Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Ezell Realty, Inc., was a licensed corporate real estate broker having been issued license number 0231943 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate. Respondent, Winfield Ezell, Sr., held real estate broker's license number 0309739 issued by petitioner and was the sole qualifying broker and officer of Ezell Realty, Inc. The firm is located at 1512 West Gore Street, Orlando, Florida. Grover Crawford was an acquaintance of Ezell who was interested in purchasing certain rental property on Coretta Way in Orlando, Florida. When he was unable to purchase the property Crawford told Ezell to let him know if anything else became available in that area. Ezell happened to own a rental house at 1121 Coretta Way which he had just purchased several months earlier in a foreclosure proceeding, and the two eventually began discussions concerning a possible sale. At all times relevant thereto, the house was rented to tenants, and Crawford intended the property to remain as investor-owned property rather than owner-occupied property. Ezell initially agreed to sell the property for $70,000 and the two entered into a contract on January 8, 1983, using this sales price. However, the lender's appraisal of the residence came in far below this figure, and the parties eventually agreed on a sales price of $55,450. A second contract for sale and purchaser was executed on June 22, 1983. Although the contract provided that Crawford would pay a cash deposit of $2,300 to be held in escrow by Ezell Realty, none was paid since Ezell was given $2,300 by the tenants of the house to make needed repairs to the property prior to the sale. This arrangement was agreeable with Crawford. The contract also required the seller (Ezell) to pay all closing coats. Therefore, Crawford was not required to pay any "up front" costs in order to buy the property. Under the terms of the second contract, Crawford was to obtain FHA financing on the property in the amount of $53,150. This type of financing is the most desirable from an investor standpoint since the mortgage can be easily transferred to another buyer for a small transfer fee without lender approval. After executing the first contract on January 8, 1983, Ezell and Crawford executed an "Addendum to Contract For Sale and Purchase" on the same date which provided in pertinent part: This contract is for the sole purpose of having the buyer obtain an assumable FHA mortgage for the seller and reconveying title to the seller. The seller hereby irrevocably assumes the said FHA mortgage from the buyer immediately after closing and the buyers hereby agree to that assumption. For this, Crawford was to receive $1,000. The parties agreed that this addendum would apply to the second contract executed on June 22, 1983. At the suggestion of Ezell, Crawford made application for a $53.150 FHA loan with Residential Financial Corporation (RFC) in Maitland, Florida, a lending institution which Ezell had done business with on a number of prior occasions. However, Ezell was not present at any meetings between Crawford and RFC. When Crawford applied for the mortgage, he indicated the property would be used for investment purposes and would not be owner-occupied. For some reason, RFC assumed the property would be owner-occupied and structured the-loan in that manner. Because of this, Crawford's down payment was slightly less than 5% of the value of the property with the remainder being financed by the institution. Had RFC treated the loan as an investor-loan, the down payment would have been increased to around 15%. Neither Crawford or Ezell advised RFC of the Addendum to the contract which required Crawford to reconvey the property to Ezell for $1,000 once the FHA mortgage was obtained. Had RFC known of this it would not have approved the loan. There was no competent evidence that such an agreement was illegal or violated any federal laws or contravened any real estate industry standard or ethical consideration. The loan was eventually approved, and a closing held on September 22, 1983. After closing, Crawford retained the property in his name with Ezell making all payments from the rent proceeds. This was consistent with an oral agreement between the two that such an arrangement would last for an indefinite period as long as the payments were current. When Crawford later received several notices from the lender stating that mortgage payments were in arrears, he hired an attorney and demanded that Ezell fulfill the terms of the Addendum. He also filed a complaint against Ezell with petitioner which precipitated the instant proceeding. After the closing, Ezell had intended for the tenants to assume the mortgage since they had expressed an interest in buying the property. However, such a sale never materialized. In July, 1984, the property was reconveyed to Ezell, and Ezell paid Crawford $1,000 as required by the Addendum.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the administrative complaint be dismissed, with prejudice. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esq. P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Julius L. Williams, Esq. P. O. Box 2629 Orlando, FL 32802 ================================================================ =
Findings Of Fact Respondent Cherylyn Stoppler, at all times pertinent hereto, was licensed as a real estate saleswoman in the State Of Florida, holding license No. 0467803. Her last and current license was issued authorizing practice at Escambia Realty, Inc., 310 South Pace Boulevard, Pensacola, Florida 32501. Respondent Dorothy Diane Owens, at all times pertinent hereto, was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding license No. 0380831. Respondent Escambia Realty, Inc., at all times pertinent hereto, was a licensed corporate real estate brokerage holding license No. 0232503. Its address is 310 South Pace Boulevard, Pensacola, Florida 32501. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing the provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, related to the licensure of real estate brokers and salesmen, the real estate professional practice standards embodied in that chapter and with prosecuting alleged violators of those standards. On April 13, 1986, Kenneth and Linda Williams, also known as Linda Brewer, requested that Cherylyn Stoppler show them rental property consisting of a single family residence located at 6853 Lake Charlene Drive in Pensacola. They had observed the Respondent corporate broker's sign on the front of that premises, advertising it for rental. Respondent Stoppler, Respondent Owens and the Escambia Realty, Inc. represented the owners of the property. Kenneth and Linda Williams examined the property and decided that they wanted to rent it. In their discussion with Cherylyn Stoppler concerning the terms of the rental arrangement, they requested that they be allowed to paint the premises and that the garage door be repaired. Respondent Stoppler agreed to this and indicated the owners would supply two gallons of paint and the prospective tenants, the Williamses, could do the painting with the owners ensuring repair of the garage door. Respondent Stoppler and the Williamses agreed to those terms and to the rental amount of $625 per month. They also agreed to pay Respondent Stoppler a $400 deposit, on behalf of the owners. Ms. Stoppler informed the Williamses that if they did not consummate the lease arrangement, upon which they had verbally agreed, the $400 would be retained and remitted over to the owners of the property. The Williamses agreed to this arrangement. The Williamses and Ms. Stoppler returned to Ms. Stoppler's office and she noted these terms on a lease agreement form with the additional term that the owner would steam clean the carpet in the house. The lease terms also provided that the premises would be used by no more than two adults and "zero" children, but the lease agreement has the "zero" stricken through indicating that that term was to be deleted. The striking of the zero on the term concerning the number of children to occupy the premises appears to have been executed with the same pen, inasmuch as the ink is the same color as the rest of Mrs. Stoppler's handwritten terms on the lease form. In any event, the Williamses were anxious to return to their home in Louisiana directly from the Respondent's office that same afternoon and to accommodate them Ms. Stoppler agreed to mail the lease form to them to be executed, urging them to send it back immediately. When they left the premises that day, Respondent Stoppler removed her firm's sign from the front of the premises and also told the Williamses that the property would be off the market as of that day, hence her admonishment to them to waste no time in returning the executed lease since the property would be off the market during the interim on the strength of the verbal agreement. The Williamses did not inform Ms. Stoppler that Mr. Williams had two children who might visit them from time to time or live with them at the premises. The Williamses returned to Louisiana and the lease was mailed to them by Ms. Stoppler. The Williamses decided not to execute the lease and to not consummate the rental arrangement. They informed Ms. Stoppler of this by phone on April 24, 1986, as well as communicating on that day with Respondent Owens. They indicated they did not desire to rent the premises and one reason given was that they felt that the two children were precluded by the lease terms from living on the premises for any period of time with them. In fact, the Williamses had never mentioned that they had any children and had sought to negotiate a reduction in the rent when they originally discussed the matter with Ms. Stoppler on the basis that only the two of them would live in the premises. The terms and conditions of the rental arrangement were those given to Ms. Stoppler by the Williamses themselves. When they conferred with Ms. Owens and Ms. Stoppler, they were again informed that the $400 would be retained and transmitted to the owners, to which they did not then object. In fact, they never did make any demand upon the Respondents for return of the $400 which was actually communicated to the Respondents. There is a letter in evidence (Petitioner's Exhibit 6) which the Respondents never received, as is shown by the certified mail receipt card and by Respondents' and Ms. Celano's testimony. The Williamses objected to consummating the lease because they contended that Ms. Stoppler had assured them that they could 1ive in the premises rent- free from the beginning of the lease, April 26, until May 1, during the time in which they would be painting the house and instead they were being charged $84 for those days. Mrs. Williams' testimony is somewhat equivocal in this regard in that she exhibited an incomplete memory regarding certain critical dates in the transaction, for example, the date she allegedly called Mrs. Stoppler to inform her of their refusal of the rental and the date she believed the lease was to commence. Mrs. Stoppler's testimony was corroborated by that of Ms. Owens, and was not refuted by the Williamses. It is accepted over that of Mrs. Williams in establishing that indeed the lease period and the rental there for was to commence on April 26. The Respondents' testimony shows that the house was off the rental market from April 13, when the verbal agreement with Ms. Williams was entered into and the sign was removed from the property and that both Respondents informed Mrs. Williams on two occasions that the $400 was not refundable but would be remitted to the owners of the property. The Respondents also established that Escambia Realty, Inc. followed a consistent policy of retaining deposit monies and remitting them to the owners without refund to prospective tenants when the tenants agreed to lease the premises after being informed that the deposit would be retained and the property taken off the market, when such tenants elect of their own volition to negate a lease or rental agreement. The Williamses additionally maintained that they did not want to consummate the lease arrangement because, in their view, the Respondents and the owners would not permit any children unrestrictedly visit or to live on the premises. That was established not to be the case. They also objected because they would not be allowed to live in the premises rent-free for several days during the time in which they were painting the premises. Additional objections involved various inconsequential technical deficiencies, such as misspellings, in the content of the lease. The employment position Mr. Williams was to have taken in the Pensacola area, and which was in large measure their reason for moving to Pensacola and renting the subject premises, failed to materialize. Ultimately, however, the Williamses moved to Pensacola and rented a different house at the lower rate of $600 per month. In short, the complaining witnesses contend that they did not want to execute the lease because of the problem of the $84 prorated rent required of them by the Respondents and the owners for the days when they thought they would live rent-free while painting the premises, because they felt that Mr. Williams' children by a previous marriage were precluded from unrestricted visits at the rental premises and because they felt that the proffered lease did not contain the proper initial date of tenancy. Thus, the Williamses breached the agreement because the Respondents refused to "correct" the lease according to the Williamses' desires. Those desires were not communicated to the Respondents until, at the very earliest, the phone conversations of April 24, 1986, some twelve days after the verbal agreement to rent the premises to the Williamses had been entered into and the $400 deposited with the Respondents on behalf of the owners. During that time, and longer, the property was taken off the rental market and the Respondents and the owners forbore the opportunity to secure other tenants. The Williamses themselves acknowledged that the letter by which they sought return of the $400 deposit was never actually received by the Respondents. Further, Ms. Williams in the telephone conversation on April 24, 1986, acknowledged that the owners were entitled to the $400 deposit. Even so, Ms. Owens waited approximately 25 days before remitting the funds over to the owners. Thus, no dispute as to the deposit was ever communicated to the Respondents, and the Respondents never misrepresented to either Mr. or Mrs. Williams the manner of disbursement of the deposit funds. It is noteworthy that Mrs. Williams is a licensed realtor herself and had some experience in similar real estate transactions. The Respondents carried out their portion of the bargain. Finally, it has been demonstrated that Respondent Owens is a well- respected real estate practitioner in the Pensacola area, having served as an officer and director of her local board of realtors and having been accorded a number of honors and certifications in connection with her professional performance as a realtor and her securing of advanced training in the field of real estate brokerage. Ms. Stoppler is relatively new to the profession, but neither she nor Ms. Owens have been shown to have ever engaged in any questionable practice or conduct in the course of their practice and neither have been shown to have been the subject of any other complaint of any nature resulting from a real estate transaction.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint against Respondents Cherylyn Stoppler, Dorothy Diane Owens and Escambia Realty, Inc. be dismissed in its entirety. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3982 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-4. Accepted. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Rejected as to its material import. 7-9. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 10-11. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Accepted. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import. 17-18. Accepted. 19. Rejected as to its material import. 20-21. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as to its material import. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import. Accepted, but rejected as to its material import. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import. 29-30. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 31. Accepted, but not as to its material import. 32-35. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as to its material import. Accepted, but not to the effect that a demand for refund was made. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 39-41. Rejected. Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact: Specific rulings are not separately made here because Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact are inseparably entwined with legal argument and recitations of, and arguments concerning, the weight and credibility of testimony and evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Cherylyn Stoppler Dorothy Diane Owens Escambia Realty, Inc. 310 South Pace Boulevard Pensacola, Florida 32501 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue The issues are whether the Petitioner lawfully revoked John Brotherton’s exemption for the repair or replacement of a dock in submerged lands and whether Respondent timely requested a hearing.
Findings Of Fact Intervenor is the successor by merger with Bankers Real Estate Investment Company. References to Intervenor shall include Bankers Real Estate Investment Company. Intervenor submitted to condominium ownership the property that, following condominium construction, has become known as Sportsman’s Riverside Townhomes Association (Sportsman’s). This property borders the Homosassa River. Subject to the legal effect of the transactions described below, Sportsman’s owns the riparian rights to the area upon which a dock owned by Respondent is located. By warranty deed dated February 1, 1984, David J. Steward acquired Sportsman’s condominium unit five. The deed contains no reference to a dock, but conveys only unit number five and an undivided share in the common element. However, by letter to Mr. Steward dated June 19, 1984, the Chairman of Bankers Real Estate Investment Corp. agreed that, in consideration of Mr. Steward’s execution of amended condominium documents, the developer “will” assign Mr. Steward more parking spaces and “[y]our boat dock will remain permanently assigned to your unit as a limited common element reserved for use by your unit.” On October 12, 1990, David J. Steward conveyed Sportsman’s condominium unit number five to Respondent. The deed conveyed “items of personal property including the private dock thereon.” On April 20, 1993, Respondent applied to Petitioner for an exemption to repair the dock that Mr. Steward had sold him. The dock had been damaged in a storm the prior month. The application includes a copy of the warranty deed to Respondent. The deed reveals that Respondent owns only a single unit of a condominium project, but the application does not name the condominium association as an adjacent property owner. Respondent checked the form on the application stating that he was the record legal owner of the “property on which the proposed project is to be undertaken.” The application states that the dock is a floating dock for the private docking of Respondent’s boat. The application reports that the dock is 128 square feet in area. By letter dated June 1, 1993, Petitioner granted Respondent the requested exemption from permitting, “[b]ased solely upon the documents submitted to the Department ” The letter adds that the exemption constitutes “authorization from the Board of Trustees Pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement entered into on November 23, 1992.” The letter warns that Petitioner may revoke the exemption determination “if the basis for the exemption is determined to be materially incorrect . . ..” The Memorandum of Agreement dated November 23, 1992, (MOA) is between the predecessor agency to Petitioner and the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board of Trustees). In the MOA, the Board of Trustees authorizes the use of state-owned submerged lands for all activities (subject to irrelevant exceptions) for which Petitioner grants exemptions from environmental resource permitting. By letter dated April 24, 1996, Petitioner informed Respondent that it had learned that Respondent had supplied “materially incorrect” information in the application submitted with the April 20, 1993, letter. The April 24 letter explains that Respondent asserted in the application that it was the record owner of the property, but the warranty deed revealed that he was not. The April 24 letter gives Respondent 21 days from receipt within which to file a petition requesting a formal administrative hearing. Respondent timely filed his request for a hearing. The facts do not establish a waiver of Respondent's right to demand a hearing. Petitioner did not rely on Respondent’s representation that he was the owner of the property on which the dock was located. The warranty deed attached to the application clearly revealed that Respondent owned only a condominium unit and undivided interest in the common element. Petitioner also knew that the state owned the submerged land at the dock.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order dismissing the proceeding seeking the revocation of the exemption from the Department and consent from the Board of Trustees. ENTERED in Tallahassee, Florida, on June 10, 1997. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on June 10, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Albert E. Ford, II, Esquire Mail Station 35 3000 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 John Brotherton 6304 North Otis Avenue Tampa, Florida 33604 Robert G. Southey, Esquire Delano & Southey Post Office Box 15707 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701-5707 Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact Dan Lee Isaacs is a real estate broker/salesman with the Petitioner, Key Realty, Inc. He seeks in this proceeding to have approved his dual licensure as a broker for Key Realty Management, Inc., as well as to retain his broker/salesman licensure with the Petitioner, Key Realty Inc. In his capacity as a broker/salesman for Key Realty Inc., he works under the supervision of Mr. Les Epperson, who is the licensed broker for that entity. Mr. Isaacs owns no stock in the corporation, Key Realty Inc. He does own stock and would be sole manager of the separate corporation known as Key Realty Management, Inc. Key Realty Management, Inc., is not affiliated in a subsidiary or other relationship with Key Realty, Inc., although there is some commonalty of ownership in that Les Epperson is a minority shareholder. The President and majority stockholder of Key Realty, Inc., Les Epperson, would have no part in the management of the operations of Key Realty Management, Inc. Mr. Isaacs desires, for personal and financial reasons, to remain active in the real estate sales field as a broker/salesman under the supervision of broker Epperson. He would, as sole manager and broker with Key Realty Management, Inc., engage in no sales activities, but rather solely in the management and supervision of various rental properties for clients of that firm. The two corporations maintain and would maintain separate accounting books and records; and, as pertinent, separate escrow and trust funds and accounts. It is to the advantage of both firms, both financially and in terms of legal liability, to maintain these escrow funds and accounts separately because of the financial and operational differences characteristic of a real estate management firm, as compared to a purely real estate sales operation as conducted by Key Realty, Inc. The Petitioner has complied with all requirements for qualification as a real estate broker pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder. In October, 1980, the Petitioner applied for the above described dual licensure. The Respondent denied the application on the basis that an individual cannot be a broker and a broker/ salesman simultaneously. The principals of both corporations, Mr. Epperson and Mr. Isaacs, have submitted the affidavits and agreements pursuant to Rule 2IV-6.06, Florida Administrative Code, attesting to the absence of any conflict of interest stemming from Mr. Isaacs' licensure as a broker of the separate corporation and that both of them agree and consent to the dual registration. There is no dispute between the parties that in essence a "salesman" and a "broker/salesman" perform some of the same real estate transaction functions under the supervision of a licensed broker, for instance, the depositing with the broker of any escrow or other funds involved in a given real estate transaction for appropriate disposition and disbursement by the broker and acting in all other pertinent operative capacities under the supervision of a broker, rather than independently. The parties also did not dispute that the real basis for the "broker/salesman" designation in the licensing scheme in Florida is to allow a licensee to demonstrate to the public that a broker/salesman is clothed with additional internship, educational and experience credentials and is thus possessed of a greater degree of expertise in real estate transactions and operations than one licensed as a salesman. The Respondent however, in its argument during and subsequent to the hearing, apparently takes the position that a "broker/salesman" and a salesman perform identical functions; and, therefore, are legally to be considered as the same type of license and licensee, for purposes of establishing its legal position that since a salesman's license may not be issued to a person registered as an active broker unless the active broker's license is surrendered that neither may a person be dually licensed as both a "broker/salesman" and a broker.
Recommendation In consideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record and the pleadings and arguments of counsel, it is; therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered granting Dan Lee Isaacs a license as an active real estate broker for, and on behalf of, Key Realty Management, Inc., and allowing his retention of licensure as a broker/salesman with Key Realty, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of September, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: W. Kirk Brown, Esquire Post Office Box 4075 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Randy Schwartz, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent Gene Lawrence (Lawrence) is president of Respondent Home Owner's Equity Fund, Inc. (Homeowners) and has been for six years. He is not licensed as a real estate broker or salesperson in Florida and has not been so since 1987 or 1988. He has never worked actively in the real estate business. At no time has Homeowners ever employed a licensed real estate broker, nor was it itself licensed to engage in real estate brokerage activities. Homeowners was formed in 1986 or 1988. Lawrence is the sole owner of Homeowners. From December 1986 through December 1993, Homeowners engaged in business involving the purchase and sale of single-family homes, employing from 1-3 employees in its principal place of business in Ft. Myers. In general, Homeowners purchased homes and sold them to buyers, receiving installment payments for the purchase price. In most cases, Homeowners used contracts for deed or sometimes a lease-purchase arrangement. Homeowners located buyers through newspaper advertising. The advertisements stated that a person could own his own home instead of paying rent for about the same monthly payment. Advertisements, mostly in a shopper- type newspaper, ran almost continuously. One of Homeowner's ads, under the "For Sale by Owner" category, states: HAVE YOU HAD TROUBLE GETTING A MORTGAGE? CAN YOU AFFORD $500 OR MORE PER MONTH? WE CAN PUT YOU IN A HOME OF YOUR CHOICE! INVESTORS WILL BUY THE HOME & HOLD THE MORTGAGE. NO QUALIFYING. 332-0043 Another Homeowner ad, under rental properties, states: WOULD YOU RATHER OWN THAN RENT? FOR THE SAME MONTHLY PAYMENTS AND DEPOSIT YOU CAN PURCHASE YOUR OWN HOME! VARIOUS PRICES - SIZES - AREAS. NO BANKS, NO CREDIT CHECKS, NO HASSLES. CALL 332-0053 TODAY!! After meeting a customer in the office, Lawrence or another employee of Homeowners would determine if the customer's desires were reasonable. If so, the customer's profile, including needs and ability to pay, would be filed. If the customer was interested in obtaining the services of Homeowners, the customer had to pay a fee at the initial meeting. The fee was usually $125. The service provided by Homeowners was to offer to sell to the customer homes that it already owned or, more often, homes that it was willing to purchase. If the customer became interested in a house that Homeowners was unwilling to purchase, Homeowners would not assist the customer in any way. Following the initial visit, Homeowners would give the customer a list of homes that Homeowners was considering buying. At the same time, Homeowners did a credit check on the customer. The fee paid by the customer entitled him to these services from Homeowners for 120 days. Homeowners typically purchased homes with seller- provided financing, usually with a low down payment. The homes were of a price that Respondents' customers could afford, given their modest means. The price range was typically $50,000 to $60,000. In Lee County, where Respondents focused their efforts, a house in that range might have two or three bedrooms. If the customer purchased a home from Homeowners, it would credit his fee against his first month's payment. Otherwise, the fee was nonrefundable. When Homeowners purchased a home, Lawrence typically handled the negotiations with the listing agent. Lawrence or one of Homeowners' employees then negotiated the sale to the customer. On November 15, 1991, Curtis McRee gave Lawrence a $750 down payment on a mobile home and lot in N. Ft. Myers. At the same time, he and his wife, Lynda L. McRee entered into a contract for deed with Homeowners under which Homeowners would convey "by a good and sufficient deed" fee simple title, clear of all encumbrances, if the McRees paid an additional $24,250 with interest at an annual rate of 10.5 percent through monthly payments of $386. At this rate, 92 monthly payments would be required to satisfy the obligation. The contract for deed involves a mobile home lot, but omits any mention of a mobile home. On the same date, Respondents acquired the same property from a third party. The purchase money mortgage note was for $19,750, bearing interest at the annual rate of 10 percent, and payable by 84 monthly payments of $327.87. When the McRees missed some payments, Respondents failed to make payments to their mortgagee, which foreclosed on the mortgage and retook title to the property. On May 18, 1992, Homeowners acquired three lots from a third party for $30,319.80. On the same date, Homeowners entered into a contract for deed with Delfino and Candelaria Lopez under which Homeowners would convey fee simple title to the three lots, free of all encumbrances, by a "good and sufficient deed," if they paid $39,950 at 10.5 percent annually by monthly payments of between $375 and $396. On May 25, 1992, Laura A. Ortiz paid Homeowners a fee of $120. The receipt form states that Ms. Ortiz acknowledges that the fee "is collected in advance from clients interested in purchasing residential property, owned, or to be owned by [Homeowners]." The form adds that, during the next 120 days, Homeowners will offer Ms. Ortiz homes with monthly payments of less than $500 and Homeowners will offer owner financing at 10.5 percent annually. The form concludes by noting that the fee is nonrefundable, but will be credited toward the first monthly payment. On June 25, 1990, Homeowners acknowledged receipt from Ms. Ortiz of $500 as an "escrow deposit" for property located at 15779 Treasure Island. It is unclear whether Homeowners had a contract with the owner of 15779 Treasure Island when Homeowners accepted Ms. Ortiz's $500 escrow deposit. However, a dispute developed between Homeowners and the owner over liability to repair a roof, and Homeowners could not offer the property to Ms. Ortiz, who instead rented another property owned by Homeowners at a monthly rental of $500. Based on Lawrence's affidavit, Ms. Ortiz paid Homeowners a deposit of $4000, of which only $3500 was refunded when the deal fell through. The $500 withheld was to pay rent that Ms. Ortiz owed. On April 19, 1993, Rosa Saez paid Homeowners the $125 fee and entered into a receipt form of the type described above. Ms. Saez found a house that she liked and paid Homeowners a deposit of $1000. When some problem arose preventing Homeowners from purchasing the property that she wanted, Lawrence returned the $1000 deposit by giving Ms. Saez a personal check dated July 8, 1993. There is no evidence connecting Humberto Zabala or Sandra Aparicio to Homeowners or Lawrence. In December 1993, Homeowners stopped operating due to the pending disciplinary investigation and poor health of Lawrence. In March 1994, Lawrence began operating a similar type of business in his own name. He claims that he is not a broker and does not need to be licensed because he does not put buyers and sellers together nor does he charge a commission. Lawrence claims to sell only the homes that he owns and does so as a "social service for people," which he has continued to offer, despite doing no better than breaking even, due to a "dogged determination, a perseverance, perseverance and tenacity."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing Counts IX and X of the Administrative Complaint, finding each Respondent guilty of four counts of engaging in real estate brokerage activities without a license, and imposing an administrative fine of $5000 against Gene Lawrence and $5000 against Home Owners Equity Fund, Inc. ENTERED on August 24, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on August 24, 1994. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-12: adopted or adopted in substance. 13: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 14-15: adopted or adopted in substance. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-3: adopted or adopted in substance. 4: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. Typically, Homeowners did not acquire the real property until a customer had expressed interest in the property. 5: adopted or adopted in substance. 6-8: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 9-11: adopted or adopted in substance. 12: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 13-14: adopted or adopted in substance. 15: rejected as irrelevant. 16-18: adopted or adopted in substance. 19: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 20-21: rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Attorney Theodore R. Gay Department of Business and Professional Regulation 401 NW 2nd Ave. Suite N-607 Miami, FL 33128 Harry Blair Blair & Blair 2138-40 Hoople St. Ft. Myers, FL 33901 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900
The Issue In this disciplinary proceeding, the issues are: (1) whether Respondents, who are licensed real estate brokers, failed within a reasonable time to satisfy a civil judgment relating to a real estate commission; (2) whether Respondents failed to maintain trust funds in an escrow account as required; and (3) whether disciplinary penalties should be imposed on Respondents, or either of them, if Petitioner proves one or more of the violations charged in its Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent Marlene Montenegro Toirac ("Toirac") is a licensed real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Real Estate Commission ("Commission"). Respondent Home Center International Corp. ("HCIC") is and was at all times material hereto a corporation registered as a Florida real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission. Toirac is an officer and principal of HCIC, and at all times relevant to this case she had substantial, if not exclusive, control of the corporation. Indeed, the evidence does not establish that HCIC engaged in any conduct distinct from Toirac's in connection with the transactions at issue. Therefore, Respondents will generally be referred to collectively as "Toirac" except when a need to distinguish between them arises. Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings for the Commission. At the Commission's direction, Petitioner is authorized to prosecute administrative complaints against licensees within the Commission's jurisdiction. The Veloso Judgment Toirac and Elena Veloso ("Veloso") did business together and wound up as opponents in court. Veloso got the better of Toirac, obtaining, on June 5, 2001, a judgment in the amount of $4,437.60 against her and HCIC from the Dade County Court. The judgment liquidated a real estate commission that Veloso claimed the defendants owed her. On June 12, 2001, Toirac filed a Motion to Set Aside Final Judgment, wherein she asked the county court to (a) vacate its judgment in favor of Veloso, on the ground that the defendants had not been served with process and (b) consolidate Veloso's county-court proceeding with an action then pending in circuit court, which Toirac had brought against Veloso.1 As of the final hearing in this case, Toirac's motion, after four years, had not been heard or decided. As of the final hearing in this case, Toirac had not satisfied the judgment in favor of Veloso. The Escrow Account Shortfall On January 24, 2002, Tibizay Morales, who was then employed by Petitioner as an investigator, conducted an audit of Toirac's records. (The impetus for this audit was Petitioner's receipt, on or about June 20, 2001, of a complaint from Veloso.) Pursuant to the audit, Ms. Morales determined that the balance in Toirac's escrow account was $4,961.05. Ms. Morales determined further that Toirac's trust liability, i.e. the total amount of money that she should have been holding in escrow on her clients' behalf, was $12,242.00. Thus, there existed a shortfall of $7,280.95 in Toirac's escrow account. Toirac was not able, at the time of the audit, to explain the shortfall. A few weeks later, however, by letter dated February 13, 2002, Toirac informed Ms. Morales that the shortfall had been caused by the issuance, "in error," of a check in the amount of $7,345.00, which was drawn on HCIC's escrow account and payable (evidently) to HCIC; HCIC had deposited the funds into its operating account, thereby creating, according to Toirac, an "overage" of $7,345.00 in the latter. To correct the problem, Toirac had arranged for the transfer of $7,345.00 from HCIC's operating account to its escrow account, which was accomplished on or about February 1, 2002. The Charges In counts I and IV, Petitioner charges Respondents with failing to account for and deliver trust funds, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes.2 Petitioner's position is that Respondents failed within a reasonable time to satisfy the county-court judgment in favor of Veloso. In counts III and V, Petitioner accuses Respondents of having failed to maintain trust funds in the real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was properly authorized, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's position is that the escrow account shortfall identified on January 24, 2002, is proof that funds held in escrow had been disbursed without proper authorization. Ultimate Factual Determinations There is no dispute (for Toirac admitted at final hearing) that the judgment debt owed by Respondents to Veloso relates to a real estate commission. It is also undisputed that, as of the final hearing, the county-court judgment had not been satisfied. The undersigned determines that Respondents have failed to satisfy the civil judgment in Veloso's favor within a reasonable time.3 Therefore, the undersigned finds Respondents guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes.4 It is determined that the erroneous transfer, via check, of funds from HCIC's escrow account to its operating account constituted an unauthorized disbursement of funds entrusted to Toirac by others who had dealt with her as a broker. While this might have resulted from the simple mistake of an incompetent bookkeeper, as Toirac maintains, nevertheless the disbursement was unauthorized and substantial——amounting to approximately 60 percent of Toirac's total trust liability. Therefore, the undersigned finds Respondents guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. In view of the foregoing, Petitioner has established the charges set forth in counts I, III, IV, and V of its Administrative Complaint, by clear and convincing evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order that: (a) finds Respondents guilty as charged in counts I, III, IV, and V of the Administrative Complaint; (b) suspends Respondents' respective real estate licenses for 90 days; and (c) imposes an administrative fine of $2,500 against Respondents, jointly and severally; and (d) places Respondents on probation for a period of at least 3 years, subject to such lawful conditions as the Commission may specify. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of September, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 2005.
Findings Of Fact This matter arose from the sale of a certain apartment building in Dunedin, Florida, known as Piper's Ten. This building was owned by two foreign corporations, the principals of which are represented by a Mr. Eugene Morgan of Boston, Massachusetts. Douglas S. Kennedy, Defendant, is a registered real estate salesman whose license was registered with Lockhart Realty, Inc., of Seawalls Point, Florida, the broker for which was his then wife Trude Kennedy. The Defendant and his wife were involved in domestic difficulties which eventually lead to a divorce. When the Defendant and his wife separated sometime in late 1972, he sought out his friend and business associate, Eugene Morgan, who suggested that the Defendant move to Dunedin, Florida and reside in the model apartment at Piper's Ten. The Defendant heeded the suggestion and took on the assignment as resident manager of the Piper's Ten Apartments at a final salary of approximately $1,000 per month. According to the Defendant and Mr. Morgan, his prime responsibility was seeing that Morgan and his co-investors in the property "receive a fair shake with the local people in and around Dunedin, Florida." At the time the property was registered with a real estate broker of Dunedin, Florida, whose name is Mr. Woodrow Register, and he had an exclusive listing on the sale of Piper's Ten Apartments. The initial arrangement between Morgan and the Defendant was that the Defendant would live in the apartment rent free and he would be paid an amount to defray his expenses for the management responsibility. When the Defendant became dissatisfied with this arrangement approximately 3 weeks later, he notified Mr. Morgan that he could no longer remain in Dunedin under that arrangement. This set the stage for the new arrangement referred to above whereby the Defendant was to be paid $1,000 per month payable out of the proceeds, when and if the building was sold. According to Morgan, this arrangement was to last for at least 4 to 5 months or until such time as a purchaser was located to purchase the apartment building. During April 1973, Kelly Prior Realty of Dunedin produced a proposed purchaser for the property at the purchase price of $400,000 which was the amount set by the owners who had agreed to pay a real estate commission of 5 percent. Kelly Prior Realty prepared a proposed contract of sale and purchase and submitted it to the offices of the attorney for the seller, Raymond Argyros, who after certain modifications, submitted the contract to the sellers for their approval. At the closing in May 1973, Kelly Prior, the selling broker, received a full commission of 5 percent as agreed upon by their sellers in their open listing of the property. According to attorney Argyros, the Defendant received a check for $5,000 as agreed upon between the Defendant and Morgan and according to him, the contract erroneously referred to such payment as a commission. It is this $5,000 payment which is the matter of controversy in this hearing. According to Morgan, Defendant was hired to "see if he could get Morgan and his associates a fair shake with the local people in Dunedin respecting the management of the apartment building." Originally the two story building was primarily an office space on the lower level and approximately ten apartments on the upper level. The plan was to rent the upper level as a condominium and to lease the office space on the lower level. Morgan was unable to sell the condominiums on the upper level based on the fact that prospective purchasers did not want to buy condominiums in a building approximately 50 percent comprised of office space. With this fact, Morgan and his associates made the decision to convert the lower level to apartments as well. When this was done, the Defendant saw to it that the building was properly managed and provided feedback to Morgan in order to keep him advised at all times of the situation with the apartment building. When the building was sold, Kelly Prior Realty Company received the commission of $20,000 which represented 5 percent of the total purchase price and the Defendant received $5,000 for his efforts. In this regard, the Defendant received a check drawn in the amount of $5,000 and the check bore a notation that the amount represented a commission. When the Defendant noted this, he changed the face of the check to reflect that the amount paid was intended to be an agency fee for the sale of Piper's Ten. The Defendant played no part in the drafting of the purchase and sales agreement. After the closing, the Defendant also was given the furniture from the model apartment and he thereafter departed for Puerto Rico. Trude Kennedy, the Defendant's former wife, testified that Lockhart Realty was in no way associated with the sale of Piper's Ten. Trude Kennedy had several conversations with Mr. Morgan regarding the sales and problems which he encountered with Piper's Ten. However the basis of these statements involved other businesses which she had with Morgan regarding the sale and subdivision of other properties in and around Dunedin. Mrs. Kennedy was unaware of the amount paid to the Defendent and she made no claim for such funds when the payment was disbursed. Morgan denied that the amount in any way reflected a commission but rather was payment for the services which the Defendant rendered in the general upkeep and management of the building such that he could be fully advised at all times of the progress, if any, that the local realtors were having with the sale of the apartment building. With these facts, the undersigned is of the opinion that the $5,000 sum given to Kennedy represented the amount as per the agreement he had with Morgan. There was no evidence that he participated in any way with the sale of the building other than to advise Morgan of any efforts that the other local realtors played in locating purchasers. It was noted that the check which represented payment for these services indicated that the amount originally was a commission. However, the Defendant, when noting that the designation of a commission was included on the check, immediately advised Mr. Argyros, the seller's agent, to correct that mistake by placing a designation that the amount represented was intended to be a "seller's agent" fee. This correction was made prior to the time the check was deposited and it was done with the consent of attorney Argyros. There was no evidence that the Defendant demanded such amount as a commission for his efforts as a salesman or that he showed the property to prospective purchasers as a real estate salesman. Thus it appears that the amount paid to the Defendant was an amount given him for his services as testified to by Morgan. The amount paid also appears to correspond with the arrangement as testified to by Morgan. I therefore find that the $5,000 sum paid the Defendant represented an amount for services that he rendered, not as a real estate salesman, but rather, as a property manager of the Piper's Ten Apartment building.
The Issue The issue is whether respondent's license as a real estate broker should be disciplined for the reasons cited in the administrative complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent, Robert Lee Fountain, Jr. (Fountain), is a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0214081 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). When the events herein occurred, Fountain's license was in limbo with a home address of 2124 Shady Oaks Drive, Tallahassee, Florida. At one time, respondent also held a license as a certified building contractor issued by the Construction Industry Licensing Board (Board). Certified copies of documents received in evidence establish that on February 14, 1989, the Board issued an administrative complaint charging respondent with various violations of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes (1987), in conjunction with a construction job undertaken by respondent in Leon County, Florida. After an evidentiary hearing was conducted and a Recommended Order entered, the Board issued a Final Order on April 24, 1991, revoking respondent's license for gross negligence, incompetence and misconduct in the practice of contracting and imposing upon him an administrative fine in the amount of $10,750.00. The order also dismissed charges of fraud and deceit. That order is now final and although respondent disputes the findings in the order which resulted in his license being revoked, he does not deny that the order was rendered and the above action being taken by the Board. The record (transcript and exhibits) which underpins the Board's final order was not entered into evidence in this proceeding. Further, there is no evidence of record that respondent intentionally violated any statute or rule governing the use of either his contractor or real estate licenses.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing all charges against respondent. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 1992.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of failing to account for and deliver a share of a real estate commission, as required by Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes, and, if, so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Petitioner has been a licensed real estate broker, holding license number 0314643. Petitioner does business under the name, Blue Ribbon Realty. Petitioner employs several real estate salesmen in her brokerage business. Virginia M. Poole is a licensed real estate salesman. During 1988, she was looking for a house to buy. At the time, she was working in a hotel as a cashier. While working at the hotel, Ms. Poole met Mary Asian, who was also working at the hotel. At the same time, Ms. Asian was and remains a real estate salesman working at Blue Ribbon Realty. In a period of several weeks, Ms. Asian showed Ms. Poole several houses and presented at least one offer with a small deposit. One day while driving on her own, Ms. Poole came across a house that appealed to her. At or prior to this time, Ms. Poole had placed her salesman's license with Blue Ribbon Realty. Ms. Poole negotiated a sales contract with the seller. The contract was signed by Ms. Poole and the seller on November 10, 1988. By a separate commission agreement signed the same date, the seller agreed to pay Respondent a commission equal to 3% of the sales price. The closing took place on December 14, 1988. The closing agent duly paid Respondent the sum of $2172, which represents 3% of the purchase price. Respondent cashed the check and received the proceeds thereof. Under the agreement between Ms. Poole and Respondent, Ms. Poole was to be paid one-half of all commissions that she earned for Blue Ribbon Realty. At the closing, Ms. Poole asked about her share of the commission. Refusing to pay anything to Ms. Poole, Respondent told her, "You get it any way you can." Respondent believed that Ms. Asian, not Ms. Poole, was due the salesman's share of the commission, which by agreement was one-half of the sum paid to Blue Ribbon Realty. Ms. Poole, who never listed or sold any properties for the two or three months that her license was placed with Respondent, had placed her license with another broker over ten days in advance of the December 14 closing. Under the agreement between Respondent and her salesmen, no commission was due any salesman who left Blue Ribbon Realty more than ten days prior to a closing. The reason for this policy was that much work had to be done in the ten days preceding a closing, and it was unfair to require others to perform the work while paying the salesman's share of the commission to a departed salesman. After repeated attempts to obtain payment of the $1086 due her, Ms. Poole filed a legal action against Respondent in Orange County Court. The defenses raised by Respondent apparently proved unavailing. On April 12, 1989, Ms. Poole received a final judgment in the total amount of $1197.44, including interest and costs. Although the filing date does not appear from the face of the exhibit, a Notice of Appeal was served on Ms. Poole on June 30, 1989. Subsequent attempts to recover on the judgment were unsuccessful. At this point, Ms. Poole filed a complaint with Petitioner. Respondent never requested the Florida Real Estate Commission to issue an escrow disbursement order determining who was entitled to the disputed half of the commission, never sought an adjudication of the dispute by court through interpleader or other procedure, and never submitted the matter to arbitration with the consent of the parties. The only thing that Respondent has done in this regard is to deposit the contested sum in the trust account of her attorney, apparently pending the resolution of the appeal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of failing to account or deliver a share of a commission to one of her salesmen, issuing a written reprimand, and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1000. ENTERED this 23 day of May, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23 day of May, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Senior Attorney Division of Real Estate P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Attorney Raymond O. Bodiford P.O. Box 1748 Orlando, FL 32802 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801 Kenneth Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
