Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral testimony and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioners were producers of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (1983). At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent GMS was a licensed dealer in agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1983), issued license no. 936 by the Department and bonded by Commercial Union Insurance Company (Commercial) in the sum of $50,000.00 - Bond No. CZ 7117346. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Commercial was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The complaint filed by Petitioner was timely filed in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes (1983). Prior to Petitioners selling or delivering any watermelons (melons) to Respondent GMS, Petitioners and Respondent GMS entered into a verbal contract whereby: (a) Petitioners would harvest and load their melons on trucks furnished by Respondent GMS at Petitioners' farm; (b) the loading, grading and inspection, if any, was to be supervised by, and the responsibility of Respondent GMS or its agent; (c) the melons were to be U.S. No. 1 grade; (d) the melons were purchased F.O.B. Petitioner's farm subject to acceptance by Respondent GMS, with title and risk of loss passing to Respondent GMS at point of shipment (See Transcript Page 95 lines 5-7); (e) the price was left open subject to Petitioners being paid the market price for the melons at place of shipment on the day of shipment as determined by Respondent GMS less one (1) or two (2) cent sales charge, depending on the price; and requiring Respondent GMS to notify Petitioners on a daily basis of that price and; (f) the settlement was to be made by Respondent GMS within a reasonable time after the sale of the melons by Respondent GMS. Respondent GMS was not acting as Petitioners agent in the sale of the melons for the account of the Petitioners on a net return basis nor was it acting as a negotiating broker between the Petitioners and the buyers. Respondent GMS did not make the type of accounting to Petitioners as required by Section 604.22, Florida Statutes had it been their agent. Although Respondent GMS purchased over twenty (20) loads of melons from the Petitioners, there are only ten (10) loads of melons in dispute and they are represented by track report numbers 536 dated April 29, 1985, 534 dated April 30, 1985, 2363 and 537, dated May 1, 1985, 2379, 2386 and 538 dated May 2, 1985, and 2385, 2412 and 2387 dated May 3, 1985. Jennings W. Starling (Starling) was the agent of Respondent GMS responsible for loading; grading- inspecting and accepting and approving the loads of melons for shipment that Respondent GMS was purchasing from Petitioners during the 1985 melon season. Petitioners and Starling were both aware that some of the melons had hollow hearth a conditions if known, would cause the melons to be rejected. Aware of this condition in the melons, Starling allowed Petitioners to load the melons on the truck furnished by Respondent GMS. Starling rejected from 20 percent to 40 percent of the melons harvested and brought in from Petitioners' fields before accepting and approving a load for shipment. Starling accepted and approved for shipment all ten (10) of the disputed loads of melons. On a daily basis, Robert E. McDaniel, Sr., one of the Petitioners, would contact the office of Respondent GMS in Lakeland Florida to obtain the price being paid that day by Respondent GMS to Petitioners but was not always successful, however, he would within a day or two obtain the price for a particular day. Robert E. McDaniel did obtain the price to be paid by Respondent GMS for the ten (10) disputed loads and informed his son Robert E. McDaniel, Jr. of those prices. The prices quoted to Robert E. McDaniel, Sr. by Respondent GMS on the ten (10) disputed loads were 12 cents, 10 cents, 8 cents, 8 cents, 8 cents, 8 cents, 8 cents, 7 cents, 7 cents, and 7 cents on tract reports number 536, 534, 2363, 537, 2379, 2386, 538, 2385, 2412 and 2387, respectively. No written record of their prices was produced at the hearing but the testimony of Robert E. McDaniel Sr. concerning these prices was the most credible evidence presented. After the melons were shipped, sometimes as much as one week after, a track report was given to Robert E. McDaniel Jr. by Starling for initialing. Sometimes a price would be indicated on the track report but this price was based on selling price at point of destination and not the market price at point of shipment. Also, the letters "H.H." would also appear on the track report which, according to the testimony of Starling, indicated hollow heart but the evidence was insufficient to prove that Starling had rejected these loads for shipment because of a hollow heart condition in the melons. The loads in question were paid for by Respondent GMS based on a price at point of destination under its drafts no. 831912 and 851311. The amount in dispute is as follows: DATE TRACK NET AMOUNT AMOUNT SHIPPED
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent GMS be ordered to pay to the Petitioners the sum of $11.212.31. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent GMS fails to timely pay the Petitioners as ordered, then Respondent Commercial be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983) and that the Department reimburse the Petitioners in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983). Respectfully submitted and entered this 13th day of June, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Hearings Hearings WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 13th day of June, 1986.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Greg Davenport Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Container Grown, is entitled to payment from an Agricultural Bond issued to Respondent, A.W. Kelley’s Gardens, Inc., and, if so, the amount owed to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a licensed producer of an agricultural product: Nursery plants and flowers. Petitioner is duly incorporated by the State of Florida and is in good standing. Greg Davenport is listed as Director and President of the corporation in the Division of Corporations’ web-based records. Respondent is a duly incorporated Florida corporation. Its business address is 6901 Hendry Creek Drive, Ft. Myers, Florida. The directors of the corporation are listed as Dixie Kelley, Drew Kelley, and Kent Kelley. Respondent is a plant retail business. Respondent has been a customer of Petitioner for many years, going back as far as 2006 according to evidence submitted at final hearing. During that time, Respondent has purchased approximately $91,000.00 worth of goods from Petitioner. (In its PRO, Respondent says the relationship goes back 25 years or more, but there was no sworn testimony to that effect.) During the period March 22 through May 24, 2012, Respondent ordered numerous items from Petitioner for which he was billed in accordance with standard practices. The following invoices provide the invoice number, date of invoice, and amount of purchase: Invoice 1399 - March 22, 2012 - $1,570.00 Invoice 1818 – March 27, 2012 - $2,105.00 Invoice 1391 – April 10, 2012 - $1,130.00 Invoice 1303 – April 25, 2012 - $ 850.00 Invoice 1419 – May 16, 2012 - $1,145.00 Invoice 1431 – May 24, 2012 - $1,175.00 TOTAL - $7,975.00 Petitioner contacted Respondent on numerous occasions to request payment on the outstanding invoices. Those efforts were in vain. At first, Respondent would make empty promises to pay, but ultimately just refused to accept Petitioner’s calls. Meanwhile, Respondent’s owner relocated to North Carolina, causing Petitioner to fear that payment may never be forthcoming. Respondent made some promises to make payments “whenever he could” to satisfy the debt. He said, however, that even if he could not pay, Petitioner should not attach his agriculture bond. Respondent’s failure to make any promised payments was the basis for Petitioner seeking payment by way of the bond. Respondent does not deny his failure to pay the outstanding invoices. He does not dispute that the products he received were of acceptable quality. He does, in fact, admit his indebtedness to Petitioner. Respondent does not feel his bond should be attached for payment of this debt. He cites, as reasons, that: 1) his business suffered during the national financial crisis; 2) there was some embezzlement going on in his business that affected his ability to pay obligees; 3) there is a related civil lawsuit underway in circuit court relating to the embezzlement; and 4) Davenport and Kelley have been friends for a long time and thus he should be allowed more time to pay the invoices. Respondent’s PRO sets forth other bases for why he believes it would be improper to attach his agriculture bond. However, none of those bases was addressed by sworn witnesses at final hearing and are thus not evidence in this case. Further, Respondent contends that two witnesses he subpoenaed but failed to show up for final hearing prejudiced his case. He did not prove, however, that either of the supposed witnesses had been properly served. Respondent’s PRO also sets forth facts not elicited through testimony or documentary evidence during final hearing. Respondent relies in part on various documents exchanged between the parties during discovery, but none of those were offered into evidence and thus are not part of the record. Respondent acquired a bond through Suretec Insurance Company. The amount of the bond was not disclosed at final hearing but, per statute, must be at least $5,000.00. The surety company was not represented at final hearing. No defense was raised by the surety company concerning Petitioner’s attempt to attach the bond. Petitioner is entitled to payment in the amount of $7,975.00 for the products it provided to Respondent. Besides the amount set forth above, Petitioner claims the sum of $100.00 paid for the filing of his two claims against Respondent’s bond. The total sum owed to Petitioner by Respondent is $8,075.00.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth above, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: Respondent shall pay to Petitioner, within 15 days of the entry of the Final Order, the sum of $8,075.00; If Respondent fails to timely make the aforementioned payment, the Department shall call upon Suretec Surety Company to pay over to the Department the full amount of Respondent’s bond; and The Department shall then turn the proceeds of the bond over to Petitioner to satisfy the debt that has been established. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Christopher E. Green, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Office of Citrus License and Bond Mayo Building, M-38 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Michael Cronin SureTec Insurance Company Suite 320 9737 Great Hills Trail Austin, Texas 78759 Greg Davenport Greg Davenport Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Container Grown 613 Corbel Drive Naples, Florida 34110-1106 Kent O. Kelley A. W. Kelley’s Gardens Inc. 6901 Hendry Creek Drive Fort Myers, Florida 33908 Lorena Holley, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Adam Putnam Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue Whether respondents owe petitioner money on account of watermelon sales?
Findings Of Fact Last spring, her first working on behalf of respondent McKay & Associates, Inc., Pat Harper nee ' Maddox accompanied Randy Finch, the company president, to Florida to help buy and ship produce. Because petitioner Bubba Hurst had sold watermelons to Ms. Harper season before last, she sought him out again. On Tuesday night, May 28, 1991, Ms. Harper orally agreed on behalf of McKay & Associates, Inc. (after Ruth Neuman, the company's secretary-treasurer, had been consulted by telephone) to pay Mr. Hurst 12 cents a pound for two truckloads of watermelons "as is." (Earlier she had seen the watermelons piled in the smaller trucks in which petitioner's crew had brought them from the fields to the melon yard, after harvesting them that day.) With Wednesday morning came a truck and driver (engaged by Ms. Harper or Mr. Finch) to haul the watermelons from petitioner's melon yard to truck scales some ten miles away, then to a farm in Denton, Georgia, for crating and transshipment to their ultimate intended destinations in Maryland and Pennsylvania. After the first truck left at 4:58 that afternoon, loaded with watermelons aggregating 43,280 pounds, Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2, a second truck and driver arrived. Mr. Finch had agreed to pay Mr. Hurst cash for the watermelons, but a complication arose before they could settle that night: Only after the crew had gone home was it discovered that the second truck was overloaded by some 9,000 pounds; and the driver refused to risk the fines he might incur by hauling an overload. As a result, it was not clear exactly how many watermelons McKay & Associates, Inc. would owe petitioner for. After some discussion, Mr. Finch wrote and signed a check in petitioner's favor but left blank the amount; petitioner then endorsed and returned the check. The plan was, once the exact amount was known, for Mr. Finch to complete the check, cash it, and give Mr. Hurst the proceeds. Afterwards it occurred to Mr. Hurst that if the check were made out for more than what he was to be paid for the watermelons, he could have problems with the Internal Revenue Service. Apprehensive, he asked Mr. Finch to void the check, which he did, by writing "VOID" across it. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Later somebody filled in an amount ($5,193.60, which corresponds to the first load, 43,280 pounds at 12 cents per) and wrote "melons no good," perhaps in anticipation of a formal administrative proceeding like the present one. The check was never negotiated. On Thursday, May 30, 1991, while watermelons were being unloaded from the second truck, two men with a brief case full of cash expressed an interest in the lightening truckload. When Ms. Harper told Mr. Hurst, he said the watermelons were hers to do with as she pleased. She then sold the load to the two men for 12 cents a pound cash, and handed the money over to petitioner. The excess watermelons on the second truck had been offloaded onto a third truck. Of like capacity as the first, the third truck was empty when it accompanied the overloaded truck to the melon yard on Thursday morning. With the departure of the second truck, Ms. Harper and Mr. Finch told Mr. Hurst to fill the third truck up and agreed to buy that truckload. For a while, Mr. Finch was actually "in the line" handing some watermelons along for loading in the third truck, and rejecting others. They weighed 20 pounds each on average. Meanwhile, when Ms. Neuman saw the first truckload, after its arrival in Denton, Georgia, on Thursday morning, she exclaimed, "My God! These are sun scald[ed]!" At hearing, she testified she was incredulous Florida would let such watermelons leave the state. Ms. Neuman telephoned Mr. Finch and told him she was sending the first load back, but that she would take the other load if it "meets federal." She also called the trucking company (then reportedly owned by the late Sam Walton), however, and told the trucker not to load any more watermelons. When Evelyn Hurst, Bubba's mother, answered the telephone at the melon yard lunchtime Thursday, she was asked to tell the driver of the third truck to call home because there was an emergency. The driver made a telephone call, after which he told Mrs. Hurst nothing was wrong at his home. Then he made a second telephone call. After that call, he ordered a stop to the loading then in progress. Bubba Hurst was eating when his mother called with word that no more watermelons were being loaded onto the third truck. He then telephoned the motel where Mr. Finch was staying, and inquired. Mr. Finch told him to finish loading the third truck; and later went to the melon yard and told the driver that loading should go forward. Loading resumed. Later Mr. Finch raised with the driver the possibility of taking the load to New York, but the driver declined the suggestion. Around four o'clock Thursday, the renewed efforts to fill the third truck with watermelons came to an abrupt end, about 250 melons shy of a full load, and the driver, who had ordered the halt, drove away. Mr. Hurst called the motel, and spoke to Ms. Harper, in hope of obtaining the cash he had been promised for his watermelons, but to no avail. The next day the first truck returned from Georgia with the watermelons whose presence on the other side of the state line had so surprised Ms. Neuman; and a federal agricultural inspector, a friend of Mr. Hurst's father, arrived at petitioner's melon yard to inspect them. Mr. Hurst told the inspector (who had been called by Ms. Neuman) that he was welcome to inspect but that the whole load had been sold "as is" and that he - Mr. Hurst - would not be paying for the inspection. Hearing this, the inspector left. Disinterested testimony established that inspections by USDA- certified inspectors are routinely called for by shippers when produce is refused by buyers claiming that produce spoiled before reaching them; but that, at least in the environs of Wildwood, Florida, it is not customary to call for a federal inspection at the point from which watermelons are shipped (unless the shipment is to the Government itself.) Of course, these particular watermelons had already been to Georgia and back. After the inspector left, the driver of the first truck asked that the watermelons be removed from his truck. When Mr. Hurst told him he was trespassing and asked him to leave the melon yard, the driver (or Ms. Neuman by long distance telephone call) summoned a Sumter County deputy sheriff. But the deputy sheriff, informed upon his arrival that the melon yard was a good quarter mile on the Marion County side of the county line, left to perform other duties. Still loaded, the first truck eventually left the melon yard a second time.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That DACS order McKay & Associates, Inc. to pay petitioner nine thousand seven hundred eighty seven dollars and twenty cents ($9,787.20) within fifteen (15) days of the final order. That, in the event McKay & Associates, Inc. fails to pay petitioner nine thousand seven hundred eighty seven dollars and twenty cents ($9,787.20) within fifteen (15) days of the final order, DACS order payment by State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., to the extent necessary to satisfy the requirements of Section 604.21(8), Florida Statutes (1991), for disbursal to petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of May, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1992. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 6, see findings of fact Nos. 5 and 6. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7, petitioner said the load may have been as many as 250 melons light. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 11, the value of the second load established by the evidence is $4,591.60, representing 38,280 pounds at 12 cents a pound. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 1 has been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 2 and 3, Ms. Neuman's testimony that she directed her agents to procure federal inspection before the first truck left has not been credited, but she did try to arrange one later. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 4, the second truck load was never rejected. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 5 is rejected. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 6, see paragraphs 5 and 6 of the findings of fact. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 7 is immaterial. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 8, Mr. Finch agreed to buy the third truckload and ordered that loading go forward even after Ms. Neuman registered her dissatisfaction with the first load. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agricultural and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agricultural and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Julian E. Harrison, Esquire 324 West Dade Avenue Bushnell, Florida 33513 John Sowa, Esquire Robert L. Rehberger, Esquire 5025 North Henry Boulevard Stockbridge, Georgia 30281
The Issue The issues presented in this action concern the Petitioner's failure to renew the Respondent's Florida Farm Labor Contractor Certificate of Registration for the year 1981. The refusal to renew the certificate is premised upon the alleged failure on the part of the Respondent to furnish Felix Munoz and others with an itemized statement of deductions made from their payments for rent, and loans owed to the Petitioner, and by doing so purportedly acting contrary to Subsection 450.33(7), Florida Statutes. In addition, it is alleged, as a ground for refusal to renew the certificate, that Raul Saldivar, Jr., failed to distribute when due all monies or other items of value entrusted him by third persons for such purpose in violation of Subsection 450.33(2), Florida Statutes, and Rule 385-4.08(8)(a), Florida Administrative Code, by receiving payroll checks payable to Arnulfo Ramirez, Esteban Guerraro, Carmen Cruz, Juan Cruz, Santos Martinez, and Leonel Flores; further, that Respondent took the payroll checks in the absence of the farm workers, endorsed and deposited the checks to his bank account. FINDINGS OF FACT 1/ In the years 1979 and 1980, the Respondent had been granted a Florida Farm Labor Contractor Certificate of Registration from the State Department of Labor and Employment Security in keeping with the terms and conditions of Chapter 450, Florida Statutes. When Saldivar applied for the renewal of his Florida Farm Labor Contractor Certificate of Registration for 1981, he was refused renewal for the reasons set forth in the issues statement of this Recommended Order. The Respondent has, in all other respects, complied with the necessary conditions for his relicensure. Beginning in August, 1979, and continuing into 1980, the Respondent was a member of a partnership known as R & S Sons. Particularly in the year 1980, Saldivar, as a member of the partnership, was involved in providing farm labor employees to various tomato growers (Corkscrew Growers, Greener's Farm, C & G Farms, Johnson's Farm, Harvey Brothers, and R & S Sons, which was the partnership farm.) There was no written contract between the growers and Saldivar. Each grower would pay Saldivar for transporting the farm laborers to the growers' farms, and in addition, pay Saldivar for running a labor camp, that is, the place at which the farm laborers resided when they were not employed picking tomatoes. This latter item was the payment for rent for the laborers. The Respondent was also paid by the growers for the units of tomatoes picked by the laborers on an increment payment basis known as a "bin." The Respondent maintained a list of farm laborers through the device of a time card for each employee that worked for a week or mere for one of the growers. Those farm employees had Social Security cards and the growers furnished Workers' Compensation Insurance coverage for the benefit of the farm laborers. There were approximately 200 farm laborers in the category being provided by the Respondent's organization. The drivers of the tomato hauling trucks worked for the growers but the trucks belonged to the Saldivar organization and the picking buckets were also provided by this latter group. The farm laborers were paid by checks issued by the various growers. They were made up from time records maintained by the Respondent's organization. The check had attached to it a stub indicating the amount of pay, and the amount of Social Security deductions and the stub was available to be maintained by the employee. The information placed on the time records was gained from field supervisors who were employees of the growers. (Although the growers had field supervisors immediately in charge of the farm laborers, Saldivar was the overall coordinator for the activities of these laborers.) No withholding amount was taken out of the checks of the laborers other than Social Security. The payroll records of the Respondent would indicate the net earnings and gross amount paid to each farm laborer. Payment to the farm laborers was made at the farm labor camp managed by the Respondent. The process for disbursing the checks was to call the laborer by name and Saldivar would hand the check to the laborer. One of the farm laborers who lived at the Saldivar camp and picked tomatoes for a grower in the area was Felix Munoz. Munoz arrived at the Saldivar camp in August, 1979. Saldivar, at that point, loaned Munoz money to pay for Munoz's transportation to Florida. There was no repayment of the travel loan for a period of time for reason of unavailability of work for Munoz. In late September, Munoz began to repay the loan, and the method of repayment was at the time wherein the Respondent disbursed the payroll check from the grower to Munoz. Munoz would in turn endorse the check over to the Respondent and receive cash in the face amount of the check, and then give the Respondent some of that cash as repayment for the loan. Munoz was not provided a statement of the amount repaid on the loan. Respondent did have the amount written on a piece of paper over which he had control. The same loan arrangements for transportation that were involved with the laborer Munoz occurred with other farm laborers living in the Saldivar camp, and the same method was utilized for handling the manner of repayment of the indebtedness, and for recording the matters of the indebtedness. Munoz and other farm laborers also paid the Respondent rent for living at the Respondent's farm labor camp and the rent was paid from the proceeds of the checks for their efforts as tomato pickers. Munoz and others were not given statements of the amount they had paid to Saldivar for rent. Arnulfo Ramirez, Esteban Guerrero, Carnen Cruz, Juan Cruz, Santos Martinez and Leonel Flores were farm laborers who arrived at the Saldivar camp in December, 1979. These individuals, as with others spoken to above, were loaned money to pay for their transportation costs to Florida. The Respondent loaned them the money, and they in turn, agreed to repay the transportation loan from salaries earned and by the method identified before. These individuals had left the area of the State when the growers issued their last paycheck. Therefore, Respondent picked up the paychecks from the growers, and acting on the advice of counsel, endorsed the farm laborers' names to the checks and deposited them in the Respondent's account and the proceeds were used as credit against the transportation loans owed by these individuals.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was a registered farm labor contractor whose Social Security number is 266-30-9569. Respondent worked as a farm labor contractor only during the potato season which usually begins in March or April. Therefore, Respondent did not apply for certification as a farm labor contractor until March 31, 1986 even though his previous certification as a farm labor contractor had expired on December 31, 1985. There was credible evidence that Respondent had been using a 1968 Chevrolet vehicle to transport farm workers which carried a valid inspection sticker and was covered by Respondent's liability insurance. The 1968 Chevrolet "broke down" and was replaced by a 1974 Dodge Van on May 6, 1986 which had passed inspection on May 6, 1986 and added to Respondent's liability insurance policy on the same date. There was credible evidence that a valid inspection certificate and insurance certificate for the 1974 Dodge Van had been furnished to Petitioner's local office in Palatka on May 1986 but was not received in Petitioner's Tallahassee Office where the official files are maintained until a later date. On May 6, 1986, Respondent was cited for failure to have the 1974 Dodge Van properly insured and inspected. There were other violations cited but the Petitioner resolved those in favor of Respondent. There was credible evidence that Respondent had operated as a farm labor contractor for a substantial number of years without being cited for any violations under the Farm Labor Registration Law, Chapter 450, Part III, Florida Statutes. Respondent is a farm labor contractor as that term is defined in Section 450.2(1), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner, enter a Final Order dismissing all charges filed against the Respondent. Respectfully submitted and entered this 9th day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Moses E. Williams, Esquire Department of Labor and Security Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Willis Glover 21 North Main Street Crescent City, Florida 32012 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 206 Berkeley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to a refund of state group life insurance premiums retroactive to the date she became disabled and continuing through the date of approval of a waiver of premium based on disability.
Findings Of Fact During her entire career with the State, Petitioner was employed by the Department of Corrections (DOC). At all times material, DOC, like all State governmental agencies, had its own personnel office. At all times material, the Division of Retirement (Retirement) handled all governmental agencies’ employees’ retirement issues. At all times material, the State has provided its employees, including Petitioner at DOC, with various types of insurance through Respondent Department of Management Services (DMS), Division of State Group Insurance (DSGI), the Respondent herein. For more than 20 years, ending January 1, 2007, the State of Florida provided state officials, employees and retirees basic life insurance coverage through Prudential Insurance Company of America (Prudential). Although Petitioner retired on full disability in mid- 2000, at all times relevant to these proceedings, Petitioner has continuously participated in the State Group Insurance Program’s (Program’s), life insurance plan (Plan). The Program is authorized by Section 110.123, Florida Statutes. Because of enhanced benefits, employees were required to complete a new life insurance enrollment form during “open enrollment,” conducted in 1999, for coverage beginning January 1, 2000. Petitioner completed the life insurance enrollment form and dated it "10/04/99." Directly below Petitioner's signature on this enrollment form, the following statement appears: Waiver of Premium for Disability If you are totally disabled for a continuous 9 months and are less than 60 years of age at the time disability begins, Prudential will continue your coverage with no premium due, provided you report your disability within 12 months of its start and submit any required proof to Prudential. The second page, last paragraph of the 1999, enrollment form provided an address and a toll-free telephone number for Prudential, and advised participants that the form was intended to provide a summary of benefits, as more completely set out in the certificate. Petitioner produced the enrollment form in response to Respondent's request for production of documents. She identified her signature thereon at hearing, and had the enrollment form admitted in evidence as Exhibit P-1. She also admits in her Proposed Recommended Order that she signed it. Although her testimony waffled in some respects, on the whole, she testified to the effect that she had retained a copy of this form where she had access to it at all times material. She is, therefore, found to have had knowledge of its contents since 1999. Petitioner testified that she never received either a life insurance policy nor a certificate of insurance, from Prudential or from any entity of Florida State Government, and that neither her DOC Personnel Office, Retirement, Florida First,1/ or DMS/DSGI advised her at the time of her retirement in mid-2000, that she could apply to Prudential for a life insurance premium waiver. However, Petitioner also had admitted in evidence as Exhibit P-2, a “Continuation/Termination Form” which she signed on “4-11-00,” stating a retirement date of “3- 10-00.” That form specifies that “. . . the amount of life insurance shall be $10,000 . . .” with a footnote reading, “This [referring to the $10,000, amount] would only apply if Waiver of Premium is not approved.” (Bracketed material supplied.) Also, the credible testimony of Respondent’s witnesses and of exhibits in evidence show that a complete certificate of life insurance was mailed to Petitioner in a timely manner. There is no proof that the insurance certificate varied the substance of the enrollment form as quoted in Finding of Fact 7. Indeed, the certificate provided, in pertinent part: The Policyholder will continue the full premium for continuance of insurance in accordance with item 8 above, [referring to “Total disability commencing before age 60— Unlimited for Employee Term Life Insurance”] provided the employee furnishes written proof of such total disability when and as required by the Policyholder. * * * Period of Extension Protection for a Disabled Employee— one year after receipt by Prudential’s Home Office of written proof that his total disability has existed continuously for at least nine months, provided the employee furnishes such proof no later than one year after the later of (1) the date premium payments for the employee’s insurance under the Group Policy are discontinued or (2) the cessation of any extended death benefit under the provisions for “Extended Death Benefit for Total Disability” above, and successive periods of one year each after the year of extension under (1), provided the employee furnishes written proof of the continuance of the employee’s total disability when and as required by Prudential once each year. Only employees disabled before retirement and under 60 years of age were eligible for the premium waiver. Employees who became disabled during retirement were not eligible for the waiver. By the terms of her enrollment form and certificate, if Petitioner did not notify Prudential before the twelfth month, she could not receive the waiver. When, precisely, Petitioner became “totally disabled” for purposes of her State life insurance certificate’s definition is debatable, because for some time prior to her actual retirement date, she was working off and on while pursuing a “permanent total disability” determination, pursuant to the definition of that term as expressed in Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, The Florida Workers’ Compensation Law. Petitioner ultimately received the workers’ compensation ruling she sought, possibly before March 10, 2000. Petitioner’s last day of work was March 10, 2000, when, she testified, a superior had her forcibly removed from DOC property. Despite her assertion that she was not approved for in-line-of-duty retirement until September 1, 2000, Petitioner also testified that the State granted her retirement upon disability, effective April 1, 2000, and April 1, 2000, is the date put forth by Respondent as Petitioner's disability retirement date, as well. Upon that concurrence, it is found that Petitioner qualified for total disability for State life insurance purposes before retirement and that she qualified for the waiver by age at retirement. When Petitioner retired on disability in 2000, employees of both DOC and of Retirement knew that she was retiring on disability. Retirement provided Petitioner with printed materials referring her to the insurance company and/or DMS/DSGI for insurance questions and stating that Retirement did not administer any insurance programs. There is no evidence Petitioner asked anyone about the waiver in 2000. From her retirement date in mid-2000, until Prudential ultimately granted her a premium waiver in 2007, Petitioner paid the full life insurance premiums to the State Life Trust, either via deduction from her retirement or directly by her own check. From the date of her retirement through December 2006, Petitioner paid $4.20, per month for life insurance, and beginning January 1, 2007, through November 2007, she paid $35.79, per month. According to Petitioner, she only became aware of the availability of the potential waiver of premiums when she received a booklet during open enrollment in October 2007, advising her that beginning January 1, 2008, the State life insurance coverage would be provided through Minnesota Life Insurance. The specific language that caught her eye was: No premium to pay if you become disabled --- If you become totally disabled or as defined in your policy, premiums are waived. Petitioner conceded that there is no substantive difference between the foregoing instruction and the statement on her 1999, enrollment form for Prudential. (See Finding of Fact 7.) Petitioner applied for the Minnesota life insurance, with premium waiver, triggering a series of bureaucratic decisions that maintained her continuous life insurance coverage by Prudential and permitted Petitioner to apply to Prudential for waiver of the life insurance premium as described in her 1999, enrollment form. Although bureaucratic delays occurred through DOC’s personnel office, Prudential accepted Petitioner’s proof of age, disability, etc., and granted the waiver of premiums based on disability. The monthly premiums of $35.79, that Petitioner paid in October and November 2007, were retroactively reimbursed to her by the State, based upon Prudential's receipt of Petitioner's waiver package on October 3, 2007. Beginning in December 2007, Prudential activated the waiver of premium, so that Petitioner has not had to pay any premium since. Adrienne Bowen, a DSGI manager of Prudential contracts for twenty years, testified that, in 1999-2000, Prudential’s waiver did not apply until after nine months of continuous disability and after the participant had reported the disability to Prudential, and after Prudential had approved the waiver of premiums. She further testified that she believed that there was no provision for the waiver to apply retroactively. For this testimony, Ms. Bowen relied upon Exhibit R-11, a “Group Life Administration Manual,” which had been devised so that the State life insurance plan would be consistently administered. On the foregoing issues, The Group Life Administration Manual states, in pertinent part: WAIVER OF PREMIUM When an employee becomes disabled and is unable to work because of a disability, the employee may be eligible to extend the group life coverage without premium payments. In order to extend coverage, the employee must submit proof of disability within the period shown on the Group Contract (generally at least 9 months but less than 12 months after the total disability starts). If the proof is accepted, you may stop the premium on behalf of the employee’s group coverage. We recommend that premium payments continue for that employee until a decision is made regarding the claim. (Emphasis in original.) However, Ms. Bowen also testified that DSGI and Prudential now allow an insured to request the waiver at any time after nine months of continuous disability, without automatic denial if the employee’s first request is not made within 12 months after she first becomes disabled. This was done in Petitioner's situation in 2007. Prudential did not refuse to waive premiums because Petitioner’s application was not made within 12 months of total disability. However, the premiums refunded related back only to the first day of the month in which she made application for waiver. Petitioner seeks a reimbursement for overpayment of premiums from April 1, 2000, to September 30, 2007. Her first request to Respondent for an administrative hearing appears to have been made on or about May 12, 2008. After several levels of internal agency “appeals,” the cause was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings on or about August 28, 2008.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance, enter a final order which calculates the State group life insurance premiums Petitioner paid between May 12, 2006, and October 1, 2007, and orders payment to Petitioner of that amount within 30 days of the final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of December, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 2008.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Department of Insurance was the government agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of insurance agents and the regulation of the practice of the insurance profession in this state. Respondent, Alan Chappuis, was licensed in Florida as a life insurance agent, health insurance agent, general lines agent, and a life, health and variable annuity contracts salesman. Erna Swan, an 84 year old twice widowed lady, and the individual to whom Respondent sold the annuity policies in question, was unable, at the time of the hearing, to recall the names of either of her former husbands or when they passed away. She recalls that both husbands worked in insurance and that she has lived in the Pinellas County area for a long time, but cannot recall for how long. Mrs. Swan lives alone and can cook for herself and bathe and dress herself, but does not know how much her current income is or the source of that income. She was able to recognize Respondent as her insurance agent of several years standing, but cannot recall whether she ever purchased anything from him, and she does not know what Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Company is. She does not know what an annuity is or whether she ever wanted to buy one from the Respondent. By the same token, she cannot recall if he ever tried to sell her an annuity. Mrs. Swan has known Nadine Hopkins, a close friend, for about 10 years. She also recognizes Mr. Wells and Mr. Tipton, her attorney and stock broker respectively, but does not know what they do. Mrs. Swan maintains a room in her condominium apartment which she uses for an office where, before she was placed under the guardianship of Ms. Hopkins, she paid her bills and kept her business records, such as they were. She recalls that she had a brokerage account with Merrill Lynch but cannot remember what it was for or what type of securities were in it. She is familiar with Bayridge Baptist Church, of which she is a member, and she recognizes that she has given money to the church over the years. Mrs. Swan's driver's license was cancelled several years ago because, according to Ms. Hopkins, she felt she could not take the test required to renew it. Mrs. Swan does not recall this though she remembers she used to own a car. She cannot remember what kind it was. Mrs. Swan's apartment is paid for. There are no mortgage payments. She claims she still writes checks for her monthly bills by herself, but also notes that Ms. Hopkins does it. More likely it is the latter. She still answers her phone, answers her mail, and reads the newspaper. She is, however, obviously incompetent to testify to the nature of an annuity, and it is quite clear that at this time she would be unable to understand the provisions of an annuity contract and the difference between an annuity contract and an investment portfolio in another product. Mr. Tipton, formerly a stock broker with Merrill Lynch, first met Mrs. Swan in the early 1960's through a family member who worked at the family insurance agency. At that time Mrs. Swan and her husband had purchased the agency from his family, and in the years following the Swans stayed as friends of Mr. Tipton. Mr. Tipton became an investment advisor in 1981 to Mr. Swan who passed away sometime in either 1985 or 1986. He started buying U.S. Government bonds and thereafter moved to tax free investments. When Mr. Swan passed away, Mrs. Swan became the owner of the account. During 1992 and 1993, Mr. Tipton would see Mrs. Swan once or twice a month. At that time, toward the end of 1993, it was clear to him that her memory appeared to be slipping. She would not remember things they had talked about and was unable to participate fully in the decisions made on her investments. At the end of 1993, Mrs. Swan's portfolio with Merrill Lynch was valued at approximately $360,000, plus a money market balance of $18,000. The account statement for October, 1993 reflected she had 5 municipal bonds valued at $80,000, tax free bond funds valued at $273,620, and approximately $18,000 in money market funds. Her estimated annual income from the bonds was approximately $6,631, or approximately $520.00 per month. Her tax free bond funds income returned approximately $1,200 per month, and her Nuveen Fund, approximately $50.00 per month, giving her a grand total of approximately $1,800 per month investment income in addition to her Social Security monthly payment of somewhat in excess of $650. On December 20, 1993, Mr. Tipton, as a representative of Merrill Lynch, received a letter moving Mrs. Swan's account to another brokerage firm, located in Texas, but with a local representative. At that time, Mr. Tipton tried to stop the transfer by contacting his main office, but was advised that by the time he had received the letter, the transfer had been completed. Mr. Tipton wanted to stop the transfer because when he called Mrs. Swan to inquire about it, she indicated to him that she did not want her account moved. Several weeks later, Mrs. Swan called Mr. Tipton to find out where her Merrill Lynch monthly account statement was. She did not recall at that time that her Merrill Lynch account had been closed and the securities therein transferred to the Texas brokerage concern. Because of this call, sometime in early January, 1994, Mr. Tipton called Mr. Wells, Mrs. Swan's attorney, and set up a meeting for the three of them. There were approximately three meetings of the three of them between January and March, 1994. The substance of their discussions was the fact that the broker to whom the Merrill Lynch account had been transferred had liquidated her entire account and used the proceeds thereof to pay for the annuities sold to Mrs. Swan by Mr. Chappuis and his associate, Mr. Mednick. According to Mr. Tipton, up until this time, Mrs. Swan had never indicated any dissatisfaction with the interest and income she was earning on her Merrill Lynch brokerage account. Mr. Tipton absolutely denies there was any churning of her account to garner more commissions. The only transfer was a sale at a premium in February, 1993 of bonds of the Jacksonville Electric Authority to create more capital for investment to provide greater income. The brokerage account owned by Mrs. Swan was not insured against loss of principal though many of the particular funds in which much of the money was invested were, however, individually insured. In 1990, Mrs. Swan's account, which had been in her name individually, was transferred to a trust account of which she was the beneficiary for life, with the provision that at her death, the funds therein would be distributed to various religious organizations and a few friends. Mrs. Swan had no family heirs. No commission was earned by Mr. Tipton on the transfer, though he did receive a commission on both the above-mentioned sale of the Jacksonville Electric bonds and the purchase of a tax free bond fund with the proceeds. Her brokerage account permitted her to write checks on the funds in the money fund. Mr. Tipton claims he never engaged in a transaction regarding Mrs. Swan's account without first talking to her about it. In his opinion, whenever he did make a change she appeared alert and aware enough to participate effectively. The last major transaction was the 1990 bond sale, however. Mrs. Hopkins and Mrs. Swan attend the same church. In late 1993 or early 1994, Respondent's business card was always on Mrs. Swan's refrigerator. At no time did she ever speak disparagingly of him to Mrs. Hopkins, or complain about any insurance product he sold her. Mrs. Hopkins was not Mrs. Swan's guardian at that time and Mrs. Swan was paying her own bills, however not effectively. She was late getting them out and complained it was becoming difficult for her to type out the checks. According to Mrs. Hopking, Mrs. Swan was not extravagant in her spending. She did not take cruises, go to expensive restaurants or buy a lot of clothes. Mrs. Swan, in Ms. Hopkins' opinion, lived comfortably. She was generous in the terms of her charitable contributions. Since being appointed Mrs. Swan's guardian, Mrs. Hopkins had seen her financial records and she knows that Mrs. Swan donated a lot of money to various churches and religious organizations. Mrs. Swan received many requests for donations and indicated that as long as she had the money to give she would do so. In later years, however, as Mrs. Hopkins recalls, it became a physical and mental burden for Mrs. Swan to write the checks, and she frequently commented on this. Mr. Wells is Mrs. Swan's attorney, specializing in estate and trust planning. He met Mrs. Swan through a friend in 1990 and began to serve as her estate planner. In the spring of 1994 Mr. Wells met with Mr. Tipton and Mrs. Swan regarding the Respondent's sale of her security portfolio and the purchase of the two annuities in issue here with the proceeds. At that time Mrs. Swan seemed to have no knowledge of the transaction. As a result, he called Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Company to get some information on what needed to be done in order to bring about a recision of the policies, but before any action was taken, the entire matter was turned over to Mr. Keirnan, another attorney, who does trial work. As a result of Keirnan's efforts, approximately two weeks before the hearing, Mr. Wells, on behalf of Mrs. Swan, received a check in the amount of approximately $372,000 from Guarantee Trust and Life Insurance Company as full reimbursement of the premiums paid for the two annuities in issue. From the time the annuities were issued in December, 1993 and January, 1994, Mrs. Swan had only her Social Security check to live on. She also received a check from Guarantee for $5,000, at her request, at the time the policies were issued as the balance in her brokerage account over the amount required as premiums for the annuities. She received nothing from her annuities which, as set up, did not call for the payment of any monthly income. As a result, Mr. Wells felt it necessary to borrow between $15,000 and $20,000 at 8 percent for Mrs. Swan from other trusts he managed to provide funds for Mrs. Swan to live on. From the documents which Mr. Tipton and Mrs. Swan brought to him in March, 1994, Wells could determine that the two annuities were purchased for her but she, at that time, did not seem to know anything about them. Though the annuities offered several options to permit period withdrawal of principal and interest, none had been selected by Mrs. Swan and as they then existed, she would draw no income from them until she was 100 years of age. When Mr. Tipton and Mrs. Swan came to Mr. Wells' office and brought the paperwork showing she had sold her securities to buy the annuities, Mr. Wells called Respondent to find out what had happened to Mrs. Swan's money. About the same time, he drafted a letter to Respondent at Mrs. Swan's request in which she requested Respondent not contact her any more. This letter was written because Mrs. Swan had said Respondent had "pestered" her at home and upset her on some occasions before the letter was written. Guarantee's manager of Government Relations and Compliance, Mr. Krevitzky, identified the two policies issued to Mrs. Swan. According to Mr. Krevitzky, an annuity is a savings vehicle which holds funds over a period at interest with provision for single or periodic pay out. Interest on both annuities in issue here was guaranteed at a rate of 4.5 percent per year or higher. The first year, the policies earned only the guaranteed 4.5 percent interest, and the income was credited to the policy from January, 1994 until the policies were surrendered as a part of the litigation settlement on March 25, 1995. At that point, since it was considered that the policies were rescinded and therefore void ab initio, the interest earned was forfeited and not paid. Only the premiums paid in were refunded in total. The commission paid to the Respondent and his associate, Mr. Mednick, was paid out of company funds and not Mrs. Swan's funds. The annuity contracts sold by the Respondent to Mrs. Swan had options for five different pay-outs, some of which would have returned income to her during the pendency of the contract. However, none of these was selected by Mrs. Swan and there was no evidence to indicate that Respondent ever explained any of them to her. As they existed as of the date they were cancelled, and at all time up until then, Mrs. Swan would receive no income until the annuity matured at her age 100. This is an unreasonable situation for an individual of Mrs. Swan's age and situation. Mr. Krevitzky contends that the potential pay out options could have provided Mrs. Swan with a substantial income equal to or exceeding the income she was received from her securities portfolio. Most of these options would have included a partial return of principal, however, whereas the income from the prior held portfolio was interest only with her principal remaining intact. One option provided an income for a guaranteed period which, in some circumstances, could have resulted in her receiving more than the amount paid in for the contract. The ultimate fact remains, however, that at the time of sale, and at all times thereafter, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Chappuis was directed to stay away from Mrs. Swan, he had failed to assist her in the selection of any income option and she was receiving no current income at all from the annuities. In each of the two years prior to the purchase, for 1992 and 1993, she had regular tax free investment income of between $26,000 and $27,000, in addition to the capital gains of approximately $23,000 from the sale of the bonds in 1992. It matters not that she needed little to live on or donated a great portion of her income to charity. This decision was hers to make. By the same token, it matters not that no request for income was made, during the pendency of the annuities, by or on behalf of Mrs. Swan. Annuities have several benefits over other types of investments, according to Mr. Krevitzky. One is the tax deferment provision for interest earned on the annuity. Another is the fact that, subject to local law, the principal of the annuity is not subject to garnishment. A third is the guaranteed return of principal at the end of the annuity which permits older annuitants to provide for their heirs while maintaining income during their lifetimes. Many senior citizens look to the safety of their investment rather than the taxability of the interest. Therefore, in selling annuities to seniors, the agents stress these factors and the no-probate consideration. David W. Johnson has been an independent contractor with Respondent's broker, Professional Systems Associates, since 1989 and is the annuity manager for the firm. Mr. Johnson indicates that there has been an increase in the annuity business with seniors in 1993 - 1994. Funds for the purchase of the annuities usually comes from bank certificates of deposit, but sometimes, like in the instant case, the funds come from a brokerage account. In his experience, seniors choose annuities over certificates of deposit and brokerage accounts. According to Mr. Johnson, if Mrs. Swan had wanted to stop the transfer from her account she could have done so up until the transaction was completed, even after the securities had been liquidated and the funds sent to Guarantee. This is so, he claims even though Mrs. Swan gave authority to make the transfer in the documentation accompanying her application for the annuities. Mr. Johnson indicated it takes about two weeks after the receipt of the premium before Guarantee issues the annuity contract and at any time before issue, the transaction could be cancelled and the money returned. Even after issue, there is a "free look" period during which the contract may be cancelled without penalty. Though the contract may be cancelled and the premium returned, the former securities are still liquidated and the brokerage account closed. According to Mr. Johnson, there was nothing in the paperwork regarding these annuities which he saw which would raise any flag for consideration. He did not feel it necessary to call Mrs. Swan to see if she really wanted the policy and he never received a call from her or anybody else regarding it. Mr. Chappuis' partner in this sale was Scott Mednick who has been a licensed insurance agent since 1984 and who is an independent contractor with the same agency. Mr. Mednick was solicited to accompany Mr. Chappuis to Mrs. Swan's home in December, 1994 because of his expertise in the annuity field. Respondent had described Mrs. Swan to him as a long time customer. Respondent claimed that Mrs. Swan had indicated she was concerned about her brokerage account and he wanted to show her some product, annuities, she might be interested in. Mr. Mednick has known Respondent for eleven years and knows him to be a top producer. Respondent's reputation is that he is cheap and close with the dollar. Nonetheless, Mr. Mednick claims he was not surprised that Respondent was willing to share the commission on this sale in order to be sure the client got the proper product. Mrs. Swan let Mr. Mednick examine her monthly statement from Merrill Lynch. It appeared to Mr. Mednick that the account had not grown over the years. This is not surprising in that the portfolio was made up solely of tax free bond funds, tax free municipal bonds and tax free money marts, the volatility of and fluctuation in price of which is minimal. Mr. Mednick cannot now recall if Mrs. Swan indicated she knew about her stocks. However, he relates that he and the Respondent suggested she look into annuities as an alternative which Respondent explained to her. In addition, he claims they provided her with a lot of written material. Based on Mrs. Swan's action, words and attitudes expressed, Mr. Mednick believed she completely understood what was explained to her and wanted to make the change. It was his belief she seemed to understand she would pay no commission on the purchase; that she would have a guaranteed income that she could not outlive; that the annuity avoided the volatility of the stock market; and it was not attachable by creditors. As structured and sold to Mrs. Swan, however, she was to get no income at all from this product until she reached the age of 100/. Mr. Mednick asserts that at no time did he feel that Respondent had less than the best interests of Mrs. Swan at heart and he can recall no time when Respondent lied to Mrs. Swan. All representations made by either Respondent or Mednick allegedly came from the brochures left with her. Mednick indicates that during their conversation, Mrs. Swan did not seem concerned about getting her principal out of the investment. She was most concerned about her desire to leave the principal to the church. Mednick claims that at the time of the sale, the two agents asked Mrs. Swan if she wanted her interest paid quarterly but she said to let it accrue. This representation, in light of the other evidence, is not credible. Taken together, Mednick's testimony does nothing to detract from Respondent's sale of this product, inappropriate as it was for this client, to Mrs. Swan. Mr. Mednick's credentials are somewhat suspect, and his credibility poor, however. By his own admission, he has been administratively fined by the Department on two occasions based on allegations of misconduct. He denies any misconduct, however, claiming he accepted punishment only as an alternative to a prolonged contest of the allegations. The allegations herein were referred to an investigator of the Department to look into. As is the custom of the Department, he did not interview the Respondent but merely sought to gather facts concerning each allegation to be sent to the Department offices in Tallahassee where the analysis and determination of misconduct is made. By the same token, he did not call or speak with Mrs. Swan, Mr. Mednick, or anyone at Professional Systems. He spoke with Mr. Tipton, Mr. Wells, Mrs. Hopkins and with Mr. Keirnan a couple of times.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the insurance licenses and the eligibility for licensure of the Respondent herein, Alan Chappuis, be suspended for nine months. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of August, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. - 21. Accepted and incorporated herein. 22. & 23. Accepted and incorporated herein. 24. - 27 Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENT: Respondent's post hearing submittal was entitled "Respondent's Final Argument." However, because it makes specific Findings of Fact, the submittal will be treated as though it were Proposed Findings of Fact which will be ruled upon herein. First sentence accepted. Balance rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. & 3. Accepted that Mr. Krevitzky testified and that there was nothing in the contract which would cause Respondent to misrepresent. The product may well be a worthy product for someone in a different financial position than Ms. Swan, and the issue is whether Respondent fully explained the implications and ramifications of the contracts to her. Rejected as a misconception of the nature of the witness' testimony. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted as a summary of the witness' testimony. First and second sentences accepted. Balance rejected as an unwarranted conclusion drawn from the evidence. Accepted but irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Alan Chappuis, Pro se P. O. Box 86126 Madiera Beach, Florida 33738 The Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Conclusions THIS CAUSE, arising under Florida’s “Agricultural License and Bond Law” (Sections 604.15-604.34), Florida Statutes, came before the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Florida for consideration and final agency action. On October 21, 2008, the Petitioner, Ricky A. Branch, III, a producer of agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(9), Florida Statutes, timely filed an administrative claim pursuant to Section 604.21, Florida Statutes, to collect $31,296.18 for eggplants they sold to Respondent, a licensed dealer in agricultural products. Respondent’s license for the time in question was supported by a surety bond required by Section 604.20, Florida Statutes, written by Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland in the amount of $100,000. On January 7, 2009, a Notice of Filing of ‘an Amended Claim was mailed to Respondent and Co-Respondent. On January 27, 2009, the Respondent filed an ANSWER OF RESPONDENT with attachments wherein they denied the claim as being valid, admitted no indebtedness and requested a hearing. Therefore, this matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) for an administrative hearing in accordance with the provisions of Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. An administrative hearing was scheduled in this matter for April 17, 2009. Attached to the NOTICE OF HEARING was an ORDER OF PRE-HEARING INSTRUCTIONS with instructions for the parties to follow prior to and at the hearing. On March 30, 2009, the Respondent filed a ' MOTION TO CONTINUE FINAL HEARING. The Administrative Law Judge (“Judge”) issued an ORDER GRANTING CONTINUANCE (“Order”) on April 3, 2009. In the Judge’s Order, he asked the parties to confer and advise him on the status of the matter among other things. An ORDER RE-SCHEDULING. HEARING was issued on April 16, 2009 and a new hearing date was set for June 9, 2009. Prior to the hearing, on June 5, 2009, the Respondent filed a RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS claiming their efforts to contact the Claimant have been futile. Additionally, Respondent asserts that Claimant failed to comply with the ORDER GRANTING CONTINUANCE, the ORDER RE-SCHEDULING HEARING and the ORDER OF PRE-HEARING INSTRUCTIONS issued by DOAH. For the aforesaid reasons, the Respondent feels the Claimant’s claim should be denied and the claim dismissed with prejudice. On June 16, 2009, the Judge issued a RECOMMENDED ORDER OF DISMISSAL, a copy of which is attached hereto as EXHIBIT “A”, to which neither party filed written exceptions with this Department. . Upon the consideration of the foregoing and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is ORDERED: Based on the fact that the Claimant failed to appear at the final hearing with DOAH on June 9, 2009 and failed to meet his burden of proof in presenting evidence in support of his claim, the Department adopts the Judge’s RECOMMENDED ORDER OF DISMISSAL. The Department hereby dismisses the captioned claim and the file is closed without further action. Any party to these proceedings adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to seek review of this Final Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes (2002) and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure (2003). Review proceedings must be instituted by filing a petition or notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk, 5" Floor, Mayo Building, Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800. A copy of the petition for review or notice of appeal, accompanied by the filing fees prescribed by law must also be filed with the appropriate District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days of the date this Final Ondet yas filed with the Agency Clerk. DONE AND ORDERED this77_ day of , 2009. ES H. BRONSON TERRY/L. RHODES Assi Commissioner of Agriculture Ke Filed with Agency Clerk this? _ day of , 2009. (pL Vb AM Agency Clerk COPIES FURNISHED TO: Judge Daniel Manry Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (Certified Receipt No. 7160 3901 9848 2604 4626) Mr. Gary Wishnatzki, Registered Agent Wishnatzki, Inc., d/b/a Wishnatzki Farms 100 Stearn Avenue Plant City, FL 33566 (Certified Receipt No. 7160 3901 9848 2605 1259) Mr. Ricky A. Branch, IIT Post Office Box 42 Webster, FL 33597 (Certified Receipt No. 7160 3901 9848 2605 1266) Ms. Kathy Alves, Claims Specialist Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland Post Office Box 87 , Baltimore, MD 21203-0087 (Certified Receipt No. 7160 3901 9848 2605 1273) (Claim No. 6380046897) Thomas F. Munro, Esquire FOLEY & LARDNER LLP 100 North Tampa Street, Suite 2700 Tampa, FL 33602 (Certified Receipt No. 7160 3901 9848 2605 1280) . Mr. Bedford Wilder General Counsel Staff Mayo Building, M-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Ms. Stephenie Butscher and Mr. Mark Moritz, Field Representatives
Findings Of Fact Essential Background. The Respondent, Larry Wayne Lindsay, is and has been at all times pertinent to this case, eligible for licensure as a general lines agent and as a life and health agent. Effective between December 31, 1987, and January 1, 1988 (the written agreement is dated December 24, 1987), Lindsay's Friendly Auto Insurance of Polk County, Inc., formerly Friendly Auto Insurance Agency of Lake Wales, Inc. (Friendly of Lake Wales), and Friendly Auto Insurance of Winter Haven, Inc. (Friendly of Winter Haven), sold their assets, including the leasehold on the Friendly of Winter Haven business location, to Central Florida Insurance Agency of Winter Haven, Inc. (Central), for $500. The Respondent, Larry Wayne Lindsay (Lindsay), signed the agreement on behalf of the sellers. Kimberly Strayer, then Lindsay's fiance, now his wife, is the sole legal owner, officer and director of Central. Effective between December 31, 1987, and January 1, 1988 (the written agreement is dated January 27, 1988), Friendly Auto Insurance of Haines City, Inc. (Friendly of Haines City), sold its assets, including the leasehold on its business location, to Ridge Insurance Agency, Inc. (Ridge), for $200. Lindsay signed the agreement on behalf of the seller. Kimberly Strayer is the sole legal owner, officer and director of Ridge. When it was formed in approximately April of 1984, Lindsay and Ruth Kent were the initial directors of Friendly of Winter Haven. The two of them remained the directors and officers of the corporation through at least January of 1987, according to the corporation's annual reports. At some point before December 31, 1987, Kent transferred all of her interest in the corporation to Lindsay, who became the sole owner, officer and director of the corporation. But the evidence was not clear when Kent transferred her interest to Lindsay or what Lindsay's ownership interest in the corporation was up to the time of the transfer. Lindsay was the full-time agent in charge of Friendly of Winter Haven in March of 1983, according to Department of Insurance records, but the evidence was not clear how long he remained full-time agent in charge. At some point, he was replaced by Thomas Shaw. The evidence was not at all clear who were the owners, directors or officers of Friendly of Lake Wales at any point in time before Lindsay, acting on its behalf, transferred its assets to Central. Robert Seese was its nominal full-time agent in charge starting approximately in July, 1986, until approximately September, 1988, according to the evidence, but he was not actually in charge of the office, had little to do with the business and spent little time at the business. He essentially allowed Friendly of Lake Wales to use his name, license and facsimile stamp. Lindsay also submitted some applications for insurance from the Lake Wales office in the fall of 1987. The evidence was not at all clear when Seese's nominal role as the full-time agent in charge was terminated or who was the full-time agent in charge when Seese was not. When it was formed in approximately September of 1983, Lindsay and Ruth Kent were the initial directors of Friendly of Haines City. The two of them remained the directors and officers of the corporation through at least January of 1987, according to the corporation's annual reports. At some point before December 31, 1987, Kent transferred all of her interest in the corporation to Lindsay, who became the sole owner, officer and director of the corporation. But the evidence was not clear when Kent transferred her interest to Lindsay or what Lindsay's ownership interest in the corporation was up to the time of the transfer. When it was formed in approximately September of 1984, Lindsay and Ruth Kent were the initial directors of Friendly Auto Insurance Agency of Bartow, Inc., (Friendly of Bartow). The two of them remained the directors and officers of the corporation through at least January of 1987, according to the corporation's annual reports. In May, 1987, Lindsay was the full-time agent in charge of Friendly of Bartow, according to Department of Insurance records in evidence. At some point in time, Lindsay transferred all of his interest in the corporation to Kent. But the evidence was not clear when Lindsay ceased acting as full-time agent in charge of Friendly of Bartow, when Lindsay transferred his interest to Kent or what Lindsay's ownership interest in the corporation was up to the time of the transfer. When Central began doing business at the former Friendly of Winter Haven location in January, 1988, Seese transferred his license there and began to pose as its full-time agent in charge. In fact, Seese was not in charge of Central's business, had very little to do with the business and spent practically no time at Central's office. Essentially, all he did was allow Central to use his name, license and facsimile stamp. Lindsay often was at Central giving advice to Strayer and, as a practical matter, acting in the role of the full-time agent in charge of Central. Ridge began doing business at the former Friendly of Haines City location in January, 1988, without having notified the Department of Insurance of the identity of its full-time agent in charge. Strayer testified that Ridge had no full-time agent in charge but conceded that she knew it was illegal to operate without one. In fact, Lindsay spent much of his time at Ridge and essentially ran the office, acting as if he were the full-time agent in charge. Business with the FJUA is produced by agents who are licensed by the FJUA to produce business at a certain location and assigned to a particular insurance company. When they began doing business, neither Ridge nor Central had a relationship with FJUA. Lindsay had been an FJUA producer assigned to State Farm Mutual Insurance Company (State Farm) and licensed to produce business at Friendly of Bartow. Although the evidence is not clear when Lindsay stopped producing FJUA business at Friendly of Bartow, he officially was terminated as a producer at that location on or about April 21, 1988. Seese had been an FJUA producer at Friendly of Lake Wales assigned to State Farm from July, 1987, officially until approximately February 9, 1988. Thomas Shaw, who was the full-time agent in charge of Friendly of Winter Haven, had been an FJUA producer assigned to State Farm at that location--the same location Central later assumed. There is no evidence when or if Shaw officially was terminated as a producer at the Friendly of Winter Haven location. Lindsay knew, and should have known, that Ridge had not yet been licensed by the FJUA to produce FJUA business at its location or that it had been assigned to State Farm. When Ridge began doing business, applications for FJUA insurance coverage first were transmitted to Central to be submitted by Central, over Seese's facsimile stamp, to State Farm. Transactions Alleged Under Counts I Through VIII. On or about January 14, 1988, Ridge took from David Doolin of Davenport, Florida, an application and $70 as a down payment for coverage under the FJUA and bound the coverage. (Count I.) On or about January 20, 1988, Ridge took from Rachel McKenny of Haines City, Florida, an application and $56 as down payment for six months of personal injury protection (PIP) coverage with United States Underwriters (USU) and bound the coverage. When coverage under USU became unavailable, Ridge advanced McKenny $12 to pay for the down payment on a year of coverage under the FJUA. (Count II.) On or about January 12, 1988, Ridge took from Richard Truett of Haines City, an application and $109 as down payment for a year of coverage under the FJUA and bound the coverage. (Count III.) On or about January 13, 1988, Ridge took from Bruce Tish, Jr., an application and $150 as down payment for and with Dairyland Insurance Company and bound the coverage. When Dairyland insurance became unavailable, Ridge advanced Tish $16 for the down payment on a year of coverage with the FJUA. (Count IV.) On or about January 15, 1988, Ridge took from Germaine Collier of Winter Haven an application and $56 as down payment for six months of PIP coverage with USU and bound the coverage. When USU coverage became unavailable, Ridge advanced Collier $2 for the down payment for a year of coverage under the FJUA. (Count V.) On or about January 15, 1988, Ridge took from Callie Robinson, Jr., of Haines City an application and $56 as down payment for six months of PIP coverage with USU and bound the coverage. When the USU coverage became unavailable, Ridge advanced Robinson $2 for the down payment for a year of coverage under the FJUA. (Count VI.) On or about January 15, 1988, Ridge took from James Belcher, through his wife Peggy, an application and $56 as down payment for six months of PIP coverage with USU and bound the coverage. When the USU coverage became unavailable, Ridge advanced Belcher $12 for the down payment for a year of coverage under the FJUA. (Count VII.) On or about January 15, 1988, Ridge took from Gerald Dempsey of Winter Haven an application and $60 as down payment for six months of PIP coverage with USU and bound the coverage. When the USU coverage became unavailable, Ridge submitted the application for a year of coverage under the FJUA (the down payment for which was only $58.) (Count VIII.) It was not proven, as alleged, that Ridge did not secure the necessary money order for the down payment for the FJUA coverage referred to in Counts I through VIII until on or after March 24, 1988, or that Ridge did not submit the applications referred to in Counts I through VIII until on or about April 12, 1988. To the contrary, it never was made clear from the Department's evidence whether the FJUA applications referred to in Counts I through VIII (Petitioner's Exhibits 18 through 25, in evidence) were among the applications received by State Farm for the first time on or about April 12 and 19, 1988, or whether they were among the applications previously submitted to State Farm but returned by State Farm for various reasons. Lindsay's evidence, which is more persuasive, suggests that Ridge transmitted the applications to Central for processing, money orders for the down payments were obtained and Central sent the applications to State Farm within approximately a week from when they were taken by Ridge. According to Lindsay's version of the events that transpired, State Farm rejected the applications once because Seese's facsimile stamp had been used on the applications. (The applications themselves would support Lindsay's version in this respect. Seese's name is signed over a part of the application that appears to have been "whited-out.") State Farm returned the applications and the money orders. Central then repurchased money orders, had Seese sign the applications and re-submitted the applications. For a second time, State Farm rejected and returned the money orders, this time because the effective date of the coverage was before Seese became licensed by the FJUA and assigned to State Farm as agent at the Central location. The applications also support Lindsay's version in this respect because the effective date of the coverage is changed to start coverage one month later, after Seese's February 9, 1988, appointment date. Central re-purchased money orders again, dated March 24, 1988, and submitted the applications for at least the third time on or about April 12, 1988. All of these applicants received coverage as of the revised effective date. Transactions Alleged Under Counts IX And X. On or about March 11, 1988, Ridge, through Lindsay, took from Charles and Erna Bluschke an application and Erna's $236 check for the down payment for a year of FJUA coverage on their 1984 Thunderbird. (Count IX.) Ridge gave the Bluschkes a Florida Automobile Insurance Identification Card indicating that State Farm was the carrier and that the coverage was bound effective March 11, 1988. When the Bluschkes received no paperwork from State Farm or the FJUA within approximately a month, Mr. Bluschke returned to Ridge and talked to Lindsay. Lindsay told him that the paperwork had not come through but should be in "any day." Approximately another month went by without any paperwork, and Bluschke again went to speak to Lindsay. Bluschke was concerned because State Farm had cancelled him previously, and he wanted to know how he could be sure he had coverage. Lindsay responded, "Don't worry, you're covered." In fact, as Lindsay knew, the Bluschkes' application had not been submitted to State Farm. By the time the Bluschkes had applied, Ridge and Central were in the midst of dealing with problems they were having getting older applications accepted by State Farm and had put the Bluschkes' application aside until the older problems were resolved. They also were attempting to be assigned to an FJUA carrier other than State Farm. Indeed, on or about April 12, 1988, certainly by the time of Bluschke's second inquiry, and perhaps even by the time of his first inquiry, Lindsay had submitted an application as Ridge's general lines agent to be licensed to produce for the FJUA and to be assigned to Allstate instead of State Farm. The representations Lindsay made to Bluschke on the first and second inquiries were knowing misrepresentations made for the purpose of concealing from the Bluschkes the actual status of Ridge's relationship to the FJUA and State Farm. After his second inquiry, Bluschke demanded and received a full refund of his $236 down payment. On or about February 12, 1988, Paris and Helen Dalton of Hamilton, Florida, went to Ridge to purchase insurance for a 1979 Pontiac and a 1977 Dodge Van. (Count X.) They completed an FJUA application and paid $409 down. They were given a Florida Automobile Insurance Identification Card indicating that State Farm was the carrier and that coverage was bound effective February 12, 1988. For the same reasons that Ridge did not submit the Bluschke application, Ridge never submitted the Dalton application to State Farm. In March, 1988, after 30 days had passed, Helen Dalton returned to Ridge because the Daltons had not yet received a payment book from State Farm. "Wanda," who worked at Ridge, assured the Daltons that the policy and payment book would come in the mail and that it sometimes took as much as 90 days. Later in March, 1988, the Daltons' bank asked for proof of insurance on their vehicles. Helen Dalton went to Ridge and got from "Wanda" a copy of the binder, signed by Lindsay. "Wanda" told Dalton that Ridge would call the bank. Ridge never called the bank, as the bank informed the Daltons in June, 1988. Helen Dalton again returned to Ridge, and this time a different person working at Ridge told her that "it's hard to get through to State Farm." Helen Dalton called State Farm directly and was told that State Farm never had received the application and that Ridge and Lindsay were not authorized to write FJUA insurance through State Farm. Dalton returned to Ridge and confronted Lindsay directly with this information. Lindsay offered to "re-write" the policy, but Dalton demanded her money back. Lindsay sent Dalton to Central in Winter Haven to have Strayer refund the money, saying he had no authority to write a refund check, and the Daltons finally got their refund on or about June 27, 1988. Transactions Alleged In Count XI. At least from on or before July 1, 1985, continuously until after December 31, 1986, Friendly of Winter Haven, Friendly of Bartow, Friendly of Haines City, and Friendly of Lake Wales arranged customers' premium financing through Time Premium, Inc., of Boca Raton, Florida. As part of each premium finance transaction, the agency submitted to Time Premium, Inc., an agency check representing the down payment received from the customer and an executed premium finance contract. The agencies also collected monthly payments from insureds and forwarded agency checks to Time Premium on behalf of these insureds. From August, 1985, through July, 1986, these corporate agencies wrote approximately $13,000 in checks payable to Time Premium drawn on the agencies' business accounts. Lindsay personally signed in excess of seven thousand dollars worth of these checks. These checks were returned due to insufficient funds. On December 10, 1986, these four corporate agencies, through Lindsay and Ruth Kent as the directors, executed a promissory note in favor of Time Premium, Inc., in the amount of $13,076.34 to satisfy the outstanding indebtedness on the returned checks. The promissory note required repayment at the rate of $500 per month. As of July 1, 1988, only $2,000 had been repaid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner, the Department of Insurance and Treasurer, enter a final order finding the Respondent, Larry Wayne Lindsay, guilty of some, but not all, of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint in this case, as reflected in this Recommended Order, and suspending, for a period of one year, his general lines, health and life insurance agent licenses and his eligibility to hold those licenses. RECOMMENDED this 22nd of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 1989.
Findings Of Fact THE INSURANCE AGENCY At all times material to the instant case, Lloyd Eldo Register was a licensed insurance agent in the State of Florida, licensed as an Ordinary Life, including Disability, General Lines and Disability Agent. The Respondent, Lloyd Eldo Register (hereinafter Register) at all times material herein, was the president, owner, and registered agent for Friendly Auto Insurance, Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as Friendly Auto). In his capacity as president and registered agent, the Respondent, Register, was responsible for and exercised supervision and control over the employees and sales agents employed by Friendly Auto. At all times material herein, Respondent, Shirley Jean Hopkins was a licensed insurance agent and was employed by Friendly Auto to sell various types of auto insurance and coverages. Specifically, Shirley Hopkins was licensed as an Ordinary Life, including Disability Agent, General Lines Agent, and an Independent Adjuster. As an employee of Friendly Auto, she worked under the supervision and control of the Respondent, Lloyd Register. At the time of the various transactions which are the subject of this administrative proceeding, Florida law required personal injury protection (hereinafter PIP) insurance coverage for each owner of a motor vehicle in Florida. (See Section 627.733 and 627.736, Florida Statutes (1981)). Because it was necessary to show proof of such PIP coverage in order to purchase a license tag for an automobile, this type of insurance was and is commonly referred to as "tag insurance." Friendly Auto offered and sold PIP or tag insurance as well as other types of insurance, including motor club policies, which included as its primary benefit an accidental death benefit. The accidental death benefit (hereinafter referred to as ADB) which was sold by Friendly Auto, was one of the benefits under a motor club policy very similar to that sold by AAA (American Automobile Association). The motor club policies also included such benefits as theft reward, hit and run services, rental car discounts, credit card services, vacation travel arrangements, trip routing, and lost baggage service. The amount of premium paid and type of plan applied for determined the benefits to be received. During the period of the transactions in this action, the Respondent, Lloyd Register, had established a policy of not selling PIP alone. Customers were required to buy PIP coupled with a motor club policy. The reason for this policy was that the commission on minimum PIP coverage was too low to justify the cost of selling it alone. The commission on the motor club policies was as high as 80 percent of the premium charged. The sales agents were instructed by Mr. Register to not sell a customer PIP unless they also purchased the ADB policy. This policy was followed by the sales agents during 1981 and the first eight months of 1982. Customers, upon entering the Friendly Auto office, would indicate the kind of insurance they wanted and they were then given a quote by a sales agent for the coverage requested plus ADB. The cost of the ADD or ADB policy was added to the cost of the coverage requested without informing the purchaser and a single quote was given to the customer. If a customer inquired about the ADB coverage, they were told it was part of the coverage and that the requested coverage could not be purchased without the accidental death benefit. The customers were not informed by the salesperson nor the forms used in the transaction that they were being charged a separate and distinct premium for the ADB or that they could reject the ADB coverage. The basic PIP coverage also included a death benefit Although the Respondent, Lloyd Register, testified that in order to make a profit, it was necessary to sell the ADB with the minimum PIP coverage, the ADB was sold inn the same manner to persons purchasing PIP, as well as liability and collision coverage. The premium for the ADB ranged from $15 to $25. The decision as to which premium to charge was made by the employee of Friendly Auto and was not discussed with the customer. The sales agents had been instructed by the Respondent, Lloyd Register, to base premium charged for ADB on the customer's driving record. However, the premium charged only affected what motor club benefits would be received. No reason was given as to what effect a person's driving record had upon the premium or benefits or risk involved. After the customer was given the quote and agreed to purchase, the sales agent then filled out and gave to the customer several documents to be signed and initialed. The places to be initialed were marked by the sales agent with a red square, rubber stamped onto the appropriate points of the forms by the sales agent, and a check mark or "X" was placed next to where they were to sign. One of the documents was an application for the motor club or ADB. Respondents contend that by signing the application and the acknowledgement at the bottom of the liability coverages rejection form, the customers were made aware that they were purchasing a separate coverage for ADB. However, when inquiry was made by customers about the ADB, they were told it was part of the coverage and had to be purchased. They were not told a separate premium was involved or that it was a separate policy. The majority of the complaining witnesses in this case were not even aware they had purchased the motor club or ADB. Most of the complaining witnesses admitted they did not read the documents they were asked to sign. The sales agents did not pressure them to sign or hurry them in any way that prevented them from reading the documents. Most of the complaining witnesses had limited education, very little knowledge of insurance and basically relied upon the sales agent to give them the coverage they requested. No complaining witness requested ADB or motor club coverage. Anne Zugelder, office manager for Friendly Auto, and Shirley Hopkins testified generally regarding the procedures used, but neither person testified about the facts of the specific transactions in this case. Shortly after January 18, 1982, Mr. John A. Hoback, an investigator for the Department of Insurance, went to the offices of Friendly Auto where he reviewed approximately 35 to 40 files relating to customers who had purchased insurance from Friendly Auto. He discovered that many of these files contained the original policy for ADB coverage; the identification card on PIP coverage; and the original policy for PIP coverage. Some of these policies had been in the files for four, five, and six months. Specifically, Mr. Hoback examined the file of James Richard Johns and found the original copy of the auto policy issued by Fortune and the ADD policy issued by American Travelers Association. The auto policy had been issued on June 4, 1981. Mr. Hoback examined the file of Charles Meadows and found that the Fortune PIP policy had been issued on June 2, 1981, and the original was still in the file. The original ADD policy issued by American Travelers was also in the file. In the file of Phillip Johnson, Mr. Hoback found the original copy of the Fortune auto policy issued to Mr. Johnson on June 1, 1981, and also found the original ADD policy in the file. The file relating to Ruben Simpson was also examined and the original copies of the Fortune auto policy and the ADD policy were still in the file. These original policies were supposed to have been sent to the insureds by the agency upon receipt from the insurance company. The deposition of Mr. James T. Harrison, Jr., was admitted and considered. However, because Mr. Harrison's opinion was based upon incomplete facts in terms of the actual sales procedures used, his opinion relating to Respondents' meeting the standard of care in the industry was given no weight. FORMS In each of the purchases involved in this action, Friendly Auto's agents used several preprinted forms as part of each sale. These forms include primarily: (1) a quote sheet, (2) rejection of liability coverages form, (3) prenumbered receipts, and (4) motor club or ADB application. QUOTE SHEET The quote sheet is a small yellow form with spaces for entering information about the insured and the cars to be insured. The quote sheet in the Section titled "Type of Coverage" reflects "PIP, LIAB, COMP, COLL". These terms refer to personal injury protection, liability, comprehensive, and collision. Nowhere on the form does ADB or motor club coverage appear. There is a space at the bottom of the form for computations. LIABILITY COVERAGES REJECTION FORM The Rejection of Liability Coverages form is divided into four main parts. The top part of the form informed the customer that they had the right to purchase liability coverage and that they can also reject liability coverage. If the customer desired to reject liability coverage, there was a signature block where the customer signed rejecting such coverage. The second portion of the form dealt with PIP and had optional blocks to be checked in order to reflect the deductible desired. The deductible ranged from $250 to $8,000. There were also optional blocks to select the type of PIP coverage and at the bottom of this section was again a signature block. The third section dealt with uninsured motorist coverage and had a block where the customer entered the limits of coverage desired if they were purchasing uninsured motorist coverage. There was a block to be checked if the customer was rejecting uninsured motorist coverage. At the bottom of this section, was again a signature block. The last section referred to an accidental death benefit and contained the following language: I UNDERSTAND THE ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFIT THROUGH MY NATION MEMBERSHIP IS A SEPARATE ITEM, THAT PAYS IN ADDITION TO MY AUTO INSURANCE POLICY. I UNDERSTAND THE ADDITIONAL CHARGE FOR THIS COVERAGE IS INCLUDED IN WITH MY DOWN PAYMENT. The above language was followed only by a signature block. There were no blocks to be checked or initialed rejecting or accepting the accidental death benefit. (this statement is referred to hereafter as the acknowledgement.) The Rejection of Liability Coverages form was used in all sales of automobile insurance at Friendly Auto. The reference in the acknowledgement above to "MY NATION MEMBERSHIP" refers to a company which provided an ADB policy prior to the time Friendly Auto began using American Travelers Association. Once Friendly Auto decided to stop using the Nation Company, the Respondent, Register, elected not to reprint the form. He also considered, but did not feel it necessary, to have the sales agents mark through Nation and pencil in American Travelers Association. Mr. Register felt that the American Travelers Association policy could be interpreted to be a "Nation membership" because it covered the insured anywhere in the nation. However, Mr. Register could not specifically recall having instructed his sales agents to give this explanation to the customers. Prior to July or August of 1982, Mr. Register had not instructed his employees to explain that the accidental death benefit referred to in the form was optional. Beginning in July or August, 1982, Mr. Register instructed his sales agents to begin telling customers the ADB was optional. This change occurred about the same time the law relating to the $8,000 deductible PIP changed and was due in part to "heat" which Friendly Auto had been getting from the Department of Insurance. RECEIPT The receipt form contained basic information blocks for date, amount, received from, and signature block for the sales agent of Friendly Auto. There was a line preceded by "In re:" which was used to reflect the coverages for which the premium was being paid. A copy of the receipt was kept in the Friendly Auto file on each customer. AMERICAN TRAVELERS ASSOCIATION APPLICATION The last of the four forms was a motor club application for "Travel/Accident Benefits including Accidental Death and Dismemberment Coverage." The form contained spaces for the name and address of the applicant and name and address of their beneficiary. Just above the signature block of the applicant, were spaces for the effective date, the expiration date, the plan, amount of ADD coverage, and the fee. (See Respondent's Exhibit 24.) An almost identical form was used when the ADB policy was written with Southern Management Company. THE SALES Each count of the First Amended Administrative Complaint against Respondent, Lloyd Register, relates to a sale to a particular customer. Several of these same transactions were also the subject of the Administrative Complaint against the Respondent, Shirley Hopkins. The following facts are found as to both the counts of the First Amended Administrative Complaint against Lloyd Register and the Administrative Complaint against Respondent Shirley Hopkins: (the count number refers to the First Amended Administrative Complaint in Case No. 82-2048). COUNT I SALE TO BRENDA CONNER On October 9, 1981, Brenda Conner went to Friendly Auto to purchase PIP insurance. She informed the Respondent, Shirley Hopkins, that she wanted to purchase PIP only. No other coverages were explained to her, but there was some discussion about who she wanted as her beneficiary. She signed the documents she was requested to sign but did not read them. She thought she had paid for PIP only. Her receipt from Friendly Auto was for $37.00 and listed only PIP as the only coverage purchased. The receipt was signed by the Respondent, Shirley Hopkins. She never received a policy from American Travelers Association. She was charged $15.00 as part of the $37.00 premium for the American Travelers Association ADB policy. She received her policy for the PIP coverage. COUNT II SALE TO BRUCE T. EDWARDS On September 15, 1981, Bruce T. Edwards purchased insurance from Friendly Auto. Mr. Edwards was sold the insurance by Respondent, Shirley Hopkins. The receipt received by Mr. Edwards reflected a total premium of $43.00 and listed only "PIP" as the coverage purchased. Mr. Edwards was unaware that as part of the $43.00 premium, he purchased accidental death and dismemberment coverage (ADB) from American Travelers Association. The premium for the ADB was $20.00. Mr. Edwards signed but did not fill out the yellow ADB application form. Shirley Hopkins explained the PIP coverage but made no mention that he was purchasing a separate ADB insurance policy. He did not read the documents he signed, but merely initialed and signed the blocks Ms. Hopkins marked. He did not request ADB coverage and thought he was getting PIP only. He had no intention of buying any insurance other than PIP. Prior to Mr. Edwards going to Friendly Auto, his wife had called and obtained a quote of $43.00 for tag insurance. She specifically told the person on the phone that her husband wanted the cheapest coverage necessary to get a tag. COUNT III SALE TO PATRICIA EDWARDS On or about August 28, 1981, Patricia Edwards purchased insurance from Friendly Auto through its sales agent Shirley Hopkins. Patricia Edwards first called Friendly Auto and requested a quote for PIP coverage only. She also gave the person all the necessary information over the phone for the needed documentation. The person who actually went to Friendly Auto and purchased the insurance and signed the documents was Bruce Edwards, Patricia Edwards' husband. Patricia Edwards requested only minimum coverage needed to get her tag. She was given a quote of $37.00. The receipt given by Friendly Auto was signed by the Respondent, Shirley Hopkins, and reflected a $37.00 payment for PIP coverage only. The total payment of $37.00 included a $15.00 payment for an Accidental Death and Dismemberment (ADB) and travel benefits with Southern Management Company. Mr. Edwards signed the Accidental Death and Dismemberment application as well as the accident death benefits acknowledgement at the bottom of the Rejection of Liability Coverages form. The acknowledgement referred to "Accidental Death Benefit Through My Nation Membership" and not to an "Accidental Death and Dismemberment" coverage with Southern Management Company. (See Respondent's Exhibit 5.) Neither Bruce Edwards nor Patricia Edwards requested Accidental Death and Dismemberment coverage and neither was aware that such coverage had been purchased. COUNT IV SALE TO ELIZABETH JONES On September 1, 1981, Elizabeth Jones purchased insurance from Friendly Auto. She first called and asked for a quote for PIP and liability insurance for a `71 Oldsmobile Delta 88. She was given a quote of $42.00 for PIP and liability. Ms. Jones then went to the office of Friendly Auto where she first talked with two different men and then Respondent, Shirley Hopkins. Shirley Hopkins informed her the premium would be $63.00 rather than $42.00. Ms. Jones had obtained quotes from several agencies for the PIP and liability in an attempt to obtain the needed coverage for no more than the 560.00 which she had available for insurance. Ms. Jones has a fifth grade education and had never purchased insurance before. She specifically told the sales people at Friendly Auto that she did not understand insurance. Because the cost was $63.00 rather than $42.00, Ms. Jones had to return home to obtain additional money. When she returned, Ms. Hopkins had the forms prepared and had marked with an the places where she needed to sign. The receipt from Friendly Auto reflects that Ms. Jones purchased "Liab. PIP. ADB" for a premium of $63.00. Ms. Jones signed the accidental death and dismemberment coverage application and the accidental death benefit acknowledgement at the bottom of the Rejection of Liability Coverage form. Prior to returning home, Ms. Jones was told by one of the sales agents that she needed the accidental death benefit that could be willed to her daughter. Ms. Jones asked if that was included in the liability and PIP and did not recall whether the person replied or not. She was not aware nor did she understand that she was purchasing a separate travel and accidental death benefit policy and paying a separate premium. She did not read the documents before she signed them and relied upon Ms. Hopkins and the other two agents to give her the coverage she had requested. Ms. Jones did not receive her ADB policy. COUNT V SALE TO BARBARA BARBATO On September 21, 1981, Barbara Barbato purchased insurance from Respondent, Shirley Hopkins, at the Friendly Auto agency. Before going to the agency, Ms. Barbato called and obtained a quote for "full coverage" on her new Camero. She spoke with a gentleman named Mike. When she arrived at the agency, she informed Ms. Hopkins that she wanted full coverage on her Camero. Ms. Hopkins did not explain the various coverages to her. Ms. Barbato paid for the insurance and signed the documents without reading them. The Friendly Auto receipt received by Ms. Barbato was signed by Shirley Hopkins and reflected a payment of $138.00 for "Liab. and Coll. and Comp.". Ms. Barbato signed the ADD coverage application and the accidental death benefit acknowledgement at the bottom of the Rejection of Liability Coverages form. She named her mother as beneficiary of the accidental death benefit and understood that benefit to be part of the auto insurance she was purchasing. She was not aware the accidental death benefit was separate and extra. She did not receive a policy for the ADB coverage with American Travelers Association. COUNT VI Count VI was voluntarily dismissed by Petitioner and no evidence was presented as to Count VI. COUNT VII Mary Beth Jones did not appear and testify and no other testimony was presented as to Count VII. COUNT VIII SALE TO JOANN BROOKS On September 1, 1981, Joann Brooks purchased insurance from Respondent, Shirley Hopkins, at the Friendly Auto Agency. Ms. Brooks is a farm laborer who completed the eleventh grade. Upon arriving at Friendly Auto, Ms. Brooks informed Ms. Hopkins that she wanted full coverage on her automobile. Ms. Brooks understood full coverage to include collision, liability, and PIP and she had no intention of purchasing any type of coverage other than these. Although Ms. Brooks received some explanation of the accidental death and dismemberment coverage, she signed the accidental death application form and named herself as beneficiary. Ms. Brooks thought the death benefit was part of the full coverage she requested. This was the first time she had purchased insurance and did not understand insurance matters. Ms. Brooks signed and initialed the documents she was given by Ms. Hopkins. She did not read them. The receipt Ms. Brooks received from Friendly Auto was signed by Shirley Hopkins and reflected that she paid $86.00 for "Liab. & Comp. & Coll.". COUNT IX SALE TO RUBEN SIMPSON On May 7, 1981, Ruben Simpson purchased auto insurance from Friendly Auto. Mr. Simpson is from Jamaica and does not read because of his very limited education. When he arrived at Friendly Auto, Mr. Simpson informed the sales agent that he wanted to buy PIP insurance in order to get his tag. Mr. Simpson could not recall the full details of the discussion but remembered giving them his mother's name as the person who would receive money if he were killed in an accident. Mr. Simpson signed his name where he was shown to sign. When he left the agency, Mr. Simpson believed he had purchased only the PIP insurance required to get his tag. Mr. Simpson signed the Southern Management Company Accidental Death and Dismemberment application and received a copy of it when he left the agency. (See Respondent's Exhibit No. 13.) The receipt given to Mr. Simpson at Friendly Auto reflects he paid $44.50 for "PIP ADB". The premium for the ADB was $22.50. At no time did Mr. Simpson request or agree to purchase anything other than tag insurance. Mr. Simpson signed the acknowledgement of the ADB at the bottom of the Rejection of Liability Coverages form, but was unaware that he was paying a separate premium for a policy which was neither PIP nor required to obtain his tag. COUNT X Prior to taking evidence in the formal hearing, Petitioner voluntarily dismissed Count X of the First Amended Administrative Complaint. No evidence was presented in support of Count X. COUNT XI On September 3, 1981, Mr. Ellison J. Eady, Jr., purchased insurance from Friendly Auto. Mr. Eady informed the sales agent at Friendly Auto that he wanted the necessary minimum insurance to get a tag for a new car he had purchased. The agent asked Mr. Eady some brief questions about his driving record and then gave him a quote for the price of the insurance he requested. The agent did not suggest any coverages in addition to what Mr. Eady had requested, but included the cost of an ADB policy in the quote he gave Mr. Eady. Mr. Eady agreed to the price quoted, and the agent then brought out several forms for Mr. Eady to fill out and sign. All Mr. Eady wanted was insurance for his tag and to his knowledge, that was all he purchased. At the time he purchased his insurance, Mr. Eady signed and received a copy of the American Travelers Association application form. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 2.) He did not ask any questions about the form. Mr. Eady thought that the American Travelers Association coverage was part of the insurance he was purchasing. However, the agent did not specifically tell him it was part of the insurance he was purchasing. At the time he purchased his insurance, Mr. Eady already had a motor club policy with Montgomery Ward which provided similar services to the American Travelers coverage. Mr. Eady did not read the various forms he signed. The agent gave him a brief explanation of what each form was. Mr. Eady just relied upon what the agent told him. Mr. Eady had no knowledge of Florida insurance. When he left Friendly Auto, he thought the only thing he had purchased was the minimum required by the state. One of the documents he signed was the acknowledgement of the accidental death benefit at the bottom of the Rejection of Liability Coverages form. (See Respondent's Exhibit 14.) Mr. Eady already had separate life insurance coverage. The agent did not explain the accidental death benefit to him. Mr. Eady did not request any coverage other than the state minimum to get his tag. The receipt given Mr. Eady reflected an $82.00 payment for "PIP. . . ADB. . . C&C". (See Respondent's Exhibit 14.) Fifteen dollars of the premium paid by Mr. Eady was for the American Travelers Association motor club policy. COUNT XII SALE TO MARY GOOD On March 17, 1981, Mr. Edward T. Good and his wife Mary Good purchased insurance at Friendly Auto. Mr. Good informed the sales agent at Friendly Auto that he wanted the cheapest insurance required by the state to get his license tag. The agent explained to him the other auto coverages he could obtain, but Mr. Good insisted that he only wanted minimum tag insurance. He was then given a lump sum quote by the agent. One of the forms Mr. Good signed was an ADB application for Southern Management Company. The agent explained that this would pay he or his wife money if they were killed in an auto accident. The agent did not explain that there was an extra charge for this benefit or that it was optional. Mr. and Mrs. Good understood the ADB coverage to be part of the PIP coverage they had requested. The receipt they were given at Friendly Auto reflected a payment of $37.00 but did not list the coverages purchased. (See Respondents' Exhibit 1.) When Mr. and Mrs. Good left Friendly Auto, they thought they had purchased only tag insurance. However, $15.00 of the $37.00 premium paid was for the ADB policy with Southern Management Company. COUNT XIII SALE TO ALICE LEAR DICKSON On or about September 3, 1981, Alice Lear Dickson (formerly Alice J. Lear) purchased auto insurance from a sales agent of Friendly Auto. Ms. Dickson called Friendly Auto to obtain quotes for full coverage for a newer automobile and minimum coverage for an older one. After obtaining these quotes, Ms. Dickson went to the office of Friendly Auto where she informed the sales agent on duty that she wanted full coverage insurance on two autos. She informed the sales agent she wanted fire, theft, windstorm, collision, liability, and uninsured motorist coverage. The sales agent also suggested a coverage for such things as towing charges. Ms. Dickson informed the agent she did not want that coverage because she already was a member of an auto club. In signing the various documents to purchase the insurance, Ms. Dickson was asked to sign a document designating a beneficiary of a life insurance benefit. She did not want this life insurance coverage, but was told by the sales agent that it was required and went along with her automobile policy and had to be purchased. In reliance upon this representation, Ms. Dickson accepted the coverage. Ms. Dickson paid a total premium of $144.03 for collision, liability, PIP, and accidental death benefit. Her receipt from Friendly Auto reflected the $144.03 was for "C&C, LIAB., PIP, ADB." (See Respondents' Exhibit 11.) The accidental death benefit purchased by Ms. Dickson was one of the travel and accident benefits provided in the American Travelers Association policy which cost Ms. Dickson $15 of the $144.03 premium she had paid. At the bottom of a Rejection of Liability Coverage form used by Friendly Auto, Ms. Dickson signed the acknowledgement relating to the ADB, but she was not aware that she could reject this coverage or that it was part of a separate motor club policy. Ms. Dickson did not desire to purchase a motor club policy and would not have purchased the motor club policy had she been aware that it was not required as an included coverage with the PIP coverage. COUNT XIV Prior to the taking of evidence at the formal hearing, the Petitioner voluntarily dismissed Count XIV of the First Amended Administrative Complaint and presented no testimony in support of that Count. COUNT XV SALE TO CHARLES MEADOWS On June 2, 1982, Charles Meadows purchased auto insurance from Friendly Auto. Mr. Meadows went to Friendly Auto to purchase PIP insurance, and upon arriving at Friendly Auto's office, he informed the sales agent he wanted only PIP insurance. When he left the Friendly Auto office, Mr. Meadows thought he had only purchased PIP. At the time he purchased his insurance, Mr. Meadows signed an American Travelers Association application. (See Respondents' Exhibit 2.) The only explanation he was given by the sales agent regarding this coverage was that if he were killed, someone would receive some money and he needed to designate who that would be. The amount of the fee charged for the American Travelers Association policy was not reflected in the appropriate block on the application form. He was not given any explanation regarding the price of this coverage. In purchasing the insurance, Mr. Meadows initialed and signed several forms. He did not read them before signing. Mr. Meadows does not read and write very well and has a problem understanding insurance policies. He completed the seventh grade in school. One of the forms signed by Mr. Meadows was the acknowledgement relating to the accidental death benefit at the bottom of the Rejection of Liability Coverages form. The quote sheet used to give Mr. Meadows his quote of $48.00 makes no reference to any coverage other than PIP. PIP is circled on the form. The receipt Mr. Meadows received from Friendly Auto reflects a $48.00 premium for "PIP. . .ADB". The cost of the PIP coverage was $23.00 and the cost of the American Travelers Association policy was $25.00. Mr. Meadows never received a policy or certificate informing him of the coverages under the American Travelers Association policy. Mr. Meadows never intended to purchase any coverage other than PIP to obtain his tag. He never requested any coverage other than PIP. COUNT XVI SALE TO PHILLIP JOHNSON On July 1, 1982, Mr. Phillip Johnson purchased auto insurance from a sales agent at Friendly Auto. Mr. Johnson went to Friendly Auto to purchase tag insurance. He informed the sales agent that he wanted just the PIP or tag insurance. The agent then prepared the necessary forms and Mr. Johnson initialed and signed the documents where he was instructed by the agent to sign and initial. No explanation of the coverages was given by the agent. Mr. Johnson was asked to name a beneficiary and was given a pink copy of an American Travelers Association application which he had signed. That form reflects a $20.00 fee was charged for the American Travelers Association policy. The receipt which Mr. Meadows received at Friendly Auto reflects a $42.00 premium paid for "8,000 PIP". (See Respondents' Exhibit 3.) Mr. Johnson also signed the accidental death benefit acknowledgement at the bottom of the Rejection of Liability Coverages form. Mr. Johnson felt when he left Friendly Auto that he had purchased only PIP insurance. Mr. Johnson completed the ninth grade in school and has difficulty reading and writing. COUNT XVII SALE TO JAMES RICHARD JOHNS On June 4, 1982, Mr. James Richard Johns purchased insurance from the Respondent, Shirley Hopkins at Friendly Auto. Mr. Johns told Shirley Hopkins he would like to purchase PIP insurance in order to get his tag for his car. Ms. Hopkins then gave him a quote for PIP and also a quote for liability coverage and she then gave him several forms to initial and sign. She gave no explanation regarding the forms and he did not read them before signing. Although Mr. Johns thought he was only purchasing PIP insurance, he was, in fact, sold PIP with an $8,000 deductible plus an American Travelers Association policy. The cost of the PIP coverage was $24.00 and the cost of the American Travelers Association policy was $25.00. Mr. Johns signed the American Travelers Association application and was given a copy of it. He also designated a beneficiary. At the time of purchase, Mr. Johns understood that the death benefit was part of the PIP insurance he was purchasing. No explanation was given by Ms. Hopkins regarding the American Travelers Association policy or coverage. Mr. Johns also signed the acknowledgement of the accidental death benefit at the bottom of the Rejection of Liability Coverages form. The receipt he received from Friendly Auto was for $50.23 paid for "PIP. . . ADB. . . 123(illegible)". When Mr. Johns left the Friendly Auto Agency, he felt he had purchased only PIP insurance. He did not receive an American Travelers Association policy and did not receive his Fortune Insurance policy for his PIP insurance until December of 1982 or January, 1983.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order finding Respondent, Lloyd Register, guilty of the violations as set forth above and that his insurance licenses be suspended for a period of one (1) year. That the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order finding Respondent, Shirley Hopkins, guilty of the violations as set forth above and that her license be suspended for a period of 90 days and that she be required to pay a civil penalty of $500. DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Curtis A. Billingsley, Esquire Dennis Silverman, Esquire Department of Insurance 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas F. Woods, Esquire 1030 East Lafayette Street Suite 112 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32301
