The Issue This is a consolidated case involving both the present and prior owners of the Country Retreat Mobile Home Park: (f/k/a Christian Retreat Mobile Home Park). The case involves the issue of whether the prior owner, Respondent, Gospel Crusade, Inc., (hereinafter Gospel) is guilty of the violations alleged in the Notice to Show Cause dated June 6, 1990, issued against Gospel by the Petitioner, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (hereinafter the Division) Gospel has been charged with renewing the existing rental agreements of at least thirty-seven (37) mobile homeowners by implementing a lot rental amount increase. Gospel has also been charged with increasing the lot rental amount on May 1, 1986, with a rent increase notice that did not provide for an effective date or disclose the present rental charge for the mobile home lot. Gospel has also been charged with increasing the lot rental amount of at least forty-six mobile homeowners on February 1, 1988, without the delivery of an approved prospectus prior to the Increase. The case also involves the issue of whether the present park owner, Respondent Country Retreat, Inc. (hereinafter `Country') is guilty of the violations alleged in the Notice to Show Cause dated June 11, 1990, issued by the Division. Respondent, Country, has been charged with increasing the lot rental amount of at least forty-six mobile homeowners on February 1, 1989, by twenty-three dollars ($23.00) per month without delivering each affected mobile homeowner a prospectus approved by the Division. Country also has been charged with collecting lot rental amount increases from at least forty-six mobile homeowners which increases were imposed by the previous owner, Gospel Crusade, Inc. prior to the delivery of an approved prospectus. The homeowners' lot rental amounts were increased on May 1, 1986 and February 1, 1988, prior to delivery of an approved prospectus. At the final hearing in this matter, the Division presented the testimony of six (6) witnesses: Faye Mayberry, Chief of the Bureau of Mobile Homes; Warren Schoder, General Manager of Gospel Crusade, Inc.; and the following homeowners: Harold Hines, Martha Potteiger, Thomas Reinecke and Carmella Campora. The Division introduced six (6) exhibits into evidence which are referred to herein as Petitioner's Exhibits 1-6. Gospel presented the testimony of five (5) witnesses; Phillip Derstine, Robert Friedrich, Walt Wirries, Crystal Milligan, and Jean Mulholland. Gospel introduced two (2) exhibits into evidence which are referred to herein as Gospel Crusade Exhibits A and B. Country presented the testimony of Mr. Robert Ruggles and did not introduce into evidence any exhibits. After examining the Recommended Order and reviewing the record, it is HEREBY ORDERED:
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Petitioner, Division, has been the state agency responsible for the regulation of mobile home parks in Florida. Gospel was the developer and former owner and operator of a facility, located on church property in Manatee County, Florida, on which mobile homes were parked, owned and operated by individuals other than Gospel members, and known as Christian Retreat. Country is the present owner and operator of the facility in question, having purchased it from Gospel on December 15, 1988. The mobile home park in question contains 76 mobile home lots which are all rented or leased by the park owner to mobile home owners under oral rental agreements. As of June 13, 1986, all lots had been leased. Occupants of the lots do and did not have to belong to the owning church nor be a part of its ministry. No formal lease was required, but it was understood that the occupant would pay the required lot rental for as long as the lot was occupied. Because of this loose arrangement, Gospel claims it was not offering mobile home lots for rent or lease and was not, therefore, a "mobile home park owner" as defined by the statute. The evidence is clear, however, that the arrangement was formalized between the park and the lot occupants and the land was owned by Gospel. Though the occupant could remain as long as he or she desired, so long as the lot rental was paid if the party was capable of paying, and the community's standards were met, the occupant did not own the lot and paid rent to Gospel for the use of the space. There is also some indication that the amount paid by the occupants to Gospel was no more than was required to meet operating costs and included no profit to Gospel or return on equity. This payment was, however, except in those few cases where the occupant could not pay, a condition precedent to the occupant's remaining on the site and regardless of by what name called, was compensation for the use of the property. This is rent. On June 13, 1986, the Division approved Prospectus No. 4102545P, submitted by Gospel. Gospel had previously delivered to park residents a notice of increase in monthly lot rental from $82.00 to $90.00 which was to be effective on May 1, 1986, but which did not so state in its body. It was a defective notice. The prospectus was not delivered by hand, sent by certified mail or left at the lot prior to the effective date of the increase and at least 46 of the 76 occupants did not receive it. According to Reverend Derstine, Gospel's minister and leader of the congregation, some discussion took place between Gospel personnel and some owners regarding those matters contained in the prospectus, and a copy was kept in the park office for review by anyone who wanted to look at it. Further, the park's communication system, both written and electronic, may have carried notices of the availability of the prospectus. However, no copies were ever distributed to the residents in general as is required by law. The monthly lot rental was again increased, from $90.00 to $127.00, effective on February 1, 1988. This increase was preceded by written notice to all 76 lot occupants by Gospel prior to its implementation. Again, on February 1, 1989, Gospel, for the third time, increased lot rentals, this time from $127.00 to $150.00 per month. No prospectus was delivered for either the February 1, 1988 or the February 1, 1989 increases by either Gospel or Country, which purchased the park from Gospel on December 15, 1988. Though the February 1, 1989 increase was implemented by Gospel, which collected all monthly rentals paid by occupants through December, 1988, as of January 1, 1989, monthly lot rentals were collected by the new owner, Country. Prior to December 15, 1988, Country was not in any way involved in the operation, management or administration of the park. Prior to purchasing the park on December 15, 1988, Mr. Robert K. Ruggles, III, sole stockholders of Country, solicited from Mr. Schoder, then manager of Christian Retreat, proof that the prospectus for the impending lot rate increase scheduled for February 1, 1989 had been approved by the State. That proof was delivered to him. Mr. Ruggles insists that he did all he could do, from a practical standpoint, to determine that the prospectus had been appropriately sent out to the lot occupants, short of actually polling all occupants to determine it had been received. While the Division does not agree with Ruggles' position, it presented no evidence to demonstrate what further actions he could have taken, and in light of his sworn evidence regarding approval of the prospectus, it is found he did all he could do, reasonably, to insure the correctness of the procedure. When Mr. Ruggles subsequently found out there was a problem, even the Division concedes he took immediate steps to rectify it and agrees he was not enriched by the error. He has been cooperative with the Division at all times, and on February 5, 1990, the Division approved an amended prospectus for the February 1, 1989 rent increase. This approved prospectus was subsequently delivered to all residents by Country Retreat, Inc.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered herein directing that: The Notice to Show Cause against Country Retreat, Inc. be dismissed. That Gospel Crusade, Inc. pay a civil penalty of $2,500.00. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASES NO. 90-4916 & 90-4917 The following constituted my specific rulings pursuant to S 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: I. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 3. Accepted Accepted and incorporated herein. - 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 10. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 13. Accepted and incorporated herein except for the names of individual residents specified which are not included. II. Accepted. - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENT, COUNTRY: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. & 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. 5. First sentence accepted and incorporated herein. Balance accepted. 6. - 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. 9. - 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. Accepted and incorporated herein. 14. - 16. Accepted. 17. Accepted and incorporated herein. 18. Accepted. 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathryn E. Price, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Joseph C. Ferrell, Esquire Ferrell and Ferrell, Chartered 1402 Third Avenue West Bradenton, Florida 34205 Robert M. Fournier, Esquire 1800 Second Street, Suite 806 Sarasota, Florida 34236 James L. Turner, Esquire Williams, Parker, Harrison Deitz & Getzen 1550 Ringling Blvd. Sarasota, Florida 34236 E. James Kearney Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Joseph A. Sole General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000
Findings Of Fact As of June 4, 1984, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided on the property. Some of those ten or more residents were Beverly Leight, William Daniel, Frank Addison, Keith Hellstrom, Faye Koch, and Helen Sutton. As of May 25, 1986, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided. On May 25, 1986, Johnny Owens owned the mobile home in which he resided on leased Lot 10. As of October 28, 1986, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided. On that date, Charles and Pauline Murphy owned the mobile home in which they resided on leased Lot 26. Upon paying the annual fee for southwinds Mobile Home Park, pursuant to Section 723.007 F.S., for the period of October 2, 1987 through October 1, 1988, Respondent Hugh D. Rowles, the park owner, advised Petitioner agency that he had dropped below ten lots available for rent. Respondent had reached this stage by simply not leasing out lots to new tenants as lots were voluntarily vacated by old tenants, and a natural attrition had occurred. The Petitioner's Fees Section accepted Respondent's word on the matter without further investigation, and Petitioner sent Respondent no more statements for the payment of the annual fee. In its business and public records, Petitioner listed Respondent and his park as not under jurisdiction of Chapter 723 F.S. On December 27, 1988, Respondent Rowles still owned Southwinds Mobile Home Park. As of that date, Beverly Leight, William Daniel, Frank Addison, Keith Hellstrom, Faye Koch, Helen Sutton, Johnny Owens, and the Murphys (8 tenants) were still residing in their respective mobile homes on the lots they were leasing from Respondent in Southwinds Mobile Home Park, as described supra. On that date, Leight, who had sold the park to Respondent in 1980, and Daniel, Addison, Hellstrom, Koch, and Sutton had been residents of Southwinds Mobile Home Park for at least three and a half years each; Owens had been a resident approximately two and a half years, and the Murphys had been residents approximately two years. In the park there were also some mobile homes owned' by Respondent which were rented as units--lot and mobile home together. To those individuals who owned their mobile homes and were leasing lots in Southwinds Mobile Home Park, Respondent sent a letter dated December 27, 1988, which provided in pertinent part: To those of you who own your own homes, I want to give you as much advance notice as possible. Sometime within the next few weeks, you will begin seeing land surveyors, soil testing people and others in the park. There is a VERY STRONG possibility that the property will be sold in JUNE of 1989. If and when the property is sold, there will NO LONGER be a trailer park here. It is STRONGLY SUGGESTED that you start making plans NOW for the removal of your trailer. If there is any way that I can assist you in relocating, I will be glad to help you. Until further notice, everything remains as usua1. After serving the letter f December 27, 1988, Respondent served the mobile home owners in Sothwinds Mobile Home Park with no other notice prior to June 1989. Faye Koch interpreted the letter of December 27, 1988 as requiring her to leave southwinds Mobile Home Park. Beverly Leight, on the other hand, understood it to mean that the park might be sold, but not that it definitely would be sold. In January 1989, Mr. Rowles offered Mrs. Koch $1,000 to leave the park by February 1, 1989. She moved out to a larger, better mobile home, after paying Respondent her overdue rent. Respondent rented the mobile home purchased from Mrs. Koch and the lot it was on, as a unit, to another person foil a short while. Rowles also purchased the mobile home of Keith Hellstrom for $1,000, which he likewise rented to someone else as a unit with his lot for a short time, He purchased Johnny Owens' mobile home for $1,000. Thereafter, Rowles sold each of these mobile homes at a loss. The Koch, Hellstrom, and Owens mobile homes were sold by Rowles for $100, $500, and $100, respectively. In March 1989, Respondent Rowles was contacted by a representative of Petitioner, apparently from the Enforcement Section, who had been contacted by Mrs. Leiht, and who advised Rowles of Petitioner agency's position that the tenancies of the remaining mobile home owners in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were subject to the protections of Chapter 723 F.S. Respondent advised Petitioner's representative that he did not regard his park as covered by Chapter 723 F.S. Respondent also requested Petitioner's representative to show Respond.ent that Chapter 723 FS was applicable to him and his park and advised the agency representative that, if he was subject to the agency's jurisdiction, he would comply. Respondent received no written response from the agency until the Notice to Show Cause was filed on July 18, 1989. On April 6, 1989, Respondent and his wife entered into a contract for the sale of the property comprising Southwinds Mobile Home Park to a third party. An addendum to the contract required Respondent to remove or pay for the removal of all personal property (that is, the mobile homes) located on the parcel upon being given thirty days notice from the third party buyer. The contract c6ntemplated that the property would continue to operate as rental property until the new owners elected to close it down or change its function. The closing on this contract for sale still had not occurred as of the date of formal hearing. The purchasers of the property comprising Southwinds Mobile Home Park have never given Respondent notice to remove any personal property from the park, nor has permitting of the property occurred such as would entitle the buyers to demand removal of such personal property. At the time Respondent entered into the April 6, 1989 contract for sale of Southwinds Mobile Home Park, only four mobile home owners were still leasing lots in the park. It may be inferred from the testimony as a whole that these were month to month tenancies. Respondent attempted to negotiate purchase of those four mobile homes. He did not suggest to any residents that they had any other options besides moving their mobile homes out of his park or selling them to him. Mrs. Leight held out for $2,500 and refused to move. She was joined in her refusal by Mr. Daniel, Ms. Sutton, and a Miss Warnock, all of whom were residing in their own mobile homes on Respondent's lots. On June 1, 1989, Respondent notified the fourmobile home owners remaining in Southwinds Mobile Home Park toremove their mobile homes no later than June 30, 1989. Thisnotification is in accord with the standards of Section 83.03(3)F.S. for month-to-month tenancies. At that point, Leight, Daniel, and Sutton were four-year residents There is noinformation as to Warnock's term of residency at southwindsMobile Home Park. On August 4, 1989, Respondent shut off waterservice to the mobile home owners remaining in southwinds MobileHome Park. As a result of Respondent's action, Beverly Leightwas compelled to move out of her mobile home in order to complywith health department requirements. In so doing, she incurredcosts of 4,486, for which she has not been reimbursed; however,she is one of the four remaining mobile homed owners (Leight,Daniel, Sutton, and Warnock) who left the subject property on orbefore October 30, 1989, pursuant to a stipulation with the Respondent whereby the Respondent deposited $10,000 with their attorney pending a judicial determination as to whether themobile home lot tenancies were governed by Chapter 723 or by Chapter 83, Parts II F.S. The Circuit Court action wherein the stipulation was filed had not yet resulted in such adetermination as of the date of formal hearing.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes enter a final order dismissing the Notice to Show Cause. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of March, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 89-4572 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: Accepted: 1-17, 19. Rejected as mere characterization of testimony and argument of counsel: 18 (with footnote) Respondent' s PFOF: Accepted: 1-3, 5-10, 12 Except for irrelevant, immaterial, subordinate or unnecessary material, the following PFOF are accepted: 4 Rejected as containing a conclusion of law: 11 COPIES FURNISHED: Eric H. Miller Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 F.A. Ford, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box-48 DeLand, Florida 32721-0048 E. James Kearney, Director Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Stephen R. MacNamara, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Joseph A. Sole, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 =================================================================
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Petitioner has been the subject of a discriminatory housing practice by the Respondent through the alleged failure of the Respondent to provide a reasonable accommodation for a disability.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the case, the Respondent operated an age-restricted mobile home park in Sarasota, Florida. With limited exceptions, residents of the mobile home park are 55 years of age and older. In September 2000, the Petitioner, a woman over 55 years of age, purchased a mobile home located within the Ridgewood Mobile Home Park. The mobile home was purchased through a real estate broker. The mobile home park apparently identifies itself through signage as a community for persons 55 years of age and older. Prior to the purchase the Petitioner had no communication with the Respondent and made no inquiry of the Respondent as to whether her son, who is under 55 years of age, would be allowed to live in the mobile home park. Within a few days of the purchase, the Petitioner was advised that residence in the mobile home park was limited, with certain exceptions, to persons 55 years of age and older. The Respondent advised the Petitioner that her son, who is under 55 years of age, could remain with her only for a period of up to two months to help her "settle in." By lease application dated October 1, 2000, the Petitioner advised the Respondent that her son would remain with her for a period of two months. In November 2000, after the two months had passed, the manager of the mobile home park (Mr. Cobb) informed the Respondent that her son would have to leave the residence. At that time, the Petitioner's son asserted that he was his mother's full-time, live-in caregiver. Prior to this point, the Petitioner had not indicated to the Respondent that she suffered from a handicap or required the services of a full-time, live-in caregiver The evidence fails to establish that, either at the time of the Petitioner's initial residence at the Respondent's mobile home park or by November 2000, the Petitioner suffered from a handicap or from any condition that substantially limited any major life activity, or that the Petitioner required the assistance of a full-time, live-in caregiver. At the time the Petitioner moved into the Respondent's mobile home park, the Petitioner was able to accomplish all major life activities. Although diabetic, the Petitioner was able to walk, drive, and shop for food or other necessities. Her son assisted in house cleaning and in other routine activities, but there is no credible evidence that, prior to August 2002, such assistance was required for performing major life activities. In August 2002, shortly after a medical procedure on the Petitioner's carotid artery, the Petitioner suffered a stroke. She was hospitalized for a period of approximately ten days and then transferred into a rehabilitation hospital for a period of approximately six weeks. Letters submitted from medical professionals involved with the Petitioner's case at the time of her stroke suggest that assistance was needed during the period of incapacity related to the stroke. There is no credible evidence that, subsequent to rehabilitation, the Petitioner needed the services of a full- time, live-in caregiver. After rehabilitation, the Petitioner recovered from the stroke sufficiently to regain her ability to perform major life activities, including driving an automobile. A subsequent automobile accident wherein she ran down a stop sign in the mobile home park after going shopping suggests that driving at night may be inappropriate. Following post-stroke rehabilitation, the Petitioner's son continued to reside with his mother, to assist in household duties and in assuring that the Petitioner followed a medication regimen, but the evidence fails to establish that she currently requires a full-time, live-in caregiver. At the time of the hearing, neither the Petitioner nor her son was residing in the Respondent's mobile home park. The evidence establishes that disabled or handicapped persons in the mobile home park who require full-time, live-in caregivers are accommodated without regard to the age of the caregiver or to the mobile home park's age-related restrictions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the complaint of Dona M. Burgess against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth M. Boyle, Esquire Gulfcoast Legal Services, Inc. 1750 17th Street, Building 1 Sarasota, Florida 34234 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kimberly P. Walker, Esquire Kevin Bruning, Esquire Williams, Parker, Harrison, Dietz & Getzen 200 South Orange Avenue Sarasota, Florida 34236-6802 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues are whether the respondents engaged in a discriminatory housing practice, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2007),1 by discriminating against Petitioner, on the basis of her alleged disability, and by harassing Petitioner and retaliating against her.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a former resident of Broadview Mobile Home Park (Broadview), located at 1701 Post Road, Melbourne, Florida. Petitioner resided in Broadview for approximately six years from an undisclosed date in 2002 through September 8, 2008. Mr. Lamont Garber holds an ownership interest in Broadview. The record does not quantify the ownership interest of Mr. Garber. Mr. Garber manages Broadview with his brother, Mr. Wayne Garber. Broadview rents sites within the mobile home park to residents who own mobile homes. Each site has access to water and electric service. Each resident arranges his or her water and electric service directly with the respective utility provider. Sometime in 2005, Petitioner purchased a mobile home for approximately $6,500.00 and moved within Broadview to Lot 24. The rental agreement for Lot 24 required rent to be paid on the first day of each month. The rent for July 2008 was due on July 1, 2008. Petitioner failed to pay the rent payment that was due on July 1, 2008. On July 9, 2008, Broadview served Petitioner, by certified mail, with a notice that she had five business days in which to pay the rent due (the five-day notice). Petitioner received the five-day notice on July 10, 2008. The five-day period expired on July 17, 2008, with no rent payment from Petitioner. Petitioner had paid rent late in the past, but Petitioner had never been more than four or five days late. After July 17, 2008, Broadview initiated eviction proceedings. Petitioner tendered the rent payment on July 20, 2008, but Broadview proceeded with the eviction. Petitioner did not appear and defend the eviction proceeding. On August 26, 2008, the County Court for Brevard County, Florida, issued a Final Default Judgment of Eviction awarding possession of Lot 24 to Broadview. Law enforcement officers thereafter executed the Court's order and evicted Petitioner from Broadview on or about September 8, 2008. After Petitioner received the notice of eviction, she filed a complaint with the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile Homes (DBPR). DBPR is the state agency responsible for regulating mobile home parks, including Broadview. The allegations in the complaint that Petitioner filed with DBPR were substantially similar to the claims of discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and unlawful rent increases Petitioner asserts in this proceeding. DBPR rejected Petitioner's allegations and found that Broadview lawfully evicted Petitioner for non-payment of rent. The final agency action of DBPR is substantially similar to that of HUD and the Commission's proposed agency action in this proceeding. Each agency found that Broadview lawfully evicted Petitioner for non-payment of rent and rejected the allegations of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. The DOAH proceeding is a de novo consideration of the proceeding before the Commission. A preponderance of the evidence does not establish a prima facie showing that Petitioner is disabled or handicapped. Petitioner has cancer and is receiving chemotherapy and radiation treatment. A preponderance of evidence does not show that the medical condition substantially limits one or more major life activities of Petitioner. Petitioner also alleges that she is disabled and handicapped by a mental condition. Petitioner submitted no medical evidence of the alleged disability or handicap. A preponderance of evidence does not establish a prima facie showing that, if such a mental condition exists, the condition substantially limits one or more major life activities of Petitioner. Assuming arguendo that a preponderance of the evidence showed that Petitioner were disabled or handicapped, a preponderance of evidence does not establish a prima facie showing that either of the respondents discriminated against Petitioner, harassed her, or evicted her in retaliation for Petitioner's disability or handicap. It is undisputed that Petitioner conducted neighborhood organization efforts to protest a rent increase at Broadview and repeatedly called law enforcement officials to report alleged drug and prostitution activity in Broadview.2 However, Broadview did not evict Petitioner for those activities, and Petitioner's testimony to the contrary is neither credible nor persuasive. Rather, Petitioner engaged in other activities that the respondents found objectionable. Petitioner baby sat for one or more dogs in violation of Broadview's prohibition against pets. Some of the dogs were dangerous to other residents. Petitioner also verbally abused Mr. Wayne Garber when he attempted to mediate with Petitioner concerning the presence of dogs and Petitioner's conduct toward management at Broadview. On July 1, 2008, Broadview served Petitioner with a seven-day notice concerning Petitioner's compliance with lease requirements. The notice, in relevant part, alleged that Petitioner harassed management and impaired the ability of management to perform its duties. The testimony of respondents describing the activities of Petitioner that precipitated the seven-day notice is credible and persuasive. A preponderance of the evidence shows that the respondents had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for requiring Petitioner to comply with the terms of the seven-day notice and for requiring Petitioner to comply with the requirement for rent to be paid on July 1, 2008. Petitioner failed to comply with either requirement, and Broadview evicted Petitioner for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. The respondents did not harass or retaliate against Petitioner.3
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding that the respondents did not engage in an unlawful housing practice and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 2009.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether state use tax is due and payable on transactions wherein the taxpayer rented mobile homes to persons for use as private residences (which the lessees were required to maintain, repair, and insure), pursuant to leases under which the lessee would acquire title to his home upon payment in full of the total rent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order withdrawing the tax assessment against Park Place. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 2004.
The Issue Did Respondent violate Section 723.037(1), Florida Statutes, by failing to give timely written notice of rent increase on mobile home lots, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent owned the Arcadia Peace River Campground (Campground) located in DeSoto County, Florida, whose mailing address is 2988 Northwest Highway 70, Arcadia, Florida 34266. From October 3, 1996 through March 21, 1998, the Campground had 14 or more of its mobile home lots occupied by mobile homes. From October 3, 1996 through March 21, 1998, seven or more of the mobile homes located in the Campground were owned by residents of the Campground other than Respondent. Furthermore, these mobile homes were placed on lots leased by the mobile home residents from the Campground. From October 3, 1996 through March 21, 1998, four or more of the mobile homes located in the Campground were owned by Respondent's employees and placed on lots in the Campground. The rental for these lots was considered as part of the employees' compensation. On January 1, 1997, Respondent implemented and began collecting a $30.00 increase in the monthly lot rental from those mobile home owners leasing spaces in the Campground. Respondent gave the affected mobile home owners written notice of the January 1, 1997, monthly lot rental increase on November 26, 1996, some 36 days prior to the effective date (January 1, 1997) of the increase. No other notice of the lot rental increase was given to the affected mobile home owners. Respondent collected the $30.00 lot rental increase from the affected mobile home owners during the period from January 1, 1997, through March 21, 1998. On January 1, 1998, Respondent implemented and began collecting a $15.00 increase in the monthly lot rental from those mobile home owners leasing spaces in the Campground. Respondent gave the affected mobile home owners written notice of the January 1, 1998, monthly lot rental increase on October 28, 1997, some 65 days prior to the effective date of the increase. Respondent collected the $15.00 monthly lot rental increase from January 1, 1998, through March 21, 1998. Each of the following affected mobile home owners paid both the $30.00 monthly lot rental increase from January 1, 1997, through March 21, 1998 and the $15.00 monthly lot rental increase from January 1, 1998, through March 21, 1998: Charles Collins; Arthur P. McRae; Harold Martin; Maurice W. Jackson; Robert F. Martin; Irene K. Apps and; Reba Conner. On March 21, 1998, the Peace River flooded the Campground. The mobile homes located in the Campground were damaged. Subsequently, the mobile homes were removed from the Campground, purchased by Respondent, or were purchased by one or more new employees of Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and having specifically reviewed the factors set out in Section 723.006(5)(c), Florida Statutes, it is recommended that the Division enter a final order assessing Respondent with an administrative fine of $500.00. It is further recommended that Respondent be ordered to refund to Charles Collins, Arthur P. McRae, Harold Martin, Maurice W. Jackson, Robert F. Martin, Irene K. Apps, and Reba Conner all sums collected from these individuals as increases in lot rental during the period of January 1, 1997 through March 21, 1998. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip Nowick, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 William Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Eric H. Miller, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 George Lempenau, Qualified Representative 2998 Northwest Highway 70 Arcadia, Florida 34266
The Issue The issues in this case concern the attempt by Petitioner to collect $11,684.62 in attorneys fees and costs associated with the defense of the case of State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, Petitioner, vs. Donald L. Hilgeman and Marilyn Hilgeman, d/b/a DLH Enterprises; and Pat Montgomery, as park owners of Lake Waldena Resort, Respondents, DOAH Case No. 89-4100, and $931.50 in attorneys fees and costs attributable to the pursuit of the present case to collect those attorneys fees and costs attributable to the defense of the administrative prosecution. See Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this inquiry Petitioner was a mobile home park owner as defined by Section 723.003(7), Florida Statutes (1987). Petitioner, Marilyn Hilgeman, his former wife, and Pat Montgomery had administrative charges brought against them through a notice to show cause. In that notice to show cause those three individuals were identified as park owners of Lake Waldena Resort in Silver Springs, Florida. In particular the present Respondent charged the Petitioner and the others with violating Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987) for having refused to meet with a designated mobile home owners committee within 30 days of giving notice of a lot rent increase and having been requested to conduct that meeting for purpose of discussing the reasons for the increase in the lot rental amount. The accused sought a formal hearing as envisioned by Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. That hearing was conducted by the undersigned and a recommended order entered on April 18, 1990, in the aforementioned DOAH Case No. 89-4100. For reasons set out in the conclusions of law found within the recommended order, the suggested disposition of that case was one which found the several Petitioners innocent of any wrong doing and called for the dismissal of the administrative prosecution. On July 25, 1990 the prosecuting agency entered its final order in DOAH Case No. 89-4100. It accepted the fact-finding in the recommended order; however, it modified the conclusions of law and recommended disposition. Unlike the recommended order, the final order in its conclusions of law specifically found that the present Petitioner and the others accused had violated Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes, wherein at page 17 it was held "Therefore, it is concluded Respondent violated Sections 723.037(3), Florida Statutes." The conclusions of law in the final order went on to say that in mitigation of the violation the prosecuting agency had considered the apparent confusion of those Respondents regarding the affect of Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code, as it might influence the actions of the accused and in particular, the present Petitioner. In the final order concerning the mitigating affects of Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code, it was decided that notwithstanding any misunderstanding the accused had as to the significance of the Rule it could not alter the statutory requirements of having a meeting within 30 days of the notice of lot rental increase as described in Section 723.037(3), Florida Administrative Code (1987). The language within Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code, stated: If requested to do so by the park owner or subdivision developer, the committee shall certify that it has been selected as described in Rule 7D-32.003, Florida Admin- istrative Code. This certification shall include a certificate of all members of the committee attesting to its proper formation under the statute and these rules. For reasons expressed in the recommended order that rule was seen as tolling the 30-day requirement for meeting expressed in Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987) on the facts found in both the recommended and final orders. This was based upon a recognition that the present Petitioner had employed the rule in an attempt to gain a certification from the committee of mobile home owners prior to the conduct of a meeting to discuss the increase in lot rentals. Again, this belief that the rule tolled the requirement for conducting the meeting within 30 days of the notice of lot rental increase expressed in the recommended order was rejected in the final order. The final order controls absent further relief by resort to the appellate court process. In describing the reasons why the prosecution maintained that the rule could not alter the statutory requirement for holding a meeting within 30 days, the final order states that there are policy considerations that make it important for the committee and the park owner to meet within 30 days and those reasons concern the fact that the rent increase becomes effective within 90 days over the notice, the informational value of having the reasons explained for the lot increase as a prelude to any request to having a dispute about lot rental increases submitted to mediation within 30 days following the scheduled meeting. The final order goes on to describe, through its conclusions of law, that the meeting to discuss lot rental increase was not held until November 14, 1989 over a year after the notice of lot rental increase. That statement comes immediately before the conclusion of law that the present Petitioner had violated Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes. In the conclusions of law set out in the final order the prosecuting agency in its paragraph describing the mitigating circumstances acknowledges the possible confusion on the part of the accused as well as the mobile home owners committee when it describes, as did the recommended order, the filing of a complaint by the committee as a means of ostensibly preserving the right to have the meeting envisioned by Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987), when taken against the background of the opportunity to have a credential check of mobile home owners committee members as envisioned by Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code. This refers to the issue of whether a meeting could be held after 30 days from the notice of intended lot rental increase absent such a complaint. In the statement on mitigation the final order recognizes that the administrative prosecution was penal in nature and that Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987) and Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code needed to be read in context and should be strictly construed with ambiguities favoring the accused. The final order cites to State v. Pattishall, 99 Fla. 296, 126 So. 147 (1930) and Davis v. Dept. of Professional Regulation, 457 So.2d 1074 (Fla. 1DCA 1984). The treatment of those cases and the resolution of the dispute through final order is one which finds the accused in violation of Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987), but mitigates the disposition in the way of the penalty based upon the reading given Pattishall and Davis, supra. That factual impression is given when the order in disposition is examined wherein it is stated through the final order, "Based upon the consideration of the facts found, the conclusions of law reached, and the mitigation evidence, it is ordered that the notice to show cause is hereby dismissed." On August 22, 1990, the present Petitioner noticed an appeal of the final order in the administrative prosecution but later abandoned that appeal before the court had the opportunity to speak to its merits. On October 22, 1990, the present Petitioner filed a petition for collection of attorneys fees and costs spoken to in the statement of issues. The petition for attorneys fees and costs were subjected to a motion to dismiss based upon a claim of untimeliness and that motion was denied by order of December 10, 1990. The present Respondent requested an evidentiary hearing as contemplated Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and Rule 22I-6.035, Florida Administrative Code, and the evidentiary hearing was conducted on the date described before. When the present Petitioner abandoned his appeal to the District Court, he necessarily was placed in the position of arguing that the final order drawn by the prosecuting agency constituted the basis for the claim that he was a small business party who had prevailed in the dispute related to DOAH Case No. 89-4100. See Section 57.111(3)(c)1, Florida Statutes. Contrary to his assertion the final order as described in these facts did not favor the present Petitioner. Although the prosecuting agency did not choose to impose a penalty against the present Petitioner based upon its assessment of matters in mitigation and dismissed the case without exacting a penalty, it had found the present Petitioner in violation of a substantiative provision of law, i.e. Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987). Thus, the disposition cannot be said to favor the present Petitioner. Having decided this mixed question of fact and law against the present Petitioner, it is not necessary to make findings of fact concerning whether the present Petitioner is a small business party as defined at Section 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes and whether the present Respondent was substantially justified in this administrative prosecution related to law and fact as contemplated by Sections 57.111(3)(e) and (4)(a), Florida Statutes, or to examine whether special circumstances exist that would make the award of attorneys fees and costs unjust.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed the violations as alleged and, if so, what civil penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, T. Cayton Enterprises, Inc. is the owner and operator of Four Oaks Mobile Home Village, a mobile home park located in Titusville, Brevard County, Florida. On or around June 27, 1986, Thomas Cayton, as President of T. Cayton Enterprises, Inc. filed a prospectus for the park with Petitioner, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes. The filing statement provided that 49 lots would be offered for rent, and that none of the lots were occupied. The $10.00 per lot filing fee ($490.00) was paid. The filing was rejected as the form was deficient. Between the end of June 1986, and August 26, 1987, the date of the approval letter, eight versions of the prospectus were filed by the park owner and were reviewed by staff of the division. After each review, the owner was sent a letter outlining the deficiencies. At one point, sometime around June 1987, Mr. and Mrs. Cayton travelled to Tallahassee to meet with Selena Einwechter, the Supervisor of the Examination Section in the agency's Bureau of Mobile Homes. The prospectus submittals and correspondence to and from the Bureau comprise 425 pages. Between the filing of the first version of the prospectus and the final approval, approximately 14 months later, twelve lots were rented at Four Oaks Mobile Home Village. The lot numbers and dates of the rentals are: Lot #3 August 1, 1986 Lot #2 August 2, 1986 Lot #44 August 15, 1986 Lot #46 August 30, 1986 Lot #12 November 1, 1986 Lot #4 November 30, 1986 Lot #19 January 15, 1987 Lot #7 March 9, 1987 Lot #6 June 1, 1987 Lot #15 June 1, 1987 Lot #5 June 6, 1987 Lot #9 June 30, 1987 Six of the recitals are evidenced by written leases; the remainder were oral agreements, reflected in the office records of the park. All of the tenants commenced paying rent upon occupancy of the lot and no one was told that the leases were unenforceable. At the beginning of the process, on July 29, 1986, Thomas Cayton was sent a letter from the Bureau of Mobile Homes confirming that his prospectus filing had been received and was being examined. The bottom of the letter includes this statement, clearly displayed: NOTE: Section 723.011, Florida Statutes, and Rule 7D-31.01, Florida Administrative Code, requires the delivery of a prospectus which has been deemed adequate by the Division prior to entering into enforceable rental agreements or renewal of existing rental agreements. Renewals of existing rental agreements or entering into new rental agreements without delivery of a prospectus which has been deemed adequate will constitute a violation of the Florida Mobile Home Act. (Petitioner's Exhibit #1, composite) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Subsection 723.005(d)1., F.S. authorizes the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes to impose a civil penalty not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000) against a mobile home park owner for each separate violation of Chapter 723, F.S. or regulation promulgated pursuant thereto. The statute and rule allegedly violated by Respondent provides as follows: 723.011 Disclosure prior to rental of a mobile home lot; prospectus, filing, approval.-- (1)(a) In a mobile home park containing 26 or more lots, the park owner shall file a prospectus with the diversion. Prior to entering into an enforceable rental agreement for a mobile home lot, the park owner shall deliver to the home owner a prospectus approved by the division. This subsection shall not be construed to invalidate those lot rental agreements for which an approved prospectus was required to be delivered and which was delivered on or before July 1, 1986, if the mobile home park owner had: Filed a prospectus with the division prior to entering into the lot rental agreement; Made a good faith effort to correct deficiencies cited by the division by responding within the time limit set by the division, if one was set; and Delivered the approved prospectus to the mobile home owner within 45 days of approval by the division. This paragraph shall not preclude the finding that a lot rental agreement is invalid on other grounds and shall not be construed to limit any rights of a mobile home-owner from seeking any remedies allowed by this chapter, including a determination that the lot rental agreement or any part thereof is unreasonable or unconscionable. (emphasis added) * * * 7D-31.001 Prospectus and Rental Agreement. * * * (13) The park owner shall deliver the prospectus to existing tenants prior to the renewal of their rental agreements or prior to entering into a new rental agreement. Once a tenant has been given a prospectus, the park owner shall not be required to provide another prospectus but shall provide amendments, as described in Rule 7D-30.004 and this rule. Because Four Oaks' prospectus was not approved until the end of August 1987, the 12 rental agreements entered between August 1, 1986 and June 30, 1987, violated the above provisions. Respondent claims that he thought that as long as the prospectus had been filed, he could enter into rental agreements. This would have been true under the original version of the Florida Mobile Home Act, passed by the Legislature in 1984. The relevant provision of that act is found in Section 720.302(1), F.S. (1984) as follows: Every mobile home park owner of a park which contains 26 or more lots shall file a prospectus or offering circular with the division prior to entering into an enforceable rental agreement. Chapter 84-80, Laws of Florida, Part III) This section took effect on January 1, 1985, for parks with more than 100 lots, and on July 1, 1985 for parks with less than 100 lots. (Chapter 84-80, Laws of Florida) The current version, reflected in Section 723.011, F.S., cited above, took effect on July 1, 1986. (Chapter 86-162, Laws of Florida) Respondent cannot avail himself of the "grand-father" provision of Section 723.011, since his rental agreements and prospectus approval occurred after July 1st. Further, the explicit language of the note on the July 29, 1986, letter should have put him on notice of the new requirements of the law. There are no guidelines for the imposition of a penalty, other than the $5,000.00 maximum per violation found in Section 723.006(5)(d)1. F.S. No evidence was presented as to prior violations by this Respondent. The extensive file evidences a good faith attempt to comply with a law that was still relatively new.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be found guilty of violation of Section 723.011(1)(a), F.S. (1986), as charged, and that a civil penalty of $100.00 per violation be imposed, for a total of $1,200.00. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Coates, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Thomas Cayton, Registered Agent 2475 Cheney Highway Titusville, Florida 3270 Debra Roberts, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Van B. Poole, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Thomas A. Bell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000
Findings Of Fact The Subject Property. The property at issue in this proceeding consists of approximately 66 lots (hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Property"), located in Highridge Estates Subdivision (hereinafter referred to as "Highridge"). Each lot is approximately one-third acre in size. Highridge and the Subject Property are located in Clay County, Florida. Highridge was filed in the public records of Clay County, Florida, as a platted subdivision in January of 1970. At the time Highridge was platted, each lot met the zoning requirements applicable to Highridge. Pursuant to then-existing zoning, each Highridge lot could be developed as a single-family residence by construction or the placement of a mobile home thereon. Adoption of the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan. Clay County adopted the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan"), on January 23, 1992, as required by the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, Part II, Chapter 163, Florida Statutes (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). At the time of the adoption of the Plan, the Plan contained policies which would have permitted lots such as those in Highridge that had not yet been developed to be developed as a single-family residence by the placement of a mobile home thereon. As required by the Act, the Plan was submitted to the Florida Department of Community Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), for review and determination of whether the Plan was "in compliance" as defined by the Act. During the time that the Plan was being considered it was publicly known that the policies which would allow the placement of mobile homes on each of the lots in Highridge might not be accepted by the Department. Petitioner's Acquisition of the Subject Property. During the early 1990's William Bitetti began looking for real estate to invest in. Mr. Bitetti, through the services of Century 21 Lakeside Realty, became aware of the availability of lots in Highridge as a possible investment. Mr. Bitetti was assured by Century 21 Lakeside Realty's realtor that Highridge could be developed by the placement of a single mobile home on each lot. On or about March 25, 1992 Mr. Bitetti entered into a Contract for Sale and Purchase of 56 lots in Highridge. The following condition was included in the Contract for Sale and Purchase: this contract is only conditioned upon Buyer being able to place a Doublewide Mobile Home with attendant well, septic tank and system and electric service on each Lot, to be deter- mined by Buyer's attorney within 2 (two) weeks of the effective date of this contract. Mr. Bitetti intended that the lots would be purchased by the Petitioner, St. William Land Company, Inc. Mr. Bitetti is the sole shareholder and the President of Petitioner. Mr. Bitetti intended that the lots would be marketed for sale as single-family mobile home sites. Mr. Bitetti's attorney, Paul D. Newell, had experience with Highridge, having owned lots within Highridge himself. Mr. Newell was also aware of the language of the Plan that would allow development of the lots in Highridge. Mr. Newell had attempted to keep himself informed as to the progress of the Plan. Mr. Newell spoke to an official of the Clay County Planning and Zoning Department to confirm the language that would allow development of the lots in Highridge was included in the Plan and was told that it was. Mr. Newell also confirmed that regulations in existence at the time would allow Mr. Bitetti to market the lots as intended. The evidence failed to prove that any official of Clay County gave Mr. Newell assurances that the Plan would be approved by the Department as written. Mr. Newell was aware that the Plan had been submitted to the Department for review and had not yet been approved by the Department. Mr. Newell was also aware that it was possible that the Department would not accept the portion of the Plan that allowed continued development of developments like Highridge. On May 21, 1992 the Petitioner purchased the 56 lots in Highridge. Two of the 56 lots were subsequently sold by Petitioner. On or about October 12, 1992, Petitioner purchased an additional 12 lots in Highridge. The 12 lots purchased on October 12, 1992 and 54 of the lots purchased on May 21, 1992 constitute the Subject Property. At the time of purchase, the Subject Property lots could be sold for the installation of a mobile home on each lot pursuant to the law then in effect. The Plan was, however, still being reviewed by the Department. The Subject Property lots have direct access to a publicly owned and maintained right-of-way or to a privately owned platted right-of-way. Alleged Government Action Relied Upon by the Petitioner. On or about July 5, 1992, after acquiring the first 56 lots, Petitioner was issued a permit by the Clay County Building Department authorizing Petitioner to place a mobile home sales model on one of the lots. The evidence failed to prove that Clay County made any representation to Petitioner or Mr. Bitetti, or their representatives, that the policies of the Plan which would allow each lot of the Subject Property to be developed as individual sites for mobile homes would be approved by the Department or that, if it was, the law would not subsequently be changed. Nor did the evidence prove that Clay County represented in anyway that the Subject Property could be developed as Petitioner intended. Petitioner's Alleged Detrimental Reliance. Petitioner purchased the Subject Property for approximately $49,048.18, including closing costs. Two of the 68 lots purchased by Petitioner were subsequently sold. Petitioner realized a profit of approximately $2,582.31 on the sale of these lots. During 1992 Petitioner paid $29,515.37 to purchase and locate a mobile home as a model on one of the lots, to furnish the mobile home, and for landscaping, utilities, and the installation of a well, septic tank and power pole associated with the lot the mobile home was placed on. Petitioner also incurred the following expenses: $1,452.29 for postage associated with attempting to sell lots; $250.00 for charitable donations; $167.66 in bank account service fees; $2,957.85 for hazard and liability insurance; $36.50 in "miscellaneous" expenses; $2,355.72 for ad valorem taxes; and $510.00 in legal fees. Similar expenses were also incurred in 1993. The evidence failed to prove that Petitioner incurred any expenses or obligations for the development of the Subject Property. Rights That Allegedly Will Be Destroyed. Subsequent to Petitioner's acquisition of the Subject Property, the issuance of the permit to place a mobile home sales model on one of the lots and the acquisition of the mobile home and placement of the mobile home on one lot, the Plan was determined to not be in compliance with the Act. In particular, it was determined that the policies of the Plan which would have permitted lots such as those in Highridge that had not yet been developed to be developed by the placement of a mobile home on each lot caused the Plan to be "not in compliance". Clay County subsequently amended the Plan to eliminate the policies that would have permitted lots such as those in Highridge that had not yet been developed to be developed by the placement of a mobile home on each lot. The Plan was determined to be in compliance on April 27, 1993. As a result of the elimination of the policies pertinent to this matter, Clay County was required to modify the zoning for the Subject Property. The Subject Property was zoned for use for the smallest lot size allowed pursuant to the Plan: one-half acre. As a result of the foregoing, most of the Subject Property lots are too small to be developed individually. Pursuant to the Plan, lots that stand alone may be developed by the placement of a single mobile home thereon. Two of the 66 lots stand alone and, therefore, may be developed by the placement of a single mobile home thereon. The remaining 64 lots of the Subject Property are located in contiguous groups and, pursuant to the Plan, must be combined into one-half acre lots or larger. As a result, the Petitioner will lose the ability to sell some number of his lots for the placement of a single mobile home thereon. The evidence failed to prove what the actual economic impact will be to Petitioner if it cannot sell each lot for use as a single mobile home lot. Petitioner was notified by a letter dated August 24, 1993 and a letter to its real estate broker dated January 24, 1994 and a letter to Mr. Bitetti dated February 2, 1994, of the restrictions on the use of the Subject Property. The letters were all from Clay County personnel.
