The Issue Proposed transfer of Bernice Ino, as specified in letter of Anthony Ninos, Director of Division of Hotels and Restaurants, dated July 27, 1976. This is an appeal of a career service employee pursuant to Section 110.061, Florida Statutes. The appeal was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Career Service Commission on November 24, 1976.
Findings Of Fact By the General Appropriations act emanating from the 1976 state legislative session, 38 employee positions of the Respondent's Division of Hotel and Restaurants were abolished. Although the specific positions were not identified in the appropriations act, the Division director was informed by a staff representative of the legislative committee on appropriations that 25 Hotel and Restaurant Inspector I positions and six Inspector II positions should be among those eliminated. The Division previously had 103 Inspectors of the two classes. Respondent identified the positions statewide to be eliminated and requested the Secretary, Department of Administration, to approve the concept that the competitive area for layoff of employees be statewide within the Division. Approval of this plan was secured and Respondent proceeded to abolish the positions and to layoff Inspectors in its various districts throughout the state. Since the Division at the time had eight vacancies for Inspector positions only 23 employees were actually eliminated. Layoffs were carried out under a retention point system based on length of service and performance evaluations, computed and applied under the provisions of Department of Administration Emergency Rule 22AER76-1, Subject "Emergency Rule Governing Layoff of Career Service Employees". As to Inspectors I, the 83 such positions in the state were placed on a numerical list, according to total number of retention points of each employee, and those with the lowest numbers were selected for layoff. Seven employees were terminated in District I (Jacksonville) and one in District IV (Ft. Lauderdale). (Testimony of Ninos, Dorn, Exhibits 1, 9-12) As a result of the abolishment of Inspector positions, there was an imbalance in manning levels in the various state districts. In Jacksonville, there had been eight inspector positions. The abolishment of three of these left five vacancies that had to be filled. On the other hand, there were negative vacancies in the Ft. Lauderdale district. The Division director therefore instructed the Respondents' personnel officer, Lee Dorn, to reapportion the state to effectively cover all inspection areas. Specifically, he directed that five Inspector I positions be transferred to Jacksonville, 3 of them to come from the Ft. Lauderdale district. In a Memorandum to Dorn, dated July 15, 1976, the director identified the three positions in Ft. Lauderdale for transfer as those held by A. V. Maloni, Bernice N. Ino, and J. F. Friedman. The retention points of these employees had been calculated respectively at 210, 169, and 165. These three employees, and two others to be transferred to Jacksonville from District V, were those Inspectors who had the lowest number of retention points after those having less retention points had been laid off. It was stipulated by the parties that the number of retention joints calculated for Petitioner is correct based on the criteria set forth in the Department of Administration's Emergency Rule. (Testimony of Ninos, Dorn, Exhibit 2) It thereafter developed that of the three Ft. Lauderdale employees, Petitioner was the only one who would actually have had to take an involuntary transfer to Jacksonville. Mr. Friedman, who had less retention points, secured a new position with another agency. Maloni, who had more retention points than Petitioner, was reassigned to a position in the Ft. Lauderdale district that was vacated when the incumbent, in turn, was reassigned to another position made vacant by the illness and eventual separation of its incumbent, John W. Murray. The person replacing Murray, A. J. Pergament, had 792 retention points. (Testimony of Ninos, Dorn, Smith, Exhibits 4, 6-8, 14-21) Petitioner was orally informed in late June of her proposed transfer by her District Supervisor, Chauncey D. Smith. This was followed by a letter, dated July 27, 1976, from the Division director that formally advised her of the transfer of her position to the Jacksonville district, effective August 1, 1976. The letter gave as a basis for the transfer the fact that legislative abolishment of positions made it necessary for the Division to reapportion its staffing to effectively cover all inspection areas and that the proposed changes were being made to obtain "equity, effectiveness, and efficiency within our districts". The letter further advised Petitioner of her right to appeal the transfer to the Career Service Commission. Although this letter did not reach Petitioner through the mail due to an incorrect address, a copy was personally served on her on July 29. Petitioner acknowledges that the incorrect address was due to her negligence in advising Respondent correctly as to the same. In a memo to Petitioner, dated July 28, Smith had conveyed Division instructions for her to report to Jacksonville on August 2. Petitioner declined to accept the transfer. She filed her appeal by letter of July 31, 1976 and thereafter resigned, effective August 2, 1976. Her appeal letter stated that she had not been given sufficient notice to relocate and that the transfer would be a great financial hardship due to the fact that she had purchased a home in the area recently. (Testimony of Dorn, Smith, Ino, Exhibits 3, 13, 22-23) At a meeting with Smith and the Division's Chief of Enforcement, B. E. Fernandez, in early August, Petitioner was informed that she would be given the next opening in Ft. Lauderdale. In fact, Inspector Murray was not separated until November but his job had been filled on a temporary basis by Maloni. When Murray was finally separated, Maloni stayed in the position. Petitioner had been told by Smith that it would be a hardship for Maloni to suffer a transfer because of family considerations, but would not be so difficult for her because she could obtain unemployment compensation and she need not be concerned because her husband was working. When Murray finally departed, Petitioner called the Division director regarding the promise that she would have the next opening and he wrote her in December, 1976, that, although she was next in line for any vacancy, Maloni had received Murray's job because he had more retention points. Also, during this period, Fernandez and Smith offered Petitioner openings in Gainesville and Daytona Beach, but she declined to accept them because she wished to stay in Broward County. Smith also suggested that she get a job as a hostess or cocktail waitress because she was cute and petite. (Testimony of Ino, Smith, Fernandez, Exhibit 4) Petitioner testified that she was of the opinion her sex was a factor in the matter because nothing was done for her by Division personnel and because of the comments made by Smith concerning her eligibility for unemployment compensation and his comments concerning the possibility of her becoming a cocktail waitress. (Testimony of Ino) Petitioner was employed by Respondent from June 1, 1973 to August 2, 1977. She had performed her duties in an exemplary manner. (Testimony of McCulley)
Recommendation It is recommended that the Career Service Commission deny the appeal. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence D. Winson Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulation The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Roger D. Haagenson 800 E. Broward Building Suite 610 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, petitioner, Mary L. Kinlaw, was employed by respondent, Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Workers' Compensation, Bureau of Claims, as a Word Processing System Operator, and held permanent status in the Career Service System. As a Word Processing System Operator, her duties included typing, filing, and general secretarial work. Petitioner worked a total of seven (7) hours in January 1991, and last reported for work on January 18, 1991. She has not thereafter reported for work, requested a leave of absence, or contacted the respondent. By letter of May 10, 1991, the respondent notified petitioner that: . . . you have been dismissed from your Work Processing System Operator position, effective 5:00 p.m., May 20, 1991. This action is being taken in accordance with Rule 22A-7.010(2), Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.) and is for the offense of abandonment of position. The predicate for such action was petitioner's failure to report for work since at least February 21, 1991, a period of more than 3 consecutive work days. By letter of June 12, 1991, filed with the Department of Administration on June 17, 1991, petitioner protested the respondent's action. Petitioner did not, however, appear at hearing, and no competent proof was offered for or on her behalf to demonstrate that her failure to report for work was other than a voluntary abandonment of her position. 1/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a final order sustaining respondent's determination that petitioner abandoned her Word Processing System Operator position with respondent, and resigned from the Career Service. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of September 1991. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September 1991.
The Issue Whether Petitioners received salary overpayments from the Agency for Persons with Disabilities.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioners Ileana Toledo, Norma Pedraza, and Lil Guerrero have been career service employees of Respondent. The Department of Management Services (“DMS”) has a classification and pay system that is used by Respondent, and DMS is responsible for designating employment positions within Respondent. A position is either included for overtime pay or excluded from overtime pay. At issue is whether Petitioners erroneously received monetary compensation for overtime hours worked after their position was reclassified from an included career service position to an excluded career service position. Prior to March 28, 2013, Petitioners held the position of Human Services Counselor III, which was designated by DMS as an included career service position. On March 26, 2013, Respondent proposed to reclassify Petitioners’ position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, which is designated by DMS as an excluded career service position. The proposed reclassification resulted from a reorganization of Respondent’s regional offices, and an effort by Respondent to standardize its functions, services, and types of positions in its regional offices. In a letter dated March 26, 2013, Petitioners were advised by Respondent’s Human Resources Director, Dale Sullivan, that if they accepted an offer to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, their “current status and salary will remain unchanged.” Notably, the March 26, 2013, letter makes no specific mention of overtime. On March 28, 2013, Petitioners accepted Respondent’s offer of employment to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst. Typically, employees of Respondent who are appointed to new positions are placed in probationary status, as opposed to permanent status, and are required to review and execute new position descriptions. However, the reclassification of Petitioners’ position by Respondent was not typical. As part of the reclassification of Petitioners’ position to Human Service Program Analyst, Respondent provided Petitioners with a new position description. However, Petitioners’ job duties, salaries, and permanent status remained the same as they had been in their prior position of Human Services Counselor III. Petitioners read and acknowledged their receipt of the new position description on March 28, 2013. On the first page of the position description, there is a heading titled “Position Attributes”. Under this heading, the term “Overtime” is shown, followed by two boxes, “Yes” and “No.” The “No” box is marked, indicating that Petitioners are not eligible to work overtime hours. The position description further indicates that Petitioners would be career service employees. However, the position description does not specifically include the terms included or excluded. Prior to the reclassification, Petitioners were paid bi-weekly based on an 80-hour pay period. If they worked more than 80 hours in a pay period, they received additional monetary compensation for their overtime hours. Payment for Petitioners’ regular and overtime work hours was based on employee timesheets submitted to the People First leave and payroll system. After the reclassification of their position, Petitioners continued to work overtime in excess of their bi-weekly contractual hours, despite the prohibition in the position description. Petitioners were required to obtain approval by their supervisors before being allowed to work overtime. Petitioners’ overtime was approved by their supervisors after the reclassification despite the prohibition on working overtime hours as indicated in the position description. During the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-June 23, 2013, Petitioner Ileana Toledo worked a total of 28 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $464.63 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Norma Pedraza worked a total of 32.25 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $624.14 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Lil Guerrero worked a total of 25.50 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $426.65 from Respondent for these overtime hours. Respondent’s payment of monetary compensation to Petitioners for the overtime hours worked after the reclassification of their position to Human Service Program Analyst occurred due to an administrative coding error, thereby resulting in the overpayment of monetary compensation to Petitioners by Respondent in the amounts the Respondent seeks to recover from Petitioners. The administrative coding error occurred because of Respondent’s failure to note the change from included to excluded on the People First system following the reclassification of Petitioners’ position. The error occurred due to an honest mistake, and resulted in the overpayments at issue. Petitioners should not have received monetary compensation for their overtime hours in the Human Service Program Analyst position because a Human Service Program Analyst position is an excluded career service position. An excluded career service employee must earn and receive regular compensation leave credits for overtime work, but cannot receive monetary compensation for overtime work. On the other hand, included career service employees, such as those persons in Petitioners’ previous position of Human Services Counselor III, must receive monetary compensation for overtime hours worked, rather than regular compensatory leave credits. Neither Petitioners nor their supervisors were aware at the time that the overpayments were made that Petitioners could not receive monetary compensation for their overtime hours, but must instead receive regular compensatory leave credits. At hearing, Petitioners did not dispute the amounts and hours of overtime worked as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. In accordance with the Department of Management Services’ Bureau of Payroll Manual, the amount of salary overpaid, and the amount sought to be repaid, was calculated as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. When an agency has determined that a salary overpayment has occurred, it is required to follow procedures set forth in the above-referenced manual, to seek repayment. Respondent followed those procedures in making the calculations relevant in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities determining that: 1) Petitioner Ileana Toledo was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $464.63; 2) Petitioner Norma Pedraza was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $624.13; 3) Petitioner Lil Guerrero was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $426.65; and 4) Petitioners are entitled to be compensated by Respondent through compensatory leave credits for the overtime hours worked as reflected in paragraphs 12-14 above. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2013.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner filed his complaint against Respondent for race discrimination more than 180 days after the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practices contrary to Section 760.10(10), Florida Statutes (1989).
Findings Of Fact The parties' Stipulated Statement of Undisputed Material Facts constitute the following findings of fact: The Petitioner, Floyd Peacock, Jr., a black male, was hired by the Respondent, Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., on August 22, 1980. The Petitioner was initially hired and employed by the Respondent as a maintenance mechanic at the hire (entry) level. On August 22, 1980, James Coleman, a white male, was hired by the Respondent as a maintenance mechanic. On August 25, 1980, Elvin Higgins, a white male, was hired by the Respondent as a maintenance mechanic at the second year step level. The Respondent has had two means of filling the vacancies that arose in the plant. First, whenever someone left the Respondent's employ due to retirement, a voluntary discharge, or involuntary termination, that vacancy would be posted on a job board on the Respondent's premises. Employees wishing to transfer to the department where the vacancy arose were then allowed to apply, or bid, for the posted vacancy. Bids are awarded based upon job skills and seniority. For positions within the operations department, seniority is determined by the amount of time the employee had with the company. For maintenance positions, seniority is determined by the amount of time the employee had with the maintenance department. The second method used by the Respondent to fill vacancies was a "back- fill" procedure. When an employee's bid was awarded and that employee then transferred to another department, the vacancy created in the transferring employee's department was "back-filled" with a new hire from outside of the company. Additionally, a position that was opened for bids but not bid upon was also back-filled with new hires from outside of the company. In 1982, the Petitioner, whose pay level as a mechanic with the Respondent was at the "second step/year level," became interested in a three- year position in the ammonia methanol area and inquired about bidding for the job. He was told by the personnel manager, Laura Finn, that since he was at the two-year level, he did not qualify for the three-year position. The Petitioner did not bid for the job. Two white males, Roy Mony and Clayton Perry, who were previously employed as mechanics with Carroll Construction, as had the Petitioner, were hired at the "third step/year level" and placed in the two "third step/year level" mechanics jobs. The Petitioner filed no charge or complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations or the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission concerning his not bidding for the "three step/year level" mechanics position or the hiring and assigning of the two white males "three-step" mechanics to those positions in 1982. At the time of his "fifth-year step" mechanic's interview in 1985 for obtaining his "five year/step" pay increase, the Petitioner confirmed with his supervisor that James Coleman had been made senior mechanic and had been advanced to the "senior mechanic" pay level. The Petitioner was given a "fifth year/step" mechanic's pay increase. Soon after the 1985 pay increase interview, the Petitioner went to the Respondent's Personnel Department with his supervisor to inquire about why James Coleman had been made a senior mechanic before the Petitioner. When the personnel manager was unable to provide the reason, the Petitioner talked with a staff member of the Escambia-Santa Rosa Human Relations Commission about his being given a "fifth year/step" mechanic's pay increase while James Coleman received a senior mechanic's title and pay increase. However, the Petitioner did not file any complaint with that agency or with the Florida Commission on Human Relations or the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission. In June, 1986, the Respondent had a reduction in force (RIF) that resulted in some employees' employment being terminated and other employees being reassigned to other lower level and lower paying jobs. The following actions were taken as part of the RIF process in June, 1986: Maintenance mechanics hired prior to June 10, 1977, continued in their positions. Maintenance mechanics hired after June 20, 1977, but before the Petitioner's date of hire of August 22, 1980, were assigned permanent operator positions. Fifteen or sixteen maintenance mechanics who had been hired on or after the Petitioner's date of hire were placed in a temporary job position designated as "utility operators." Among the mechanics retained in the employ of the Respondent but assigned as utility operators was Elvin Higgins, a white male senior mechanic, and the Petitioner. The remaining mechanics were discharged as a result of the RIF in June, 1986. Among the mechanics who were discharged at that time were Roy Mony and Clayton Perry, whose hiring dates were after the Petitioner's date of hire. The utility operator position was a new, temporary position created in response to the RIF. In lieu of being discharged, fifteen employees, including Petitioner, were placed in the utility operator position. Utility operators worked at reduced pay, performing work previously accomplished by independent contractors. As vacancies arose in other departments of the company, one by one, each of the utility operators were to fill these vacancies until no one remained in the utility operator position. The respondent provided the utility operators with two means of transferring out of the utility operator position into a regular, higher paying position. First, utility operators were allowed to bid on any position that was subject to the Respondent's customary bid procedure. The second means that the utility operators had for leaving the utility operator position was through the assignment of a "back-fill" position. Instead of back-filling positions with new hires from outside of the company, as was the procedure before the RIF, utility operators were to be assigned to the back-fill positions. A utility operator would be back-filled into any vacancy that had been opened up for bids under the customary bid procedure, but on which no one had bid. Second, utility operators could be back-filled into a secondary vacancy created when another employee transferred from one position to another. The utility operators were to back-fill these non-bidded [sic] positions and secondary vacancies in order of seniority with the company (i.e., by date of hire). In June, 1986, when Elvin Higgins was reduced from senior mechanic to a utility operator because of the reduction in force (RIF), the Petitioner first became aware that Elvin Higgins had previously received senior mechanic status. On July 28, 1987, Aubry Garrett, one of the utility operators, used the normal bid procedure and successfully "bid-out" of the utility operator's position and took an operator's position. The Petitioner did not bid for this position. Between the time of the RIF in June, 1986, and the time the first back-fill position arose in September, 1987, the Respondent had not provided its employees with a finalized written or oral statement about how the back-fill positions would be administered after the RIF; however, during this period before the Petitioner refused the first back-fill position, when asked about this procedure by employees, Ernest Labadie, the personnel manager, told them that utility operators would be assigned back-fill positions in the order of the employees' length of service with the company. In September, 1987, two operator positions became available for utility operators to "back-fill" as secondary vacancies. The Petitioner, as the most senior utility operator based on date of hire, was offered one of the positions, but he refused the job because it was rotating shift work and he desired to work only "day hours" like he was working as a utility operator and had worked as a maintenance mechanic. Elvin Higgins and Gene Moore, the next senior utility operators based on date of hire, accepted the "back-fill" positions and were assigned those positions in early October, 1987. At the time of the Petitioner's refusal to "back-fill" and accept the available advancement to operator, the Petitioner was informed by Ernest Labadie, the personnel manager, that the Petitioner would be placed at the bottom of the list of the utility operators for future "back-filling" of jobs by utility operators. The Petitioner made no complaint to anyone or any agency about his being placed at the bottom of the list of utility operators for "back-filling" purposes in September, 1987, and believed at that time that his placement at the bottom of the list was fair and not discriminatory. Gary Kent is a white male who is senior the Petitioner both by date of hire and by amount of time in the Respondent's maintenance department. Before the reduction in force (RIF) in June, 1986, Mr. Kent was a mechanic, but as a result of the RIF, he was transferred to an operator's position in the amines area of the company. The amines job was not shift work. On November 24, 1987, Mr. Kent bid for an operator's position in the PVC area and received the job on December 8, 1987. His move to the PVC area from the amines area resulted in an operator vacancy (secondary vacancy) in the amines area that would be "back- filled" from the utility operators' list (i.e., without the need for bidding for the vacant position). On December 8, 1987, the vacant operator position in the amines area was "back-filled" by David Hart, who was the next utility operator on the "back- fill" list since the Petitioner was at the bottom of the list. The Petitioner became aware of this assignment, or surmised that the assignment of Mr. Hart to the amines area would occur, before the announcement of the assignment was posted and when he heard that Mr. Kent had bid for the PVC area operator position. In November or December, 1987, the Petitioner spoke with the personnel manager, Mr. Labadie, about the Petitioner's chances of getting the vacant amines area operator position that was to be "back-filled" since Gary Kent had bid for the PVC operator's position. The Petitioner was interested in this operator position because it was not a rotating shift job. The Petitioner was told that consistent with the personnel manger's discussions with the Petitioner in October, 1987, the Petitioner was not eligible to "back-fill" the position because he was at the bottom of the "back-fill" list. The Petitioner accepted the explanation and understood the policy and procedure for "back-filling." The Petitioner made no complaint to anyone about assigning the amines area operator's job to Mr. Hart instead of to the Petitioner. In January, 1988, Bruce Holiday, a white male who is senior to the Petitioner by amount of time in the Respondent's maintenance department and who has been working as an operator after the reduction in force, bid for and received on February 1, 1988, the assignment back into the maintenance mechanic. The Petitioner had bid for this position but has no complaint of racial discrimination about his not being awarded the position because Mr. Holiday was a senior to the Petitioner for the maintenance mechanic position by the amount of time in the maintenance department. In February, 1988, the Petitioner and the other two last remaining utility operators, Randy Mock and Lawrence Pearce, were assigned and "back- filled" to operator positions. The Petitioner made no complaint and has no complaint about this assignment. In November, 1988, Gary Kent, who was also senior to the Petitioner both by date of hire and by amount of time in the Respondent's maintenance department, bid for and received on November 20, 1988, an assignment back into the maintenance department as a maintenance mechanic, a position subject to the customary bidding procedures. The Petitioner had also bid for this position. The announcement of Mr. Kent's assignment was posted on the bulletin board for employees to see. The Petitioner became aware of the assignment of Mr. Kent to maintenance on or before the posting of the announcement on November 16, 1988. On or about November 16, 1988, the Petitioner discussed with Mr. Labadie, the personnel manager, Mr. Kent's bidding and being assigned into the maintenance department as a mechanic. The Petitioner complained that since Mr. Kent had previously bid and received the PVC position in December, 1987, Mr. Kent, in the Petitioner's view, had decided at that time that Mr. Kent did not want to go back into the maintenance department. Therefore, the Petitioner surmised that, even though Mr. Kent would later be the senior person eligible to be awarded a maintenance mechanic job if he had bid it, Mr. Kent should have been "placed at the bottom of the list" for purposes of bidding on any maintenance mechanic positions. The Petitioner asserted that this would be consistent with his being placed at the bottom of the "back-fill" list when he refused to accept the "back-fill" assignment in September or October, 1987. Mr. Labadie asserted in response to the Petitioner that there was nothing inconsistent since Mr. Kent's assignment was pursuant to and consistent with the Respondent's bidding procedures and policies for maintenance department positions which were in effect and used both before and after the RIF (and under which the Petitioner was allowed to bid and did bid for mechanic's positions); while the Petitioner's assignments from utility operator to the operator positions were governed by the "back-fill" procedure. The Petitioner personally did not agree with and did not accept this explanation, although he understood the two different procedures, and told Mr. Labadie that it was Petitioner's opinion that the bidding and "back-filling" should operate the same way. In January, 1989, the Petitioner again had a similar conversation with Mr. Labadie about Mr. Kent's bidding and being assigned a maintenance mechanic's job and the Petitioner's being put at the bottom of the "back-fill" list for assignment to operator positions. In late February, 1989, Ricky Cook and John Rink, both white males who are senior to the Petitioner by the amount of time in the Respondent's maintenance department and who had been working as operators after the June, 1986 reduction in force, bid for and received assignments back into the maintenance department as mechanics. The Petitioner has no complaint, based on racial discrimination or otherwise, as to these assignments. The Petitioner's employment discrimination charge was filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations on March 27, 1989, and filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on March 31, 1989. On or about March 29, 1989, the Petitioner bid for and received assignment to maintenance mechanic in the Respondent's maintenance department, along with Larry Perritt, who is a white male and who was a senior to the Petitioner by the amount of time in the Respondent's maintenance department. The Petitioner was assigned the job on April 16, 1989, at the senior mechanic pay level. The Petitioner has no complaints about any of these assignments. The Petitioner received a pay increase at the "top level" of senior mechanic in October, 1989, after serving six (6) months in that position. In October, 1989, Elvin Higgins, after bidding for the position, was assigned to maintenance mechanic at the senior mechanic pay level.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's charges. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 19th day of June, 1995. SUZANNE F. HOOD, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard E. Johnson, Esq. Spriggs & Johnson W. College Ave. Tallahassee, FL 32301 Ralph B. Peterson, Esq. Beggs & Lane P. O. Box 12950 Pensacola, FL 32576-2950 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission John Knox Rd., Bldg. F, Ste. 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esq. Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Rd., Bldg. F, Ste. 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act 1992, as alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on August 10, 2002. of
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts 1. Petitioner, Ernest E. Whitehurst, was employed by the Duval County School District (school district) beginning November 26, 1984. 2. Petitioner was discharged from employment effective August 25, 2000. 3. Petitioner was informed of his discharge by a letter signed by Lisa Moore, an employee of the school district, a copy of which was hand-delivered by management. 4. Petitioner suffered an on-the-job injury in September of 1991. 5. After recovering from the on-the-job injury, Petitioner had a permanent injury in that he was restricted in lifting objects. 6. Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination in relation to his termination on or about August 6, 2001. 7. Petitioner is presently suffering from a serious mental disorder. Facts Established by the Evidence of Record 8. The letter of termination stated in pertinent part: Under Civil Service Rule 9.05(1), an employee can be dismissed for inability to perform assigned duties. You were hired as a school [sic] clerk II, after a fitness for duty assessment, job skills inventory and job search, the district has determined that you are unable to perform your assigned duties and that there are no other positions available, 9. Petitioner was hired and worked as a Stock Clerk II. The position description for Stock Clerk II includes the following: KNOWLEDGES, SKILLS AND ABILITIES: Ability to establish and maintain effective working relationships with others. Requires alertness and manual dexterity. Ability to understand and carry out oral and written instructions. Ability to maintain manual and computerized records. Ability to lift 60 pounds. Ability to operate computer. Knowledge of computers regarding maintenance of records and inventories. Knowledge of storeroom methods and procedures. 10. The job description also includes the following as examples of work to be performed: supervising and/or participating in the ordering, receiving, storing, and issuing of a variety of equipment and supplies; assembling, parking, and arranging for transport of stored materials; preparing and maintaining an inventory system using computerized and manual records; and may be required to drive a truck up to 26,000 GUV, as well as to operate a forklift, stock-picker, and other material-handling equipment. Physical Injuries 11. During his first years as a district employee, Petitioner apparently performed his job without serious problem or difficulty. On September 9, 1988, however, he strained and pulled his right arm and shoulder while lifting a gate to open it, which limited his ability to raise his arm over his head and in reaching. Medical records reflect that a long period of limited duty ensued during which Petitioner was medically restricted to lifting no more than 30 pounds and doing no overhead lifting with his right arm. 12. On September 6, 1991, Petitioner was injured on the job again. The description of the accident furnished by the school district, is as follows: Employee was moving storage bins in Warehouse and they fell over on him, hurting his head, nose, back, both shoulders and both knees. 13. Petitioner's treating physician at the time of the 1991 injury, Dr. Lenger, a neurologist, placed work restrictions on Petitioner. The primary work restriction limited Petitioner to lifting not more than 30 pounds. The physical sequela from this accident remained with Petitioner through the time he was dismissed. 14. On August 30, 1995, Dr. Lenger, determined that Petitioner's injury was permanent in nature and irreversible. Petitioner's work restrictions at this point included the following: sitting no more than one hour; driving no more than one hour; standing no more than one hour; no prolonged walking; no repetitive bending; and no carrying or lifting in excess of 30 pounds. These same work limitations were reiterated by Dr. Lenger on March 8, 1996, with the exception of the walking limitation. The last medical report reiterating the physical restrictions was dated April 27, 2000. The restrictions described by Dr. Langer remained in effect when Petitioner was dismissed. 15. In 1999, Petitioner developed carpal tunnel syndrome. On September 17, 1999, Dr. Lenger reported that Petitioner had "worsening CTS [carpal tunnel syndrome] bilat." This finding was reported by Dr. Lenger again on September 27, 1999, along with the notation "requires wrist splints for CTS." Dr. Lenger's January 14, 2000, report indicates "Rt. Carpal 2 This condition also continued to affect tunnel syndrome." Petitioner through the end of his employment with the school district. It hindered his ability to do repetitive work. 16. The school district accommodated Petitioner for his physical disabilities for many years by permitting him to remain on light-duty status. He received generally satisfactory job evaluations. However, his supervisors based these evaluations on the limited amount of work he was able to do, not on the entire scope of the job. Mental Illness® 17. Petitioner also developed manifestations of mental illness during the time frame he was employed with the district. On or about March 8, 1996, Dr. Lenger reported that Petitioner was so upset he couldn't stop crying. Dr. Lenger's progress notes reflect that Petitioner's regular physician put him on an anti-depressant. Petitioner continued to take the anti- depressant through the time he was dismissed from employment by the district. 18. On July 13, 1998, a Monday, Petitioner told his supervisor and another co-worker that he had contemplated suicide during the prior weekend. He also told them that he had hit himself in the head numerous times. Larry McDonald, Director, Consolidated Services Property Manager, told Petitioner to go to the district's Wellness Clinic for counseling, but Petitioner refused. 19. Petitioner admitted to barking from time to time in the workplace. According to Petitioner, he did this to startle people. Petitioner's barking was observed and heard by many district employees, including Larry McDonald, Lee Taylor, Leroy Williams, Michael Myers, Colleen Taylor, and Rufus Harmon. These people found Petitioner's barking disturbing, frightening, strange, or annoying. It occurred frequently, was very loud, and could be heard 300 to 400 feet away, half the length of the warehouse, and while visitors were present in the warehouse. 20. During the course of his employment, Petitioner made threatening remarks concerning management and specifically concerning Larry McDonald, Petitioner's superior through the reporting chain. On one occasion in 1999, Petitioner remarked to a co-worker that he would line management up and shoot them. Petitioner stated that if he lost his job, he would get even, a comment made in a conversation concerning other persons on "light" duty who had been dismissed. 21. Petitioner had a psychiatric examination on August 24, 2000, after he had received his letter of dismissal, but prior to the last day of his employment, August 25, 2000. According to Petitioner's psychiatrist, Dr. Martinez, Petitioner was having intense thoughts of killing himself and his supervisor because of being dismissed. Dr. Martinez hospitalized Petitioner due to suicidal and homicidal ideation on an emergency basis at Ten Broeck Hospital, and recommended long- term psychiatric treatment. It was Dr. Martinez's opinion that Petitioner was not employable at that point. 22. Petitioner acknowledged that when he visited Dr. Martinez on August 24, 2000, he had been homicidal and that he expressed at that point that he wanted to kill Mr. McDonald. 23. Dr. Martinez has continued to see Petitioner on a very regular basis. Petitioner's diagnosis is intermittent explosive disorder, clinical depression, and personality disorder. Dr. Martinez testified that Petitioner functions on a chronic level of paranoia and distrust, which is psychotic. Dr. Martinez stated that Petitioner continues to be permanently mentally disabled as a result of his industrial accident and the psychiatric sequelae following the accident.‘ 24. It is Dr. Martinez's opinion that Petitioner "has always been severely mentally disturbed," that he is very distrusting on a chronic basis, probably since he was a small boy, and that he is suspicious, hypervigilant and explosive. "I think he's been that way for quite a while." According to Dr. Martinez, behavior such as barking in the workplace is indicative of severe mental disturbance. Employability at Time of Dismissal 25. Mr. McDonald estimated that Petitioner was doing only 35 percent of his job and was not carrying out its essential functions at the time of his dismissal. A supervisor estimated that Petitioner did 40 percent of his job. Another supervisor estimated that Petitioner could do between 15 percent to 25 percent of the job. One co-worker stated that Petitioner did very little work. No one testified that Petitioner was able to do all functions of his job. 10 26. In the opinion of Dr. Martinez, Petitioner was not able to do his work: Q: If he hadn't been terminated, I mean, is there any reason you would suspect he couldn't continue working unless there was another triggering event? A: If he had not been terminated? Q: Yes. A: I think that he needed to be out of this work situation. He couldn't do it. Q: Because there were triggering events other than the termination? A: He's fully disabled. You know, he couldn't do his job. But it's how it was handled that I have the issue with. It was--minimize the damage control. It should have been--human resources screen them before they work with children, you know. 27. In 1998, the district had 65 employees in "light" duty positions who could not perform and who had reached maximum medical improvement ("MMI"). The purpose of "light" duty was to allow employees a reasonable period of time to heal if they were injured. The school district hired a new "Safety Director" who was instrumental in the implementation of a process directed toward this large number of individuals who were not performing the full scope of their jobs. A review of their status commenced to either find jobs for them or separate those individuals who had reached MMI. Petitioner was one of the employees who became a subject of this process. 11 28. The evidence is unclear as to whether every step of this process was undertaken regarding Petitioner. The first step was a fitness for duty evaluation. This step was unnecessary regarding Petitioner because the school district already had Dr. Lenger's opinion that Petitioner's physical injuries were permanent. The termination letter indicated that prior to Petitioner's dismissal, a job skills inventory and search for other possible jobs for him within the district had been conducted, although no business records relating to this search was produced. 29. Vicki Reynolds is the current Assistant Superintendent of Human Resources. While she was not in that position at the time of Petitioner's dismissal, she reviewed school district business records relating to available vacancies which the district had in the months immediately prior to Petitioner's dismissal. She also reviewed business records relating to individuals who had been surplused because their positions had been cut for budgetary reasons. Those persons have rights to positions under the collective bargaining agreement and, in the case of teachers, under the applicable teacher tenure law. Ms. Reynolds' review indicated that the school district had no vacant position in which Petitioner could have been placed at the time of dismissal, taking into consideration Petitioner's limitations. 12 30. At the time of Petitioner's dismissal, there were some persons occupying Stock Clerk II positions who did not regularly do lifting, e.g., persons assigned to the purchasing office. However, according to Mr. McDonald, all Stock Clerk II's "are required to have the ability to lift." Regarding those positions, Mr. McDonald stated: Q: He [Petitioner's attorney] mentioned three things, whether stock clerks do computerized work, telephone, typing. Is that all part of a Stock Clerk II's job that goes along with lifting? Do they all do some of that? A: Yeah. The stock clerks that work in the office, their duties are typical clerical duties. They--they're expected to be able to work on a computer, on a computer networking system. They're expected to work on the telephone with both vendors and school board customers and meet personally with the vendors. Q: Do they go into the warehouse ever? A: Yes, they do. Q: What do they do out there? A: The ones on the warehouse side, they are in charge of certain commodities. We have-- in the warehouse, we have 6,000 items, different items. And we break it up by about a third of those for each one. And their duties are to make sure that we are carrying and maintaining our certain inventory levels. This may require them to go out and physically count, physically inspect, move around items, help with the incoming of the inventory when it comes in as an inspector. 13 Q: And. . . but why could Whitehurst not have been placed in one of those jobs, which is the implication, in August of 2000? A: Well, we didn't have any openings. And you cannot bump a person out of a job. It's illegal under the civil service rules and regulations. Q: And any other reason that you can-- A: Well, his physical impairment. Mr. Whitehurst was limited to sitting, standing, walking. He had carpel tunnel on his wrist. He had several reasons that he wouldn't be a candidate for one of those jobs, if I had an opening at the time. 31. Petitioner did not identify a specific vacant position which the district had at the time he was dismissed for which he was qualified. 32. Petitioner had been issued a statement of eligibility for a teaching certificate. However, Petitioner had been evaluated by the school district and found not to be suitable for teaching positions. Dr. Martinez concurred that it would not have been appropriate for Petitioner to work at a school either before or after he was dismissed. 33. Petitioner was dismissed on August 11, 2000, effective August 25, 2000, for inability to perform his assigned duties and because no other position for him was available pursuant to Civil Service Rule 9.05(1). Civil Service Rule 9.05(1) provides that employees may be dismissed for cause. A determination of 14 cause may be predicated on "inability to perform assigned duties."
Conclusions For Petitioner: Arthur G. Santorius, Esquire 1919 Atlantic Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32207 For Respondent: Ernst D. Mueller, Esquire Office of the General Counsel 117 West Duval Street, Suite 480 Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is 24 RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Ernest E. Whitehurst. DONE AND ENTERED this aot aay of June, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. iS Administrative™Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20 aay of June, 2003.
The Issue What amount of legal fees and costs should be awarded to Petitioner pursuant to Section 120.569(2)(e) or 57.105(5), Florida Statutes, for Respondent’s erroneous classification of Petitioner’s position and subsequent failure to correct that error and reclassify Petitioner’s position back to career service as requested by her in Georgalis v. F.D.O.T., DOAH Case No. 03-4665SED.
Findings Of Fact On April 1, 2002, Petitioner was discharged from her position with the Department without stated cause or hearing. See Petitioner’s Ex. 1-2, Dep’t of Transportation v. FCHR, 842 So. 2d 253, 256 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). On June 11, 2003, Petitioner was temporarily reinstated by order of the Circuit Court to her position with the Department pursuant to section 112.3187(9)(f). Petitioner’s Ex. 1-3. The administrative case underlying this request for fees and costs was initiated by Petitioner through the filing of a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on August 15, 2002. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-4. In that Petition, Petitioner demonstrated, through reference to the position description provided to her by the Department, that she did not fit within any of the categories of employees exempted from career service by Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-4, paragraph 7. Petitioner also put the Department on notice that she believed the Department’s action in reclassifying her was “frivolous and was done for an improper purpose,” since it was contradicted by the Department’s own documents. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-4, paragraph 12. She also requested that she be awarded appropriate attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. After nearly four months, the Department forwarded the Petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a formal administrative hearing regarding whether its decision to reclassify Petitioner was proper. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-5. By this letter, which was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 10, 2003, the Department requested a formal administrative hearing and manifested its opposition to the relief requested by Petitioner in her Petition. A hearing was held in DOAH Case No. 03-4665SED on April 15, 2004. Following the preparation of a transcript, the parties submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. Petitioner filed a Motion to Strike portions of the Department’s Proposed Recommended Order because it improperly raised an argument that Petitioner could properly be exempted from career service because she was an “administrator.” Petitioner’s Ex. 1-6. That Motion was granted. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-7.1/ On July 2, 2004, the undersigned entered a Recommended Order concluding that Petitioner was improperly reclassified into Select Exempt Service. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-8, p. 12. On September 1, 2005, the Department entered a Final Order adopting the Recommended Order entered in DOAH Case No. 03-4665SED.2/ Petitioner’s Ex. 1-11. Paragraph 13 of the fully-adopted Recommended Order states that: based on the duties and responsibilities contained in Petitioner’s position description and the actual duties she performed, there is no basis for concluding that Petitioner was subject to exemption from career service as concluded by Respondent in July 2001. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-8, paragraph 13. In paragraph 19 of the fully-adopted Recommended Order, the undersigned concluded that: [t]he suggestion of the Respondent’s witness that the exemption should apply if a state employee is assigned to work with anyone retained or commissioned by Respondent to perform services for Respondent, however menial the task, simply misconstrues the statutory exemption: the relevant issue for the purposes of the exemption is whether such persons are department “employees,” not whether a department has contracted or engaged their services as independent technical consultants. Such contract administration is not relevant to the issue of whether Petitioner could properly be classified as a selected exempt employee. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-8, paragraph 19. Following entry of the Recommended Order, Petitioner filed her two (2) Motions for Attorneys’ Fees. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-12 and 1-13. These motions seek an award of attorney’s fees and costs based on the lack of factual or legal support for the Department’s opposition to Petitioner’s request that the Department correct its error in reclassifying her position to Select Exempt Service. Id. Petitioner submitted an affidavit and itemized statement of the requested hours, a summary of hours by the attorney, and a summary of costs incurred in this matter. Petitioner’s Ex. 1-14. Petitioner also submitted the testimony of J. Steven Menton, Esquire, who corroborated the reasonableness of the services and time expended by Petitioner’s counsel and also confirmed the reasonableness of the fees charged and costs incurred by Petitioner’s counsel for those services. The Department did not contest the number of hours sought by Petitioner’s counsel. Respondent did offer the testimony of Michael Mattimore, Esquire, who was also counsel of record for the Department in this case, suggesting that the rates charged by Petitioner’s counsel exceeded those which are normally charged by similar attorneys in the community. Mattimore’s testimony related to fees charged in “employment” law cases in which he has been involved during his career and did not focus on administrative litigation challenging the actions of a governmental agency, such as the present case which involved more than merely examining the factual circumstances surrounding a discharge or other adverse employment action. Confirming the complexity of the underlying case was Mattimore’s testimony regarding the outcome in other reclassification cases. The great majority of reclassification challenges (more than 95 percent of them) have been resolved in favor of the governmental agency or have not been pursued by the impacted employee. Id. The outcome obtained by attorneys for Petitioner in the underlying case is suggestive of fees toward the high end of the range. Petitioner reported the following hours and rates (Petitioner’s Ex. 1-14): LAWYERS: Hours Rate Amount M. Stephen Turner, P.A. 44.40 $400 $17,760.00 David K. Miller, P. A. 1.00 $300 $ 300.00 Martin A. Fitzpatrick 228.50 $250 $57,125.00 Brooke Lewis .90 $200 $ 80.00 TOTAL ATTORNEY HOURS 274.80 $75,365.00 Paralegals: Theresa J. Everhart Hours 1.90 Rate $80 Amount $152.00 Trishia Finkey 1.00 $80 80.00 TOTAL PARALEGAL HOURS 2.90 $ 232.00 TOTAL LEGAL FEES: $75.597.00 The hours and rates requested are found to be reasonable in view of the novelty and complexity of the issues, level of legal skills required, and the result obtained for the Petitioner. The rates sought are in line with fees charged by similarly-situated attorneys for similar work in the community. The amount requested is reasonable and justified under the circumstances. Moreover, the costs and expenses for which reimbursement is sought ($1,523.25) and the expert witness fees of $1400 ($280 /hour for 5 hours) are also reasonable and are of a kind typically billed to clients in addition to the hourly rate charged.
The Issue Whether City of Belleair Beach Treasurer Robert K. Hebden was an independent contractor or an employee of the city.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner City of Belleair Beach (City) is a participating local agency of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) and is subject to the laws applicable to the FRS. The City began participating in the FRS through the adoption of City Ordinance 99 in 1973. The Respondent Division of Retirement (Division) is the state agency charged by statute with the administration of the FRS. On a date unspecified, the Division's Management Review Section audited the City as required by statute. Based on the audit, the Division concluded that Mr. Hebden was not an independent contractor, but was a part time employee of the City. The Division communicated this information to the City by letter of May 27, 1992. The Division's Enrollment Section, responsible for enrolling employees in the FRS, conducted an analysis of the materials obtained by the Management Review Section, and concurred in the initial employment status determination. By letter of October 11, 1993, the Director of the State Division of Retirement notified the City that the Division had determined Mr. Hebden to be have been an employee in a regularly established position for purposes of the FRS from July 1979 through February 1991, and that FRS contributions were due for that period. On October 15, 1993, Mr. Hebden signed an FRS application for service retirement. The application was filed with the FRS. Mr. Hebden completed the application on the suggestion of the Enrollment Section Administrator. Mr. Hebden considers himself to have worked for the City as an independent contractor and would not have filed an FRS application without the request by the enrollment administrator. In concluding that Mr. Hebden was an employee, the Division reviewed all materials furnished by the City. Such materials included copies of contracts, billing statements and IRS forms. At all times, the Division has been amenable to reviewing any additional documents submitted by the City. Beginning in 1972, and continuing to February of 1991, Robert K. Hebden provided various services to the City. Beginning in July 1979, Mr. Hebden served as the City Treasurer. The position of Belleair Beach City Treasurer is established by city ordinance. The position description for the City Treasurer sets forth duties as follows: The treasurer works on a daily basis primarily under the mayor's supervision but is ultimately accountable to the city council. Compiles operating and capital expense estimates for annual budget. Forecasts problem areas of income and expense and proposes possible solutions. Maintains general accounting system and appropriate operating cash balances. Submits to council a monthly detailed statement of revenue and disbursements in contrast with annual budget. Prepares for submission to council a detailed financial statement as of the end of each fiscal year. Invests surplus General Government Funds in conjunction with the Mayor or Deputy Mayor and recommends investment of Sewer Trust Funds in conjunction with the approved Trustee. Provides for payment of bonds and interest and maintains files for cancelled coupons and bonds. Maintains capital assets inventory including acquisition and disposition. Between July 1, 1979 and February 12, 1991, Mr. Hebden was the Belleair Beach City Treasurer. He performed the duties of the position description and such additional duties as were assigned at the discretion of the Mayor and Council. In February 1983, Mr. Hebden and the City entered into a written contract regarding his service as Treasurer. The initial contract was retroactive to October 1, 1982. Prior to this point, Mr. Hebden acted as City Treasurer under an oral agreement with the City officials. The February 2, 1983 contract identifies Mr. Hebden as "the Contractor." The contract is for the one year period of October 1, 1982 to September 30, 1983 and provides as follows: The Contractor will be allowed twelve (12) days of paid sick leave and at times mutually agreeable fifteen (15) days of vacation without adjustment to the monthly fee. Absence in excess of this amount will be adjusted on a prorata basis. The work week will be 8:30 A. M. to 12:30 P. M. daily, Monday through Friday, except for legal holidays recognized by the City. In addition, attendance will be required at Council meetings, work sessions and committee meetings, as may be determined by the Mayor. Services will be reimbursed on a monthly basis at the rate of SEVEN HUNDRED DOLLARS ($700.00) per month, plus an allowance of SEVENTY DOLLARS ($70.00) for expenses upon receipt of a statement. This agreement may be extended beyond the original term of One (1) year upon such terms and conditions as the parties shall mutually agree between them. Beginning with the subsequent agreement dated July 14, 1983, all contracts identify Mr. Hebden as "the City Treasurer" rather than "the Contractor." The July 14, 1983 contract provides as follows: That Robert K. Hebden shall serve the City of Belleair Beach as the City Treasurer, appointed by the City Council. The services of the City Treasurer shall be performed between the hours of 8:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. daily, Monday through Friday, except for legal holidays recognized by the City. In addition, attendance will be required at Council meetings, work sessions and committee meetings, as may be determined by the Mayor. The duties of the City Treasurer shall include but not be limited to: -compilation of current and capital expense estimates for the annual budget -maintenance of a general accounting system -submission to the city council of a monthly detailed statement of revenue and disbursements in contrast with the annual budget -preparation for submission to council of a detailed financial statement as to the end of each fiscal year A RETAINER fee shall be paid by the City of Belleair Beach to the City Treasurer for the above service which shall be EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY DOLLARS AND NO/100 ($830.00) per month. THIS AGREEMENT shall be reviewed annually by the Personnel Committee of the City Council, the Mayor and the City Treasurer. THIS AGREEMENT shall expire on September 30 of each year unless renewed by Council prior to that time. THIS AGREEMENT shall be cancelled by either party upon a thirty (30) day notice of intent to do so. The September 10, 1984 contract for the one year period to September 30, 1985 is identical to the agreement of July 14, 1983 except that the retainer fee was increased to $900.00 monthly. The July 15, 1985 contract for the one year period to September 30, 1986 is similar to the agreement of September 10, 1984. The retainer fee was increased to $1100.00 monthly and paid leave was again included. The agreement provides as follows: ....In addition, the City Treasurer shall receive three work-weeks vacation annually (allowing for a base figure of 3 work-weeks for the current fiscal year) and twelve work-days sick leave annually (allowing for twelve work-days for the current fiscal year). THIS AGREEMENT shall be reviewed annually by the Personnel Committee of the City Council, the Mayor and the City Treasurer. THIS AGREEMENT shall commence October 1, 1985, and shall expire on September 30 of each year unless renewed by Council prior to that time. THIS AGREEMENT shall be cancelled by either party upon a thirty (30) day notice of intent to do so. The September 23, 1986 contract for the one year period to September 30, 1987 is substantially similar to the preceding contract, however, an amendment was made to the paid leave provisions. The agreement provides as follows: That Robert K. Hebden shall serve the City of Belleair Beach as the City Treasurer, appointed by the City Council. The services of the City Treasurer shall be performed between the hours of 8:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. daily, Monday through Friday, except for legal holidays recognized by the City. In addition, attendance will be required at Council meetings, work sessions and committee meetings, as may be determined by the Council or Mayor. The duties of the City Treasurer shall include but not be limited to: compilation of current and capital expense estimates for the annual budget maintenance of a general accounting system submission to the city council of a monthly detailed statement of revenue and disbursements in contrast with the annual budget preparation for submission to council of a detailed financial statement as to the end of each fiscal year A RETAINER fee shall be paid by the City of Belleair Beach to the City Treasurer for the above service which shall be ELEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY DOLLARS AND NO/100 ($1100.00) per month. In addition, the City Treasurer shall receive three work-weeks vacation annually and twelve work-days sick leave annually. Annual leave, which will only be applied against working days, and shall be taken in not less than four (4) hour increments, may accrue to a maximum of fifteen (15) days. Annual leave in excess of fifteen (15) days will be forfeited on the following anniversary date after the year in which earned. The August 3, 1987 contract for the one year period of October 1, 1987 to September 30, 1988 is substantially similar to the preceding contract except that the work hours were amended to 8:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and monthly payment was increased to $1300.00. The September 12, 1988 contract for the one year period of October 1, 1988 to September 30, 1989 is substantially similar to the preceding contract except that monthly payment was increased to $1350.00. In 1989, some Council members questioned Mr. Hebden's performance and considered termination of his contract. The September 25, 1989 contract for the one year period of October 1, 1989 to September 30, 1990 is substantially similar to the preceding contract except that the agreement provides "for a six months performance evaluation." Apparently, the concerned Council members were satisfied with the review and the contract was again renewed. The September 10, 1990 contract reflected Mr. Hebden's intention to leave his position. The contract provides as follows: That Robert K. Hebden shall serve the City of Belleair Beach as the City Treasurer, appointed by the City Council. The services of the City Treasurer shall be performed between the hours of 8:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. daily, Monday through Friday, except for legal holidays recognized by the City. In addition, attendance will be required at Council meetings, work sessions and committee meetings, as may be determined by the Council or Mayor. The duties of the City Treasurer shall include but not be limited to: compilation of current and capital expense estimates for the annual budget maintenance of a general accounting system submission to the city council of a monthly detailed statement of revenue and disbursements in contrast with the annual budget preparation for submission to council of a detailed financial statement as to the end of each fiscal year * A RETAINER fee shall be paid by the City of Belleair Beach to the City Treasurer for the above service which shall be [[THIRTEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY DOLLARS AND NO/100 ($1350.00)]] <<FOURTEEN HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS AND NO/100 ($1450.00)>> per month. In addition, the City Treasurer shall receive [[three work-weeks vacation annually and twelve]] <<three>> work-days sick leave [[annually. Annual leave, which will only be applied against working days, and shall be taken in not less than four (4) hour increments, may accrue to a maximum of fifteen (15) days. Annual leave in excess of fifteen (15) days will be forfeited on the following anniversary date after the year in which earned.]] <<Annual leave earned through September 30, 1990 and not taken will be paid on completion of this contract.>> [[THIS AGREEMENT shall provide for a six months performance evaluation.]] [[THIS AGREEMENT shall be reviewed annually by the personnel committee of the City Council, the Mayor and the City Treasurer.]] THIS AGREEMENT shall commence October 1, 1985, and shall expire on <<December 31, 1990>> [[September 30 of each year unless renewed by Council prior to that time.]] THIS AGREEMENT shall be cancelled by either party upon a thirty (30) day notice of intent to do so. * Note: In the above quotation, language which has been added is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. All the contracts identified herein were between the City and Mr. Hebden personally. Mr. Hebden signed the contracts. Except as otherwise stated herein, the terms of the contracts were negotiated between Mr. Hebden and the City. Mr. Hebden performed all the responsibilities of the contract personally. For a brief period, he was assisted by a man identified as "Mr. Denman," a person employed by the City. He hired no assistants. Mr. Hebden performed his responsibilities according to practices and procedures he created. He was not provided instructions by the City on how to perform his tasks. The City provided no training to Mr. Hebden. Prior to terminating his tenure as City Treasurer, Mr. Hebden trained his successor in the practices and procedures Mr. Hebden had developed. At all times during Mr. Hebden's employment with the City, he worked the hours specified by the contracts in his office at City Hall. Mr. Hebden testified that he could not recall how his office hours had been determined. The space was provided by the City. The responsibilities of Mr. Hebden's position required utilization of city records, and it was therefore appropriate for such tasks to be performed in an office at City Hall. All furnishings for the office and materials used in performing his tasks were provided by the City. During the period between July 1979 and February 1991, Mr. Hebden submitted to the City statements for payment. Generally, the statements were submitted on a monthly basis. Mr. Hebden had no risk of profit or loss based on any actions of the City. He had no personal investment in the City. Mr. Hebden was paid according to the terms of the contract. He did not receive additional remuneration for his appearance at or participation in Council meetings, work sessions or committee meetings as directed by the Council or Mayor. In the first written contract, Mr. Hebden received a payment for "expenses" in addition to the monthly remuneration. Additionally, Mr. Hebden was reimbursed for personal expenses related to City business use of his car and his boat. Although only one formal performance evaluation was completed during his service, the contracts provide for annual review, except for the final contract which terminated Mr. Hebden's service to the City. Upon said termination, Mr. Hebden was paid for the accrued annual leave. Under the terms of the contract, Mr. Hebden's services could be terminated without penalty upon thirty days notice by either party. Mr. Hebden did not advertise his services to the general public, because he was not interested in taking on additional work, however, for a time, he provided accounting consulting services to the Indian Rocks Fire Control District and was compensated for his work. He also provided volunteer services to the Church of the Isles. During the period relevant to this proceeding Mr. Hebden held no business or occupational licenses. For the years 1979 through 1982, the City reported Mr. Hebden's compensation to the Internal Revenue Service Form by using IRS Form 1099-NEC, the form used to report "Nonemployee Compensation." For the years 1983 through 1991, the City reported Mr. Hebden's compensation to the Internal Revenue Service Form by using IRS Form 1099-MISC, the form used to report "Miscellaneous Compensation." The City did not provide health or life insurance coverage to Mr. Hebden. The City did not pay federal social security or withholding taxes for Mr. Hebden. The City did not provide or pay workers compensation benefits or unemployment benefits for Mr. Hebden. The City did not pay retirement contributions to the FRS for Mr. Hebden.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order determining that as City Treasurer of the City of Belleair Beach from July 1979 through February 1991, Robert K. Hebden was an employee of the City, and as such was a compulsory member of the Florida Retirement System for which contributions from the City are due. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 21st day of March, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 1994. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 93-6518 The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 3. Rejected, contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Mr. Hebden submitted invoices for payment as early as July, 1979. 11. Rejected, not supported by greater weight of the evidence. Because Mr. Hebden developed his own procedures for performing the duties of the City Treasurer, and trained his successor in performing the tasks of City Treasurer, it is not possible to conclude that Mr. Hebden's services were "not essential to the success or continuation of the City's operation." Rejected, irrelevant. Rejected, contrary to greater weight of evidence. Mr. Hebden testified on direct examination that he could not recall who chose the work hours set forth by contract. All contracts specify the hours to be worked. As to leave time, the first contract provided that such leave could be used only "at times mutually agreeable...." Subsequent contracts required annual leave to be used in four hour increments. Rejected, contrary to greater weight of evidence. Mr. Hebden testified that some auto and boat expenses had been reimbursed. First contract and invoices for payment through September 30, 1982 include payment of sums for "expenses." Rejected, contrary to greater weight of evidence. The contracts specify standard hours of employment and require attendance at meetings as directed by the Mayor and Council. The Respondent's assertion that Mr. Hebden "could make a profit or suffer a loss" is unsupported by credible evidence. Respondent The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 5. Rejected, as to employment status of Mr. Hebden's predecessor or successor as City Treasurer, irrelevant. 28, 30. Rejected, as to employment status of Mr. Hebden's successor as City Treasurer, irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Bldg. C 2639 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 William H. Lindner, Secretary Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Knight Building, Suite 312 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950 Thomas J Trask, Esquire Frazer, Hubbard, Brandt & Trask 595 Main Street Dunedin, Florida 34698 Jodi B. Jennings, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Petitioner’s reclassification and transfer from career service to the selected exempt service pursuant to Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes (2001), was valid and lawful. All citations are to Florida Statutes (2001) unless otherwise stated.
Findings Of Fact Prior to July 1, 2001, Petitioner was a career service employee of Respondent, for whom she had worked since 1988. On that date, Petitioner was involuntarily reclassified as a selected exempt employee of Respondent. Both before and after her reclassification, Petitioner’s job required her to act as a liaison and contract administrator for technical consulting contracts relating to Respondent’s information technology systems. Respondent contends that it reclassified Ms. Georgalis to selected exempt service in July 2001 as a result of amendments to Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statues. Consequently, the Section then read, in pertinent part, as follows: (2) EXEMPT POSITIONS.--The exempt positions that are not covered by this part include the following: * * * (x) Effective July 1, 2001, managerial employees, as defined in s. 447.203(4), confidential employees, as defined in s. 447.203(5), and supervisory employees who spend the majority of their time communicating with, motivating, training, and evaluating employees, and planning and directing employees' work, and who have the authority to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline subordinate employees or effectively recommend such action, including all employees serving as supervisors, administrators, and directors. Respondent reclassified all persons who were "Level VI managers and Level 5 supervisors" to select exempt service as a result of the content of Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes. Respondent did not confirm that the responsibilities and duties of the position occupied by Petitioner necessitated reclassification to select exempt employee status. Petitioner’s job duties were substantively different from other persons within the DP Level VI occupational group.1 Petitioner did not primarily oversee the work of Respondent's employees as required by the career service exemption. Moreover, she did not even oversee the work of non-governmental supplemental or augment persons who were providing services that could otherwise be provided by departmental employees, assuming such oversight is relevant to the statutory exemption. Petitioner's role was primarily that of liaison and coordinator between Respondent's management and end users of Respondent’s planned technology services, including Respondent's employees who would use the technology that was being developed, as well as construction companies and engineers outside Respondent's department who would ultimately use such technology in working on department's construction projects in the future. Another part of her duties was the administration of contracts between the Department and outside contractors, and in doing so she dealt with independent subcontractor technical consultants who had subcontracts with those outside contractors. These technical subcontractor consultants were not augment employees, and Petitioner was not knowledgeable enough to supervise them on a technical basis. In Petitioner's words, "They spoke an entirely different language." She presented them with broad goals formulated by higher management and served as the conduit to inform them as to whether their work product was acceptable to Respondent and other end users. Petitioner’s job description, both before and after her transfer, confirmed that her position was a “senior level career service data processing position.” She was not required to spend the majority of her time “communicating with, motivating, training, and evaluating employees, and planning and directing employees’ work.” Petitioner was only expected to spend approximately 10 percent of her time overseeing the work of the two state employees working in her area. As established by her testimony, Petitioner never spent more than 3 percent of her time supervising those state employees. Furthermore, the two state employees assigned to specialized technologies were supervised by another employee after the Summer of 2001. At hearing, Respondent's only witness, suggested that Petitioner spent 60 percent of her time supervising “employees,” but he did not know what percentage of that time was spent overseeing the work of career service employees. Testimony of Respondent's witness, Nelson Hill, in this regard is not credited in view of his admission that he was not housed in the Rhynne Building in 2001, where Petitioner was located, and thus had no first-hand knowledge of the day-to-day activities of Petitioner or the other persons working at that building. In any event, a majority of the persons which Hill contends were “supervised” by Petitioner (six out of eight) were not employees of Respondent, but were rather independent subcontractors whose services Respondent retained through contracts with outside third parties. These technical consultants were subcontractors under state approved contracts. They were not “hired” by Respondent. Further, they were not paid by the State, but were rather compensated pursuant to their agreement with the third party state contractor. They were not provided with any insurance, pension, unemployment or worker’s compensation benefits, but were instead treated as true independent contractors; and, most importantly, they were not protected by career service protections, as would have been required if they were indeed state employees. In sum, Respondent's position, as expounded by Hill at the final hearing, is that the application of the exemption provided in Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes, may be justifiably applied to Petitioner due to Petitioner's alleged oversight of the independent subcontractors even though they were not “employees” of Respondent.2 The evidence does not support a conclusion that Petitioner spent a majority of her time “supervising” anyone. Petitioner’s position description confirms that her contract administration activities consumed no more than 35 percent of her time. By that description, Petitioner was required to provide “daily direction of consultant activities” and “manage, direct, and supervise technical and administrative staff." In actuality, Petitioner spent less than 25 percent of her time in such activities. Petitioner spent the vast majority of her time gathering and transmitting information regarding technological and budgetary needs and facilitating the flow of information from the end users (i.e., Respondent's employees or outside construction contractors and engineers who would use the proposed technology) to Respondent management and back again. Any oversight provided by Petitioner to the technical consultants was exactly the same as that provided to other third-party companies with which Respondent had contracts. These outside companies and technical consultants were engaged by Respondent because they had the skill to achieve the goals that were presented to them within the budget that was established by Respondent. Petitioner's interaction with these persons was not “supervision” of a state employee, but rather “contract administration.” Petitioner’s position descriptions specifically confirm that she was not a “managerial” or “confidential” employee as that term is defined in Section 447.203(4) and (5), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, based on the duties and responsibilities contained in Petitioner’s position description and the actual duties she performed, there is no basis for concluding that Petitioner was subject to exemption from career service as concluded by Respondent in July 2001.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Department of Transportation should enter a final order finding that the position held by Petitioner Mavis R. Georgalis on July 1, 2001, was not properly classified into the selected exempt service. Petitioner was, and should continue to be, classified as a career service employee. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of July, 2004.
The Issue Whether Petitioner abandoned her position of employment and resigned from the career service.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Hermia Reid, began her employment with Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) on April 29, 1985. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, she was a registered nurse and held the career service position of Senior Registered Nurse Supervisor at the Landmark Learning Center, a DHRS facility. Petitioner had been given a copy of the DHRS Employee Handbook which contained the pertinent attendance and leave policies. Petitioner was on authorized annual leave for a vacation from June 25, 1990 through July 10, 1990. She was scheduled to return to work on July 11, 1990. For her vacation, Petitioner traveled to the State of New York to visit relatives. On July 1, 1990, Petitioner received injuries to her neck and back from an automobile accident. On July 2, 1990, Petitioner was examined by Dr. Victor Brooks, a physician whose office is in Yonkers, New York. Dr. Brooks determined that Petitioner required therapy and bed rest for three to four weeks. On Friday, July 6, 1990, Petitioner telephoned Claude Sherman, her supervisor, and told him of her injuries and of her inability to return to work as scheduled. Petitioner requested an extension of her leave. Mr. Sherman verbally granted a one-week extension of her authorized leave on the condition that Petitioner send him a letter from her doctor. On July 9, 1990, Petitioner returned to Dr. Brooks and received a note from him which he dated July 2, 1990, the date of the initial visit. This note provided in pertinent part as follows: The above named individual was in a motor vehicle accident and suffered neck and back injuries. Due to her present condition, it was decided that she should receive therapy and bed rest over a period of 3-4 weeks. On July 10, 1990, Petitioner gave the note from Dr. Brooks dated July 2, 1990, to her brother and asked him to mail it to Mr. Sherman by certified mail, return receipt requested. On July 20, 1990, Petitioner became concerned that the receipt for the certified mailing had not been returned and asked her brother about the mailing. Petitioner learned that her brother had forgotten to mail the note. Petitioner's brother mailed the note dated July 2, 1990, to Mr. Sherman on July 21, 1991. On July 30, 1990, Ulysses Davis and Mr. Sherman, as Superintendent and as Executive Nursing Director of Landmark, respectively, mailed to Petitioner at her home address in Miramar, Florida, a letter which had been dated July 23, 1990. This letter provided, in pertinent part, as follows: You have not called in or reported to work since July 10, 1990, and therefore you have abandoned your position as a Senior Registered Nurse Supervisor and are deemed to have resigned from the Career Service according to Chapter 22A-7.010(2)(a) of Personnel Rules and Regulations of the Career Service System. Your resignation will be effective on the date you receive this letter or on the date we receive the undelivered letter advising you of your abandonment. At the time the letter of July 23, 1990, was mailed to Petitioner, the note from Dr. Brooks dated July 2, 1990, had not been received by Mr. Sherman. Because Mr. Sherman did not receive a doctor's note from Petitioner prior to July 23, 1990, he did not authorize her leave after her authorized annual leave expired on July 11, 1990. Dr. Brook's note dated July 2, 1990, was received by Landmark on or about August 2, 1990. 1/ The letter from Mr. Sherman and Mr. Davis was mailed to Petitioner by certified mail, return receipt requested. Daphney Gaylord, Petitioner's neighbor, received this mailing on Petitioner's behalf and signed the return receipt. Petitioner did not receive the letter, nor was she made aware of its contents, until August 15, 1990. On July 27, 1990, Petitioner returned to Dr. Brooks and received another note which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The above named was examined by me today and as a result, I am requesting a follow up visit in two weeks as she is not ready to return to work. Dr. Brook's note of July 27, 1990, was mailed by certified mail to Mr. Sherman by Petitioner's brother on August 2, 1990, and was received by Mr. Sherman on August 6, 1990. After visiting Dr. Brooks on July 27, 1990, Petitioner attempted to reach Mr. Sherman by telephone to advise him of her status. Mr. Sherman was not available so Petitioner talked with Mr. Sherman's wife. Mrs. Sherman also worked at Landmark, but she was not Petitioner's supervisor. Mr. Sherman was unaware that Petitioner had spoken with his wife. On August 13, 1990, Dr. Brooks discharged Petitioner from his care and authorized her to return to work after she had visited her physician in Florida. Dr. Brook's note of August 13, 1990, provided, in pertinent part: As per previous notes and as per complete physical examination today it is my feeling that the above named can return to work after seeing her regular M.D. On August 14, 1990, Petitioner returned to Florida. On August 15, 1990, Petitioner was examined by Dr. Sylvia Cohn, a physician practicing in Pembroke Pines, Florida, who advised that Petitioner would be able to return to work on August 20, 1990. Also on August 15, 1990, Petitioner met with Mr. Sherman at Landmark. Mr. Sherman advised Petitioner that her employment had been terminated, asked whether she had received his letter dated July 23, 1990, and advised her to talk with Thelma Olifant, Landmark's personnel director. Petitioner went home after unsuccessfully attempting to locate Ms. Olifant. After she returned home on August 15, 1990, Petitioner contacted her neighbor, Ms. Gaylord, and received from her the certified letter from Mr. Sherman and Mr. Davis dated July 23, 1990. Petitioner had no history of discipline concerning abuse of leave policies. Petitioner did not intend to resign her position with the career service.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which finds that Petitioner did not abandon her career service position and which orders that Petitioner be reinstated with back-pay to her career service position with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of May, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 1991.
