Findings Of Fact Respondent is a certified law enforcement officer and was issued certificate number 13-84-002-01 on July 14, 1984. On September 1, 1988, Respondent was employed as an investigator with the State Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit working in the misdemeanor division. While on duty and driving his employment car on the evening of September 1, 1988, Respondent was in the area of Lee Street and 20th Street in Orlando, Florida. He was in the area attempting to locate a witness as part of a criminal investigation he was conducting. He had previously made the acquaintance of a person named Ruby Burk. He would on occasion drive past her house and stop and they would talk and once previously had engaged in a sex act. On the night of September 1, 1988, he went to Burk's house, talked with her and then left on a futile attempt to locate a witness. He then returned to Burk's residence, picked her up and proceeded to a dark secluded area on an unpaved street which borders an elementary school. Shortly thereafter, while on routine patrol, an Orange County Deputy Sheriff observed Respondent sitting behind the wheel of the state vehicle in a complete state of undress. When she shined her bright lights into the vehicle, the Deputy observed the head of a black female pop up from the direction of the Petitioner's lap. The Deputy recognized Burk and observed that she was fully clothed. The Deputy permitted Respondent to put his pants on before he exited his vehicle. Respondent and Burk were engaging in fellatio in the front seat of the state vehicle. At the time of the incident, Respondent was having marital problems which caused him to be despondent. In mitigation, Respondent demonstrated that he had been a certified law enforcement officer for over four years at the time of this incident and has had no prior disciplinary problems. He has performed his job in private security and as an investigator in an exemplarily capacity. In September 1988, Respondent was discharged by the State Attorney, but was given a favorable recommendation He is presently employed as a Child Protective Investigator with HRS. He is respected by his peers and in his community. The violation of the law and rules by the Respondent was an isolated incident.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found guilty of the following offense: Failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (1989). It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent's certification be suspended for a period of six months, followed by a probationary period of one year, subject to the successful completion of such career development training and counseling as the Commission may impose. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 (in part), 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 (in part), 17, 18, 19 (in part), 21. Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence or irrelevant: Paragraphs 7 (that Burk had been convicted of engaging in prostitution on Westmoreland Street), 11, 16 (in part), 19 (in part), 20, 22. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (in part), 6, 7. Rejected as irrelevant or as argument: Paragraphs 5, 8 and 9. COPIES FURNISHED: Elsa L. Whitehurst, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Leon B. Cheek, Esquire 101 Sunnytown Road Suite 306 Casselberry, FL 32707 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 James T. Moore Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Tallahassee, FL 32302
The Issue Should Respondent Division of Retirement grant Petitioner's request to be included for retirement purposes in the Special Risk Class (SRC) from July 1, 1981 through October 24, 1985? Should Respondent Division of Retirement grant Petitioner's request to be included in the Special Risk Administrative Support Class (SRASC) for the period October 25, 1985 until January 1, 1998?
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Alachua County employed a jail facility Director who had overall supervision of correctional officers and special risk employees and who was ultimately responsible for restraint of inmates. Petitioner was continuously employed by the Alachua County Department of Corrections at the Alachua County Jail from the date of his initial employment as a Correctional Officer I on April 22, 1974, to his lay-off as Assistant Director of the Alachua County Jail on January 1, 1998. Political opponents of Petitioner raised the issues of his eligibility for SRC and SRASC classification and the validity of his correctional officer certification beginning approximately in 1996. Petitioner began work April 22, 1974, as a Correctional Officer I (uniformed line officer) and was recommended by his employer Alachua County and approved by Respondent for SRC membership, effective April 22, 1974. Respondent reviews applications for SRC and SRASC for completeness with no audit beyond the certification by the member and the employer. Respondent may approve, retroactive to the date specified in the application. If at any time it is determined that a member is not eligible for inclusion in a particular retirement category, the member is removed, retroactive to the date of ineligibility. Petitioner was certified as a correctional officer by the Council of Correctional Standards on July 1, 1974. Petitioner was promoted to an Administrative Assistant I position, effective May 18, 1981. The Administrative Assistant I position did not require certification as a correctional officer. On May 18, 1981, Petitioner was a certified correctional officer in a position that did not require certification. Effective July 1, 1981, the Florida Legislature merged the Council of Correctional Standards, which had certified Petitioner on July 1, 1974, with the Law Enforcement Standards Council, to form the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (CJSTC), an arm of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE). In so doing, the Legislature provided Section 943.19(3), Florida Statutes, to "grandfather-in" certain correctional officers' certifications. On July 1, 1981, Petitioner was a certified correctional officer in a position that did not require certification. Sometime later in 1981, the newly-formed CJSTC requested that Alachua County send the CJSTC a list of all certified correctional officers in its employ. Such a list was prepared by Alachua County personnel and forwarded to the CJSTC. The list prepared by the County did not include Petitioner's name, presumably because at that time, as an Administrative Assistant I, he was not serving in a position requiring certification as a correctional officer. Petitioner was promoted to the position of Administrative Operations Supervisor, effective March 22, 1982. This position also did not require correctional officer certification. Although Petitioner was employed as an Administrative Assistant I beginning May 18, 1981, and as an Administrative Operations Supervisor beginning March 22, 1982, he did not make application for inclusion in SRASC until March 17, 1986. On April 23, 1986, Alachua County recommended Petitioner's SRASC classification. Kim Baldry, Director of Personnel for Alachua County since 1983, signed off on a form stating that Petitioner: Was employed for training and/or career development . . . and is subject to reassignment at any time to a position qualifying for special risk membership. Respondent approved Petitioner's SRASC membership retroactive to October 25, 1985. Petitioner's November 13, 1987, application for inclusion in SRC as "Assistant Director/Administrative Support," was neither recommended by Alachua County, nor approved by Respondent. In July 1994, the Administrative Operations Supervisor position was reclassified, without any change in job description or duties, as Assistant Director/Administrative Support, and Petitioner served in that capacity until his lay-off in 1998. The position never required a correctional officer certification. Petitioner was not employed as a uniformed correctional officer from May 18, 1981, to his lay-off in 1998. Petitioner did not hold a position for which the minimum requirements included certification as a correctional officer from May 18, 1981, until his lay-off in 1998. Kim Baldry testified that although Petitioner had many job titles during his 1981 to 1998 employment, his actual duties from 1981 to 1998 were consistently over personnel, budget, and fiscal matters; that he primarily supervised fiscal assistants and accounting clerks; and that he was never a jail "supervisor" as such. She did, however, concede that she had dealt with him over correctional officer discipline from 1983 to 1998. Petitioner and Ms. Baldry concurred that from 1981 to 1998, his duties remained basically the same, and that at various times, he was known as "Acting Assistant Director" and "Assistant Director" and when the Director was out of town, Petitioner served as "Acting Director." Petitioner testified without refutation that from 1981 to 1998, his duties always included personnel oversight of line correctional officers; overseeing payroll leave and timecards for such officers; and screening, interviewing, and processing applications for new correctional officers. One of his job descriptions confirms this. Petitioner also testified that he had daily contact with inmates of the Alachua County Jail in the commissary, medical services area, and food preparation area, and with trustees in support services, and that he regularly appeared before the County Commission concerning budget, jail crowding, and the need for more correctional officers. Petitioner's daily primary duties and responsibilities after May 18, 1981, were neither the direct custody, nor the physical restraint, of prisoners or inmates at Alachua County Jail. His daily primary duties were fiscal, budgeting, accounting, and personnel administration in nature. He was not a line officer on the floor with special risk officers and inmates on a daily basis, although he did consult with some line and special risk correctional officers on personnel matters, including disciplinary matters. Actual discipline went through correctional officer captains and lieutenants. Petitioner stated that when he was an Administrative Assistant I, he was subject to reassignment as a line correctional officer at any time and that when he was Administrative Operations Supervisor, there were two other supervisors who oversaw work release and jail supervision, respectively, on a day-to-day basis. At some point, one position was eliminated and one was assigned to the court system. From 1994 to 1995, when Petitioner was Assistant Director, there was one other Assistant Director. Both Assistant Directors reported directly to the Director of Alachua County Jail, who had total oversight of the jail operation. However, when both the Director and the other Assistant Director were out of town, or later, when Petitioner was the sole Assistant Director, the Director delegated his duties to Petitioner for the interim, and Petitioner was left directly in charge of all functions, including security, supervision of correctional officers, and supervision of inmates. When questions concerning his certification and retirement status arose in 1996, Respondent requested that Alachua County personnel look into the matter because he considered it to be his employer's problem and not his own. Alachua County formally requested review by the Respondent of Petitioner's retirement designation, indicating that it did not believe that Petitioner should continue in SRC or SRASC, because he was serving the employer in an administrative capacity. After considerable correspondence back and forth, FDLE, the agency that houses the CJSTC which has the responsibility and authority to certify correctional officers, advised Alachua County by a May 24, 1996, letter that: . . . A review of the files in the Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training indicates that Mr. Krank was a certified correctional officer with the Corrections Council. That council was merged with the Law Enforcement Standards Council to form the Criminal Justice and Training Commission (CJSTC) in 1981. Officers employed in correctional officer positions were "grandfathered" into the CJSTC at that time. Mr. Krank was not employed as a correctional officer at the time of the merger, and, therefore, was not grandfathered into the CJSTC. It is suggested that if Mr. Krank requests more specific information concerning the grandfather clause in the statute, that he contact the State Department of Corrections. I have enclosed a copy of the 1983 Florida Statutes reference [sic] the "Saving Clause." However, it does not go into any detail as to what the process was at that time. (Joint Composite Exhibit 5) (Emphasis supplied.) Respondent received a May 21, 1998, letter from FDLE, stating: After a thorough search of the Automated Training and Management System (ATMS2), historical databases, and records stored on microfiche, there is no record of Mr. Krank working as an officer in Florida. Citing Rule 11B-27.0026, Florida Administrative Code, first enacted in 1994, FDLE went on to say that it considered Petitioner to be a certified correctional officer separated from employment and not re-employed within four years after the last date of separation, who therefore needed to reactivate his certification. (Joint Exhibit 10). The undersigned's research shows that Rule 11B-27.0023, Florida Administrative Code, new in 1982, provided that a certified correctional officer separated from employment and not re-employed within four years must reactivate his or her certification and that Rule 11B-27.0026, Florida Administrative Code, cited in FDLE's letter, actually explains how to reactivate certification. In reliance on FDLE correspondence, Respondent removed Petitioner from the SRC and SRASC classifications. Subsequent to being laid-off by Alachua County in 1998, Petitioner accepted a job as a correctional officer trainee with the Florida State Prison on February 2, 1999. Petitioner was hired as a correctional officer trainee at Florida State Prison, pending resolution of the instant case. Petitioner's arrangement with Florida State Prison personnel was that he would attend training from February 22, 1999, through May 25, 1999, after which he would have to pass a test administered by FDLE on June 29, 1999, in order to become a certified correctional officer and continue in the correctional officer position for which he had been hired.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a Final Order removing Petitioner from SRC and SRASC classification from July 1, 1981 to October 24, 1985, and from October 25, 1985 to January 1, 1998, respectively. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1999.
Findings Of Fact Prior to his termination, Petitioner had been employed as a Correctional Officer by the Respondent, Department of Corrections, at Glades Correctional Institute for approximately two years. On April 3, 1987, Petitioner signed a written statement acknowledging that he was immediately responsible for reading the rules of the Respondent. Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Mr. Edward Minor, Correctional Officer Supervisor at Glades Correctional Institute. Mr. Chester Lambdin is the Superintendent of Glades Correctional Institute. Although he felt ill, Petitioner reported to work on January 25, 1989 before his scheduled eight hour work shift was to begin at midnight and continue through January 26, 1989. Petitioner left work due to his illness before the end of his January 26, 1989 shift. Petitioner did not report to work after he left on January 26, 1989. On January 26, 1989, Petitioner contacted his supervisor, Mr. Minor, and informed him that he was ill; that he would not report to work for about two days and that he had a doctor's excuse for his absence. Mr. Minor excused Petitioner for two days, January 27, 1989 and January 28, 1989. Petitioner's doctor's excuse covered the period of January 27, 1989 through January 30, 1989. Petitioner gave the excuse to a fellow worker and requested the associate to deliver the excuse to Mr. Minor. Before February 2, 1989, Mr. Minor did not see the excuse. Petitioner did not contact Mr. Minor until the afternoon or evening of February 2, 1989. Petitioner was not scheduled to work on January 30 or January 31, 1989. Petitioner stated that he knew he should contact his supervisor before each work shift if he were ill and would not report to work, but he stated that most of his fellow workers did not follow the procedure and were not penalized for failure to make the required report. Notice before an absence is the standard policy of the Respondent. Petitioner was on unauthorized leave on January 29, 1989, February 1, 1989 and February 2, 1989. On February 3, 1989, Mr. Lambdin drafted a letter to Petitioner, which was posted by certified mail, informing Petitioner that he had been deemed to have abandoned his position as a Correctional Officer I at Glades Correctional Institution and to have resigned from the career service system.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration issue a final order that the Petitioner abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service System as contemplated by Rule 22A-7.010(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of May 1989. JANE C. HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-1189 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. The Respondent was the sole party who submitted Proposed Findings of Fact. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 2; rejected in part as not supported by competent and substantial evidence. Rejected as conclusion of law. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6 and 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 11. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 11. As to first sentence, rejected as irrelevant. As to the remainder, adopted in Findings of Fact 15 and 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Lynne Winston, Esquire Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Mr. Lewis C. Stewart 692 Waddel Way Pahokee, Florida 33476 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Richard L. Dugger, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Louis A. Varga, Esquire Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2002), by unlawfully soliciting a woman to commit prostitution, in violation of Section 796.07(2)(f), Florida Statutes (2002).
Findings Of Fact Respondent has been a certified correctional officer since 1990. He holds Correctional Certificate Number 53627. On December 8, 1999, Respondent was operating his motor vehicle in a light rain in the vicinity of 68th Avenue and 17th Street at approximately 8:45 p.m. He saw a young female standing alongside the road. Respondent stopped his car and rolled down the passenger side window. He asked the woman if she needed a ride. She replied, "Do I ride?" This response implied to Respondent that she would assume the superior position in any sexual activity. Respondent repeated his initial question, and the woman replied with the same answer. The woman was a police officer who was conducting a prostitution sting operation with other officers, who were not visible to Respondent. The woman did not testify, and the other officers did not hear the conversation that took place between the woman and Respondent, so the sole source of the conversation is Respondent, who testified at the hearing and gave a statement to investigators. The conversation as described in these findings of fact is derived entirely from Respondent. Respondent replied to the woman, "I got $20." The woman asked, "For what?" Respondent answered, "For a fuck." The woman asked Respondent would he give her a ride back to their current location, and Respondent assured her that he would. The woman then turned away, explaining to Respondent that she was getting her pocketbook, but actually signalling to her fellow officers to take down Respondent. Respondent had felt that something was wrong and had started to drive away, but the officers quickly apprehended him. Following his arrest, Respondent was charged with soliciting a prostitution. However, he completed a pretrial diversion program, and the State Attorney's Office dismissed the case.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of failing to maintain good moral character and revoking his correctional officer certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of November, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Laurie Beth Binder Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 William Chennault Chennault Attorneys & Counsellors at Law Post Office Box 1097 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302-1097
The Issue Whether Respondent, a police officer, violated section 951.22(1), Florida Statutes, by conspiring to introduce, take, or attempt to take contraband into the Hamilton County Jail for an inmate of the jail, so as to result in a finding that Respondent has not maintained good moral character; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the entity within the Florida Department of Law Enforcement responsible for the execution, administration, implementation, and evaluation of the powers, duties, and functions established under sections 943.085 through 943.255, Florida Statutes, and is charged with certifying and revoking the certification of law enforcement officers in Florida. § 943.12, Fla. Stat. Pursuant to section 943.1395, Petitioner is authorized to investigate incidents in which certified law enforcement officers are alleged to have failed to maintain compliance with the minimum qualifications for certification, and to take disciplinary action against law enforcement officers found to have failed to maintain those qualifications. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was certified by Petitioner as a law enforcement officer, and holds Law Enforcement Certification Number 313297. She was initially certified on January 8, 2014. On March 11, 2019, Respondent served responses to Petitioner’s First Set of Requests for Admission. Respondent acknowledged at the hearing that her responses were accurate. As discussed at the final hearing, and as reflected in the preliminary statement, Requests for Admissions 1 through 17 were accepted. Respondent has not previously been the subject of any disciplinary action. On February 28, 2017, Respondent was employed as an officer with the City of Jasper Police Department. On that date, Respondent was in a romantic relationship with Derrick Harris. On the morning of February 28, 2017, Mr. Harris turned himself in on an active warrant for what was apparently a misdemeanor offense in Duval County, and held in the Hamilton County Jail in Jasper, Florida. On February 28, 2017, from roughly 10:00 a.m. to roughly 4:35 p.m., Respondent and Mr. Harris spoke by telephone on nine separate occasions, for a total of roughly one hour and 50 minutes.2/ In addition, Respondent visited Mr. Harris in the jail visitation area, separated by glass and using a telephone handset, from 10:23 a.m. until 10:53 a.m. Thus, during the day, Respondent and Mr. Harris spoke for about two hours and 20 minutes. Much of the discussion between Respondent and Mr. Harris centered on how he would be able to come up with a $3,500 cash bond to get him released, and getting money put on the phone so he could make calls from the jail. During telephone call 713077714, which started at 2:17:32 p.m. on February 28, 2017, Respondent was upset that Mr. Harris’s mug shot had appeared on an unofficial website. She was also upset that a rumor was going around that she was responsible for Mr. Harris’s arrest. The tone of her voice ranged from angry to upset to tearful. During the call, Mr. Harris complained of being hungry. It was not the first time he made that complaint. He also stated, “I wish I had a cell phone -- if I had a cell phone I’d talk to you all night.” After a brief discussion, initiated by Mr. Harris, of how Respondent could slip a sack of Arby’s and a phone in her police vest, the idea was quickly shot down, with Mr. Harris stating that “I don’t want you to do nothing to jeopardize your job.” The entirety of the discussion lasted scarcely more than 90 seconds, and quickly reverted to a continuation of the discussion of how to raise bond money. Neither Arby’s nor a cell phone was brought up again. Respondent testified convincingly that “I didn’t -- I really didn’t plan on actually taking [anything in] -- I was just explaining over the phone because I was upset.” Her testimony is accepted. Idle chatter does not manifest intent to commit a crime, nor does it evince an agreement to do so. The evidence in this case establishes clearly, and it is found that Respondent had no actual intent to bring Arby’s or a cell phone, to Mr. Harris at the jail, that Respondent and Mr. Harris made no agreement to do so, and that she did not attempt to do so. Captain Bennett established that the Hamilton County Jail has: standing policy as per the Sheriff. When we come -- when an inmate comes into the jail facility, and they are indigent and don't have any money on them at the time, or they come in before commissary has arrived, he allows for a one-time initial issue, if there is someone that can bring underwear, socks, T-shirts, boxers, soap, deodorant, and basically hygiene items as for someone to, you know, be able to survive in the jail setting for -- you know, until they can get money there. Because everything else after that is usually purchased off of commissary, sir. Mr. Harris was new to the jail. He stated on several occasions during his conversations with Respondent that he did not have any “canteen.” Thus, despite the fact that “clothing” is listed as an item of contraband in section 951.22(1), and that Petitioner pled Respondent’s conspiracy to introduce clothing as an element of the second Amended Administrative Complaint, the evidence firmly establishes that Respondent’s delivery of underwear, t-shirts, socks, and hygiene items to the jail for the benefit of Mr. Harris was done through regular channels as duly authorized by the Sheriff or officer in charge. During the course of telephone call 71307815, which started at 3:15:45 p.m. on February 28, 2017, Mr. Harris can be clearly heard, on more than one occasion, asking jail staff what could be brought to him. The replies of jail staff were indistinct. However, Mr. Harris told Respondent that he could have socks, a t-shirt, deodorant, and the like. It was reasonable, based on Mr. Harris’s recitation, for Respondent to (correctly) understand that clothing, including socks and a t- shirt, were authorized by the correctional officer in charge. Mr. Harris stated that the correctional officer “didn’t say nothing about food.” He suggested that Respondent bring a couple of packs of ramen noodles and “see if they’ll let you give them to me.” Later during that call, Mr. Harris stated that Respondent would have “to ask them could I get the noodles.” It is clear that Mr. Harris wanted some ramen noodles, and that Respondent was willing to bring them. It is equally clear from the evidence as a whole that neither Respondent nor Mr. Harris intended to introduce the ramen noodles, or any other item, into the jail without permission from the correctional officer in charge. In order to avoid bringing anything improper into the jail, Respondent decided, “I’m going to message Captain Bennett over the Facebook because I was friend with him on Facebook. And I asked him what was allowed to be brought in.” At 4:07 p.m. on the afternoon of February 28, 2017, Respondent sent a direct message to Captain Bennett asking (verbatim): Would i be able to bring him some soap and deodorant and something to eat in there If they gonna pick him up for transport will i be able to see him before he go? Captain Bennett responded that “You can take him some soap and deodorant. I’m sure they will if the bond isn’t posted. Will have to see what’s going on about a visit.” The first and third sentences of the response are fairly straightforward, and directed towards Respondent’s first request (soap and deodorant), and her last request (a visit). The second sentence is ambivalent if not confusing, and could reasonably be understood to her second request, and to mean that jail staff would allow Respondent to bring Mr. Harris some food “if the bond isn’t posted.” In the context of the questions asked by Respondent, that is the most logical meaning, since soap and deodorant and a possible visit were already specifically addressed. Respondent gathered some items, including boxers, t-shirts, socks, body wash, deodorant, and the like, and placed them in a plastic bag with several packages of ramen noodles. There was no evidence that Respondent attempted to conceal the noodles. Respondent took the plastic bag to the jail. She drove her personal vehicle and was not in uniform. She tapped on the glass behind, which the correctional officer on-duty sat, and asked the correctional officer if the items could be taken to Mr. Harris. Respondent did not ask to take the bag to Mr. Harris herself. A correctional officer came from within the secured area, “and took out of the bag what was allowed in there.” There was no testimony as to which of the items, including the ramen noodles, made their way to Mr. Harris, and which, if any, were returned to Respondent. Nonetheless, Respondent was not trying to, and did not attempt to introduce contraband into the jail outside of regular channels and without the actual knowledge and authorization of the correctional officer in charge.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the second Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2019.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsections 943.1395(6), 943.1395(7), and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(a), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Anderson is a certified correctional officer, certified by Petitioner. Her certificate number is 190482. At the time of the incident at issue, Anderson was working for the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation as a correctional officer at South Bay Correctional Facility. On May 27, 2003, Patricia Johns (Johns) was in the Wal-Mart parking lot in Clewiston, Florida. Johns was taking groceries she had purchased from a shopping cart and placing them in her vehicle. She placed her sweater and her purse in a shopping cart while she was loading the groceries. Johns retrieved her sweater from the cart, but left her purse in the cart. She pushed the cart with the purse in it between her vehicle and another vehicle, got into her vehicle, and left the parking lot. A few seconds later Anderson pulled into Johns' parking space. Anderson's vehicle bumped the shopping cart, pushing it forward a couple of feet. She got out of her vehicle, went over to the cart, and removed the purse. Anderson, while wearing her correctional officer uniform, placed the purse in the backseat of her vehicle, took her son out of the vehicle, and went into Wal-Mart. She did not take the purse into Wal-Mart and attempt to locate the owner. The purse was a Tommy Hilfiger brand valued at $50. Inside the purse was a wallet with $18 in cash, a credit card, and blank checks. A cellular telephone valued at $350 was also in the purse. Anderson picked up some prescriptions at Wal-Mart, returned to her vehicle, and eventually returned home. She knew that the purse did not belong to her, but claimed that she was planning to turn the purse in at the police department the next day. Her claim that she was going to turn the purse into the police is not credible based on later actions. Sometime after she had returned home, she remembered she had put the purse in the back of her vehicle and asked her fiancé to get the purse. When he went to retrieve the purse, only the wallet remained minus the cash. During the time that Anderson left Wal-Mart and the time that her fiancé discovered that the purse, cash, and cellular telephone were missing, both Anderson and her fiancé had driven the vehicle while carrying other passengers. Anderson did not remove the purse, cash, and cellular telephone from the vehicle. She believes that one of the other passengers who had been riding in her vehicle on May 27, 2003, took the purse, cash, and cellular telephone. The next day, Anderson placed the wallet in a zip-lock plastic bag and dropped it in a drop box at the post office. She did not notify the owner of the purse that she had taken the purse from the Wal-Mart parking lot, and did not notify the police until later that she had taken the purse. Johns reported to the police that her purse had been stolen. An investigation ensued, and it was learned based on a video tape of the Wal-Mart parking lot on May 27, 2003, that Anderson had taken the purse. A police officer attempted to contact Anderson by telephone concerning the incident. On June 9, 2003, Anderson gave a taped interview to police officers, in which she admitted taking the purse out of the shopping cart and placing it in the backseat of her car. She was arrested for grand theft and released on the same day after posting a bond. An information for grand theft, a third degree felony, was entered against Anderson on August 13, 2003. She agreed to make restitution in the amount of $419, and a Notice of Nolle Prosequi was entered on December 5, 2003. As a result of the incident at issue, Anderson was dismissed from her position as a correctional officer at South Bay Correctional Facility. She is sincerely sorry for her actions and has made restitution for the property taken.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Lenora R. Anderson is not guilty of a violation of Subsection 943.1395(6), Florida Statutes (2003); finding that she failed to maintain good moral character as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2003), and defined by Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011; and imposing the following penalties as set forth in Subsection 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2003): issuance of a written reprimand and placement of Respondent on probation for two years under conditions as specified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2004.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding concerns a dispute as to whether the Petitioner successfully passed the State Officers Certification Examination, and specifically, a dispute involving the wording of certain examination questions.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, dismissing the Petition filed herein in its entirety for lack of prosecution and lack of evidence in support thereof. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Grace A. Jaye, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Gerald Bailey, Commissioner Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Jocelyn Mathis Post Office Box 1753 Lynn Haven, Florida 32444
Findings Of Fact On August 28, 1987, Respondent, David E. Hancock, was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a correctional officer, holding certificate #11-87-502-02. On March 4, 1988, Respondent, Floyd W. Winkle, was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a correctional officer, holding certificate #11-87-502-03. In March, 1989, Respondents were employed as correctional officers by the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA). CCA operates the county corrections facilities for Bay Counnty, Florida. Additionally, CCA is responsible for booking new arrestees into the jail facility. On March 11, 1989, Respondent Hancock was the supervisor of the night shift at the main jail facility in Bay County. Respondent Winkle was the booking officer. The evening of the 11th was a very heavy evening for arrests. The facility was understaffed for the numbers of arrests being processed. In fact, the holding cells, located in the basement of the jail, were full and female prisoners were being held in the interview rooms across the hall from the holding cells. Marcus Kitchens was brought to the jail in a highly intoxicated state. He was bleeding and exhibited lacerations and abrasions to his face and limbs. Mr. Kitchens was also in a very noisy and rowdy state. During the course of the evening, one of the female prisoners requested to use the restroom facilities. These facilities are located in the holding cells which were occupied by the male prisoners. The male prisoners were transfered to an interview room so that the female prisoner could use the restroom facility in the holding cell. The transfer was made by Officer Winkle. One of the inmates was Marcus Kitchens. He had not yet been officially booked into the jail. While transferring the male prisoners back to the holding cell Mr. Kitchens asked Officer Winkle for a blanket. For a number of valid security reasons jail policy does not permit a prisoner to have a blanket until the prisoner is officially booked into the facility and on his her her way to a more permanent cell. When Mr. Kitchens was told that he could not have a blanket he became violent and charged Officer Winkle, hitting the officer on the left side of face with his fist and knocking the officer's glasses off. Officer Winkle pushed Mr. Kitchens into the holding cell. Mr. Kitchens grabbed Officer Winkle by the shirt and pulled him into the holding cell with him. The two landed up against one of the walls of the holding cell and Mr. Kitchens hit Officer Winkle several more times in the chest and abdomen with his fist. While Officer Winkle was trying to block the blows, Mr. Kitchens hit Officer Winkle again on the left side of the face. Officer Winkle then grabbed Mr. Kitchens and put him on the floor. Officer Hancock heard the noise from the altercation and responded from another part of the basement area to the site of the altercation. By the time Officer Hancock arrived, Officer Winkle had Mr. Kitchens on the floor. Officer Winkle was sitting on top of Mr. Kitchens trying to subdue him. Officer Hancock stepped in between Officer Winkle and the inmate, put his knee into Mr. Kitchens chest, grasped the shoulder area and shoved Mr. Kitchens against the back wall of the holding cell. Officer Hancock inquired if Officer Winkle was alright. After Officer Winkle responded that he was, Officer Hancock told him to leave the cell. Officer Winkle left the cell and Officer Hancock released Mr. Kitchens from the wall. Mr. Kitchens began to charge Officer Hancock. Officer Hancock ordered him not to move and Mr. Kitchens sat back down on the floor. Officer Hancock left the cell and the door was locked. The entire altercation to the close of the cell door lasted a maximum of two and one-half minutes. It was while Respondents were in the holding cell with Mr. Kitchens that the alleged excessive use of force occurred by Officer Winkle banging Mr. Kitchens' head against the floor and hitting him three times on the side of the head with his fist after Mr. Kitchens had submitted to the officers. The use of excessive force was testified to by an officer who arrived from another part of the basement area after the altercation began and who could only have seen the last few seconds of the incident. The only testimony this officer gave regarding Officer Hancock was that while he was leaning against the cell wall he told Officer Winkle that Mr. Kitchens was "all his" after which Officer Winkle allegedly banged Mr. Kitchens' head on the floor and punched him on the side of the head. Contrary to this officer's testimony and corroborative of Respondents' testimony was the testimony of the nurse on duty at the jail facility. She did not see any excessive use of force and did not hear Officer Hancock make the statement referenced above while the officers were in the holding cell. She also testified that Mr. Kitchen's appeared to be struggling somewhat while he was on the floor. Officer Hancock testified that he told Officer Winkle Mr. Kitchens was "all his" after the officers had locked the door to the holding cell. Officer Hancock made the statement in response to Officer Winkle's complaint that he needed help in booking. The statement was meant to communicate to Officer Winkle that help would not be forthcoming and that he had to handle Mr. Kitchens during the booking process. Clearly, given the facts of this case, such a vague statement, regardless of where it was made, does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that Officer Hancock aided, abetted, counseled or procured any battery being effected against Mr. Kitchens. Moreover, this case boils down to a swearing match between the various parties and witnesses involved. On these facts and given the demeanor of the witnesses, such a swearing match does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that Respondents have failed to maintain the good moral character required of correctional officers. Additionally, given the fact that the Respondents were subdueing a violent inmate and the very short time span in which the alleged use of force occurred it is improbable that any excessive force was used which would reflect on the character of either Respondent. Therefore the Administrative Complaints against each Respondent should be dismissed. 1/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the amended Administrative Complaints filed against David E. Hancock and Floyd W. Winkle be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 1992.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against her and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since November 29, 2001, certified as a correctional officer in the State of Florida. She holds Correctional Certificate Number 2000056. Javeres Kendrick and Willie Kendrick are Respondent's brothers. Respondent has lived in the same residence as her brother Javeres her entire life. Since February of 1999, when they were placed on probation for committing the felony crime of lewd and lascivious assault on a child under 16 years of age, Javeres Kendrick and Willie Kendrick have been under the supervision of the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC). On or about November 27, 2000, Respondent completed and submitted to the Department of Corrections (DOC) a Correctional Officer/Correctional Probation Officer Supplemental Application. At the time, she did not have any training or experience as correctional or probation officer. Question 4 on this employment application asked: Do you have a business or personal relationship with anyone presently incarcerated or under the supervision of the Florida Department of Correction's system? If yes, give name, relationship, and place of incarceration/supervision. Respondent answered this question by checking "No." In doing so, she believed that she was providing accurate information to DOC. Although she was aware that her brothers were on probation, she did not understand them to be "incarcerated or under the supervision of the Florida Department of Correction's system," within the meaning of the question, because they were not in state prison. Furthermore, in her mind, she had a familial, not a "business or personal relationship" with her brothers.3 Respondent was ultimately employed by DOC as a correctional officer and assigned to Broward Correctional Institution (BCI). On September 18, 2003, a team of DOC correctional probation officers (Team), consisting of Raul Fernandez, Sara Bermudez, and Juan D'Elia, accompanied by local law enforcement officers, including David Torres of the Miami-Dade County Police Department, went to the residence of Javeres Kendrick at 4270 Northwest 197th Street, Miami, Florida, to conduct a "pre- planned sex offender compliance check." The purpose of the Team's visit was to ascertain whether Mr. Kendrick was in compliance with the terms and conditions of his probation. When the Team arrived at the residence, Mr. Kendrick was outside washing a vehicle. The Team members exited their vehicles and walked up to Mr. Kendrick. They identified themselves as correctional probation officers and told Mr. Kendrick that they were there to make sure that he was in compliance with the terms and conditions of his probation. To do so, they advised him, they needed to search his bedroom (which they were authorized to do by the court order placing Mr. Kendrick on probation). Mr. Kendrick responded that his bedroom was "a mess" and that he wanted "to go and clean [it] up" before the Team conducted its search. Despite being told that he "couldn't do that," Mr. Kendrick "bolted" away from the Team members and went "inside the house." Officers Fernandez and D'Elia followed Mr. Kendrick to the front door of the residence, where they were met by Respondent, who "intercepted" them and blocked their paths, thereby "prohibit[ing] [them] from entering [the residence] immediately." While standing in their way and interrupting their pursuit of Mr. Kendrick, Respondent, using profanity, yelled at Officers Fernandez and D'Elia in a "hostile and belligerent" manner, expressing her strong displeasure over their presence at the residence. She told them that they "had no right to be there," adding that "every time [they] show[ed] up there [they] always w[ound] up arresting her brother."4 Respondent was asked at least twice to "please move," which she finally did, albeit "in a very slow and deliberate manner." Officer Fernandez instructed Respondent to "take the children out of the residence and to wait outside until [the Team] conducted [its] search." With Respondent out of the way, Officer Fernandez and D'Elia entered the residence. Officer D'Elia spotted Mr. Kendrick "in the second bedroom on the left." Mr. Kendrick had his hand in a chest drawer. While Officer D'Elia "secured" Mr. Kendrick, Officer Fernandez searched the drawer and found "paraphernalia used for the pack[ag]ing of narcotics" and baggies containing what appeared to be cocaine and marijuana. After this discovery was made, Respondent came into the bedroom (contrary to the instructions she had been given) and asked "how much longer [the Team] had left." A conversation between Officer Fernandez and Respondent ensued, during which Officer Fernandez informed Respondent about "the narcotics that were in the drawer." Upon being so informed, Respondent, with the intent to deceive the Team, falsely claimed that the bedroom in which the "narcotics" had been found was not her bother Javeres' bedroom. Rather, she told Officer Fernandez and the other Team members, the bedroom had last been occupied by her uncle, who "had wound up going to jail." As the Team was leading him away from the residence, Mr. Kendrick asked Respondent to "retrieve" for him from "his room" a pair of pants, socks, and tennis shoes that he could wear in jail. Complying with this request, Respondent, followed by Officer Bermudez, went straight to the bedroom in which the "narcotics" had been found (which was Mr. Kendrick's bedroom, contrary to what Respondent had previously claimed) and "retrieve[d]" the items her brother had requested. During her dealings with the Team that day, Respondent revealed that she was a correctional officer at BCI. Upon returning to his office, after having "finished processing Mr. Kendrick and logging in the evidence" seized from Mr. Kendrick's bedroom, Officer Fernandez complained to his supervisor about Respondent's hostile and obstructive conduct during the Team's "compliance check" at Mr. Kendrick's residence earlier that day. Inasmuch as Respondent was a DOC employee, Officer Fernandez's supervisor referred the matter for an internal affairs investigation pursuant to DOC policy. Scott Thomas, a senior prison inspector with DOC, conducted the investigation. As part of his investigation, Inspector Thomas reviewed the contents of Respondent's DOC personnel file (including the employment application she had submitted on November 27, 2000) and obtained sworn affidavits from Officers Fernandez, Bermudez, and D'Elia. In addition, on November 12, 2003, he interviewed Respondent under oath. During the interview, among other things, Respondent repeated the falsehood that the bedroom in which the "narcotics" had been found during the September 18, 2003, "compliance check" was not her brother Javeres' bedroom. In addition, she falsely denied ever having used "profanity towards the [Team] members" conducting the "compliance check" and further falsely denied that that the Team members, during the September 18, 2003, "compliance check," ever told her to "wait outside the house." Respondent made these statements to Inspector Thomas knowing that they were not true. Inspector Thomas determined from his investigation that Respondent had "provided untruthful information" on her November 27, 2000, employment application and that she had engaged in "conduct unbecoming" a DOC employee during the September 18, 2003, "compliance check" at her residence. Based on the findings of Inspector Thomas' investigation, Respondent's employment with DOC was terminated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of Allegation Two and Three and, based on these findings of guilt, revoke her certification. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 2004.
