The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner timely terminated Respondent's employment, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed in this cause.
Findings Of Fact On July 22, 1997, Respondent completed his application for employment as a teacher for the school year 1997-98. He was hired to be the coordinator for the English for speakers of other languages (ESOL) program at Western Pines Community Middle School. That position is a teaching position. Western Pines is a new school, opening in time for the 1997-98 school year. Principal Peggy Campbell determined she needed extra assistance for the school to be ready in time for the students. As with any new school, floors needed to be mopped, windows needed to be washed, supplies needed to be unloaded and stored, desks needed to be placed in the classrooms, books needed to be stamped, and many other things needed to be done to get ready. She requested volunteers from the staff she had hired, and Respondent agreed to help prepare the school for the arrival of students. At the time that volunteers were obtained and began working, Campbell did not have approval to pay any of the volunteers. She subsequently obtained approval. Respondent began working as a volunteer on August 1, 1997. He labeled, stamped, and shelved books. He worked a total of 7 1/2 days. Afterward, he was given a one-time paycheck for those 7 1/2 days based upon a daily rate of pay. In computing the amount to pay him, Petitioner calculated a daily rate for Respondent by dividing his annual salary by 196, the number of duty days for teachers within Petitioner's school system. On August 13, 1997, all teachers reported for duty for the 1997-98 school year. August 13 began the five-day pre-school period for instructional employees, a time during which all teachers attend meetings and prepare for the arrival of students. On that date, Respondent began his professional duties as an instructional staff member of Petitioner's school system. That date was also the effective date for Respondent's instructional position. Starting on August 13, 1997, Respondent's duties were substantially different than they were prior to that date. Prior to August 13, 1997, Respondent's work was akin to that of an incidental day laborer. August 20, 1997, was the first day of classes for students within Petitioner's school system. On January 9, 1998, Principal Campbell met with Respondent and gave him a letter advising him that she was recommending to the superintendent the termination of Respondent's employment, effective January 15, 1998. She told him not to report to the school for those interim days but that he was assigned to his home for those additional days for which he would be paid. On February 21, 1998, the School Board ratified that termination, effective January 15, 1998, as part of its consent agenda at a regularly-scheduled Board meeting. At the time Respondent was notified he would be terminated and at the time of the School Board meeting, annual contracts for that school year had not yet been prepared. There is a normal delay with finalizing annual contracts due to extended negotiations with the teacher's union once the budget is final.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered determining that Respondent's employment was terminated within his probationary period. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Joan Kowel, Superintendent Palm Beach County School Board 3340 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5869 Tom Gallagher, Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Thomas E. Elfers, Esquire JenniLynn Lawrence, Esquire Palm Beach County School Board 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-302 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Ronald G. Meyer, Esquire Meyer and Brooks, P.A. Post Office Box 1547 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Petitioners’ installation of ditch plugs on their property qualifies for an agricultural exemption from the requirement to obtain an environmental resource permit pursuant to section 373.406(2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Paul and Kathleen Still (Petitioners), own a parcel of property comprised of 118 acres located within Section 33, Township 6 South, Range 21 East, in Bradford County, Florida, approximately six miles southwest of Starke, Florida (the Property). The Department is the state agency authorized under section 373.407, Florida Statutes, to make binding determinations at the request of a water management district or landowner as to whether an existing or proposed activity qualifies for an agricultural-related exemption from environmental resource permitting, pursuant to section 373.406(2). The Property is classified as agricultural by the Bradford County Property Appraiser. A county-maintained dirt road, Southwest 101st Avenue, forms the western boundary of the Property, and Lake Sampson forms the eastern boundary of the Property. Petitioners have owned the Property since 1996, and currently reside on the Property. A drainage ditch runs through the Property from Southwest 101st Avenue to Lake Sampson. The evidence suggests that it was originally constructed in the 1960s, was dug through wetlands and uplands, and serves to drain the area west of Southwest 101st Avenue. The ditch had the effect of draining some of the wetlands that had previously existed on the Property. The drainage ditch ends in the Northwest corner of the wetland above ditch plug 3, at which point water flows east and then north, eventually flowing into Lake Sampson north of the Property. The wetland above ditch plug 3 was a natural wetland which was likely part of Lake Sampson before Lake Sampson was partially drained in 1887. At some point, a low berm was pushed around parts of this wetland. Prior to Petitioners’ ownership, the berm was breached and the wetland drained. Ditch plug 3 was installed in this breach. Ditch plug 3 restored water to the same level as was present when the wetland was part of Lake Sampson. The Property contains stands of planted and naturally- regenerating pine, natural cypress, and a stand of cypress trees planted by Petitioners. Cypress is present on 43 acres of the Property, with more than 50 percent of that area having been planted. The density at which the cypress was planted will require that the stand be thinned. Most of the thinned cypress trees will be sent off to be turned into mulch. Some will be of a size that it can go into saw timber. Silviculture has been defined in several ways: The United States Department of Agriculture and the Department have, on their websites defined silviculture as “the art and science of controlling the establishment, growth, composition, health, and quality of forest and woodland vegetation to meet the diverse interests of landowners and a wide variety of objectives.” The United States Forest Service website defines silviculture as “the art and science of controlling the establishment, growth, composition, health and quality of forests and woodlands to meet the diverse needs and values of landowners and society on a sustainable basis.” Florida Administrative Code Rule 5I-2.003(29) defines silviculture as “a forestry operation dealing with the establishment, development, reproduction, and care of forest flora and fauna.” The Department’s Silviculture Best Management Practices, adopted in rule 5I-6.002, defines silviculture as “a process, following accepted forest management principles, whereby the trees constituting forests are tended, harvested and reproduced.” Production of cypress for lumber and mulch is a silvicultural and agricultural activity. Petitioners’ production of cypress for lumber and mulch constitutes a silvicultural operation. The production of cypress is enhanced by periodic inundation to control hardwood species of competing trees. Starting in 2004, Petitioners began to plan for the installation of ditch plugs on the Property, and shortly thereafter installed ditch plug 3, which is not in wetlands. That plug was short-lived, being removed prior to 2006 when Petitioners started getting groundwater infiltration into their shallow drinking water well. At some time in 2006 or 2007, Petitioners reinstalled ditch plug 3. In 2009, at the request of Petitioners, a preliminary field review was conducted by staff of the District to discuss the potential to install ditch plugs on the Property. Based on the preliminary investigation, it was determined that additional analysis would be needed to make sure that the proposed plugs would not have offsite and upstream drainage problems. Ditch plugs 1 and 2 were installed in stages beginning in 2011. Construction of the ditch plugs was done in stages to ensure that no offsite impacts would occur. There is no evidence in this case to suggest that the ditch plugs have resulted in any offsite and upstream drainage problems. Petitioners assert that the ditch plugs were installed to return water to wetlands that had been drained so as to enhance the production of cypress in those wetlands. Petitioners also admit that the ditch plugs will also have the effect of mitigating for sediment eroding from Southwest 101st Avenue. On November 5, 2014, the District notified Petitioners that it had come to the attention of the District that the ditch plugs may have been installed on the Property without proper authorization. At some time after November 5, 2014, Petitioners requested that the District provide notification of the applicability of one or more of the exemptions in section 373.406 to the installation of the ditch plugs on their Property. On April 24, 2015, the District requested additional information in support of Petitioners’ request, and advised Petitioners that the ditch plugs were not exempt under section 373.406(2) because the predominant purpose of the ditch plugs was to impede or divert the flow of surface water. The District further advised Petitioners that the ditch plugs may be eligible for exemption under section 373.406(9), which exempts measures having the primary purpose of environmental restoration or water quality improvement on agricultural lands where these measures have minimal or insignificant adverse impact on the water resources of the state. On June 4, 2015, as a result of the District’s April 24, 2015, letter, Petitioners requested a binding determination as to the applicability of the section 373.406(2) agricultural exemption. On June 18, 2015, the Department conducted a site visit. According to Mr. Lamborn, the county forester for Baker and Bradford counties, who wrote the Stewardship Forest Management Plan for the Property and has visited the Property several times, the Property is not a typical timber operation. Mr. Lamborn noted that Petitioners were the only landowners during his time as a county forester that identified soil and water conservation as their primary management goal for a forest stewardship plan. Mr. Vowell has never seen ditch plugs used in a silvicultural operation in the manner that Petitioners have used them on their Property. Mr. Bartnick testified that the Department has never issued an agricultural determination providing an exemption for ditch plugs in wetlands. In coming to its Binding Determination, the Department reviewed, among other information, correspondence between the District and the Petitioners; the Silvicultural Best Management Practices manual (2008); current and historical aerial photography of the Property; a USDA Soil Survey map; the 2015 Bradford County Property Appraiser Information Card; the National Wetland Inventory Map; and the Florida Forest Service Stewardship Management Plan. The review of the request for a Binding Determination substantially complied with the requirements of Florida Administrative Code Chapter 5M-15. On September 14, 2015, the Department applied the three-part test in rule 5M-15.005, and issued its Binding Determination which concluded that Petitioner’s activities did not meet the requirements for an agricultural exemption. Under the heading "Application of Statutory Criteria,” the Binding Determination provided that: Pursuant to Section 373.406(2) F.S., all of the following criteria must be met in order for the permitting exemption to apply. "Is the landowner engaged in the occupation of agriculture, silviculture, floriculture, or horticulture?" YES. FDACS-Florida Forest Service finds that Mr. Paul Still is engaged in the occupation of silviculture. "Are the alterations (or proposed alterations) to the topography of the land for purposes consistent with the normal and customary practice of such occupation in the area?" NO. FDACS-Florida Forest Service finds that the construction of the ditch plugs are not a normal and customary practice for silviculture being conducted in the area. Normal and customary silviculture would typically not include the plugging of existing ditches. In fact, silviculture in Florida often necessitates some level of drainage to make wetter sites more accessible and therefore more productive. Based on his experience, Mr. Lamborn explained that “conservation of soils and water resources”, as the main component of a Stewardship Plan is not customary. Moreover, the 2008 Silviculture Best Management Practices manual does not list ditch plugs installed in wetlands or in large ditches connected to wetlands, as a viable practice. The reference to ditch plugs in the 2008 Silviculture Best Management Practices manual is for “road-side” ditches and has to do with the entrapment and dispersion of sediment and the reduction of ditch- flow velocity, not hydrologic restoration. "Are the alterations (or proposed alterations) for the sole or predominant purpose of impeding or diverting the flow of surface waters or adversely impacting wetlands?" Because the exemption in section 373.406(2), F.S., requires an affirmative answer to all these criteria, and we have already found that the alterations are not consistent with normal and customary practice of such occupation in the area (see (b) above), there is no need to address this issue. In sum, the Binding Determination concluded the installation of ditch plugs in Petitioners’ particular circumstance did not qualify for the agricultural exemption under section 373.406(2), because such is not a normal and customary practice for silviculture being conducted in the area. Petitioners asserted that the Department’s determination reflected a “bias” towards pine production, and did not consider the requirements of cypress production. Much of the testimony regarding customary silvicultural practices was provided by Mr. Vowell. Mr. Vowell has worked with hundreds of small, private, non-industrial forest owners, and was clearly well-versed in pine production. He described his experience with the production of cypress as “very little.”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order finding that the activities on Petitioner’s Property addressed in this case are not exempt pursuant to section 373.406(2), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Lauren Brothers, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Suite 520 407 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 (eServed) Paul Still Kathleen Still 14167 Southwest 101st Avenue Starke, Florida 32091 (eServed) Lorena Holley, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 (eServed) Honorable Adam Putnam Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue is whether the land development regulations (LDRs) adopted by Respondent, Monroe County (County), by Ordinance Nos. 008-2006, 009-2006, 010-2006, 011-2006, and 013- 2006, and which were approved (with one minor exception) by five Final Orders issued by Respondent, Department of Community Affairs (Department) on June 5, 2006, are consistent with Section 380.0552(7), Florida Statutes (2006)1.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented by the parties, the following findings of fact are made: Parties The County is a non-chartered county and a political subdivision of the State. Because the County is located within the Florida Keys Area, which is a statutorily designated Area of Critical State Concern, all LDRs adopted by the County must be approved by the Department. §§ 380.05(6) and 380.0552(9), Fla. Stat. The LDRs are codified in the Monroe County Code. The Department is the state land planning agency with the power and duty to exercise general supervision of the administration and enforcement of the Area of Critical State Concern program, and to approve or reject LDRs adopted by local governments within an Area of Critical State Concern. Petitioner, Florida Keys Citizens Coalition, Inc., is a not-for-profit Florida corporation whose address is 10800 Overseas Highway, Marathon, Florida. The parties have stipulated that there are sufficient facts to establish that the substantial interests of FKCC could be adversely affected by the LDRs being challenged and thus FLCC has standing to initiate this action. Petitioner, Protect Key West and the Florida Keys, Inc., d/b/a Last Stand, is a not-for-profit Florida corporation whose address is Post Office Box 146, Key West, Florida. The parties have stipulated that there exists a sufficient factual basis to demonstrate that its substantial interests may be affected by this proceeding, and thus it also has standing to bring this action. Background This case involves a challenge to five Final Orders (DCA06-0R-123, DCA06-0R-124, DCA06-OR-125, DCA06-OR-126, and DCA-0R-127) entered by the Department on June 6, 2006, under the authority of Sections 380.05(6) and 380.0552(9), Florida Statutes. Those Orders approved, with one minor exception, five County Ordinances (Ordinance Nos. 008-2006, 009-2006, 010-2006, 011-2006, and 013-2006), which adopted LDRs implementing a so- called "Tier System" in order to meet natural habitat protection requirements. In essence, the LDRs place all undeveloped parcels of land in the unincorporated County into one of three categories, and then adopt development standards applicable to each category. Petitioners have challenged ninety of the tier maps (which contain the tier designations of multiple parcels in those maps) and many of the related development standards. In addition, the Ordinances allow the issuance of certain residential allocations for building permits in excess of previously established annual caps, for up to five years into the future for affordable units. The Keys were originally designated an Area of Critical State Concern by the Administration Commission in 1975 and re- designated by the Legislature in 1986. See § 380.0552, Fla. Stat. The Legislative Intent section and the Principles for Guiding Development codified in Section 380.0552(9), Florida Statutes, together require an effective land use management system that protects the natural environment and character of the Keys, maintains acceptable water quality conditions, ensures adequate public facility capacity and services, provides adequate affordable housing, supports a sound economic base, protects constitutional property rights, and requires adequate emergency and post-disaster planning to ensure public safety. Approximately sixty to seventy percent of the land in the Florida Keys is owned by the public, fifteen percent is already developed, and only fifteen to twenty percent is privately owned and not developed. If the mainland portion of the County (which includes a portion of the Everglades National Park) is excluded, over ninety-nine percent of land is in public ownership. The Florida Keys are a long arc of islands extending more than one hundred miles from just north of Key Largo to Key West. Excluding the City of Key West, the mainland portion of the Keys is approximately 80,000 to 100,000 acres. The Keys differ in size, type of plant communities, and geological characteristics and are generally divided into the Upper, Middle, and Lower Keys. A County staff report describes the Upper Keys as extending from Mile Marker 91 (Tavernier Creek Bridge) northward to Mile Marker 112, excluding the Ocean Reef subdivision; the Middle Keys as the unincorporated area stretching from Mile Marker 60 (Duck Key) through Mile Marker 71 (Long Key); and the Lower Keys as including all of the islands from Mile Marker 4 (Stock Island) to Mile Marker 40 (Little Duck Key), excluding Big Pine and No Name Keys. See Respondents' Exhibit 9, pages 11-16. Most of the parcels in dispute here are in the Upper Keys. The Upper and Middle Keys are the product of an old coral reef formation, while the Lower Keys consist of solidified limestone sand. The coral reef formation extends like a spine much of its way down the Keys. At the higher elevations in the Upper and Middle Keys (which approach five to ten feet above sea level) are uplands, consisting of tropical hardwood hammocks. As the elevation drops, different habitat occur, including transitional wetlands, salt marshes, mangroves, and eventually shallow water seagrass beds. (Surprisingly, the highest elevation in the Keys is Solares Hill in Key West, which is eighteen feet above sea level.) Upland plant communities in the Keys include a variety of hardwood trees, including gumbo-limbo, mahogany, mastic, dogwood, and tararind, and specialized shrubs, vines, and ground cover. Tall or high hammocks occur on the connected islands, mostly in the Upper Keys, and on offshore mangrove-fringed islands that provide habitat to a wide range of wildlife and maintain water quality and other functions. Shorter, denser low hammocks are found in the Lower Keys. Regardless of size, though, hammocks in one part of the Keys are important to hammocks in other parts of the Keys due to the seed dispersal role played by neo-tropical birds, which migrate every year from North America through the Keys and into the Caribbean and Central and South America. The Keys host a vast array of unique endemic animal and plant communities, over one hundred of which are listed by the federal and state governments as endangered, threatened, or of special concern. Among these are the Florida Key deer, marsh rabbit, silver rice rat, Key Largo woodrat, and Key Largo cotton mouse. In addition, the American crocodile inhabits the Keys, and the tree snail is now confined to just ten or twelve small hammocks. Also, the white crowned pigeon is a migratory bird that uses the Keys in the summertime as a migratory stopping point and is listed as a species "of concern" by the State. The Current Regulations The current version of the LDRs includes a residential Rate of Growth Ordinance (ROGO) found in Sections 9.5-120 through 9.5-123, a non-residential Rate of Growth Ordinance (NROGO) in Section 9.5-124, and environmental standards which focus on a Habitat Evaluation Index (HEI) codified in Sections 9.5-335 through 9.5-349. A building permit for a residential dwelling unit cannot be issued unless the dwelling unit has received a ROGO allocation. § 9.5-120.1. A building permit for non-residential floor area cannot be issued without an NROGO allocation. § 9.5- 124.1(a). The ROGO and NROGO allocations are issued based upon a competitive point system, with the applicants who receive the most points receiving the limited number of annual permit allocations. §§ 9.5-122(a), 9.5-122.2, 9.5-124.4, and 9.5- 124.6. The ROGO point system consists of eighteen evaluation criteria, which assign positive points for factors such as infrastructure availability, lot aggregation, density reduction, land dedication, affordable housing, and water and energy conservation. They also assign negative points for factors such as the presence of significant or critical habitat, threatened or endangered species, and coastal high hazard area. § 9.5-122.3. For example, ten negative points are assigned for federal coastal barrier resource system lands due to the environmental importance of coastal resources, while all offshore islands and conservation land protection areas receive ten negative points. NROGO utilizes a similar point system with thirteen evaluation criteria. § 9.5-124.8. The habitat protection criterion of ROGO and NROGO is based upon the type and quality of habitat on the parcel proposed for development. §§ 9.5-122.3(a)(7) and 9.5-124.8(a)(4). If a development permit is sought for land classified on the existing conditions map as slash pineland or tropical hardwood hammock, the habitat must be analyzed under the HEI system. §§ 9.5-336 through 339.1. (The existing conditions map is a map reflecting the "conditions legally in existence on February 28, 1986" and consists of 1985 Florida Department of Transportation aerial photographs at a scale of one inch equal two hundred feet depicting habitat types coded according to the system set forth in the Comprehensive Plan (Plan). It is intended to serve only as a general guide to habitat types "for the purpose of preliminary determination of regulatory requirements." § 9.5- 336.) The HEI consists of an elaborate point system covering nineteen pages in the LDRs and requires a site visit to each parcel by a qualified biologist. §§ 9.5-339.1 through 9.5-343. Through experience and the passage of time, the County and Department have become aware of deficiencies in the ROGO- NROGO-HEI point systems. The existing conditions map is based on more than 20-year-old data, and some areas that did not have valuable habitat at that time have regrown into valuable hammock. The HEI criteria are complicated and difficult to apply consistently. The HEI evaluates the habitat parcel-by-parcel and allows scattered development within large patches of habitat. The HEI criteria are also subject to varied interpretations by individual biologists. The Work Program and Carrying Capacity Study The current Plan is a result of a series of plan amendments made in order to bring the Plan into compliance with Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. After a lengthy review and hearing process that lasted a number of years, the Department found the County's initial comprehensive plan out of compliance, entered into a compliance agreement with the County requiring a complete rewrite based upon an overall carrying capacity approach, and then found the rewritten plan out of compliance. Eventually, a Final Order requiring that the County adopt additional remedial amendments was entered by the Administration Commission in 1995. See Department of Community Affairs v. Monroe County et al., DOAH Case No. 91-1932GM (DOAH July 17, 1995, Admin. Comm. Dec. 12, 1995), 1995 Fla. ENV LEXIS 129. Under the authority of Section 380.0552(9), Florida Statutes, the Administration Commission has promulgated parts of the County's Plan through the adoption of Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 28-20. One of those provisions is the Work Program in Policy 101.2.13, which includes, among others, tasks regarding preservation of upland habitat and affordable housing. These tasks are enumerated on a year-by-year basis, beginning with Year One, which ended on December 31, 1997, and continuing through Year Ten, which runs from July 13, 2006, through July 12, 2007. The Annual Work Program is a central component of the Plan's remedial amendments (required by the Administration Commission in 1995) and requires the County to implement the Florida Keys Carrying Capacity Study (FKCCS) with appropriate Plan and LDR changes. The purpose was to ensure that the zoning map maintained the carrying capacity of the Keys in perpetuity. The FKCCS was completed over a period of six years at a cost of six million dollars. The contractor, URS Corporation, completed the FKCCS and the Carrying Capacity/Impact Assessment Model (CCIAM), a separate component to be used in forecasting land use scenarios. A panel of external experts was used to peer review the scope of work. The National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences reviewed the CCIAM and FKCCS and, as a result of its review, adjustments were made to the CCIAM. The Council's review concluded that overall, due to data constraints and other issues in certain portions of the CCIAM, the model proved insufficient to develop a comprehensive carrying capacity framework that would allow for undisputable determinations of whether future development scenarios fall within the carrying capacity of the Florida Keys. The marine module, the most data deficient, was subsequently removed from the CCIAM. The study was completed in September 2002. The FKCCS' chief findings were that: Development in the Keys has surpassed the capacity of the upland habitats to withstand further development; Any further encroachment into areas dominated by native vegetation would exacerbate habitat loss and fragmentation. The lower Keys marsh rabbit and silver rice rat are highly restricted and likely could not withstand further habitat loss without facing extinction. Development in the Keys has surpassed the capacity of upland habitats to withstand further development. The secondary and indirect effects of development further contribute to habitat loss and fragmentation. Any further development in the Keys would exacerbate secondary and indirect impacts to remaining habitat. Virtually every native area in the Keys is potential habitat for one or more protected species. The FKCCS suggested four main guidelines for future development in the Keys: Prevent encroachment into native habitat. A wealth of evidence shows that terrestrial habitats and species have been severely affected by development and further impacts would only exacerbate an already untenable condition. Continue and intensify existing programs. Many initiatives to improve environmental conditions and quality of life exist in the Florida Keys. They include land acquisition programs, the wastewater and stormwater master plans, ongoing research and management activities in the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary, and restoration efforts throughout the Florida Keys. If further development is to occur, focus on redevelopment and infill. Opportunities for additional growth with small, potentially acceptable, additional environmental impacts may occur in areas ripe for redevelopment or already disturbed. Increase efforts to manage the resources. Habitat management efforts in the Keys could increase to effectively preserve and improve the ecological values of remaining terrestrial ecosystems. The FKCCS also considered a fiscal analysis. The fiscal module predicted that the programs needed to protect the Keys would be very expensive, with a disproportionate increase in government expenditures compared to the increase in population. The very high per capita costs of the needed programs is one factor to be considered as the County implements the FKCCS. The FKCCS recognizes that development pursuant to the then-existing comprehensive plan and LDRs is already extremely restricted. It also recognizes that additional growth with some associated environmental impact would be acceptable in areas that are already disturbed or ripe for redevelopment. In 2001, the County adopted Goal 105 of the Plan (also known as the Smart Growth Goal) to provide a framework within the 2010 Plan to implement the FKCCS and a 20-year land acquisition program. The initial phase of implementing this Goal called for the drafting and adoption of "Tier maps" to be used as guidance for the County's land acquisition program. The Goal contemplates that the Tier maps would designate and map properties into one of three general categories: Conservation and Natural Area (Tier I), Transition and Sprawl Reduction Area (Tier II), and Infill Area (Tier III). Additional work tasks contemplated in the implementation of Goal 105 (and thus the FKCCS) included amendment of the zoning map with a tier overlay and supporting text amendments to the LDRs, revising the permit allocation system, developing a land acquisition strategy, and a land maintenance program. These tasks are more specifically identified in a series of policies adopted at the same time to assist in the implementation of Goal 105. According to the Department, if the regulations at issue here are found to be consistent with Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, the requirements of the FKCSS will be satisfied, and there is no further requirement to make any further changes to the Plan or LDRs to implement the FKCSS. In 2004, the Administration Commission began the process for adopting a new rule, which later became effective in 2005 as Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-20.110,4 to add the following tasks to the existing Work Program in Policy 101.2.13 of the Plan related to habitat protection: In Year 8: Review and revise (as necessary) the Conservation and Natural Areas Map, Initiate acquisition strategy for lands identified outside the Conservation and Natural Areas identified as worthy of protection, Begin public hearings for Conservation and Natural Areas boundaries, Conclude public hearings for the adoption of the amended Conservation and Natural Areas Boundaries, Adopt an ordinance to implement a moratorium on ROGO/NROGO applications that involves the clearing of any portion of an upland tropical hardwood hammock or pinelands habitat contained in a tropical hardwood hammock or pinelands patch of two or more acres in size located within a Conservation and Natural Area, Adopt amendments to the comprehensive plan and land development regulations to enact overlay designations, and eliminate or revise the Habitat Evaluation Index, and modify the ROGO/NROGO system to guide development away from environmentally sensitive lands, Amend land development regulations to prohibit the designation of Conservation and Natural Areas (Tier I) as a receiver site for ROGO exempt development from sender sites; and to further limit clearing of upland native habitat that may occur in the Natural Areas (Tier I) and the Transition and Sprawl Reduction Area (Tier II) upon designation by the County, and Develop Land Acquisition and Management Master Plan and address both funding and management strategies. In 2005, the County adopted the plan amendments contemplated by Year 8 of the Work Program. These plan amendments delete the requirements for the HEI, simplify ROGO and NROGO, and adopt the Tier designation criteria. Relevant to this proceeding are Goal 205, Objective 205.1, and Policy which read as follows: GOAL 205 The health and integrity of Monroe County's native upland vegetation shall be protected and, where possible, enhanced. Objective 205.1 Monroe County shall utilize the computerized geographical information system (GIS) and the data, analysis and mapping generated in the Florida Keys Carrying Capacity Study (FKCCS), FMRI, habitat maps and field evaluation to identify and map areas of upland vegetation in the Florida Keys and to prepare Tier Overlay District Maps as required in Policy 105.2.2. Policy 205.1.1 The County shall establish the following criteria at a minimum to use when designating Tiers: Land located outside of Big Pine Key and No Name Key shall be designated as Tier I based on the following criteria: Natural areas including old and new growth upland native vegetated areas, above 4 acres in area. Vacant land which can be restored to connect upland native habitat patches and reduce further fragmentation of upland native habitat. Lands required to provide an undeveloped buffer, up to 500 feet in depth, if indicated by appropriate special species studies, between natural areas and development to reduce secondary impacts; canals or roadways, depending on size may form a boundary that removes the need for the buffer or reduces its depth. Lands designated for acquisition by public agencies for conservation and natural resource protection. Known locations of threatened and endangered species. Lands designated as Conservation and Residential Conservation on the Future Land Use Map or within a buffer/restoration area as appropriate. Areas with minimal existing development and infrastructure. Lands on Big Pine Key and No Name Key designated as Tier I, II, or III shall be in accordance with the wildlife habitat quality criteria as defined in the Habitat Conservation Plan for those islands. Lands located outside of Big Pine Key and No Name Key that are not designated Tier I shall be designated Tier III. Designated Tier III lands located outside of Big Pine Key and No Name Key with tropical hardwood hammock or pinelands of one acre or greater in area shall be designated as Special Protection Areas. Lands within the Ocean Reef planned development shall be excluded from any Tier designation. These plan amendments were found in compliance by the Department, were not challenged, and are part of the presently effective Plan. Year 8 of the Work Program also required that the County amend its LDRs to implement the Tier system. The LDRs being challenged here are intended to meet that requirement. The Challenged Ordinances After a series of eight public hearings that took place between December 2004 and March 2006, the County adopted four Ordinances on March 15, 2006, and a fifth Ordinance on March 21, 2006. Those Ordinances amended the LDRs. More specifically, on March 15, 2006, the County adopted Ordinance No. 008-2006, which deleted requirements for the preparation of the HEI for properties containing hammock, requires an existing conditions report, vegetation survey, and grants of conservation easements, and limits clearing of native upland vegetation dependent on the tier system designation. It also proposed to delete Section 9.5-342, which establishes when a hammock is classified as a Palm Hammock. In a Final Order dated June 5, 2006, the Department determined that with the exception of the proposed deletion of Section 9.5-342, the Ordinance was consistent with the Principles for Guiding Development as a whole, and was therefore approved. The County has not challenged that portion of the Final Order which disapproved the deletion of Section 9.5-342. On March 15, 2006, the County also adopted Ordinance No. 009-2006, which implements Goal 105 of the Plan by utilizing tier overlay maps as a basis for the County's competitive point system; providing revised criteria for the building permit allocation system; allowing the transfer of development exempt from the Residential ROGO provided the receiver site is located in Tier 3, is not in a velocity zone, and requires no clearing; and creating an appeal process. On June 5, 2006, the Department issued a Final Order finding that the Ordinance was consistent with the Principles for Guiding Development and was therefore approved. On March 15, 2006, the County adopted Ordinance No. 010-2006, which implemented Goal 105 of the Plan by providing criteria for the designation of the tier boundaries, excluding Ocean Reef, a vested subdivision; prioritizes land for public acquisition; and contains a mechanism for property owners to obtain due process by requesting an amendment based on specific criteria. By Final Order dated June 5, 2006, the Department determined that the Ordinance was consistent with the Principles for Guiding Development was therefore approved. On March 15, 2006, the County adopted Ordinance No. 011-2006, which implemented Goal 105 of the Plan by revising the NROGO in the unincorporated part of the County between Key West and Ocean Reef, and designating the boundaries of Tiers I, II, and III and Tier III Special Protection Areas (SPA). By a Final Order dated June 5, 2006, the Department determined that the Ordinance should be approved. Finally, on March 21, 2006, the County adopted Ordinance No. 013-2006, which implemented Goal 105 of the Plan by utilizing the tier overlay maps for all land in unincorporated Monroe County between Key West and Ocean Reef, and designating the tier boundaries of Tiers I, II, and III and Tier III SPAs. By a Final Order dated June 5, 2006, the Department approved the Ordinance. On July 7, 2006, Petitioners filed their initial Petition for Formal Administrative Proceedings challenging each of the Final Orders. On September 7, 2006, Petitioners filed an Amended Petition which made minor changes to their original Petition. The substantive allegations at issue here are found in paragraphs 26 through 31 and challenge each of the Ordinances in various respects as well as the designations given to a large number of parcels of land on ninety sheets of the Tier Overlay Maps. Just prior to hearing, Petitioners voluntarily dismissed paragraphs 26(b), 26(c), and 27(d) of the Amended Petition and therefore those allegations need not be addressed. The LDRs at issue delete the HEI system, adopt the Tier System, and simplify the ROGO and NROGO point systems. The HEI system called for lot-by-lot evaluations, which failed to take into account secondary impacts of development and resulted in loss of valuable habitat. The Tier system consists of maps which designate all areas outside of mainland Monroe County (except Ocean Reef, Big Pine Key and No Name Key) as either Tier I, SPA, or Tier III.5 The Tier designations now constitute the only habitat suitability determination, replacing all HEI and other habitat qualitative analysis. Under the new simplified ROGO point system the major points are based on the Tier designation. An application for development of a parcel in Tier I receives 10 points, in a SPA receives 20 points, and in Tier III receives 30 points. The simplified NROGO has a similar point spread. These points are intended to discourage development in environmentally sensitive areas and to direct and encourage development in appropriate infill areas, while recognizing that any development has an impact on the carrying capacity of the Florida Keys. § 9.5-122.4(a). Similar language regarding the NROGO point system is found in Section 9.5-124.7(a)(1). Tier I is assigned to parcels which are not suitable for development and are suitable for acquisition to protect native upland habitat. Tier III is assigned to parcels which are suitable for development. The SPA designation is assigned to parcels in Tier III which are part of areas of tropical hardwood hammock or pinelands of greater than one acre. Because of the point differential between Tier I, SPA, and Tier III, development will be guided towards areas suitable for development. The simplified ROGO system also awards points for lot aggregation (where the owner of multiple lots preserves all, except the lot to be developed), land dedication, affordable housing, flood hazard area, service by central wastewater system, payment to the land acquisition fund, and perseverance points. However, the major points are awarded based upon the Tier designation. The points awarded by the new LDRs are consistent with the point system already adopted in the Plan. See Policy 101.5.4., which requires the County to "implement the residential Permit Allocation and Point System through its [LDRs] based primarily on the Tier system of land classifications as set forth under Goal 105." Under both the old and the new ROGO/NROGO systems, it is possible that an applicant will never receive enough points to get an allocation since a low-scoring application always competes against all other applications for the limited number of allocations. The points for dedication of land encourage applicants to donate environmentally sensitive land to the County and assist the County to avoid inverse condemnation claims. The Tier system is easy to understand and easy to implement. The Tier system will not protect every piece of valuable habitat, but does preserve ninety-nine percent of the habitat value. The Tier system (with the changes recommended below) takes simple steps to make great gains in the preservation of habitat and thus implements the recommendations of the FKCCS. Petitioners' Challenge Prioritization Within Tiers As noted above, all parcels designated Tier I receive 10 points, and all parcels designated SPA receive 20 points. Paragraph 27f of the Amended Petition alleges that these Tier points "fail to prioritize the protection of protected species based upon their status or habitat based upon its quality within each Tier." Paragraph 27a of the Amended Petition also alleges that the Tier points "fail to assign negative points for endangered species and habitat quality to direct development in Tier I away from the most important natural areas." Petitioners are correct that the Tier system avoids the fine gradations that they describe. The County has deliberately avoided a complex point system in favor of protection for all important upland habitat. The Tier system avoids individual site assessments and designates the Tiers with a meaningful spread of points to target development to Tier III instead of environmentally sensitive land. The Tier point awards adopted in the challenged LDRs are consistent with the standards of the Plan. See Policy 101.5.4. Adjacent Projects Paragraph 27h of the Amended Petition alleges that Ordinance 009-2006, which includes the ROGO point allocations, allows the granting of 30 ROGO points to projects adjacent to native vegetation in Tier I or an SPA, as long as there is no clearing. This is arbitrary as it allows the type of indirect impact which the Carrying Capacity Study determined should no longer be allowed. Recommendation 3 of the FKCCS focuses on redevelopment and infill and recognizes that there may be some minor impacts that will be acceptable in these areas. Where existing development is already causing secondary impacts, the line between Tier I and Tier III could have been drawn further into the natural area, because the edge has already been impacted. The Tier system conservatively includes the undeveloped areas already suffering from secondary impacts in Tier I. Parcel Boundaries One of the new Tier designation criteria is found in Section 9.5-256(b) (in Ordinance No. 010-2006) and reads as follows: (b) Tier boundaries: Tier boundaries shall follow property lines whenever possible, except where a parcel line or distinct geographical feature, such as a canal or roadway, may be more appropriate. Paragraphs 28a and 28b of the Amended Petition allege that Section 9.5-256(b) is "arbitrary" and that given the underlying science concerning the need to protect all remaining natural areas, it is arbitrary and capricious for the LDR to fail to require the designation in the most protective Tier for lands that meet or potentially meet criteria for more than one Tier. The parcel-based information from the local Property Appraiser is commonly utilized as a base layer of the geographical information system (GIS) data. One goal of the Tier system is to render the permit allocation system transparent to the citizens. Assigning two Tier designations to the same parcel would create confusion, since the Tier system is designed to allocate development to parcels. For those parcels which include developed or scarified (lacking vegetation) areas and habitat suitable for Tier I designation, the County properly took into account the context of the parcel and whether the LDR development standards would allow further encroachment into the habitat. The Property Appraiser's data layer assigns a parcel number to all land that is known to be owned. Some areas of the County that appear to be land on aerial photographs are not owned by taxpayers and have not been assigned a parcel number. Since the adopted Tier Maps are based on the Property Appraiser's data layer, those areas that were not assigned parcel numbers by the Property Appraiser did not receive a Tier designation.6 If an error is discovered in the Property Appraiser's data layer and an owner of an undesignated piece of land seeks a development permit, the permit cannot be issued until the error is corrected. The LDRs apply to all land in the County, and no development can be undertaken without a development permit. § 9.5-2(a). As noted above, a development permit cannot be issued without a ROGO or NROGO allocation, or an exemption. §§ 9.5-120.1(a), 9.5-120.2, 9.5-124.1, and 9.5-124.2(a). Also, a ROGO or NROGO allocation cannot be awarded without an evaluation of the number of points assigned to an application, and points cannot be assigned without a Tier designation for the parcel. §§ 9.5-122.4 and 9.5-124.7. The following land areas challenged by Petitioners were appropriately not assigned a Tier designation because the land areas are not presently recognized as parcels on the Property Appraiser's data layer: 103 (outside parcel lines); 109 (outside parcel lines); 110; 116A and 116; 117A (outside rectangular parcel); 117; 118 and 119 (near U.S. Highway 1); 120 and 121; K146e; 154, 155, and 156; 507; K546; and 568. Tier I: Wetlands Paragraph 28e of the Amended Petition alleges that "the definition of Tier I [in Ordinance 010-2006] is arbitrarily vague in that it does not specify whether wetland native vegetated areas are to be included." Paragraph 28k of the Amended Petition alleges that the same LDR "provides inadequate protection for transitional wetlands and 'disturbed' salt marsh and buttonwood wetlands." The criteria for designation of Tier I are not vague. The criteria clearly do not include wetland native vegetated areas. The criteria "are used to evaluate upland habitats." § 9.5-256(c). The term "upland native habitat" is used throughout the criteria; the term "wetland" does not appear in the criteria. Although some wetland areas have been included in Tier I if part of a larger natural area, the focus of the Tier system is on uplands. The focus of the LDR Tier criteria on uplands is consistent with the Plan. Goal 205 states that "[t]he health and integrity of Monroe County's native upland vegetation shall be protected and, where possible, enhanced." Objective 205.1 requires the County to use various data sources "to identify and map areas of upland vegetation in the Florida Keys and to prepare Tier Overlay District Maps." Policy 205.1.1 requires the County to establish criteria for designation of Tier I. These Plan criteria refer to "upland native vegetation" and "upland native habitat" and do not refer to wetlands. The fact that the Tier I criteria are focused on uplands, and not on wetlands, does not mean that wetlands are unprotected. Section 9.5-338 of the new LDRs (in Ordinance No. 008-2006) provides that No development activity, except as provided in this division, are permitted in mangroves, freshwater wetlands and in disturbed saltmarsh and buttonwood wetlands; the open space requirement is one hundred (100) percent. The one hundred percent open space ratio for mangrove, freshwater wetlands, saltmarsh, and buttonwood wetlands is repeated in existing Section 9.5-347(b), which provides that "[n]o land shall be developed, used or occupied such that the amount of open space on the parcel proposed for development is less than the open space ratio listed below for each habitat." Only limited water-related development is allowed in undisturbed wetlands. §§ 9.5-347(c)(3) and 9.5-348(d). Disturbed wetlands are protected based on their evaluation under the Keys Wetlands Evaluation Procedure. § 9.5-348(d)(6). These wetland protections are adequate, and there is no need to require that all wetlands be designated as Tier I. Also, while some parcels designated as Tier I are surrounded in part by land that appears to be submerged, the absence of a Tier I designation on the surrounding land does not render the provision arbitrary since the new LDRs establish a process whereby a County biologist makes a site visit before the land gets scored for development. Finally, Petitioners' unsubstantiated fear that federal and state agencies may not adequately enforce their regulatory authority over future wetland development in the Keys, thus requiring a further strengthening of the County's proposed LDRs, is an insufficient basis upon which to invalidate the regulation. The following parcels challenged by Petitioners were correctly designated because the parcels are submerged lands or wetlands that are not part of a larger natural area: K105a; K112d and e; K113a; K125b; K134b; K137a and b; K145b; 148 and 148/151; K250a and b; K387a; K441b; K467b and c; K538a; K538/546a; K553; K575d; K579; K581; and K581/582a. Tier I: Natural Areas Above Four Acres One of the designation criteria for Tier I boundary criteria is found in Section 9.5-256(c)(1)a. (in Ordinance No. 010-2006) and reads as follows: Natural areas including old growth as depicted on the 1985 Existing Conditions Map and new growth of upland native vegetation areas identified by up-to-date aerials and site surveys above four (4) acres in area. Paragraph 28c of the Amended Petition alleges that this criterion "is arbitrary and capricious in that the relevant science does not support a categorical determination that natural areas below that size threshold require less protection than those at or above that threshold." The existing Plan (upon which the language in Section 9.5-256(c)(1)a. is obviously patterned) provides that one criterion for Tier I designation is "natural areas including old and new growth upland native vegetated areas, above 4 acres in area." Policy 205.1.1. In this respect, the new LDR is consistent with and implements Policy 205.1.1 and adds detail concerning sources of information. However, this policy merely establishes the "minimum" standard which the County must follow in establishing the Tier I boundary designation and does not bar a smaller size threshold, if appropriate. There are no scientific studies of record which support a particular number of acres when designating natural areas for levels of protection. Studies do show, however, that as patches of habitat become smaller, the ecological function of the patch deteriorates. Given these considerations, the County points out that in order to prioritize ecological and fiscal resources, a policy decision (with respect to the size of Tier I parcels) had to be made in order to create a system that could be administered. It also points out that the Florida Forever Program seeks to purchase "large" parcels of hardwood hammock in the Keys, presumably greater in size than four acres. (The Florida Forever Program is a land acquisition program administered by the Department of Environmental Protection.) Four-acre tracts of "natural areas" are not insignificant or common; they are "huge" by Keys standards. Simply because larger parcels have more value than smaller ones does not mean that smaller hammocks in the unique, small-island geography of the Keys are unimportant. Neither the FKCSS, nor the expert panel or peer reviews related to the study, support the use of four acres as a threshold for hammock importance. Indeed, the FKCSS and the best available science support the importance of preserving as much native hammock as possible. The scientific evidence also shows that areas less than four acres serve an important biological function for wildlife in the Keys. On the other hand, there is no relevant science that supports the claim that hardwood hammocks of less than four acres are not ecologically important or require less protection than do larger hammocks. Smaller hammocks are important for the unique plant communities they contain, regardless of their importance to wildlife. Finally, it is fair to infer from the evidence that the County's "policy" decision to use a four-acre threshold was not based on scientific considerations but, in the words of one County witness, was simply a number the County Commissioners "became comfortable with." (In fact, a January 19, 2004 memorandum by the County's outside consultant, which supports the four-acre threshold, was prepared after he knew that the County had decided to use that size threshold. See Respondents' Exhibit 5.) Because there is insufficient evidence to support the four-acre size limitation used in Section 9.5- 256(c)(1)a., that provision, as now written, should not be validated. Therefore, the following parcels were placed in an incorrect category because of the arbitrary four-acre size limitation and should be re-evaluated by the County after the Tier I regulation is revised: 91 (triangle) Ranger Station; K105c; K106a and b; K113c; K124/114; K125a; K126; K135a; K135b; K139a; K141; K142b and d; K142/144/145; K145c; K146b and c; K147b; K150; K151d; K151/152; K281a; K371a, b and c; K372a; K387b and c; K400a; 439a and b; K441a; K450/457; K468 (orange area); K482; K538b; K538/546; K548/549/540; K547; K553; K553/554; K554b; K575a; K575c; and K576. Tier I: Known Locations of Threatened and Endangered Species Another designation criterion for Tier I is found in Section 9.5-256(c)(1)e. (in Ordinance No. 010-2006) and provides as follows: Known locations of threatened and endangered species as defined in section 9.5-4, identified on the Threatened and Endangered Plant and Animal Maps or the Florida Keys Carrying Capacity Study, or identified in on-site surveys. Paragraph 28d of the Amended Petition alleges that limiting Tier I protections to known locations identified on the Threatened and Endangered Plant and Animal Map is contrary to the science as the referenced maps are not the best available science and limiting protection to "known locations" of such species arbitrarily fails to protect locations which have not yet been verified as "known" locations, but which may or are likely to be important to protected species. The Plan already provides that one criterion for Tier I designation is "known locations of threatened and endangered species." See Policy 205.1.1. This new LDR is consistent with and implements Policy 205.1.1 and adds detail concerning sources of information. In addition to consistency with the Plan, the known locations of threatened and endangered species criterion is a rational standard. Contrary to the allegations in the Amended Petition, the criterion is not limited to known locations as shown on the Threatened and Endangered Plant and Animal Maps. Known locations as identified in the FKCCS maps, and as identified in on-site surveys, also meet this criterion for inclusion in Tier I. The thrust of Petitioners' allegation is that the criterion ought to include suitable or potential habitat in Tier I, rather than known locations. "Known locations" means a location where the threatened or endangered species has actually been observed. "Potential habitat" or "suitable habitat" includes areas where the species has not been observed, but the habitat is similar to areas where the species has been seen. With the amendment of Tier I boundaries to an area of less than four acres, the vast majority of suitable habitat will be included in that Tier. See Finding of Fact 65, supra. Petitioners also contend that the Tier system should be based on the latest protected species maps, and that those used by the County are outdated and flawed. (Some of the data and imagery used by the County are several years old. This is presumably due in part to the fact that the process of formally adopting these LDRs began several years ago, and the County used data existing at that time.) There are now available United States Fish and Wildlife Service habitat maps reflecting 2006 conditions, which would obviously be more desirable to use. At some point in time, however, the process must come to an end; otherwise, the mapping studies would be constantly changing as new data became available, new site visits and re-evaluation of the parcels would be required each time the data were revised, and there would be no finality to the process. Tier I: Roads Paragraph 28e of the Amended Petition alleges that the Tier I designation criteria are arbitrarily vague because the criteria do not "specify . . . how roads will impact the determination of the relevant 'size area.'" The failure to address every conceivable factor does not render the Tier I designation criteria arbitrary or vague. The Tier I designation is intended to focus on larger areas, and the larger roads such as U.S. Highway 1 would have been considered a break between natural areas. However, this regulation should be distinguished from the determinations in Finding of Fact 95, infra, which relate to a lack of standards when constructing roads in the much smaller SPA areas. Tier I: Request for Designation Section 9.5-256(e) (in Ordinance No. 010-2006) provides that any individual may submit an application that an area meets the Tier I criteria, that a special master shall hold a public hearing on the application, and that the special master will render a written opinion to the planning commission and board of county commissioners either that the application meets the criteria for designating the lands as Tier I or that the documentation is insufficient to warrant a map amendment. Paragraph 28j of the Amended Petition alleges that Section 9.5-256(e) "grants the County Commission unfettered discretion to adopt or not adopt a special master recommendation to change a parcel's Tier designation." Subsection (e) of Section 9.5-256 was not changed by the new LDRs; therefore, the new LDR grants nothing that is not already in the LDRs. Moreover, subsection (e) provides a standard for the Commission's decision, that is, whether "the application meets the criteria for designating the lands as Tier I." Tier I: Six Annual Allocations Section 9.5-122(a)(6) of the new LDRs (in Ordinance No. 009-2006) provides as follows: Limit on number of Allocation Awards in Tier I: Except for Big Pine Key and No Name Key, the annual number of allocation awards in Tier I shall be limited to no more than three (3) in the Upper Keys and three (3) in the Lower Keys. Paragraph 27a of the Amended Petition alleges that Section 9.5-122(a)(6) is vague, arbitrary, and capricious because it does not specify how the six allocations will be determined. Section 9.5-122(a)(6) does not over-ride the rest of the Tier system. Each application must still garner enough points to out-compete the other applications. Section 9.5- 122(a)(6) provides a further layer of protection for Tier I parcels by specifying that, even if a larger number of Tier I parcels have enough points for a ROGO or NROGO allocation, no more than six may receive allocations in each year. Tier I: Off-Shore Islands Section 9.5-256(c)(1)f. of the new LDRs (in Ordinance No. 010-2006) provides that one criterion for designation as Tier I is "Conservation, Native Area, Sparsely Settled, and Off- Shore Island Land Use Districts." The adopted Tier Maps show some off-shore islands without a Tier designation. The County and Department have agreed with Petitioners that the Tier Maps should show the following off-shore islands as Tier I: K250c; 251; 252; 256; 390 (three islands); 4151 (two islands); K546a; 567; and K582. SPA: One Acre of Hardwood Hammock or Pinelands Section 9.5-256(c)(3) of the new LDRs (in Ordinance No. 010-2006) establishes that the fundamental criterion for designation as a SPA is as follows: Designated Tier III lands located outside of Big Pine Key and No Name Key with tropical hardwood hammock or pinelands of greater than one acre shall be designated as Special Protection Areas. Paragraph 28f of the Amended Petition alleges that the one-acre criterion for SPA is inconsistent with the best available science, which does not support a categorical conclusion that habitat patches of one acre or less is size require less protection than those placed in the SPA category. The existing Plan provides that at a minimum, "[d]esignated Tier III lands located outside of Big Pine Key and No Name Key with tropical hardwood hammock or pinelands of one acre of greater shall be designated as Special Protection Areas." Paragraph 4, Policy 205.1.1. In this respect, the new LDR is consistent with and implements that provision. As noted above, however, this does not bar the County from using a smaller acreage threshold, if appropriate. Like the four-acre threshold for Tier I parcels, a fair inference to be drawn from the evidence is that the establishment of a one-acre threshold for SPA parcels with tropical hardwood hammock or pinelands was a "policy" decision by the County Commissioners, was simply a number they felt "comfortable" with, was not based on the best available science, and is therefore arbitrary. Indeed, this "policy" decision was inconsistent with a staff recommendation made in 2004 that Tier III include "isolated upland habitat fragments of less than half an acre." See Petitioners' Exhibit 29, page 8; Respondents' Exhibit 9, page 8. The County acknowledges that current regulations that govern site visits for the HEI are based on valid science appropriate to the Keys. Under that system, the County considers only those hammock patches less than .37 of an acre to have no ecological value. Further, the County now awards positive points to patches of slightly more than one- third of an acre for having ecological value. Thus, it can be reasonably inferred that patches greater than one-third of an acre have ecological value and should be afforded more protection than now provided. Given the lack of scientific evidence to support the one-acre threshold, the validity of Section 9.5-256(c)(3), as now written, cannot be sustained. To support the one-acre threshold, the County points out that its staff performed site visits to the parcels in question to determine whether a potential SPA was really composed of hammock or pinelands and whether it was an acre or greater in size. However, this type of field work does not address the issue of whether the one-acre threshold is supported by the best available science. Accordingly, the following parcels were incorrectly placed in another category because of the arbitrary one-acre size limitation and should be re-evaluated after the SPA regulation is revised: K105b; K105/106; K106c and d; K112a, b, c and f; K113b, d and e; K114; K124/125; K125b, c and e; K133a, b, c, d, K133/134, K134a, c and d; K134a; K139b; K142a and c; K144/145 and 145a, d and e; K146a and d; K147a and c; K151a, b and c; K152a and b; K370-371; K371d; K372b; K385; K400b; K412b; K413a and b; K414b; K425; K441b; K450a, b and d; K467a, d and e; K549; K554a; K575/576; and K581/582. SPA: 40 percent Invasives Section 9.5-256(c)(3)a. of the new LDRs (in Ordinance No. 010-2006) provides conditions which "constitute a break in pinelands or tropical hardwood hammock for calculating the one- acre minimum patch size for designation" as a SPA. One of these conditions is "[a]ny disturbed pinelands or hardwood hammock with invasive coverage of forty (40) percent or more." § 9.5- 256(c)(3)a.2. Paragraph 28g of the Amended Petition alleges that Section 9.5-256(c)(3)a.2. "is contrary to the science, which calls for the removal of exotic vegetation to restore habitat and re-establish contiguity." Taking invasive infestation into account in determining whether a patch is large enough to qualify as a SPA is consistent with the FKCSS, which states Successful restoration of lands to create large patches of terrestrial habitats and to reestablish connectivity seems improbable. Restoration would require the conversion of large developed areas to native habitat, a goal that would face legal constraints, as well as high costs, uncertain probability of success, and a long timeframe for execution. Continuing and intensifying vacant land acquisition and restoration programs may provide more and faster returns in terms of consolidating protection of habitats in the Florida Keys. Since the resources to address these issues are not infinite, money is better spent acquiring larger patches in Tier I than in trying to restore the smaller patches with exotic vegetation. SPA: Central Sewer Section 9.5-256(c)(3)b.1. of the new LDRs (in Ordinance No. 010-2006) provides that the owners of lots designated as SPA may petition for a rezoning to Tier III if [t]he lot will be served by a central sewer and the wastewater collection system has an approved permit that was effective 3/21/06 to construct the system on file from the Department of Environmental Protection; Paragraph 28h of the Amended Petition alleges that Section 9.5-256(c)(3)b.1. is arbitrary because it "allows for the removal of parcels from the SPA Tier for [a reason] unrelated to their habitat value, such as service by central sewer " The March 21, 2006 date in Section 9.5-256(c)(3)b.1. means that this condition for removal from SPA applies only in the service area of the North Key Largo sewage treatment plant. The County and Department determined that development should be encouraged in the area served by the North Key Largo sewer plant, even though habitat that otherwise qualified for designation as SPA existed in that service area. The Principles for Guiding Development require the County and Department to improve nearshore water quality, and the best way to accomplish this goal is to construct central sewer systems to replace septic tanks. The Work Program adopted by the Administration Commission requires the County to fund and construct the North Key Largo central sewer system, which cannot be financed or operated without a customer base. Designating parcels as SPA in the North Key Largo service area would discourage development in that service area. In adopting and approving this regulation, the County and the Department appropriately balanced the competing goals of the Principles for Guiding Development. Given these unique circumstances, the LDR is not arbitrary. SPA: Sixteen Foot Road Section 9.5-256(c)(3)b.2. of the new LDRs (in Ordinance No. 010-2006) provides that owners of lots designated as SPA may petition for a rezoning to Tier III if [t]he lot is located within a one acre patch of hammock that is divided from the other lots that make up the one acre or more patch by a paved road that is at least 16 feet wide. Paragraph 28h of the Amended Petition alleges that this provision is arbitrary because it "allows for the removal of parcels from the SPA Tier for [a reason] unrelated to their habitat value, . . . [such as] the existence of a paved road at least 16' wide." The new regulation provides that if the owner of an undeveloped parcel designated as SPA constructs a sixteen-foot wide paved road through his property, he may then petition the County to rezone the property as Tier III simply because a paved road has been built. In providing this opportunity to rezone and develop a SPA parcel, however, the County failed to impose a corresponding requirement that the owner demonstrate that the functionality of the existing hammocks has been compromised by the road. By omitting this requirement, or imposing any other reasonable constraint, Section 9.5-256(c)(3)b.2. is arbitrary because it allows a property owner to circumvent a SPA designation by merely building a paved road. SPA: Survey Section 9.5-256(c)(3)c. of the new LDRs (in Ordinance No. 010-2006) provides that [a]ny hammock identified in the County's data base and aerial surveys as 1.00 to 1.09 acres in area shall be verified by survey prior to its designation as Tier III-A. A hammock that is deemed by survey and a field review by County Biologists to fail the minimum size criteria shall have the Special Protection Area designation removed from the subject parcel. Paragraph 28i of the Amended Petition alleges that Section 9.5-256(c)(3)c. is arbitrary because it requires a survey of any hammock less than 1.09 acres before designating it Tier III-A, while the balance of this LDR fails to require a survey of parcels below the size threshold set for Tier I before concluding that a parcel should not be placed in Tier I. The Tier designations were accomplished primarily by using GIS mapping data. When applied to the larger Tier I areas, a tenth of an acre is a small error. However, when applied to the much smaller SPA, a tenth of an acre error can be significant. The County's choice of surveying the smaller SPAs, while not treating the Tier I areas in the same manner, was not arbitrary. It is also reasonable to assume that in administering this regulation, the County will require a landowner to use a qualified surveyor to guarantee accuracy of the survey, and not allow the landowner to submit a survey that is self-serving and inaccurate. SPA: Development Standards Paragraph 28l of the Amended Petition alleges that "[t]he development standards for Tier III-A (SPA) are inadequate to protect the natural areas placed in that Tier." The development standards which apply specifically to parcels designated as SPA are Residential development is discouraged in SPAs, which receive 20 points towards a ROGO application, while Tier III parcels receive 30 points. § 9.5-122.4(a). Non-residential development is discouraged in SPAs, which receive 10 points towards an NROGO application, while Tier III parcels receive 20 points. § 9.5- 124.7(a)(1). No points are awarded for lot aggregation for a ROGO application which proposes clearing of any native upland vegetation in a SPA. § 9.5-122.4(c). No more than 40 percent of native upland vegetation, up to a maximum of 7,500 square feet, may be cleared in Tier III, including SPAs. § 9.5-347(b). For applications under consideration for sixteen consecutive quarters, the preferred County action is purchase for SPA, while an allocation award is available for Tier III that is not suitable for affordable housing. §§ 9.5-122.3(f) and 9.5-124.7(f). All generally applicable development standards also apply to SPAs, such as the environmental design criteria in Section 9.5-348; the density and intensity limitations in Sections 9.5-261, 9.5-262, 9.5-267, and 9.5-269; the shoreline setback requirement in Section 9.5-249; and the scenic corridor and bufferyard requirements in Sections 9.5-375 through 9.5-381. These development standards applicable in SPAs are adequate to protect these natural areas. Clearing on Aggregated Lots Section 9.5-347(e) of the new LDRs (in Ordinance No. 008-2006) establishes clearing percentages within the Tiers. For example, forty percent of native upland vegetation, up to a maximum of 7,500 square feet, may be cleared on a Tier III lot. Under Section 9.5-122.4(c) of the new Tier System, an applicant can receive four additional points by aggregating a contiguous vacant, legally platted lot within Tier III. Lot aggregation is "intended to encourage the voluntary reduction of density " Paragraph 26e of the Amended Petition (as orally modified at the hearing) alleges that new Section 9.5-347(e) "allows clearing on lots that receive points for aggregation, thus failing to protect the natural areas that aggregation is designed to protect." However, Section 9.5-122.4(c) provides that No points for aggregation shall be awarded for any application that proposes the clearing of any native upland habitat in a Tier III-A (Special Protection Area) area. No aggregation of lots will be permitted in Tier I. Therefore, applications which receive points for aggregation will not fail to protect natural areas because of clearing. Not-For-Profit NROGO Exemption in Tier III Section 9.5-124.3(a) provides that certain types of nonresidential development do not need an NROGO allocation. The exemptions include such uses as public/government uses, certain industrial uses, and agriculture uses. For example, Section 9.5-124.3(a)(4) of the new LDRs (in Ordinance No. 011-2006) makes the following changes to one such exemption: Development activity for certain not-for- profit organizations: Except for the non- public institutional uses on Big Pine Key and No Name Key pursuant to section 9.5- 124.2, non-residential development activity within Tier III designated areas by federally tax exempt not-for-profit educational, scientific, religious, social, cultural and recreational organizations, which predominately serve the county’s permanent population, if approved by the planning commission after review and recommendation by the planning director. This exemption is subject to the condition that a restrictive covenant be placed on the property prior to the issuance of a building permit. The restrictive covenant shall run in favor of Monroe County for a period of at least twenty (20) years. Any change in the use or ownership of the property subject to this restrictive covenant shall require prior approval of the planning commission, unless the total floor area exempted by the planning commission is obtained through an off-site transfer of floor area and/or non residential floor area allocation pursuant to this chapter. If the total amount of floor area that is transferred and/or allocated meets or exceeds the total amount of floor area exempted, the restrictive covenant shall be vacated by the County. This not-for-profit exemption is not applicable to non-residential development proposed within a Tier I designated area. those areas proposed for acquisition by government agencies for the purpose of resource protection. Non residential development approved under this section may not be changed to a for-profit use without permit approvals and a NROGO application for and receipt of a floor area allocation. (Underscored portions represent new language while the strike-through language represents deleted portions) Paragraph 29a of the Amended Petition alleges that new Section 9.5-124.3(a)(4) "arbitrarily allows a 'not-for- profit' NROGO exemption in the SPA that is not allowed in Tier I." The not-for-profit NROGO exemption is not created by the new LDRs; the new LDRs adopt new restrictions for the existing exemption. Moreover, there is nothing arbitrary about treating SPA differently than Tier I; the two designations are treated differently throughout the Tier system. The Tier I areas receive greater protection than the SPA areas as a matter of design. Existing Conditions Report The LDRs at issue in this case delete language in old Section 9.5-336, which references an "Existing Conditions Map," and create a new Section 9.5-336, which references an "Existing Conditions Report." (See Ordinance No. 008-2006). The new section requires that an application for land containing upland native vegetation communities must include a report that "identifies the distribution and quality of native habitat and any observed endangered/threatened or protected species within the parcel proposed for development." Paragraph 26a of the Amended Petition alleges that new Section 9.5-336 "provides inadequate protection for endangered/threatened or protected species that are not observed on the surveyed parcel, and does not require the use of the most current state and federal protected species lists." Paragraph 26d of the Amended Petition also alleges that new Section 9.5- 336 "fails to require the identification of potential habitat of protected species." Petitioners have mistaken the significance of the existing conditions report in the Tier System. Under the old HEI system, the habitat analysis required by old Section 9.5-337 was used to determine the quality of habitat on the surveyed parcel for the purpose of assigning points. Under the Tier System, each parcel has already been assigned to a Tier. The existing conditions report is used for the purpose of locating development on the parcel that avoids the most valuable habitat. There is nothing in new Section 9.5-336 that suggests that the most current state and federal lists will not be used in the preparation of the existing conditions report. Affordable Housing At least twenty percent of the ROGO allocations can only be used for affordable housing. See old § 9.5-122(b)(1)a.; new § 9.5-122(a)(3)a.; Policy 101.2.4. Approximately 7,000 families in Monroe County are "cost burdened," in that they pay more than thirty percent of their income for housing, which is part of the affordable housing crisis in the County. Section 9.5-266 of the old LDRs provides standards for affordable housing and grants an increase of density in some land use districts if the density is used for affordable housing. The new LDRs (in Ordinance No. 009-2006) make the following minor changes to Section 9.5-266(a)(8): (8) If an affordable or employee housing project or an eligible commercial apartment(s) designated for employee housing contain(s) at least five (5) dwelling units, a maximum of twenty (20) percent of these units may be developed as market rate housing dwelling units. The owner of a parcel of land must develop the market rate housing dwelling units as an integral part of an affordable or employee housing project. In order for the market rate housing dwelling units to be eligible for incentives outlined in this section, the owner must ensure that The use of the market rate housing dwelling unit is restricted for a period of at least fifty (50) thirty (30) years to households that derive at least seventy (70) percent of their household income from gainful employment in Monroe County; and Tourist housing use and vacation rental use of the market rate housing dwelling unit is prohibited. Paragraph 27g of the Amended Petition alleges that Section 9.5-266(a)(8) "allows housing units permitted as 'affordable or employee housing' to be used for market rate housing." The amendments to Section 9.5-266(a)(8) make only a minor adjustment in the existing incentive to include affordable or employee housing in market rate projects. Moreover, neither the old nor the new Section 9.5-266(a)(8) allows affordable housing ROGO allocations to be used for market rate housing. This section allows a developer to use market rate ROGO allocations together with affordable housing ROGO allocations to take advantage of the increased density available to affordable housing projects, while also providing an economic incentive to construct affordable housing. The new LDRs also address affordable housing by increasing the density for affordable housing in the Suburban Commercial district from fifteen dwelling units per acre to eighteen, see Section 9.5-266(a)(1)b., and increasing the length of time that an affordable housing unit must remain affordable from thirty years to privately financed projects and fifty years for publicly financed projects to ninety-nine years for all affordable housing projects. § 9.5-266(f)(1). Market Rate Housing Awards from Future Allocation Periods Section 9.5-122.1 (in Ordinance No. 009-2006) provides the application procedure for residential ROGO allocations. Subsection (h) in the old LDRs, which has been renumbered and amended as subsection (g) in the new LDRs, authorizes borrowing from future ROGO allocations in limited circumstances. Paragraph 27b of the Amended Petition alleges that new Section 9.5-122.1(g)(1), which allows the Planning Commission to award additional dwelling units from future annual allocations to complete projects, "is arbitrary and capricious as it provides no standards or limits on whether or to what extent, such additional allocations can be awarded." Among other things, Ordinance No. 009-2006 makes the following changes to Section 9.5-122.1, which pertains to the authority of the Planning Commission to award units from future allocations: ((h) (g) Borrowing from future housing allocations: ((1) Subject to approval by the board, t The planning commission may award additional units from future quarterly annual dwelling unit allocations periods to fully grant an application for multi-family residential units, if such an application receives an allocation award for some, but not all, of the units requested because the applicant seeks more units than are available during the allocation period. * * * * (3) The planning commission shall not reduce any future market rate quarterly allocation by more than twenty (20) percent, but may apply the reduction over any number of future quarterly allocation periods and shall not apply these reductions to more than the next five (5) annual allocations or twenty (20) quarterly allocations. The amendments to the LDRs do not create the authority of the Planning Commission to award future allocations to complete projects; such authority already existed. The amendments to Section 9.5-122.1 limit the extent of the additional allocations. In addition, the Plan contemplates that residential allocations can be borrowed from future quarters. See Policy 101.2.3, which provides procedures for the annual adjustment of the number of permits. Affordable Housing Awards from Future Allocation Periods The old LDRs provided the following guidance to the Planning Commission for awarding future allocations: "Multi- family affordable housing or elderly housing projects shall be given priority." Section 9.5-122.1(g)(4) of the new LDRs (in Ordinance No. 009-2006) provides that [t]he board of county commissioners, upon recommendation of the planning commission, may make available for award up to one- hundred (100) percent of the affordable housing allocations available over the next five annual allocations or twenty (20) quarterly allocations. Paragraph 27c of the Amended Petition alleges that new Section 9.5-122.1(g)(4) is arbitrary and capricious and inconsistent with the comprehensive plan, which does not allow for allocations beyond the annual caps. In addition, this allowance may result in unacceptable evacuation and environmental impacts. As stated above, the Plan contemplates that residential allocations can be borrowed from future quarters. See Policy 101.2.3, which provides that one of the factors to be considered in the annual adjustment of the number of permits is the "number of allocations borrowed from future quarters." The borrowing forward for affordable housing projects will assist the County in addressing the affordable housing crisis. As noted above, approximately 7,000 families in the County are "cost-burdened" by paying more than thirty percent of their income for housing. See Finding of Fact 111, supra. The annual permit caps are the result of a determination that there is a finite amount of development that can be allowed in the Keys without exceeding a 24-hour evacuation time (in the event of hurricanes). While County witness Conaway believes that the regulation is subject to the 24-hour evacuation cap, she acknowledged that it does not specifically say that. Even so, in making its annual evaluation, the County (and its planning staff) will know what the clearance time is from a particular area of the Keys and the amount of future allocations that can be issued without exceeding the 24-hour evacuation cap. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the new LDR will not result in unacceptable evacuation impacts. Administrative Relief Both the old and the new LDRs provide administrative relief for residential applications which have been unsuccessful in seeking a ROGO application. See old § 9.5-122.2(f) and new § 9.5-122.3. The administrative relief available under both the old and the new sections is a grant of a ROGO allocation, an offer to purchase the parcel at fair market value, or such other relief as appropriate. The old section provides administrative relief if the application has been considered for at least three consecutive annual allocation periods, and the new section if the application has been considered for sixteen consecutive quarterly allocation periods. The old and new NROGO sections have a similar provision. See old § 9.5-124.7 and new § 9.5- 124.7(f). Paragraphs 27e and 29b of the Amended Petition allege that new Sections 9.5-122.3(f) and 9.5-124.7(f) fail "to establish any required facts or findings as a condition precedent before the County can provide a form of administrative relief other than an offer to purchase." However, the new sections provide more guidance than the old LDRs because they specify that an offer to purchase at fair market value shall be the preferred action for Tier I parcels, SPA parcels, and Tier III parcels suitable for affordable housing. Also, the new LDR sections are consistent with Plan provisions regarding administrative relief. See Policies 101.6.1, 101.6.5, and 105.2.12. Protection of Listed Species Paragraph 28m of the Amended Petition alleges that Ordinance 010-2006, which adopts changes to Section 9.5-256, "provides inadequate protections for threatened or endangered species or species of special concern." Besides the thresholds used for Tier I and SPA habitat patches (which presumably will be changed to smaller areas in the future), the system uses other elements to place lands in Tier I or SPA and adequately protects the majority of undeveloped upland habitat in the Keys. The Tier system is robust, easy to administer, and implements the guidelines of the FKCCS. Protection of Habitat Paragraph 31 of the Amended Petition, as an ultimate fact, alleges that "[t]he land development regulations approved by the Final Orders are inadequate to protect the tropical hardwood hammock, pine rockland, and transitional wetland communities in the Keys." The Tier system is not intended to protect wetland communities; that is accomplished by other provisions in the LDRs. (The tier designation is primarily designed to protect upland native habitat.) The new LDRs strongly discourage development in tropical hardwood hammock and pine rockland communities. The 20-point spread between Tier I and Tier III and the 10-point spread between SPA and Tier III make it very difficult to develop in SPA and especially in Tier I. Mapping Errors As might be expected, any county-wide mapping exercise of this magnitude will inevitably include some errors. The County and Department agree with Petitioners that the following parcels were incorrectly designated: 71 (Tier III rectangle) should be Tier I; 91 (2 small lots) should be Tier I; 101 (2 small lots) should be Tier I; 102&103 (Tier 0 parcel) should be Tier I; 109 (lower right corner) should be Tier I; 117A (rectangle) should be Tier I; K124a should be SPA; K125d should be Tier I; K140/141 should be Tier I; K251/252 should be Tier I; K281b should be Tier I; K400b should be SPA; K401b should be Tier I; K412a should be Tier I; K413b and c should be Tier I; K414a should be Tier I; K450c and e should be Tier I; 526 (peninsula north of US 1) should be Tier I; K554c and d should be Tier I; K566/567 should be Tier I; K575b (except for 1 developed lot) should be Tier I; and K581 (portion drawn by Trivette) should be Tier I. aa. Big Pine Key Tier Maps 334, 344, and 345 are included in the Amended Petition and in Petitioners' Exhibits 67 and 68, both entitled "Parcels Where Tier Designation Changes Recommended." However, Petitioners offered no testimony concerning these maps. Tier Maps 334, 344, and 345 are located on Big Pine Key. The Tier Overlay Maps for Big Pine Key and No Name Key were adopted by a separate Ordinance which is not at issue in this case. bb. Consistency with the Principles for Guiding Development The Principles for Guiding Development for the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern are found in Section 380.0552(7), Florida Statutes, and are the benchmark by which to measure the validity of the LDRs. They read as follows: To strengthen local government capabilities for managing land use and development so that local government is able to achieve these objectives without the continuation of the area of critical state concern designation. To protect shoreline and marine resources, including mangroves, coral reef formations, seagrass beds, wetlands, fish and wildlife, and their habitat. To protect upland resources, tropical biological communities, freshwater wetlands, native tropical vegetation (for example, hardwood hammocks and pinelands), dune ridges and beaches, wildlife, and their habitat. To ensure the maximum well-being of the Florida Keys and its citizens through sound economic development. To limit the adverse impacts of development on the quality of water throughout the Florida Keys. To enhance natural scenic resources, promote the aesthetic benefits of the natural environment, and ensure that development is compatible with the unique historic character of the Florida Keys. To protect the historical heritage of the Florida Keys. To protect the value, efficiency, cost- effectiveness, and amortized life of existing and proposed major public investments, including: The Florida Keys Aqueduct and water supply facilities; Sewage collection and disposal facilities; Solid waste collection and disposal facilities; Key West Naval Air Station and other military facilities; Transportation facilities; Federal parks, wildlife refuges, and marine sanctuaries; State parks, recreation facilities, aquatic preserves, and other publicly owned properties; City electric service and the Florida Keys Electric Co-op; and Other utilities, as appropriate. To limit the adverse impacts of public investments on the environmental resources of the Florida Keys. To make available adequate affordable housing for all sectors of the population of the Florida Keys. To provide adequate alternatives for the protection of public safety and welfare in the event of a natural or manmade disaster and for a postdisaster reconstruction plan. To protect the public health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the Florida Keys and maintain the Florida Keys as a unique Florida resource. Except for those portions of new Sections 9.5- 256(c)(4)a., 9.5-256(c)(3), and 9.5-256(c)(3)b.2, which relate to the threshold sizes for Tier I and SPA natural areas, and the rezoning of SPA parcels based upon the construction of a road, and the parcels identified in Findings of Fact 65, 80, 86, and 132, which were incorrectly designated, the new LDRs are consistent with, and implement, the Plan. Also, with the same exceptions, the new LDRs strengthen the County's capability for managing land use and development by providing a transparent, easily implemented ROGO system that can be understood by the citizens of the County. The new Tier system avoids reliance on the varied HEI interpretations of individual biologists and simplifies implementation for County planning staff. The new LDRs are not intended to protect shoreline and marine resources, which are protected by other provisions in the LDRs. However, as development is curtailed in the upland areas, the downstream effects of runoff will be limited. The new LDRs are not intended to protect freshwater wetlands or dune ridges and beaches; these are protected elsewhere in the LDRs. Except for those provisions and parcels described in Finding of Fact 135, the new LDRs protect upland resources, tropical biological communities, and native tropical vegetation by awarding fewer points to these sensitive upland areas and directing development to scarified and infill areas. The new LDRs do not address sound economic development. The new LDRs are not intended to address quality of water, although they do promote good water quality to some extent by preserving natural habitat and open space, and thus reducing runoff. With the same exceptions identified in Finding of Fact 135, by protecting the vast majority of the upland habitat and directing development to scarified and infill areas, the new LDRs will help maintain the scenic value and the historic character of the Keys. With the same exceptions, the new LDRs also protect the small patches of hammock that contribute to the community character of the Keys. The new LDRs do not protect the historical heritage of the Florida Keys, but also do nothing to harm the historical heritage. The new LDRs encourage the public purchase of lands within the wildlife refuges and thus protect the value and efficiency of those refuges. The new LDRs also encourage the cost-effective installation of central sewer collection and disposal facilities by directing development to subdivisions which are fifty percent built-out. By directing growth to Tier III areas, the Tier system allows the County to avoid the construction of public infrastructure to serve Tier I areas. The new LDRs increase the density for affordable housing in the suburban commercial areas and double the length of time that an affordable unit must remain affordable. The new LDRs also take steps to make adequate affordable housing available in the Keys by providing that a developer may receive a density bonus by building some market rate housing as part of an affordable project. The new LDRs maintain the limitation on the annual number of development allocations and allow the County to maintain its ability to evacuate during a hurricane. With the exception of those regulations and parcels identified in Finding of Fact 135, the new LDRs designate the majority of the Keys as Tier I, which is intended for public purchase. The only way to maintain the hurricane evacuation time is to purchase developable property and retire the development rights. Except as to those LDRs and parcels identified in Finding of Fact 135, the remaining LDRs are consistent with the Principles for Guiding Development as a whole.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order approving Ordinance No. 008-2006, except for the deletion of Section 9.5-342; Ordinance No. 009-2006; Ordinance No. 010-2006, except for Sections 9.5-256(c)(4)a., 9.5- 256(c)(3), and 9.5-256(c)(3)b.2.; Ordinance No. 011-2006; and Ordinance No. 013-2006, except for the parcels identified in Findings of Fact 65, 80, 86, and 132. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 2007.
The Issue Whether the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (the “Commission”) should grant the Petition of the Tolomato Community Development District ("Tolomato") and the Split Pine Community Development District ("Split Pine") (collectively, the "Districts" or "Petitioners") to merge the two community development districts pursuant to Section 190.046(3), Florida Statutes? Concomitantly, whether the Commission should adopt a rule pursuant to Section 190.005, Florida Statutes, that establishes a single community development district with boundaries that incorporate the areas of Tolomato and Split Pine merged into the single district to be known as the Tolomato Community Development District (the "Merged District")?
Conclusions Pursuant to Section 190.005(1)(d), Florida Statutes, the initial two sessions of a local public hearing were conducted on July 7, 2009, before David M. Maloney, an Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), at the Ponte Vedra Beach Library Community Room, 101 Library Boulevard, Ponte Vedra, Florida 32082 and the Baymeadows Residence Inn Marriott, 8365 Dix Ellis Trails, Jacksonville, Florida 32256. Two additional sessions were held on July 27, 2009, at the same locations.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been an employee of HRS for more than seven years. She has cerebral palsy and uses a motorized wheelchair. During her tenure with HRS, she worked initially as a CETA employee under the supervision of Timothy Myers. She was a Social Work Assistant in a para-professional position requiring minimal paperwork. She did very well and had no problems with her supervisor or cc-workers. She received a promotion to the position of AFDC worker under the supervision of Ann Hauckes in October, 1979, and worked in the HRS Suncoast office in St. Petersburg for approximately six months. During that six-month period, she had problems completing the "on-call" and workload responsibilities of an AFDC worker and was placed on conditional status. Due to her unhappiness with her supervisor and her conditional evaluation, she was transferred from the HRS Suncoast office in St. Petersburg to Pinellas Park under the supervision of Theresa Ruppel. Ruppel supervised Petitioner from March, 1980 to January, 1982. Ruppel was instructed by her superiors to give Petitioner a limited caseload so that Petitioner could perform her job duties as an AFDC counselor, and Petitioner was given a specialized caseload of AFDC foster care cases which required limited client contact and the use of small, lightweight files. Petitioner continues to be assigned a minimal workload of substantially less than other AFDC workers. She is evaluated just within her special work assignment and not within the responsibilities of an AFDC worker. When Petitioner first came to Ruppel's unit, she brought with her unfinished "on-call" work which Ruppel had to transcribe for her. During Petitioner's tenure under Ruppel, she served only as a backup "on-call" worker. Ruppel found Petitioner to be a very difficult employee to supervise. Petitioner had emotional outbursts as a worker in Ruppel's unit but received no disciplinary action, even when on one occasion she left the work site after having an emotional outburst and refused to advise the supervisor as to why she was leaving or when she would return to work. After Ruppel transferred out of the Pinellas Park Service Center, Susan Gilbert became Petitioner's supervisor from January, 1982, until January, 1984. The initial working relationship was good. Gilbert rearranged her office so Petitioner's wheelchair moved easily within it. Gilbert assisted Petitioner by updating Petitioner's policy manual, by making an easy reference chart for Petitioner so that every time Petitioner needed something, she did not have to pull out the HRS manual and read it but could just refer to the chart. Gilbert even assisted Petitioner with a case in which the written narrative had been accomplished by Petitioner, by taking the computer document apart, stapling it, and organizing it so it could be put in the filing cabinet. Gilbert also assisted Petitioner in preparing for the recertification test that all AFDC counselors must take. Gilbert made up some exercises to help Petitioner take the test. She allowed Petitioner 8 hours in which to take the 4 hour test. When Petitioner failed the test, Gilbert gave her 12 hours in which to take it again. The relationship between Gilbert and Petitioner deteriorated when, in March or April of 1982, Petitioner invited Gilbert, her supervisor, to take two days of annual leave and a weekend to accompany Petitioner to a Miss Wheelchair pageant, an invitation which Gilbert declined because she did not want to have a personal relationship with any person she supervised. The relationship then deteriorated, with Petitioner calling Gilbert a snob for refusing to go to the Miss Wheelchair pageant and accusing Gilbert of not liking her due to her handicap. Thereafter, there were emotional outbursts by Petitioner over minor matters. Petitioner served as a backup "on-call" person under Gilbert until December of 1982, when she was removed because she had complained about the amount of paperwork and she did not want to be "on-call" on Fridays. Petitioner was put back on "on-call" duty in June, 1983, due to Petitioner's complaints, and she worked "on-call" with her friend Frances Whittle who was willing to help Petitioner with those duties until Petitioner was moved out of Gilbert's AFDC Unit in January, 1984. Between January, 1983, and December 5, 1983, Petitioner would not accept authority or supervision from Gilbert. Petitioner questioned every decision Gilbert made. She would leave Gilbert's office upset and come back in a matter of minutes, arguing with her supervisor. The problem in the working relationship between Petitioner and Gilbert resulted in high-level District Administration meetings to determine how to resolve the problem. Initially, in early 1983, the high-level District officials met to determine how they could resolve the conflict, and the Deputy District Administrator suggested transferring Petitioner to the Clearwater AFDC Unit under a new supervisor. Petitioner opposed being moved to the Clearwater office, and so the Department did not move her from Pinellas Park to Clearwater. Both Gilbert and Petitioner agreed to try to resolve any problems on their own. As 1983 went on, the work relationship again deteriorated which again resulted in the District Administrator, Deputy District Administrator, Personnel Officer, Gilbert, Petitioner and the Human Services Program Administrator meeting to see if they could resolve the deteriorated relationship. There was a meeting on December 5, 1983, with those persons and another meeting on December 12, 1983. On December 5, 1983, four options were presented to Petitioner: (1), transferring Gilbert to another unit if HRS could find another supervisor willing to trade positions with her; (2), transferring Petitioner to a position in St. Petersburg under a different AFDC supervisor; (3), allowing Petitioner to work at home and equipping her office at home with all the rehabilitation equipment necessary to do her work, under which option she would only have to be involved with Gilbert once a week to have her work reviewed; and (4) having Petitioner stay at the Pinellas Park office but transferring her supervision away from Gilbert, with Petitioner being supervised long distance by Karen Raym Girard who would then drive, initially from Suncoast in St. Petersburg and, when the Wildwood Service Center opened, from the Wildwood office in St. Petersburg once a week or as often as was needed by Petitioner. Option 4 was the option chosen by Petitioner at the December 12 meeting. 2O. The effective date for the transfer of supervision from Gilbert to Karen Raym Girard was to be effective January 3, 1984. Subsequent to December 12, 1983, but before January 3, 1984, Petitioner changed her mind and did not want option 4. Petitioner requested a third meeting with the District Administrator after she had changed her mind about the option she had selected. The District Administrator declined a third meeting and told Petitioner that she could institute an internal grievance if that is what she wanted to do. When the District Administrator did not have yet another meeting, Petitioner filed an internal HRS grievance. Before the grievance committee met, the transfer of supervision did take place on January 3, 1984. During the period January 3, 1984 until February 10, 1984, Petitioner decided she was being segregated because she was working in the Pinellas Park office but was being supervised by Girard who was located in the Suncoast office in St. Petersburg. Petitioner's feelings of segregation were based upon the fact that she was taken off "on-call" duties in Gilbert's office because she was no longer a member of that unit; her name was removed from Gilbert's bulletin board showing the names of the persons in Gilbert's unit; and there was a sign placed on a vacant office in the building reserving it for Girard to use when her supervision of Petitioner required. While Petitioner was under the supervision of Girard from January 3, 1984, until February 10, 1984, Girard had weekly conferences with Petitioner where Girard would come from St. Petersburg to Pinellas Park to the office assigned to her in the Pinellas Park Service Center. Petitioner told Girard that she wanted Gilbert to be a personal friend with her and associate with her after working hours, and that she felt that Gilbert did not like her because Gilbert did not pursue being a personal friend of hers. During the time that Girard supervised Petitioner, she found Petitioner very difficult to supervise. Petitioner would lose her temper, raise her voice, or lose emotional control. The main issue Petitioner always wanted to discuss with Girard was that she wanted Gilbert to be friends with her. Petitioner did not want to discuss work-related issues with Girard. From February 10, 1984 until August 31, 1984, Petitioner was on extended leave -- annual leave, sick leave, and leave without pay. She never physically transferred to Wildwood in St. Petersburg, although her office furniture was moved there while she was on leave. The HRS internal grievance committee consisted of one member of Petitioner's choosing, one of HRS' choosing, and one agreed upon by both HRS and Petitioner. The internal grievance committee found: that an irreconcilable personality conflict existed between Gilbert and Petitioner; that the conflict was based on Petitioner's desire for a relationship that was personal as well as professional and Gilbert's inability to provide that relationship; that Petitioner did not have any problems with performing her job duties and was rated above satisfactory (it did not mention that Petitioner was only evaluated against her own performance) that considerable efforts were made to try to improve and clarify the relationship between Gilbert and Petitioner; that those efforts were not successful and the situation deteriorated rather than improved; that four options or solutions were discussed with Petitioner; that Petitioner participated in the selection of the option to remain in Pinellas Park but transfer her supervision, and that she agreed to that option; that subsequently she experienced a feeling of segregation and decided that the option was not in her best interest; that due to her physical location and supervision, she was segregated from her unit; that the committee was unable to substantiate any instance of discrimination due to Petitioner's handicap on the part of management; that she had been afforded special accommodations due to her handicap not normally given employees; that Petitioner's proposed solution was to return to her previous unit for a 90-day trial period during which all parties should work to improve the relationship. On February 9, 1984, the internal grievance committee recommended that: Both Petitioner and Gilbert be referred to EAP, Petitioner for counseling and more realistic expectations in dealing with management/employee relationships and Gilbert for sensitivity training in dealing with employees with special needs. Petitioner be physically transferred to Girard's unit when the HRS move to the Wildwood Service Center was made for the following reasons: Petitioner was experiencing segregation which could only be alleviated by physically locating her with the unit of which she was a member. The personality conflict between Gilbert and Petitioner could not be solved. The situation was detrimental to Petitioner's emotional and physical well being. By waiting to relocate Petitioner at the time of the HRS move to Wildwood, she would not be singled out as being moved because of a problem. Moving her when others were also being moved would afford her the opportunity to naturally interrelate with staff experiencing the same action. It was hoped that would facilitate her adjustment to her new service center. The Wildwood facility could easily be made accessible for her and a room could be adapted to her needs. Wildwood is on the Interstate and, therefore could be reached from Petitioner's home within a reasonable time frame. In the future, District Management should make every effort to afford Petitioner treatment consistent with treatment afforded all other employees. Special considerations given in the past had exceeded reasonable accommodation and had led Petitioner to have unrealistic expectations and difficulty in adjusting to the normal work setting. The many special considerations had not been to her benefit and, in fact, had been a disservice to her. On February 23, 1984, Petitioner's position was transferred from Pinellas Park to St. Petersburg. The District Administrator accepted the recommendation of the internal grievance committee and agreed to transfer Petitioner from Pinellas Park to Wildwood in St. Petersburg when Wildwood opened in the spring of 1984. The District Administrator was satisfied that Petitioner could drive from Pinellas Park to St. Petersburg where she had previously worked. Petitioner was very unhappy with the HRS internal grievance committee recommendation because she did not want to be transferred from Pinellas Park to St. Petersburg where she had formerly worked. Her preference at that Point was that the District place her back under the supervision of Gilbert and that they attempt to work out any relationship problems. When Gilbert transferred away from her supervisory position in Pinellas Park to a counseling position in the Central Licensing Unit in June, 1984, HRS offered Petitioner the opportunity of coming back to Pinellas Park with a new supervisor, Lawrence R. Raym. Raym supervised Petitioner from July 1, 1984, until February, 1985. During that time, Petitioner's temper tantrums continued. It was estimated that her caseload only took from 2 to 7 days to accomplish each month. Susan McPhee supervised Petitioner from March of 1985 until September of 1986 and also had problems with Petitioner's general acceptance of supervisory authority. During McPhee's supervision of her there were times when Petitioner would not like what McPhee told her and would abruptly terminate the conference by simply wheeling out of the room in anger. Martin Ademy became Petitioner's supervisor in October of 1986 when this case was initially scheduled for final hearing. Ademy has not had any difficulty in supervising her. Ademy estimates that it should take her between 10 to 12 days a month to do the work assigned to her. Any work she does not complete is assigned to another AFDC counselor. Ademy does not have Petitioner do "on-call" work because, in his opinion, she cannot handle those duties. Although Petitioner has applied for some unidentified promotions which she has not received, there is no evidence that Petitioner is able to perform the duties of those unidentified positions with reasonable accommodations being afforded her. Additionally, some of those positions were at locations to which Petitioner had refused to be transferred. Respondent has not discriminated against Petitioner based upon her handicap and has not retaliated against her in any way. HRS has provided Petitioner with much more than reasonable accommodation. To the extent that HRS has treated Petitioner differently than other employees, it has been through pampering rather than discrimination or retaliation. Petitioner has not suffered any physical or emotional illness as a result of any conduct on the part of Respondent. Although Petitioner testified that her absence from work from February until August, 1984, was due to illness brought on by Respondent's discrimination and retaliation, her testimony is simply untrue. Petitioner became ill while she was on annual leave. The minimal medical attention she received was for long- standing medical problems. Although Petitioner had provided HRS with reports from her doctor indicating her medical problems were work-related, those opinions were not those of her doctor. Rather, those reports were "doctored" by Petitioner herself before she gave them to HRS.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and conclusions of Law, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Respondent has not discriminated or retaliated against Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 9th day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Beverly L. Lassor 6333 81st Avenue North Pinellas Park, Florida 34665 Barbara Ann Dell McPherson, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2255 East Bay Drive Clearwater, Florida 33546 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the respective Administrative Complaints, and, if so, whether Petitioner should impose against Respondent an administrative fine, penalty, and survey fee.
Findings Of Fact DOAH Case No. 13-2011: Failure to Properly Train, Supervise, and Perform CPR Pine Tree Manor is licensed by the Agency for Health Care Administration to operate a 24-bed assisted living facility. The facility's license number is 8317, and it expires on November 13, 2014. On February 12, 2013, the date of the incident that provides the basis for the instant action, Aurelia Cristobal was employed as a staff member at the facility operated by Pine Tree Manor. Spanish is Ms. Cristobal's native language, and her ability to speak English is very limited. Brent Sparks, the owner and administrator at Pine Tree Manor, acknowledged, when interviewed as part of the post-incident investigation, that Ms. Cristobal struggles at times with English, especially when under stress. Mr. Sparks was aware of Ms. Cristobal's limitations with English prior to February 12, 2013. Within a few days of B.Y.'s death, Ms. Cristobal left the United States and is believed to be currently living in Mexico. Ms. Cristobal did not testify during the final hearing. For the period June 15, 2011, through June 15, 2013, Ms. Cristobal was certified by the American Safety & Health Institute in the areas of automated external defibrillation (AED), cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), and basic first aid. In the spring of 2011, Ms. Cristobal received training from Pine Tree Manor in the areas of facility emergency procedures and do not resuscitate (DNR) orders. Pine Tree Manor's written emergency procedures provide, in part, as follows: In all emergencies, it is important to remain calm and display a sense of control. Upsetting our residents will only induce undue stress. DIAL "911" EMERGENCY in the following cases: A medical emergency such as serious injuries or life threatening incidences. Fires Bodily harm to staff or residents such as terrorism, robbery, inclement weather. Call the administrator if there is any question concerning injury or illness, a resident is missing, security of facility is in doubt, or inspectors enter the facility. In the case of any significant changes or emergency, call the family, guardian and a health care provider. Also, contact the administrator. In cases of non-emergency need for transportation to the hospital or emergency room, call SUNSTAR AMBULANCE SERVICE @ 530-1234. In all cases, use common sense and remain calm, and remember to contact the administrator if in doubt. Pine Tree Manor's policy regarding DNR orders provides that: In the event a resident with a signed DNR experiences cardiopulmonary arrest, our policy is for staff trained in CPR/AED to withhold resuscitative treatment. Staff will report to the administrator immediately and in turn notify [the] resident's medical providers and resident representative. For example, staff on duty shall call 911 to report the condition, or if on Hospice [place] a call to (727) 586-4432, the Lavender Team Patient Leader. B.Y. became a resident of Pine Tree Manor on or about December 23, 2010. B.Y. did not execute a DNR directive. On February 12, 2013, between the hours of approximately 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., Ms. Cristobal was the only employee on site at Pine Tree Manor. According to J.M., who on February 12, 2013, was a resident at Pine Tree Manor, B.Y. entered a common area of the facility where J.M. and other residents were located. J.M. advised that B.Y. sat on the sofa, and started watching television. While on the sofa, B.Y. stopped breathing. The evidence is inconclusive as to how long B.Y. was incapacitated before others learned of her condition. Although it is not clear from the testimony how Ms. Cristobal was informed of B.Y.'s peril, she did, at some point, learn that B.Y. was incapacitated and was experiencing a medical emergency. After learning of B.Y.'s situation, Ms. Cristobal, according to J.M., became nervous and "didn't know what to do." In fact, Ms. Cristobal was so nervous that she did not call 911, she did not check B.Y. for a pulse, and she did not perform CPR on B.Y. Ms. Cristobal did, however, make several attempts to contact Mr. Sparks. Ms. Cristobal eventually reached Mr. Sparks and advised him of the situation with B.Y. The evidence does not reveal how long B.Y. remained incapacitated before Ms. Cristobal was able to speak with Mr. Sparks. When Mr. Sparks received the call from Ms. Cristobal, he was at his residence in Hillsborough County. Pine Tree Manor is located in Pinellas County. Because Mr. Sparks was in Hillsborough County when he received the call from Ms. Cristobal, he was not able to call 911 and be immediately connected to an emergency operator in Pinellas County. Understanding this limitation, Mr. Sparks called the non-emergency number for the Pinellas County Sheriff's office, who, in turn, contacted the 911 operator and informed them of the emergency. In the course of discussing the emergency situation with Ms. Cristobal, Mr. Sparks learned that she had not called 911. Knowing the emergency nature of the situation and the fact that he could not call Pinellas County 911 directly, Mr. Sparks should have directed Ms. Cristobal to call 911, since she was located in Pinellas County, but he did not. Mr. Sparks should have also instructed Ms. Cristobal to start CPR on B.Y., but he did not. According to the Pinellas County Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Patient Care Report for B.Y., the 911 call was received by the 911 dispatcher at 6:11 p.m. and an EMS unit was dispatched to Pine Tree Manor at 6:12 p.m. The EMS unit arrived at the facility at 6:15 p.m. and commenced treating B.Y. at 6:16 p.m. EMS personnel worked for nearly 30 minutes to revive B.Y., but their efforts were unsuccessful. Richard Sherman (EMT Sherman) is a firefighter and paramedic for the Pinellas Suncoast Fire District. EMT Sherman was the first paramedic to arrive at Pine Tree Manor on the day in question. Upon arrival at the facility, EMT Sherman attempted to enter through the facility's main door, but could not gain immediate entry because the door was locked. EMT Sherman rang the doorbell and knocked on the door in an attempt to gain entry into the facility. Resident J.M. opened the door, and EMT Sherman entered the facility. Upon entry, EMT Sherman noticed that B.Y. was unresponsive on the sofa. He also observed at the same time that there were several residents in B.Y.'s immediate area and that there was no staff present. When EMT Sherman arrived, Ms. Cristobal was in another part of the facility assisting a resident who had become upset because the resident was having difficulty satisfying her toileting needs. Approximately a minute after EMT Sherman started resuscitation efforts on B.Y., Ms. Cristobal appeared in the area where B.Y. was located. Because Ms. Cristobal was wearing scrubs, EMT Sherman correctly identified her as a facility employee. EMT Sherman asked Ms. Cristobal if she knew anything about B.Y. and the circumstances surrounding her collapse. Ms. Cristobal did not respond to EMT Sherman's questions. EMT Sherman testified that Ms. Cristobal, after not responding to his questions, simply "looked at [him] and then turned and walked away" towards the main doors of the facility. While continuing to attempt to resuscitate B.Y., EMT Sherman noticed that Ms. Cristobal appeared to be locking the doors that he had just entered. EMT Sherman instructed Ms. Cristobal several times to not lock the doors because more emergency personnel would soon be arriving. Apparently not understanding EMT Sherman's directives, Mr. Cristobal locked the doors. A few minutes later, district fire chief John Mortellite arrived at the facility. EMT Sherman, while continuing to work on B.Y., heard District Chief Mortellite banging on the locked main doors in an effort to gain entry to the facility. A resident eventually unlocked the doors, and District Chief Mortellite entered the building. When asked why Ms. Cristobal would call him in an emergency situation and not 911, Mr. Sparks explained that it was Ms. Cristobal's practice to always call him in an emergency and that he would, in turn, manage the situation. Mr. Sparks, by allowing Ms. Cristobal "to always call him" in emergency situations instead of 911, created an alternative practice that was directly contrary to the facility's written policy which clearly directs employees to "DIAL '911'" when confronted with a medical emergency. Ms. Cristobal was, therefore, not properly trained. Mr. Sparks, by establishing and, indeed, encouraging a practice that shielded Ms. Cristobal from directly communicating with 911, placed B.Y. in a position where there was an unacceptable delay, though not precisely quantifiable, in contacting emergency personnel on her behalf. In a life or death situation such as that experienced by B.Y., every second matters because, as noted by EMT Sherman, "the longer the delay [in receiving medical treatment] the less probability of a positive outcome." When EMT Sherman arrived at Pine Tree Manor, he was completely unaware of the fact that the only employee on site spoke little, if any English. It is, therefore, reasonable to infer that Mr. Sparks failed to inform either the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office or the 911 operator of Ms. Cristobal's limitations with the English language. By Ms. Cristobal's not calling 911, and Mr. Sparks' not disclosing to the 911 operator that the only employee on site had limited English language skills, decedent B.Y. was placed in the unenviable position of having EMT Sherman's attention divided between resuscitation efforts and worrying about whether Ms. Cristobal was able to comply with his instructions. EMT Sherman testified that Pinellas County EMS, including 911 operators, has protocols in place for dealing with individuals that may not speak English. Had either Mr. Sparks disclosed to the 911 operator Ms. Cristobal's language limitations or had Ms. Cristobal herself called 911, protocols could have been implemented by emergency personnel that would have triggered certain safeguards designed to ensure that Ms. Cristobal's language limitations did not interfere with the delivery of emergency services to B.Y. DOAH Case No. 13-2397: Failure to Remain Generally Aware of the Whereabouts of Resident Most recently, R.D., on September 27, 2010, became a resident of Pine Tree Manor. A demographic data information survey was prepared as part of R.D.'s new resident intake process. R.D.'s intake data showed that he was independent in the areas of ambulation, bathing, dressing, toileting, eating, and transferring. R.D. was identified as needing supervision when performing tasks related to personal grooming. It was also noted that R.D. suffered from anxiety and panic attacks. According to R.D.'s brother Tom, R.D. was under the care of a psychiatrist for many years and "suffered from debilitating panic attacks." When suffering a panic attack, R.D. would often lay on the ground or floor, most often in a fetal position, and remain in this position until help arrived. As a part of the new resident intake process, R.D. was assessed for his risk of elopement. The assessment revealed that R.D. was not at risk for elopement and that he was free to "come and go [from the facility] as he pleases" and that he needed to "sign out" whenever leaving the facility. By correspondence dated March 14, 2011, the administration of Pine Tree Manor reminded R.D. that he needed to adhere to the facility's resident sign-out procedure whenever leaving from and returning to the facility. Approximately ten months after reminding R.D. of the facility's sign-out procedure, Mr. Sparks, on January 2, 2012, updated R.D.'s risk assessment form and again noted thereon that R.D. "may come and go as he pleases" and he "[n]eeds to remember to sign out" when leaving the facility. On May 23, 2012, R.D. was evaluated by a physician and it was noted, in part, that R.D. could function independently in the areas of ambulation, bathing, dressing, eating, grooming, toileting, and transferring. As for certain self-care tasks, the evaluating physician noted that R.D. needed assistance with preparing his meals, shopping, and handling his personal and financial affairs. It was also noted that R.D. needed daily oversight with respect to observing his well-being and whereabouts and reminding him about important tasks. The evaluating physician also noted that R.D. needed help with taking his medication.1/ The evaluation was acknowledged by Mr. Sparks as having been received on May 25, 2012. R.D.'s most recent itemization of his medications shows that on October 10, 2012, he was prescribed Clonazepam and Buspirone. The Clonazepam was administered three times a day at 8:00 a.m., noon, and 8:00 p.m. The Buspirone was administered four times a day at 8:00 a.m., noon, 5:00 p.m., and 8:00 p.m. These medications are often prescribed for anxiety, however, R.D.'s medications listing form does not expressly denote why the drugs were prescribed. At 7:58 a.m., on November 10, 2012, an ambulance from the Pinellas County EMS was dispatched to Pine Tree Manor. When the EMS unit arrived at 8:00 a.m., R.D. was found "on the ground or floor" and was complaining of feeling anxious. While being treated by EMS, R.D. took his 8:00 a.m. dose of Clonazepam and was transported to "Largo Med." Less than 24 hours later, EMS, at 4:29 a.m., on November 11, 2012, was dispatched to 13098 Walsingham Road, because R.D. was again complaining of feeling anxious. This location is apparently near Pine Tree Manor, as the EMS Patient Care Report for this service call notes that R.D. "walked to [the] store." Following the evaluation by EMS, R.D. was again transported to "Largo Med." At 12:24 p.m., on November 18, 2012, EMS was dispatched to a location near Pine Tree Manor where R.D. was found "lying supine on [the] sidewalk." According to the EMS report, R.D. advised that he became lightheaded and fell to the ground. R.D. did not complain of any other symptoms and was transported to a medical facility in Largo for further evaluation. At 1:27 p.m., on November 25, 2012, EMS was dispatched to a 7-11 store near Pine Tree Manor. Upon arrival at the store, EMS personnel found R.D. and, when questioned, he advised that he was again feeling anxious. Per R.D.'s specific request, as noted on the EMS report, he was transferred to St. Anthony's Hospital in St. Petersburg. On November 28, 2012, Mr. Sparks made an entry into R.D.'s file and noted that a neurosurgeon evaluated R.D.'s shunt on that date in an attempt to determine if a malfunction was the cause of R.D.'s panic attacks. Mr. Sparks noted in the record that the doctor advised that the shunt was working properly and that the shunt was ruled out as the "cause of [R.D.'s] panic attacks." As of November 28, 2012, Mr. Sparks was aware that R.D. had recently complained of experiencing panic attacks and that the cause of the same had not yet been determined. It was not confirmed, although it was certainly believed by Mr. Sparks, that R.D. was manipulating medical personnel at local treatment facilities for the purpose of securing medication beyond that prescribed by his regular treating physicians. This belief by Mr. Sparks is reasonable especially in light of R.D.'s request to EMS personnel on November 25, 2012, that he was to be transported to a medical facility other than "Largo Med" for treatment related to his feelings of anxiety.2/ R.D.'s medication record for December 4, 2012, shows that he was given his prescribed medication for the 8:00 a.m. dispensing time. Soon after receiving his medication, R.D. left Pine Tree Manor for the purpose of visiting his local congressman's office. According to the survey notes from the investigation related hereto, the congressman's office is located approximately two miles from Pine Tree Manor. Although it cannot be confirmed, it reasonably appears that R.D. walked to the congressman's office. R.D. did not sign out of the facility when he left Pine Tree Manor on the morning of December 4, 2012. R.D. did, however, inform facility staff that he was going to the congressman's office to discuss an issue.3/ Security video from the building where the congressman's office is located established that R.D. arrived at the congressman's office at 9:50 a.m. At approximately 10:45 a.m., a representative from the congressman's office called Pine Tree Manor and informed them that R.D. was ready to return to the facility. The person receiving the message from the congressman's office contacted Mr. Sparks and informed him that R.D. was requesting a ride back to Pine Tree Manor from the congressman's office. Mr. Sparks was assisting another resident at a local hospital when he received the request to transport R.D. and was, therefore, unable to transport R.D. from the congressman's office. Pine Tree Manor had no obligation to provide transportation services to R.D. Surveillance video from the building where the congressman's office is located confirmed that R.D. exited the building on December 4, 2012, at approximately 10:50 a.m. R.D.'s body was found on December 12, 2012. It is not known what happened to R.D. between the time he left the congressman's office and when his body was eventually discovered.4/ When Mr. Sparks returned to Pine Tree Manor on December 4, 2012, he was advised by staff that R.D. had not returned from the congressman's office. According to the posted work schedule for December 4, 2012, Mr. Sparks worked from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. When Mr. Sparks left Pine Tree Manor on December 4, 2012, R.D. had not returned. Mr. Sparks, upon leaving the facility for the day, instructed staff (Aurelia Cristobal) to call him when R.D. returned. Ms. Cristobal's shift ended at 8:00 p.m. Pine Tree Manor employee Laura Munoz worked from 7:00 p.m. on December 4, 2012, to 7:00 a.m. on December 5, 2012. Ms. Munoz was not responsible for assisting R.D. with his medication, so it is unlikely that she would have known that R.D. missed receiving his medication prior to her arrival at work. Because Mr. Sparks left Pine Tree Manor on December 4, 2012, before Ms. Munoz arrived for work, he called Ms. Munoz after her shift started (precise time unknown) and requested that she call him upon R.D.'s return. There were no instructions given to Ms. Munoz by Mr. Sparks as to what she should do if R.D. did not return by some time certain. On December 4, 2012, Mr. Sparks knew that R.D. had never spent the night away from Pine Tree Manor without someone at the facility knowing R.D.'s whereabouts and that R.D. had never gone unaccounted for a period greater than 12 hours. On December 5, 2012, Mr. Sparks' scheduled work time was from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Prior to reporting to the facility on the morning of December 5, 2012, Mr. Sparks learned that R.D. had not returned to his room during the night shift. The exact time is not known when Mr. Sparks acquired this information, but it was likely sometime around 6:30 a.m. After learning that R.D. was still unaccounted for, Mr. Sparks immediately began canvassing the area near Pine Tree Manor. Around this same time, Mr. Sparks contacted R.D.'s brother and apprised him of the situation. At approximately noon on December 5, 2012, Mr. Sparks contacted the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office and reported R.D. missing. Pine Tree Manor has an elopement and missing residents policy that provides, in part, as follows: Residents may come and go as they please and shall not be detained unless family/resident representative and administrator agree supervision is required. A resident leaving the facility should either sign out by the front door or inform a staff member of their departure and provide an estimated time of return. The staff person should sign the resident out and notify other staff on duty. . . . If a resident . . . is deemed missing, staff shall immediately search the entire facility inside and around the facility grounds. . . . Whenever a resident is not found within the facility or its premises, the Administrator will: Notify the resident's representative. Notify the County Sheriff's Department by calling 911. Provide staff and searching parties with information and photo I. D. Instruct the staff to search inside the facility and the premises, the adjacent residential properties to the facility, up and down 131st Street, 102nd Avenue and the cross streets.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration: Enter in Agency Case No. 2013002572 (DOAH Case No. 13-2397) a final order finding that Respondent, Pine Tree Manor, Inc., d/b/a/ Pine Tree Manor, committed a Class II violation and assessing an administrative fine of $5,000.00 and a survey fee of $500.00. Enter in Agency Case No. 2013004620 (DOAH Case No. 13-2011) a final order finding that Respondent, Pine Tree Manor, Inc., d/b/a/ Pine Tree Manor, committed a Class I violation and assessing an administrative fine of $8,000.00. It is also RECOMMENDED that the final order not revoke Respondent's license to operate an assisted living facility in the State of Florida, but, instead, suspend Respondent's license for a period of 60 days.7/ DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2013.
The Issue The issue before the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC) in this proceeding is whether to grant the Petition for Establishment of the Pine Island Community Development District (Petition), dated September 9, 2003. The local public hearing was for purposes of gathering information in anticipation of quasi-legislative rulemaking by FLWAC.1
Findings Of Fact Exception to Finding of Fact Number 1 is accepted, but not materially dispositive of the issues presented. Intervenor suggests that the Hearing Officer erroneously found that the dispute arose "when the Board and DNR took a position that Clam Bayou . . . is a part of the Pine Island Sound Aquatic Preserve." The dispute arose when a DNR planning manager took the position that Clam Bayou was in the preserve. (Petitioner's Exhibit #4) This determination was made before the June 12, 1991 Cabinet Meeting, when the Board of Trustees ratified their intent to include Clam Bayou in the preserve when the preserve was created in 1970. This finding was made independently of the Hearing Officer's legal conclusions and, to the extent the Hearing Officer misstated the facts, the misstatement has no bearing on the ultimate issue of whether Clam Bayou is a part of the preserve. Exception to Finding of Fact Number 2 is rejected. The Hearing Officer's findings are supported by competent substantial evidence. (TR 96) Exception to Finding of Fact Number 5 is rejected. The Hearing Officer's findings are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Petitioner's Exhibit #13) Exception to Finding of Fact Number 6 is rejected. The Hearing Officer's findings are supported by competent substantial evidence. Exception to Finding of Fact Number 7 is rejected. The Hearing Officer's findings are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Petitioner's Exhibit #`s 12 and 13) Exception to Finding of Fact Number 8 is accepted to the extent that between 1968 and 1972, Clam Bayou was physically connected to Pine Island Sound via Blind Pass. This exception has been incorporated into revised Finding of Fact 8. Exception to Finding of Fact Number 9 is accepted and the principles set forth in the exception have been incorporated into the amended Finding of Fact 9. Exception to Finding of Fact Number 10 is rejected. The Hearing Officer's findings are supported by competent substantial evidence. 9. Exception to Finding of Fact Number 11 is accepted. 10. Exception to Finding of Fact Number 12 is accepted. 11. Exception to Finding of Fact Number 14 is accepted. 12. Exception to Finding of Fact Number 15 is accepted. 13. Exception to Finding of Fact Number 17 is accepted. Exception to Finding of Fact Number 18 is rejected. The Hearing Officer's findings are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Petitioner's Exhibit #3, 6-A, 6-B and 10-B) Exception to Finding of Fact Number 19 is rejected. The Hearing Officer's findings are supported by competent substantial evidence. (Petitioner's Exhibit #3, 6-A, 6-B and 10-B) Exception to Finding of Fact Number 20 is accepted. EXCEPTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW EXCEPTION TO CONSIDERATION OF THE RECOMMENDED ORDER BY THE GOVERNOR AND CABINET Intervenor's exception to consideration of the Recommended Order by the Governor and Cabinet is rejected. The transcript of the June 12, 1991 Cabinet meeting clearly shows the Governor and Cabinet's intent to have the issues in this case determined by a hearing officer. Although Petitioners and Intervenors presented brief oral argument to the Cabinet, no evidence was received and the Cabinet did not review the resolution and legal description, or all of the maps, photographs, or various other exhibits presented at hearing. The Cabinet did not make any findings of fact or conclusions of law with regard to this agenda item, and did not reach a conclusion as to the proper interpretation of the legal description or as to a finding of the actual intent of the Board of Trustees at the time the resolution was adopted. EXCEPTIONS TO OTHER CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Intervenors have asserted several exceptions to the conclusions of law contained in the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order. This order will address those exceptions in the format as presented in Intervenor s exceptions. Ambulatory Boundaries. This exception is rejected without reaching the merits because a conclusion of law as to ambulatory boundaries is not necessary or applicable to the determination of this matter. Clam Bayou's Presence in the Aquatic Preserve in 1970 The "Headlands Rule". This exception is rejected without reaching the merits because, as recognized by the Hearing Officer, a conclusion of law as to the Headlands Rule is not necessary or applicable to the determination of this matter. The Hearing Officer recognized that the headlands rule was never intended to be applied to the aquatic preserve: [S]trict application of the "Headlands Rule" was never intended and should not be applied in this case in construing the entire boundary, else numerous of the coves, inlets, bays, and other water bodies opening into Pine Island Sound would be excluded from the preserve. The evidence ... concerning the Board's intent establishes that such a result was not intended. (Recommended Order, Conclusions of Law, p. 22) The "Separate Name" Theory. This exception is rejected without reaching the merits because a conclusion of law as to a Separate Name Theory is not necessary or applicable to the determination of this matter. Maps of the Preserve. This exception is rejected. There is competent substantial evidence in the record to support the Hearing Officers's conclusion that the intent of the drafters of the legal description was to exclude Clam Bayou from the preserve.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Respondent agency finding that Clam Bayou and the proposed construction site at issue and referenced in the above Findings of Fact be deemed to be without the boundaries of the Pine Island Sound Aquatic Preserve. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NOS. 91-3249R AND 91-3770 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-7. Accepted. 8. Accepted, except that the maps are not exactly identical since Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 is a stippled or shaded map and the map recorded in the Lee County Public Records at Book 648, page 736, in evidence, is not actually shaded or stippled. 9-29. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-3. Accepted. Accepted, but not as being materially dispositive of the issues presented. Accepted. 6-12. Accepted. Accepted, but not in itself materially dispositive. Rejected, as not in accordance with the preponderant weight of the evidence. Accepted. 16-17. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not entirely in accordance with the preponderant weight of the evidence. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not entirely in accordance with the preponderant weight of the evidence. Accepted. Accepted, but not materially dispositive of the issues presented. Accepted, but not materially dispositive of the issues presented and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but not itself materially dispositive of the issues presented. Accepted, but not itself materially dispositive of the issues presented. Accepted. Accepted, but not materially dispositive of the issues presented standing alone. Accepted, but not materially dispositive of the issues presented standing alone. Accepted, but not materially dispositive of the issues presented standing alone. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact (City of Sanibel) 1-2. Accepted. Accepted, but not materially dispositive in this de novo proceeding. Accepted, but not materially dispositive of the issues presented. Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact (Ralph Clark, et al.) Accepted, but not materially dispositive, given the de novo nature of this proceeding. Accepted, but not materially dispositive of the issues presented. Rejected, as not in accordance with the preponderant weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Ken Plante, Esq. General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station #10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 Kenneth G. Oertel, Esq. OERTEL, HOFFMAN, ET AL. 2700 Blair Stone Road P.O. Box 6507 Tallahassee, FL 32314-6507 John Costigan, Esq. Edwin Steinmeyer, Esq. Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 Robert D. Pritt, Esq. City of Sanibel 800 Dunlop Road Sanibel, FL 33957 Mark A. Ebelini, Esq. HUMPHREY & KNOTT, P.A. 1625 Hendry Street Ft. Myers, FL 33901
