Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In February 1989, petitioner, Dennis John Hujar, was an examinee on the certified residential contractor examination The test is prepared under the direction of and administered by respondent, Department of Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board (Department or Board). Petitioner later received written advice from the Department that he had made a grade of 68 on the examination. According to agency rules, a score of at least 69.1 is required for passing. Petitioner then filed an appeal of his grade contending that question 19 was ambiguous. That prompted this proceeding. The examination in question was prepared by the National Assessment Institute and contains three specific areas of testing, including business and financial management. The latter section includes questions on business law. Each item or question is drafted by a committee made up of representatives of the Department, Board and construction industry. After being drafted, the question is reviewed by the Department and Board for accuracy and content. However, the business law questions are not reviewed by attorneys prior to their use. Question 19 was a business law question having a value of two points on an examinee's overall score. The parties agree that if Hujar had received two additional points he would have passed the examination. Question 19 was designed to ascertain if the candidate could differentiate between a licensed and unlicensed contractor, the significance of that distinction, and the circumstances under which the recovery of profit and supervisory costs would be allowed. The question contained four possible answers, (a), (b), (c) and (d), one of which was a "good detractor" for the examinees. The correct solution was based on reference material contained in section 2.10 of the Florida Construction Law Manual, a copy of which has been received in evidence as hearing officer exhibit 2. As is pertinent here, that section provided as follows: Where a contractor or subcontractor has no license and enters into a contract, the contract is void for illegality. (citation omitted) The unlicensed contractor is not permitted to recover for lost profit. However, where work has already been done, the courts have allowed recovery on the basis of quantum meruit, but still deny recover of lost profit and cost of supervision. (citation omitted) In a case where the principal of a corporation was licensed as a general contractor for 17 years, but the corporation owned by the principal was not so licensed, a California court held that there was substantial compliance with licensing so as not to deny recovery of sums due. (citation omitted) Any person who is not licensed may not be considered as a lienor and may not have a mechanic's lien. (citation omitted) Because of security and confidentiality constraints, the challenged question cannot be repeated verbatim herein. It is suffice to say that the problem posed a hypothetical situation involving a state licensed general contractor who utilized an out-of-state (or unlicensed) subcontractor for site work on a Florida project. After the subcontractor completed site work of a specified value, the initial draw request was submitted to the owner for reimbursement of that cost and a reasonable profit. A second invoice for site work was then submitted to the Florida contractor but not the owner. At the same time, the owner learned of the subcontractor's unlicensed status and halted work on the project. The question asked the amount of money that the owner would "most likely (be) liable for at the time of the due date for the initial draw." According to the answer sheet received in evidence as hearing officer exhibit 1, the owner was liable for the initial draw request at that time, including allowable overhead, but did not owe for the cost of the second invoice not yet submitted to him by the contractor. This response was consistent with the cited reference material. Through his representative, petitioner claimed that the word "liable" most logically should be construed to mean the amount of money that the owner was ultimately liable to pay on the project although not necessarily at that point in time. Under this theory, the owner would have been responsible for a dollar amount at least equal to the contractors's cost in the initial draw plus the second but not yet submitted invoice for completion of the site work. If such an interpretation of the question was valid, petitioner's answer would have been correct. In this regard, it is noted that although there is no testimony as to the response given by Hujar on this question, it may be reasonably inferred that his answer was the same as that suggested by his representative. Koning contended further that in order to make correct the Board's response, the question should have asked for the owner's liability "at that time", thereby denoting that the ultimate liability was not in issue. It is noted that petitioner's representative is a licensed general, plumbing, roofing and underground utilities contractor and teaches the law manual as a preparatory course for the state examination. Petitioner is a former student. Respondent's consultant, George Bruton, who is a licensed general contractor and assists in the preparation of examination questions, considered the question to be clear and unambiguous. According to Bruton, the question required a student to recognize that 100% of a subcontractor's invoice plus allowable overhead are due and payable in full at the time of the first draw. However, because the owner had not yet been invoiced for the remaining amount of site work, he would not be liable for that amount. Bruton discounted petitioner's suggested answer as being nonresponsive on the grounds the words "ultimate liability" did not appear in the question, and petitioner was assuming a condition not called for in the question. Since the question did not use the words "ultimate liability", and petitioner's interpretation is not the most reasonable one, it is found that the question was not so "substantially misleading and insufficient" as to warrant the invalidation of the question or to justify a different response.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying petitioner's request to receive a passing grade on the examination. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of October, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-4313 Petitioner: 1-2. Used in finding of fact 2. Used in findings of fact 2 and 4. Used in preliminary statement and conclusions of law. Used in preliminary statement and finding of fact 8. Used in finding of fact 7. Rejected since it can be inferred that petitioner's response was choice c. Respondent: Respondent's "summary of facts" has been treated as conclusions of law and therefore specific rulings have not been made. The document attached to the summary of facts is not of record and has accordingly been disregarded. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Robert Koning 8301 Joliet Street Hudson, Florida 34667 Mr. Dennis J. Hujar 1511 Brooker Road Brandon, Florida 33511 E. Harper Field, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Fred Seely, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief in this case. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1990.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Petitioner, Gary P. Santoro (“Petitioner” or “Mr. Santoro”), undeservedly received a failed grade on the Construction Business and Finance Examination (“Examination”) for licensure as an air-conditioning contractor; whether any questions on the examination had more than one correct answer; whether the examination is unfair; whether there is transparency in the examination review process; and whether the examination grading process is arbitrary and capricious.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Santoro took the Examination on November 16, 2018. Petitioner failed the Examination because he scored less than 70 percent correct. The Examination contains 125 questions, 120 of which are scored. The other five are not scored and are considered “pilot” questions for potential use on future examinations. In order to pass the Examination, a candidate must obtain a score of at least 70 percent. All scored questions on the Examination are weighted equally. As a result of failing to pass the Examination, Petitioner was notified of his results. All questions on the Examination had a single correct answer. Cynthia Woodley, Ph.D., employed by Professional Testing, Inc. (“PTI”), as the chief operating officer, is an expert in psychometrics and exam development. She holds a master’s degree in vocational education and a doctorate in curriculum and instruction with a specialization in measurement. Her current position calls for her to manage a number of licensure and certification exam programs. She explained at length how specific questions become part of a professional licensure exam. To develop questions, her company brings in any number of subject matter experts, people actually employed in the professions being tested, and they help develop subject matter questions for a particular exam. That was the process used for development of the Examination in this matter. Once the subject matter experts are trained in exam question writing techniques, they write questions, which are reviewed by other subject matter experts to determine whether the questions are fair and understandable enough to be answered by prospective test takers. Generally, five subject matter experts review each question before it makes its way onto an exam. PTI measures the “P value” of the questions by determining what percent of individuals taking a given exam answer a particular question correctly. For example, a P value of .90 means that 90 percent of the people taking the exam answered a particular question correctly. PTI looks for a wide range of P values in its exam questions. If a P value is too low, say .40, the company might reexamine that question to determine whether it should be removed from future exams since fewer than half the people taking the exam answered it correctly. The business and finance portion of the exam is given to all contractors, regardless of their specialty, with the exception of pool service contractors. Here, Petitioner, a HVAC contractor was administered the same Examination as plumbing contractors, electrical contractors, general contractors, etc. Each of the 120 questions on the exam in this case was equally weighted. There were also five pilot questions inserted into the exam, which did not count towards the total score, but were included as test questions for future exams. Petitioner provided hearsay documents regarding computer hacking and computer glitches associated with some exams administered around the United States. However, he did not connect the articles submitted into evidence to the exam administered in this case or any exam administered by the Department in Florida. Dr. Woodley was familiar with the allegations of computer glitches in testing, but testified that the problems were with K-12 testing in schools, not with professional licensure exams, such as administered by the Department. Therefore, since the hearsay evidence was not linked to the exam at issue or similar professional licensure exams given in Florida, it is entitled to no weight in arriving at the decision in this case. Question BF 1290 has a single correct answer, which is answer “C.” Petitioner selected answer “B.” Petitioner was unable to demonstrate that the answer he selected was correct. Question BF 0473 has a single correct answer, which is answer “A.” Petitioner selected answer “C.” This question asks for an answer of general applicability. Petitioner’s claim that his answer is equally correct is based on a narrow exception in law. Accordingly, Petitioner was not able to demonstrate that the answer he selected was correct. Question BF 0162 has a single correct answer, which is answer “B.” Petitioner selected answer “C.” Petitioner was unable to demonstrate that the answer he selected was correct. Question BF 1691 has a single correct answer, which is answer “C.” Petitioner selected answer “D.” Petitioner was unable to demonstrate that the answer he selected was correct. Petitioner was unable to submit sufficient evidence to show that the Examination is unfair, that there is insufficient transparency in the examination review process, or that the examination grading process is arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, he cannot prevail in his challenge to the Examination. Petitioner testified that he took and passed the HVAC contractors special license examination on his first attempt. He has taken the Examination on numerous occasions and is yet to be successful. He testified he studied hard for every administration of the exam, but just cannot reach the finish line successfully. While that is unfortunate, the evidence does not support that his failure to succeed on the Examination is the fault of the exam itself or of the Department either in its contracting to have the exam created or in the administration of the exam. From the way he conducted himself at hearing, Petitioner appears to be an intelligent, diligent, and successful individual in his HVAC business. For some unknown reason he has been unable to successfully complete the Examination. His persistence in retaking the Examination multiple times is admirable and should ultimately pay off with his successful passage of the Examination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a final order upholding the Department’s Amended Grade Report finding that Petitioner failed to achieve a passing score on the Construction Business and Finance Examination, which he took on November 16, 2018. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of August, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of August, 2019. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas G. Thomas, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 (eServed) Gary Peter Santoro Hometown Air & Services 8229 Blaikie Court Sarasota, Florida 34240-8323 (eServed) Ray Treadwell, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 (eServed) Daniel Biggins, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Halsey Beshears, Secretary Department of Business and Professional Regulation 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Myra McKinney, is a black female. The Respondent is an insurance company which conducts operations in Florida, as pertinent hereto, consisting of the receipt of insurance policy applications with attendant premium payments, the recording of such policy applications, and other administrative procedures and operations necessary to act on the applications and receipt of premium monies by underwriting the risks involved by insurance policies issued by the company. The Respondent is an employer in the State of Florida for the purposes of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner was employed by Respondent at times pertinent hereto and from 1981 through June 2, 1992. When she was terminated she held the position of "processing manager." This position involved presiding over the department as supervisor, with the responsibility and function of receiving insurance policy applications and related binder and/or premium monies and properly accounting for them in the process leading up to the Respondent company issuing insurance policy contracts. The Petitioner was the supervisor of personnel charged with the receipt of and proper accounting for such applications and premium monies. On or about June 11, 1992, after being terminated by the Respondent on June 2, 1992, the Petitioner filed a charge of racial discrimination related to her termination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission). An investigation was conducted by the Commission which ultimately resulted in the determination of "no cause." The Petitioner had been placed on work probation on May 11, 1992, because of poor work performance. The terms of her probation status specified that her work performance would have to be reviewed in 30 days and that if objectives were not met she would be terminated. The Petitioner had been asked by her manager or supervisor to provide him with reports on missing work (lost or misplaced applications), as well as a plan to correct the processing deficiencies leading to this problem and to eliminate the backlog of unprocessed applications. The Petitioner failed to provide the requested response and report until the supervisor had to make a second request of her. Witness John Burkhalter, the Petitioner's most recent supervisor, as well as witnesses Maria Diaz and Connie Bonner, established that a corporate audit revealed severe deficiencies and discrepancies in the processing department's function, which the Petitioner supervised. Under the Petitioner's management the processing department had fallen into severe disarray with a serious backlog of unprocessed work, a loss of control by Ms. McKinney over the processing of the work, particularly the problem of lost or misplaced insurance policy applications and related premium or binder checks. There were organizational and work-flow management problems, and very poor morale throughout the processing department. Ms. Diaz established that the poor morale was directly attributable to the Petitioner's performance because she had poor organizational skills. Numerous meetings were held with no apparent purpose for the meetings and little was accomplished. Meeting agendas between the Petitioner and her subordinates were lacking or rudimentary. The Petitioner had the habit of intimidating employees, being critical of them, and causing the employees to feel reluctant to express ideas and opinions clearly, particularly criticisms of the manner in which the office was operated. Once the Petitioner left employment, the backlog of unprocessed work and the problem of missing or misplaced applications was immediately alleviated, with the office functioning in much better fashion ever since. Additional missing applications and a box of "backlogged", unprocesed applications were found concealed in the office on the day of the Petitioner's termination, June 2, 1992, during the course of her work probationary period. Mr. Burkhalter established, as the immediate supervisor of the Petitioner and the regional operations officer of the Respondent company, that the Respondent had a progressive discipline policy and termination policy. The corporate policy was followed with regard to the termination of the Petitioner. The Respondent employed progressive discipline when it learned of the severity of the problems in the processing department, imposing a probationary period first, and giving the Petitioner an opportunity to correct the problems, followed by termination for work performance deficiencies when the opportunity to correct those deficiencies was not taken advantage of by the Petitioner. Ms. McKinney's actual performance in May of 1992 was not consistent with her previous performance evaluations. Her former manager, Mr. McFall, had inflated her performance ratings and given her satisfactory ratings when actually her performance did not justify such. Mr. McFall himself was terminated near the same time as the Petitioner and testified on behalf as concerning purported satisfactory performance but, given the totality of the circumstances surrounding his termination and testimony in support of the Petitioner, is deemed a biased witness against the Respondent. His testimony was colored by his own dispute and history of litigation with the Respondent concerning his employment and termination. Mr. Burkhalter reviewed the Petitioner's entire personnel file, the deficiencies in her work performance and her lack of any improvement during the work probationary period when the Respondent gave her an opportunity to improve and make corrections. He determined termination was, therefore, the only option. He reviewed such considerations as transferring the Petitioner or demoting her to another position. However, because of the exceedingly poor morale generated in the department largely by the Petitioner's management and supervisory practices, Mr. Burkhalter determined that neither option was in the best interest of the Respondent or Ms. McKinney. He, therefore, terminated Ms. McKinney in compliance with the provisions of the work probation policy of the Respondent. He did not terminate her or otherwise discipline her for any reasons motivated by consideration of her race. In establishing this as fact, his testimony is corroborated by that of Ms. Lynn Jones, a black female employee, who testified that she had never been personally discriminated against by Mr. Burkhalter or Colonial nor had she observed any other black person employed by the Respondent treated in what appeared to her to be a disparate fashion, including the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of Record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the subject petition of Myra McKinney in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of January, 1994 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 1994. APPENDIX Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted but not in itself materially dispositive of the relevant issues. Rejected as not in accordance with the preponderant weight of credible evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact on this subject matter. Rejected as not in accordance with the preponderant weight of credible evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact on this subject matter. Rejected as not in accordance with the preponderant weight of credible evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact on this subject matter. Rejected as not in accordance with the preponderant weight of credible evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact on this subject matter. Rejected as immaterial. Rejected as not in accordance with the totality of the preponderant, credible evidence. 8-9. Accepted, but not dispositive of the material issues presented. Rejected as not in accordance with the preponderant, credible evidence of record. Rejected as not clearly established by the preponderant evidence of record. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact on this subject matter. Accepted. Rejected as immaterial and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact on this subject matter. Rejected as not entirely in accord with the preponderant weight of the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the preponderant weight of the credible evidence. Rejected as contrary to the preponderant weight of the credible evidence. Accepted. Rejected as immaterial. Rejected as immaterial. Accepted. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact on this subject matter. Rejected as immaterial. Rejected as immaterial given the issues in this proceeding. Rejected as immaterial and not in accord with the preponderant weight of the evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact on this subject matter. Rejected as not in accordance with the preponderant weight of the credible evidence. Rejected as immaterial. Rejected as not in accord with the preponderant weight of the credible evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact on this subject matter. Rejected as immaterial under the circumstances presented by the issues in this case. Rejected as immaterial under the circumstances presented by the issues in this case. Rejected as immaterial under the circumstances presented by the issues in this case. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-14. All accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact on the same subject matter to the extent that they differ. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Myra McKinney 1823 Mayfair Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Lucinda A. Reynolds, Esquire McCutchan, Druen, Maynard, Rath & Dietrich One Nationwide Plaza Columbus, Ohio 43216 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact 1. The Findings of Fact set forth in the Recommended Order are approved, adopted, and incorporated by reference as modified by Rulings on Respondent’s Exceptions noted above. 2. There is competent, substantial evidence to support the Findings of Fact.
Conclusions Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is Ordered that Petitioner’s challenge to the licensure examination taken December 6, 2000, is Denied and his petition is Dismissed. This order takes effect upon filing with the Clerk of the Department of Health. Done and Ordered this ( , day of , 2002. BOARD OF PODIATRIC MEDICINE
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing one copy of a Notice of Appeal with the agency clerk of the Department of Health and a second copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal. That Notice of Appeal must be filed within thirty days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by Certified Mail to Charles Pellegrini, Katz, Kutter, Alderman, Bryant & Yon, P.A., 106 E. College Ave., Suite 1200, Tallahassee, FL 32301, and Perry Verleni, 7624 S.W. 56th Avenue, Gainesville, FL 32608, and by interoffice mail to Cherry Shaw, Department of Health, 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Tallahassee, FL 32399-1783, Ella Jane P. Davis, Division of Administrative Hearings, 1230 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, FL 32399-3060, and to Ann Cocheu, Office of the Attorney General, PL 01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050, this IS. day of "\ , 2002. LE qlee F.\Usens\ ADMIN\WILMA\ Ann \pod\000208d.wpd
The Issue Whether Petitioner's responses to Questions 38, 53, and 71 of the April 1991 Mental Health Counselor's Examination were incorrectly scored. Whether Question 71 of said examination is an improper question.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner sat for the Mental Health Counselor's Examination administered by Respondent in April 1991. Petitioner was credited with 102 correct answers out of 140 questions on the professional counseling section of the examination. A score of 103 correct answers out of 140 questions was required to pass the section. Petitioner abandoned all challenges except the challenges to the scoring of her responses to Questions 38, 53, and 71. Petitioner also asserts that Question 71 is unfair because it is ambiguous. All three of the questions involved in this proceeding are multiple choice questions, each with four possible answers. The candidates are instructed to select the best answer to the question. Question 38 pertains to an expression used to described adolescence and asks the candidate to select the best answer that explains the meaning of that expression. Petitioner selected multiple choice number 4 as her answer to the question. Respondent established that multiple choice number 1 was the best answer to the question. Petitioner received no credit for her answer to question 38 because she did not select the best answer to the question. Question 53 pertains to a patient who rambles during an interview and requires the candidate to select from among the four multiple choice answers the best answer that names the technique used by the interviewer to bring the patient back to the main purpose of the discussion. Petitioner selected multiple choice number 1 as her answer to the question. Respondent contends that multiple choice number 4 was the best answer to the question. Petitioner contends that multiple choice number 4 is not a technique and that, consequently, number 4 cannot be the best answer to the question. The greater weight of the evidence, including the literature submitted as exhibits by the parties, is that multiple choice number 4 is a technique and that multiple choice number 4 is the best answer to the question. Petitioner received no credit for her answer to question 53 because she did not select the best answer to the question. Question 71 pertains to an employee at an industrial plant who has sought out the mental health counselor in the employee assistance program. Petitioner contends that the question is ambiguous because insufficient information is given for the reasons the employee sought out the mental health counselor. Respondent established that sufficient information was provided by the root of the question to enable the candidate to select the best answer to the question. Consequently, it is concluded that the question is not impermissibly ambiguous. Petitioner selected multiple choice number 1 as her answer to Question Number 71. Respondent established that multiple choice number 2 was the best answer to the question. Petitioner received no credit for her answer to question 71 because she did not select the best answer to the question.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which upholds the validity of Question 71 and which denies Petitioner's challenge to the scoring of her responses to Questions 38, 53, and 71 of the professional counseling section of the Mental Health Counselor's Examination administered by Respondent in April 1991. DONE AND ORDERED this 11th day of May, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearing The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 1 are discussed as preliminary matters. The proposed findings are unnecessary as findings of fact and are, consequently, rejected. The proposed findings of fact contained in the first sentence of Paragraph 2.a.(1) are rejected because they are unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The candidates are instructed to select the best answer to the question. All four choices may be correct answers. While it may arguably be a correct answer, the answer selected by the Petitioner was not the best answer to the question. The proposed findings of fact contained in the second sentence of Paragraph 2.a.(1) are rejected because they are contrary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact contained in Paragraph 2.a.(2) are rejected because they are subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact contained in Paragraph 2.a.(3) are rejected because they are contrary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in Paragraph 2.b.(1) are rejected as being the recitation of testimony that was considered in making the finding that the question is not ambiguous. The proposed findings of fact in Paragraph 2.c.(1) are rejected as being the recitation of testimony that was considered in making the findings reflected herein. The question called for the candidate to state what the phrase means, not whether the phrase is an improper use of a word of art. The proposed findings of fact in Paragraph 2.c.(2) are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 3, 4, 5, and 6 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 7 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent. The proposed findings of fact in Paragraphs 1 and 2 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in Paragraph 3 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. COPIES FURNISHED: Caren Glassman 1231 SE 1 Street Apt. 13 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Vytas J. Urba, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Diane Orcutt, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Mental Health Counselors 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Petitioner's responses to Question 10 and to Question 19 on the October 1990, general contractor's examination were incorrectly scored.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner sat for the general contractors licensing examination administered by Respondent in October 1990. The overall examination consisted of three parts. Petitioner has passed Parts I and III of the examination, but he failed Part II of the examination. Petitioner received a score of 67 on Part II of the examination while a score of 69.01 is required to pass that part of the examination. Petitioner initially challenged nine questions on Part II of the examination. Prior to hearing, Petitioner abandoned his challenges to all questions except for questions 10, 19, and 20. Evidence as to all three questions was presented by the parties at the formal hearing. In his post- hearing submittal, Petitioner abandoned his challenge to question 20. Consequently, only the challenges to Questions 10 and 19 need to be resolved. Question 10 and Question 19 are each worth four points. If Petitioner is given additional credit worth 2.01 points, he will have passed Part II. The challenged questions are multiple choice questions with only one response being considered by Respondent to be the correct response. For each challenged question, Petitioner selected a response other than the response Respondent considered to be the correct response. For each of the challenged questions, Petitioner received a score of zero. Question 10 requires the candidate to make certain calculations to determine the cost of a change order for a construction project. Petitioner contends that the question is unfair because of the narrow band between the possible answers. Respondent established that the question contained all information necessary to make the required computations. While Petitioner is correct in that some other questions may be less difficult because of the greater margin of error in the calculations required by those less difficult questions, his answer to Question 10 is nevertheless incorrect. Petitioner is entitled to no credit for his incorrect answer to Question 10. Question 19 provides certain information in the stem of the question and pertains to the time constraints on the service of a notice to owner by a subcontractor under the Florida Mechanics Lien Law. From the information provided in the stem of the question, the candidate can determine the date the subcontractor first furnished materials or labor. The stem of the question also informs the candidate of the date on which final payment was made to the contractor in reliance on the final contractor's affidavit. The answer to the question contains four multiple choice dates from which the candidate is to choose his answer. Preceding the answers is the following: "According to the Florida Construction Law Manual, in order to meet the requirements of the Mechanics Lien Law, concerning proper filing of the Notice to Owner, the concrete subcontractor's Notice to Owner must be served to the owner no later than:". The pertinent portions of the Florida Construction Law Manual provide as follows: Notice to the owner must be served on the owner within the earliest of the following time periods: One, before or within 45 days of the first commencement to furnish labor and materials on the job site, or within 45 days of starting to make specialty manufactured materials. Two, before final payment is made in reliance on the final contractor's affidavit. 1/ Petitioner contends that Question 19 is ambiguous because the stem of the question does not identify whether the contract referred to in the stem of the question is between the contractor and the owner or between the contractor and the subcontractor. Petitioner is correct in his contention that the question refers to the date that a contract was signed without identifying whether the contract was that between the owner and the contractor or that between the contractor and the subcontractor. The absence of that information is not fatal because the question enables the candidate to determine the date the subcontractor started work and provides the date of final payment was made to the contractor, which is the information necessary to correctly answer the question. Petitioner also contends that Question 19 is ambiguous because the answer considered by Respondent to be the correct answer is not the last date upon which the notice to owner can be served upon the owner. The correct response to Question 19 from the dates provided as possible answers to the question according to Respondent is the day before final payment was made to the contractor in reliance on the affidavit. The day that the final payment was made was not one of the four possible answers. Petitioner argues in his post- hearing submittal (but not at the formal hearing) that the question is misleading because the notice to owner could have been served on the day of final payment if the notice was served prior to the final payment by the owner. While the date of the final payment may arguably be a better choice than the date preceding the date of final payment, the date of final payment is not one of the choices. Of the choices offered the date preceding the date of final payment is clearly the best possible response. Petitioner's response to Question 19 was based on the statutory provision permitting the subcontractor to perfect service within 45 days of the date the subcontractor first furnished labor or material. The question informed the candidate that final payment to the contractor was made in reliance on a final contractor's affidavit six days prior to the date selected by Petitioner. Petitioner's answer to Question 19 was clearly wrong because a notice to owner from a subcontractor must be served before final payment to the contractor. The question is not misleading or unfair. Petitioner is entitled to no credit for his incorrect response to question 19.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which denies Petitioner's challenges to questions 10 and 19 of the October 1990 general contractor's examination. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of February, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 1992.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of national origin, race, and perceived disability in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended.
Findings Of Fact No dispute exists that Mr. Pierre is a male and Black and that his national origin is Haitian. No dispute exists that he is a member of the protected class as it relates to discrimination. No dispute exists that, at all times material hereto, the School Board was an employer as defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended. Mr. Pierre began his employment with the School Board in 1996. For nine (9) years, he worked in the Maintenance Department and was promoted three times. His various supervisors rated his work as excellent. At all times material hereto, Mr. Pierre’s co-workers were of various ethnic groups—Haitian, Hispanic, Black/African American, Caucasian, etc. For approximately seven years, Mr. Pierre was under the supervision of Foreman John Bateman. Mr. Bateman considered Mr. Pierre to be a “fabulous” worker and recommended Mr. Pierre for promotion. Subsequent thereto, Mr. Bateman observed a change in Mr. Pierre’s behavior and attitude. Mr. Bateman discussed the changes in Mr. Pierre’s behavior and attitude with his (Mr. Bateman’s) supervisor, James Bass. Such a change in behavior and attitude was exhibited on April 27, 2004. On that date, Mr. Pierre refused to take orders from a temporary leadman, Joe Williams, in the absence of the leadman, Joe Pierrot. Mr. Bass was called to the work-site, and he spoke to Mr. Pierre regarding his refusal to follow the directives of Mr. Williams. After the discussion, Mr. Pierre agreed to follow the directives of Mr. Williams. Mr. Bass memorialized the incident in a memorandum “For the Record” dated the same day. Mr. Bass testified as to the incident and noted, among other things, in the memorandum that Mr. Pierre had become “very disruptive, creating a hostile environment;” that, after the discussion, Mr. Pierre “returned to his duties without incident;” and that Mr. Pierre was “a very hard worker, but he appears to have ‘fits’ at times . . . seems to intimidate his co-workers with his attitude and overly-aggressive behavior . . . has a tendency to accuse his co-workers of not liking him because of his nationality (Haitian).” Mr. Pierre testified that he did not look at the memorandum and refused to sign it; and that he informed Mr. Bass that he (Mr. Pierre) did not have a “fight” with anyone. Another incident occurred on July 9, 2004. Mr. Bass memorialized the incident in a memorandum “For the Record” dated the same day of the incident. A worker, Mike Walters, had placed a bottle of water in a refrigerator over night, and the next day, the bottle of water was missing. As Mr. Pierre was walking past Mr. Walters, he (Mr. Walters) commented that someone had taken his bottle of water. Mr. Pierre immediately took offense, became agitated, and refused to calm down, even after Mr. Walters explained to Mr. Pierre that he was making a general statement, not directed at Mr. Pierre. Only after the leadman, Mr. Pierrot, interceded did Mr. Pierre calm down. Mr. Bass included in the memorandum that Mr. Pierre appeared to believe that “everyone was out to get him”; that Mr. Pierre’s co-workers expressed being fearful of him; that Mr. Pierre was advised that such behavior was not acceptable; and that further such behavior would lead to disciplinary action up to and including termination. Mr. Bass signed the memorandum, but Mr. Pierre refused to sign it. Mr. Pierre testified at hearing that the Mr. Walters accused him of “stealing” the water but that he knew nothing about it. The undersigned finds Mr. Pierre’s testimony credible that he (Mr. Pierre) believed that he was being accused of stealing the water but that he knew nothing about the water being stolen. An inference is drawn and a finding of fact is made that Mr. Pierre became upset because of this belief. Mr. Pierre was counseled regarding his behavior. Mr. Bass and the District Maintenance Manager, Mark Dorsett, decided that a re-assignment might benefit Mr. Pierre and his co-workers. As a result, on July 20, 2004, Mr. Pierre was re- assigned from a team of workers, i.e., a crew, responsible for cleaning air conditioning coils to a crew responsible for preventative maintenance tasks. The re-assignment was memorialized in a memorandum dated July 20, 2004. The memorandum provided, among other things, that Mr. Pierre would be monitored for six months and, if the re-assignment did not improve Mr. Pierre’s relationship with his co-workers, “progressive disciplinary action” would be invoked; and that the re-assignment would hopefully improve the relationships. The memorandum was copied to Mr. Pierre. Approximately three months later, however, on October 20, 2004, another incident occurred. The incident was memorialized in a memorandum “For the Record” dated October 25, 2004. According to the memorandum, Mr. Pierre had an argument with Sammie Riviera, Mr. Pierre’s work-partner, regarding Mr. Pierre’s tools, which “escalated to a verbal altercation.” Also, the memorandum indicated that, when Mr. Pierre returned to work, after the incident, he began accusing his co-workers of taking his missing tools, which he was unable to locate. Further, the memorandum indicated that the foreman, Jose Martell, advised Mr. Pierre that his behavior would have to “cease immediately.” Moreover, the memorandum indicated that Mr. Martell and Mr. Martell’s supervisor, Diane Caulfield, determined that Mr. Pierre would benefit from the School Board’s Employees Assistance Program (EAP). Mr. Martell and Ms. Caulfield signed the memorandum, but Mr. Pierre did not. Mr. Riviera did not testify at hearing. Mr. Pierre testified that, contrary to what others thought that he believed, he did not believe that Mr. Riviera stole his tools. Mr. Pierre testified that Mr. Riviera used his tools and dropped them on the floor; that he (Mr. Pierre) picked-up the tools and placed them in the truck; that Mr. Riviera attempted to talk to him (Mr. Pierre) but that he (Mr. Pierre) refused to talk to Mr. Riviera. In his testimony, Mr. Pierre did not deny that he and Mr. Riviera argued. On October 26, 2004, Ms. Caulfield presented Mr. Pierre with an EAP Referral Form, which stated the reason for the referral as “Anger Management – no one wanting to work with him.” Ms. Caulfield signed the EAP Referral Form, but Mr. Pierre refused to sign it. At hearing, Mr. Pierre testified that he did not recall Ms. Caulfield’s request for him to attend the EAP. The undersigned finds Mr. Pierre’s testimony to be credible, but such finding does not change or affect the undersigned’s finding that Ms. Caulfield requested Mr. Pierre to attend the EAP. Approximately 20 days later, on November 15, 2004, another incident occurred. The incident was memorialized in a memorandum “For the Record” dated November 16, 2004. Mr. Pierre’s work-partner, Mr. Riviera, observed Mr. Pierre handling a device that he (Mr. Pierre) should not have been handling, and Mr. Riviera so advised Mr. Pierre, who became “very agitated” and was “yelling” at Mr. Riviera. Additionally, the memorandum indicated that Mr. Riviera had observed, on occasion, Mr. Pierre mumbling to himself “excessively” and “banging himself against a wall.” Further, Mr. Riviera indicated that such behavior by Mr. Pierre, together with Mr. Pierre’s exhibited temper, caused Mr. Riviera to be “fearful of his personal well-being” while working with Mr. Pierre. Mr. Martell signed the memorandum, but Mr. Pierre did not sign it. Approximately, nine months later, in August 2005, Mr. Pierre visited the Director of Maintenance, Sylvester Davis. Mr. Davis had known Mr. Pierre since Mr. Pierre began working with the School Board and had always encouraged Mr. Pierre to visit him. Mr. Davis observed that Mr. Pierre was upset about something, but Mr. Pierre was unable to explain to Mr. Davis what was happening to him (Mr. Pierre), so Mr. Davis decided to talk to Ms. Caulfield. Mr. Pierre testified that he went to talk to Mr. Davis because he (Mr. Pierre) was not feeling safe at work, believed that he (Mr. Pierre) was being “persecuted,” and believed that Mr. Davis could help. Mr. Davis met with Ms. Caulfield and expressed his concern regarding Mr. Pierre. She explained what had been happening with Mr. Pierre and showed Mr. Davis the memoranda that had accumulated regarding Mr. Pierre’s behavior. Mr. Davis suggested the EAP, and Ms. Caulfield advised him that Mr. Pierre had already been referred to the EAP. After his meeting with Ms. Caulfield, Mr. Davis became concerned regarding the safety of Mr. Pierre and the other workers. Mr. Davis determined that a Fit-For-Duty examination was appropriate. In a memorandum dated September 19, 2005, directed to the School Board’s Special Investigative Unit (SIU), which is within the School Board’s Office of Professional Standards (OPS), Mr. Davis, among other things, provided the SIU with information in order for it to conduct a Fit-For-Duty examination of Mr. Pierre. In the memorandum, Mr. Davis indicated, among other things, that Mr. Pierre’s behavior had gotten progressively worse; that a safety problem had arisen since Mr. Pierre’s work assignments required assistance, but his co-workers were refusing to work with him because of their fear of his reactions; that Mr. Pierre’s co-workers were concerned about him, had respect for him, and viewed him as an excellent worker; and that Mr. Pierre’s co-workers just wanted him to get help. Further, in the memorandum, Mr. Davis requested that a person who could speak Creole be present when the SIU spoke with Mr. Pierre. Moreover, at hearing, Mr. Davis testified that, at no time did he want Mr. Pierre to be terminated, only for him to get the help that he needed to continue to work for the School Board. Mr. Davis viewed the Fit-For-Duty examination as a way to help Mr. Pierre. Mr. Davis’ testimony is found to be credible. The Fit-For-Duty evaluation is a non-disciplinary process wherein the School Board is attempting to help an employee. School Board Policy 4004 provides in pertinent part: RULES Fit for Duty Determination Procedures (emphasis in original) The Executive Director of Professional Standards & Special Investigative Unit (SIU) receives request from a Principal/Administrator (includes District Administrators) or Superintendent/Designee. (Supporting Documents) SIU notifies employee via certified mail that he/she must undergo a physical and/or psychological examination. A reassignment letter is prepared directing employee to remain at home with pay, pending the outcome of the examination. (Letter 1) The affected employee shall select the name of a medical doctor, psychologist or psychiatrist from a list maintained by the Executive Director of Professional Standards & Special Investigative Unit, within 48 hours. (See Attachment to Letter 1) SIU Administrator schedules within ten working days a medical appointment and follows-up in writing to the doctor’s office and to the employee of appointment confirmation. Note: This is a mandatory appointment and failure to attend can result in termination of employment for failure to comply with School Board Policy 4004. (Letters 2 & 3) (emphasis in original) * * * 6. The doctor as delineated in the policy will conduct Pre-evaluation at District expense. Note: a 2nd Opinion will be at the employees expense if requested, with the employee selecting from the School Board approved list as delineated in the policy. (emphasis in original) * * * If employee fails to attend any mandatory appointment with the assigned doctor of the designee assigned to handle the Fitness for Duty Evaluation Case per School Board Policy 4004, then a pre- disciplinary meeting is arranged and employee is notified in writing. (Letter 7) If applicable a recommendation for termination is sent to the School Board of Broward County based on just cause, for insubordination, failure to comply with School Board Policy 4004. (Letter 8) By letter dated September 27, 2005, which was hand- delivered to Mr. Pierre, the Executive Director of OPS, SIU, Joe Melita, notified Mr. Pierre that Mr. Davis had requested a Fit- For-Duty Assessment, pursuant to School Board Policy 4004, and that Mr. Pierre was required to submit to a psychological examination at School Board expense. Mr. Melita provided further in the letter that Mr. Pierre was directed to choose a doctor from a list of doctors, which was attached to the letter, indicating his (Mr. Pierre’s) first and second choice, within two days of receipt of the letter; that the OPS Administrator, Richard Mijon, would schedule the appointment with the physician chosen; and that Mr. Pierre was to not return to work, but remain at home with pay pending the determination of the examination. The letter was addressed to Mr. Pierre at 2450 SW 7th Street, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312. An inference is drawn and a finding of fact is made that a perception existed that Mr. Pierre may have been experiencing psychological problems. Additionally, on September 27, 2005, Mr. Mijon met with Mr. Pierre and two of Mr. Pierre’s line supervisors in Mr. Mijon’s office. The line supervisors requested that a Creole-speaking individual also attend to assist Mr. Pierre in communicating only. Mr. Mijon complied with the request and obtained the services of one of his officers, Marc Elias, who was born in Haiti and who spoke Creole, for interpretation purposes only. The aforementioned letter dated September 27, 2005, was hand-delivered to Mr. Pierre at this meeting, and Mr. Mijon reviewed the contents of the letter with Mr. Pierre, who signed the letter and dated his signature (September 27, 2005). The list of physicians attached to the letter included physicians from the counties of Dade [sic], Broward, and Palm Beach. Mr. Pierre testified at hearing that he did not know any of the doctors on the list and, therefore, Mr. Elias circled three of the doctors and marked the order of preference (first, second, and third) for him. Mr. Pierre’s testimony is found to be credible, but also an inference is drawn and a finding is made that the choices were made after consulting with Mr. Pierre. Additionally, on the list, Mr. Pierre provided his contact telephone numbers (home and cell). Mr. Mijon reviewed with Mr. Pierre the choice of doctors, with preferences, and his (Mr. Pierre’s) telephone numbers. Also, Mr. Pierre’s address on the letter dated September 27, 2005, was taken from the School Board’s records. At the meeting, Mr. Pierre did not indicate that his mailing address was incorrect. At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Pierre requested that a Creole-speaking doctor perform the Fit-For-Duty examination. Mr. Mijon considered Mr. Pierre’s request reasonable, knew that none of the physicians on list spoke Creole, and indicated to Mr. Pierre that he would hold the list of physicians in abeyance and locate a Creole-speaking doctor through the EAP. On or about October 3, 2005, Mr. Mijon received a list of Creole-speaking psychiatrists and/or psychologists from the EAP. On that same day, Mr. Mijon again obtained the services of Mr. Elias and directed Mr. Elias to contact Mr. Pierre by telephone. Mr. Elias complied and contacted Mr. Pierre by telephone, activating the speakerphone. Mr. Elias participation in the entire telephone conversation was for translation purposes only. Mr. Mijon informed Mr. Pierre that a list of Creole-speaking doctors had been obtained and that Mr. Pierre needed to come to Mr. Mijon’s office on October 5, 2005, to do as he had done previously—choose three doctors, identifying his preferences (one through three), and sign and date the document. Mr. Pierre indicated, during the telephone conversation, that he would not come into Mr. Mijon’s office to do anything, indicating, among other things, that he (Mr. Pierre) was being persecuted. Mr. Mijon informed Mr. Pierre that, if he did not come into his (Mr. Mijon’s) office on October 5, 2005, that he (Mr. Pierre) would be considered to have waived his right to choose from the second list of doctors, and that he (Mr. Mijon) would have no choice but to use the original list chosen by Mr. Pierre, which contained no Creole-speaking doctors, contact Mr. Pierre’s first choice, and schedule an appointment with the first doctor from the original list. On October 5, 2005, Mr. Pierre failed to appear at Mr. Mijon’s office. Mr. Mijon proceeded to schedule an appointment with the doctor from the original list, Laura Hohnecker, Ph.D., who was indicated as Mr. Pierre’s first choice. The appointment was set for October 12, 2005, at Dr. Hohnecker’s office, 1:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. On October 6, 2005, Mr. Mijon contacted Mr. Pierre by telephone and again obtained the services of Mr. Elias for translation purposes only. Again, the telephone was placed on speakerphone. Mr. Mijon advised Mr. Pierre that an appointment had been scheduled with Dr. Hohnecker, Mr. Pierre’s first choice from the original list, for the Fit-For-Duty examination, and provided Mr. Pierre with the date, time, address, and telephone number of Dr. Hohnecker. Further, Mr. Mijon informed Mr. Pierre that the appointment was mandatory and that, if he (Mr. Pierre) failed to attend the appointment, disciplinary action may result. In addition to the telephone conversation, Mr. Mijon sent a letter, dated October 6, 2005, by certified and regular U.S. mail to Mr. Pierre, containing the same information that was discussed during the telephone conversation. The letter was addressed to Mr. Pierre at the same address that was used by Mr. Mijon on the letter dated September 27, 2005. The certified letter was returned but not for being unclaimed. Mr. Pierre failed to appear at Dr. Hohnecker’s office on October 12, 2005, for his appointment for a Fit-For-Duty examination. Due to Mr. Pierre’s failure to appear for his appointment, by letter dated October 14, 2005, Mr. Melita directed Mr. Pierre to appear at his (Mr. Melita’s) office on Tuesday, October 25, 2005, at 9:00 a.m. to meet with Mr. Mijon for a pre-disciplinary meeting, indicating that the purpose of the pre-disciplinary meeting was Mr. Pierre’s insubordination/noncompliance with School Board Policy 4004. The letter further indicated, among other things, that Mr. Pierre had failed to attend the mandatory appointment, as directed, with Dr. Hohnecker for his Fit-For-Duty examination. Moreover, the letter advised Mr. Pierre that his failure to attend the meeting on October 25, 2005, would result in his (Mr. Pierre’s) name being forwarded to the School Board for “termination” of employment. The letter was addressed to Mr. Pierre at the same address that was used by Mr. Mijon on the letter dated September 27, 2005, and was sent to Mr. Pierre by certified and regular U.S. mail. The certified letter was returned but not for being unclaimed. Subsequently, by letter dated November 7, 2005, Mr. Melita informed Mr. Pierre that, due to a hurricane, the meeting scheduled for October 25, 2005 was re-scheduled for Monday, November 14, 2005, at 9:00 a.m., restating the purpose for the meeting and the same information contained in the letter dated October 14, 2005. The letter was sent to Mr. Pierre by certified and regular U.S. mail, at the same address that was used by Mr. Mijon on the letter dated September 27, 2005. Mr. Pierre, accompanied by his counsel, attended the meeting on November 14, 2005. Mr. Elias was also present at the meeting for interpretation purposes only. At the meeting, Mr. Pierre denied that he had received a telephone call on October 3, 2005, regarding Mr. Mijon obtaining a list of Creole- speaking doctors for the Fit-For-Duty evaluation and the consequences for him (Mr. Pierre) not attending the meeting scheduled for October 5, 2005, with Mr. Mijon. At hearing, Mr. Pierre also testified that he did not receive the telephone call on October 3, 2005, regarding the meeting on October 5, 2005, and the consequences for his failure to attend. The undersigned does not find Mr. Pierre’s testimony to be credible. The undersigned makes a finding of fact that Mr. Pierre received the telephone call on October 3, 2005, regarding the meeting on October 25, 2005, and the consequences for his failure to attend. Also, at hearing, Mr. Pierre testified that he did not speak on the telephone with Mr. Mijon and Mr. Elias on October 6, 2005, regarding the appointment with Dr. Hohnecker on October 12, 2005, and the consequences for his failure to attend. The undersigned does not find Mr. Pierre’s testimony to be credible. A finding of fact is made that Mr. Pierre received the aforementioned telephone call on October 6, 2005, regarding the appointment with Dr. Hohnecker on October 12, 2005, and the consequences for his failure to attend. At the meeting on November 14, 2005, Mr. Melita determined that Mr. Pierre had presented no justifiable explanation for his (Mr. Pierre’s) failure to attend the appointment with Dr. Hohnecker on October 12, 2005, for the Fit- For-Duty examination. Mr. Melita recommended termination of Mr. Pierre’s employment with the School Board due to insubordination and non-compliance with School Board Policy 4004. By letter dated November 30, 2005, sent by certified and regular U.S. mail, Mr. Melita notified Mr. Pierre, among other things, of the recommendation, the basis for the recommendation, and the date (December 13, 2005) that the recommendation would be submitted to the School Board for approval. Mr. Pierre testified that he did not receive the letter dated November 30, 2005. Regarding Mr. Pierre’s address on the letters from the School Board sent by certified and regular U.S. mail, at hearing, Mr. Pierre testified that, in 2004, he had moved from the address reflected on the letters; that, after he was sent home in September 2005, he was receiving his paychecks from the School Board in the mail at his new 2004 address; and that, around December 2005, he moved to Sarasota, Florida. The evidence demonstrates that the certified letters were returned but fails to demonstrate whether the letters sent by regular U.S. mail were returned or not returned. Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates and Mr. Pierre admits that he and his counsel attended the re-scheduled pre-disciplinary meeting on November 14, 2005, regarding Mr. Pierre’s insubordination/noncompliance with School Board policy 4004, as to Mr. Pierre’s failure to attend the mandatory appointment with Dr. Hohnecker for his Fit-For-Duty examination. Mr. Pierre testified that he and his counsel became aware of the meeting on November 14, 2005, as a result of his counsel contacting Mr. Melita, attempting to discover what issue the School Board had with Mr. Pierre. The undersigned finds Mr. Pierre’s testimony credible regarding his addresses for 2004 and 2005. However, the undersigned further finds that the failure of Mr. Pierre to advise Mr. Mijon of his (Mr. Pierre’s) correct address at the meeting on September 27, 2005 was unreasonable. Mr. Pierre has not been employed since his termination from the School Board. Mr. Pierre has been consistently seeking employment since his termination from the School Board. At the time of the hearing, Mr. Pierre was suffering from hypertension and depression for which is taking medication for both. The evidence fails to demonstrate that Mr. Pierre was suffering from these illnesses or taking medication for them at the time that he was employed with the School Board. The evidence fails to demonstrate that similarly situated employees of the School Board were treated differently or more favorably.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the discrimination complaint of Antoine Daniel Pierre against the Broward County School Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In February 1989, petitioner, Michael J. Millillo, Jr., was a candidate on the certified building contractor examination. The test is prepared and administered by respondent, Department of Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board (Department or Board). Petitioner later received written advice from the Department that he had made a grade of 63 on Part II of the examination. According to agency rules, a score of at least 69.1 is required for passing. Petitioner then filed an appeal of his examination results contending that question 8 was ambiguous and that question 20 contained more than one correct answer. That prompted this proceeding. As a result of a stipulation by counsel at hearing, petitioner was given credit for his answer to question 20 and his grade was raised to 67. Accordingly, the appeal is now limited to question 8. The examination was prepared by the National Assessment Institute and requires an examinee to use "entry level" knowledge in formulating his responses. Question 8 was a mathematics question having a value of four points on a candidate's overall score. It is undisputed that if Millillo had received four additional points he would have passed the examination. Question 8 was a multiple choice question containing four possible answers. Although the question cannot be repeated verbatim here because of confidentiality constraints, it required a candidate to make nine separate mathematical calculations in order to arrive at the correct solution. Petitioner's challenge is limited to the first calculation, and more specifically, to the wording in the question. He contends that the wording was so ambiguous that a candidate could easily arrive at a different answer than suggested by the Board. In general terms, the subpart in dispute provided a candidate with an annual payroll cost for a general superintendent who was the supervisor on a project taking one hundred fifty days to complete. The candidate was required to calculate the superintendent's cost assuming he spent 15% of his time on the project. The solution was derived by multiplying a .15 factor X 150/360 X the annual payroll cost. Petitioner testified on his own behalf and suggested that the question assumed the superintendent devoted 15% of his total time for the entire year to the project, and that the appropriate cost would be obtained by multiplying that percentage factor times the individual's annual payroll cost. The resulting number was approximately twice as great as the Board's correct solution. Respondent's consultant, George Bruton, is a licensed contractor and assisted in the preparation of the examination questions. He considered the question to be clear and unambiguous and required a student to recognize that the superintendent spent 15% of his total time on the project for five months, which was the life of the project. This interpretation is logical and reasonable, consistent with the wording in the question, and is found to be correct. The witness added that because 78% of all candidates on the examination obtained the correct answer, it reinforces his contention that the question was not ambiguous.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying petitioner's request to receive a passing grade on the February 1989 certified building contractor's examination. DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-4312 Respondent: 1. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 1. 2-4. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 2. 5. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 5. 6-7. Substantially adopted in finding of fact 6. COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick F. Rudzik, Esquire One Fourth Street, North Suite 800 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 E. Harper Field, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Fred Seely Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue is whether Mr. Harrison's response to question 8 on the General Contractor's Examination given on October 3, 1985 was incorrectly graded. If Mr. Harrison were given credit for his answer to that question, he would pass the examination. The examination was correctly graded, however, and the petition filed by Mr. Harrison should be dismissed.
Findings Of Fact Mr. William D. Harrison took the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board's General Contractor's Examination on October 3, 1985. According to his grade report his grade was 68.65. A total grade of 69.01 is necessary to pass the examination. Rule 21E-16.05, Florida Administrative Code. If he were given credit for the answer he gave to question number 8 on the portion of the examination given the afternoon of October 3, 1985, he would pass the examination. The question at issue sought an estimate of the amount of concrete necessary to construct entrance steps for a hypothetical building. The Department of Professional Regulation, Office of Examination Services had prepared drawings for a building consisting of 14 different sheets showing various elevations, aspects or other details of the building. These drawings were used in answering the examination questions. Question 8 read: The total volume of concrete to place the concrete entrance steps (only) is cubic yards. Select the closest answer. (A) 4.7 (B) 5.9 (C) 6.5 (D) 7.0 Mr. Harrison chose answer (A). The correct answer is answer (D). Sheet 4 of 14 of the drawings shows the first floor plan for the building. There are a total of four 11'6" spans of concrete entrance steps to the covered entry on the north and south sides of the building. The detail of the steps on sheet 4 of 14 shows that they generally have a 6" rise and are 1' in depth. According to the same sheet of the drawings, there are also other concrete steps to be constructed on the east and west sides of the building of 11' spans. In the northwest and southeast corners of the building there are enclosed stairwells serving the four floors of the building. The steps in these stairwells also contain concrete as an element in their construction. Mr. Harrison contends that the question is phrased in a misleading manner. In his view only the north and south entrance steps should be included in the calculation of the amount of concrete needed for "entrance steps (only) ." According to his calculations, placing those entrance steps would require 4.889 cubic yards of concrete. The closest answer available is 4.7, answer (A), which he gave. By reference to a dictionary of construction terms, Mr. Harrison argues that a building's area excludes uncovered entrances, terraces and steps. He believes he correctly excluded the covered steps on the east and west sides of the building from the calculation of "entrance steps," treating them as part of the building area, not entrances. The Departments contends that the question is specifically constructed to test the level of detail with which examinees read the drawings. On sheet 4 of 14 the symbol "A/4" appears, with a line cutting perpendicularly through the western steps. That symbol points out to examinees that a detailed drawing for the construction of the concrete entrance steps appears on that sheet. That perpendicular line through the western steps demonstrates that the eastern and western steps are "entrance steps" in the plans, and must be included in the calculation required in question 8. Answer (A), chosen by Mr. Harrison, is a distractor specifically designed to determine whether examinees have included the east and west steps in their calculation. If excluded, the calculation yields an answer of exactly 4.7 cubic yards of concrete (Mr. Harrison's calculation of 4.889 is slightly off). If all four spans of entrance steps are included, the correct answer of 7.0 cubic yards is obtained. The phrase "entrance steps (only)" appears in question 8 to make clear to examinees that the concrete allocable to the steps of the enclosed northwest and southeast stairwells is not part of the calculation. After an examination is graded, but before the grade reports are distributed, the Department does a statistical analysis of the patterns of responses to all examination questions to determine whether those patterns reveal a problem such as a general misreading of any questions. If a question performs badly, it can be deleted from the grading process before the grade reports are distributed to examinees. The analysis done on the answers to question 8 shows that of the 887 examinees, 180 of those who ultimately scored in the upper 27 percent of the examination overall answered the question correctly with answer (D); of those scoring in the middle 46 percent on the overall examination, 148 gave the correct answer; of those examinees scoring in the lower 27 percent overall, only 69 gave the correct answer. Among those choosing answer (A), as Mr. Harrison did, 36 of those who scored in the upper 27 percent overall gave that answer, 116 of those in the middle 46 percent chose the answer, and 102 of those scoring in the lower 27 percent chose that answer. Statistically, the question performed well. The evidence shows that answer (A) acts as the distractor which it was designed to be. Those who do not read the drawings carefully select the answer which would be correct if only the north and south steps are included in the calculation. Given the specificity of the drawing showing the east and west steps as entrance steps, however, Mr. Harrison's objection to the grading of his answer to question 8 is not well founded. Mr. Harrison had also raised, in his letter challenging his grade, an objection to another test question. At the hearing, however, he abandoned that challenge.
Recommendation It is recommended that the petition for regrading of the General Contractor's Examination given in October 1985 by the Construction Industry Licensing Board be DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED this 28th day of April 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Fred Seely Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Mr. Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 H. Reynolds Sampson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. William D. Harrison 3490 Artesian Drive Lantana, Florida 33462
