The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully dismissed from his employment with the City of Clearwater.
Findings Of Fact On December 5, 1990, Truman Gooden was employed by the City of Clearwater as a truck driver and was assigned to pick up trash at Sand Key in Pinellas County. While driving the truck assigned to him on the beach below the high water line, the truck started to slide in loose sand, Gooden attempted to back and turn the truck away from the water, but was unsuccessful, and the truck slid into the water with the engine running. By the time Gooden extricated himself from the vehicle, the entire hood was under water (Exhibit X), the cab was full of water, and the engine was ruined. The total damage to the truck was approximately $22,000. Gooden reported the incident to his superior, and the vehicle was subsequently removed from the water by two tow trucks. Gooden testified that he had driven the truck in the same manner for several years performing the same tasks and had never encountered such a problem before. The tide was extremely low on December 5, 1990, and Gooden was driving the truck on the sand further seaward from the high water mark than normal. To perform the task, it was unnecessary for Gooden to drive very far seaward of the high water line, and Gooden's negligence in this regard was the proximate cause of the truck sliding into the water and becoming ruined. For this negligence, Gooden was assigned 20 disciplinary points. During the preceding two years prior to this incident, Gooden had received the following disciplinary actions for the following offenses: March 10, 1989 - counseling session: quitting work, wasting time March 23, 1989 - written warning: tardiness March 28, 1989 - 3 days suspension: unauthorized/ unexplained absenteeism April 4, 1989 - letter of reprimand: carelessness, vehicle accident June 20, 1989 - 4 days suspension: productivity not up to standards June 22, 1989 - less than satisfactory annual performance rating June 27, 1989 - letter notifying Gooden of accumulation of 60 points July 14, 1989 - letter of reprimand: vehicle accident Sept. 22, 1989 - less than satisfactory 3 month follow-up rating Nov. 13, 1989 - 6 days suspension: operating city vehicle without a license; failure to report lack of valid license April 16, 1990 - written warning: tardiness June 22, 1990 - less than satisfactory annual performance rating Aug. 10, 1990 - letter of reprimand: lack of personal hygiene Dec. 5, 1990 - current incident/recommendation for dismissal 10. At the time of the December 5, 1990 incident, Gooden had accumulated 60 disciplinary points and was given 20 disciplinary points for this incident. By letter dated January 27, 1989, Gooden was advised that he had accumulated 60 points since September 23, 1988, and any further disciplinary action within a 2-year time frame may be grounds for dismissal.
Recommendation It is recommended that a Final Order be entered sustaining the action of the City Manager in dismissing Truman Gooden from his position as truck driver for the City of Clearwater. ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED TO: TRUMAN GOODEN 1144 ENGMAN STREET CLEARWATER, FL 33615 CYNDI GOUDEAU, CLERK CITY OF CLEARWATER POST OFFICE BOX 4748 CLEARWATER, FL 34618-4748 MILES A. LANCE, ESQUIRE POST OFFICE BOX 4748 CLEARWATER, FL 34618-4748
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: On or about January 28, 1977, at approximately 2:00 P.M., respondent Spencer, Clarence Jones, and John Aaron were all on duty as employees of the petitioner. The three men were dressed in City work clothes and were riding in a small truck with a City of Clearwater emblem on the side. John Aaron was driving the truck. As the City truck approached the intersection of Jones Street and Garden Avenue in Clearwater at a speed of about 5 miles per hour, it came upon three teenage pedestrians -- two girls and a boy -- walking on the left side of the rode. Driver Aaron said "Hey, now" or "Hey baby" to one or both of the girls. One of the girls said something offensive in reply. At that point, respondent Spencer asked Aaron to stop the truck. After two or three such requests, Aaron stopped the truck and respondent Spencer got out. By this time, the three teenagers had begun to walk away from the truck into a vacant field. Respondent Spencer walked up to the teenagers and one of the girls called him a "nigger" and continued to walk away. Spencer testified that the same girl swung at him with her fist. Neither Aaron nor Jones saw the girl make any threatening gestures toward respondent. After respondent was called a "nigger," he removed his belt and hit the girl twice with the belt as she was walking away. Respondent then returned to the City truck and the three employees drove off. By a "termination and dismissal notice," respondent was advised that he was dismissed as an employee of the City of Clearwater for his activities occurring on January 28, 1977. As causes and reasons therefor, petitioner listed three violations of Rule 14 of the Civil Service Rules of Clearwater. (Exhibit 4) Respondent timely filed his answer and explanation to the charges, petitioner did not accept the same and respondent therefore requested a hearing pursuant to City Ordinance Number 1643, S2-38. Pursuant to a contract between the City of Clearwater and the Division of Administrative Hearings, the undersigned Hearing Officer was duly designated to conduct the hearing. By an Agreement between the parties dated June 7, 1977, the parties recognized the recent ruling of the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County (Civil Case No. 77-1023-7) which held invalid the referendum election amending the City's Civil Service System. Expressing doubt as to Whether the hearing should be held before the Civil Service Board or before a Hearing Officer appointed by said Board, the parties mutually agreed to waive any and all rights to a hearing before the Board, and to abide by the judgment rendered by the Board pursuant to the findings of the Hearing Officer pursuant to Ordinance Numbers 1643 and 1649, subject to the judicial review procedures established by law. (Exhibit 1)
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the respondent's dismissal by the City of Clearwater be upheld and AFFIRMED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 13th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frank X. Kowalski, Esquire Chief Assistant City Attorney Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 33518 Ronald E. Smith, Esquire 308 South Garden Avenue Clearwater, Florida 33516
Findings Of Fact On the evening of February 7, 1978 Officer Di Stasio stopped a vehicle driven by Michael Gross in the City of Clearwater. The primary reason for stopping this vehicle was that Gross had exited onto the main street from a side street and nearly collided with the car driven by Di Stasio. After stopping the vehicle Di Stasio questioned the driver regarding the registration of the vehicle, among other things, and although Gross could not produce the registration he did produce a Bill of Sale for the vehicle dated in 1976. Gross told Di Stasio that the car had been registered in his wife's name, that they were in the process of getting a divorce, and the registration was probably in the mail to him. The tag was from Kentucky, was bent and rusty, and was secured to the vehicle by wire. In lieu of citing Gross for driving with an invalid tag Di Stasio removed the tag from Gross's car and advised Gross that it was unlawful to drive the vehicle without a valid tag. Di Stasio subsequently threw the tag in the trash and made no report of the incident. The Clearwater police had a book showing the various states' automobile tags and expiration dates of these tags. Had Di Stasio radioed in for this information he would have learned that the tag on Gross' car had not expired. Police officers had been instructed regarding the existence of the book but Di Stasio apparently missed the training session when this Information was disseminated. The following morning on February 8, 1978 Gross appeared at the police station to inquire what he needed to do to drive his car. He related the instance of the previous evening to Captain Enlow of the Clearwater Police and when the latter could find no report of the incident called Gross at his home to come down to the police station. Di Stasio advised Captain Enlow that he thought the tag was invalid and therefore he removed it from the car. Although the tag had a `77 decal on it information in the police station indicated the tag was valid until March, 1978. Di Stasio took Gross to the tag office in the courthouse where he was able to obtain a temporary tag for the vehicle. As a result of Officer Di Stasio removing the tag and failing to maintain custody of the tag as required by police regulations he was suspended without pay for three days. Subsequent inquiries to Kentucky confirmed that the car was properly registered to Michael Gross and that the tag on the vehicle was a valid tag on February 8, 1978. Respondent's primary explanation for removing the tag from the vehicle was that Gross told him the tag had been placed on the vehicle to come to Florida and that it did not belong to the car. Gross was not a witness at this hearing and this testimony was rebutted by information in Exhibit 6 received from the Lexington, Kentucky Police. In defense of his actions in not securing the tag as required by Rule 73 when it came into his possession, Respondent produced several witnesses who testified that they had been instructed not to bring in partly filled beer cans or to remove whiskey from a motor vehicle when the driver was apprehended. None of these witnesses recalled any specific instance where a tag had been removed from a vehicle and not accounted for pursuant to Rule 73. Respondent contended that a police officer is given wide latitude to exercise discretion in the handling of property and as an example cited the instances when children's toys are left in the street and the police do not take this property into custody. The principal exception to the rule that property coming into the possession of a police officer is to be turned in to the property office involves the handling of alcoholic beverages which is not evidence.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Lori Goldston, was employed by the Petitioner, City of Clearwater, for approximately seven and one-half years as a Building Construction Inspector II. On April 13, 1994, Respondent was placed on administrative leave and on April 21, 1994, she was terminated and all pay and other benefits were terminated as of 4:00 p.m. on April 21, 1994. Specifically, Respondent was terminated for alleged violations of Rule 14, Sections 1(b), (d), (k), and (1) of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations of Respondent, to-wit: (b) Is incompetent in the performance of the specific duties of [her] position. (d) Has been careless or negligent in the care of the property of the City; or has participated in the unauthorized use thereof. Has been . . . guilty of conduct un- becoming a City employee defined as scandalous or disgraceful conduct while on or off duty where such conduct tends to embarrass the City or bring its service into public disrepute. Has violated any lawful and reasonable official regulation or order or failed to obey any lawful and reasonable direction made and given . . . by [her] superior officer when such violation or failure to obey amounts to insubordination or serious breach of discipline which may reasonably be expected to result in a lower morale in the department or to result in loss, inconvenience, or injury to the City or the public. During the week of April 4, 1994, Tom Chaplinsky received two complaints that a City vehicle was observed leaving the city limits with a magnetic sign covering the City seal. The complainants related that the driver appeared to be Respondent and that the vehicle was heading north on alternate route 19 when it was so observed. Vick Chadora, assistant central planning director, requested that Chaplinsky investigate the complaints. Chaplinsky along with Kevin Garriot, a building code analyst, initiated an investigation to check Respondent's inspection schedule and job sites for the day of April 11, 1994. Chadora and Chaplinsky reviewed Respondent's inspection schedules and job sites on April 11, 1994, and discovered that most of Respondent's inspections were completed by mid-morning. Chadora then instructed Chaplinsky to check Respondent's residence which is located north of Palm Harbor, approximately 8 to 10 miles outside of the city limits. During mid-morning on April 11, 1994, Chaplinsky parked near the end of the dead end street on which Respondent's residence is located. He saw what appeared to be her city vehicle but was unable to make a positive identification. On Tuesday, April 12, 1994, Chaplinsky again found that a majority of Respondent's inspections had been completed by mid-morning. Chaplinsky contacted her by radio at approximately 11:00 a.m., to determine her location and she replied that she was in Clearwater Beach. Chadora drove to the beach area while Chaplinsky and Garriot drove to Respondent's residence between 11:00 and 11:15 a.m. Messrs. Chaplinsky and Garriot parked at the entrance to the dead end street where Respondent resides and waited. At approximately 11:45 a.m., Chaplinsky and another staff assistant began trying to reach Respondent by radio. At approximately 12:55 p.m., Respondent answered her radio. At that time, Respondent was asked to investigate a complaint on the beach. At approximately 1:20 p.m., Messrs. Chaplinsky and Garriot observed Respondent in her city vehicle, with the City seal covered, leaving her neighborhood. They lost Respondent in traffic but later caught up with her at the site of the complaint. At that time, the City seal on her vehicle was no longer covered. On April 13, 1994, Messrs. Chaplinsky and Garriot again drove to Respondent's residence during mid-morning and waited at the entrance to her street. Respondent was observed leaving the City in the city vehicle with the City seal covered. At approximately 2:55 p.m. on April 13, 1994, with Messrs. Chaplinsky and Garriot present, Respondent was advised by Chadora that two people had complained that she was using her city vehicle with the City seal covered while leaving the city limits. Before Chadora could complete his inquiry, Respondent immediately denied that it was her. Upon Respondent's repeated and adamant denial, Chadora told her that he and Garriot has observed her leaving her residence on Tuesday, April 12 and Wednesday, April 13 in the City vehicle. Upon being confronted with that information, Respondent admitted that they had caught her in a lie and she admitted that she did leave the city limits in the city vehicle. Respondent indicated that she was trying to complete a construction project at home in order to re-finance and satisfy a balloon note which was coming due and the lender was insisting that certain renovations be completed prior to closing. During 1990, Respondent was disciplined for leaving the city limits and going to her home. At that time she was specifically advised that she should not leave the city limits to return home in the city vehicle without first obtaining permission from her supervisor. For that offense, Respondent was suspended for four days. Petitioner has a system of progressive discipline in effect which is utilized to discipline employees who engage in conduct contrary to the City's rules and regulations. An employee who violates the rules accumulates points under the disciplinary system. An employee who receives up to 60 points within a specified period (24 months), can be subjected to discharge. Respondent accumulated 140 points for the alleged infractions that she received for leaving the City limits during the days April 11-13, 1994. Petitioner also has a liberal sick leave policy which employees may avail by demonstrating need to use sick leave. Respondent did not advise Petitioner that she was suffering from any medical disability or other infirmity which would warrant the utilization of sick leave prior to her discharge. Respondent maintained that she failed to advise Petitioner of her need for sick leave -- she suffers from severe depression which is prompted by a chemical imbalance in her brain -- because she did not want other employees to know about her problems as she feared it would be common knowledge among her colleagues. Respondent attempted to show that she was being treated unfairly and more harshly than other employees had been treated for similar misconduct. Specifically, Respondent related an incident wherein an employee threw a temper tantrum during a grievance meeting, tossed a beeper against a bookcase and was generally insubordinate when he was questioned about an infraction. Petitioner explained that that employee "blew up" when he was confronted about a simple rule infraction and that employee was suspended as was Respondent when she was first disciplined for leaving the City in a vehicle without authorization in 1990. Respondent failed to show that she was treated more harshly or that she was the recipient of disparate treatment by Petitioner. Respondent demonstrated that the other employee was similarly treated when Petitioner was disciplined in 1990. Moreover, that employee was subjected to discharge when he later violated the city's rules and regulations (a drug offense-employee failed a urinalysis screen). Petitioner had no way of knowing prior to April 21, 1994, that Respondent requested or was otherwise in need of "an accommodation" due to her health in April of 1994.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order dismissing Respondent from her position of a Building Construction Inspector II effective April 21, 1994. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February 1995 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February 1995. APPENDIX The following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1, adopted as modified, paragraphs 2, 18, and 19, Recommended Order. Paragraph 3, rejected, unnecessary. Paragraph 4, adopted as modified, paragraph 18, Recommended Order. Paragraph 7, rejected, irrelevant. Paragraph 8, conclusionary and argument. Paragraph 11, adopted as modified, paragraph 22, Recommended Order. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 5, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraph 16, Recommended Order. Paragraph 8, rejected, irrelevant. Paragraph 11, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraphs 2, 14, and 19, Recommended Order. Paragraph 13, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Paragraphs 15 and 16, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraph 23, Recommended Order. Paragraph 17, adopted as modified, paragraphs 17-20, Recommended Order. Paragraph 18, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraph 23, Recommended Order. Paragraphs 19-22, rejected, irrelevant and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Miles A. Lance, Esquire Assistant City Attorney City of Clearwater Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618-4748 Robert McCormack, Esquire Prestige Professional Park 2655 McCormick Drive Clearwater, Florida 34619 Karleen DeBlaker City Clerk City of Clearwater P.O. Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618-4748
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses who observed and/or participated in each of the four episodes, the following facts are found: At all times material to the charges herein, respondent DeSantis was an on-duty Clearwater Police Department. officer, holding the rank of patrol sergeant. The respondent had been employed by the Clearwater Police Department since March 14, 1977. He was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on July 7, 1977, and was issued Certificate Number 02-18239. THE ANDERSON INCIDENT At approximately 8:00 p.m. on October 27, 1984, a radio dispatch was transmitted to Clearwater police officers advising that there was an armed black male in the area who had threatened that he was either going to get some money or someone would be hurt. Respondent observed a suspect, later identified as Harold Anderson, in front of a laundromat where three or four people were sitting in chairs. Respondent drove up to the laundromat, and observed Mr. Anderson walk inside. A woman and a child were inside the front area of the laundromat. Respondent followed Anderson into the laundromat and Anderson proceeded to walk the back area, keeping his back to the respondent. Assuming that Anderson had a gun in his hand and fearing a possible hostage situation with the woman and child, respondent drew his service revolver and informed Anderson that he was under arrest. With pistol drawn and facing Anderson's back, respondent made two attempts within the laundromat to take Anderson into custody. During the second attempt and while respondent's gun was placed on Anderson's spine, a struggle ensued near the front doorway. The struggle caused both the respondent and Anderson to fall, with Anderson on the bottom, upon the hood of a car parked outside the entryway to the laundromat. Sometime during the struggle, respondent was attempting to place his service revolver under Anderson's chin. Instead, the barrel of respondent's pistol went into Anderson's mouth, where it remained for between 20 and 40 seconds, causing Anderson to make choking and gagging sounds. Respondent's pistol was removed from Anderson's mouth after Anderson was handcuffed with the assistance of two other police officers. A loaded handgun was retrieved from the waistband of Anderson's trousers. Officer Kettel arrived on the scene as respondent and Anderson were struggling at the doorway of the laundromat. He observed that Anderson was resisting arrest and that respondent was attempting to calm Anderson down and to retrieve his gun. He recalled that respondent's pistol went into Anderson's mouth as they both landed on the car hood. Officer Watson was the third police officer to arrive. He did not observe the struggle between respondent and Anderson prior to the two reaching the hood of the parked car. When Watson arrived at the scene, Anderson was lying on his back on the car hood and respondent was holding a pistol in Anderson's mouth. Watson's testimony was conflicting as to the exact point in time that Anderson ceased to struggle and the point in time that the pistol was removed from his mouth. Until the point in time that Anderson was handcuffed and his loaded gun retrieved from him, respondent was in fear for his life. He admits that the barrel of his service revolver went into Anderson's mouth, but states that this was unintentional and that he could not remove it without endangering himself until he received assistance from other officers in subduing Anderson. The testimony of two civilian eyewitnesses to this incident was somewhat conflicting as to when the gun went into Anderson's mouth, when Anderson ceased resisting his arrest, and when the gun was removed from Anderson's mouth. There was no evidence that Mr. Anderson was injured as a result of respondent's revolver being inside his mouth. THE HEYWOOD INCIDENT On November 3, 1984, three police officers responded to a radio dispatch concerning an individual who had returned to a Maas Brothers department store armed with sticks and bricks after previously having had an altercation with the security guard there. The individual was Steve Heywood, a 19 year old black male, who had testified that he had returned to Maas Brothers "to defend himself" because the security guard had broken his necklace approximately one-half hour earlier in the evening. When respondent drove into the Maas Brothers parking lot, he observed five or six people standing near the doorway and saw Heywood, dressed only in shorts and tennis shoes, throw some bricks and sticks in a bush. Respondent got out of his cruiser and Heywood started walking away from him. Respondent told Heywood to "freeze" and to "hit the ground." Heywood took three or four more steps, then turned around quickly. At that point, respondent drew his service revolver. Heywood put his hands out or up, started pleading that he had done nothing and went down to the ground on his stomach, with his hands visible. Respondent then approached Heywood with his gun still pointing at him, put his knee on Heywood's back, and placed the barrel of his service revolver next to Heywood's head where it remained for a period of about 30 seconds until another officer handcuffed Heywood. While Heywood appeared excited or upset during this process, he did not fight or struggle. THE TRUBY INCIDENT On October 5, 1984, respondent and Reserve Officer Karen Jackson were dispatched to investigate a report of a fight at an apartment complex. Soon after the officers arrived, Paul Truty began creating a disturbance in the parking lot by shouting abusive and threatening remarks at a victim of a prior sexual abuse, her family and the police officers. Detective Margaret Jewett was also dispatched to the scene to assist the sexual a~use victim. When Truby refused to stop yelling obscenities and inciting the crowd, respondent told him he was under arrest. Truty then began to walk backwards away from the respondent. Respondent pounded his nightstick on the ground three or four times, demanding that Truby return, and Truby then turned and started walking between two apartment buildings. Respondent and Detective Jewett followed Truby a short distance and apprehended him. The respondent pushed Truby against a wall and Jewett placed handcuffs on Truby, securing his hands behind his back. The respondent and Detective Jewett each took one of Truby's arms and escorted him approximately fifty yards back to the respondent's police car. During the walk back to the car, Truby did not resist or struggle and was cooperative and submissive. From this point, there is conflicting evidence between respondent's recollection of events and the recollections of Reserve Officer Jackson and Detective Jewett. Respondent states that Truby was highly intoxicated at the time of his arrest and that he had to use his nightstick to keep Truby's spine stiff and steer him while they were walking back to the patrol car. Respondent explains that Truby stumbled near the car due to the presence of some concrete tire stops adjacent to the passenger side of the cruiser. Detective Jewett and Officer Jackson recall that respondent positioned his police baton parallel to Truby's spine and under his handcuffed hands. As Truby was beginning to enter the police cruiser, respondent intentionally pulled up on the lower end of the nightstick near the handcuffs, thus causing TruLy to stumble and fall off balance. According to these witnesses, respondent then made a sarcastic remark about Truby falling and subsequently pulled Truby up with the nightstick and placed him in the car. Detective Jewett stated that Truby may have been intoxicated. THE VONDERAU INCIDENT On the evening of October 5, 1984, Officer David Watson was dispatched to investigate a report of a domestic disturbance in a residential neighborhood. Officer Green was dispatched as a back-up officer. Upon arrival at the scene, the officers spoke to a very upset woman who told them that her son had done extensive damage to her home and had threatened her. The interior of the woman's home was in shambles. A neighbor led the son, later identified as John Vonderau, to the area of the street where the officers were. He was wearing no shirt and the officers believed he had been drinking. Vonderau exhibited bizzare behavior, marked bye dramatic swings of mood from calm and lethargic to aggressively pacing the street with clenched fists. Officer Watson was concerned that Vonderau could become violent, but he was unsure of his legal right to arrest him since no crime had been committed in Watson's presence. He considered taking Vonderau to a detoxification center or effecting an involuntary commitment to a treatment facility for the mentally ill, pursuant to the Baker Act. Being unsure of the legal ramifications of doing so, Watson radioed respondent, who was his superior on duty that evening, and asked him to come to the scene to advise on the proper course of action. Before respondent arrived, Officer Desrosiers drove by and Officer Watson requested that he stay because Vonderau appeared to be getting more agitated. When respondent and Reserve Officer Jackson arrived on the scene, Officers Watson, Green and Desrosiers were standing in the street in a loose circle around Vonderau, who was pacing back and forth. Officer Watson advised respondent that Vonderau had made death threats to his mother and had completely ramshackled her house. A decision was made that the officers would take Vonderau into custody as a Baker Act patient. When respondent and Watson began to approach Vonderau, he brushed against respondent's shoulder and then assumed a martial arts/karate-type stance, and said, "You'd better get your clubs out. You're going to need them." The officers all took out their police batons, and Vonderau continued to make karate- type motions. Officer Desrosiers was talking on his radio when Vonderau swung at him. Respondent thought Vonderau struck Desrosiers, but no contact was made. Vonderau also approached Officers Watson and Green in an aggressive fashion. When he turned away from Officer Watson, Watson struck Vonderau's leg with his police baton. Vonderau then ceased his crouched stance, stood erect, put his hands in the air and said, "You got me." Officer Watson then ordered Vonderau to get down on the ground. After hesitating momentarily, Vonderau then assumed a push-up position, facing the street and suspending himself with his feet and hands. Immediately after Officer Watson ordered Vonderau to lie flat on the street, the respondent struck a very hard blow with his police baton across Vonderau's shoulders, causing a welt. Vonderau then went immediately to the ground. Once Vonderau was down flat on the street, at least three of the officers quickly moved to securely hold him down and handcuff his hands behind his back. The fourth officer walked over to the police vehicle to retrieve a set of "flex cuffs" to place around Vonderau's legs. At some point, respondent drew his service revolver and, after Vonderau was down and was being handcuffed by the other officers, respondent held his gun to the back of Vonderau's neck behind his ear, while pushing his nightstick against Vonderau's neck. Vonderau had ceased resisting and being aggressive from the time he went flat on his stomach to the street. Respondent held the gun to Vonderau's neck or head for approximately thirty seconds, angrily telling him that if he moved, respondent would "blow his head off." After Vonderau was hand and leg cuffed, he was taken to the police station by Officers Watson and Desrosiers. The testimony is somewhat conflicting as to the exact point in time that respondent withdrew his service revolver from his holster. Respondent states, and the other officers present admit the possibility, that his pistol was drawn when Vonderau first assumed his karate-type stance and began swinging at the other officers. He further states that he thereafter attempted to place his pistol back in its holster, but, because his holster lining was torn, he had to hold it there. However, on cross- examination, respondent admitted that he intentionally placed his gun next to Vonderau's head because he felt he and the other officers were in jeopardy. Respondent felt that the placing of his service revolver against Vonderau's neck was effective in calming him down. All officers on the scene believed that Vonderau possessed knowledge of a martial art and that he was dangerous. However, officers Watson, Green, Desrosiers and Jackson agreed that Vonderau ceased to resist completely once he was flat on the ground on his stomach.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED THAT: Respondent Joseph DeSantis be dismissed as an employee of the Clearwater Police Department for utilizing excessive force during the arrests of Steve Heywood and John Vonderau, and that the Administrative Complaint filed by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 20th day of April, 1987. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer The Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway The Oakland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488 9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Louis Kwall, Esq. 133 N. Ft. Harrison Avenue Clearwater, FL 33516| Margot Pequignot, Esq. P.O. Box 1669 Clearwater, FL 3351 Robert G. Walker, Jr., Esq. P.O. Box 4748 Clearwater, FL 33516 Miles A. Lance, Esq. P.O. Box 4748 Clearwater, FL 33516 Joseph S. White, Esq. Florida Department of Law Enforcement P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 APPENDIX The proposed findings of fact submitted by each of the parties have been carefully considered and have been accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below: Petitioner, CJSTC 22. The evidence is unclear as to the number of officers holding Vonderau down. 40, 41 and 43. Rejected; not established by competent, substantial evidence. Rejected; not established by competent, substantial evidence. First sentence rejected; contrary to the evidence. 55. Rejected, contrary to the evidence. Petitioner, City of Clearwater (NOTE: Many of the City's proposed findings of fact constitute recitations or summaries of an individual's testimony. The following rejections of the proposed factual findings does not indicate that the cited witness did not so testify, but that said testimony was not sufficient, in light of other testimony, to support a factual finding.) 8(b) Rejected. 8(f) Rejected. 8(i)(2) Rejected, as contrary to the evidence. 8(i)(5) Rejected, as contrary to the evidence. 8(i)(6) Rejected, as contrary to the evidence. 8(i)(7) Rejected, as constituting a legal conclusion as opposed to a factual finding. 9(i) McKenna was accepted as an expert in the area of law enforcement standards. 9(k)(5) Rejected as a factual finding. 10(d)(l) Rejected, not established by competent, substantial evidence. 10(d)(3) Rejected, not established by competent, substantial evidence. 10(g)(3) & (i) Rejected, not established by competent, substantial evidence. Respondent (NOTE: Many of respondent's proposed factual findings constitute verbatim recitations of testimony. These are improper findings of fact and are rejected as such.) page 6, first Rejected, as contrary to the sentence of last evidence. paragraph page 24, second Rejected, not supported by full paragraph competent evidence. page 27, first Rejected, as contrary to the paragraph evidence. page 28A, last Rejected as irrelevant and paragraph immaterial to the issues in dispute. ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION, Petitioner, vs. DOAH Case Nos. 85-3698 86-0889 JOSEPH R. DESANTIS, CJSTC Case No. L-1703 Certificate Number: 02-18239 Respondent. /
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Fletcher Armour, should have been suspended by the Respondent, City of Clearwater, for a three-day period.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an employee of the City of Clearwater and was at the time pertinent to this hearing a meter reader for the city. He was suspended for a period of three (3) days beginning July 31, 1979, and ending August 2, 1979, for insubordination and a serious breach of discipline. In February, 1979, Petitioner Armour and his superior, Fred W. Lewis, Accounts Supervisor, discussed the Petitioner's planned vacation. The Petitioner requested six (6) consecutive days: June 28 and 29, 1979, for religious reasons, plus the following four (4) days. Although tentative written approval was given by Lewis, he warned the Petitioner that if a meter reader with seniority requested the same four (4) "non-religious" vacation days Lewis would have to accede to the request for the reason that there is a seniority policy in the Utilities Department of the City of Clearwater, and further that the department could not properly function with two (2) meter readers on vacation at the same time. Lewis told the Petitioner that the two (2) vacation days requested for religious purposes, June 28 and 29, would be granted regardless of seniority. Subsequent to this first meeting, a Mr. Henderson, a meter reader with seniority over Petitioner Armour, requested the same four (4) days desired by the Petitioner. To resolve this conflict of vacation schedules, Lewis called a meeting during early June, 1979, at which all meter readers were present, including Kim Kyler, a witness for Respondent at the hearing. According to the testimony of Lewis and Kyler, Lewis asked Petitioner Armour during the meeting what days he wanted to take off. Petitioner responded by stating he would take his first two (2) vacation days (June 28 and 29), but not the last four (4) days, and that he would postpone taking these four (4) days until sometime in December when he had two (2) weeks. He was then told that he was not entitled to two (2) weeks until after January 1, and therefore could not take the requested four (4) days in December. Lewis thereupon documented the vacation schedules of Petitioner Armour and Henderson accordingly, giving Henderson the last four (4) days he desired and had theretofore requested. Witness Kyler corroborated the testimony of Lewis. Petitioner Armour took off the four (4) days following the two (2) days leave granted that he had requested in February but was denied in June.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the three (3) days suspension of the Petitioner, Fletcher Armour, by the Respondent, City of Clearwater, be sustained. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of January, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Rick Griesinger, Esquire Assistant City Attorney City of Clearwater Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 33518 Mr. Fletcher Armour 535 Fairwood Avenue, #230 Post Office Box 794 Clearwater, Florida 33518
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Sammie Rayner, Respondent, was employed by the City of Clearwater as a customer service representative in the utility department. On February 11, 1992, Respondent needed to take her daughter to Seminole High School for a test and mentioned this to Joyce Griesel, Senior Customer Service Representative. The only city employees in the customer service section with authority to grant Respondent permission to leave the building on February 11, 1992, were John Scott, Utility Consumer Response Manager and Tim Bissonnette, Customer Service Supervisor. On the afternoon of February 11, 1992, Bissonnette was out of the office attending a conference; however, Scott was available. Bissonnette was Respondent's immediate supervisor, and Scott was over Bissonnette. Prior to October 1991, the Senior Customer Service Representative had authority to allow customer service representatives to leave the building for short periods. However, because of an incident in October 1991, this authority was removed from the Senior Customer Service Representative, and all employees were advised of the changed policy. Although Respondent denies that she was told that only Scott and Bissonnette could grant permission to leave the building, she did ask if Bissonnette was available before she departed the office around 3 p.m., on February 11, 1992. Respondent also contends that she asked Giesel for permission to leave, but Giesel denies that she gave such authorization, knowing full well that she had no such authority. Respondent was not given permission to leave the building on February 11 by Giesel.
The Issue Whether Respondent Wilton Hill committed the violations alleged in the Decision-Making Leave and Mandated EAP Referral notice; and, if so, the appropriate discipline that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The City is a municipality governed by a city council. A city manager oversees the City’s operations. On September 8, 2015, Petitioner hired Respondent to work as a senior systems programmer, which is categorized by the City as a “Classified” service position. The Clearwater Civil Service Board has adopted rules and regulations which govern the conduct of all City employees. Chapter 13 of the CSR provides the framework for suspending, demoting, and dismissing City employees. By correspondence dated February 22, 2021, Petitioner provided Respondent with what is commonly referred to as a “predetermination notice” and advised Respondent therein that it was believed that he “committed an offense warranting formal discipline.” The predetermination notice states, in material part, that Respondent violated “Integrity Standards, listed on page iv of the official PBMP manual, adopted by the City of Clearwater on February 15, 1998 and revised on July 1, 2014, to wit: [1] Violation of the provisions of Chapter 13, Section 3, of the City Civil Service Rules and Regulations[;] [and] [2] [d]ishonesty or untruthfulness or willful refusal to provide information or otherwise cooperate during an internal investigation or when directed to do so by competent authority.” The notice also specifically alleges that Respondent violated chapter 13, section 3(b), (f), and (l) of the CSR. The City seeks to discipline Respondent based on events that occurred on or about February 1, 2, 3, and 10, 2021, respectively. On February 24, 2021, Respondent met with the director of his department and presented his version of the events in question. Following the meeting, the City, by correspondence dated March 5, 2021, notified Respondent that he would be placed on “a two-day Decision-Making Leave and mandated EAP for ... violating the Clearwater PBMP Citywide Personal Responsibility, Integrity, and Excellence standards.” Performance and Behavior Management Program (PBMP) The City developed the PBMP in order “to provide a method of working with employees whose performance or behavior does not meet the City’s standards.” The philosophy of the program “is based upon the belief that, in most cases, employees can change behavior and improve performance when standards and expectations are clear and when employees are given opportunities to change.” Whenever practicable, “the City will provide intervention, coaching, and corrective guidance or counseling ... for employees ... in order to bring their performance or behavior up to standard.” The program recognizes, however, “that some behaviors that are serious and are direct violations of City Policy may warrant immediate disciplinary action up to and including termination.” According to the PBMP manual, there are three categories of performance and behavior: (1) Personal Responsibility; (2) Integrity; and (3) Excellence. As to each, the manual notes that: These categories are based on employees’ willingness or ability to meet standards of behavior or performance. Willingness refers to the employees’ decision to meet expectations, follow rules and policies, and perform work that meets efficiency and quality standards. Ability refers to the employees’ capability and skills in performing job tasks. The first two categories, Personal Responsibility and Integrity, are considered “will do” categories because they typically involve situations wherein the employee has a choice and makes a decision about whether or not to meet the standards. The third category, Excellence, is considered a “can do” category, because it most often refers to a situation where the employee is not able to perform up to standard because of a lack of resources, skill, or capability. City of Clearwater expectations for each of these three categories are stated below. Personal Responsibility (“Will Do” Issues) - City of Clearwater employees will be held personally accountable for the actions they take in meeting the customer service needs of the City and the community the organization serves. Employees are expected to take full responsibility for their conduct and job performance and exhibit commitment to fulfilling their responsibilities to the best of their ability. Integrity (“Value and Ethics” Issues) - As public employees representing the citizens of Clearwater, employees are expected to commit to the highest standards of personal and professional integrity. The City expects employees to communicate openly and continually demonstrate honesty, fairness, and respect for others. Employees should do what is ethically appropriate. Employees are expected to adhere to City policies. Excellence (“Performance/Can Do” Issues) - City of Clearwater employees have an obligation to provide the highest quality of service and results to our customers. This commitment to excellence involves developing the job knowledge and skills needed to perform the tasks required and to continually improve the City’s ability to meet the needs of the community we serve. The PBMP manual generally lists 75 Personal Responsibility Standards, 14 Integrity Standards, and 41 Excellence Standards. Regarding the Integrity Standards, the PBMP manual notes in bold print that “immediate formal discipline, up to and including termination, may be recommended” for a violation of these standards. The PBMP manual does not set forth any such illumination for the other standards. As previously noted, the City contends that Respondent violated several of the PBMP Integrity Standards and should therefore be subjected to formal discipline. Background – Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) Respondent suffers from a serious medical condition that occasionally impacts his ability to perform his job. Under the City’s policy related to FMLA, an employee may intermittently take leave under FMLA “whenever medically necessary … because the employee is seriously ill and unable to work.” The policy also instructs that “[e]mployees should make a reasonable effort to schedule intermittent leave as to not unduly disrupt office operations.” Because of Respondent’s underlying medical condition, Petitioner, since at least November 2020, has allowed Respondent “4 [to] 5 episodes per month” during which Respondent can take FMLA leave without having to submit documentation related to the same. As a practical matter, this means that when Respondent experiences a medical episode that impairs his ability to work, he is to contact his supervisor, if possible, and let the supervisor know that he is utilizing FMLA leave for his anticipated absence from work. Herein lies “the rub” in the instant dispute. Respondent’s Understanding of Leave Protocol According to the City’s governing manual for supervisory, administrative, managerial, and professional employees (SAMP), “Classified employees who have successfully completed an initial probationary period become certified to regular employment status and have certain rights of appeal through the Civil Service grievance process.” The SAMP manual also provides that “Classified SAMP employees will not be disciplined except for just cause.” Section 2 of the SAMP manual provides that “Classified SAMP employees must obtain approval from a person of competent authority prior to working any hours outside of their established work schedule, either before their designated starting time or after their designated quitting time or during an unpaid meal period. Chapter 22, section 1, of the CSR provides as follows: Normal Work Hours -- The number of hours constituting a regular schedule work week for City Employees is specified by the City and excludes meal periods. In positions requiring shift work, the City reserves the right to include meal periods as actual time worked. Regularly scheduled work hours may be adjusted or “flexed” within a specific work week with proper notification and at the mutual convenience of the employee and the respective department. Such adjustments or flexing of work hours must be approved in advance by the respective department…. Chapter 4 of the CSR defines “flex time” as “the process whereby an employee’s regularly scheduled hours of work within a specific workweek are adjusted with proper notification and at the mutual convenience of the employee and the respective department. Such flexing of work hours must be approved in advance by the respective department….” Respondent, at all times material hereto, understood that he was to first contact his supervisor before taking time off related to a medical episode. Evidence of Respondent’s understanding is illustrated in emails that he sent to his supervisor on December 2 and 31, 2020. February 1 and 2, 2021 Sometime around January 2021, the City implemented a number of workplace measures designed to mitigate the risk of contracting and spreading the COVID-19 virus. One such mitigation effort allowed employees “to work from home on their assigned remote day.” During February 2021, Tuesdays were Respondent’s assigned days to telecommute. On Monday, February 1, 2021, the following emails were exchanged between Respondent and his supervisor: From: Williams, Jeremy Sent: Monday, February 1, 2021 (2:12 p.m.) To: Hill, Lloyd Subject: Feb 01, 2021 Hi Lloyd, Where are you? Thanks, Jeremy From: Hill, Lloyd Sent: Monday, February 1, 2021 (2:15 p.m.) To: Williams, Jeremy Subject: Feb 01, 2021 At lunch From: Hill, Lloyd Sent: Monday, February 1, 2021 (2:21 p.m.) To: Williams, Jeremy Subject: Feb 01, 2021 Precisely; (Respondent provided the email address for the auto/electronics store where he was located) From: Williams, Jeremy Sent: Monday, February 1, 2021 (4:00 p.m.) To: Hill, Lloyd Subject: Feb 01, 2021 Can you confirm what time you arrived today? From: Hill, Lloyd Sent: Monday, February 1, 2021 (4:04 p.m.) To: Williams, Jeremy Subject: Feb 01, 2021 Is anyone else required to confirm their time today? From: Williams, Jeremy Sent: Monday, February 1, 2021 (4:08 p.m.) To: Hill, Lloyd Subject: Feb 01, 2021 I put the timesheets on your desk for time entry this AM and noticed that your laptop was not here and your desk looked to be unoccupied, at 2:30 your desk looked the same. We need to make sure to charge your time correctly, so if you had an appointment not reflected on my calendar I need to update it. Please confirm your arrival time, and how long of a lunch you took for my records please. Thank you, Jeremy On Tuesday, February 2, 2021, Respondent and his supervisor exchanged additional emails regarding Respondent’s absence from work: From: Williams, Jeremy Sent: Tuesday, February 2, 2021 (10:21 a.m.) To: Hill, Lloyd Subject: Feb 01, 2021 Hi Lloyd, Can you confirm your times for yesterday as I requested please? Thank you, Jeremy Soon after sending the email to Respondent at 10:21 a.m., on February 2, 2021, Mr. Williams met with Respondent via videoconference. During the videoconference, Mr. Williams again asked Respondent about his whereabouts and arrival time to the office on February 1, 2021. Mr. Williams credibly testified that Respondent, in response to his inquiry, became argumentative by wanting to know if other employees where being questioned about their whereabouts and arrival time to work. Respondent never answered the questions posed to him by Mr. Williams, but instead, advised Mr. Williams that his time away from the office on February 1, 2021, should be charged as one of his monthly FMLA episodes. Mr. Williams was confused by Respondent’s request, in part, because Respondent was requesting FMLA leave that covered time when Respondent actually performed certain work-related tasks, albeit via unauthorized telecommuting. Shortly after the videoconference ended, Respondent and Mr. Williams had additional discussions regarding the matter as reflected in the following emails: From: Hill, Lloyd Sent: Tuesday, February 2, 2021 (11:12 a.m.) To: Williams, Jeremy Subject: Re: Lloyd - ? 5.0hrs I am using this as one episode of FMLA. My [redacted] was too high to drive. I am notifying you after the incapacity has passed as allowed by law. From: Williams, Jeremy Sent: Tuesday, February 2, 2021 (11:32 a.m.) To: Hill, Lloyd Subject: Re: Lloyd - ? 5.0hrs Hi Lloyd, We will need to refer to HR as to what is allowed. I will update this outage once we hear back from them. Thank you, Jeremy From: Hill, Lloyd Sent: Tuesday, February 2, 2021 (11:35 a.m.) To: Williams, Jeremy Subject: Re: Lloyd - ? 5.0hrs To be clear, I have notified you that I was incapacitated due to an underlying condition covered by my FMLA on the morning of February 1st. From: Williams, Jeremy Sent: Tuesday, February 2, 2021 (11:37 a.m.) To: Hill, Lloyd Subject: Re: Lloyd - ? 5.0hrs Hi Lloyd, I only have record of your FMLA request for the AM of 2/1/2021 on a video call that occurred on 2/2/2021. Can you send me the notification that you sent me on the 1st indicating this? It[’s] possible that I missed it. Thanks, Jeremy From: Hill, Lloyd Sent: Tuesday, February 2, 2021 (12:14 p.m.) To: Williams, Jeremy Subject: Re: Lloyd - ? 5.0hrs I think you missed it. I don’t have a copy. From: Williams, Jeremy Sent: Tuesday, February 2, 2021 (12:46 p.m.) To: Hill, Lloyd Subject: Re: Lloyd - ? 5.0hrs Hi Lloyd, This doesn’t make any sense. Either you requested the time or you didn’t. If you don’t have a record, you didn’t request it. I certainly did not receive anything. I have re-reviewed my emails, teams and sms and see nothing from you indicating that you would be out of the office on Monday (2/1/21) morning and early afternoon. We will confer with HR as to what we can use to charge your time. Thank you, Jeremy As previously mentioned, the City, on or about February 22, 2021, informed Respondent that it intended to suspend him for two days. In response to the City’s notice of disciplinary suspension, Respondent stated the following with respect to matters that transpired on February 2 and 3, 2021: On February 1, 2021, I began working from home at about 7 AM. I typically log on the server in the morning before leaving for work to check on emails and overall functioning of all systems, as well as respond to the system users. Due to severe anxiety arising out of my continuing concern over the risk to my health posed by the pandemic as well [as] the ongoing dispute with the City over my ADA reasonable accommodation request to telecommute, I experienced [redacted] symptoms. My first … reading taken was [redacted] putting me in the range of an ... emergency. As such, I decided to remain at home and continue to work. I did not feel safe to drive to the office and kept monitoring my [redacted] to determine whether I needed to go to the emergency room. When my readings returned to a safe level, I arrived at the office later that day around 3 PM. My manager acknowledged my presence because I walked past his office several times. I am more than willing to provide documentation of the ... readings I took that day. On February 2, 2021, I had a video meeting with my manager and explained to him the stress that I was experiencing. At that time, I requested 5 hours of leave (against my available intermittent FMLA leave) because he would not consider time I spent at home earlier that day as hours worked, despite the fact that I performed my job duties during that period. Respondent’s suggestion of incapacity is not supported by the evidence. By his own admission, Respondent, on the morning of Monday, February 1, 2021, was able to log onto the City’s server which allowed him to “check on emails and overall functioning of all systems, as well as respond to the system users.” Respondent also admits that after his first elevated reading he decided to “remain at home and continue to work” because he did not “feel safe to drive.” The issue is not whether Respondent felt well enough to drive, but whether he felt well enough to send an email. If Respondent felt well enough to “respond to the system users, and continue to work,” then he was certainly capable of sending an email to his supervisor. There is no credible evidence that Respondent suffered from any form or type of medical condition on the morning of February 1, 2021, which prevented him from notifying his employer that he was taking an “episode” of FMLA leave for the workhours in question. It is undisputed that Monday, February 1, 2021, was not Respondent’s designated day to telecommute. Chapter 12, section 1, of the CSR clearly provides that the City determines normal work hours for its employees, and that employee-initiated changes to the normal work hours “must be approved in advance.” The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Respondent was not authorized to telecommute on Monday, February 1, 2021, and that he did so in violation of the CSR and SAMP manual. Respondent’s assertion that he did not violate City rules and regulations “because he performed [his] job duties” while at home on February 1, 2021, is irrelevant because, as noted above, he lacked authority to telecommute on the day in question. February 3, 2021 Respondent reported to work on February 3, 2021, and worked until leaving the building at 1:30 p.m. Respondent did not return to work on this date and several hours later initiated the following email chain with his supervisor: From: Hill, Lloyd Sent: Wednesday, February 3, 2021 (4:27 p.m.) To: Williams, Jeremy Subject: One FMLA Episode From Now Till Tomorrow [There was nothing written below the subject line]. From: Williams, Jeremy Sent: Wednesday, February 3, 2021 (5:13 p.m.) To: Hill, Lloyd Subject: RE: One FMLA Episode From Now Till Tomorrow I have you down for Tomorrow in the AM, you’ll confirm with me the specific amount of time when you get in. See you tomorrow, Jeremy From: Williams, Jeremy Sent: Wednesday, February 3, 2021 (5:21 p.m.) To: Hill, Lloyd Subject: RE: One FMLA Episode From Now Till Tomorrow Hi Lloyd, Did you mean to say that you took off work at 4:30 p.m. today (using FMLA)? I stopped by your desk to clarify what you meant by this email, you weren’t there (5:20 p.m.). Office 365 saw you last at 4:48 p.m. I’m pretty confused if you can clarify, I’d appreciate it. Thank you, Jeremy From: Hill, Lloyd Sent: Wednesday, February 3, 2021 (5:47 p.m.) To: Williams, Jeremy Subject: One FMLA Episode From Now Till Tomorrow Correct Before Respondent prematurely ended his workday on February 3, 2021, he had been assigned that morning to provide IT support services for the City’s recreation centers. Mr. Milou Louis, who worked as senior systems programmer at the City’s recreation centers, was retiring from employment with the City, and Respondent, because of his availability and skill set, was tasked with replacing Mr. Louis. In explaining his actions related to his early departure from work on February 3, 2021, Respondent stated the following: On February 3, 2021, I was informed that I was required to be on-site at the City’s Parks & Rec centers where COVID-19 infection rates were among some of the highest for City employees. Notably, this documented infection rate does not consider infected members of the public who may use the centers. I immediately informed my manager, who rendered his lay opinion that I was at no higher risk than anyone else. Notably, I had not previously been assigned to be on-site, let alone during a pandemic. Thereafter, I suffered a sever anxiety attack because I legitimately feared for my health. At that point I left the building. Management told me I left at 1:30 PM. I contacted my supervisor at around 4 PM informing him I would take available FMLA leave for the rest of the day. As an initial matter, there is no credible evidence of record that Respondent’s particular work environment at the recreation centers would have been any more at risk for COVID-19 exposure than his regular work environment, or say, the electronics store where Respondent stopped during his lunch break on February 1, 2021. During Respondent’s email exchange with his supervisor on February 3, 2021, Mr. Williams clearly communicated to Respondent that he was confused about Respondent’s FMLA leave request. Respondent, despite having the opportunity to do so, never sought to clarify his leave request, and, for whatever reason, chose not to correct Mr. Williams’ erroneous belief that Respondent left work at 4:30 p.m., when all the while Respondent knew that he actually left work several hours earlier at 1:30 p.m. With respect to the events of February 3, 2021, the evidence establishes that Respondent violated City rules and regulations by failing to inform his supervisor of his early departure from work under circumstances where he clearly had the opportunity to do so. Also, as noted above, the email that Respondent sent at 4:30 p.m., on February 3, 2021, advised that Respondent was taking “One FMLA Episode From Now Till Tomorrow.” Because Respondent’s email was misleading as to when he actually left work, Respondent actually had a three-hour unauthorized absence from work (i.e., from 1:30 p.m. to 4:40 p.m.) and misled his supervisor as to the amount of FMLA leave that was being requested. February 10, 2021 On February 10, 2021, Respondent reported to work at his scheduled time and then left the office from 2:00 p.m. to 4:40 p.m. When asked by his department supervisor to account for the missing time, Respondent could not do so and instead elected to quibble with his supervisor about whether his authorized lunch break was 30 minutes or one hour in duration. Respondent’s unauthorized leave was charged against his accrued vacation hours.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Owen Kohler, Esquire City of Clearwater 600 Cleveland Street, Suite 600 Clearwater, Florida 33755 For Respondent: Richard Michael Pierro, Esquire Calciano Pierro, PLLC 146 Second Street North, Suite 304 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that that the Civil Service Board of the City of Clearwater enter a final determination suspending without pay Respondent’s employment for a period of two days. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Owen Kohler, Esquire City of Clearwater 600 Cleveland Street, Suite 600 Clearwater, Florida 33755 Rosemarie Call, City Clerk City of Clearwater Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 33758-4748 Richard Michael Pierro, Esquire Calciano Pierro, PLLC 146 Second Street North, Suite 304 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner in this action is the City of Clearwater, Florida, a municipality in the State of Florida which provides governmental services to the citizens within that community, to include police protection. It has among other powers, the power to hire and dismiss employees and in keeping with that authority, the City has enacted Ordinance No. 1831, pursuant to Chapter 21153, Special Laws of Florida, 1941. This ordinance deals with a career civil service system for employees of the City of Clearwater and it sets forth the rights which an employee would have if that employee had been accused of misconduct. A subunit within the City of Clearwater is the Clearwater Police Department which has rules and regulations which would apply to the employees within that Department. This case concerns charges placed by the Petitioner, City of Clearwater, against the Respondent, Danny Fivecoat, who held the position of Sergeant in the Clearwater Police Department on July 25, 1980. Those charges placed under the terms and conditions of a "Termination Dismissal Notice" which may be found as Joint Exhibit No. 3, admitted into evidence, set forth the accusations as alluded to in the Issues statement of this Recommended Order. The termination and dismissal notice was placed against the Respondent on December 15, 1980, when he was relieved as a police officer and dismissed from employment with the City of Clearwater. This action was taken in keeping with the authority of City of Clearwater Ordinance No. 1831 and pursuant to Rule 14, Section 6, Civil Service Rules of Clearwater, Florida. Subsequently, the Respondent attempted to explain and answer the charges and specification placed against him, but the explanation and answer were found to be insufficient by the appointing authority, City Manager, City of Clearwater, Florida, and pursuant to the terms and conditions of City of Clearwater Ordinance No. 1831, Section 2-38, the Respondent requested a formal hearing to be held before the Division of Administrative Hearings. That formal hearing was held in keeping with the terms of the aforementioned ordinance and the agreement between the City of Clearwater and the Division of Administrative Hearings to provide a Hearing Officer for these matters. See also Subsection 120.65(6), Florida Statutes. The hearing in this cause was conducted on March 25, 1981. In July, 1980, while employed as a sergeant in the Clearwater Police Department, the Respondent was assigned as supervisor of a TAC unit. Within that unit were five (5) or six (6) subordinate officers to the Respondent. One of the duties of the TAC unit in July, 1980, concerned an effort to ascertain the identity of a person or persons who were suspected of committing the felony offenses of burglary and arson at a commercial premises now known as Gulf Branch Saloon and formerly known as Bobby Sands 60. This bar was located on State Road 60 within the corporate limits of the City of Clearwater, Florida. To apprehend the offenders, Fivecoat established a surveillance network in the area of the bar location. The rough details of that network may be seen as Employee's Exhibit No. 6, admitted into evidence, which is a sketch, not to scale, depicting surveillance locations in July, 1980, and in particular, on July 25, through July 27, 1980. The numbers 1, 2 and 3 depict surveillance points of members of the TAC unit who were on foot. The word van indicates the location of the command post of the surveillance unit and in addition, there were two unmarked automobiles that were east and west of the location of the bar. These locations are not depicted with any particularity. The primary surveillance was being conducted by the three individuals shown by the numbers on Employee's Exhibit No. 6, with the idea being that from the three locations, the entire bar area could be surveilled. The van served as a command post and a rallying point for the officers on the surveillance team and was used as a location for taking breaks and meals while on the surveillance assignment. Those persons in the outlying surveillance posts would come to the van to take breaks and to have their meals after being relieved by Respondent and an Officer Adamson. Officer Adamson was assigned to drive the van and to assist Sergeant Fivecoat. The van itself was not equipped as a police unit per se, it was unmarked and did not have police emergency lights or sirens or communications equipment and was not designed for pursuit responsibility, although it had been used as mobile surveillance and on occasion, Officer Adamson had attempted to use it as a pursuit vehicle. The Respondent did not find it to be an appropriate pursuit vehicle, he did, however, feel that it could be used as mobile surveillance and as an apparatus for blocking suspects who were fleeing a scene of a crime in an automobile. The van had two front seats and other additional seating that had been placed there by arrangement of members of the TAC unit and it contained bicycles to be utilized for transportation in the area of a surveillance setting. The van was not primarily used for the surveillance, but it did allow a view of the west side of the subject bar and this observation was principally the assignment of Officer Adamson. On the evening of July 25, 1980, prior to setting up the surveillance operation alluded to herein, the Respondent and members of his unit went to a local restaurant in Clearwater, Florida, to have dinner and to discuss the plans of operation for that evening. While at the restaurant, the Respondent and one Kim Dubois, an employee in the State Attorney's Office which has jurisdiction in Clearwater, Florida, engaged in a conversation through which the woman Dubois determined that the surveillance activities were ongoing, specifically that the Respondent could be found in the parking lot of the Western Sizzler on State Road 60 later on that evening. In the course of this conversation, Fivecoat let it be known that it would be acceptable for Dubois to come to the stakeout and carry on a conversation while the surveillance was ongoing. Between 2:45 A.M. and 3:00 A.M., on July 26, 1980, Kim Dubois and one Diana Scanlan, another employee of the same State Attorney's Office, went to the location of the van in the Western Sizzler parking lot. At that time, the surveillance operations had been underway for a period of approximately an hour and forty-five minutes. The two women sat in their automobile and talked to Sergeant Fivecoat and Officer Adamson who were seated in the van. Fivecoat was on the passenger side of the van. At times the women were outside their car talking to the officers who remained in the van. Other officers who were on the surveillance team came to the van while the women were present and Officers other than Adamson and Fivecoat entered into conversation with the women. The two women remained in the area of the van engaging in a conversation until around 5:00 to 5:30 A.M., at which point they left the area of the surveillance and the members of the surveillance team left shortly thereafter. Nothing other than the conversation between the women and Respondent and other members of his team took place and no burglary or other incident occurred which required police intervention. Neither Fivecoat nor other members of his team asked the women to leave the area of their surveillance. While these events were going on, cars were operating on State Road 60 and at times, other persons were in the parking lot of the Western Sizzler eating establishment. None of the officers were wearing police uniforms on this occasion nor were they in uniform on the night of July 26, 1980, in the early morning hours of July 27, 1980. Again, in the early morning hours, around 2:45 to 3:00 A.M., July 27, 1980, the women came to the location of the van in the parking lot of the Western Sizzler where the Respondent and Officer Adamson were located. The surveillance team members were located in approximately the same positions as depicted in Employee's Exhibit No. 6. Initially, the women sat in their car and talked to the Respondent and Officer Adamson who were seated in the van, until the police officers ran out of soft drinks and the women departed and brought soft drinks back to the police officers in the van. The drinks were given to the officers and the women were allowed in the van, into the back part of that vehicle. While they were inside, the side cargo door remained open and no other matters transpired between the women and the police officers other than conversation between them. Sergeant Fivecoat never indicated that the women should not be in the van and the women were lead to believe that it was acceptable for them to be inside. The women remained in the van for approximately an hour and left the scene of the surveillance around 5:00 to 5:30 A.M. and the Respondent and members of his team concluded the surveillance shortly thereafter. Again, the pattern of traffic on State Road 60 and in the Western Sizzler parking lot was essentially the same as the evening and morning before and no criminal violation occurred which required the action of the police officers in the TAC unit. Had such activity occurred as was the expectation of sergeant Fivecoat, the members of the TAC team outside the van proper would have been primarily responsible for enforcement and he and Adamson were mostly responsible for relieving those officers during breaks. Nonetheless, Sergeant Fivecoat was the overall supervisor and responsible for the surveillance operation in question. On the second night and morning, other officers came to the van and entered into conversation with the women. On the second morning and evening, neither Sergeant Fivecoat nor any members of the TAC unit asked the women to leave the area of the surveillance. Sergeant Fivecoat knew that the presence of the two women at the TAC command post was in violation of the prohibition against their presence as set out in Rule 23, Rules and Regulations of the City of Clearwater Police Department.
Recommendation The Respondent's Composite Exhibit No. 5, admitted into evidence, is a compilation of fitness reports and other items related to the Respondent's performance as a police officer. These items are taken from the personnel file of the Respondent as administered by the Petitioner. With the exception of the incident occurring in June, 1977, related to a liaison of a sexual nature between the Respondent and a female which occurred in the months of March or April, 1977, for which the Respondent was given a ten-day suspension, the Respondent has not been disciplined in the past and has an acceptable record. The details of the other disciplinary action may be found in the Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. The actions of Sergeant Fivecoat, as set forth in this Recommended Order, related to the incident involving the two civilian females is reprehensible and having occurred with the knowledge of Sergeant Fivecoat that he was committing a violation is inexcusable. Nonetheless, it is not of such magnitude that it would warrant the ultimate imposition of the penalty of dismissal as would be contended for by the City Manager, City of Clearwater. Likewise, the recommendation of demotion from Sergeant to patrolman and a five (5) day suspension as made by the interim Police Chief would seem too lenient. Under the circumstances, the recommendation herein would be that Sergeant Danny J. Fivecoat be reduced in grade to patrolman and be suspended for a period of thirty (30) days to run from the entry of a final order in this cause. 1/ DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of April, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 1981.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Studebaker's Restaurant (Respondent), owns a 50's theme bar in Clearwater which offers entertainment and dancing and serves alcoholic beverages and food. Studebaker's has a nationwide policy, also followed at the Clearwater establishment, of restricting admittance to persons aged 23 and older. In the same building housing the Clearwater Studebaker's, Respondent also owns and operates a theme bar called the Palm Beach Club which is under common management and which is operated like Studebaker's except that the theme and music is contemporary and anyone who has attained the legal drinking age is allowed admittance. Petitioner, Ronald M. McElrath, is the coordinator for the Community Relations Board established under Chapter 99 of the City of Clearwater Code. He is approximately 38 years of age. In May or June 1985, McElrath witnessed an employee of the Clearwater Studebaker's refusing admission to a female on the basis that she was not at least 23 years of age. Investigating further, McElrath verified through the manager of the Clearwater Studebaker's that Respondent did have a policy restricting admission to the Clearwater Studebaker's to persons at least 23 years of age. Based on McElrath's knowledge and information, McElrath and the Community Relations Board attempted to conciliate with Respondent the alleged conflict between Respondent's age policy at the Clearwater Studebaker's and Chapter 99 of the City of Clearwater Code. By November 13, 1985, McElrath and the Community Relations Board concluded that their attempts at conciliation would not be successful, and the Community Relations Board filed a charge of discrimination against Respondent. That charge of discrimination was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned Case No. 85-3513. On or about February 11, 1986, Case No. 85-3513 was dismissed and the file closed based upon the Community Relations Board's report that it was withdrawing its petition in the case and that an individual other than the Community Relations Board would file a separate petition as Charging Party. Actually, on or about January 9, 1986, McElrath, in his capacity as coordinator for the Community Relations Board, had filed a Supplemental Charge Of Discrimination against Respondent on the same alleged facts that formed the basis of Case No. 85-3513. McElrath's Supplemental Charge Of Discrimination was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings on or about February 4, 1986, resulting in this case. McElrath has never attempted to file any other complaint under Chapter 99 of the City of Clearwater Code in his capacity as coordinator for the Community Relations Board. Because no further investigation was necessary and no further attempts to conciliate were reasonably likely to succeed, McElrath made no further investigation and made no further attempts to conciliate with Respondent after filing the Supplemental Charge Of Discrimination. Before filing of the Supplemental Charge Of Discrimination in this case, McElrath did not make a formal probable cause determination and did not serve notice of determination of probable cause on the Respondent. Respondent and its management has a commendable and appropriately implemented policy of being a responsible seller of alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises. However, contrary to Respondent's assertions in this case, the policy of allowing only persons 23 years of age and older in the Clearwater Studebaker's is not significantly motivated by a desire to reduce alcohol-related traffic accidents. The primary motivation for the age limit is to establish and maintain an economically successful theme bar. Any contribution towards reducing alcohol related traffic accidents is an after thought rationalization. This was proven by Respondent's willingness to divert patrons younger than 23 next door to its Palm Beach Club where Respondent willingly serves them alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises.