureau. The "P86" prospectus differed from the "P" prospectus only to the extent required by the 1986 amendments to Chapter 723, Florida Statutes (1989), and did not alter disclosures regarding recreational facilities. A third Water Oak prospectus ("P2"), preserved the Golfside Villas concept and the idea of a separate recreational complex. As filed with the Bureau, however, the P2 prospectus stated: The recreational and other common areas discussed above are completed and available for use by the residents. The maximum number of home sites that are presently entitled to use these facilities is 590. FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS-- Water Oak Country Club Estates will build an additional clubhouse, a swimming pool, and a shuffleboard center, which will be for and in the Golfside Villas Section. Management may increase or decrease the size or modify the use of any of the shared facilities to serve the changing needs of the community, as determined by management. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4, p. 7. In due course, the Bureau approved all three prospectuses, "P", "P86" and "P2", one after another. In approving prospectuses "P86" and "P2", the Bureau implicitly deemed them consistent with earlier approved prospectus(es). Because of considerations not pertinent here, Water Oak decided to abandon the idea of a discrete Golfside Villas section with its own exclusive recreational complex. Instead, it proposed, in developing phase II, to build the recreational complex contemplated in prospectuses "P", "P86" and "P2" (the original prospectuses) but to make both the phase II recreational complex and the original complex available to all residents of the park. Accordingly, Water Oak proposed amendments to the original prospectuses outlining its revised plans, and on April 16, 1988, filed them with the Bureau. Water Oak's cover letter explained: More specifically, a new clubhouse, heated swimming pool and shuffle board center open to all park residents will soon be available for use and so information concerning those facilities has been moved from the "Future Improvements" sections of these documents to the "Recreational and Other Common Areas" section. The proposed amendments are designed to make the "RECREATIONAL AND COMMON FACILITIES" section of all these prospectuses identical, and thus the existing versions of that section are deleted in their entirety in each prospectus and the new language substituted. . . . One other point is relevant to your consideration in this matter. The original owner of Water Oak Country Club Estates intended to designate a section of the park as the "Golfside Villas." However, no such section was ever developed ant the current owner has decided not to develop that section as such. Therefore, the Golfside Villas section of the park will not be created. Thus, all references to the Golfside Villas are now proposed to be deleted from all of the prospectuses in use in the park. No homeowner has leased a lot in an area designated as "the Golfside Villas," nor has any resident received any lease or other notification stating that his lot is in an area known as the Golfside Villas. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 (Emphasis in original.) Bureau personnel reviewed the amendments and approved the applications. Respondent's Exhibits Nos. 4 and After the approval, Water Oak gave prospective lessees amended P2 prospectuses, and entered into 60 or more leases with new residents to whom they had furnished amended prospectuses. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7, a printed map of the park that is not part of any prospectus, labels a shaded portion in the northeast as "GOLFSIDE VILLAS AREA." Margerie Monski received a copy of the map on August 4, 1987, (T.411) before she and her husband leased a lot depicted on the unshaded portion of the map, in phase I. Respondent leased lot No. 2472 to Mr. and Mrs. Edward Reposa on April 4, 1988. T. 445; Petitioner's Exhibit No. 11. When respondent filed proposed prospectus amendments two days later, it had leased no other lot within the shaded area on Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. Respondent leased lot No. 2510 to Mr. and Mrs. Alador Kurucz on April 20, 1988, and lot No. 2519 to Mr. and Mrs. Lloyd W. Wunder on June 8, 1988. Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 12 and 13. Lots Nos. 2472, 2510 and 2519 all lie within the part of the park represented by the shaded area on Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. But, as far as the evidence showed, none of the three lots' lessees has ever seen Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7 or any other map of the park on which Golfside Villas was depicted as a discrete section. No prospectus ever indicated that lots had been or were being leased in Golfside Villas. Unbeknownst to Water Oak, Mel Bishop Enterprises, Inc., the predecessor in interest who initially continued as park manager for Water Oak, filed a map similar to Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7 with the Bureau on October 27, 1987 (a prerequisite to its lawful use as advertising.) Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. Lots depicted in the shaded area number far fewer than the 587 mentioned in the original prospectuses. The three original prospectuses, "P", "P86" and "P2", contain maps of phase I only. Front, back, left side and right side lot dimensions are listed for phase I, lot by lot. With respect to Golfside Villa lot dimensions, only the following appears: Front Left Side 1-587 - - - - 56 90 Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. On April 6, 1988, respondent's principals were under the impression that no specific area within the park had ever been officially designated as Golfside Villas. Nothing in any of the materials they reviewed when respondent acquired the park located Golfside Villas at a particular spot on the land reserved for development in phase II. Testifying at hearing, petitioner's personnel conceded that respondent had no intention to mislead the Bureau with regard to any fact material to approval or acceptance of respondent's prospectus amendments. Nor did the evidence show that the fact that the respondent leased three lots depicted within the shaded area on Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7 would have been material in the Bureau's original decision to approve respondent's prospectus amendments.

Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss its notice and order of rejection. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 26, 30, 31, 32, 35, 37, 38, 41, 45 and 49 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 6, the pertinent part of the letter is quoted. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 10, 15, 28, 33, 34, 39, 40, 42 and 50 pertain to immaterial matters. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 19, 24, 27, 43 and 44, no prospectus located a "Golfside Villas section of the park" at any specific place. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 20, 21, 22, 23, 25 and 47 pertain to subordinate matters. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 29, Mr. Stoppa made the allegation, but no prospectus located a "Golfside Villas section of the park" at any specific place. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 36, only two such leases were proven. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 46, see paragraph 10 of the findings of fact. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 48, it was not clear from the evidence what the basis was. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 21 22, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 37, 38, 42, 43, 44 and 45 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 4, the number was 587. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 10, 25 and 39 pertain to immaterial matters. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 26, 27, 32, 33, 36 and 41 pertain to subordinate matters. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 23, it is not clear what petitioner's policy was at any given time. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 40, petitioner failed to prove its materiality. Copies furnished: Debra Roberts, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Daniel C. Brown, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman Davis, Marks & Rutledge, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street First Florida Bank Bldg., Suite 400 Tallahassee, FL 32301 E. James Kearney, Director Department of Business Regulation Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000 General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000

Florida Laws (3) 723.006723.011723.031
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FLORIDA MANUFACTURED HOUSING ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES, 85-003858RX (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-003858RX Latest Update: Mar. 26, 1986

The Issue Whether Rules 7D-30.04, 7D-30.06, 7D-31.01(2), 7D-31,01(4), 7D-31.01(5), 7D-31.01(12), 7D-32.01 and 7D-32.02, Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority and are arbitrary and capricious?

Findings Of Fact The following findings of fact were stipulated to and are hereby adopted: The following is a Florida non-profit corporation, whose address is 115 N. Calhoun Street, Tallahassee, Florida. The FMHA is organized and maintained for the benefit of its members, which includes approximately 950 mobile home park owners and operators. A substantial portion of these members own or operate parks which contain 10 or more lots and therefore are subject to regulation by the Division of Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, Department of Business Regulation. The Division of Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, Department of Business Regulation is delegated the authority pursuant to Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, to regulate mobile home parks, including the powers to enforce and ensure compliance with the provisions of the Chapter and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, including the authority to impose a civil penalty against a mobile home park owner for any violation of the Chapter, or a rule or regulation of the Division. Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, was enacted by the Florida Legislature as Chapter 84-80, was signed by the Governor and filed in the office of the Secretary of State on June 4, 1984. Rules 7D-30, 7D-31, and 7D-32, Florida Administrative Code, are rules of the Division of Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, Department of Business Regulation, which were properly adopted in accordance with Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner is a trade association the members of which are engaged in business in the mobile home industry in the State of Florida. The Petitioner has members who are mobile home manufacturers, retailers, equipment suppliers and servicers, owners and operators of mobile-home rental parks, developers of mobile home parks and subdivisions, insurance firms and lending institutions. The Petitioner has 1,020 members who develop mobile home parks and subdivisions or are owners and operators of mobile home rental parks. As stipulated to by the parties, approximately 950 of the Petitioner's members are owners and operators of mobile home rental parks. The Petitioner's members are involved in the rental of between 300,000 and 350,000 mobile home spaces. A substantial number of the Petitioner's members are subject to regulation by the Respondent pursuant to Chapter 723, Florida Statutes (1985), the "Florida Mobile Home Act." In July of 1984, subsequent to the effective date of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes (1985), the Bureau of Mobile Homes was created as a part of the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes. Dr. Faye Mayberry has been, and continues to be, the Chief of the Bureau of Mobile Homes. Following the enactment of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes (1985), the Bureau of Mobile Homes concluded that there was a need to clarify certain portions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes (1985), and a need to establish procedures necessary for the filing of prospectuses and other documents. Therefore, the Bureau initiated a process to determine what rules needed to be adopted. The Bureau also received numerous inquiries from mobile home owners and mobile home park owners concerning Chapter 723. The Bureau first looked at Chapter 723 in-house and looked at the nature of inquiries it had received and then drafted a conceptual approach to part of the rules. The conceptual draft, at the invitation of the Bureau, was reviewed by representatives of the Petitioner and the Intervenor. A meeting was held with the Respondent to discuss the conceptual approach. The Respondent left the meeting with the impression that the conceptual approach was not that far off. Following its discussions of the conceptual approach with the Petitioner and Intervenor, the Respondent drafted rules pursuant to Chapter 723. Four workshops, in three locations in Florida, were conducted to receive public input on the draft rules. Advance notice of the workshops was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly. Representatives of the Petitioner had notice of, and participated in, the workshops. Subsequent to the public workshops, in October of 1934, the Respondent published proposed rules under Chapters 7D-30 and 7D-31, in the Florida Administrative Weekly. In November of 1984, the Respondent published proposed rules under Chapter 7D-32. After publication of the proposed rules in the Florida Administrative Weekly, requests for a public hearing were received by the Respondent and public hearings were held. Representatives of the Petitioner attended these hearings and had an opportunity to provide input on the content of the proposed rules. Revisions were made to the proposed rules based upon suggestions from the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee and comments made by the public during the hearings held by the Respondent. The revisions were published in the Florida Administrative Weekly in January of 1985. As revised, the rules contained in Chapters 7D-30 and 7D-31, Florida Administrative Code, became effective on January 10, 1985. The rules contained in Chapter 7D-32. Florida Administrative Code, became effective on February 6, 1085. The Joint Administrative Procedures Committee did not file any challenge to the rules after they became effective. A substantial amount of input and work went into adopting Chapters 7D-30, 7D-31 and 7D-39, Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioner had notice of the promulgation of the rules at issue and has been involved in the development and distribution of information it believed was necessary to assist its members in complying with the requirements of Chapter 723. The Petitioner has distributed memoranda, conducted seminars, distributed prospectuses and communicated with representatives of the Respondent in an effort to assist its members in complying with the requirements of Chapter 723. The Petitioner provided definitions of terms for use in prospectuses and notices required by Chapter 723 and for use in complying with the Respondent's rules. The Petitioner has attempted to assist its members in preparing a prospectus which could be filed with the Respondent and would meet the requirements of Chapter 723. Toward this end, the Petitioner prepared a sample or model prospectus and conducted a seminar on the model prospectus on December 17, 1984. The seminar was conducted in Orlando, Florida, and was attended by over 600 people. In the model prospectus the Petitioner provided three alternative methods of providing for future rental increases to be included in a prospectus. The model prospectus discussed at the December 17, 1984 seminar was for use by those mobile home parks with 100 or more rental spaces. The Petitioner also prepared a model prospectus for mobile home parks with 26 to 99 rental spaces which it distributed in June of 1985. This model prospectus was sent to all members of the Petitioner. A large number of the Petitioner's members used the model prospectus prepared by the Petitioner. Information provided to members by the Petitioner was developed by the Petitioner based in part upon its discussions with the staff of the Respondent. The Petitioner received questions from its members concerning certain aspects of the Respondent's rules and Chapter 723 which the Petitioner attempted to answer. A substantial number of the Petitioner's members advertise their mobile home parks. Mr. Neil Kullman is a member of the Petitioner and is the President of Florida Leisure Communities. Florida Leisure Communities owns and operates 3 mobile home parks in Florida. Florida Leisure Communities waits for the Respondent to approve advertising materials it files with the Respondent because it has decided that it does not want to risk using an advertisement which may be found to be defective by the Respondent. Florida Leisure Communities does not wait for approval of its advertisements by the Respondent because it believes that it is required to do so by the Respondent's rules. Time delays have been experienced in getting advertisements approved. A substantial number of the Petitioner's members have rental agreements in existence at mobile homes parks which have anniversary dates or renewal dates which would allow increases in rent. Most of the rental agreements have renewal dates or anniversary dates of July 1 or January 1. The Petitioner provided information to its members in March of 1985 and August of 1985 concerning the Petitioner's understanding of what constitutes an effective notice of lot rental increase. In explaining how members can provide a concise explanation of the reason for a proposed lot rental increase, the Petitioner told its members the following in a memorandum distributed in March of 1985: You need only to provide a concise explanation of the reason for the proposed change. Be brief! You should only include a list of factors (for rent increases), or a short plain statement for the change in services or rules or regulations. Important! As for rent increases, the rule limits the factors you may consider to those specifically identified in the prospectus. If the homeowners go to mediation or arbitration, or to court, then only those factors identified in the prospectus can be used to justify the reasonableness of the increase. Also, you should only place on the notice of increase the category of factor used to determine the rent increase level. For example: Operating costs; Prevailing market rent; Prevailing economic conditions; or Consumer Price Index (CPI). Be sure to list only those factors which are necessary to fully justify the rent increase. In August of 1985 the Petitioner provided the following guidance to its members with respect to how to provide a concise explanation of the reason for a lot rental increase: 4. You need only to provide a concise explanation of the reason for the proposed increase. Be brief! You should only include a list of factors, or a short plain statement of the reason or reasons for the increase. For example, a response might be: "The reasons for the increase are increased operating costs, prevailing market rent, and prevailing economic [sic] conditions, as set forth in the prospectus." You need not to go [sic] into great detail as to the specific costs which may have increased during the course of the year which you may want to take into consideration, or do you need to explain what is intended to mean [sic] by prevailing market rent or prevailing economic conditions. You need only to include a concise explanation of the reasons for the increase. The recommendation of the Petitioner to its members concerning how to provide a concise explanation of an increase in lot rental was basically that the member refer to factors which might cause a rental increase as provided in the member's prospectus. In the model prospectus recommended by the Petitioner to its members in June of 1985, the Petitioner recommended that the following explanation of the manner in which lot rental could be increased should be used by its members: is as follows: Increase in Lot Rental The manner in which lot rental will be increased, Definitions. As used in this Section VIII: "Lot rental" means all sums paid or to be paid by the mobile home owner in consideration of leasing or renting a mobile home lot or lots in the Park. Such sums include any and all rents, special use fees, pass-through charges, installation and set-up charges, and other fees, charges and assessments imposed by the Owner. "Special use fees" mean those separately itemized amounts for specific services or privileges which are charged in addition to rent, including, but not limited to, such charges as guest fees, pet fees and entrance fees. "Pass-through charges" are defined as those amounts, other than special use fees, which are itemized and charged separately from the rent and which represent the mobile home owner's share of costs charged to the Park Owner by any state or local government or utility company. Notice of Increase. The mobile home owner shall be notified of any increase in the lot rental at least 90 days prior to the effective date of such increase. Lot Rental-Increases. General. The lot rental and each of the categories of charges current Iv or hereafter comprising a part of the lot rental are subject to periodic increases by the Owner. However, except for increases resulting from the imposition of pass-through charges, the lot rental will not be increased more frequently than annually, except for initial tenancies which commence after the beginning of the annual rental term. Factors Affecting Increases. Factors which may affect the level of increases in lot rental are as follows: Increased costs, which refers to any increases experienced by the Owner since the delivery of notice of the last increase in the lot rental in the total costs arising out of the ownership, operation and management of the Park. Prevailing Market Rent--Refers to the lot rental imposed in mobile home parks comparable to this Park, or the lot rental willingly paid from time to time by new residents of this Park. A park will be deemed comparable if it is located in the same general vicinity as this Park, and offers similar densities, amenities and services. Prevailing Economic Conditions--are intended to refer to those factors which bear on the economic viability of a real estate investment and which would be considered by a prudent businessman in establishing the base rent and other charges or any increase in the amount thereof. These factors may include: the costs attendant to the replacement of this Park in the economic environment existing at the time of any rental increase, including land acquisition costs, construction costs, and losses associated with the operation of a park prior to full occupancy, and the level at which the lot rental must be established in order that the Park Owner will realize a reasonable return on the costs referred to in this clause (1); the level of interest rates and other financing charges associated with construction, interim and permanent financing; (3) the availability of alternative forms of real estate investment capital; (4) the levels of the Consumer Price Index, defined as the United States Department of Labor, Consumer Price Index, U.S. City Average--All Urban Consumers, 1967 100, or, in the event of the discontinuation of publication of the Consumer Price Index, then an alternative index which has been reasonably related to the Consumer Price Index in evaluating economic conditions, and which has been, or can reasonably be expected to be, generally accepted as a replacement index for the Consumer Price Index; (5) the level at which the lot rental must be established in order that the Owner will realize a reasonable return on the "Owners's Equity"; for this purpose, the "Owner's Equity" refers to the fair market value of the Park from time to time, less existing mortgage indebtedness; (6) other economic factors which might reasonably be expected to affect-either the value of the Park, the rate of return available to the Owner of the Park at the existing level of rent, the present value of the real estate investment in the then current economic conditions, and which would be taken into consideration by a prudent businessman in considering the amount of rental increase required in the Park in order -to realize a rate of return similar to other at risk real estate ventures from the then current value of the Park. To the extent permitted by law, the mobile home owner may also be required to bear, in the form of increases in the lot rental, the costs incurred by Owner in installing capital improvements or performing major repairs in the Park. Additional Considerations The reasons for the increase in lot rental or other fees and charges will be set forth in the notice of increase. Only those factors set forth in the notice will be relied upon by the Park Owner as justification for the rent increase. The Park Owner reserves the right to amend this Prospectus or any Exhibit thereto from time to time to the extent permitted by law to conform with changes in relevant statutory provisions or changes in relevant rules of the Department of Business Regulation, or any other agency having jurisdiction over the operation of this mobile home park. An increase in one or more of the above- described factors may result in an increase in the mobile home owner's rent or other charges. Tenants assuming the remaining portion of a tenancy as prescribed by Section 723.059(3), F.S., are hereby notified that upon the expiration of the assumed tenancy, the Park Owner expressly reserves the right to increase lot rental amount in an amount deemed appropriate by the Park Owner with such increase being imposed in the manner disclosed in the Prospectus delivered to the initial recipient. A number of the Petitioner's members used the notice of lot rental increase recommended by the Petitioner and the portion of the prospectus quoted in finding of fact 33. The Respondent advised some of the Petitioner's members that the notice recommended by the Petitioner was deficient under the Respondent's rules. The notice was deficient because the Respondent determined that the notice did not provide a concise explanation of the reason for a lot rental increase. The notice used by several members of the Petitioner stated that the reason for the increase was "prevailing market conditions and economic conditions." The Respondent notified members that used this explanation that it was deficient. The Respondent also told those members that "the explanation must include the specific changes in the factors described in the prospectus under prevailing market conditions and economic conditions which were the reasons for the change." The Petitioner challenged the Respondent's interpretation of its rules concerning notices in Leon County Circuit Court. The Court advised the parties to work things out following a preliminary injunction hearing. Representatives of the Petitioner and the Respondent met and discussed the problem with the Petitioner's notice and the Respondent subsequently indicated that several examples of a concise explanation for lot rental increases proposed by the Petitioner were acceptable. The method of increasing rent provided in existing rental agreements at various mobile home parks varies. Because existing tenants have different anniversary dates or renewal dates, if notice of a lot rental increase affecting some tenants is given to all tenants of a park, it is more costly to the park owner. It is possible, however, to mail one notice of rental increase to all tenants of a park at the beginning of each year. Florida Leisure Communities has filed a prospectus for all three of its mobile home parks in Florida. The prospectuses have been approved by the Respondent. At the Colonnades, a Florida Leisure Communities park, 156 lots have been completed and 19 of those lots have been occupied. Improvements to be made by Florida Leisure Communities are specified in the prospectus for the parks. In order to keep pace with market conditions and provide different improvements, a new prospectus has to be filed with the Respondent. At Brittany Estates, another Florida Leisure Communities park, after a prospectus had been distributed to all tenants, a tornado destroyed 50 mobile homes. Most of the tenants of the 50 homes voluntarily terminated their leases. Mr. Bernie Covington is vice-president and director of the parks of Angeles Real Estate Management Company (hereinafter referred to as "Angeles"). Angeles owns and operates 13 mobile home parks in Florida. Angeles has filed a prospectus for Heritage Village, a 436 site park. The prospectus had not been approved or distributed as of the date of the hearing of these cases. Heritage Village owns and operates its own sewage treatment plant and water system. Heritage Village will be required, however, to tie into the County's water and sewage system at substantial costs. Existing leases with tenants of Heritage Village allow the park to pass the impact fees ($1,250.00 for sewage and $1,149.00 for water, per site) and the cost of tieing into the force main ($30,000.00 to $35,000.00) on to the tenants. The cost of tieing into the force main may not be passed on to the tenants under the Respondent's rules, however. Angeles has also filed a prospectus for Pleasant Living Mobile Home Park which has 218 tenants. The prospectus had not been approved or distributed as of the date off the final hearing of these cases. Angeles would now like to provide a secure area for storage of boats, RVs and cars and charge a fee for this service. The prospectus being reviewed by the Respondent, however, does not indicate that a secure area will be provided.

Florida Laws (14) 120.5630.0230.0530.06723.006723.011723.012723.014723.016723.017723.031723.037723.038723.059
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DONALD L. HILGEMAN, D/B/A DLH ENTERPRISES vs FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES, 90-006664F (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 22, 1990 Number: 90-006664F Latest Update: Apr. 26, 1991

The Issue The issues in this case concern the attempt by Petitioner to collect $11,684.62 in attorneys fees and costs associated with the defense of the case of State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, Petitioner, vs. Donald L. Hilgeman and Marilyn Hilgeman, d/b/a DLH Enterprises; and Pat Montgomery, as park owners of Lake Waldena Resort, Respondents, DOAH Case No. 89-4100, and $931.50 in attorneys fees and costs attributable to the pursuit of the present case to collect those attorneys fees and costs attributable to the defense of the administrative prosecution. See Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this inquiry Petitioner was a mobile home park owner as defined by Section 723.003(7), Florida Statutes (1987). Petitioner, Marilyn Hilgeman, his former wife, and Pat Montgomery had administrative charges brought against them through a notice to show cause. In that notice to show cause those three individuals were identified as park owners of Lake Waldena Resort in Silver Springs, Florida. In particular the present Respondent charged the Petitioner and the others with violating Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987) for having refused to meet with a designated mobile home owners committee within 30 days of giving notice of a lot rent increase and having been requested to conduct that meeting for purpose of discussing the reasons for the increase in the lot rental amount. The accused sought a formal hearing as envisioned by Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. That hearing was conducted by the undersigned and a recommended order entered on April 18, 1990, in the aforementioned DOAH Case No. 89-4100. For reasons set out in the conclusions of law found within the recommended order, the suggested disposition of that case was one which found the several Petitioners innocent of any wrong doing and called for the dismissal of the administrative prosecution. On July 25, 1990 the prosecuting agency entered its final order in DOAH Case No. 89-4100. It accepted the fact-finding in the recommended order; however, it modified the conclusions of law and recommended disposition. Unlike the recommended order, the final order in its conclusions of law specifically found that the present Petitioner and the others accused had violated Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes, wherein at page 17 it was held "Therefore, it is concluded Respondent violated Sections 723.037(3), Florida Statutes." The conclusions of law in the final order went on to say that in mitigation of the violation the prosecuting agency had considered the apparent confusion of those Respondents regarding the affect of Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code, as it might influence the actions of the accused and in particular, the present Petitioner. In the final order concerning the mitigating affects of Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code, it was decided that notwithstanding any misunderstanding the accused had as to the significance of the Rule it could not alter the statutory requirements of having a meeting within 30 days of the notice of lot rental increase as described in Section 723.037(3), Florida Administrative Code (1987). The language within Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code, stated: If requested to do so by the park owner or subdivision developer, the committee shall certify that it has been selected as described in Rule 7D-32.003, Florida Admin- istrative Code. This certification shall include a certificate of all members of the committee attesting to its proper formation under the statute and these rules. For reasons expressed in the recommended order that rule was seen as tolling the 30-day requirement for meeting expressed in Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987) on the facts found in both the recommended and final orders. This was based upon a recognition that the present Petitioner had employed the rule in an attempt to gain a certification from the committee of mobile home owners prior to the conduct of a meeting to discuss the increase in lot rentals. Again, this belief that the rule tolled the requirement for conducting the meeting within 30 days of the notice of lot rental increase expressed in the recommended order was rejected in the final order. The final order controls absent further relief by resort to the appellate court process. In describing the reasons why the prosecution maintained that the rule could not alter the statutory requirement for holding a meeting within 30 days, the final order states that there are policy considerations that make it important for the committee and the park owner to meet within 30 days and those reasons concern the fact that the rent increase becomes effective within 90 days over the notice, the informational value of having the reasons explained for the lot increase as a prelude to any request to having a dispute about lot rental increases submitted to mediation within 30 days following the scheduled meeting. The final order goes on to describe, through its conclusions of law, that the meeting to discuss lot rental increase was not held until November 14, 1989 over a year after the notice of lot rental increase. That statement comes immediately before the conclusion of law that the present Petitioner had violated Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes. In the conclusions of law set out in the final order the prosecuting agency in its paragraph describing the mitigating circumstances acknowledges the possible confusion on the part of the accused as well as the mobile home owners committee when it describes, as did the recommended order, the filing of a complaint by the committee as a means of ostensibly preserving the right to have the meeting envisioned by Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987), when taken against the background of the opportunity to have a credential check of mobile home owners committee members as envisioned by Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code. This refers to the issue of whether a meeting could be held after 30 days from the notice of intended lot rental increase absent such a complaint. In the statement on mitigation the final order recognizes that the administrative prosecution was penal in nature and that Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987) and Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code needed to be read in context and should be strictly construed with ambiguities favoring the accused. The final order cites to State v. Pattishall, 99 Fla. 296, 126 So. 147 (1930) and Davis v. Dept. of Professional Regulation, 457 So.2d 1074 (Fla. 1DCA 1984). The treatment of those cases and the resolution of the dispute through final order is one which finds the accused in violation of Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987), but mitigates the disposition in the way of the penalty based upon the reading given Pattishall and Davis, supra. That factual impression is given when the order in disposition is examined wherein it is stated through the final order, "Based upon the consideration of the facts found, the conclusions of law reached, and the mitigation evidence, it is ordered that the notice to show cause is hereby dismissed." On August 22, 1990, the present Petitioner noticed an appeal of the final order in the administrative prosecution but later abandoned that appeal before the court had the opportunity to speak to its merits. On October 22, 1990, the present Petitioner filed a petition for collection of attorneys fees and costs spoken to in the statement of issues. The petition for attorneys fees and costs were subjected to a motion to dismiss based upon a claim of untimeliness and that motion was denied by order of December 10, 1990. The present Respondent requested an evidentiary hearing as contemplated Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and Rule 22I-6.035, Florida Administrative Code, and the evidentiary hearing was conducted on the date described before. When the present Petitioner abandoned his appeal to the District Court, he necessarily was placed in the position of arguing that the final order drawn by the prosecuting agency constituted the basis for the claim that he was a small business party who had prevailed in the dispute related to DOAH Case No. 89-4100. See Section 57.111(3)(c)1, Florida Statutes. Contrary to his assertion the final order as described in these facts did not favor the present Petitioner. Although the prosecuting agency did not choose to impose a penalty against the present Petitioner based upon its assessment of matters in mitigation and dismissed the case without exacting a penalty, it had found the present Petitioner in violation of a substantiative provision of law, i.e. Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987). Thus, the disposition cannot be said to favor the present Petitioner. Having decided this mixed question of fact and law against the present Petitioner, it is not necessary to make findings of fact concerning whether the present Petitioner is a small business party as defined at Section 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes and whether the present Respondent was substantially justified in this administrative prosecution related to law and fact as contemplated by Sections 57.111(3)(e) and (4)(a), Florida Statutes, or to examine whether special circumstances exist that would make the award of attorneys fees and costs unjust.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.6857.111723.003723.037
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs CHESTER YU, RONAL YU AND CAROL YU, 01-002350 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Pierce, Florida Jun. 12, 2001 Number: 01-002350 Latest Update: Oct. 12, 2001

The Issue The issue is whether Respondents imposed upon mobile home owners an invalid "pass-through" charge to pay for the cost of work on the park's electrical distribution system, in violation of Section 723.031(5), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Tanglewood Mobile Home Park, Inc., owns the Tanglewood Mobile Home Park located at 345 Weatherbee Road, Fort Pierce, St. Lucie County, Florida (Tanglewood). The Patricia Yu Irrevocable Trust owns Tanglewood Mobile Home Park, Inc. Respondents Chester Yu and Ronald Yu are the trustees of the trust; Respondent Carol Yu is not a trustee. References to "Respondents" shall include only Chester Yu and Ronald Yu. Tanglewood was developed in 1969. The park was originally owned and operated for many years by Respondents' father. An undated prospectus for Tanglewood Mobile Home Park (Prospectus) contains several provisions that have some bearing on this case. Prospectus Section VI.A.1 requires each mobile home owner to bear the expense of "electrical connections." Prospectus Section VI.A.2.a states that, "to the extent permitted by law, the mobile home owner may also be required to bear, in the form of increases in the lot rental, the costs incurred by Owner in installing capital improvements or performing major repairs in the Park." Prospectus Section VIII.3 states that the Owner may assess, on a pro rata basis, "pass-through charges" as rent increases. Prospectus Section VIII.3.a prohibits more than one increase in lot rental annually, except for "pass-through charges." Section VIII.1.c defines "pass-through charges" as "those amounts, other than special use fees, which are itemized and charged separately from the rent and which represent the mobile homeowner's share of costs charged to the Park Owner by any state or local government or utility company." Section VIII.3.b.4 states: "To the extent permitted by law, the mobile home owner may also be required to bear, in the form of increases in the lot rental, the costs incurred by Owner in installing capital improvements or performing major repairs in the Park." The Prospectus states that Tanglewood has 158 lots. In reality, only 148 lots are improved and available for rent. One of these lots is the park office. At present, 139 lots are leased. In October 1999, Hurricane Irene caused flooding in Tanglewood. After the flooding had receded, the power company restored power to the area, but a submerged transformer blew out and damaged part of the Tanglewood's electrical distribution system, leaving 16 mobile homes without power. After repairing or replacing the transformer, the power company employee responsible for reconnecting Tanglewood's electrical distribution system reenergized eight mobile homes, but refused to reenergize the remaining eight due to the deteriorated condition of their meter bank. Meter banks are located in groups at various points in the park. Power enters the park either above- or below-ground and is fed into individual meters for each mobile home. Each meter bank typically contains eight meters, and each meter typically has a junction box and a disconnect box. The concern of the power company employee was that the mechanical force required to reconnect power to one meter bank could possibly be too great for the deteriorated supports to withstand. As was typical of many meter banks at Tanglewood, the meter bank for these eight lots was poorly supported due to the deterioration of its support structure. Most supports at Tanglewood were made of wood, which required close monitoring and careful maintenance. Exposed to the elements, wood suffered considerable damage over time from wood rot. If the support failed, a meter bank would fall over to the ground, exposing live electrical lines in close proximity to the mobile homes and their occupants. Many meter banks throughout Tanglewood also suffered from deteriorated supports. Many meter banks were deficient because of the use of plumbing-grade PVC pipes as conduit, which are of a decreased thickness, when compared to PVC pipes approved for outdoor electrical use and, when exposed to sunlight, tend to deteriorate faster than the type of PVC pipes approved for outdoor electrical use. The use of plumbing-grade PVC pipes may not have been legal at the time it was used. Other meter banks also suffered from rusted and missing components, which might allow rainwater to enter the system and damage the parts. Some of the larger missing components left gaps large enough to allow a child's finger to penetrate and touch a live wire. Meter cans were damaged, masts (for above-ground supply lines) were inadequately supported, and drop wires (for above-ground supply lines) were too low. Confronted with the problem of eight lots without electrical service, Respondents contacted a local electrical contractor, who replaced the meter bank and its supports, using new pressure-treated wood. He also increased the service for these eight meters from 100 amps to 150 amps. The power company promptly restored electrical service after these repairs were completed. Respondents did not try to assess the mobile home owners a pass-through charge for this work. Instead, on January 28, 2000, Respondents sent the mobile home owners a notice that their monthly rent would increase by $15 (net, $12, after relieving the tenants of the obligation to pay a $3 monthly administration fee for water and sewer). The notice states that the rent increase is effective May 1, 2000, which may reflect a common commencement date on all lot leases. The letter notes that the park owner "has expended and will expend substantial sums for improvements and upgrades in the park," but warns that the park owner does not know if "any additional tax, utility or assessment prorations will be necessary." The rent increase covered, among other things, the cost of the work to restore electrical service to the eight lots whose meter bank required replacement. On February 12, 2000, the St. Lucie County Building Inspector inspected the electrical distribution system at Tanglewood. He noted the conditions described above and issued numerous citations, which were submitted to the St. Lucie County Code Enforcement office. In 1998, St. Lucie County adopted the National Fire Protection Association code, which is based on the 1996 National Electrical Code. The new code requirements prohibit a wood support system, require the placement of meters within 30 feet of the mobile home, and require underground wiring, but do not require service above 100 amps, which was the minimum level of service at Tanglewood prior to any electrical work following Hurricane Irene. On May 25, 2000, the County Code Enforcement Officer issued a notice of citations to Respondents for unsafe electrical equipment. The officer required the replacement of the remainder of the electrical distribution system. When work stopped at Tanglewood, the County Code Enforcement Officer issued other notices of citations in June 2000. Respondents responded to these demands from the County by undertaking extensive work to Tanglewood's electrical distribution system. The result was a modern electrical distribution system--at a cost of $161,912, plus $28,977.76 in finance charges, for a total of $190,889.76. By Notice of Pass-Through Charge dated August 14, 2000, Respondents advised the mobile home owners of a monthly pass-through charge of $28.61 per lot from December 1, 2000, through November 1, 2004. The notice discloses that the reason for the pass-through charges is the electrical distribution system upgrade that had recently been completed. The evidence is clear that, except for the upgrade to 200-amp service, the electrical work done in this case was governmentally mandated. This finding is supported by the reluctance of Respondents to attend to the electrical system unless a mobile home was without electricity. Despite Respondents' electrical invoices, their park-management policy obviously deferred maintenance, at least with respect to the electrical distribution system. The closer question in this case is whether the work was a capital improvement or a repair. The addition of 50-100 amps of service was a capital improvement, but it was not mandated by the government. So the capital improvement versus repair question applies to the remainder of the work. In their proposed recommended order, Respondents contend that the electrical distribution system was "completely functional" prior to the inspection and citations. This is true as to the function of conducting electricity; this is untrue as to the function of conducting electricity safely. Weakened and sometimes nonexistent supports, rusted holes, holes from missing components, and occasionally exposed wiring substantially undermined the safety of the electrical distribution system at Tanglewood. Respondents argue that new code requirements forced them to relocate disconnects closer to the mobile homes, use four-wire (not three-wire) feeder line to all mobile homes, use electrical-grade conduit, and use metal supports for meter banks. However, these are subsidiary costs of repair, not capital improvements. As contrasted to the expansion of service, the remaining work does not enlarge the capacity of the electrical distribution system. The remaining work repairs the system to make it safer, with some additional work required to meet current code requirements. Respondents argue that the work increases the value of the land. The record does not support this assertion. Even if such evidence were present in this case, it would not be determinative. Although a capital improvement normally adds value, a residential safety hazard subtracts value, so its elimination would have the appearance of adding value. Respondents argue that the work substantially extends the life of the electrical distribution system. This argument would be more appealing in the presence of an effective preventative maintenance program covering such basic needs as replacing wooden supports and metal covers when needed. However, the nature of the work, other than raising the service from 100 amps, is more retrospective than prospective; the work is really only catching up on preventative repairs and maintenance that was not done for years. Once Respondents allowed the system to fall into such a state of disrepair, the secondary costs of bringing the system up to code, such as adding four-wire feeds and relocating disconnects, do not change the nature of the expenditures; they are repair expenses, not capital improvements. Respondents have proved that a portion of the work was clearly the responsibility of individual mobile home owners. For instance, about two-thirds of the mobile homes required $150-$200 of work to separate the grounded conductors from the grounding conductors. However, it is unclear that any of such work, for which individual mobile home owners were directly responsible, was performed on all lots. Even if this work were a capital expenditure, which it is not, it could not be passed "proportionately" among all of the mobile home owners, if only some of them required the work. Respondent contends correctly that the pass-through charges are a minor violation, as defined in Section 723.006(9), Florida Statutes. Respondents fully disclosed the pass-through charges prior to assessing them. The pass-through charges did not endanger the health, safety, or welfare of the mobile home owners; to the contrary. The charges arose from a substantial expenditure by Respondents to enhance the health, safety, and welfare of the mobile home owners. The pass-through charges caused no economic harm to the mobile home owners because Respondents were authorized by the Prospectus to raise the rent by a sufficient amount to compensate for the entire cost of the work on the electrical distribution system. For these reasons, alone, neither a penalty nor a refund is appropriate; a cessation of the assessment of further pass-through charges and the imposition of the maximum civil penalty for a minor violation are sufficient. An order requiring a refund of any portion of the collected pass-through charges may have a disproportionately disturbing effect on Respondents and the mobile home owners. Respondents borrowed the full cost of the work on the electrical distribution system, and this note is payable in 48 equal monthly instalments ending on August 4, 2004. An order requiring a refund of any portion of the monies already collected may result in a significant disruption in the anticipated cash flow to Respondents, necessitating an even greater increase in rent to cover the loss of these funds. Mobile home owners who have left the park between the time of the electrical work and the time of the rent increase would unfairly be relieved of their proportionate share of the cost of this work, and mobile home owners coming to the park after this rent increase would unfairly be imposed with a disproportionately larger share of the cost of this work.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes enter a final order dismissing the Amended Notice To Show Cause against Respondent Carol Yu. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes enter a final order finding that Chester Yu and Ronald Yu have assessed a pass-through charge in violation of Section 723.031(5), Florida Statutes; that Chester Yu and Ronald Yu shall cease and desist from assessing this pass-through charge upon the effective date of the final order; that the violation is a minor violation and no refund is appropriate under the circumstances; and that Chester Yu and Ronald Yu shall pay a single civil penalty of $250, for which they are jointly and severally liable. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Ross Fleetwood Division Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Hardy L. Roberts, III General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Janis Sue Richardson Attorney for Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Bernard A. Conko Attorney for Respondent Cohen, Norris, Scherer, Weinberger & Wolmer 712 U.S. Highway One Fourth Floor North Palm Beach, Florida 33408

Florida Laws (10) 120.57723.003723.006723.011723.016723.031723.033723.035723.037723.059
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IRENE CASSERMERE AND MILAGROSS DIAZ vs SHERWOOD FOREST MOBILE HOME PARK, 03-004846 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Dec. 24, 2003 Number: 03-004846 Latest Update: Oct. 04, 2004

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in prohibited discriminatory conduct against Petitioners, Irene Cassermere (Ms. Cassermere) and Milagross Diaz (Ms. Diaz), within the terms and conditions, privileges, or provisions of services or facilities in the sale or rental of real property in violation of Section 760.23, Florida Statutes (2002).

Findings Of Fact Ms. Diaz is a female of Hispanic ethnicity with a physical disability that limits one or more of her major life activities. At all times material, she lived in the State of New York. Ms. Diaz was in Florida during the month of February 2002. On February 20, 2002, she completed an application for lot rental in the Sherwood Forrest Mobile Home Park (Sherwood Forest) with the intent to purchase a mobile home located on a rental lot at 216 London Drive, Kissimmee, Florida, owned by Beth Koze (Ms. Koze), who did not testify. Respondent informed Ms. Diaz that her credit check would be completed within a couple of days to ascertain her income and credit history. It was her understanding that Respondent had no interest in the potential purchase transaction between her and Ms. Koze. However, Respondent explained to Ms. Diaz, that ownership of a mobile home at the time of application was not required in order to be approved. According to Ms. Diaz, Respondent eventually informed her that due to insufficient income shown on her application she had been disapproved for lot rental. Ms. Diaz testified that Respondent informed her that she needed approximately twice the amount of her reported monthly income to qualify for lot rental approval. Thereafter, Ms. Diaz submitted a second lot rental application to Respondent. On the second application, Ms. Diaz included a co-applicant, Ms. Cassermere, who intended to relocate to Florida with her when the mobile home purchase and the lot rental application were completed. No monthly income for Ms. Cassermere was included on the lot rental application. On the second lot rental application, Ms. Diaz testified that she listed her "Occupation of Applicant" as "disabled." In the column regarding "income," she included her income and listed a Mr. LaRosa as a source of monthly income of $400.00, the amount she claimed Respondent previously informed her she needed to qualify for lot rental. According to Ms. Diaz, Respondent received her second lot rental application and called her to discuss the matter. During the conversation Respondent asked "[W]hat she was doing for Mr. LaRosa that he would put out $400.00 on her behalf." Ms. Diaz testified that she was offended by the tone of Respondent's voice and the implications that she believed prompted the question. She believed the question to have been irrelevant and did not answer. Ms. Diaz testified that in the "Assets and Income" column of her second lot rental application, she listed the amount of $10,000. When asked by Respondent the source of the $10,000, which apparently was not initially included on her first lot rental application, she explained to Respondent she intended to make a cash purchase of the mobile home from Ms. Koze for $10,000. When asked by Respondent the source of such a large sum, when her monthly income was insufficient to qualify for lot rental, she explained that she was to receive a lump sum, five years' retroactive social security benefit payment. Ms. Diaz testified that approximately one month after submitting her second rental lot application to Respondent and having received no response, she called Ms. Koze to ascertain the status of the mobile home sale. Ms. Diaz also testified that Ms. Koze advised her to call Respondent to find out what was holding up her second lot rental application. Believing the lot rental approval was a condition precedent to the mobile home sale, Ms. Diaz testified that at no time during her conversation with Ms. Koze did Ms. Koze advise her that she intended to take the mobile home off the market. Ms. Diaz then called Respondent and spoke with Andy Windfelder (Mr. Windfelder) about the rental lot application status. Mr. Windfelder told her to call Ms. Koze. Ms. Diaz's recollection of the telephone conversation between her and Ms. Koze follows: [A]t this point it's just too much trouble, that at this point she was going to keep the house. . . for a family member--So I told her at this point, she's been patient and she's been holding up with me for that whole time that we were waiting on this credit report, which is four weeks, that I'm not going to put her on the spot of going against them and tell me what transpired in that conversation for them to convince her not to sell to me. I told her that at that point I have no alternative but to tell her that I was going to go file a housing complaint, and I'm sorry that I would have to involve her, but that we had a contract and I gave her a deposit. So at that point she took my name and address and she mailed me my deposit back on a check, and at that point, I didn't contact Sherwood--I contacted Sherwood Forest only to tell them right after that that I filed this housing complaint, that I was going to file this housing complaint . . . As stated, Ms. Diaz filed her discrimination complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations and no longer communicated directly with Respondent regarding the matter. The core of Ms. Diaz's complaint is Respondent's failure, or refusal, to contact her by mail or by telephone about the result of her second lot rental application. Further, Ms. Diaz opined that Respondent pressured Ms. Koze not to sell her mobile home to her, which caused Ms. Koze to return Ms. Diaz's purchase contract deposit money. Ms. Diaz argued that Respondent's conduct, unreasonable delay in acting upon her lot rental application and pressure on Ms. Koze not to sell, had two direct effects: (1) she lost the opportunity to purchase the mobile home located on the rental lot at 216 London Drive, Kissimmee, Florida, and (2) she was denied the right to reside in Respondent's facility because she was a dark, disabled, Hispanic female. At all times material, Jeff Leeds (Mr. Leeds) was general manager of Sherwood Forest in Kissimmee, Florida. In that position, Mr. Leeds supervised a staff of 28 persons, of whom many were Hispanic. The park consisted of approximately 1,600 rental sites. According to Mr. Leeds, approximately 30 percent of Sherwood Forest residents were Hispanic, and he had never met Ms. Diaz. According to Mr. Leeds, Ms. Diaz's background check reflected insufficient income that raised an alert. Her second application, based upon his conversation with Ms. Diaz, would include her sister, Ms. Cassermere, as co-applicant. Ms. Diaz was unaware that in October 2003, Ms. Koze placed her mobile home back on the market and was willing to sell to her. This information was made available to Ms. Diaz by and through Respondent through the report provided to Respondent by the Commission's investigator. Based on the evidence of record, Ms. Diaz failed to present any credible evidence to substantiate her claim of discrimination. Ultimate Factual Determinations Respondent rejected Ms. Diaz's initial lot rental application, not because of her handicap or her Hispanic ethnicity, but because through a reasonable process of credit check references, it was discovered that Ms. Diaz's disability income was insufficient to meet Respondent's requirements for lot rental. The additional income of $400.00, an apparent loan from her friend, entered on her second rental lot application raised reasonable concerns; and, when inquiry was made, she refused to respond. There is no credible, competent evidence that Respondent attempted to influence and/or pressure the mobile home owner, Ms. Koze, to take her mobile home off the market and/or cancel her contract for sale with Ms. Diaz. Ms. Koze voluntarily returned Ms. Diaz's deposit money. There is no credible, competent evidence that Respondent intentionally delayed processing Ms. Diaz's second lot rental application with the intent or for the purpose of denying her approval because of her disability, gender, or her Hispanic ethnicity. In short, Respondent did not unlawfully discriminate against Ms. Diaz; rather, the delay caused by her second lot rental application to Respondent was for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and was not proven to be the reason Ms. Koze took her mobile home off the market.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing Petitioners', Irene Cassermere and Milagross Diaz, Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 2004.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57760.20760.23760.37
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FLORIDA MANUFACTURED HOUSING ASSOCIATION, INC., AND GERRY BARDING vs. DIVISION OF LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES, 88-000815RP (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-000815RP Latest Update: Jul. 01, 1988

Findings Of Fact The Petition filed herein, among other matters, alleges, in pertinent part, that: This is a petition for determination of the invalidity of a proposed rule of the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, pursuant to Section 120.54(4), Fla. Stat. (1987). The 1,000 members of the FMHA may be sub- jected to this rule and Gerry Barding as an individual are substantially affected in that the rule has the effect of allowing the DBR to schedule a mediation or arbitration if the request "does not substantially comply with Chapter 723, Fla. Stat., and these rules." Section 723.037 limits the substantial rights of a party who fails to mediate or arbitrate a dispute under Section 723.037 with the DBR . . . . * * * The substantial rights of the members of FMHA will be affected if the DBR is allowed to grant mediation or arbitration requests when the mobile home owners have not complied with the provisions of Section 723.037, Fla. Stat. (1987). The proposed rule of the DBR enlarges, modifies, or otherwise contravenes the statu- tory authority granted by Chapter 723, Fla. Stat. (1987), and is unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. Petitioner, FMHA, is an incorporated association not for profit whose members include approximately 1,000 mobile home park owners. All of the mobile home park members of FMHA own mobile home parks which contain greater than 25 mobile home lots which are offered for lease. A substantial number of the members of the FMHA on a regular basis annually increase the lot rental amount in their mobile home parks. The residents of the FMHA members' mobile home parks are entitled to and may request mediation of lot rental amount increases pursuant to Sections and 723.038, F.S. (1987), and the rules of the Florida Department of Business Regulation. Requests for mediation have been made in the past by homeowners residing in FMHA members' mobile home parks and many of those mediation proceedings have not yet been completed. Petitioner, Gerry Barding, is the owner of Pinelake Village Mobile Home Park located in Jensen Beach, Florida. In the past, Mr. Barding has increased the lot rental amount in Pinelake Village Mobile Home Park and expects to do so in the future. In September 1987, a request for mediation from Pinelake Village residents was not filed within 30 days of the meeting between the park owner and the residents. The Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes reviewed the request for mediation and determined that it was willing to mediate the dispute. The Division requested that Mr. Barding advise it of his willingness or refusal to participate in the mediation. Mr. Barding declined to agree to mediation of the dispute, and the mediation file of the Division was closed. Sections 723.037(4), F.S. (1987), provides in pertinent part that: Within 30 days of the date of the scheduled meeting described in subsection (3), the home owners shall request that the dispute be submitted to mediation pursuant to Section if a majority of the affected home owners have designated, in writing, that: The rental increase is unreasonable; The rental increase has made the lot rental amount unreasonable; The decrease in services or utilities is not accompanied by a corresponding decrease in rent or is otherwise unreasonable; or The change in the rules and regulations is unreasonable. [Emphasis supplied]. The Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes does not interpret Section 723.037(4), F.S., as depriving it of authority to mediate when the request for mediation is filed more than 30 days after the referenced meeting. Section 723.037(6), F.S., provides that: No action relating to a dispute described in this section may be filed in any court unless and until a request has been submitted to the Division for mediation and arbitration and the request has been processed in accordance with Section 723.038. Section 723.037(7), F.S., provides that: If a party refuses to agree to mediate or arbitrate, or fails to request mediation, upon proper request, that party shall not be entitled to attorney's fees in any action relating to a dispute described in this section. Section 723.004(4), F.S., provides that: Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent the enforcement of a right or duty under this section, Sections 723.022; 723.023; 723.031; 723.033; 723.035; 723.037; 723.038; 723.061; 723.0615; 723.062; 723.063; or 723.081 by civil action after the party has exhausted its administrative remedies, if any. Existing Rule 7D-32.005(3), F.A.C., provides in pertinent part: The homeowners' committee shall request mediation, or the homeowners' committee and the park owner may jointly request arbitration, by mailing or delivering the following items to the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, 725 South Bronough Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007: A completed Form DBR 405, which becomes effective on the same date as this rule and which may be obtained by writing to the Division at the above address, and A copy of the written designation required by Rule 7D-32.005(1), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 723.037(4), Florida Statutes; and A copy of the notice of lot rental increase, reduction in services or utilities, or change in rules and regulations which is being challenged as unreasonable; and A copy of the records which verify the selection of the homeowners' committee in accordance with Rule 7D-32.003, Florida Administrative Code, and Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes. [Emphasis supplied] Proposed Rule 7D-32.005(4), F.A.C., which was published in Volume 14, No. 4, Florida Administrative Law Weekly (January 29, 1988), and which is here challenged, provides that: A request for mediation or arbitration shall be denied if the request does not substantially comply with Chapter 723, Fla. Stat., and these rules. The word "may," which is struck through, is to be deleted from the existing rule now in effect. The underlining indicates that the words "shall" and "substantially" are amendatory language to be added. Rule 7D-32.005(5), Florida Administrative Code, provides: If the homeowners' committee requests media- tion, a copy of the four items required by subsection (3) of this rule shall be furnished to the park owner by Certified U. S. Mail, Return Receipt Requested, at the time the request is filed with the Division. Failure to comply with this requirement may result in a delay in scheduling of a mediation meeting until the required items have been furnished to the park owner. [Emphasis supplied] Rule 7D-32.005(6), Florida Administrative Code, provides: Within 10 days from the date that the park owner or his agent receives copies of the documents required to be furnished to him pursuant to subsection (5) of this rule, the park owner shall advise the Division in writing of his willingness or refusal to participate in the requested mediation. If the park owner is of the opinion that the home owners or the homeowners' committee have failed to satisfy the statutory requirements set forth in Section 723.037, Florida Statutes, or the requirements of these rules he may indicate his willingness to participate in the mediation process without waiving his objections to the procedures used by the homeowners' committee. Rule 7D-32.005(7), Florida Administrative Code, provides: A decision by the Division to grant or deny a request for mediation does not constitute an adjudication of any issues arising under Section 723.037, Florida Statutes. Any dispute concerning the applicability of Section 723.037(6)-(7), Florida Statutes, must be submitted to a court of competent jurisdiction in the event that judicial proceedings are initiated. Rule 7D-32.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, provides: `Mediation' means a process whereby a mediator provided by the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes partici- pates in discussions with a homeowners' committee and a park owner concerning the reasonableness of an increase in lot rental amount, change in park rules and regulations, or a decrease in services or utilities. The purpose of the mediator's participation is to assist the parties in arriving at a mutually agreeable settlement of their differences.

Florida Laws (12) 120.52120.54723.004723.006723.022723.031723.035723.037723.038723.0615723.063723.081
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NANCY E. CRONK vs BROADVIEW MOBILE HOME PARK AND LAMONT GARBER, 09-000037 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Palm Bay, Florida Jan. 06, 2009 Number: 09-000037 Latest Update: Sep. 04, 2009

The Issue The issues are whether the respondents engaged in a discriminatory housing practice, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2007),1 by discriminating against Petitioner, on the basis of her alleged disability, and by harassing Petitioner and retaliating against her.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a former resident of Broadview Mobile Home Park (Broadview), located at 1701 Post Road, Melbourne, Florida. Petitioner resided in Broadview for approximately six years from an undisclosed date in 2002 through September 8, 2008. Mr. Lamont Garber holds an ownership interest in Broadview. The record does not quantify the ownership interest of Mr. Garber. Mr. Garber manages Broadview with his brother, Mr. Wayne Garber. Broadview rents sites within the mobile home park to residents who own mobile homes. Each site has access to water and electric service. Each resident arranges his or her water and electric service directly with the respective utility provider. Sometime in 2005, Petitioner purchased a mobile home for approximately $6,500.00 and moved within Broadview to Lot 24. The rental agreement for Lot 24 required rent to be paid on the first day of each month. The rent for July 2008 was due on July 1, 2008. Petitioner failed to pay the rent payment that was due on July 1, 2008. On July 9, 2008, Broadview served Petitioner, by certified mail, with a notice that she had five business days in which to pay the rent due (the five-day notice). Petitioner received the five-day notice on July 10, 2008. The five-day period expired on July 17, 2008, with no rent payment from Petitioner. Petitioner had paid rent late in the past, but Petitioner had never been more than four or five days late. After July 17, 2008, Broadview initiated eviction proceedings. Petitioner tendered the rent payment on July 20, 2008, but Broadview proceeded with the eviction. Petitioner did not appear and defend the eviction proceeding. On August 26, 2008, the County Court for Brevard County, Florida, issued a Final Default Judgment of Eviction awarding possession of Lot 24 to Broadview. Law enforcement officers thereafter executed the Court's order and evicted Petitioner from Broadview on or about September 8, 2008. After Petitioner received the notice of eviction, she filed a complaint with the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes (DBPR). DBPR is the state agency responsible for regulating mobile home parks, including Broadview. The allegations in the complaint that Petitioner filed with DBPR were substantially similar to the claims of discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and unlawful rent increases Petitioner asserts in this proceeding. DBPR rejected Petitioner's allegations and found that Broadview lawfully evicted Petitioner for non-payment of rent. The final agency action of DBPR is substantially similar to that of HUD and the Commission's proposed agency action in this proceeding. Each agency found that Broadview lawfully evicted Petitioner for non-payment of rent and rejected the allegations of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. The DOAH proceeding is a de novo consideration of the proceeding before the Commission. A preponderance of the evidence does not establish a prima facie showing that Petitioner is disabled or handicapped. Petitioner has cancer and is receiving chemotherapy and radiation treatment. A preponderance of evidence does not show that the medical condition substantially limits one or more major life activities of Petitioner. Petitioner also alleges that she is disabled and handicapped by a mental condition. Petitioner submitted no medical evidence of the alleged disability or handicap. A preponderance of evidence does not establish a prima facie showing that, if such a mental condition exists, the condition substantially limits one or more major life activities of Petitioner. Assuming arguendo that a preponderance of the evidence showed that Petitioner were disabled or handicapped, a preponderance of evidence does not establish a prima facie showing that either of the respondents discriminated against Petitioner, harassed her, or evicted her in retaliation for Petitioner's disability or handicap. It is undisputed that Petitioner conducted neighborhood organization efforts to protest a rent increase at Broadview and repeatedly called law enforcement officials to report alleged drug and prostitution activity in Broadview.2 However, Broadview did not evict Petitioner for those activities, and Petitioner's testimony to the contrary is neither credible nor persuasive. Rather, Petitioner engaged in other activities that the respondents found objectionable. Petitioner baby sat for one or more dogs in violation of Broadview's prohibition against pets. Some of the dogs were dangerous to other residents. Petitioner also verbally abused Mr. Wayne Garber when he attempted to mediate with Petitioner concerning the presence of dogs and Petitioner's conduct toward management at Broadview. On July 1, 2008, Broadview served Petitioner with a seven-day notice concerning Petitioner's compliance with lease requirements. The notice, in relevant part, alleged that Petitioner harassed management and impaired the ability of management to perform its duties. The testimony of respondents describing the activities of Petitioner that precipitated the seven-day notice is credible and persuasive. A preponderance of the evidence shows that the respondents had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for requiring Petitioner to comply with the terms of the seven-day notice and for requiring Petitioner to comply with the requirement for rent to be paid on July 1, 2008. Petitioner failed to comply with either requirement, and Broadview evicted Petitioner for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. The respondents did not harass or retaliate against Petitioner.3

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding that the respondents did not engage in an unlawful housing practice and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 2009.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.595760.20760.37
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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs GOSPEL CRUSADE, INC., T/A CHRISTIAN RETREAT, 90-004916 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bradenton, Florida Aug. 06, 1990 Number: 90-004916 Latest Update: Jun. 22, 1992

The Issue This is a consolidated case involving both the present and prior owners of the Country Retreat Mobile Home Park: (f/k/a Christian Retreat Mobile Home Park). The case involves the issue of whether the prior owner, Respondent, Gospel Crusade, Inc., (hereinafter Gospel) is guilty of the violations alleged in the Notice to Show Cause dated June 6, 1990, issued against Gospel by the Petitioner, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (hereinafter the Division) Gospel has been charged with renewing the existing rental agreements of at least thirty-seven (37) mobile homeowners by implementing a lot rental amount increase. Gospel has also been charged with increasing the lot rental amount on May 1, 1986, with a rent increase notice that did not provide for an effective date or disclose the present rental charge for the mobile home lot. Gospel has also been charged with increasing the lot rental amount of at least forty-six mobile homeowners on February 1, 1988, without the delivery of an approved prospectus prior to the Increase. The case also involves the issue of whether the present park owner, Respondent Country Retreat, Inc. (hereinafter `Country') is guilty of the violations alleged in the Notice to Show Cause dated June 11, 1990, issued by the Division. Respondent, Country, has been charged with increasing the lot rental amount of at least forty-six mobile homeowners on February 1, 1989, by twenty-three dollars ($23.00) per month without delivering each affected mobile homeowner a prospectus approved by the Division. Country also has been charged with collecting lot rental amount increases from at least forty-six mobile homeowners which increases were imposed by the previous owner, Gospel Crusade, Inc. prior to the delivery of an approved prospectus. The homeowners' lot rental amounts were increased on May 1, 1986 and February 1, 1988, prior to delivery of an approved prospectus. At the final hearing in this matter, the Division presented the testimony of six (6) witnesses: Faye Mayberry, Chief of the Bureau of Mobile Homes; Warren Schoder, General Manager of Gospel Crusade, Inc.; and the following homeowners: Harold Hines, Martha Potteiger, Thomas Reinecke and Carmella Campora. The Division introduced six (6) exhibits into evidence which are referred to herein as Petitioner's Exhibits 1-6. Gospel presented the testimony of five (5) witnesses; Phillip Derstine, Robert Friedrich, Walt Wirries, Crystal Milligan, and Jean Mulholland. Gospel introduced two (2) exhibits into evidence which are referred to herein as Gospel Crusade Exhibits A and B. Country presented the testimony of Mr. Robert Ruggles and did not introduce into evidence any exhibits. After examining the Recommended Order and reviewing the record, it is HEREBY ORDERED:

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Petitioner, Division, has been the state agency responsible for the regulation of mobile home parks in Florida. Gospel was the developer and former owner and operator of a facility, located on church property in Manatee County, Florida, on which mobile homes were parked, owned and operated by individuals other than Gospel members, and known as Christian Retreat. Country is the present owner and operator of the facility in question, having purchased it from Gospel on December 15, 1988. The mobile home park in question contains 76 mobile home lots which are all rented or leased by the park owner to mobile home owners under oral rental agreements. As of June 13, 1986, all lots had been leased. Occupants of the lots do and did not have to belong to the owning church nor be a part of its ministry. No formal lease was required, but it was understood that the occupant would pay the required lot rental for as long as the lot was occupied. Because of this loose arrangement, Gospel claims it was not offering mobile home lots for rent or lease and was not, therefore, a "mobile home park owner" as defined by the statute. The evidence is clear, however, that the arrangement was formalized between the park and the lot occupants and the land was owned by Gospel. Though the occupant could remain as long as he or she desired, so long as the lot rental was paid if the party was capable of paying, and the community's standards were met, the occupant did not own the lot and paid rent to Gospel for the use of the space. There is also some indication that the amount paid by the occupants to Gospel was no more than was required to meet operating costs and included no profit to Gospel or return on equity. This payment was, however, except in those few cases where the occupant could not pay, a condition precedent to the occupant's remaining on the site and regardless of by what name called, was compensation for the use of the property. This is rent. On June 13, 1986, the Division approved Prospectus No. 4102545P, submitted by Gospel. Gospel had previously delivered to park residents a notice of increase in monthly lot rental from $82.00 to $90.00 which was to be effective on May 1, 1986, but which did not so state in its body. It was a defective notice. The prospectus was not delivered by hand, sent by certified mail or left at the lot prior to the effective date of the increase and at least 46 of the 76 occupants did not receive it. According to Reverend Derstine, Gospel's minister and leader of the congregation, some discussion took place between Gospel personnel and some owners regarding those matters contained in the prospectus, and a copy was kept in the park office for review by anyone who wanted to look at it. Further, the park's communication system, both written and electronic, may have carried notices of the availability of the prospectus. However, no copies were ever distributed to the residents in general as is required by law. The monthly lot rental was again increased, from $90.00 to $127.00, effective on February 1, 1988. This increase was preceded by written notice to all 76 lot occupants by Gospel prior to its implementation. Again, on February 1, 1989, Gospel, for the third time, increased lot rentals, this time from $127.00 to $150.00 per month. No prospectus was delivered for either the February 1, 1988 or the February 1, 1989 increases by either Gospel or Country, which purchased the park from Gospel on December 15, 1988. Though the February 1, 1989 increase was implemented by Gospel, which collected all monthly rentals paid by occupants through December, 1988, as of January 1, 1989, monthly lot rentals were collected by the new owner, Country. Prior to December 15, 1988, Country was not in any way involved in the operation, management or administration of the park. Prior to purchasing the park on December 15, 1988, Mr. Robert K. Ruggles, III, sole stockholders of Country, solicited from Mr. Schoder, then manager of Christian Retreat, proof that the prospectus for the impending lot rate increase scheduled for February 1, 1989 had been approved by the State. That proof was delivered to him. Mr. Ruggles insists that he did all he could do, from a practical standpoint, to determine that the prospectus had been appropriately sent out to the lot occupants, short of actually polling all occupants to determine it had been received. While the Division does not agree with Ruggles' position, it presented no evidence to demonstrate what further actions he could have taken, and in light of his sworn evidence regarding approval of the prospectus, it is found he did all he could do, reasonably, to insure the correctness of the procedure. When Mr. Ruggles subsequently found out there was a problem, even the Division concedes he took immediate steps to rectify it and agrees he was not enriched by the error. He has been cooperative with the Division at all times, and on February 5, 1990, the Division approved an amended prospectus for the February 1, 1989 rent increase. This approved prospectus was subsequently delivered to all residents by Country Retreat, Inc.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered herein directing that: The Notice to Show Cause against Country Retreat, Inc. be dismissed. That Gospel Crusade, Inc. pay a civil penalty of $2,500.00. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASES NO. 90-4916 & 90-4917 The following constituted my specific rulings pursuant to S 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: I. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 3. Accepted Accepted and incorporated herein. - 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 10. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 13. Accepted and incorporated herein except for the names of individual residents specified which are not included. II. Accepted. - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENT, COUNTRY: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. & 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. 5. First sentence accepted and incorporated herein. Balance accepted. 6. - 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. 9. - 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. Accepted and incorporated herein. 14. - 16. Accepted. 17. Accepted and incorporated herein. 18. Accepted. 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathryn E. Price, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Joseph C. Ferrell, Esquire Ferrell and Ferrell, Chartered 1402 Third Avenue West Bradenton, Florida 34205 Robert M. Fournier, Esquire 1800 Second Street, Suite 806 Sarasota, Florida 34236 James L. Turner, Esquire Williams, Parker, Harrison Deitz & Getzen 1550 Ringling Blvd. Sarasota, Florida 34236 E. James Kearney Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Joseph A. Sole General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000

Florida Laws (6) 120.57120.68723.006723.011723.031723.037
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PAUL CONLEY vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 07-000049 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Jan. 03, 2007 Number: 07-000049 Latest Update: Jul. 02, 2007

The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue (DOR) should grant Petitioner's request for a refund of the $1,433.40 in sales tax Petitioner paid in connection with his purchase of a mobile home from Dwight Hatfield Manufactured Homes, Inc.

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: In October 2002, Petitioner purchased a lot in a mobile home park in Davie, Florida (Petitioner's Property). There was a "worn out" mobile home on the property that Petitioner had "demolished and removed." On May 30, 2003, Petitioner entered into a Purchase Agreement with Dwight Hatfield Manufactured Homes, Inc., wherein he agreed to purchase, for $23,890.00, a 2003 Homes of Merit mobile home that was not yet built (Purchased Mobile Home). The Purchase Agreement provided that the Purchased Mobile Home was to be "drop shipped" directly from the manufacturer's facility to Petitioner's Property, where it would be "met by [Petitioner]." The Purchase Agreement further provided, in pertinent part, as follows with respect the passing of title of the Purchased Mobile Home: Title to said equipment shall remain in the Seller until the agreed purchase price therefor is paid in full . . . ; thereupon title to the within described unit passes to the buyer as of the date of . . . full cash payment . . . . Petitioner paid the full purchase price of the Purchased Mobile Home upon execution of the Purchase Agreement, but no sales tax was collected from him at that time. On July 13, 2003, the Purchased Mobile Home was delivered to Petitioner's Property, where it has remained. Thereafter, Larry Douglas, Sr., of Dwight Hatfield Manufactured Homes sent the following letter, dated September 11, 2003, to Petitioner: You have recently purchased a new Homes of Merit manufactured home from Dwight Hatfield Manufactured Homes, Inc. You have not provided us with proof that you are exempt [from] sales tax. Therefore, you owe Dwight Hatfield Manufactured Homes, Inc., the amount of $1,433.40 for the sales tax on your home. Your home will not be registered in your name until the balance is paid in full. On or about September 15, 2003, Petitioner filed with the Broward County Property Appraiser an "application for the issuance an 'RP' License Plate to identify [the Purchased Mobile Home] as real property." In his application, Petitioner represented that the Purchased Mobile Home had been "permanently affixed on January 1 of the current year, [was] now permanently affixed, and it [was his] intention that [it] remain permanently affixed," to Petitioner's Property. At no time prior to the filing of the application had the Purchased Mobile Home been classified as real property. The Broward County Property Appraiser, on September 15, 2003, issued a certificate stating that the Purchased Mobile Home was "included in an assessment for ad valorem taxation of [Petitioner's Property]." On September 18, 2003, Petitioner reluctantly paid the $1,433.40 that Dwight Hatfield Manufactured Homes claimed was due "for the sales tax on [the Purchased Mobile Home]." On September 19, 2003, the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles issued a certificate of title for the Purchased Mobile Home in Petitioner's name. In March 2006, Petitioner applied to DOR for a refund of the $1,433.40 he had paid to Dwight Hatfield Manufactured Homes in sales tax for the Purchased Mobile Home. On July 27, 2006, DOR issued its Notice of Decision of Refund Denial.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's refund request. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 2007.

Florida Laws (12) 120.569120.57193.075212.02212.05212.06212.07320.01320.015320.08320.0815672.401
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