Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with licensing insurance agents of all types, regulating licensure status, and enforcing the practice standards of licensed agents within the powers granted by the Legislature in Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the disciplinary action, Respondent Mahle was licensed as an insurance agent in the following areas: Life and Health Insurance and Health Insurance. During the last quarter of the year 1988, New Concept Insurance, Inc. mailed brochures to residents of Naples, Florida, which stated that representatives of the company were willing to provide information about long- term care insurance, including nursing facility benefits, to interested parties. Those who wanted to learn more about the insurance were asked to return their name, address and telephone number to the company on an enclosed card. Eleanor Drown responded to the advertisement, and an appointment was arranged for Thomas DiBello and Respondent Mahle to meet with her regarding the insurance program. On November 10, 1988, Thomas DiBello and Respondent Mahle met with Ms. Drown and discussed the benefits of a long-term care policy with a nursing facility daily benefit of one hundred dollars ($100.00). After the discussion, Ms. Drown completed an application for the insurance and gave it to Respondent Mahle, along with a check for five thousand one hundred and eighty-three dollars and forty-nine cents ($5,183.49). During the insurance transaction on November 10, 1988, Ms. Drown was given a receipt which states: This receipt is given and accepted with the express understanding that the insurance you applied for will not be in force until the policy is issued and the first premium is paid in full. If your application cannot be approved, we will promptly refund your money. Application is made to the company checked (/) on this receipt. On another area of the receipt, it is clearly written, as follows: If Acknowledgement of Application does not reach you within 20 days, write to: Mutual Protective Insurance Company, 151 South 75th Street, Omaha, Nebraska 68124. The Respondent Mahle did not forward the application and the check completed by Ms. Drown to Mutual Protective Insurance Company. The check issued by Ms. Drown to Mutual Protective Insurance Company was deposited into the account of New Concept Insurance, Inc. A cashier's check for the same amount of money was issued by New Concept Insurance, Inc. to Ms. Drown on March 7, 1989. The letter from New Concept that was mailed with the check represented that the check was the refund of the money paid to Mutual Protective Insurance Company by Ms. Drown. Mitigation An application for long-term care insurance from a different insurance company was sent to Ms. Drown by Respondent Mahle on March 2, 1989. Although this course of conduct was not directly responsive to the duties owed by the Respondent to Mutual Protective Insurance Company or his customer, Ms. Drown, it does demonstrate a concern about the insurance needs requested by the customer. This conduct also reveals that there was no intention to convert the funds received to the Respondent's own use, and it explains some of the delay in the return of the premium funds to the customer. The Respondent has been an insurance agent for twenty years. This was the only complaint against the Respondent the Hearing Officer was made aware of during the proceedings. The allegations in the Complaint involve a single insurance transaction.
Recommendation Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent be found guilty of one violation of Section 626.561(1), Florida Statutes, and one violation of Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes, during a single insurance transaction. That the Respondent pay an administrative penalty of $500.00 for the two violations of the Insurance Code within thirty days of the imposition of the penalty. That the Respondent be placed upon six month's probation. During this probation period, he should file a report with the Department demonstrating the manner in which he intends to keep accurate business records which assure him, the insurance company, and the customer that he is continuously accounting for premium funds and promptly carrying out his fiduciary responsibilities. That the Respondent's requests for licensure dated October 10, 1989 and May 18, 1990, be granted. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of September, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE No. 89-6040 The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #5. Accepted. See HO #5. Accepted. See HO #5. Accepted. See HO #5. Rejected. Conclusion of Law. Rejected. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #7. Accepted. See HO #7. Accepted. See HO #7. Accept that Ms. Drown's funds remained in the insurance agency's financial accounts for four months. Reject that the interest bearing ability of these funds is relevant in any manner to this case. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #3 and #4. Accepted. See HO #5. Accepted. See HO #5. Accepted. See HO #5. Accepted. Rejected. This testimony was rejected by the hearing officer as self serving. It was not found to be credible. Rejected for the same reasons given immediately above. Accepted, but not particularly probative. Rejected. Contrary to the testimony of Ms. Drown which was believed by the hearing officer. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to the testimony of Ms. Drown which was believed by the hearing officer. Accept that an application for Penn Treaty Insurance was sent to Ms. Drown on this date. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to the testimony of Ms. Drown which was believed by the hearing officer. Rejected. Self serving. Not believed or found to be credible by the hearing officer. Accepted. See HO #9. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Christopher Anderson III, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark P. Smith, Esquire GOLDBERG, GOLDSTEIN & BUCKLEY, P.A. 1515 Broadway Post Office Box 2366 Fort Myers, Florida 33902-2366 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esquire Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 =================================================================
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent has violated various provisions of the Florida Insurance Code as alleged in an Amended Order to Show Cause and, if so, what penalty, if any, is warranted.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with licensing and regulating viatical settlement providers in the State of Florida. The Respondent, Future First Financial Group, Inc., is licensed by the State of Florida as a viatical settlement provider. Its President and Chief Executive Officer is Mr. Randy Stelk. A viatical settlement contract involves the sale of a life insurance policy's benefits in exchange for an immediate discounted cash settlement to the original policy holder. A Florida resident "viator" (the insured) desiring to enter into a viatical settlement contract, acts through a Florida licensed broker, who provides the policy information to licensed viatical settlement providers like the Respondent, for subsequent re-sale of policy benefits to purchasers. Future First was initially licensed as a viatical settlement provider on December 26, 1997. The initial regulation of viatical settlement providers in the State of Florida by the Petitioner began at approximately the time Future First initially became licensed. Consolidated findings concerning Counts 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 12, 15, 16, 20, 22, 28, 29, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 43, 44, and 45: Future First was a licensee of and regulated by the Department of Insurance at all times pertinent hereto. The health status representations on the exhibits (referenced in the Department's Proposed Recommended Order) concerning each of these counts, which are the insurance policy applications in question in these counts, are materially inconsistent with the health status representations related to the later viatical settlement agreements contained in the other exhibits so referenced as to each of the above-enumerated counts. These latter exhibits constitute the showing of actual medical condition to the Respondent by the insureds or viators in each transaction referenced in these counts. The overall effect of this showing is to indicate to the Respondent that the viators in question in these counts were HIV positive or had the disease AIDS, along with related diseases and medical conditions, contrary to the representations initially made to the insurance companies issuing the subject policies, in the insurance policy applications referenced in these counts, wherein the viators represented that they suffered from none of the medical diseases or conditions referenced in those application forms, including AIDS. All the exhibits referenced in these counts came from the business files of Future First and were supplied to the Department by Future First upon the Department's request during the investigation process. These material inconsistencies should have caused Future First to be on notice or to know or believe that the viators in question in these counts had made or indeed may have made fraudulent or material misrepresentations on their insurance policy applications. Subsection 626.989(6), Florida Statutes, requires Department licensees to report to the Department any knowledge or belief that a fraudulent insurance practice, as defined in Section 817.234, Florida Statutes, had been or was being committed. Subsection 817.234(3), Florida Statutes, specifically prohibits the presentation of false, incomplete or misleading information in support of an insurance application or the concealing of any fact material to the application. Thus Subsection 817.234(3), supra, specifically prohibits the very act strongly suggested by the evidence presented in the exhibits supportive of the above-referenced counts of the Amended Order. Future First made no reports to the Department concerning these matters until it contends it first became aware of these inconsistencies in health status representations upon receipt of the Order to Show Cause and later the Amended Order to Show Cause. Consolidated Findings of Fact Concerning Counts 2, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 23, 24, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 40, and 42: The facts established as to these counts are much the same as those referenced above. The health status representations on the insurance policy applications in question and in evidence (exhibit numbers cited in the Proposed Findings as to these counts in the Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order) are materially inconsistent with the health status representation on the other exhibits which consist generally of the various documents of health or medical information provided to the Respondent by the viators in question, when the transactions leading to the viatical settlement agreements at issue were being entered into and finalized. The commonality among all of these counts as well as the counts in the above Findings of Fact (Part A above) consist of the viator's having been diagnosed with HIV or AIDS and/or related medical conditions sometime in the past prior to executing the insurance policy applications at issue and then responding in the negative on relevant questions on those policy applications, the overall effect of which was to deny the HIV positive test result, the HIV infection and the diagnosis of AIDS and related medical conditions. The viators at issue then openly revealed these conditions and the dates of the relevant diagnoses, all of which pre-dated the insurance policy applications, in the medical status representations they made to the Respondent and which were also revealed in the medical records provided to the Respondent at some point prior to the issuance of the Order to Show Cause and Amended Order. The health status representations made by the viators at these two different, germane points in time are materially inconsistent. Those material inconsistencies reasonably should have caused Future First and its operating officers to be on notice, to know or to believe that the viators made or may have made fraudulent or material misrepresentations on their insurance policy applications. Moreover, the evidence, as to these counts delineated in Part B above, shows that Future First was actually informed specifically that the policies in question had been rescinded by the insurers because the viators had made material misrepresentations on their policy applications. Exhibits such as the Future First policy summary forms show that Future First had been informed of the policy recisions as to the Counts referenced in Part B above. All of the documents constituting the Department's exhibits supportive of these findings, and the policy summary forms included, were found within the business files of Future First and were supplied to the Department by Future First upon its request during the investigative phase of this prosecution. Subsection 626.989(6), Florida Statutes, requires Department licensees to report to the Department any knowledge or belief that a fraudulent insurance practice as defined in Section 817.234, Florida Statutes, had been or was being committed. Subsection 817.234(3), Florida Statutes, specifically prohibits the presentation of false, incomplete or misleading information in support of an insurance application or the concealing of any fact material to the application. Thus, Subsection 817.234(3), supra, specifically prohibits the acts suggested by the documentary evidence presented by the Department, which supports the Findings of Fact herein. Future First made no report on these matters concerning the viators and policies to the Department, prior to the investigatory audit. Additional Findings of Fact Concerning Counts 2, 5, 41, 42, 43, and 44: Concerning Count 2, Exhibits 15 through 17 are viatical settlement purchase agreements entered into between Future First and various viatical settlement purchasers. These agreements represent to those purchasers that the policies, which are the subject of the agreements, are beyond the contestability period (typically two years) during which an insurer company may rescind its policy. The settlement purchase agreements specify that the "contestability period" runs for two years from the date of policy issuance. Exhibit 2 shows, however, that the policy in question was issued on January 22, 1998, and Exhibits 15 through 17, the agreements, were entered into in February, March and April of 1998, well before the January 22, 2000, conclusion of the contestability period. Future First thus had within its possession, in its files, the documents and information to show that the policies were not beyond contestability when the interests in those policies were sold to the investors or viatical settlement purchasers. The purchasers, by initialing the relevant portion of their purchase agreements had indicated and contracted for the purchase of non-contestable policies or policies which had survived the two-year contestable period before being purchased by these investors or viatical settlement purchasers. The vice-president in charge of underwriting, Mr. Sweeney, under the business practices of Future First, essentially made all the calculations and decisions involved in negotiating and effecting the settlement purchase agreements with the investors and the viatical settlement agreements with the original viators or insureds. As an experienced insurance executive and underwriter who had all of the relevant documents available to him, he is chargeable with knowledge that the policies he and Future First were conveying to the settlement purchasers were still within the contestability period, despite his being on documentary notice that the investors had contracted to purchase only non-contestable policies. The officers and directors of the Respondent allowed him to have this independence of action, freedom of conduct and bargaining power on behalf of Future First and therefore, Future First, the corporation, is chargeable with the conduct it allowed him to engage in, even assuming, arguendo, that no other officer, director or employee of the company knew of the relevant details of these transactions. Thus Future First misrepresented to its investors that the policies were beyond contestability when in fact they were not. It thus is chargeable with knowingly selling interests in contestable policies to investors, who had specifically contracted for the purchase for non-contestable policies. This misrepresentation was material to the purchases because the insurers' ability to rescind the policies during contestability, thereby destroying the very instrument securing the purchasers' investment, was not made known to those purchasers. The potential destruction of that instrument and the consequent loss of the investment to the purchaser is material to any reasoned decision to invest. CEO Randy Stelk's testimony at hearing to the effect that computer input error had caused contestable policies to be inadvertently sold to purchasers who contractually specified a non-contestable policy is rebutted by Future First's own documents from its records which correctly and explicitly identify the policy as contestable. See Exhibits 11a and 11f, at pages 1 and 4, and Exhibit 24, all of which correctly identify the policy as contestable. Exhibit 24 specifically notes the dates at which the policy was projected to emerge from its contestability period. Thus this documented evidence, together with the evidence of Mr. Sweeney's close and direct involvement with arranging for the transactions and making decisions as to which policies to sell to which investors belies Mr. Stelk's testimony in this regard. Concerning Count 5, Exhibits 50, 54, 55, 56 and 57, are viatical settlement purchase agreements which inter alia represented to the respective viatical settlement purchasers that the policy in question was beyond the contestability period during which an insurer may rescind the policy. The "contestability period" runs for two years from the date of policy issuance. However, Exhibit 39, shows that the policy in question was issued on February 3, 1998, and Exhibits 50, 54, 55, 56 and 57, were respectively entered into in February of 1998, well prior to the February 3, 2000, end of the contestability period. Here again, Future First's own records, which correctly and explicitly identify this policy as contestable also specifically note, at Exhibits 42d and 46, the date at which the policy was projected to emerge from the contestability period. The purchase agreements referenced above clearly show that the investors contemplated and contracted to purchase a non-contestable policy. These documents clearly were available to Mr. Sweeney and to Future First at the time Mr. Sweeney was making the underwriting decisions and entering into the agreements with the investors, and consequently this knowledge is chargeable to him and to Future First. Again Mr. Stelks' testimony that computer input error had caused inadvertent sale of contestable policies to purchasers who had contractually specified non-contestable policies is rebutted by Future First's own records, the evidence concerning Future First business practices and specifically Mr. Sweeney's underwriting methods and conduct. Thus, Mr. Stelk's testimony in this regard is not credited. Thus, it is inferred that Future First, through Mr. Sweeney, knowingly represented to investors that the policies were beyond contestability when they were not and such a representation was material to the purchase because the insurers' ability to rescind a policy during contestability and destroy the very instrument securing the investment was not made known to the purchaser. The potential destruction of that instrument and the consequent loss of investment is material to any reasoned decision to invest. Concerning Count 41, the fifth page of Exhibit 428, contains a paragraph entitled "Incontestability" which establishes that the life insurance policy in question was subject to a two-year contestability period, during which the insurer could rescind the policy. Exhibits 446, 447, 448, 449, 450 and 451, are all viatical settlement purchase agreements through which the viatical settlement investors purchased an interest in the death benefit of the life insurance policy in question. Each of those purchase agreements contains a standard section entitled "Minimum Criteria" which is initialed by the purchaser, thereby indicating the purchaser's decision to purchase an interest only in a policy which was beyond contestability. Future First nonetheless placed all of those investors' monies into the policy in question (See Exhibit 428) while it was still within the two-year contestability period without informing the purchasers of that fact. Future First had the policy in its possession and necessarily had to have a copy of it in possession in order to purchase the policy from the viator, which it did in July of 1998. It thus knew the policy was still within its contestability period when interest in it were sold to the purchasers in question. The same reasons found with regard to Counts 2 and 5 prevail here with regard to Mr. Sweeney's involvement. The documents were in Future First's possession and within its knowledge such that the circumstantial evidence clearly shows that Future First is chargeable with knowledge or belief that it sold contestable policies to investors who had no reason to believe they were purchasing contestable policies. Concerning Count 42, Exhibit 453 is dated March 24, 1998, and is a viatical settlement purchase agreement between Future First and the viatical settlement purchaser named therein. The agreement contains the same initialed provision found with regard to the agreements in Counts 2, 5 and 41, indicating the purchasers' decision to invest only in a policy which was beyond the two-year contestability period. The agreement bears the designation "PRA 58075" in the lower left hand corner of the first page (purchaser number). Exhibit 459 is a letter dated May 21, 1998, authorizing Charles R. Sussman, Trustee for the Fidelity Trust (identified in numerous exhibits, including 454 in this count, as the escrow agent used by Future First for viatical settlement contract transactions), to wire funds from that trust to Compass Bank for the purchase of an interest in the death benefits of the Farmers New World Life Insurance policy on the viator named therein, which purchase was accomplished through the execution of Exhibit 454 on June 6, 1998. Among the PRA numbers identified in Exhibit 459, is 58075, corresponding to Exhibit 453, the above-referenced purchase contract. Exhibit 455 is an internally prepared Future First document that clearly states that the life insurance policy in question was still well within its contestability period on May 21, 1998. The exhibits thus establish that Future First represented to the investor that the policy it would purchase with his funds was beyond contestability when, because of the unequivocal documents in its possession, Future First had to have known, through Mr. Sweeney, that it was not. Indeed all of those exhibits were found within the business files of Future First and Future First stipulated that included in those exhibits are its purchase request agreements that contain the contestability provision in question. Exhibits 462 and 463 establish that the Manhattan National Life Insurance policy referenced in those exhibits was issued on March 28, 1998. Exhibit 465, establishes that the Manhattan National Life Insurance policy was purchased by Future First on June 22, 1998. Exhibit 468, establishes that on July 1, 1998, purchaser 58075's funds were used to purchase an interest in that Manhattan National Life Insurance policy obviously well within the two-year contestability period since the policy was only issued on March 28, 1998. This was despite an express representation otherwise in the viatical settlement purchase agreement. Exhibits 471 and 472, show that the Manhattan National Life Insurance policy was rescinded during the contestability period in September 1998. Exhibit 473 establishes that Future First decided to switch the viatical settlement purchaser's funds out of the Manhattan National Life Insurance policy into a John Hancock Life Insurance Company policy. However, it did not inform the purchaser that the Manhattan National Life Insurance policy had been rescinded during its contestability period. Exhibits 485 and 486, establish that the Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance policy referenced therein was issued on January 23, 1998. Exhibit 487 establishes that the Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance policy was purchased by Future First in November of 1998, using the purchaser's funds referenced in Exhibits 488 and 489. Among those purchaser's funds were those of Purchaser 58075. Thus, Purchaser 58075's monies were used to purchase an interest in the death benefit of the Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance policy in question. Despite the "beyond contestability" representation made in the viatical settlement purchase agreement between Purchaser 58075 and Future First, Future First placed that purchaser's money into the Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance policy while it was still in its contestability period. Future First's own records refute Mr. Stelk's testimony that computer input error caused inadvertent sales of contestable policies to purchasers who had specified, contractually, their desire for non-contestable policies. The documents from Future First's own records in evidence, explicitly identify this policy as contestable and that the purchasers involved had desired non- contestable policies. In light of the foregoing reasons found as fact as to Counts 2, 5 and 41, which are adopted as to Count 42, Future First is chargeable with knowledge that it was selling contestable policies to purchasers who had specified contractually their wish and intent to purchase non-contestable policies. Count 43 involves the sale by Future First of interests in the death benefits of J.C. Penny Life Insurance Company Policy No. 25184/74L40L3762 in January of 1998, to three different viatical settlement purchasers. This is evidenced by Exhibits 498, 499 and 500, the respective settlement purchase agreements. Each of those purchase agreements includes a provision that required the purchase of an interest only in a policy which was beyond contestability. Exhibits 494, 496, 498, 499 and 500, together however, show that the interest in the policy sold to those purchasers were sold while the policy was still contestable, without informing the purchasers. All of these exhibits came from the business files or records of Future First and Future First stipulated that included in those exhibits are the purchase request agreements that contain the provisions restricting purchases to policies which were beyond the two-year contestability period. In light of the findings made as to Counts 2, 5, 41 and 42, next above, it is determined that Future First, the Respondent, is charged with knowledge that it, and specifically its vice-president in charge of underwriting, Mr. Sweeney, sold those policies which were still contestable to the relevant purchasers; that those purchasers had specified in their purchase agreements their intent to purchase only policies which were uncontestable and that it had not so informed those purchasers. Count 44, concerns a viatical settlement purchase agreement entered into by Future First on March 24, 1998, relating to the sale and purchase of an interest in the death benefit of an insurance policy. See Exhibit 510, in evidence. That agreement represented to the purchaser that the interest to be purchased was to be from a policy which was beyond the two- year contestability period. See Exhibits 508 and 510. However, the policy selected for investment for that purchaser by Future First was not beyond contestability. Exhibit 506, obtained from Future First's own files, clearly shows that the issuance date of the policy was May 6, 1998, and Exhibits 504, 508 and 510 considered together, indicate that the policy was sold to that purchaser while it was still contestable. Future First thus subjected the purchaser's investment to the undisclosed risk of rescission of the policy. The existence of such a risk would certainly be material to that investor's decision about whether to so invest. Thus by investing the purchaser's funds in a contestable policy instead of an uncontestable policy, without advising that investor of such a deviation from their contractual agreement, is, in effect, a material misrepresentation in that transaction. For the reasons found as to Counts 2, 5, 41, 42 and 43 above, Future First is chargeable with knowledge that the policy was contestable and that it had invested the purchaser's funds in a contestable policy when it was contractually bound to only invest that purchaser's funds in an uncontestable policy, as established by the terms of the viatical settlement purchase agreement. Future First's business practices. Future First conducts its business in various states through representatives resident in such states known as viatical settlement brokers. Viatical settlement brokers gather all relevant information, including available medical information and usually provide it to various viatical settlement providers in order to solicit multiple bids on a particular policy. Future First does not solicit viators itself. During the time period relevant to the allegation in the Amended Order, when Future First initially received a package from a broker, it was divided into its insurance and medical components. The insurance component was provided to Mr. William Sweeney, Future First's Vice-President of Underwriting. The medical component was provided to a nurse on the staff with Future First for initial medical review and then forwarded to Future First's independent medical consultant, Dr. Michael Duffy. During the time period relevant to the Amended Order, Future First offered a one, two or three-year viatical purchase program. That is, viators must have a certified life expectancy of one, two or three years in order to qualify with Future First. After Dr. Duffy reviewed a particular file and the viator was deemed qualified as to one of the three available programs, Dr. Duffy would certify and assign a life expectancy to the viator and return the file to Mr. Sweeney. Life expectancy estimates are inherently subject to many variables, are unpredictable and constitute a risk to the purchaser. Mr. Sweeney's responsibilities included verification that the insurance information provided with any particular file was correct and complete (including insurance policy applications), that the policy actually existed and was in force, that premiums were paid up to date, that the insurance company had the appropriate rating, as well as conducting other verifications. Before a policy was approved for purchase, it was Mr. Sweeney's ultimate responsibility, pursuant to Future First's existing corporate policy, to compare the date of initial diagnosis of a potential viator's medical condition to the insurance policy application to look for any inconsistencies. Mr. Sweeney next completed a "file summary cover sheet" referencing certain information and verifications and attached it to the file. Mr. Sweeney was essentially a "one-man operation" in exclusive control of Future First's underwriting department and was ultimately responsible for deciding whether or not Future First would offer to bid on a particular policy. Future First's business operations in effect at the time relevant to the Amended Order were so compartmentalized that other officers or employees at Future First might not know any details associated with Mr. Sweeney's activities. After Mr. Sweeney authorized Future First to bid on a particular policy, the file was transferred to the bidding department. The bidding department did not re-visit or otherwise question Mr. Sweeney's decision to bid on a particular policy, but only reviewed the cover sheet to establish a bid price. If documentation was missing from any file, it was Mr. Sweeney's responsibility to contact the broker to request the missing documents. All viatical settlement brokers with whom Future First did business in Florida were required to be licensed by the Petitioner. Future First currently no longer conducts business with the broker "Funds For Life" because that particular broker dealt solely in "contestable" policies and Future First no longer purchases such policies, at least since the Petitioner's audit. Future First no longer has a business relationship with the Texas-based broker "Southwest Viatical," in part because Southwest Viatical routinely failed to provide complete documentation to Future First, including the insurance applications of viators. Southwest Viatical was specifically requested to provide insurance policy applications regarding the relevant policies referred to in the Amended Order but refused to do so. Most of the Southwest Viatical files purchased by Future First did not include insurance applications at the time of purchase. The insurance applications were ultimately obtained by Future First, however, at some point prior to the 1999 audit by the Petitioner. Future First became concerned about the character of individuals associated with Southwest Viatical and when requested by Southwest Viatical to forward commission funds to an offshore account, Future First declined to do so and immediately ceased doing business with Southwest Viatical. Future First cooperated thoroughly with Texas authorities in their investigation of Southwest Viatical, ultimately culminating, as a direct result of Future First's assistance, with the apprehension and subsequent incarceration of two principals of Southwest Viatical. During the period of time alleged in the Amended Order Future First received, on the average, between 400 and 600 policies per month from brokers requesting a bid. Future First rejected and never bid on the majority of policies referred to it by Southwest Viatical. On the average, Future First ultimately purchased approximately 25 percent of the policies submitted to it for a bid. Mr. Sweeney was primarily responsible for communicating with brokers as to all aspects of a potential viatical settlement transaction and to request all required documentation, including insurance policy applications. During the course of Mr. Stelk's affiliation with Future First he personally became familiar with the handwriting of William F. Sweeney. It is Mr. Sweeney's initials which appear on the cover sheets entered into evidence by the Petitioner, exemplified by Petitioner's Exhibit 4a. All the remaining "cover sheet" exhibits of the Petitioner contain the initials "WFS" on the top right hand corner which are Mr. Sweeney's initials. Mr. Sweeney is not currently an officer, director or employee of Future First because he was removed from any position with the Respondent corporation by order of the Petitioner. No other officers, directors or employees of the Respondent have been subject to a similar removal order, nor has Future First itself. The criminal proceedings currently pending against the Respondent are the direct result of Mr. Sweeney's activities while employed by Future First. The Petitioner's lead investigator reviewing Future First's business activities recommended that individual charges only be brought against Mr. Sweeney and against no other individual employed by or affiliated with the Respondent. Future First has a business relationship with licensed life insurance agents and/or securities brokers throughout the United States to solicit funds from individuals for ultimate purchase of viatical settlements. Those licensed individuals present an approved Purchase Request Agreement (PRA) to a potential purchaser to discuss the various Future First programs available and to help the purchaser finalize a PRA. Depending on what state the purchaser resided in, the purchaser would then issue a check either to Future First directly or to the Fidelity Trust (Future First's escrow agent), to be held until such time as Future First could purchase from a viator a policy matching the program desired by that purchaser. Thereafter, a formal "closing" would occur when the purchaser was, where appropriate, made a beneficiary on one or more insurance policies; all verifications and notifications to the insurance company and other entities were completed; an attorney and the trustee, would approve all aspects of the transaction within their purview, and a copy of the closing package would be sent to the purchaser for his or her records. After the closing, Future First would engage Life Watch Services, Inc., an unaffiliated company, to monitor the health status of the viator on a monthly basis in order that all appropriate actions may be taken at the time of the viator's death, so that the policy benefits may be promptly paid to the purchaser. Future First initially engaged in the purchase of contestable policies only after being approached by groups of agents with potential purchasers willing to assume the risk associated with contestable policies. Understanding the risk associated with such policies, Future First reserved 20 percent of its potential profit from such transactions and placed those funds in trust in a "Guaranty Fund" in the event that an insurance company rescinded a policy within the contestable period. In the event an insurer rescinded a contestable policy, Future First purchased a new policy for its customer out of the Guaranty Fund, at no additional cost to the customer. No purchaser ever lost any "investment time" if a policy was rescinded by an insurance company because that purchaser would be provided a new policy involving a viator with the same ultimate remaining life expectancy. Thus, without any prompting by a governmental authority, Future First made the business decision to voluntarily exceed the protections of Florida law by establishing the Guaranty Fund in order to purchase replacement policies for its customers if the initial policy was rescinded by the insurer. The Guaranty Fund was also utilized to make the purchaser whole even when an insurance company cancelled or non- renewed an insurance policy on an entire group, or if a new insurance carrier for a particular group later reduced the benefit level assigned to the purchaser. The Guaranty Fund was also used for the benefit of purchasers if a viator as a member of an employer group, quit his or her job and the viator exercised a statutory right to have the group policy benefits converted to an individual policy. Because benefit levels on such individual policies are typically lower, the Guaranty Fund was used to purchase additional insurance benefits to assign to the purchaser. Additionally, if a policy lapsed for any reason, the Guaranty Fund was used to procure a new policy or policies in order that the purchaser would be fully protected according to the terms of the PRA. No policy purchased by Future First has ever lapsed for failure of Future First to pay the premium. Funds from the Guaranty Fund have been used to purchase new policies when a viator committed suicide and the insurance company later rescinded the policy, as well. The Guaranty Fund maintained by Future First existed to cover other contingencies beyond just the possible recession of insurance policies because of the misrepresentation of the viator discovered by the insurer within the contestable period. Future First, through use of the Guaranty Fund, has replaced approximately 17 million dollars in face value of insurance policies, equating to about 12.4 million dollars in direct cost to Future First and, as a result, no Future First purchaser has ever been harmed. The 12.4 million dollars used to purchase replacement policies would otherwise have been retained by Future First as profit. Today Future First does not purchase contestable policies in the regular course of its business. The only exception to that occurs when an insured group undergoes a carrier change and a new contestable period is automatically instituted by the new carrier. There is no prohibition in Florida either presently or during the times relevant to the Amended Order, against the purchase of contestable policies by a viatical settlement provider. The recission of the contestable policies at issue in fact immediately followed an inquiry from the Department of Insurance to the insurers, which alerted them that the Department suspected fraud in the inception of the policies. That is, it suspected fraud on the part of the viators or insureds on those policies, not Future First. Future First immediately utilized the Guaranty Fund and began replacing the policies. None of the rescinding insurers have accused Future First of any complicity in any alleged fraud with respect to the policies referenced in the Amended Order, nor has the Department of Insurance alleged any such fraud against Future First. All but one or two of the rescinded policies have been replaced and the purchasers made whole, pursuant to the terms of their original PRA. One of the two policies not fully replaced as of the date of the hearing was being contested by Future First as to the legality of the insurance company's rescission, and Future First will replace the policy, if needed, at such time as that legal issue is resolved. Of all the policies at issue in the Amended Order, including, as well, any replacement policy subsequently purchased by Future First with money from the Guaranty Fund, only one or two contestable periods had not expired as of the date of the hearing. Those contestable periods were to expire thirty to sixty days after the date of the final hearing in this matter. Future First regularly monitors and verifies the status of all policies assigned to its purchasers, including the status of all replacement policies. The direct costs to Future First to purchase replacement policies for the rescinded policies referenced in the amended order was approximately $1.5 million dollars paid out of the Guaranty Fund. Since its initial licensure in the State of Florida, Future First has cooperated with the Petitioner concerning pending legislation, rule development and other contacts with the Petitioner agency. It has cooperated fully with the Petitioner when the audit of Future First occurred in February of 1999, provided all requested information and documentation and made all personnel available to confer with examiners in a full and frank manner. In the course of the four-week on-site audit, Mr. Stelk personally met with the Petitioner's examiners once or twice a week to discuss the Petitioner's suggestions for improving compliance. The Petitioner issued a draft "Report of Examination" as a result of its audit on August 5, 1999. It contained suggestions, comments and recommendations which had been discussed during Future First's staff meetings with the examiners. Future First addressed many of the Petitioner's concerns raised in the Report of Examination (report) and implemented certain suggested changes in its business practices. Mr. Stelk directed that a formal response to the report be filed, addressing the specific points raised by the Petitioner and explaining any corrective action taken where applicable. Future First viewed certain of the findings and suggestions made at the earlier meetings and later contained in the draft report as potentially helpful to its business. It therefore implemented those suggestions even before receiving the draft of the report. Certain suggestions in the report of such as a request to formalize a refund policy, were not strictly required by a controlling statute. However, Future First nonetheless voluntarily implemented such a refund policy. Future First has cooperated with all governmental agencies interested in reviewing its files at all times during the course of its licensure as a viatical settlement provider and during the course of the relevant investigations. There has been no allegation or suggestion that it has in any way altered any documents, tampered with its files or that any information was purposely missing. The Respondent contends that the Petitioner had no knowledge as to when any particular documents were received into Future First's files, including insurance applications, medical diagnosis information or other documents and has conceded that some policy applications or medical documentations may not have been received until after the bid process and viatical transactions in some cases were actually closed. Thus, Future First would not have been able to compare documents to detect possible fraud as to those situations. Therefore, Future First could not have been guilty of fraud or misrepresentation to its purchasers as to such transactions and files if it had no documentation at the point of the transaction being closed to indicate to it that possible insurance fraud in the inducement, by a viator, had occurred. In point of fact the Petitioner is not accusing Future First of fraud. However, as of the time of the audit in February 1999, because of the discussions and information it received at meetings with Department agents and employees, and certainly as to formal notification on August 5, 1999 in the Department's report, the Respondent knew that many insurance applications in its files had medical diagnosis information or disclosures by viators which were at odds with the medical information it obtained in the viatical settlement and contracting process. It still failed to report that knowledge (and indeed circumstantial evidence clearly indicates that at least Mr. Sweeney had that knowledge even before the February 1999 audit, as to many of the files). Future First still did not report potential fraud on the part of viators to the Department that it obviously had knowledge of until it began to actually report it in a formal way, after the first Show Cause Order was served (January 2000). It is also clear that the Department knew about this inconsistent medical information and probable insurance fraud by the time of its February 1999 audit. In November of 2000, as part of its efforts to cooperate with the requirements of the Department and the relevant statutes and rules, Future First filed an Anti-Fraud Education and Training Plan (Plan) with the Department, Division of Insurance Fraud. Neither Future First nor any of its representatives received any notice from the Department that the Plan was in any way deficient or otherwise non-compliant with Florida law. It has implemented that Plan and adherence to it has had a positive effect on Future First's business. The Anti-Fraud Plan stresses that Future First will not bid on a policy for purposes of viatical settlement unless the viator's insurance application is present in the file at or before the time of the bid. Future First's corporate policy, even prior to the implementation of the Anti-Fraud Plan has been that the insurance application must be reviewed and compared with available medical documentation for any inconsistencies prior to bidding on a policy. It is also apparent, however, that Mr. Sweeney and those under his direction and control apparently did not do so in many cases. During the course of the investigation, the "free- form" stage of this proceeding and the formal stage of this proceeding, Future First has made numerous form and other filings with the Petitioner seeking approval in connection with a new PRA and various other purchaser disclosures required by recent amendments to Florida Statutes. After comments and questions from the Department, resulting in some revisions to such documents, the new PRA and disclosure documents were approved by the Department, approval of the last document being obtained in April 2001. The Respondent, by its involvement through Mr. Stelk with the Viatical Life Settlement Association of American and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, has made a bonafide effort to gain knowledge of specific, appropriate business practices of other viatical settlement providers doing business in the United States as well as in Florida. Unlike certain other viatical settlement providers operating in Florida and elsewhere, Future First has never made premium payments on insurance policies out of the personal checking accounts of officers, directors or employees, has never instructed viators not to contact insurance companies and has never required viators to sign undated, change-of-ownership forms for filing with the insurer after the contestability period expired for any reason whatever, including as part of an effort to conceal from an insurance company the fact that an insurance policy was subject to viatical settlement. No such activity or effort to conceal has been alleged. (Compare, Accelerated Benefits Corporation documents in evidence pursuant to the Petitioner's Motion for Official Recognition). On March 19, 2000, February 8, 2001, and March 6, 2001, Future First filed with the Department identifying information and documents pursuant to the requirements of Subsection 626.989(6), Florida Statutes, to the effect that fraud may have been involved in the procurement of all of the rescinded insurance policies referenced in the Show Cause Order and the Amended Order. The three separate fraud notifications constitute the Respondent's Exhibits 7, 8 and 9 and correspond to the time period shortly after service of the initial Show Cause Order and the Amended Show Cause Order.
Findings Of Fact During 1977, while licensed as an insurance agent, Mr. Yesnes engaged in a scheme to fraudulently obtain sales commissions from various insurance companies. He submitted applications for insurance coverage without the prior consent of the purported applicants. He obtained the data to fill in their application forms from information contained in previous policy records. This scheme was admitted by Mr. Yesnes when he appeared before a Department of Insurance investigator, Eugene Petree, III, to explain consumer complaints against him related to the bogus applications. On February 24, 1977 Mr. Yesnes, while registered with the Department as a non-resident agent, sold a $50,000 decreasing term life insurance policy to a 65 year old widow, Mrs. Inez Cameron. This sale was made in Pensacola, Florida, where both Mr. Yesnes and Mrs. Cameron were living at the time. The beneficiary of the policy was designated as "the estate of Inez Cameron." When that designation was made, Mr. Yesnes was the legatee of Mrs. Cameron's will. Mr. Yesnes later requested the company issuing the policy, United Presidential Life Insurance Company, to change the beneficiary of the policy to himself by name, but the company refused to make the change. Under the foregoing circumstances it is contrary to the standards of the insurance industry for an agent to sell a policy in which he is made the beneficiary. Mrs. Cameron was a widow and had no known living close relatives. She had established a personal "mother-son" relationship with Mr. Yesnes and for a period of time they lived together. For the last year and a half Mr. Yesnes has been a pizza wholesaler in the Pensacola area. He contracts for a supplier to manufacture the pizzas which Mr. Yesnes then sells to bars and small restaurants who cannot economically produce their own pizzas. According to his present supplier Mr. Yesnes sells a product of a much higher quality than the purchasers should expect to get for their cost. His present supplier, Mr. Meehan, has known Mr. Yesnes for eight to nine months. In his opinion Mr. Yesnes is trustworthy and reliable. He pays his bills on time and keeps his obligations. Mr. Secchiari, the owner of Genos Pizza in Pensacola, is Mr. Yesnes' former supplier. He too believes him to be trustworthy and reliable. In his opinion as an insurance consumer he believes that if licensed, Mr. Yesnes would be better than some life insurance agents and not as good as others. Mr. Yesnes has always been prompt in paying his bills with Mr. Secchiari. Mr. Yesnes was initially licensed as an insurance agent in Florida in February 1965. Three years later he moved to Atlanta, Georgia. He later moved to Pensacola in 1976 where he was employed by the Franklin Life Insurance Company. During that employment he was supervised by Michael Howard, an area manager. Mr. Howard had contact with Mr. Yesnes for a period of eighteen months. On the basis of that experience Mr. Howard is of the opinion that Petitioner is ethically unfit to be in the insurance business. Respondent offered testimony from Ms. Dorothy Dale Godwin and Ms. Sarah Dawson in the form of their opinion of Petitioner's character. This testimony is not accepted as credible. It lacks an adequate foundation because the witnesses contact with Mr. Yesnes was fleeting. Due to their relationship with Mrs. Cameron they are also found to be biased against Mr. Yesnes. On his pending application for licensure Mr. Yesnes gave 804 Royce Street, Pensacola, Florida 32503 as his address for the past five years. In fact, during that time he lived in Atlanta, Georgia; Mobile, Alabama; and at different addresses in Pensacola. He gave the 804 Royce Street address because that is where his father lives. At times Petitioner has lived there and he considers it his permanent address. At no time during these proceedings has Petitioner expressed regret for any past unprofessional actions. He has also not expressed any commitment not to engage in unprofessional behavior in the future, if licensed to sell insurance in the State of Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent, Department of Insurance and Treasurer, enter a final order denying the application of Ivan Yesnes for a license as a life agent in the State of Florida. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 14th day of July, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida MICHAEL PEARCE DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 1981.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Albert Lawrence Alfano, was licensed by the Florida Department of Insurance as an Ordinary Life including Disability and an Ordinary-Variable Annuity including Disability Insurance Agent during the period of time delineated in the Administrative Complaint. With respect to Counts II through VII of the Administrative Complaint, the following findings are made: COUNT II Danny Hostutler discussed purchasing a $100,000 Metropolitan Life Insurance Company life insurance policy with Respondent on or about February 27, 1979, but told Respondent that he could not buy the insurance because he could not afford it, and did not pay any premium. Hostutler did sign an application for a policy and took a medical exam so that the information would be on file in case he eventually might buy the policy. Respondent submitted the application without Mr. Hostutler's knowledge or consent to the insurer, which issued Policy #794239558PR. Mr. Hostutler never received the policy because Respondent failed to deliver it. Respondent forged Mr. Hostutler's signature to a Request for Policy Loan form and took out a loan to pay the premium on the policy without the insured's knowledge or consent. Respondent also submitted to the insurer a Request for Change in Frequency of Premium Payment form on the same date without Mr. Hostutler's knowledge or consent. Respondent received commissions on the sale of this policy. COUNT III Thomas E. Clement discussed a $100,000 Metropolitan Life Insurance Company life insurance policy with Respondent on or about August 28, 1978. Respondent had Mr. Clement sign an application, falsely representing to Mr. Clement that the application was for a new type of policy for businessmen and that his signing it was for the sole purpose of submitting the application to the insurer as a test case for Respondent's own personal knowledge without having any legal effect. Mr. Clement did not want to purchase insurance, which fact was impressed upon Respondent, and did not pay any premium for a policy. Respondent submitted the application without Mr. Clement's knowledge or consent to the insurer, which issued Policy #784935889A. Mr. Clement never received the policy because Respondent failed to deliver it. Respondent forged Mr. Clement's signature to a Request for Change in Frequency of Premium Payment form and submitted it to the Insurer without the insured's knowledge or consent. Respondent received commissions on the sale of this policy. COUNT IV Eric Bylock on or about January 1978, requested and received a policy loan check on his Metropolitan Life Insurance Company Policy #600303436A from the insurer. Thereafter, Mr. Bylock decided he did not want the loan and delivered the unendorsed policy loan check to Respondent with express instructions to return it to the insurer. Respondent forged Mr. Bylock's endorsement signature on the check, cashed it, and kept the proceeds without the insured's knowledge or consent. COUNT V Respondent forged Leslie E. Swenson's signature to a Policy Loan Request form on Metropolitan Life Insurance Company Policy #1019058SC and submitted it to the insurer without the insured's knowledge or consent. In or about July 1978 the insurer issued a policy loan check payable to Leslie E. Swenson which was sent to Respondent for delivery to Mr. Swenson. Respondent forged Mr. Swenson's endorsement to the policy loan check, deposited the check in his own bank account, and kept the proceeds without Mr. Swenson's knowledge or consent. COUNT VI Respondent forged Edwin H. Mathis' signature to two Request for Policy Loan forms on Metropolitan Life Insurance Company policies and submitted them to the insurer without the insured's knowledge or consent. In or about May 1979 the insurer issued two policy loan checks payable to Edwin Mathis which were sent to Respondent for delivery to Mr. Mathis. Respondent forged Mr. Mathis' endorsement on each policy loan check, cashed or deposited the checks in his own account, and kept the proceeds without Mr. Mathis' knowledge or consent. COUNT VII In Count VII, Petitioner alleges that the Respondent in the conduct of business under his license violated various provisions of the Insurance Code. Count VII calls for legal conclusions which will be discussed in the Conclusions of Law section of this Recommended Order.
Recommendation It is therefore recommended upon consideration as contained in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that: All licenses of the Respondent, Albert Lawrence Alfano, to engage in the business of insurance and eligibility to hold the licenses be revoked. An order revoking Respondent's licenses and eligibility to hold licenses be issued by the Insurance Commissioner. ENTERED this 5th of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard P. Harris, Esquire Department of Insurance 428-A Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Mendelow, Esquire 4299 N.W. 36th Street Suite 324 Miami Springs, Florida 33166 The Honorable Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the licensure and eligibility for licensure as an insurance agent in Florida held by Respondent Michael David Garrett should be disciplined based on the allegations of the Administrative Complaint filed against him and, if so, the extent of such discipline.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency that is responsible for the regulation of insurance agent conduct and licensure. Respondent is currently eligible for licensure as an insurance agent and is licensed in this state as a life, variable annuity and health agent, life and health agent, and health agent. The Association for Independent Managers (AIM) is an entity that was founded in 1979 for the purpose of providing educational and other services or benefits to a membership base that is comprised primarily of small businesses. In February 2002, Jack Winebrenner, AIM’s chief executive officer, desired to secure health insurance benefits for AIM’s members. On or about February 7, 2002, Winebrenner delivered applications for health insurance and a cashier’s check in the amount of $23,920.77 to Respondent. The pertinent applications were intended to secure health insurance with an entity known as Mutual Service Life Insurance Company and/or an entity known as United States Life Insurance Company. Winebrenner agreed to gather the applications on behalf of AIM and to forward them to Respondent and Respondent’s company, known as Eastwich Re, Inc. Respondent had represented that he was a licensed insurance agent. The identifying number of the $23,920.77 cashier’s check referred to hereinabove that was delivered to Respondent is 381524555. Respondent’s company, Eastwich Re, Inc., had a business checking account at Flagship National Bank (Flagship) in Sarasota, Florida. On February 12, 2002, the $23,920.77 check that Winebrenner had delivered to Respondent was deposited into Eastwich Re’s Flagship account. Respondent was a signatory on Eastwich Re’s Flagship account. Respondent did not secure health insurance from United States Life Insurance Company or Mutual Service Life Insurance Company or any other company for any of the AIM applicants. Respondent did not forward any premium moneys in the year 2002 to United States Life Insurance Company or Mutual Service Life Insurance Company for the purpose of securing health insurance for any of the AIM applicants. Respondent returned only $10,000.00 from the amount that Winebrenner gave to him in the $23,920.77 cashier’s check. Winebrenner testified that he requested several times of Respondent that the full amount ($23,920.77) of the cashier’s check be returned, once it was clear that no health insurance had been secured for any AIM applicants. AIM engaged private counsel to seek return of the entire $23,920.77 amount, but the efforts of private counsel were not successful. No reason was offered for Respondent only returning $10,000.00. On September 19, 1991, Respondent’s licenses and appointments as an insurance agent were surrendered as part of a Consent Order into which he entered with the Department of Insurance. In 1996, Respondent’s application for licensure as an insurance agent was denied. Respondent’s application for licensure was denied based on information “indicating that Respondent transacted insurance in 1992, in violation of the September 19, 1991 Consent Order which resulted in the surrender of all licenses and appointments held by Respondent . . . [and] had the same force and effect as a revocation.” Respondent was again granted a license as an insurance agent in 1997. Respondent was a licensed insurance agent in Florida at the relevant times that are material to the Administrative Complaint that is the basis for the instant action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding Michael David Garrett guilty of violating the provisions of Section and Subsections 626.561(1); 626.611(7), (9), (10), and (13); 626.621(6); 626.9521; and 626.9541(1)(o)1., Florida Statutes. As penalty for these violations, it is recommended that Petitioner (1) revoke Respondent's insurance licenses and eligibility for licensure; (2) that Respondent be required to pay an administrative fine of $20,000.00; and (3) that Respondent be required to pay restitution to AIM for the benefit of the defrauded insurance applicants in the amount of $13,920.77. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2005.
