Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was an Ordinary Life, including Disability Agent, and a Disability Agent licensed by the State of Florida. During this period, Respondent was licensed to sell life and health insurance policies for National States Insurance Company, American Guaranty Life Insurance Company, and Old Southern Life Insurance Company. Respondent was employed as an agent by Diversified Health Services, an insurance agency whose office is located in St. Petersburg, Florida. At no time material hereto was Respondent employed by any agency of the State of Florida. As indicated above, there remain viable in the Administrative Complaint ten counts charging Respondent with various violations of provisions of the Florida Insurance Code. For purposes of clarity, the findings of fact with regard to each of those remaining counts will be set forth separately. COUNT I On February 12, 1983, Respondent visited Lucille Shock at her home in Bradenton, Florida. Mrs. Shock had earlier purchased a Medicare supplement policy from National States Insurance Company through another agent, but had decided to cancel that policy. Respondent visited Mrs. Shock's home in response to her notice of cancellation in hopes of persuading her to reinstate coverage. In paragraph three of Count I of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent is charged with having told Mrs. Shock that he was ". . . authorized by the Florida Department of Insurance to investigate the Diversified Health Agency" when, in fact, he was not employed by any state agency. While it is true that Respondent was not at the time of his visit to Mrs. Shock employed by any state agency, the record in this cause is insufficient to establish the foregoing allegation of the Administrative Complaint. Respondent denies having made any c representation to Mrs. Shock that he was employed by the State of Florida. Further, Mrs. Shock's testimony in this regard is inconsistent and conflicting. In a February 21, 1983, letter to a representative of the Florida Department of Insurance, Mrs. Shock stated that at the time of his visit to her home the Respondent represented that he ". . . was an investigator for the Diversified Health Agency. . . . At final hearing, Mrs. Shock testified that Respondent told her that he was an investigator for the "insurance department," but also, on cross-examination, testified that Respondent told her that he was an investigator for Diversified Health. Despite these inconsistencies, it is clear from the record in this proceeding that before the end of Respondent's visit with Mrs. Shock on February 12, 1983, she knew that Respondent was an insurance agent for National States Insurance Company. Because of the inconsistencies in Mrs. Shock's testimony, it is specifically concluded that her testimony concerning Respondent's representation about his employment is unreliable. Other than Mrs. Shock's testimony, there is no other record basis to establish that Respondent represented himself to be an employee of the Department of Insurance as alleged in Count I. Respondent is also charged in paragraph five of Count I of the Administrative Complaint with having "falsely represented the financial condition of several insurance companies licensed to do business in Florida as part of your sales presentation to induce Mrs. Shock to buy insurance policies from you." The record in this cause establishes that Respondent and Mrs. Shock discussed several insurance companies, including Vulcan Insurance Company, Tara Life Insurance Company, and Bankers Life during their visit on February 12, 1983. Respondent reviewed with Mrs. Shock data contained in certain A. M. Best Company reports concerning these insurance companies.Respondent advised Mrs. Shock that Vulcan Insurance Company was "a rather shaky company" and that Tara Life Insurance Company had been experiencing "financial problems." There is, however, nothing of record in this proceeding to establish either that these companies are licensed in Florida or that the representations made by Respondent to Mrs. Shock concerning these insurance companies were false. Accordingly, the allegations contained in paragraph five of Count I have not been established. COUNT II On or about February 10, 1983, Respondent visited Koy B. Cook at his home in Port Orange, Florida. The purpose of Respondent's visit to Mr. Cook was to dissuade Mr. Cook from cancelling a policy with National States Insurance Company whichir. Cook had previously bought from another agent. After buying the National States policy initially, Mr. Cook had attempted to cancel a preexisting policy with Bankers Life Insurance Company, but had been advised by that company that the policy could not be cancelled. Mr. Cook determined that he could not afford duplicated coverage, so he contacted National States Insurance Company and advised them of his desire to cancel his National States policy. Be was advised, in writing, by National States, that his policy had been cancelled and that his premium had been returned to the insurance agency which had sold him the policy for refund. Sometime prior to January 12, 1983, Respondent contacted Mr. Cook by telephone, identified himself by name, and arranged an appointment to visit with Mr. Cook in his home. Mr. Cook understood from the conversation with Respondent that the purpose of their appointment was to return Mr. Cook's refund check from his cancelled National States policy. Immediately prior to Respondent's arrival at Mr. Cook's home, Mr. Cook had been asleep. When Respondent arrived at Mr. Cook's door, Mr. Cook was still in a "daze," having just awakened. This fact is of significance, because at various times in his testimony Mr. Cook testified that Respondent identified himself as . . . an adjuster with Bill Gunter out of Tallahassee, or . . . an adjuster for the insurance company out of Tallahassee." Mr. Cook also testified that Respondent showed him some identification which bore a photograph of Insurance Commissioner Bill Gunter. This photograph was apparently attached to a document, the contents of which were unknown to Mr. Cook. Respondent denies having represented that he was an employee of the Department of Insurance. During the course of their conversation, Mr. Cook advised Respondent that he preferred the coverage offered under the National States policy to that of the Bankers Life policy, but simply could not afford duplicate coverage. Respondent and Mr. Cook discussed the amount of unearned premium outstanding on the Bankers Life policy as compared to the cost of reinstating the National States policy. Mr. Cook had originally paid $630 for the issuance of the National States policy. Respondent returned to Mr. Cook a check in that amount during the course of their visit. Further, by offering to reinstate the National States policy for a $526 annual premium, Respondent demonstrated to Mr. Cook that he would save approximately the amount that remained in unearned premiums on the Bankers Life policy. Mr. Cook agreed to this proposal, Respondent completed an application form, and Mr. Cook gave Respondent a check for approximately $526 to reinstate the National States policy, with the understand- ing that the National States and Bankers Life policies would overlap for some period of time. Upon leaving Mr. Cook's house, Respondent gave Mr. Cook one of his business cards, which identi- fied Respondent as an agent of National States Insurance Company. In Count II of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent is charged with having told Mr. Cook that he was an "insurance adjuster working out of Tallahassee" and that he "worked for the Florida Department of Insurance. Respondent is further charged with having told Mr. Cook that he "had a refund check for a cancelled Bankers Life policy when in fact the] had no such check." The testimony of Mr. Cook and Respondent on the issues alleged in Count II are diametrically oooosed. Viewing the transaction between Mr. Cook and Respondent in its totality, it is concluded that Respondent's version of the transaction is the more credible. Mr. Cook's testimony concerning Respondent's representations about his employment status contained several contradictions and inconsistencies. In addition, it is clear that Mr. Cook expected to receive a refund check from National States Insurance Comoany, that Mr. Palesky contacted him by telephone prior to his February 10 visit to advise him that he had his refund check, and that Respondent conducted himself during the entire transaction in a manner which clearly identified him as an insurance salesman. Finally, Respondent furnished Mr. Cook with a business card during the course of their meeting which clearly showed Respondent to be an agent of National States Insurance Company. It is also clear that Mr. Cook was aware during this entire transaction that his Bankers Life policy had not been cancelled, and that as a result of his transaction with Respondent he would be carrying policies with National States and Bankers Life which afforded duclicate coverage, and that he was advised of this fact by Respondent. These facts are clearly inconsistent with Mr. Cook's testimony that Respondent advised him that he had a refund for a cancelled Bankers Life policy in his possession. COUNT IV On or about March 2, 1982, Respondent visited Marjorie Brubaker in her home in Bradenton, Florida. The purpose of Respondent's visit to Mrs. Brubaker was to dissuade her from cancelling an insurance policy with National States Insurance Company which she had previously purchased through another agent and had subsequently cancelled. Mrs. Brubaker testified that, upon arrival at her home, Respondent represented to her that he was an "investigator for the state" or a "state investigator," looking into her cancellation of her policy with National States Insurance Company. Respondent denies having made that representation. The record is clear, however, that shortly after entering Mrs. Brubaker's home, Respondent showed Mrs. Brubaker materials which clearly identified him as an agent of National States Insurance Company, and that Mrs. Brubaker clearly understood within minutes after his entering her home that he was, in fact, a salesman for National States Insurance Company. Under these circumstances, it is specifically found that Respondent's testimony concerning his employment status is more credible. If, as is clear from the record, Respondent intended to sell insurance to Mrs. Brubaker, there is little logic to his having represented himself as a state employee at the door to her home, and within minutes clearly divulging to her that that was indeed not the case. Petitioner also alleges in the Administrative Complaint that Respondent displayed a photograph of Insurance Commissioner Bill Gunter to Mrs. Brubaker to establish his position as an investigator for the state. Mrs. Brubaker, however, was unable to identify the person in the photograph displayed to her by Respondent, other than to assert that the person in the photograph was not the Respondent, but instead a clean-shaven person with light hair and fair, reddish complexion. Those facts, standing alone, are insufficient to establish that the person in the photograph was, in fact, Mr. Gunter. Respondent is alleged in paragraph twenty of Count IV of the Administrative Complaint of having ". . . . falsely represented the status of Medicare coverage in this state in order to induce Mrs. Brubaker to purchase' new insurance policies from you." The only evidence in the record on this issue is Mrs. Brubaker's testimony that Respondent told her that Blue Cross-Blue Shield would soon cease to be the Medicare carrier in Florida, and that there existed a substantial possibility that National States Insurance Company would be designated as the new Medicare carrier in Florida. The record in this cause is absolutely devoid of any evidence that that representation, even if it had been made, was false. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to establish facts to support the allegations that Respondent has falsely represented the status of Medicare coverage in Florida. Finally, paragraph twenty-one of Count IV of the Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent falsely told Mrs. Brubaker that her present insurer, Orange State Life Insurance Company, was cancelling its Medicare Supplement policies. . . . It is undisputed that Mrs. Brubaker, at the time she was visited by Respondent, had insurance coverage through Orange State Life Insurance Company. Mrs. Brubaker, it is clear from the record, was under the impression that her policy with Orange State Life Insurance Company was a Medicare supplement policy. Respondent testified that her policy was not a Medicare supplement policy, and, in fact, bore a statement across the top of the policy to the effect that the policy was not a Medicare supplement policy. Petitioner offered no evidence to rebut Respondent's testimony in this regard, and neither party sought to introduce the policy into evidence. The only evidence offered by Petitioner to support the allegation that Respondent's representation that Orange State Life Insurance Company was cancelling its Medicare supplement policv was the fact that Mrs. Brubaker had continued to pay premiums on her policy after the representation was made by Respondent without receiving notice of any cancellation. However, any inference that might be drawn from continued payment of premiums fails if, in fact, the policy held by Mrs. Brubaker was not a Medicare supplement policy. Neither party having offered competent evidence to establish that Mrs. Brubaker's Orange State Life Insurance Company policy was in fact a Medicare supplement policy, the allegations contained in paragraph twenty-one of Count IV of the Administrative Complaint are deemed to be without factual support. COUNT VI In Count VI f the Administrative Complaint, it is alleged that Respondent visited the home of Leila Mueller on October 18, 1979. It is further alleged that at that time Respondent told Mrs. Mueller that he was ". . . from Medicare and that [Respondent] had called at one of [Mrs. Mueller's] neighbor's homes to explain the changes in Medicare coverage." It is further alleged that Respondent ". . . misrepresented [his] actual employment in order to induce Mrs. Mueller to buy insurance policies. The record in this cause establishes that on or about October 18, 1979, Mrs. Mueller was visited in her home by two insurance salesmen whom she believed to be in some way affiliated with Medicare. Mrs. Mueller did not recall the names of either of the two men, was not asked to physically identify the Respondent, and could not recall which of the two men led her to believe that they were affiliated with "Medicare." Mrs. Mueller inquired about whether there existed any written material that she could review to decide whether to purchase insurance coverage. One of the men furnished her a brochure which had the name "Palesky" on it. There is no evidence of record in this proceeding to establish that Respondent was ever in the home of Mrs. Mueller or that he in any fashion ever represented to her or to anyone else that he was a representative of Medicare. The only testi- mony in this record that in any way connects Respondent with Mrs. Mueller was her testimony that she was given a brochure, which was not introduced into evidence, containing Respondent's name. This fact, standing alone, is insufficient to establish the factual allegations contained in Count VI of the Adminis- trative Complaint. COUNT XI On or about March 21, 1982, Respondent visited William F. and Winifred M. Bell in their home in Sarasota, Florida. The purpose of Respondent's visit to the Bells was to sell them a Medicare supplement policy. The Bells had previously purchased a policy from Union Fidelity Insurance Company. During the course of Respondent's visit with the Bells, Respondent advised them that Union Fidelity was "not a good company" and that the policy they had with Union Fidelity was "not a good policy." In addition, Respondent advised the Bells that if anything happened to Mr. Bell that Mrs. Bell would not be insured within two months after Mr. Bell's death. Paragraph fifty-five of Count XI of the Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent told the Bells ". . . that their present insurance coverage was no good" and that if Mr. Bell died, Mrs. Bell would not be insured when in fact [Respondent] knew that both of those statements were false." The record in this cause contains no evidence that the representations set forth above made by Respondent to the Bells were false. The Bells' insurance policy was not received into evidence because Petitioner failed to respond fully to Respondent's Request for Production of Documents, and had further failed to fully exchange exhibits with Respondent, including a copy of the Bells' policy, as required by the Pre-hearing Order entered by the Hearing Officer approximately two months prior to the date set for final hearing in this cause. Accordingly, there are no facts to substantiate the allegations contained in Count XI of the Administrative Complaint. COUNT XII On or about February 4, 1983, Respondent visited Louise S. Donovan at her home in Daytona Beach, Florida. Respondent visited Mrs. Donovan in response to her cancellation of a previous policy purchased from National States Insurance Company from another agent on or about November 17, 1982. Soon thereafter, she cancelled that policy but on December 22, 1982, reinstated the policy after having available coverages explained to her by the other agent. Sometime thereafter she again can- called the National States policy. By letter dated January 17, 1983, from the home office of National States Insurance Company, Mrs. Donovan was advised that her refund-check had been returned to her agency for refund to her. On February 4, 1983, Respondent visited Mrs. Donovan in her home. Under direct examination, Mrs. Donovan testified as follows concerning that visit: Q So, you showed [the January 27, 1983] letter to Mr. Palesky; and, how did he respond to the letter? A He said sort of -- it's a little vague now after all these months -- that, oh, well, they didn't pay any attention to those things, or some- thing like that, and that the company would not refund any money on the policy. Q Be made the statement to you that the company was not going to refund? A The company would not -- now, I believe his interpretation of that, but it wasn t clear to me, was that there was a certain clause in that policy that I was not satisfied with and that he would not reissue the same policy under the same conditions. Well, I'm a lay person. I don't know all these fine points. And, I under- stood that he meant that the company would not refund any money to me at all... During the course of their discussions, Mrs. Donovan advised Respondent that she had cancel led the policy because she did not have nursing home coverage. Respondent explained to her that, under those circumstances she would have to either add nursing home coverage to the policy she had cancelled, which he was not sure that he could do for her because the so-called "RS 100 feature" was in the process of being discontinued, or she could take out a separate nursing home policy. Resnondent advised her that in order to keep the RS 100 feature she would have to reinstate the policy which she had cancelled, and take out a separate nursing home policy at a later date. This is the option which Respondent recommended to Mrs. Donovan, and the option that she ultimately chose. Accordingly, Mrs. Donovan opted to fill out an application reinstating the cancelled policy. She had originally paid $659 for the policy she took out on December 22, 982, but premium rates had increased since that time. The application filled out by Mrs. Donovan on February 4, 1983, reflects the premium rate increased to $691. Mrs. Donovan testified that she did not recall endorsing a refund check in the amount of $659 from National States Insurance Company and allowing Respondent to submit the endorsed check to National States along with the application dated February 4, 1983. Respondent testified that she did, in fact, endorse that check, which he forwarded to National States Insurance Company with the February 4, 1983, application. According to Respondent's testimony, which is uncontradicted, he submitted the $659 check to National States, notwithstanding the fact that the premium rate had increased to $691, with the understanding that the company had the option of either reinstating the policy for $659 or insisting upon the increased premium rate. Thereafter, Mrs. Donovan again decided to cancel the coverage she received as a result of the February 4, 1983, application submitted through Respondent. Mrs. Donovan signed a sworn statement on March 30, 1983, which provided, in part, as follows: Mr. Palesky has shown me the com- plaint filed against him by the Department of Insurance. I totally disagree with the accusa- tions in the complaint. My only problem with Mr. Pale sky was a misunderstanding concerning the fact that the RS 100 rider could not be refunded and reissued (as it was being discontinued) [sic] I thought he meant the entire policy could not be refunded. . . . Count XII of the Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent ". . . refused to return [premium] money to Mrs. Donovan. . ., and that ". . . as a result of your refusal Mrs. Donovan felt pressured into applying for a new policy at a higher premium." Further, Count XII alleges that ". . . the new policy was written for a higher premium, that [Resoondent] signed a receipt acknowledging receipt of the higher premium, and that Mrs. Donovan gave [Respondent] no money during [the] visit [of] February 4, 1983." The evidence in this cause does not establish that Respondent refused to return premium money to Mrs. Donovan, nor does the evidence establish that Mrs. Donovan was pressured into applying for a new policy at a higher premium. Finally, the evidence in this cause establishes that Respondent attempted to have National States Insurance Company reinstate Mrs. Donovan's coverage at the premium originally paid in December of 1982, notwithstanding a premium increase that had occurred in the interim, a procedure which has not been shown by the record in this cause to be in any way improper. COUNT XV On or about January 24, 1983, Kenneth E. Fritz bought a National States Insurance Company policy from an agent other than Respondent. On or about February 12, 1983, Mr. Fritz cancelled that policy and asked for a full refund. Mr. Fritz subsequently received a letter dated March 11, 1983, from National States Insurance Company acknowledging his request for cancellation, and advising him that a full refund of his premium was being sent to the agency office which had sold the policy to him, with instructions to deliver the refund to him. On or about March 24, 1983, Respondent visited Mr. Fritz in his home in Largo, Florida, with Mr. Fritz' refund check. In paragraph eighty-eight of Count XV of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent is charged with having ". told Mr. Fritz that [Respondent was] an `investigator with Florida' and that [Respondent] pointed to an emblem on [Respondent's] jacket which gave [Mr. Fritz] the idea [Respondent was] employed by the State of Florida' when in fact [Respondent was] not and are not employed by the Florida Deoartment of Insurance in any capacity." It is further alleged that Resoondent made this representation to influence Mr. Fritz to buy insurance policies, and that Mr. Fritz did not realize that Respondent was not a government employee until reading a newspaper article on or about April 2, 1983, concerning the emergency suspension of Respondent's licensed. Respondent denies ever having represented to Mr. Fritz that he was an employee of the State of Florida. Indeed, Mr. Fritz testified on this issue only that: Mr. Palesky came here, and he had a thing on his coat, and he says[sic] you bought some policies from the -- and he mentioned the name of the company in St. Louis, and he says[sic] I'm here to check on that, and he rattles this thing and give [sic] me the impression that he was the--was from the State of Florida checking this. . . . As mentioned above, Respondent is charged with representing to Mr. Fritz that Respondent was an "investigator with Florida." Nothing contained in the record in this cause establishes that Respondent ever made such a representation to Mr. Fritz. Indeed, Mr. Fritz clearly testified that he could not remember exactly what Respondent said to him to give him the "impression" that he was an employee of the State of Florida. It is, however, clear from the record in this cause that the allegation of the Administrative Complaint that Mr. Fritz did not know that Respondent was not a state employee until reading of Respondent's emergency suspension in a newspaper article on or about April 2, 1983, is false. What is clear is that Respondent made a sales presentation to Mr. Fritz which resulted not only in Mr. Fritz' reinstating the policy he had earlier purchased from another agent and cancelled, but in fact buying another policy from Respondent at the same time. It is also clear that Respondent gave Mr. Fritz a business card during the course of their conversation which clearly identified Respondent as a salesman for National States Insurance Company. In short, this record does not establish that Respondent ever represented himself as an employee of the State of Florida during the course of his sales presentation to Mr. Fritz, nor did Mr. Fritz reinstate his cancelled policy and purchase a second policy based upon any such representation. COUNT XVII On April 15, 1981, Esther Huddleson purchased two Medicare supplement policies issued by National States Insurance Company from agent Michael Frye. On April 16, 1901, she requested a refund on the National States policies. On June 1, 1981, she was visited in her home by Respondent. Count XVII alleges that Respondent falsely advised Mrs. Huddleson that he was an "insurance investigator" and an "investigator for the State." It is also alleged that Respondent was not an "investigator" for National States Insurance Company and that his status with the company had always been that of a sales representative. Further, it is alleged that Respondent ". . . falsely told Mrs. Huddleson her statutory `free look' had expired and so persuaded her to sign a conservation notice." It is clear from the record in this proceeding that Respondent never advised Mrs. Huddleson that he was an "investigator for the State" or in any other manner employed by the State of Florida or the Department of Insurance. A sworn statement signed by Mrs. Huddleson upon which she was closely interrogated by counsel and the Bearing Officer during the course of this proceeding clearly reflects that Respondent identified himself either as "an investigator from National States Insurance Company" or "States Insurance Company." Fur ther, there is no evidence in the record in this cause from which it can be concluded that this representation by Respondent was in any way false. Finally, the only testimony in the record in this cause concerning Mrs. Huddleson's statutory "free look" period occurred on the direct examination of Mrs. Buddleson as follows: Q Did [Respondent] lead you to believe that your 30-day period had passed? A yes. At least, that was in my mind. Mrs. Buddleson's testimony in this regard is, at best, equivocal, and does not persuasively establish that Respondent did, in fact, advise her that her "free look" period had expired as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. There is, accordingly, insufficient evidence of record in this proceeding to establish the allegations against Respondent contained in Count XVII of the Administrative Complaint. The Bearing Officer feels constrained, further, to note with concern the failure of Petitioner's counsel to deal with both Mrs. Huddleson's sworn statement and direct testimony concerning the fact that Respondent never represented himself to her to be an employee of the State of Florida. In fact, to say that Petitioner's counsel failed to deal with those issues is most charitable. It would perhaps be more accurate to say that the proposed findings submitted by Petitioner's counsel on this particular issue have absolutely no factual basis in this record, despite citations to a portion of the transcript purportedly supporting the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. COUNT XXI In December of 1982 Mary Ellen Stapleton purchased a Medicare supplement policy from an agent, other than Respon- dent, representing National States Insurance Company. After reviewing the policy and deciding that she did not want to retain it, Mrs. Stapleton returned the policy on or about February 8, 1983, to National States Insurance Company, and requested a refund of her premium. Through a series of correspondence with National States Insurance Company, Mrs. Stapleton's cancellation request was acknowledged, and she was advised that her premium refund had been returned to the office of the agency selling the policy, with instructions to make immediate delivery to her. On or about March 8, 1983, Respondent telephoned Mrs. Stapleton at her home and advised her that he was an investigator for National States Insurance Company and that he was investigating a Mr. Buffer, who had sold Mrs. Stapleton her National States policy. Count XXI, in pertinent part, alleges: That on or about March 8, 1983, you, JOSEPH MICHAEL PALESKY, telephoned Mrs. Stapleton at her home in Lakeland, Florida, and told her you were "an investigator for National States and [that you were] investi- gating Mr. Buffer" when in fact you were not and are not an investigator for National States Insurance Company but were and are only a salesman. That at no time did you tell Mrs. Stapleton that you represented Diversified Health Services of St. Petersburg, Florida. That you, JOSEPH MICHAEL PALESKY, created the false impression of your employ- ment status in order to induce Mrs. Stapleton to keep the [cancelled] policy. . Respondent did not tell Mrs. Stapleton that he represented Diversified Health Services of St. Petersburg, Florida. It is undisputed that Respondent was, on March 8, 1983, a salesman for National States Insurance Company. Petitioner has not established by any evidence whatsoever that Respondent was not an investigator for National States Insurance Company with authority to investigate Mr. Buffer. Neither has it been shown in this record that Respondent was under any obligation to identify the insurance agency by whom he was employed after having first clearly identified himself as being affiliated with National States Insurance Company. It is, therefore, specifically concluded that there are no facts of record to establish the violations alleged in Count XXI of the Administrative Complaint. COUNT XXII On September 24, 1980, Respondent visited John Capers Smith and Lillian H. Smith in their home in Bradenton, Florida. Respondent went to the Smiths' home in response to the Smiths having sent a card to National States Insurance Company requesting information concerning Medicare supplement policies. Upon his arrival at the Smiths' home, Respondent was advised by Mrs. Smith initially that she did not wish to speak with him further on that day because her husband had recently undergone surgery and was still recuperating. However, uoon Respondent's insistence, he was admitted to the Smiths' home at approximately 1:00 p.m. Respondent remained in the Smiths' home until approximately 8:00 p.m. on September 24, 1980. When he first arrived in the Smiths' home, Respondent told the Smiths that he worked for the State of Florida and that Bill Gunter was his boss. In the course of discussing National States Insurance Company policies, Respondent advised the Smiths that this type of policy was something that Mr. Gunter was attempting to do to assist elderly Floridians. During the course of his conversation with the Smiths, Respondent displayed a photograph of Mr. Gunter to the Smiths as proof of his affiliation with the State of Florida, and offered to call Mr. Gunter on the telephone to verify his credentials. After a long period of discussion, the Smiths purchased an insurance policy from Respondent, and gave him a check for $694. The Smiths' purchase of the policy was due in large part to Respondent's representation that he was an employee of the State of Florida, and that Mr. Gunter approved of the policy. Respondent denies having made any representation to the Smiths concerning his employment by the State of Florida, but, under the circumstances here present, it is specifically concluded that the Smiths' versions of the transaction occurring on September 24, 1980, are more credible.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant and material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, the Respondent, Alan Jay Gottlieb, was licensed in the State of Florida as a life insurance agent, as a life and health insurance agent, and as a health insurance agent. In March of 1991, Mr. George Alboum was interested in purchasing a health insurance policy for his wife, Mildred Alboum. To that end he contacted Mr. Jordan S. Cain, who was one of the principals in an insurance firm named San Souci Insurance. Mr. Alboum contacted Mr. Cain because he had previously done business with Mr. Cain and with San Souci Insurance. In response to the contact from Mr. Alboum, Mr. Cain sent the Respondent to meet with Mr. Alboum on or about March 18, 1991, to discuss procuring a health insurance policy for Mrs. Mildred Alboum. At that time the Respondent was an employee of Mr. Cain and of San Souci Insurance working in the area of insurance sales. At the time of his meeting with Mr. Alboum, the Respondent was not appointed as an agent with Boston Mutual Life Insurance Company. The procurement of health insurance for Mrs. Mildred Alboum was complicated by the fact that an application could not be submitted to one of the potential insurers, Acceleration Life, because Acceleration Life would not accept an application for coverage for Mrs. Alboum. The reason for Acceleration Life's refusal to accept such an application was that during 1990 Acceleration Life had issued a health insurance policy covering Mrs. Mildred Alboum that was rescinded later that same year on the grounds of either material misrepresentation in the application or material omission in the application. The rescinded policy had been procured by Mr. Jordan S. Cain. During the meeting on March 18, 1991, the Respondent and Mr. George Alboum discussed possible ways of obtaining health insurance coverage for Mrs. Alboum. Because of the problems with the prior policy that had been recently rescinded, the Respondent wanted to be especially careful in handling any further efforts to obtain health insurance coverage for Mrs. Alboum. Because of the underwriting consequences that flow from having had a prior policy rescinded for material misrepresentation or material omission or from previous denials of coverage, under circumstances like those presented by Mrs. Mildred Alboum an insurance agent will often make informal telephone inquiries to potential insurers as to the acceptability of a described risk, rather than submit an application without some advance indication that it would meet the underwriting standards of the insurance company to whom the application was submitted. Accordingly, although the matter is not entirely free from doubt, it is unlikely that the Respondent solicited or procured an application for a health insurance policy from Mrs. Mildred Alboum when he met with Mr. Alboum on March 18, 1991. Rather, it is more likely that he recommended informal inquiries to several insurance companies prior to the submission of an application to any specific insurance company. Similarly, although again the matter is not entirely free from doubt, it is unlikely that the Respondent received a check from Mr. Alboum when he met with him on March 18, 1993. Shortly after the March 18, 1991, meeting with Mr. Alboum, the Respondent transferred out of insurance sales and began to do bookkeeping for San Souci Insurance.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case dismissing all charges against the Respondent on the grounds that the evidence submitted at hearing was insufficient to establish the allegations of the Administrative Complaint by clear and convincing evidence. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of July, 1993, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 1993. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-1902 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: It is accepted that on or about March 18, 1991, the Respondent met with Mr. George Alboum and discussed the possibilities for obtaining health insurance coverage for Mr. Alboum's wife. The other facts proposed in this paragraph are rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Although there is some evidence that touches upon the facts proposed in this paragraph, that evidence falls somewhat short of the clear and convincing standard described in such cases as Smith v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 522 So.2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), and Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So.2d 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). Paragraph 3: Rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Although there is some evidence that such a check was written and delivered to the Respondent, that evidence is by no means clear and convincing because, in view of the circumstances when the Respondent met with Mr. Alboum, it is unlikely that the Respondent would have asked for a check. Paragraph 4: Rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence and as, in any event, being contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. In view of the recision of Mrs. Alboum's previous policy, it is most unlikely that the Respondent would be expressing assurances about the issuance of the next policy. Paragraphs 5 and 6: Rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence inasmuch as there is no clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent ever received the application and the check. Although Mr. Alboum testified that the Respondent received the application and the check, that testimony has not been found to be clear and convincing. Paragraph 7: Rejected as irrelevant because there is no clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent ever received the check. Paragraph 8: Accepted that at the time the Respondent met with Mr. Alboum, the Respondent was not appointed as an agent with Boston Mutual Life Insurance Company. The implication in this paragraph that the Respondent solicited Mrs. Alboum is rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: (None submitted) COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph D. Mandt, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0330 Mr. Alan Jay Gottlieb, pro se 20527 Northeast 9th Place North Miami Beach, Florida 33179 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level II Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds a property and casualty insurance license, life and health insurance license, and life insurance license for the State of Florida. She has held her property and casualty license for about 20 years. In 1976, she was employed as an agent for the Orlando office of Commonwealth insurance agency, which she purchased in 1977 or 1978. She continues to own the Commonwealth agency, which is the agency involved in this case. Respondent has never previously been disciplined. In 1979 or 1980, Respondent was appointed to the board of directors of the Local Independent Agents Association, Central Florida chapter. She has continuously served on the board of directors of the organization ever since. She served as president of the association until September, 1991, when her term expired. During her tenure as president, the local association won the Walter H. Bennett award as the best local association in the country. Since May, 1986, Commonwealth had carried the insurance for the owner of the subject premises, which is a 12,000 square foot commercial block building located at 923 West Church Street in Orlando. In July, 1987, the insurer refused to renew the policy on the grounds of the age of the building. Ruth Blint of Commonwealth assured the owner that she would place the insurance with another insurer. Mrs. Blint is a longtime employee of the agency and is in charge of commercial accounts of this type. Mrs. Blint was a dependable, competent employee on whom Respondent reasonably relied. Mrs. Blint contacted Dana Roehrig and Associates Inc. (Dana Roehrig), which is an insurance wholesaler. Commonwealth had done considerable business with Dana Roehrig in the past. Dealing with a number of property and casualty agents, Dana Roehrig secures insurers for the business solicited by the agents. Dana Roehrig itself is not an insurance agent. In this case, Dana Roehrig served as the issuing agent and agreed to issue the policy on behalf of American Empire Surplus Lines. The annual premium would be $5027, excluding taxes and fees. This premium was for the above- described premises, as well as another building located next door. The policy was issued effective July 21, 1987. It shows that the producing agency is Commonwealth and the producer is Dana Roehrig. The policy was countersigned on August 12, 1987, by a representative of the insurer. On July 21, 1987, the insured gave Mrs. Blint a check in the amount of $1000 payable to Commonwealth. This represented a downpayment on the premium for the American Empire policy. The check was deposited in Commonwealth's checking account and evidently forwarded to Dana Roehrig. On July 31, 1987, Dana Roehrig issued its monthly statement to Commonwealth. The statement, which involves only the subject policy, reflects a balance due of $3700.86. The gross premium is $5027. The commission amount of $502.70 is shown beside the gross commission. Below the gross premium is a $25 policy fee, $151.56 in state tax, and a deduction entered July 31, 1987, for $1000, which represents the premium downpayment. When the commission is deducted from the other entries, the balance is, as indicated, $3700.86. The bottom of the statement reads: "Payment is due in our office by August 14, 1987." No further payments were made by the insured or Commonwealth in August. The August 31, 1987, statement is identical to the July statement except that the bottom reads: "Payment is due in our office by September 14, 1987." On September 2, 1987, the insured gave Commonwealth a check for $2885.16. This payment appears to have been in connection with the insured's decision to delete the coverage on the adjoining building, which is not otherwise related to this case. An endorsement to the policy reflects that, in consideration of a returned premium of $1126 and sales tax of $33.78, all coverages are deleted for the adjoining building. The September 30 statement shows the $3700.86 balance brought forward from the preceding statement and deductions for the returned premium and sales tax totalling $1159.78. After reducing the credit to adjust for the unearned commission of $112.60 (which was part of the original commission of $502.70 for which Commonwealth had already received credit), the net deduction arising from the deleted coverage was $1047.18. Thus, the remaining balance for the subject property was $2653.68. In addition to showing the net sum due of $944.59 on an unrelated policy, the September 30 statement contained the usual notation that payment was due by the 12th of the following month. However, the statement contained a new line showing the aging of the receivable and showing, incorrectly, that $3700.86 was due for more than 90 days. As noted above, the remaining balance was $2653.68, which was first invoiced 90 days previously. Because it has not been paid the remaining balance on the subject policy, Dana Roehrig issued a notice of cancellation sometime during the period of October 16-19, 1987. The notice, which was sent to the insured and Commonwealth, advised that the policy "is hereby cancelled" effective 12:01 a.m. October 29, 1987. It was the policy of Dana Roehrig to send such notices about ten days in advance with two or three days added for mailing. One purpose of the notice is to allow the insured and agency to make the payment before the deadline and avoid cancellation of the policy. However, the policy of Dana Roehrig is not to reinstate policies if payments are received after the effective date of cancellation. Upon receiving the notice of cancellation, the insured immediately contacted Mrs. Blint. She assured him not to be concerned and that all would be taken care of. She told him that the property was still insured. The insured reasonably relied upon this information. The next time that the insured became involved was when the building's ceiling collapsed in June, 1988. He called Mrs. Blint to report the loss. After an adjuster investigated the claim, the insured heard nothing for months. He tried to reach Respondent, but she did not return his calls. Only after hiring an attorney did the insured learn that the cancellation in October, 1987, had taken effect and the property was uninsured. Notwithstanding the cancellation of the policy, the October 31 statement was identical to the September 30 statement except that payment was due by November 12, rather than October 12, and the aging information had been deleted. By check dated November 12, 1987, Commonwealth remitted to Dana Roehrig $3598.27, which was the total amount due on the October 30 statement. Dana Roehrig deposited the check and it cleared. The November 30 statement reflected zero balances due on the subject policy, as well as on the unrelated policy. However, the last entry shows the name of the subject insured and a credit to Commonwealth of $2717 plus sales tax of $81.51 minus a commission readjustment of $271.70 for a net credit of $2526.81. The record does not explain why the net credit does not equal $2653.68, which was the net amount due. It would appear that Dana Roehrig retained the difference of $125.87 plus the downpayment of $1000 for a total of $1125.87. It is possible that this amount is intended to represent the earned premium. Endorsement #1 on the policy states that the minimum earned premium, in the event of cancellation, was $1257. By check dated December 23, 1987, Dana Roehrig issued Commonwealth a check in the amount of $2526.81. The December 31 statement reflected the payment and showed a zero balance due. The record is otherwise silent as to what transpired following the issuance of the notice of cancellation. Neither Mrs. Blint nor Dana Roehrig representatives from Orlando testified. The only direct evidence pertaining to the period between December 31, 1987, and the claim the following summer is a memorandum from a Dana Roehrig representative to Mrs. Blint dated March 24, 1988. The memorandum references the insured and states in its entirety: Per our conversation of today, attached please find the copy of the cancellation notice & also a copy of the cancellation endorsement on the above captioned, which was cancelled effective 10/29/87. If you should have any questions, please call. Regardless of the ambiguity created by the monthly statements, which were not well coordinated with the cancellation procedure, Mrs. Blint was aware in late March, 1988, that there was a problem with the policy. She should have advised the insured, who presumably could have procured other insurance. Regardless whether the June, 1988, claim would have been covered, the ensuing litigation would not have involved coverage questions arising out of the cancellation of the policy if Mrs. Blint had communicated the problem to the insured when she received the March memorandum. Following the discovery that the policy had in fact been cancelled, the insured demanded that Respondent return the previously paid premiums. Based on advice of counsel, Respondent refused to do so until a representative of Petitioner demanded that she return the premiums. At that time, she obtained a cashiers check payable to the insured, dated June 1, 1990, and in the amount of $2526.81. Although this equals the check that Dana Roehrig returned to Commonwealth in December, 1987, the insured actually paid Commonwealth $1000 down and $2885.16 for a total of $3885.16. This discrepancy appears not to have been noticed as neither Petitioner nor the insured has evidently made further demands upon Respondent for return of premiums paid. The insured ultimately commenced a legal action against Commonwealth, Dana Roehrig, and American Empire. At the time of the hearing, the litigation remains pending.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 626.561(1) and, thus, 626.621(2), Florida Statutes, and, pursuant to Sections 626.681(1) and 626.691, Florida Statutes, imposing an administrative fine of $1002.70, and placing her insurance licenses on probation for a period of one year from the date of the final order. If Respondent fails to pay the entire fine within 30 days of the date of the final order, the final order should provide, pursuant to Section 626.681(3), Florida Statutes, that the probation is automatically replaced by a one-year suspension. RECOMMENDED this 5th day of February, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 James A. Bossart Division of Legal Affairs Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Thomas F. Woods Gatlin, Woods, et al. 1709-D Mahan Drive Tallahassee, FL 32308
The Issue Whether Respondents violated various provisions of the Florida Insurance Code, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against them, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent The Administrators Corporation (hereinafter "TAC") has been an authorized administrator, and Respondent Charles N. Zalis (hereinafter "Zalis") has been licensed or eligible for licensure as a life insurance agent, a life and health insurance agent, and a legal expense insurance sales representative in the State of Florida. Zalis is the chief executive officer of TAC. TAC is not licensed in Florida as an insurer. An authorized administrator in Florida may engage in the solicitation, negotiation, transaction and/or sale of insurance in Florida if such activity takes place pursuant to an agreement between the authorized administrator and an authorized insurer. Life and Health Insurance Company of America (hereinafter "Life & Health"), which is not a party to this administrative proceeding, is an authorized insurer in Florida. On April 13, 1988, TAC entered into a contract with Life & Health to market and service group health insurance. The term of that contract was for four years and one month. Life & Health attempted to terminate its Administrator Agreement with TAC by letter dated March 16, 1989, effective immediately. The date on which the responsibilities under that Administrator Agreement terminated, if ever, is an issue in dispute between Life & Health and TAC. The Department takes no position on that issue. That issue is the subject of a civil lawsuit filed in Broward County, between Life & Health and TAC, which is currently being litigated. Although Life & Health's original position was that the contract between it and TAC terminated as of March 16, 1989, that position apparently changed because Life & Health continued paying claims up to July 1, 1989. TAC's position was that Life & Health's responsibilities under that contract did not terminate until September 26, 1989, when George Washington, an authorized group health insurance carrier in Florida, agreed to assume the risk for the block of business retroactive to July 1, 1989. TAC could have obtained a replacement carrier earlier than September 26, 1989, if the Department had advised TAC and Zalis as to the procedure involved to allow Summit Homes, an authorized property and casualty insurer, to broaden the scope of its certificate of authority to include group health insurance. The simple procedure could have been accomplished in as little as 24 to 48 hours. A group health insurance carrier remains on the risk to its policyholders until there has been a valid cancellation or termination of that coverage. In the pending Circuit Court litigation between Life & Health and TAC, the validity of the termination or cancellation and the date of same are ultimate issues in that law suit and have not yet been determined by the Court. On March 27, 1989, Life & Health sent a letter to agents informing them of its termination of its relationship with TAC and that it would not accept any new business written after March 16, 1989. The evidence in this cause, however, indicates that Life & Health did continue to accept new business after that date. The Department became aware of the dispute between Life & Health and TAC on June 8, 1989. The Department knew as of July 12, 1989, that TAC was continuing to write business on Life & Health "paper." At some point after the attempted March 16, 1989, termination of the contract by Life & Health, TAC and Life & Health informally agreed to a July 1, 1989, date after which Life & Health would no longer be responsible for any claims and TAC would have a replacement insurer in place to take over the block of business. That agreement was based upon TAC and Life & Health each agreeing to cooperate with each other and to take certain actions to facilitate the transfer of the book of business. Both the Department and the Circuit Court were aware of the informal agreement whereby Life & Health agreed to remain on the risk for the block of business at least through July 1, 1989, and Zalis and TAC would issue no further policies on Life & Health "paper" and would not remain involved in the processing or payment of claims after July 1, 1989. Prior to July 12, 1989, those matters required to take place in connection with the July 1, 1989, "cutoff" date had not been accomplished, and Zalis and TAC continued writing new business on Life & Health "paper" believing that Life & Health was still legally responsible. Zalis informed the Department's investigator on July 12, 1989, that he was writing and that he intended to continue to write new business on Life & Health "paper." No evidence was presented to show that the Department notified Zalis or TAC that they could not do so, and the Department took no action to stop that activity. Additionally, Life & Health took no action to enjoin TAC or Zalis from writing new business on Life & Health "paper." The evidence does suggest that Life & Health may have continued to accept the benefits and liabilities. The premiums for policies written by TAC on Life & Health "paper" after July 1, 1989, were not forwarded to Life & Health; rather, they were retained by TAC in a trust account. Zalis and TAC offered to deposit those monies with the Circuit Court in which the litigation between TAC and Life & Health was pending or to transmit those monies to the Department to insure that the monies would be available for the payment of claims. Pursuant to an agreement with the Department, the monies representing those premium payments were transmitted to the Department On September 26, 1989, George Washington Insurance Company, an authorized health insurance company in the State of Florida, agreed to take over the block of business from Life & Health, retroactive to July 1, 1989. Life & Health, however, had not yet signed the assumption agreement to transfer its responsibility to George Washington Insurance Company as of the time of the final hearing in this cause. TAC and Zalis did not place any Florida insurance business with any companies not authorized to do business in Florida. Respondent Zalis has been in the insurance business for 26 years and enjoys a good reputation for honesty and integrity. Zalis and TAC have never had prior administrative action taken against them. As of the date of the final hearing in this matter, there had been no Circuit Court determination of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of Life & Health's termination of the Administrators Agreement nor of the date of that termination, if any.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents not guilty of the allegations contained in the Order to Show Cause and dismissing the Order to Show Cause filed against them. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of July, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 89-5981 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3, 6-9, 14-17, 20, 21, and 25-27 have been adopted either in substance or verbatim in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 4 and 5 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law or argument of counsel. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 10, 11, 13, and 22 have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 12 and 19 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 18, 23, and 24 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 1-17 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter D. Ostreich, Esquire Office of Treasurer and Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Jerome H. Shevin, Esquire Wallace, Engels, Pertnoy, Martin, & Solowsky, P.A. CenTrust Financial Center 21st Floor 100 Southeast 2nd Street Miami, Florida 33131 William M. Furlow, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Davis, Marks & Rutledge, P.A. Post Office Box 1877 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1877 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact At all times material herein, the Respondent was a licensed Health and Legal Expense Insurance agent in the State of Florida. By criminal indictment filed October 4, 1984, Respondent was charged with the crimes of conspiracy to commit fraud, use of the mails to defraud and the use of a fictitious name or address to defraud. After a jury trial, Respondent was convicted of the offenses of conspiracy to commit fraud, in violation of Title 18, USC, Section 1341, Title 29, USC, Section 501(c), all in violation of Title 18, USC, Section 371, as charged in Count One of the Indictment and mail fraud, all in violation of Title 18, USC, Sections 1341 and 1342, as charged in Counts Two through Five of the Indictment. The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) was at all times material herein a labor union affiliated with the AFL- CIO, a labor organization as defined in Section 402 of Title 29, United States Code. Florida Public Employees Council 79 (Council 79) was at all times material herein a labor union affiliated with AFSCME and the AFL-CIO, a labor organization as defined in Section 402 of Title 29, United States Code. The scheme upon which the Respondent's conviction rests, was directed toward both AFSCME and Council 79. At all times herein, Respondent was employed by either AFSCME or Council 79. Upon Council 79 being chartered, Respondent became its Tallahassee Regional Director. The record does not reflect any persons as victims of the scheme upon which the Respondent's conviction rests other than AFSCME and Council 79. Respondent's participation in the schemes upon which his conviction rests was as follows: (a) at the directions of William Van Zandt, Assistant to Jerry Wurf, President of AFSCME, and Thomas J. Fitzpatrick, President of Council 79, Respondent enrolled David J. Michalski as an employee of Council 79 and met with David J. Michalski in November 1979 to set up an address where payments on expense account vouchers and salaries would be delivered, and assisted David J. Michalski in opening an account at the bank for this purpose, and; (b) contacted George Albert Cuneo, Jr., President and owner of Cuneo Advertising, Inc., and requested that Cuneo mail bills for printing a Council 79 newspaper directly to G.A.D., Inc. G.A.D., Inc. was a corporation used by defendants other than Respondent to funnel inflated bills for advertising and public relations for payment by AFSCME or Council 79. The record is clear that Respondent had no knowledge of the schemes, was following orders of his superiors, and received no money, property, or other consideration for his participation in the schemes. The only evidence in the record concerning the Respondent's participation in the mail fraud is that the Respondent did apparently mail some matters concerning David R. Michalski's expense vouchers. Whether he mailed anything concerning the "kick-back scheme" or the inflated bills for advertising and public relations is not clear from the record. Respondent had never been convicted of a crime before this conviction. Respondent was sentenced to three (3) years on Count One but served only eight (8) months. The sentences in Count Two through Five were suspended and Respondent was placed on probation. Respondent was placed on probation for six (6) months on Counts Two through Four which began immediately and was placed on three (3) years probation on Count Five which was to run consecutively with the sentence imposed in Count One. After serving the eight (8) months of his sentence, Respondent returned to Tallahassee and enrolled in, and completed, a course in insurance at Tallahassee Community College hoping to further expand his existing insurance license. The record is clear that Respondent's reputation for truth and veracity in the community is good despite his conviction, and the Respondent enjoys a good reputation as far as his integrity in dealing with others in concerned.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Insurance, enter a Final Order dismissing all counts of the Administrative Complaint filed herein. Respectfully submitted and entered this 31st day of March, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-4404 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3 as clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5 with the exception of the phrase "with in excess of ten numbers" which is rejected as immaterial since there was no substantial competent evidence in the record to show that any individual member had been defrauded or that any conspiracy to defraud was directed at any individual member. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 2-7. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9 and 11. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9 and 11. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9 and 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Findings of Facts 9 and 11. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. 19.-20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert V. Ellias, Esquire Department of Insurance 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Ben R. Patterson, Esquire PATTERSON and TRAYNHAM 1215 Thomasville Road Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315 Honorable William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Respondent has been licensed by Petitioner as a physician in the State of Florida and has, at all times pertinent to this proceeding, held license number ME0030090. Andy Moya, a law enforcement investigator with the Division of Insurance Fraud of the Florida Department of Insurance, conducted an investigation of Respondent's billings to insurance companies. As a result of this investigation, Mr. Moya executed a probable cause affidavit that led to Respondent's arrest on multiple counts, including four counts of grand theft. Grand theft is a third degree felony. On June 12, 1991, Respondent was arrested pursuant to the arrest warrant that had been obtained by Mr. Moya. On October 8, 1991, Respondent freely and voluntarily entered a plea of nolo contendre to four counts of grand theft. The presiding circuit judge accepted Respondent's plea of nolo contendre, withheld adjudication of guilt, placed the Respondent on probation for a period of five years, and ordered Respondent to pay the Department of Insurance the sum of $1,000.00 and the State Attorney's office the sum of $750.00. A condition of Respondent's probation was that under no circumstances could he bill insurance companies for services he performed. All billings to insurance companies would have to be done by someone over whom Respondent had no control. A plea of nolo contendre to four counts of grand theft for billing insurance carriers for services not rendered is directly related to the practice of medicine. The following facts underlie the criminal charges to which Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendre. PATIENT #1 AND PATIENT #2 Patient #1 and #2 were in a car accident in Hialeah, Florida, and subsequently were referred to Respondent by attorney Richard H. Reynolds. Respondent billed U.S. Security Insurance Company, Inc., a total of $1,995.00 for treating Patient #1 on 41 different dates from January 17, 1990, through May 2, 1990. Patient #1 later testified that she had been treated by Respondent on no more than ten different dates. Respondent assigned to Patient #1 a disability rating of five to six percent permanent/partial impairment. Patient #1 later denied under oath that any disability resulted because of the accident. Respondent billed U.S. Security Insurance Company, Inc., a total of $2,195.00 for treating Patient #2 on 46 different dates from January 17, 1990, through May 7, 1990. Patient #2 later testified that she had been treated by Respondent on no more than ten different dates. Respondent assigned to Patient #2 a disability rating of five to six percent permanent/partial impairment. Patient #2 later denied under oath that any disability resulted because of the accident. On October 25, 1990, Respondent authenticated his medical records and billings on Patient #1 and Patient #2 and affirmed to Mr. Moya that these documents were correct. Respondent's medical records and billings for Patient #1 and Patient #2 were fraudulent. PATIENT #3 On July 13, 1990, Patient #3 was in a car accident. On July 27, 1990, an attorney referred Patient #3 to Respondent. Several days after July 27, 1990, Patient #3 visited Respondent (or any other doctor following the accident) for the first time. Respondent subsequently billed U.S. Security Insurance, Inc., for services rendered to Patient #3 on July 20, 23, 25, and 27, 1990. These billings, in the approximate amount of $300.00, were fraudulent in that they were for services purportedly rendered on dates before Respondent first saw this patient. PATIENT #4 Respondent billed Allstate Insurance Company for services that Respondent purportedly rendered to Patient #4 as follows: office visit on June 26, 1990, and physiotherapy treatments on June 26, 28, and 29, and July 3, 5, 6, and 9, 1990. These billings were fraudulent in that Patient #4 was hospitalized at Coral Gables Hospital from June 26, 1990, to July 11, 1990. Respondent did not provide the services for which he billed Allstate Insurance Company during June and July 1990. On February 6, 1991, Respondent signed an affidavit that provided, in pertinent part, as follows: I have read the attached medical report and bill for services rendered to [Patient #4]. I declare that the treatments indication on the attached medical report and bill for services were provided by me on the dates listed and that the treatment and services rendered were reasonable and necessary with respect to the bodily injury sustained. Respondent's billings for Patient #4, in the approximate amount of $300.00, were fraudulent and the affidavit he signed on February 6, 1991, was untrue. Respondent was born in Cuba and graduated from the University of Havana School of Medicine in 1962. Respondent testified at the formal hearing that he was born on May 26, 1919, but the application for licensure submitted by Respondent reflects that Respondent was born May 26, 1924. There was no explanation for this discrepancy. Respondent has been licensed as a physician in the State of Florida since 1977. There was no evidence that Respondent has been previously disciplined by Petitioner. At the time of the formal hearing, Respondent was practicing medicine with Dr. Antonio Ramirez, M.D. Dr. Ramirez is a physician licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. Dr. Ramirez was also educated in Cuba, and had known Respondent since the 1970s. Dr. Ramirez is of the opinion that the services rendered by Respondent have been satisfactory. Respondent has no responsibility for submitting bills to patients or to insurance companies.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order which finds that Respondent committed the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint and which revokes Respondent's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida. DONE AND ORDERED this 7th day of February, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Carlos J. Ramos, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Manuel F. Fente, Esquire 1835 West Flagler Street, Suite 201 Miami, Florida 33135 Dr. Marm Harris, Executive Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0770 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Petitioner should be licensed as a life, variable annuity and health agent by the Department of Financial Services?
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is 51 years old; has Associate of Arts degrees from Seminole Community College, Sanford, Florida, and Davenport University, Grand Rapids, Michigan; will soon acquire a bachelor of business administration degree from Belhaven College; and is applying for a doctoral program at the University of Central Florida. Petitioner holds a real estate sales associate license issued by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate. The effective date of the license is September 29, 2003; it will expire on September 30, 2005. On November 28, 2001, Petitioner applied to Respondent for a license classified as a "life and variable annuity and health insurance agent." One of the screening questions on the license application was the following: "[H]ave you ever had any professional license subjected to any of the following actions by any state agency or public authority in any jurisdiction?" In response, Petitioner circled "Yes." The screening question was then followed by the following "actions": suspension, revocation, placed on probation, administrative fine or penalty levied, cease and desist order entered. In response, Petitioner circled "suspension." On July 17, 1997, a Final Order was entered in Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate v. David Nelson Weiker, Case No. 95-85173, which reads, in part, as follows: . . . the Commission finds the Respondent guilty of violating ss 475.25(1)(c) and 475.42(1)(j), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint. Therefore the Commission ORDERS that the license of David Nelson Weiker be suspended until the liens are removed. At the conclusion of the period of suspension, the Respondent is directed to contact the Records Section of the Division of Real Estate . . . to secure proper forms for reinstatement of Respondent's suspended license. The Commission further ORDERS that the Respondent pay a $1000 administrative fine and investigative costs of $768 within 30 days of the filing date of this order or the Respondent's license shall be suspended until such time as the fine and costs are paid in full. In Weiker, Case No. 95-85173, Petitioner, David N. Weiker, Sr., initially requested a formal hearing, then failed to respond to a request for admissions. As a result, he admitted being a licensed real estate salesperson who, as an employee of a builder, Mercedes Homes, Inc., filed 14 liens in a total amount of $23,301 against homes owned by Mercedes Homes, Inc., in an attempt to collect sales commissions he deemed he was owed. The administrative fine of $1,000, in Weiker, Case No. 95-85173, was paid by a check dated August 5, 1998, drawn on the account of David S. Piercefield, P.A. On August 13, 1998, an Amended Final Order was entered in Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate v. David Nelson Weiker, Case No. 96-83238 (DOAH Case No. 97-4742), which reads, in part, as follows: . . . the Commission finds the Respondent guilty of violating s.475.25(1)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint. The Florida Real Estate Commission therefore ORDERS that the Respondent pay a $1,000.00 administrative fine. . . . Therefore the Commission ORDERS that the Respondent be placed on probation for a period of ninety days . . . In Weiker, Case No. 96-83238 (DOAH Case No. 97-4742), the Real Estate Commission adopted the Recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge. In that Recommended Order, the Administrative Law Judge found that "he [Weiker] furthered a scheme of misrepresentation, false promises, and dishonest dealing." The administrative fine of $1,000, in Weiker, Case No. 96-83238 (DOAH Case No. 97-4742), was paid by a SouthTrust Bank check dated October 14, 2003. The remitter was Irene L. Weiker. On several occasions, in correspondence with representatives of Respondent, and while testifying at the final hearing, Petitioner testified that his real estate license had not been suspended. He also maintained, without substantive evidence or reasonable explanation, that the two administrative fines had been paid several times or by the wrong individuals. His attempts to explain the facts and circumstances of the two administrative actions disciplining his real estate license were unreasonable and not credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's decision to deny Petitioner's application for a life, variable annuity and health insurance agent license is well-founded; Petitioner's license application should be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: R. Terry Butler, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0399 David N. Weiker, Sr. 1506 Elfstone Court Casselberry, Florida 32707 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against a licensee on the basis of alleged violations set forth in a one-count Administrative Complaint. It is alleged that the Respondent has violated numerous specified provisions of Chapters 626 and 631, Florida Statutes, by failing to satisfy a judgment entered against him in favor of the Department in its capacity as receiver for an insurance company.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent, Steven Peter Alicino, has been licensed to engage in the insurance business in the State of Florida. On or about December 21, 1993, a Consent Order was entered by the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, in and for Leon County, Florida, appointing the Florida Department of Insurance as Receiver for General Insurance Company. On or about August 12, 1996, a Final Judgment was entered by the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, in and for Leon County, Florida, in the amount of $2,377.40 in favor of the Department of Insurance as Receiver for General Insurance Company, and against Stephen Peter Alicino and Budget Insurance, jointly and severally. The judgment was for unearned insurance commissions retained by the Respondent and owed to General Insurance Company. On or about May 12, 1997, the Department of Insurance sent a certified letter to the Respondent demanding payment of the judgment described above. The Respondent received the letter on or about May 15, 1997. The judgment remains outstanding and unpaid.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued revoking the Respondent's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick Creehan, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Stephen Peter Alicino 634 Castilla Lane Boynton Beach, Florida 33435 Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue As to DOAH Case No. 90-3698: Whether Howell Vinson Peavy's insurance licenses should be disciplined for violations of Sections 626.611(7) and (14) and 626.621(8) F.S., and As to DOAH Case No. 90-6615: Whether Howell Vinson Peavy should be licensed to represent Bankers and Shippers Insurance Company as a general lines insurance agent.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Peavy is currently licensed and eligible for licensure and appointment in Florida as a life and health and general lines agent. Mr. Peavy began work at the Citizens (formerly Ellis) Bank of Bunnell, Florida in 1952. A director of that bank owned an insurance agency in town. In 1964, the owner of the bank, Mr. Creal; his mother; the bank attorney; and Mr. Peavy bought the insurance agency. Mr. Peavy continued to work at the Citizens Bank in the mornings and at the insurance agency in the afternoons and evenings. Mr. Peavy has been licensed by the Department of Insurance since purchasing the agency in 1964 and has had no previous disciplinary complaints against his insurance license(s) in the ensuing 26 years. Approximately ten years ago, in 1980, during a stressful and transitional period of the Citizens Bank operation, a customer came into Mr. Peavy's office at the bank and sought to pay in excess of $10,000 in cash in connection with a land transaction. Mr. Peavy received the money and turned it over to a bank secretary to make the deposit. The secretary subsequently put the money in the bank's loan department cash drawer instead of taking it to the head teller, who was the bank employee responsible for filing the Currency Transaction Report required by the federal Internal Revenue Service for such cash transactions. Mr. Peavy did not initially know that a Currency Transaction Report had not been filed. Indeed, he had never personally filled out or filed such a report before, and doing so was not normally his responsibility. Mr. Peavy received no personal gain from the failure to file the report. On July 13, 1985, approximately five years after Mr. Peavy's failure to file the Currency Transaction Report and five years before the instant state disciplinary charges were filed, a seven-count indictment was filed against Mr. Peavy in U.S. District Court in and for the Middle District of Florida, Case No. 85-99CR-JAX-12. Approximately five years ago, on October 4, 1985, Mr. Peavy entered a plea of guilty to one count of violating Title 18, USC Sections 1001 and 1002 in that he knowingly and willfully concealed and covered up and caused to be concealed or covered up, material facts within the jurisdiction of the Department of the Treasurer of the United States to wit: knowingly and willfully failing to file a Currency Transaction Report for a transaction in excess of $10,000. It appears that a total of $50,000 cash somehow wound up in an escrow account at the bank, but there is no evidence or admission to show that either Mr. Peavy or the bank realized any profit or benefit from the transaction. The transaction also was unconnected to Mr. Peavy's insurance business. Mr. Peavy's federal guilty plea was accepted, and on December 4, 1985, he was adjudicated and convicted of the named felony. U.S. District Court Judge Howell Melton imposed a $5,000 fine and placed Mr. Peavy on three years' probation. Prior to entering his guilty plea, Mr. Peavy had executed a "Stipulated Factual Basis for the Plea of Guilty to Count One of the Indictment." This document was not offered in evidence at formal hearing, but upon Mr. Peavy's testimony, it is found that he had the opportunity to review and sign this document before entering his guilty plea and knew that it confirmed his willful failure to file the Currency Transaction Report and that his willful failure to file the Currency Transaction Report was for the purpose of concealing the $50,000 cash transaction from the Internal Revenue Service. At formal hearing, Mr. Peavy elaborated on his reasons for entering his plea of guilty in 1985 as being, in part, due to monetary reasons; his lawyer had advised him of the difference in cost of going to court and fighting the charges contained in seven counts as compared to working out a plea agreement to one count. There is no dispute that Mr. Peavy pleaded guilty and was convicted of a felony punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under the law of the United States of America. However, at the time Mr. Peavy entered his plea, Florida's insurance disciplinary statutes did not specifically address federal felonies. The material state statutes in effect at the time of Peavy's failure to file, at the time of his plea, and at the time of his conviction read: 626.611 Grounds for compulsory refusal, suspension, or revocation of agent's, solicitor's, or adjuster's license or service representative's, supervising or managing general agent's, or claims investigator's permit.--The department shall deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew or continue the license of any agent, solicitor, or adjuster or the permit of any service representative, supervising, or managing general agent, or claims investigator, and it shall suspend or revoke the eligibility to hold a license or permit of any such person, if it finds that as to the applicant, licensee, or permittee any one or more of the applicable grounds exist: * * * (14) Having been found guilty or, or having pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to, a felony in this state or any other state which involves moral turpitude, without regard to whether a judgement of conviction has been entered by the court having jurisdiction of such cases. * * * 626.621 Grounds for discretionary refusal, suspension or revocation of agent's, solicitors, or adjuster's license or service representatives, supervising or managing general agent's, or claims investigator's permit.--The department may, in its discretion, deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew or continue the license of any agent, solicitor, or adjuster or the permit of any service agent, solicitor, or adjuster or the permit of any service representative, supervising or managing general agent or claims investigator, and it may suspend or revoke the eligibility to hold a license or permit of any such person, if it finds that as to the applicant, licensee, or permittee any one or more of the following applicable grounds exist under circumstances for which such denial, suspension, revocation, or refusal is not mandatory under Section 626.611: * * * (8) Having been found guilty of, or having pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to a felony in this state or any other state, without regard to whether a judgment of conviction has been entered by the court having jurisdiction of such cases. Mr. Peavy paid his fine, successfully completed his probation, and was granted restoration of his civil rights on January 13, 1989, pursuant to Article IV, Section 8, Constitution of the State of Florida. Robert Gayle Mercer is a Florida-licensed insurance agent in good standing. He was tendered and accepted over objection as an expert in the business of insurance. Mr. Mercer also has served for many years as a director of a state bank located in Kissimmeee, Florida. The bank of which Mr. Mercer is a director is substantially similar in all respects to the bank in Bunnell, Florida, where Mr. Peavy's legal difficulties arose. As a bank director, Mr. Mercer is familiar with the necessity that banks file Currency Transaction Reports. It was Mr. Mercer's expert professional opinion, rendered within his education, training, and experience as an insurance agent, that the failure to file a Currency Transaction Report is not directly related to the business of insurance and that such failure has not rendered Mr. Peavy unfit or untrustworthy to engage in the business of insurance. In assessing the weight and credibility to be assigned to Mr. Mercer's expert opinion, the undersigned is not unmindful that at some point in time the witness Mercer, and the accused, Peavy, practiced the insurance business together, but due to the lapse of time and the removal of Mr. Mercer from the immediate geographical community wherein Mr. Peavy resides and practices, Mr. Mercer's testimony is found to be credible in all respects. The agency offered no expert testimony/evidence to refute Mr. Mercer's opinion. Mr. Peavy was held in the highest esteem by business, professional, and community service colleagues at the time the federal charges arose, plea was entered, and conviction adjudged. At that time, Mr. Peavy attempted to resign as a member of the Flagler County Chamber of Commerce; his colleagues, knowledgable of the federal charges, refused to accept his resignation. Many prominent community leaders knowledgeable of the nature of the federal charges also wrote to Judge Melton extolling Mr. Peavy's virtues and urging that he be placed on probation. Mr. Peavy has lived in Bunnell, Florida, since 1939, except for a short period of military service. During the whole of that time, he has been a community leader and volunteer, serving at various times on the City Commission, the County School Board, the County Chamber of Commerce, and as a Governor- appointed member of the County Housing Authority. He is active in church and in service and charity organizations, particularly as a fund raiser for the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, the March of Dimes, and the Humane Society. Mr. Peavy's current reputation in his community is one of trust, confidence, fair dealing, and a respect for the rights of others. Upon the direct testimony of Captain C. B. Eisenbach, a retired captain of the Flagler County Sheriff's Department, and Mrs. Etta Peterson, Flagler County Supervisor of Elections, each rendered by deposition, and upon the hearsay evidence which may legitimately be characterized as "explaining or supplementing" direct evidence pursuant to Section 120.58(1) F.S., it is found that Mr. Peavy has consistently maintained and currently maintains an exemplary reputation in the community for honesty, trustworthiness, and good moral character, as well as a reputation for truth and veracity. In making the foregoing finding of fact, the undersigned has considered the somewhat vague understanding Ms. Peterson expressed with regard to the nature of Mr. Peavy's very stale federal crime/conviction but does not find that her vagueness on that legal concept detracts from the credibility or significance of her testimony concerning Mr. Peavy's current reputation and good character.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order dismissing the administrative complaint in Case No. 90-3698 and granting Peavy a license to as a general lines agent for Bankers and Shippers Insurance in Case No. 90-6615. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of February, 1991 at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Department of Insurance PFOF: 1, 2, 3, and 4 are all accepted. Peavy's PFOF: 1-5, 7-10, and 12 are accepted and adopted with minor modifications to better express the record as a whole and to eliminate legal conclusions. 6, and 11 are rejected as subordinate or unnecessary to the facts as found; admissible and reliable hearsay has been assessed within the RO. COPIES FURNISHED: Albert J. Datz, Esquire Datz, Jacobson and Lembcke Suite 2902 Independent Square Jacksonville, Florida 32202 W. Douglas Hall, Esquire R. Vincent Russo, Esquire Cynthia S. Tunnicliff, Esquire Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A. Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 John C. Jordan, Esquire Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
