Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and operates a Citgo Food Mart in Naples at which it sells gasoline and diesel fuel at retail, provides limited motor vehicle service, and sells food and beverage items. Petitioner issued Respondent retail dealer's fuel license #21- 000828, which authorizes Respondent to sell motor fuel at retail and requires Respondent to collect and remit to Petitioner motor fuel taxes. The principal of Respondent is Jack Stellman. He caused Respondent to purchase the business in April 1993 from the fuel wholesaler, which had purchased it from the previous retailer. The previous retailer had suffered business and personal setbacks that necessitated the sale. Mr. Stellman and his wife, Phyllis, who claims not to be an officer or employee of Respondent despite her considerable involvement, have contributed much personal capital and labor to the new business. Immediately after taking over the business, Mr. and Mrs. Stellman discarded outdated inventory, fired a number of dishonest employees, eliminated prostitution that had been taking place on the premises, added new equipment such as a pressure fryer and hood system, and started advertising. Cash flow was a problem for Respondent from the start. The major improvements were completed by the fall of 1994. By early 1994, however, Mr. Stellman had quit taking a salary from Respondent. Over the 19-month period from August 1993 through March 1995, Mr. and Mrs. Stellman borrowed $140,000 from a variety of sources, including from their retirement plan, from relatives, and on property that they own individually. Despite these infusions of cash, Respondent was unable to stay current with certain important creditors, such as their fuel supplier, the Internal Revenue Service, and Petitioner. In August 1993, the fuel wholesaler began to demand payment on delivery, instead of in 30 days, as it had done previously. The wholesaler shortened the credit terms on fuel after Respondent fell behind in payments shortly after beginning operations. In any event, the change in credit terms involved monthly volumes of typically 40,000-50,000 gallons. The loss of use of money corresponding to the wholesale purchase of this amount of fuel does not begin to explain the tax deficiencies that Respondent ran up. Respondent's deficiencies on its motor fuel tax also began in August 1993. Returns are filed the month following the month for which the motor fuel tax is due. For August 1993, Respondent filed a return in which it underremitted the motor fuel tax by $62.15. The next month, Respondent filed a return in which it remitted $2000 and left an unremitted balance of $2867.49. The next month, Respondent filed a return, but remitted none of the $6077.28 of motor fuel tax due. For November 1993, the next month, Respondent filed a return and remitted $2000, leaving an unremitted balance of $3278.78. For December 1993 through July 1994, Respondent filed returns but remitted no tax. The total tax deficiency for this eight-month period was $58,300.87, or an average of $7287.61. In the 12-month period ending with the July 1994 return, Respondent had failed to remit a total of $70,586.57. For the August, September, and October 1994 returns, Respondent made partial remittances. For August and September, Respondent left unremitted balances of only $15.34 and $84.30, respectively, remitting a total of $11,315.49. For October, Respondent remitted $4827.90, leaving an unremitted balance of $2623.98. For November 1994, Respondent filed a return, but failed to remit any of the $5983.74 due. In the summer of 1994, the Stellmans finally sold their house in New York, but realized less cash than they had expected. In October 1994, the Stellmans applied for a loan on their Florida residence. During the same month, they began negotiations with Texaco to convert their Citgo convenience store into a Texaco outlet. The Stellmans believed that they would receive $225,000 from Texaco, which would be sufficient to pay their fuel wholesaler and Petitioner, convert their service operation into more store space, and acquire additional inventory and working capital. The record does not permit a finding whether $225,000 would cover all of these items. In any event, the Texaco negotiations did not proceed quickly. The fuel wholesaler threatened litigation over the prospective cancellation of its contract to supply Respondent with fuel and oil. And Petitioner's representatives were increasingly unsatisfied with Respondent's lack of progress in paying back taxes. Repeatedly, the Stellmans promised payments that did not materialize. At the same time, Respondent was not remitting motor fuel taxes currently. For December 1994 through March 1995, Respondent did not even file returns. During this four-month period, motor fuel taxes due and unremitted totalled $32,106.59. The total of unremitted motor fuel taxes for August 1993 through March 1995 was now $111,400.52, exclusive of penalties and interest. Penalties for the underremittances for the period August 1993 through March 1995 totalled $60,284.67. Interest for the same period totalled $14,042.88. The total of tax, penalties, and interest was thus $185,728.07. Respondent later reduced this deficiency by paying a total of $323.48 of penalties and $4154.52 of interest, so the current totals are tax of $111,400.52, penalties of $59,961.19, and interest of $9888.36, for a total of $181,250.07. The interest is current through August 1, 1995, and the daily interest thereafter is calculated by multiplying the tax deficiency by 0.000328767. Mr. and Mrs. Stellman claim that the $185,728.07 deficiency arose due to business setbacks, but the business setbacks that they have shown do not account adequately for the deficiency. The Stellmans clearly began the business badly undercapitalized. Mr. and Mrs. Stellman attribute part of the financial problems to bad debts suffered by Respondent. From August 1993 through the end of 1993, the Stellmans pursued seasonal business by offering liberal credit terms, which eventually resulted in worthless accounts receivable. However, the total bad debt was only $15,000. Although hardly meriting mention, except perhaps to reveal their lack of insight, the Stellmans also complain that they lost cash flow due to ill- advised advertising deals into which they entered where they traded fuel for advertising. Even ignoring the benefits derived from such agreements, Respondent traded only about $4000 worth of fuel under these arrangements. Together, these claimed business setbacks of no more than $20,000 constitute less than 18 percent of the taxes, penalties, and interest owed Petitioner. The amount of motor fuel tax that Respondent would have collected on $20,000 worth of fuel would be around $1500. With more zeal than business acumen, the Stellmans attacked the challenge of a new business. Their lack of business sophistication, not fraud, led the Stellmans to convert the motor fuel taxes from current payables to long- term debt, to underreport the amount of fuel pumped on 12 of 19 returns filed with Petitioner during the period in question, and repeatedly to file returns late, so as to lose the collection allowance normally given retail dealers. The unwillingness of Petitioner to become a long term creditor was manifested dramatically when, on May 4, 1995, Petitioner issued an emergency order suspending Respondent's retail dealer's fuel license. The emergency suspension took place after a meeting of Petitioner's Emergency Response Group, which, after reviewing the facts, determined that this was the best course of action to prevent the loss of motor fuel tax. The Stellmans complain that Petitioner did not give them enough time to try to pay the tax deficiencies. However, the record does not justify the Stellmans' demand that Petitioner share their confidence in their ability to take care of this substantial debt. As late as mid-February 1995, the Stellmans were still making unfulfilled promises to pay, as when they assured a Naples employee of Petitioner that Respondent would pay $10,000 by mid-April. This sum was not paid, nor were the motor fuel taxes that Respondent collected at the time even paid currently. In other words, Respondent was still taking the motor fuel tax that it was collecting from customers and applying it to other debts. The Stellmans never told Petitioner what they expected to net from the Texaco agreement. They never explained why the negotiations took so long to conclude. In early 1995, Petitioner's representatives justifiably saw: 1) new financing never resulted in any reduction of the outstanding deficiencies and 2) the outstanding deficiencies continued to grow as Respondent continued to collect motor fuel tax and apply it to other purposes. The record is not entirely clear as to the status of Respondent with respect to unremitted or unpaid taxes in April 1995 and following. Respondent owed $34,861.20 in unremitted sales tax, as of May 1, 1995. However, it appears more likely than not that, during at least part of the period subsequent to May 1, 1995, Respondent remitted and paid to Petitioner its currently accruing tax obligations. With the cessation of fueling operations, these obligations arose from sales of convenience store items, as these sales were unaffected by Petitioner's action against Respondent's retail dealer's fuel license. Since the suspension of the license, the Stellmans have supplied Petitioner with accurate, current information concerning Respondent's tax liabilities, at least to the extent that they possess such information. Respondent's financial condition is precarious, at best. Even assuming that the Stellmans were willing to continue to contribute more money to Respondent, there is nothing in the record to suggest that they have the financial resources to contribute substantial sums beyond a large fraction of the total currently due Petitioner in this case. Such a payment would probably come from a combination of the Stellmans' assets and the assets of friends and family. Their obvious failure to prepare and follow a feasible business plan does not bode well for Respondent's future ability to operate and, at the same time, retire what has become a substantial financial liability owed to Petitioner.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order: 1) suspending Respondent's retail dealer's fuel license for the lesser of six months from the date of the final order or until Respondent pays the sums described in paragraphs 38 and 39 and executes a promissory note with the conditions set forth in paragraphs 38 and 39 and 2) revoking Respondent's retail dealer's fuel license at the expiration of six months from the date of the final order unless Respondent has paid the above-described sums and entered into the above-described promissory note. ENTERED on October 27, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 27, 1995. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-4: adopted or adopted in substance. 5-7: rejected as recitation of evidence and subordinate. 8: adopted or adopted in substance. 9-10: rejected as subordinate. 11: adopted or adopted in substance. 12-18: rejected as subordinate. 19-21: adopted or adopted in substance. 22-23: rejected as subordinate. 24-26: adopted or adopted in substance except the taxpayer is Respondent, not Mr. Stellman individually. 27: rejected as subordinate. 28: adopted or adopted in substance. 29-35: rejected as subordinate. 36-37: adopted or adopted in substance. 38: rejected as subordinate. 39: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 40-43: adopted or adopted in substance. 44: rejected as recitation of evidence. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-7: adopted or adopted in substance, although the "great expense" in paragraph 7 is rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 8-10: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. The financial problems were minor. 11: adopted or adopted in substance to the extent relevant. 12-13: rejected as subordinate. 14: rejected as speculative. 15: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 16: rejected as irrelevant. 17: adopted or adopted in substance. 18-19: rejected as subordinate. 20: adopted or adopted in substance. 21: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence except that the filings is rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Francisco Negron, Jr. Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Christian B. Felden Felden and Felden 2590 Golden Gate Parkway Suite 101 Naples, FL 33942
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Dick's Auto Sales, Inc., is the holder of a motor vehicle dealer license issued by the Petitioner, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ("the Department"). Richard R. Borst ("Borst") is the president of Respondent Dick's Auto Sales, Inc., and one of two stockholders in the company. At all times material hereto, the Respondent maintained a business address at 110 N.W. 18th Avenue, Delray Beach, Florida. Borst also operates an auto parts business at the same address as the motor vehicle dealership. On or about June 9, 1989, Borst appeared before the Honorable James C. Payne, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, and entered a plea of guilty to aiding and abetting the transportation of stolen motor vehicle parts in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2314 & 2 in Case Number 89-6032- Cr-PAYNE-(01), United States v. Richard Borst,. Based on the plea entered and the plea agreement then before the court, Borst was adjudicated guilty in a Criminal Judgment dated June 28, 1989. Imposition of a sentence of confinement was suspended and Borst was placed on probation for a period of three (3) years. Borst was also fined Fifty Dollars ($50.00). Borst's conviction arose in connection with his purchase of auto parts from a "chop shop" (i.e., an operation which dismantled stolen cars and sold the parts,) in the Connecticut area. The purchase took place in May, 1987. In April, 1988, Borst met with state and federal investigators and agreed to fully cooperate with a task force set up to investigate the operation. He also agreed to testify against the individuals involved. While Borst was in Connecticut waiting to testify, the other defendants entered guilty pleas. In Respondent's initial dealer license application dated September 24, 1987, Borst stated under oath that he was not facing criminal charges. On April 27, 1989, Borst, as president of Respondent, signed an application to renew Respondent's license, stating under oath: Under penalty of perjury, I do swear or affirm that the information contained in this application is true and correct and that nothing has occurred since I filed my last application for a license or application for renewal of said license, as the case may be, which would change the answers given in such previous application. On January 18, 1989, Borst and his attorney signed a "Consent to Transfer of Case for Plea and Sentence", in United States v. Richard Borst, Criminal No. B-89-6-(TFGD), United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (the "Connecticut Case"). This document expressly acknowledges that an Information was pending against Borst in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, that Borst wished to plead guilty to the offense charged, and that he consented to the disposition of the case in the Southern District of Florida. The Information entered in the Connecticut Case, charged Borst with violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2314 and 2, for transporting motor vehicle parts in interstate commerce knowing them to have been stolen. The date of this Information was not established, but it was clearly on or before January 18, 1989. Thus, sometime prior to January 18, 1989, Borst was charged with criminal violations of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2314 and 2, and these charges were pending when Borst signed and filed Respondent's renewal application for 1989. Petitioner contends that Borst's conviction is directly related to the business of being a motor vehicle dealer, especially since Borst operates a motor vehicle parts business in conjunction with his motor vehicle dealership. However, the evidence presented provided only a very limited factual background regarding the conviction, none of Petitioner's representatives talked with the investigators or prosecutors in the criminal case and no evidence was presented regarding the Respondent's role in the transactions leading to Borst's conviction. At the time of the hearing, Borst was fifty-three (53) years of age. Within the last twenty-four (24) months, he has suffered numerous health problems including a nervous breakdown which necessitated an eighteen (18) week period of confinement to his residence for rest. He currently undergoes twice- weekly therapy with a psychiatrist and has been taking an antidepressant prescription. In addition, in October of 1989, he was admitted to the hospital for a heart condition. Subsequently, a balloon angioplasty was performed on him. He was later re-admitted to the hospital for five (5) days as a result of post surgery complications. He is also an insulin dependent diabetic. He attributes most of these health problems to the stress and turmoil of his criminal conviction. In light of his emotional and physical condition, he has been required to reduce his work load. Borst has been actively trying to sell the existing business in order to retire the outstanding indebtedness on the business and the property on which it is located. There is no evidence that the Respondent and/or any of its duly elected officers or stockholders have ever been subjected to any other complaints and/or investigations by the Department or by any other investigatory or regulatory agency during the past seventeen (17) years since it was originally licensed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order which finds Respondent not guilty of the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint and dismisses the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of June, 1990. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 1990.
The Issue The issues for determination are whether the emergency suspension of Respondents' licenses was proper and whether revocation of those licenses is required.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Robinson, an authorized Chevron representative, is the sole proprietor of Jack A. Robinson, Distributor. Respondent R&R Partnership (R&R) is a partnership between Jack A. Robinson and Dee Ann Rich (Rich). Respondent I-10 Corporation (Stacks) is a subchapter S corporation in which Respondent Robinson is a 50 percent shareholder. Rich is the general manager of Jack A. Robinson, Distributor and exercises administrative responsibilities with regard to Respondents Stacks and R & R Corporation. Robinson holds Special Fuel Dealer's License No. 10 Wholesaler's License No. 09000950/9356 issued by Petitioner. Robinson sells diesel fuel and gasoline at wholesale to I unrelated parties. I products at retail. Robinson admits in response to Counts III, IV, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XVI, XIX, XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXVII, and XXX, of the Notice To Show Cause in DOAH Case No. 93-1563 that $210,876.19 of tax remains due and owing. Rich is Jack A. Robinson's step supervising and preparing tax returns for Robinson. With regard to the $210,876.19 admitted as due and owing, these state funds were collected by Respondent Jack A. Robinson as an agent for the State of Florida but, instead of being remitted to the state, these funds were spent by Respondent in the course of business operation. DOAH Case No. 93-1563 In response to Counts I, II, V, XV, XVII, XXI, XVI, XXVIII, and XXIX of the Notice To Show Cause in DOAH Case No. 93 that $103,452.71 tax is due. As to Count I, the balance for the tax return period of February 1990, for motor fuel tax due is $2,524.14. In regard to Count II, Respondent also owes motor fuel tax in the amount of $26,839.71 for the tax return period of March, 1990. Although Rich requested Respondent's bank to make the appropriate electronic funds transfer to Petitioner, the amount was not received by Petitioner and no explanation was provided by Respondent for the failure of Petitioner to receive this amount. As to Count V, Respondent owes a total motor fuel tax of $12,900.27. The previous total of $36,232.69 was reduced by a late partial payment of $11,562.53, and an additional payment of $11,769.87 on September 25, 1991. No payment of tax was made for the period of March 1992. As to Count XIV, Respondent Robinson filed a tax return for January 1993, motor fuel local option tax in the month of February 1993. The return showed a total tax due of $21,044.62. A collection allowance of $148.56 is shown deducted. No proof of payment of the tax was presented. In regard to Count XVII, a return for the tax period of March 1990, was filed on behalf of Respondent Robinson, declaring a total special fuel tax due of $23,572.82. No evidence was presented that payment was actually made, although Rich testified that a wire transfer payment of that amount was requested by Respondent. With regard to Respondent Robinson, the amounts of tax admitted in responsive pleading together with all counts of the Notice To Show Cause where no evidence or allegation of payment was presented total: Admitted in pleading $210,876.19 Admitted owing for March of 1990 in Motor Fuel and Special Fuel Tax $ 50,412.53 Copies of Returns introduced and alleged to have been filed, but unsupported by Petitioner's records and otherwise unsubstan- tiated by proof (for August of 1992 and January of 1993). $ 35,655.06 No proof of payment presented for balance of November of 1990 tax. $ 12,900.27 Admitted, paid less than due for January 1990; August 1990; and November, 1990. $ 8,058.52 This amount does not include applicable penalties and interest. DOAH Case No. 93-1565 Counts I through IV are admitted by Respondent R & R Partnership as to the amounts owned for a total tax due of $9,189.12. This amount does not include applicable penalties and accrued interest. While R & R reported taxes due on Respondent Robinson's returns, no proof was submitted that these taxes were paid to Petitioner. For the tax period of January, 1993, Rich maintained that a return was filed on behalf of R & R partnership and payment made. However, the copy of the payment check presented at hearing had "2/93" written in pencil as the date of the check and no evidence was presented that the check was presented for payment to Respondent's bank. DOAH CASE NO. 93-1564 With regard to I allegations of Counts I, II, III, IV, V, VII, VIII, X, XI, and XII. As to Counts VI and IX, Respondent denies only that there was improper reporting, not that the amount of tax is not due. Respondent maintains that all taxes collected by Stacks were paid to Respondent Robinson and reported on those returns. The periods of January 1990; February 1990; March 1990; April 1990; August 1990; November 1990; February 1992; correspond to the counts of the Notice To Show Cause to which Stacks denies all allegations. These periods and denied counts match precisely with periods in Counts IX, X, XI, XII, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, of the Notice To Show Cause filed against Respondent Robinson. Robinson admits Counts IX, X, XI, XII, XVI, XVII, XIX, XX, and XXII and presented no proof of payment at hearing with regard to Count XV and XVII. This fact, coupled with testimony that Stacks and R & R taxes were paid to Robinson and reported as line items on his returns, show that Stacks does owe the taxes claimed by Petitioner in the amount of $36,029.45 exclusive of interest and penalties. Debra Swift, a Certified Public Accountant, employed by Petitioner, personally reviewed records of Petitioner in determining the amounts of tax, penalty and interest due from each Respondent. All payments received by Petitioner were credited by Swift in performing her calculations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered revoking the fuel licenses of all three Respondents. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of May, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 1993. APPENDIX The following constitutes my rulings pursuant to Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings: 1.-12. Adopted, though not verbatim. 13.-15. Accepted. 16.-22. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings: 1. Rejected, no record citation. 2.-3. Adopted. 4. Accepted, except for last sentence which is rejected as legal conclusion. 5.-7. Adopted. 8.-9. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings on this point. 10.-12. Rejected, weight of the evidence. 13. Rejected, relevancy. 14.-16. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 17. Adopted by reference. 18.-21. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 22.-24. Rejected, weight of the evidence, no citation. 25._38. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 39.-40. Rejected, weight of the evidence. 41.-42. Adopted by reference. 43.-44. Rejected, subordinate, misconstruction of testimony. 45. Rejected, conclusion of law, weight of the evidence. 46.-48. Rejected, subordinate, argumentative, relevancy. COPIES FURNISHED: Lealand L. McCharen Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol-Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Timothy J. Warfel Messer, Vickers Suite 701 First Florida Bank Building 215 South Monroe Street Post Office Box 1878 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Linda Lettera General Counsel 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs Executive Director 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent should be granted an Independent Motor Vehicle Dealer License, pursuant to Section 320.27, Florida Statutes (2008).
Findings Of Fact The Department is an agency of the State, charged with regulating the business of buying, selling or dealing in motor vehicles under § 320.27, Florida Statutes (2007). The Respondent applied for a license as an Independent Motor Vehicle Dealer. The application was signed by Harold Gillis. Mr. Gillis is the Respondent's president and sole corporate officer. The Resident Agent is Andrew Kiswani. Mr. Kiswani is also known as Alex Kiswani and Andy Kiswani. On the insurance certificate filed with the license application, Mr. Kiswani is shown as one of the named insureds. Named insureds on this type of insurance certificate are typically the dealer principals, the people actually operating the dealership. Mr. Kiswani is a convicted felon. He was convicted twice for theft of state funds. He has thirteen convictions of failure to file state tax returns and seven convictions of issuance of worthless checks to the Department of Revenue. Mr. Kiswani previously was licensed as a Motor Vehicle Dealer, as President of Ocala Auto and Truck Sales, Inc. That license expired on April 30, 2008. On May 19, 2008, Mr. Gillis and Mr. Kiswani displayed vehicles for sale at Ocala Auto and Truck Sales, Inc.'s former licensed location. Both of them were warned by Department employees to cease the unlicensed activity. On June 2, 2008, Mr. Gillis and Mr. Kiswani again displayed motor vehicles for sale at Ocala Auto and Truck Sales, Inc.'s former licensed premises. They were again warned by Department employees to cease the unlicensed activity. On June 11, 2008, Ocala Auto and Truck Sales, Inc. sold a car to James Reed. That seller failed to apply for a Certificate of Title on behalf of Mr. Reed and failed to pay off a lien on the vehicle, within 10 days of acquisition of the vehicle. Ocala Auto and Truck Sales, Inc., sold a vehicle to Wesley Leon Linsey. On February 7, 2007, the seller failed to apply for a Certificate of Title and registration within 30 days of delivery of the vehicle. On December 28, 2007, Ocala Auto and Truck Sales, Inc. entered into a contract with Darrell Lenamond for the consignment sale of a motor vehicle owned by Mr.Lenamond. Ocala Auto and Truck Sales, Inc. sold the vehicle and never paid Mr. Lenamond the money due him from the sale. Mr. Kiswani operated Mr. Gillis's previous dealership. He would be actively involved in operating the dealership for which the license is sought, by the Respondent Corporation, as its Resident Agent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a Final Order denying the Respondent's license application. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Electra Theodorides-Bustle, Executive Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Robin Lotane, General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Michael James Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32344 Harold Gillis Certified Motors, Inc. 2895 South Pine Avenue Ocala, Florida 34471
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner holds a valid special fuel dealer's license issued by the Respondent. The license was issued during approximately March, 1972. The Respondent conducted an audit of Petitioner's sales operations, and assessed special fuel taxes, plus penalty, on approximately 264,973 gallons of special fuel for which the Respondent contended inadequate account was given. 29,166 gallons of the special fuel involved in the assessment was sold to local oil field drillers. These sales are reflected in invoices which were received in evidence as Joint Exhibit 1. This fuel was used for industrial and commercial purposes, and not for the propulsion of motor vehicles on the public highways of the State of Florida. 161,900 gallons of the special fuel involved in this assessment was sold to Ard Oil Company, Summerdale, Alabama. Petitioner had every reason to believe that Ard Oil Company held a valid license as a dealer of special fuels in the State of Florida. Petitioner took reasonable steps to insure himself as to Ard's status, and received no instructions from the Respondent as to steps that could be taken to identify persons who were not properly licensed as special fuel dealers. 11,700 gallons of the special fuel involved in this assessment was sold to Hagler Grocery. All subsequent sales made by Hagler Grocery were for off- road, agricultural uses. During July, 1973, 5,000 gallons of the Petitioner's special fuel was mistakenly mixed with gasoline. The mixing rendered the special fuel unusable, and it was emptied onto Petitioner's property. This 5,000 gallons of fuel was never sold by the Petitioner, and was never used. On one occasion during the period of the audit, 5,000 gallons of special fuel leaked from one of the Petitioner's storage tanks due to a valve being left open erroneously. This fuel was never sold by the Petitioner, and was never used. During the period covered by the audit involved in this case, the Petitioner sold more than 5,000,000 gallons of special fuel. The Petitioner donates approximately 2,000 - 3,000 gallons of fuel yearly to the local fire department for training purposes. The Petitioner rinses his tanks periodically to keep down the lead content, and this results in some loss in special fuel. The Petitioner loses approximately 5 gallons of special fuel in each loading operation. The Petitioner made effort to account for all special fuel which came into his possession. Less than one percent of the fuel that came into his possession during the audit period has not been accounted for. It is reasonable to conclude, that 52,207 gallons of the Petitioner's special fuel was lost due to spillage, flushing operations, and donations to the local fire department. There was no evidence offered at the hearing from which it could be determined that any unaccounted fuel was used for a taxable purpose, or for any purpose.
The Issue Whether Petitioner owes tax in the amount of $4,554.80 plus a penalty and interest on the sale of special fuel between December 1, 1976, and December 31, 1979.
Findings Of Fact Miami Tiresoles, Inc., sells both new and retreaded tires for cars and trucks. The company also sells gasoline and diesel fuel. It is licensed by the Department as a dealer in special fuels. As far as this case is concerned special fuel is number 2 diesel oil. Unless an exemption is met each gallon of special fuel sold by MTS is taxed by the Department at a rate of eight cents per gallon. The Department has given BITS a revised notice of proposed assessment of tax for the sale of special fuel in the amount of $4,551.88 plus a penalty of $455.48 and interest in the amount of $735.11 (through April 21, 1980). The tax figure on the assessment appears to reflect a typographical error. The Department's records (Exhibit A) indicate that for the period in question, 2/ MTS sold 56,936 gallons of special fuel subject to tax according to the Department's interpretation of the law. If a tax at a rate of eight cents per gallon is due, then the amount due should be $4,554.88 and not $4,551.88. The correct tax figure is reflected on the Department's work sheets but was probably misread when the figure was transferred to the revised Notice of Assessment issued on April 21, 1980. The foregoing assessment is based on MTS' invoices which reflect sales of special fuel to customers in amounts of more than 110 gallons at one time. Those sales were made to MTS customers who have filed with MTS a document called "Purchaser's Exemption Certificate". A typical example of such a certificate states: PURCHASER'S EXEMPTION CERTIFICATE The undersigned hereby certifies that the motor duel (sic) and/or special fuel pur- chased on 1-19-79 is for the following purpose as checked in the space provided. (X) Purchased for home, industrial, com- mercial, agricultural or marine purposes for consumption other than for the propul- sion of a motor vehicle. ( ) Purchased at bulk plant or terminal in volumes of not more than 110 gallons for delivery into a receptacle not connected to the fuel supply system of a motor vehicle for consumption other than for the propulsion of a motor vehicle. Purchaser is aware that if this exemption if (sic) falsely claimed, or if this certificate is not rescinded at the time he fails to quality (sic) for the exemption, he shall be liable for the taxes imposed under Chapter 206, F.S. Furthermore, by issuing this certificate, the purchaser also certifies that he does not have any motor vehicles which use special fuel for propulsion. This certificate is to continue in force until revoked by written notice to MIAMI TIRESOLES, INC. Purchaser Trade Name A ACME SANDBLASTING, INC. Street Address 9521 W. Oakmont Dr. ,Hialeah,Fla. 33015 BY /s/ The industrial customers of MTS (those who have filed an exemption certificate) are engaged in the construction business. They use the diesel fuel to operate bulldozers, front-end loaders, back hoes, sandblasters and similar equipment. None of the fuel is used for the operation of motor vehicles on the public highways of Florida. All the fuel in question is sold on the premises of MTS. At the time of sale it is placed either in the fuel tank of a particular piece of equipment such as a back hoe, or it is placed in a fuel storage tank mounted on the back of a truck. The storage tanks are not connected so they can provide fuel for the propulsion of the truck. They are used to transport fuel to the purchaser's particular job site. The storage tanks have a capacity of between 100 to 300 gallons. MTS does not have delivery trucks of its own and has no facilities for taking fuel to its customers' job sites. A single invoice of MTS which indicates a sale of 110 gallons of special fuel to an individual customer is frequently the result of a sale where multiple fuel tanks are filled at one time. For Instance, the customer may have a back hoe sitting on the rear of a flat-bed truck. He will fill the fuel tank in his back hoe and then perhaps fill an additional 55 gallon drum or two which would be on the truck. This would occur all in one transaction. The reason why the Department seeks to tax special fuel sold by MTS to its industrial customers in an amount exceeding 110 gallons is because the fuel was placed in the customers' own fuel tanks on the premises of MTS and not on the premises of the customer or at the customer's job site.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a final order affirming its assessment for a special fuel tax against the Petitioner in the amount of $4,554.88 plus penalty and interest computed pursuant to Section 206.44, Florida Statutes (1979). DONE and RECOMMENDED this 25th day of March 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL PEARCE DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March 1981.
The Issue Whether or not the Petitioner, Radiant Oil Company of Jacksonville, is responsible to pay $4,466.64, plus the penalty and interest currently due from a proposed assessment by the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Revenue, Motor Fuel Tax Bureau, under the alleged authority of Chapter 206, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Radiant Oil Company of Jacksonville is a dealer in special fuels within the meaning of Chapter 206, Florida Statutes. The Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Revenue, Motor Fuel Tax Bureau is responsible for the enforcement of the tax provisions found in Chapter 206, Florida Statutes. On October 6, 1977, the Respondent issued a notice of proposed assessment against the Petitioner claiming the amount of tax due to be $4,837.92. This notice of proposed assessment may be found as part of the Composite Exhibit 1 of the Respondent, admitted into evidence. There remains in dispute $4,466.64 together with a possible penalty and interest that would be assessed. This amount of disputed tax, penalty and interest pertains to transactions between the Petitioner and the Boam Company, one of its customers. Specifically, the Respondent is asserting a tax on the amount of 55,833 gallons of diesel fuel which was sold to the Boam Company by the Petitioner. Diesel fuel is a "special fuel" within the meaning of Section 206.86(1), Florida Statutes. The Boam Company is not a dealer within the meaning of Chapter 206, Florida Statutes, it has executed an exemption certificate for the benefit of the Petitioner on a form provided by the Respondent. The certificate is Petitioner's Exhibit 1, admitted into evidence. The facts in the transaction which lead the Respondent to believe that the tax is owed are constituted through the method of Boam Company sending their tanker truck to the depot/business compound of the Radiant Oil Company for purposes of picking up the diesel fuel in question. After the individual deliveries of diesel fuel were made at the compound, that fuel was then taken by the Boam Company's tanker truck to be delivered for utilization by certain off road equipment owned by Boam Company. None of the fuel in dispute was used by any form of over the road vehicle which requires a motor vehicle license. (The 55,833 gallons in dispute does not involve the first 110 gallons of diesel fuel delivered on each pickup made by the Boam Company tanker at the Petitioner's compound.) The Petitioner takes the position that Section 206.87 (4)(a) exempts the questioned transactions from the taxes set forth in Chapter 206, Florida Statutes. That provision of Chapter 206 reads as follows: 206.87 Levy of tax.- The following sales shall not be subject to the tax herein imposed: Sales by a dealer when the special fuel is delivered for home, industrial, commercial, agricultural, or marine purposes, for consumption other than use, or for resale pursuant to paragraph (c) hereof. In particular the Petitioner contends that the sale by Radiant Oil Company to the Boam Company constitutes deliveries for commercial purposes other than use or other than for resale pursuant to paragraph (c) of the same section of Chapter 206, Florida Statutes. That paragraph (c) pertains to sales of five gallons or less by a person not a dealer, when that person does not have facilities for placing this special fuel in the fuel supply system of a motor vehicle, and would not fit the facts of this case. To understand the continuation of the argument by the Petitioner, it is necessary to look at the meaning of the word "use." In Section 206.86(5), Florida Statutes, "use" is defined in this fashion: 206.86 Definitions.- As used in this part: "Use" means the placing of special fuel into any receptacle on a motor vehicle from which fuel is supplied for the propulsion thereof. It is also necessary to understand what "motor vehicle" means within the definition of Chapter 206, Florida Statutes. "Motor vehicle," is defined in Section 206.86(2), Florida Statutes, as being: 208.86 Definitions.- As used in this part: (2) "Motor vehicle" means any form of vehicle machine, or mechanical contrivance which is propelled by any form of engine or motor which utilizes special fuel and is required, or which would be required, to be licensed under the motor vehicle license law if owned by a resident. It is the Petitioner's position that the vehicles which ultimately used the diesel fuel in question, did not require any form of license under the motor vehicle license law in the State of Florida, if they had been owned by a resident, and consequently did not constitute "motor vehicles" within the meaning of the definition found in the aforementioned section. Accordingly, from the point of view of the Petitioner this utilization of the motor fuel was for purposes of consumption other than "use." The Respondent replied to the Petitioner by stating that the exempt category which would apply in this instance is that found in Section 206.87(4)(b), Florida Statutes. That provision reads as follows: 206.87 Levy of Tax. - (4) The following sales shall not be subject to the tax herein imposed: (b) Sales at the dealer's place of business if not more than 110 gallons by a dealer into a receptacle not connected to the fuel supply system of a motor vehicle for consumption other than use. In the mind of the Respondent, this provision of the law creates an exemption for the sale of the first 110 gallons by a dealer, delivered into a receptacle not connected to the fuel supply system of a motor vehicle for consumption other than "use;" and acts to the exclusion of any possible exemption under 206.87(4)(a), Florida Statutes, which has been claimed by the Petitioner. Moreover, the Respondent relied strongly on a portion of the language of Section 206.87, Florida Statutes, which states ". . . unless expressly provided to the contrary in this part, every sale shall be deemed to be for use in this state . . . " Consequently, according to the Respondent, because Section 206.87 (4)(b), Florida Statutes, addresses the kind of transaction that the petitioner is involved in, this exemption creates the only possible exclusion from tax consequences that is available to the Petitioner. The Respondent expresses a retreating argument to the effect that the use of the word "delivered" found in Section 206.87 (4)(a), Florida Statutes, would mean direct delivery to the site of the place of consumption other than "use." After examining the position of the two parties, it is the undersigned's conclusion that Section 206.87(4)(a), Florida Statutes, creates an exemption from the possible tax consequences noted in Chapter 206, Florida Statutes. This conclusion is reached because the use of the word "delivered" in Section 206.87(4)(a) is followed by the word, "for" which creates the impression that delivery could be made either at the business location of the vendor, or at the location of the equipment that would be consuming the fuel for purposes other than "use." Had the legislature intended to limit the exemption found in the quoted provision to only those transactions involving deliveries to the home, industrial location, commercial location, agricultural location, or marine location, it would seem that they would have expressed it in the terms of the necessity to deliver "to the location" as opposed to stating it in terms of delivering "for purposes." In addition, the Section 206.87 (4)(b) Florida Statutes, does not exclude the right of the Petitioner to claim an exemption under Section 206.87(4)(a), Florida Statutes, nor is it inconsistent with that prior provision. Section 206.87(4)(b) , Florida Statutes, when read in pari materia with Section 206.87(4)(a) Florida Statutes, stands on its own and involves a different category of exemption. This category of exemption would include utilization of the special fuel for home, industrial, commercial, agricultural, or marine purposes, as well as any other utilization of the special fuel other than "use." Had it been intended for this provision, Section 206.87(4)(b), Florida Statutes, to exclude the right to exemption found in Section 206.87(4)(a), Florida Statutes, there would have been a connecting phrase between the two subsections (a) and (b) such as the word "or," such as the phrase "unless it exceeds the 110 gallon exemption found in the following subsection," or some similar comment. Since that type of language does not appear, it is unreasonable to assume that the legislature intended to have the prospective exempt organization or person required to accede to the exemption which affords the least advantage. For the reasons stated above the assessment in the amount of $4,466.64 plus the possible penalty and interest asserted under Chapter 206, Florida Statutes, should be rejected.
Recommendation It is recommended that the portion of the proposed assessment to the extent of $4,466.64 together with the penalty and interest be denied, and the Petitioner not be required to make such payment. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of May, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack G. Hand, Jr., Esquire 1320 Atlantic Bank Building Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Maxie Broome, Jr., Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 John D. Moriarty, Esquire Department of Revenue Room 104, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 =================================================================
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue's ("Department") assessment of tax, penalty, and interest against Nation Auto Sales of South Florida, Inc., is valid and correct.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the agency responsible for administering the revenue laws of the State of Florida, including the imposition and collection of the state's sales and use taxes. Petitioner, during the period of October 1, 2005, through March 31, 2010 ("assessment period"), was engaged in the business of selling used motor vehicles at retail in Broward County, Florida.1/ Arie Abecasis was Petitioner's president and sole corporate officer. Petitioner was continuously registered with the Department as a "dealer," pursuant to chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was continuously licensed by the State of Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ("DMV") as an independent motor vehicle dealer, pursuant to chapter 320, Florida Statutes. On September 3, 2008, the Department issued correspondence to Petitioner advising that the Criminal Investigations process had received a referral from the Department's collection sub process, concerning Petitioner's possible failure to remit all of the sales tax collected from its customers. In order to determine if a discrepancy existed, the Department requested Petitioner to provide: (1) sales invoices/ buyer's orders; (2) sales journals; (3) cash receipt and disbursement journal; (4) general ledger; and (5) bank statements for all depository accounts. On September 9, 2008, Mr. Abecasis met with Robert Taft, a criminal investigator for the Department. Mr. Taft advised Mr. Abecasis that there were two areas of concern: (1) Petitioner's failure to file returns and remit collected sales tax over several collection periods; and (2) that a comparison of the Department and DMV records appeared to reveal a substantial and repeated underreporting and under-remitting of collected sales tax. Mr. Abecasis advised that he would fully cooperate and provide records from 2005 on or before September 17, 2008. Thereafter, Petitioner provided some 2005 records, which Mr. Taft compared with DMV records. After completing a review of the same, on November 7, 2008, Mr. Taft issued correspondence to Petitioner advising that Petitioner's license was used to transfer vehicles for which Petitioner had failed to provide documentation. The same records indicated sales tax collected but never remitted to the Department. Accordingly, Mr. Taft requested all of the documentation originally requested to be produced on or before December 5, 2008. The Department did not receive the requested documentation. Thereafter, Mr. Taft obtained additional records from the DMV regarding a listing of all vehicles titled during the period from October 1, 2005, through March 31, 2010, using Petitioner's motor vehicle dealer's license numbers. Additionally, certified title applications for each of the title transfer transactions were reviewed. From the documents obtained, the Department was able to determine the following information regarding vehicles sold by Petitioner: the acquisition month, dealer number, acquisition date, title number, owner's last name, vehicle make, vehicle body, vehicle ID, and tax credit. The Department established that Petitioner filed with the Department Sales and Use Tax Returns, Form DR-15, that were not accompanied by payment of the tax due, for the following months: April through July, 2008; and February through August 2009. The Department established that Petitioner did not file with the Department Sales and Use Tax Returns, Form DR-15, for February and March, 2010. Petitioner collected at least $810,063.15 in sales tax. Petitioner remitted to the Department $509,735.53 in sales tax. Petitioner failed to remit to the Department at least $300,327.62 in sales tax collected from its customers. On or about November 1, 2010, the Department referred the matter to the Office of the State Attorney for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit of Florida for criminal prosecution. On October 31, 2012, in the case styled State v. Abecasis, Case No. 11-0002423 CF 10A, Mr. Abecasis entered a plea of no contest to the criminal charge of theft of state funds in an amount of $20,000 or more, a second-degree felony. As a special condition of his probation, Mr. Abecasis was ordered to make restitution to the Department in the amount of $50,000.00. It is undisputed that, on or before April 10, 2014, Petitioner satisfied the restitution ordered. On April 17, 2014, the Department issued to Petitioner a Notice of Jeopardy Finding and a Notice of Final Assessment. The Notice of Final Assessment notified Petitioner that $192,501.80 in tax, $20,190.35 in penalty, and $66,031.36 in interest were due.2/ The Notice of Jeopardy Finding averred that the Department found "one or more of the jeopardy conditions provided in Rule 12-21.005, Florida Administrative Code, which tend to prejudice or render wholly or partly ineffectual the normal conditions for collection of tax, penalty, or interest." The stated jeopardy condition was delay. On April 21, 2014, the Department recorded a warrant for collection of delinquent sales and use tax against Petitioner in the amount contained in the Notice of Final Assessment. Petitioner testified that, due to the nature of his business, it was a frequent occurrence that potential vehicle purchasers would require financing. Petitioner testified that it was Petitioner's practice to allow the customer to obtain the vehicle prior to financial approval from the lending institution. Accordingly, when the customer was not ultimately approved for financing or when the vehicle was repossessed, a true "sale" did not occur, and, therefore, sales taxes were not collected and remitted. The undersigned finds Petitioner's testimony not credible and not otherwise supported by the record evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that The Department of Revenue enter a final order that validates the assessment against Nation Auto Sales of South Florida, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of November, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 2014.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations herein, the Petitioner, the Department, was the state agency responsible for the licensing and monitoring of the operation of interstate motor carriers in this state. The Respondent, PAT, was an interstate motor carrier of automobiles operating over the roads of this state. On October 10, 1991, Officer Ralph Vargas, an officer with the Department's Office of Motor Carrier Compliance stopped the Respondent's automobile carrier being operated by an employee of the Respondent in Boynton Beach, Florida, going north on US Highway #1. The stop was a random routine Level III safety inspection. Review of the documents carried by the driver reflected that the driver's driver license and the vehicle registration were in order. However, a review of the outside of the cab revealed that there was no required fuel decal being displayed. The driver showed Officer Vargas the cab card issued by the State of Florida for the fuel decal reflecting a decal had been issued for this vehicle. However, the decal was not displayed on the outside of the vehicle even though Mr. Vargas could see an area where an decal had been affixed. He can not recall whether he felt the area to see if it was sticky and he was unable to determine whether the former decal had been issued by the State of Florida or not. He did not see a CVSA, (Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance) decal either. As a result of this infraction, Mr. Vargas assessed a penalty in the amount of $50.00 and issued a temporary permit at a cost of $45.00, both of which were paid by the driver at the scene. It is this penalty and permit which the Respondent contests. The pertinent statute in issue here required a vehicle of this kind to have both a cab card and a fuel decal which must be affixed to the vehicle. Mr. Vargas also issued the driver a warning for having an unauthorized passenger, (his son) on board and for not having his log book current. Mr. Hurley contends that just one week prior to this stop, the vehicle and driver were in California where a CVSA inspection was accomplished. While this was being done, Mr. Hurley personally inspected the vehicle to insure that all required decals were affixed. Again, before the truck left New Jersey on the instant trip, he again checked to insure the required decals were there. They were. Because he is aware of the extended time required to get a replacement decal for a vehicle, Mr. Hurley routinely purchases several extra $4.00 cab card and fuel decal sets for his trucks so that if, as here, one is lost or removed, he can, upon notice, get a replacement to the driver overnight. Here, he claims the decal must have been peeled off by someone while the vehicle was on this trip. It is his experience that Florida's decals are easily pulled off and, unlike the decals in some other states, there is no built in voiding process which would void the decal in the event it is stolen. Here, Mr. Hurley claims, the driver did not know the decal was gone. Had he known, he could have called the home office on the truck phone and have it delivered. It is so found.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered herein denying Professional Auto Transport, Inc.'s request for a refund of the $50.00 civil penalty and $45.00 permit fee. RECOMMENDED this 12th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr. Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Richard L. Hurley President Professional Auto Transport, Inc. Box 492 Lakewood, N.J. 08701 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Bldg. 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
