Findings Of Fact P. S. Construction is a Florida corporation in the general construction business, specializing in the construction of single family homes. Pamela Sigmund is the President of P. S. Construction, and is the sole stockholder and director of the company. Ms. Sigmund is licensed by the State of Florida as a general contractor and is the general contractor for P. S. Construction. She also is the qualifying agent for Pine Hollow Construction Corporation (Pine Hollow Construction), a non-minority construction firm. Pamela Sigmund has no ownership interest in Pine Hollow Construction. However, Ms. Sigmund is currently employed by Pine Hollow Construction as the general contractor. In that capacity, Ms. Sigmund has oversight responsibility for a project involving the construction of two-story condominiums. Pursuant to a written agreement, Pine Hollow Construction compensates Ms. Sigmund for her services as follows: a weekly salary of $600.00; a monthly car allowance of $300.00; a Christmas bonus of $4000.00; insurance benefits; and vacation time. Furthermore, the agreement provides that Pine Hollow will pay to Ms. Sigmund a small percentage of the net cash flow. Considering the scope of Pamela Sigmund's responsibility for this large construction project, the compensation package is reasonable. Pine Hollow Construction provides space within its business office for Pamela Sigmund to perform her duties as general contractor for Pine Hollow Construction. A secretary, employed by Pine Hollow Construction, is assigned to Ms. Sigmund to assist her in performing responsibilities related to Pine Hollow Construction. This secretary works exclusively for Pine Hollow Construction and does not perform any duties related to P. S. Construction. P. S. Construction's mailing address is Post Office Box 6124, Venice, Florida. This address is used exclusively for P. S. Construction and is not the mailing address for Pine Hollow. Ms. Sigmund conducts P. S. Construction's business out of her home during evening hours and not while she is working for Pine Hollow Construction in its office. Although P. S. Construction has a post office box and the company's business is conducted from Ms. Sigmund's home, neither of these addresses was listed on Petitioner's application for MBE status. Rather, Petitioner's application listed the address of Pine Hollow Construction. This was done, not because P. S. Construction is located at the same address as Pine Hollow Construction, but as a convenience to Ms. Sigmund, who is usually at the Pine Hollow Construction office during the day. Pine Hollow Construction and P. S. Construction are involved in different types of construction and share no common owners, directors, managers, facilities, or financial resources. Likewise, the two companies do not share employees, nor do they use the same subcontractors.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Minority and Economic and Business Development enter a Final Order granting P. S. Construction certification as a Minority Business Enterprise. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of June, 1996, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CARLOYN S. HOLIFIELD, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 96-0380 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent in this case. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Accepted and incorporated. 2-3. Rejected as not supported by the record. Accepted and incorporated. First sentence as a conclusion of law. Second sentence rejected as not supported by the record. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Hazen, Esquire 227 Pensacola Road Venice, Florida 34285 Joseph L. Shields General Counsel Commission on Minority Economic and Business Development 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2000 Veronica Anderson Executive Administrator Commission on Minority Economic and Business Development 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2000
The Issue Whether Grandview Landscaping Services, Inc., is liable to Petitioner for the purchase of landscaping trees; and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Southeastern Trees, LLC (Petitioner or Southeastern Trees), is a Florida Limited Liability Corporation located in Gainesville, Florida, engaged in the business of commercial tree farming. Keith Lerner is the President of Southeastern, and David Lerner is the Vice President. Respondent, Grandview Landscaping Services, Inc. (Respondent or Grandview), is a Florida corporation headquartered in Ocala, Florida, engaged in commercial landscaping. Grandview is licensed by the Department as a dealer in nursery products, flowers, and sod. In August 2015, John Sapp, Grandview’s owner, visited Petitioner’s tree farm and selected 27 live oak trees to purchase. On December 11, 2014, Mr. Sapp returned to Southeastern Trees and took possession of the 27 live oak trees. Mr. Sapp used his own equipment to haul the trees. Petitioner sent an invoice to Respondent on December 11, 2014, in the amount of $5,724.00 for the 27 live oak trees. The invoice term was “net 30,” allowing 30 days for Respondent to pay in full. After 30 days had elapsed without payment, David Lerner contacted Mr. Sapp to request payment. Mr. Lerner also requested the location of the trees in order to place a lien thereon. According to Mr. Lerner, Mr. Sapp refused to divulge the location of the trees. After 60 days had elapsed without payment, Keith Lerner contacted Mr. Sapp via telephone. According to Keith Lerner, he spoke with Mr. Sapp on March 1, 2015, who informed him the trees were beautiful and Mr. Sapp would “get him a check.” Keith Lerner attempted to reach Mr. Sapp via telephone again on March 10, 2015, and left messages with Grandview’s office and on Mr. Sapp’s personal mobile phone. Mr. Lerner did not receive a return call. On March 25, 2015, Petitioner sent Respondent, via certified mail, a letter requesting payment of $5,724.00 for the 27 live oak trees and “any interest available to us beyond the 30 days of credit that were extended to you.” The letter was delivered to both Grandview’s business address and Mr. Sapp’s home address. The certified mail receipts were returned to Southeastern Trees, signed and dated March 26, 2015. Petitioner filed a complaint with the Department on March 31, 2015, against Southeastern Trees. Petitioner paid a filing fee of $50.00 As of the date of the hearing, Southeastern Trees had not responded to Petitioner’s request for payment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order approving the claim of Southeastern Trees, LLC, against Grandview Landscaping Services, Inc., in the amount of $5,774.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Suzanne Van Wyk Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 2015.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether respondent should be dismissed from her position as a teacher for the reasons given in the amended notice of proposed dismissal dated January 20, 1995.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Gwendolyn M. Beeks, was a classroom teacher employed by petitioner, Duval County School Board (Board). When the events herein occurred, respondent was employed at Pine Estates Elementary School in Jacksonville, Florida. Between July 9, 1994, and August 22, 1994, respondent had access to the bank account of the Pine Estates Elementary School Safety Patrol. Based on a complaint by parents of patrol members, an investigation of the bank account was conducted by the state attorney. On November 14, 1994, the state attorney filed an information against respondent charging her with violating Section 812.014(c), Florida Statutes, a third degree felony. Specifically, respondent was charged with the theft of approximately $1,600.00 from the Safety Patrol bank account. On December 15, 1994, respondent entered a plea of guilty to the charge. The circuit court withheld adjudication, placed her on eighteen months probation, required restitution, payment of costs and a letter of apology, and ordered that she perform fifty hours of public service. On January 20, 1995, the Board issued its amended notice of proposed dismissal. Respondent has been suspended without pay since that time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Duval County School Board enter a final order discharging respondent as a classroom teacher for violating Sections 4(a) and (d) of the Duval County Teacher Tenure Act, as amended. The charge that she has violated Section 4(b) should be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Larry L. Zenke Superintendent of Schools Duval County Public Schools 1701 Prudential Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32207-8182 Thomas E. Crowder, Esquire 600 City Hall 1300 East Bay Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Ms. Gwendolyn M. Beeks 9801 Baymeadows Road, Number 156 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Honorable Frank T. Brogan Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should be granted an exemption from disqualification from employment with a private contractor providing adult day training to developmentally disabled clients of Respondent.
Findings Of Fact From April 2016 to October 2016, Petitioner Bertha Delaney ("Delaney") was employed by Cypress Place, Inc. ("Cypress"), a private, nonprofit corporation that provides services to developmentally disabled clients, and operates under the regulatory jurisdiction, of Respondent Agency for Persons with Disabilities ("APD"). Delaney was hired by Cypress as a receptionist, and her responsibilities included answering the phones, handling clerical tasks such as maintaining attendance sheets and filing, and assisting other employees as needed. Cypress operates an adult day training program, which offers "adult day training services" to APD clients. Such services include "training services that take place in a nonresidential setting, separate from the home or facility in which the client resides, and are intended to support the participation of clients in daily, meaningful, and valued routines of the community. Such training may be provided in work-like settings that do not meet the definition of supported employment." § 393.063(1), Fla. Stat. There is no persuasive evidence showing that, during her employment with Cypress, Delaney ever had face-to-face contact with a client while performing adult day training services. She was not, therefore, a "direct service provider" as that term is defined in section 393.063(13), Florida Statutes. Delaney did, however, have incidental, in-person interactions with clients, the evidence establishes, occasionally assisting clients in need of immediate help. Thus, although Delaney did not provide training services to clients, she provided some services in the broader sense of "helpful acts." In early August of 2016, an incident involving a client occurred at Cypress's facility, which the Department of Children and Families ("DCF") investigated. In the course of the investigation, the DCF investigator interviewed Delaney and learned that, because the subject client had appeared to be limping on the day in question, Delaney had helped the client walk from the bus to the building. At the time, Delaney had not yet undergone level 2 background screening because Cypress had not instructed her to do so. Rather, in or around April 2016, when she was hired, Cypress had required Delaney to go to the police department for a local criminal background check, which she did. Delaney, in fact, did everything that Cypress asked her to do with regard to background screening. Soon after (and perhaps because of) the DCF investigation, Cypress directed Delaney to submit to a level 2 background review, which she did.1/ And so it happened that in late August 2016, a search of Delaney's criminal history was performed, and the results were forwarded to DCF, which administers the background screening process for APD. By letter dated October 3, 2016, DCF notified Delaney that it had discovered her criminal conviction on a charge of grand theft of the third degree, to which she had pleaded no contest on June 13, 2001. This crime is a "disqualifying offense" under the applicable screening standards, which means that Delaney is ineligible to work as a direct service provider without an exemption from such disqualification. DCF advised Delaney that she needed to quit her job at Cypress and obtain an exemption from disqualification if she wanted to resume working there. Delaney promptly resigned her position with Cypress. Delaney then sought an exemption from disqualification from employment, submitting her Request for Exemption to DCF in November 2016. By letter dated March 17, 2017, APD informed Delaney that it intended to deny her request based solely on the ground that Delaney had "not submitted clear and convincing evidence of [her] rehabilitation." In other words, APD determined as a matter of ultimate fact that Delaney was not rehabilitated, which meant (as a matter of law) that the head of the agency had no discretion to grant an exemption.2/ APD did not, as an alternative basis for its proposed agency action, articulate any rationale for denying the exemption notwithstanding a showing of rehabilitation, assuming arguendo that such had been made. Delaney initiated the instant proceeding, hoping to prove her rehabilitation. The undersigned has considered the evidence as it relates to the statutory criteria for assessing rehabilitation, and makes the following findings of fact as a predicate for the ultimate determination. The Circumstances Surrounding the Criminal Incident. In or around September of 2000, Delaney stole cash receipts from her employer, Blockbuster Video, totaling approximately $13,800.00. She was soon arrested and charged with grand theft of the third degree, a felony offense as defined in section 812.014, Florida Statutes. At the time of the offense, Delaney, then 25 years old, was experiencing financial difficulties raising two young daughters. Although married, Delaney managed the household mostly on her own, as her husband, an interstate truck driver, was often on the road. Exercising what she now acknowledges was poor judgment, Delaney stole her employer's funds to ease her personal financial burden. On June 13, 2001, appearing before the Circuit Court in and for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, Delaney entered a plea of nolo contendere to the criminal charge, was convicted by plea (adjudication withheld), and was sentenced to two years' probation with orders to make restitution in the amount of $13,778.00 to Blockbuster. Delaney completed her term of probation and complied with all of the other conditions imposed by the court, including the payment of restitution. The Time Period That Has Elapsed since the Incident. The disqualifying offense was committed about 17 years ago. Delaney thus has had ample time to restore her reputation and usefulness to society as a law abiding citizen following her conviction, and to mature into an older, more responsible adult. The Nature of the Harm Caused to the Victim. Delaney did not cause personal injury to any person in the commission of her crime. She was ordered to make restitution to the victim, and did, although the details of this transaction are not available in the record. Therefore, the economic harm caused by Delaney's theft appears to have been minimal. The History of the Applicant since the Incident. Since her conviction, Delaney has completed a training program to become a patient care technician and obtained a license to practice in Florida as a certified nursing assistant. She has held positions in these fields and performed admirably. Delaney lives with her two adult daughters, son-in-law, grandson, and fiancé; her current family situation is stable, both emotionally and financially. Her civil rights have been restored. She has not reoffended or otherwise run afoul of the law. APD severely faults Delaney for a so-called nondisclosure in her response to a question on the exemption request form concerning previous employment. The form asks the applicant to "provide your employment history for the last three years." Delaney answered, in relevant part, by stating: "I have not been employed for the last three (3) years." She followed this statement by describing employment predating "the last three (3) years" and explaining that an ankle injury in May 2013 (which required multiple surgeries to repair), together with the attendant convalescence and rehabilitation, had kept her out of the workforce for a couple of years. APD argues that Delaney lied about her employment history——it is undisputed that she had, in fact, worked (for Cypress) during the three years preceding her request for an exemption——and that this alleged "lie" proves Delaney had known not only that she was required to undergo level 2 background screening before taking the job with Cypress, but also that such screening would reveal her disqualifying criminal conviction, and that, therefore, to avoid detection, she had worked without being screened, in knowing violation of law. Put aside for the moment the issue of fact regarding whether Delaney "lied" about her employment history. APD's argument (that this "lie" is proof of Delaney's knowing violation of the background screening law) is illogical. For even if (as a matter of fact3/) Delany were required to be screened, and even if (as a matter of law4/) the background screening statutes were personally violable by an applicant or employee, Delaney's allegedly fraudulent answer to the employment history question does not rationally lead to the conclusion that she knew either of these premises to be true. Moreover, as discussed in endnote 1, it is unacceptable for an agency to rely upon an applicant's alleged violation of a regulatory statute as grounds to deny an exemption request where such alleged violation has never been proved in an enforcement proceeding. This is because any person charged with committing a disciplinable offense must be served with an administrative complaint and afforded clear notice of the right to a hearing, at which, if timely requested, the agency must prove the alleged wrongdoing by clear and convincing evidence. APD wants to skip all that and just have the undersigned find here, for the first time, that Delaney clearly violated section 393.0655 by working at Cypress for at least six months without being screened. See Resp.'s PRO at 9. That's not happening. The only relevant finding in this regard, which the undersigned makes, is that Delaney has never been found to have violated section 393.0655 by working at Cypress for at least six months without being screened. As for the alleged "lie," APD's position that Delaney's response to the employment history question was knowingly and intentionally false (by omitting reference to Cypress) does not make sense, because DCF already knew (from investigating an unrelated matter) that Delaney had worked for Cypress, and Delaney knew that DCF was aware of this fact when she filled out the form. That cat was out of the bag. At hearing, Delaney testified credibly and convincingly that she had not intended to mislead DCF. It is clear that she interpreted the question as asking about her employment during the three years before the job from which she had been disqualified (as opposed to the three years before completing the exemption request form). She misunderstood the question, to be sure, but it was an honest mistake, and the undersigned can appreciate how a person in Delaney's shoes could conclude that the job from which one has recently been disqualified does not "count" towards her employment history for purposes of seeking an exemption from disqualification. Delaney's testimony in this regard is corroborated by the fact that she submitted to DCF, as part of her exemption request package, two letters of recommendation from employees of Cypress, written on Cypress letterhead, attesting to her good character. These letters, taken together, make it clear that Delaney had recently been an employee of Cypress. Obviously, if Delaney had intended, knowingly, to deceive DCF by concealing her employment with Cypress, she would not have provided these letters. APD argues that one of these letters, from Rashard Williams, which is dated October 27, 2016, does not specifically indicate that Delaney ever worked at Cypress——and thus does not bolster Delaney's testimony that she never intended to conceal the fact that she had. To reach this conclusion one must discount the writer's statement that "Ms. Delaney has proven herself to be reliable, trustworthy, and compassionate both as a person and as an employee." If the Williams letter were the only written recommendation from a Cypress employee, however, the undersigned would consider APD's interpretation to be, while certainly not the best or most reasonable, at least plausible in view of Mr. Williams's additional comments about how well Delaney took care of his grandmother in a capacity, apparently, other than as an employee of Cypress. But the companion to the Williams letter, a recommendation from Mark Chmiel dated October 24, 2016, leaves no room for doubt that Delaney was a recent employee of Cypress. A short, two-sentence excerpt suffices to support this finding: "Bertha is an invaluable addition to our agency [i.e., Cypress,] and she has fulfilled the potential of her position far better than anyone before her. Her moral character is beyond reproach and I have no qualms about trusting her with our clients."5/ The letters of recommendation that Delaney furnished DCF refute the notion that she knowingly omitted Cypress from her employment history with the intent to mislead DCF. They prove, instead, that Delaney took for granted DCF's knowledge of her work for Cypress, for she was certain DCF already knew about it. In turn, that foundational assumption (which, in fact, was true) prompted Delaney to provide a history of her employment during the several years leading up to the job with Cypress. The undersigned finds that Delaney is not guilty of knowingly withholding material information from DCF in response to the question about her previous employment. Finally, the undersigned observes that APD, in its preliminary decision-making, impermissibly allowed speculation and conjecture to take the place of facts. In forming its intent to deny Delaney's application, APD took into account the "possibility that Ms. Delaney was trying to protect Cypress Place from demonstrating that they were in violation of the screening laws" as well as the "possibility that Rashard Williams might have tried to hide the fact [sic6/] that there was a violation of the screening requirements by Cypress Place." Resp.'s PRO at 10 (emphasis added). On the basis of this rank speculation, APD conjectured that "Ms. Delaney was willing to collude with [Cypress employees] in order not to spotlight their violation of the licensing law." Resp.'s PRO at 18. APD proved none of this imaginative guesswork. Circumstances Showing Applicant Poses No Danger. Yvonne Ginsberg, the executive director of Cypress, testified in support of Delaney's application. Ms. Ginsberg stated that Delaney was an "excellent" employee and affirmed that she had "no qualms" about Delaney's returning to work at Cypress once an exemption has been secured. The undersigned credits Ms. Ginsberg's testimony as to Delaney's character. In addition, Delaney submitted the written character references of Messrs. Chmiel and Williams, which were discussed above. These documents credibly attest to Delaney's trustworthiness, integrity, and ethical behavior. The undersigned finds without hesitation that Delaney would likely not present a danger in the future if an exemption from disqualification were granted. Ultimate Factual Determination The undersigned has determined, based on clear and convincing evidence, including sufficient persuasive evidence of rehabilitation, that Delaney should not be disqualified from employment because she is, in fact, rehabilitated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order granting Bertha Delaney the exemption from disqualification for which she is, in fact, eligible. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 2017.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether a fence constructed by Charles and Kathleen Moorman (Moormans), as owners, and Your Local Fence, Inc. (Your Local Fence), as contractor, in the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern, Big Pine Key, Monroe County, Florida, was contrary to the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner, Department of Community Affairs (Department), is the state land planning agency charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, including Areas of Critical State Concern, and all rules promulgated thereunder. Monroe County is a local government within the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern designated by Section 380.0552, Florida Statutes, and is responsible for the implemen-tation of, and the issuance of development orders that are consistent with, the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations, as approved and adopted in Chapters 9J-14 and 28-20, Florida Administrative Code. Most of Monroe County, including the Big Pine Key Are of Critical County Concern discussed infra, is contained within the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern. Respondents, Charles and Kathleen Moorman (Moormans) are the owners of Lots 15, 16, and half of Lot 17, Block D, Pine Heights Subdivision, Big Pine Key, Monroe County, Florida. Such property is located within the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern, as well as the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern, and consists of native pine lands, which are natural habitat for the Key Deer. Respondent, Your Local Fence, Inc. (Your Local Fence), is a business engaged in constructing fences in Monroe County, and is owned by Mr. Moorman. On March 20, 1991, Monroe County issued to the Moormans, as owners, and Your Local Fence, as contractor, building permit No. 9110002231 to construct a fence on the foregoing property. As permitted, the fence would be constructed of wood to a height of 6 feet and, except for a setback of 25 feet, would completely enclose the Moormans' property. So constructed, the fence would measure 125 feet along the front and rear of the property and 75 feet along the side property lines for a total of 400 linear feet. Pertinent to this case, the Moormans' permit was not effective until 45 days after it was rendered to the Department (the "appeal period"), which period accords the Department an opportunity to review the permit and decide whether to contest its issuance by filing an appeal with the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC), and , if appealed, its effectiveness is stayed until after the completion of the appeal process. Section 380.07(2), Florida Statutes, and Section 9.5-115(a), Monroe County Land Development Regulations (MCLDR). Here, the Department, pursuant to the provisions of Section 380.07, Florida Statutes, filed a timely appeal with FLWAC to contest the issuance of such permit. Notwithstanding the Moormans' express knowledge that their permit was not effective until expiration of the Department's appeal period and, if appealed, resolution of the appeal process, the Moormans erected the fence on their property. Such action was contrary to the provisions of the Monroe County land development regulations and Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. Sections 9.5- 111(a) and 9.5-115(a), MCLDR, and Section 380.07(2), Florida Statutes. By separate recommended order to FLWAC, bearing Case No. 91-4110DRI, 91-5966DRI, 91-5968DRI, and 91-6603DRI (the "FLWAC Cases"), it was found, for reasons hereinafter discussed, that building permit No. 9110002231, issued by Monroe County for the construction of the Moormans' fence in the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern was not consistent with the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations. Accordingly, it was recommended that FLWAC enter a final order reversing Monroe County's decision to issue such permit and to deny the Moormans' application for such permit. Consistency of the Moorman permit with the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations Big Pine Key is the primary habitat of the Key Deer, an endangered species, and Monroe County has designated most of Big Pine Key, including the properties at issue in these proceedings, as an area of critical county concern. 1/ Pertinent to this case, Section 9.5-479, Monroe County Land Development Regulations (MCLDR), provides: Purpose: The purpose of the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern is to establish a focal point planning effort directed at reconciling the conflict between reasonable investment backed expectations and the habitat needs of the Florida Key Deer which is listed as endangered under the Federal Endangered Species Act. Focal Point Planning Program: Monroe County shall initiate a focal point planning program for the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern that considers the following: The reasonable investment backed expec- tations of the owners of land within the Big Pine Key Area of Critical Concern; The habitat needs of the Florida Key Deer; The conflicts between human habitation and the survival of the Florida Key Deer; The role and importance of freshwater wetlands in the survival of the Florida Key Deer; Management approaches to reconciling the conflict between development and the survival of the Florida Key Deer; and Specific implementation programs for the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern. The focal point planning program shall be carried out by the director of planning, in cooperation with the officer in charge of the National Key Deer Refuge. The planning program shall include a public participation element, and shall provide for notice by publication of all public workshops or hearings to the owners of land within the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern. The focal point planning program for the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern shall be completed within twelve (12) months of the adoption of this chapter, and the director of planning shall submit a report together with recommended amendments to the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan and this chapter within thirty (30) days after the completion of the focal point planning program for the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern. Interim Regulations: Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, no development shall be carried out on the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern prior to the completion of the focal point planning program required by subsection C of this section and the adoption of amendments to the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan and this chapter except in accordance with the following: No development shall be carried out in the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern except for single-family detached dwellings on lots in the Improved Subdivision District or on lots having an area of one (1) acre of more. And, Section 9.5-309, MCLDR, provides: It is the purpose of this section to regulate fences and freestanding walls in order to protect the public health, safety and welfare. * * * Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern: No fences shall be erected here until such time as this chapter is created to provide for the regulation of fences within this ACCC. The foregoing land development regulations were adopted by Monroe County to further and implement the standards, objectives and policies of the Monroe County comprehensive plan. Here, such regulations further the plan's "Generic Designations and Management Policies," contained within the plan's "Criteria for Designating Areas of Particular Concern," to maintain the functional integrity of habitat and, more particularly, the requirement that: Development within areas identified as Key Deer habitat shall insure that the continuity of habitat is maintained to allow deer to roam freely without impediment from fences or other development. Rule 28-20.020(8), Generic Designations, subparagraph 4, Florida Administrative Code. Over the course of the past five years, Monroe County has discussed design criteria for fences on Big Pine Key but has not yet adopted a regulation that would provide for fences within the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern, as mandated by Section 9.5-309, MCLDR, nor has Monroe County amended Section 9.5-479, MCLDR, to permit, pertinent to this case, any development except single-family detached dwellings on lots in the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern. Under such circumstances, it was concluded in the FLWAC Cases, and is concluded here, that the permit issued by Monroe County for the construction of the Moorman fence in the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern is not consistent with the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations. Other considerations At hearing, Mr. Moorman offered proof that the Department had failed to appeal every fence permit issued by Monroe County in the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern, and contended, as a consequence of such failure, that the Department should be precluded from contesting the issuance of his permit, or maintaining this enforcement action. Mr. Moorman's contention was not found persuasive in the FLWAC Cases, and is not found persuasive in this case. Here, the proof demonstrates that the Department's Key West Field Office, to which Monroe County renders its permits, was established in 1983, and that from January 1, 1984 to September 15, 1986, the Monroe County land development regulations did not regulate fences on Big Pine Key and the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern (BPKACCC) did not exist. Effective September 15, 1986, the Monroe County land development regulations were adopted in their current form and, among other things, created the BPKACCC and prohibited fencing within such area. Accordingly, prior to September 15, 1986, there was no prohibition against erecting fences in the BPKACCC, and no reason for the Department to question the propriety of such develop-ments. Since the effective date of the current regulations, the Department has, as contended by Mr. Moorman, failed to appeal some permits for fencing in the BPKACCC. Such failure was, however, persuasively shown to have occurred as a consequence of severe understaffing, which inhibited the Department's ability to review all permits issued by Monroe County in a timely fashion (i.e., before the appeal period expired), and the breach of a memorandum of understanding entered into between the Department and Monroe County, and not as a consequence of any position adopted by the Department that fencing in the BPKACCC was permissible. Accordingly, the Department's appeal of the Moorman permit is not inconsistent with any position it has previously taken with regard to the propriety of fencing in such area. 2/ Moreover, neither the Moormans nor Your Local Fence made any inquiry of the Department as to why some permits were appealed and others were not, or requested that the Department waive its appeal period, prior to erecting their fence. Under such circumstances, it was found in the FLWAC cases, and is so found here, that the proof fails to support the conclusion that the Department misled the Moormans or Your Local Fence so as to bar it from contesting the propriety of their permit or, here, from maintaining this enforcement action. 3/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order directing the respondents, Charles Moorman, Kathleen Moorman, and Your Local Fence, Inc., to remove the 400 linear foot fence constructed on the Moorman property, and that the respondents not construct, reconstruct, enlarge or expand a fence on the subject property unless and until such time as the Monroe County Board of County Commissioners adopts, and the Department of Community Affairs approves, a comprehensive plan and land development regulations which specifically authorize such development. Removal of the subject fence shall occur within thirty (30) days after the entry of the final order. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of April 1992. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April 1992.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether a statement promulgated by an employee or representative of the Respondent, Department of Natural Resources ("DNR"), by letter of April 2, 1991, and the later adoption or ratification of that opinion by the Respondent, Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund ("Board"), by resolution of June 12, 1991, constitutes an unpromulgated rule or amendment of a rule and thus whether it is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner has applied for a dredge and fill permit from DER. If the application is approved, the Petitioner intends to construct a 490-foot elevated driveway or timber bridge across Clam Bayou from the Sanibel-Captiva Island Road to Silver Key, on and in the vicinity of Sanibel Island in Lee County, Florida. The Petitioner proposes to construct the bridge so as to allegedly provide reasonable access to the property upon which he intends to construct residences. A number of protests to that application before DER have been filed and the petitions related to that application are now pending before the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings in Case Nos. 91- 1320 through 91-1324. The Board is an agency of the State of Florida created pursuant to Section 253.02, Florida Statutes, and consists of the Governor and Cabinet. Generally, title to submerged lands underlying navigable waters is vested in the Board pursuant to Section 253.03, Florida Statutes. The Board is authorized to approve activities in the preserve by Section 258.42, Florida Statutes. DNR is an agency of the State of Florida and serves as the staff of the Board. When DER reviewed the Petitioner's dredge and fill permit application, it determined that Clam Bayou was not within the Pine Island Sound Aquatic Preserve, an aquatic preserve created by act of the Legislature in 1975 and codified at Subsection 258.39(22), Florida Statutes. However, on April 2, 1991, DNR, through an employee or representative in its Fort Myers district office, sent a letter to the City of Sanibel ("City"), the Petitioner in Case No. 91- 1324, advising the City that the proposed project was within the boundaries of the preserve. That letter stated, in pertinent part, as follows: To follow up our recent discussions regarding the referenced file, I requested that the department's title and land records section in Tallahassee `re-review' the project site to determine if it is actually in the Pine Island Sound Aquatic Preserve. As you know, the title and land records section initially determined that the project site was not within the aquatic preserve. In response to my request, Kathy Miklus, planner, title and land records section, provided me with information indicating that the project site is indeed within the boundaries of Pine Island Sound Aquatic Preserve. Copies of that information are enclosed. Therefore, it would appear that the application will be subject to the applicable criteria of Section 258.42, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 18-20, Florida Administrative Code, regarding activities in aquatic preserves. However, as we previously discussed, the application is currently `on hold' because of the coastal island moratorium adopted in 1989 by the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, and may be subject to the pending rule amendments regarding sovereignty, submerged lands surrounding coastal islands, if those rule amendments are ultimately adopted by the Board of Trustees... DNR is the agency charged with administering the aquatic preserve program, its preserves, and with resolving issues concerning the boundaries of those preserves. Thus, the effect of the letter, if it were to become final agency action, would be to impose a more restrictive body of rules on the Petitioner concerning his entitlement to the DER permit sought from DER because if the site in question were determined to be within the preserve, it would, under the applicable rules of DER, be deemed to be within Outstanding Florida Waters. The Petitioner thus filed the petition which initiated this proceeding, contending, in essence, that the statement in the letter (as adopted by the Board) amounts to an illicit, unpromulgated rule, including the contention that it constitutes an improper repeal or amendment of the existing Rule 18- 20.002(7)(a)19., Florida Administrative Code. The questioned language in the letter at issue and under challenge reads as follows: The project site is indeed within the boundaries of the Pine Island Sound Aquatic Preserve. According to the Petitioner, this language enlarges upon or amends the existing rule cited above which describes the preserve as follows: Pine Island Sound Aquatic Preserve, as described in the Official Records of Lee County in Book 648, pages 732-736. The document recorded at the referenced Official Record Book and page numbers is the Board's Resolution No. 70-25, the document establishing the preserve and containing the legal description of its boundaries. The Petitioner contends that the Respondent's statement reflected in the above-quoted portion of the letter is a new statement of the boundary of the preserve, and it is materially different than the rule-adopted, recorded boundary description. Thus, the Petitioner asserts that the agency has clearly amended its rule describing the preserve. The statement in the letter, however, does not constitute a new statement of the boundaries of the preserve but rather the opinion of agency personnel, adopted by the Board, concerning what the already- adopted and recorded boundary description means in the view of the agency as to whether a specific site and project is included within those already-adopted boundaries. It was not proven in this proceeding that the agency statement referenced above evidences any intent to amend or change the legal description of the preserve as recorded in the Official Records of Lee County, Florida, and as codified in the above-cited rule. Rather, it represents an interpretation of that existing rule and its existing boundary description by DNR and, specifically, amounts to an interpretation concerning whether the Petitioner's property is located within the legal boundaries as presently codified in that rule.
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner, Department of Community Affairs (Department), is the state land planning agency charged with the responsibility to administer and enforce the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder. Respondent, Board of County Commissioners of Monroe County (Monroe County), is a local government within the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern designated by Section 380.0552, Florida Statutes, and is responsible for implementation of the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan and Land Development Regulations, as approved and adopted in Chapters 9J-14 and 28-20, Florida Administrative Code. Between January 6, 1988, and January 12, 1988, Monroe County cleared, graded and filled a .6 mile stretch of road between Key Deer Boulevard and Ixora Road on Big Pine Key, Monroe County, Florida. As sited, the project was within the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern and the National Key Deer Wildlife Refuge, and altered the character of the road from a private access road, which provided a right of ingress and egress for the landowners within Pine Key Acres Section 1 (Pine Key Acres), to a public collector road, which was capable of carrying traffic from local roads outside Pine Key Acres to major thoroughfares. On January 29, 1988, the Department issued a notice of violation to Monroe County which, among other things, directed Monroe County to cease work on the road project and to conform its activities to the land development regulations approved and adopted in Chapters 9J-14 and 28-20, Florida Administrative Code. Monroe County filed a timely request for a formal administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, and contended that the road work constituted routine maintenance or improvement of an existing road and, therefore, did not constitute development as defined by Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. Thereafter, the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal hearing. The Project at Issue The road work at issue in this case was constructed along the easterly .6 mile portion of the proposed right-of-way for the Cross Big Pine Key Arterial Access Road (Arterial Road). That Arterial Road would run east and west approximately 1.2 miles, through a corridor located approximately one-half mile north of and parallel to US 1, and would provide the developed residential areas of Big Pine Key, located at the extreme east and west ends of the proposed road, with an alternate to travel on US 1 to reach the central shopping area located immediately north of US 1 on Key Deer Boulevard. As proposed, the right-of-way follows a corridor along a 50-foot wide private easement, within which existed poorly maintained private access roads. The property north and south of these dirt roads, with the exception of a prison located at the southwest corner of the right-of-way and Key Deer Boulevard, is sparsely developed with single family residences, is natural habitat for the Key Deer, and is located immediately south of the main reservation of the National Key Deer Wildlife Refuge. The Arterial Road was conceived in 1985, following a six-month study by a Tripartisan Road Committee formed at the suggestion of County Commissioner Ed Swift to study alternate routes to move traffic across the island that would avoid the congestion experienced on US 1. The committee, composed of three members each from the Lower Keys Chamber of Commerce, Big Pine Civic Association, and Big Pine Concerned Citizens, ultimately recommended the proposed route to Monroe County in July 1985. This recommendation was made without benefit of a professional traffic study or environmental study to assess the need for or impact of the road. Monroe County approved the recommended route in July 1985, and authorized the committee to contact the landowners who held title to the land underlying the proposed right-of-way and to see if they could be persuaded to deed such property to the county for construction of the road. As previously noted, the proposed right-of-way followed a 50-foot wide private easement, and the landowners to the north and south of the proposed right-of-way owned, respectively, 25 feet of such lands, subject to the private access easement for adjacent land owners. In 1986, as the committee was endeavoring to acquire title to the right-of-way on behalf of Monroe County, Monroe County was developing its comprehensive plan and land development regulations for submittal to the Department as required by Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. Pertinent to this case, the plan and regulations contained no reference to the Arterial Road and permitted only one single family residence per gross acre in suburban residential areas, and excluded public rights-of-way from that calculation. Accordingly, since the lots along the proposed right-of-way were largely one- acre lots, including the 25 foot easement, the lot owners were at peril of rendering their lots unbuildable if they deeded such portions of their lands to the county. To alleviate this impediment, Monroe County, at some time prior to February 23, 1986, "assured" the committee that credit for the square footage deeded to the county would be included in calculating the size of the lot for building purposes. On February 28, 1986, Monroe County adopted its comprehensive plan and land development regulations (Land Use Plan), and forwarded them to the Department for review. On September 15, 1986, the County's Land Use Plan was approved by the Administrative Commission by rule and became effective. The Land Use Plan adopted by Monroe County and approved by the Administration Commission contained no reference or description of the proposed Arterial Road. It further permitted only one single family residence per gross acre in suburban residential areas, and still excluded public right-of-way from that calculation. On June 6, 1986, while its Land Use Plan was pending Department and Commission approval, Monroe County, in apparent recognition of the adverse impact its Land Use Plan would have on lot owners along the proposed road, adopted Ordinance No. 019-1986. Pertinent to this case, the ordinance provided: Section 1. Where a dedication is made for a county road and accepted by the county, the property so dedicated shall be taken into account by the proper county authorities and credited to the dedicating property owner for the purpose of computing density and/or area when and if the property owner applies for an improvement permit for the property. This ordinance was never submitted to the Department for approval, and was not a part of the Land Use Plan approved by the Administration Commission on September 15, 1986. Despite the fact that the Arterial Road was not included in the transportation element or any other element of its comprehensive plan, Monroe County engaged the services of Post, Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan to prepare the proposed right-of-way map for the proposed road. This map was prepared and filed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court, Monroe County, on March 26, 1987. On February 2, 1988, Monroe County adopted Resolution No. 059-1988 to "address" its failure to include the Arterial Road in its Land Use Plan. Pertinent to this case, that resolution provided: WHEREAS, the Board of County Commissioners of Monroe County adopted a Comprehensive Plan and Land Development Regulations on February 28, 1986, and said Plan and Regulations became effective on September 15, 1986, and WHEREAS, Section 13-101(E) of the Land Development Regulations provides that the Board of County Commissioners may correct typographical and drafting errors in the Regulations at any regular meeting without posted notice or public hearing provided that notice of such corrections is transmitted to the Florida Department of Community Affairs within thirty days of the adoption of such corrections: now, therefore, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF MONROE COUNTY, FLORIDA, that: Section 1. The proposed "Cross Big Pine Key Arterial Access Road" is consistent with the transportation element of the Monroe County Comprehensive Master Land Use Plan, and by prior vote of the Board of County Commissioners of Monroe County, Florida, was identified as a proposed road to be incorporated in the Monroe County Comprehensive Master Land Use Plan as a secondary collector road. Section 2. This Resolution correcting scrivener's errors and omissions described in section one shall be construed nunc pro tunc to February 28, 1986. Section 3. That the Clerk of the Board is hereby directed to provide notice of the adoption of this Resolution to the Department of Community Affairs within thirty days of adoption and the correct (sic) be appropriately noted in the permanent records of Monroe County relating to the Land Use Plan and Maps. This resolution was never submitted to the Department, and consequently never approved by it. By January 6, 1988, Monroe County had received quit claim deeds to the land underlying the 50-foot right-of-way from all the land owners along that portion of the proposed route lying east of Key Deer Boulevard to the intersection of Ixora and Hibiscus Roads, except the Trustees of the internal Improvement Trust Fund (Trustees) which owned the land underlying the area immediately prior to and at the intersection of the proposed road and Key Deer Boulevard. 1/ No proof was offered at hearing that the County had received any deeds for the right-of-way of the proposed road from its intersection with Key Deer Boulevard west to its terminus at Ships Way, and no construction has been undertaken along that .6 mile stretch of roadway. The right-of-way acquired by Monroe County had been in existence since it was created in 1973 as a private easement and dedicated to the landowners in Pine Key Acres for use as a road for ingress and egress. 2/ The road the developer constructed at that time was of limited stature, and consisted of a 30-foot wide simple fill road through the pine woods that characterize the area. Over the years, the landowners did not maintain the road, and it sank into a severe state of disrepair. Consequently, when the road was acquired by Monroe County it was severely potholed and rutted, partly overgrown with vegetation, and of insufficient width to allow the passage of cars in some areas. At the extreme easterly end of the road, where it now connects with the intersection of Ixora and Hibiscus Roads in the Whispering Pines Subdivision, a dump existed which contained tree stumps from the original creation of the road, and discarded refrigerators, air conditioners, cars and construction debris. This debris severely restricted the access to the road at its eastern terminus, and few ventured through it from the developed easterly part of Big Pine Key. Because of the limited access to the road at its eastern terminus, its severe state of disrepair, and the few residences that existed along its length, the easement running from Key Deer Boulevard to Wilder Road and from Wilder Road to Ixora Road received little traffic. What traffic it did receive was, because of the road's character, required to travel at an exceedingly limited speed. On January 6, 1988, Monroe County commenced construction on the subject road between Key Deer Boulevard and Ixora Road. While such construction did not conform to the design or construction standards for the Arterial Road evidenced by the proposed right-of-way map filed by the County, the compelling proof demonstrates that it does conform to and is in furtherance of the County's announced desire to construct an alternative access road at the subject location. Accordingly, while not the Arterial Road evidenced by the proposed right-of-way map filed by the County, the subject road is in furtherance of the County's plan to create such a road, albeit of a different design and construction standard than evidenced by the proposed right-of-way map. 3/ Between January 6 and 12, 1988, Monroe County's surveyor staked the centerline of the road right-of-way, and within 15 feet on either side of the centerline the County's work crews laid down a new bed of fill from Key Deer Boulevard to Ixora Road, rolled it, and would have applied a paving material but for the Department's cease and desist order. In the process, the County cleared vegetation from the right-of-way. At the eastern terminus of the road, the County also removed the debris from the dump area, and connected the road to the residentially developed areas of eastern Big Pine Key. In so doing, the county "straightened out the edges of the road" (created a road where it no longer existed because of lack of maintenance), and created a public access road from Ixora Road to Key Deer Boulevard capable of handling traffic at significant speeds. Notably, a portion of that roadway was created over the lands of the Trustees, to which Monroe County held no title and, overall, upon lands dedicated as a private access way. Monroe County undertook the aforementioned work without benefit of a building permit or certificate of compliance, and, accordingly, never rendered such a permit or certificate to the Department. 4/ Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern Section 11-109, Monroe County Land Development Regulations, establishes the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern (Area of Critical Concern), and provides: Purpose. The purpose of the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern is to establish a focal point planning effort directed at reconciling the conflict between reasonable investment backed expectations and the habitat needs of the Florida Key Deer which is listed as endangered under the federal Endangered Species Act. Focal Point Planning Program. 1. Monroe County shall initiate a focal point planning program for the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern that considers the following: The reasonable investment backed expectations of the owners of land within the Big Pine Key Area of Critical Concern; The habitat needs of the Florida Key Deer; The conflicts between human habitation and the survival of the Florida Key Deer; The role and importance of freshwater wetlands in the survival of the Florida Key Deer; Management approaches to reconciling the conflict between development and the survival of the Florida Key Deer; and Specific implementation programs for the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern. Interim Regulations. Notwithstanding any other provisions of these land development regulations, no development shall be carried out on the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern prior to the completion of the focal point planning program required by Section C of this designation and the adoption of amendments to the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan and these land development regulations except in accordance with the following: 1. No development shall be carried out in the Big Pine Key Area of Critical County Concern except for single family detached dwellings on lots in the Improved Subdivision District or on lots having an area of one (1) acre of more. To date, the focal point planning program has not been completed by Monroe County, and that portion of the subject road running between Key Deer Boulevard and Wilder Road is within the Area of Critical Concern. The Florida Key Deer is a unique species of deer listed as endangered by both the state and federal government. The official estimate of the total population of these deer is 250-300, most of which live on Big Pine Key. The federal government has designated most of Big Pine Key as the National Key Deer Refuge, including the area through which the subject road runs. The area surrounding this road is prime habitat for the Key Deer because of the large number of endemic plants that are necessary elements of the Key Deer's diet. The primary threat to the continued existence of the Key Deer is the destruction of habitat and road kills (the killing of the animal by a motor vehicle). Construction of the subject road will adversely impact the Key Deer's chance of survival since it bisects the deer's natural foraging area, and will permit high speed travel and increased traffic across a road that previously accommodated limited local traffic at moderate speeds. Maintenance or development? Pertinent to this case, Sections 6-101 and 6-102, Monroe County Land Development Regulations (MCLDR) provide that no "development" may occur within the county except pursuant to a building permit and upon the issuance of a certificate of compliance with existing development regulations. "Developer" and "development" are defined by Section 3.101, MCLDR, as follows: DEVELOPER means any person, including a governmental agency, undertaking any development as defined in this Plan. DEVELOPMENT means the carrying out of any building activity, the making of any material change in the use or appearance of any structure or land or water.... * * * (c) For the purpose of these regulations the following operations or uses shall not be taken to involve "development": * * * (4) A change in the ownership or form of ownership of any parcel.... * * * (6) ... the maintenance of public rights of way and private accessways existing on the effective date of these Land Development Regulations or approved private rights of way. At hearing, Monroe County contended that the work it undertook on the subject road was not "development", as defined by the MCLDR because it constituted "maintenance" of a private accessway existent when its Land Use Plans became effective. Based on the findings which follow, Monroe County's contention is rejected. The 50 strips of land that Monroe County took title to was burdened with "an easement for the purpose of use as a road for ingress and egress into and from Pine Key Acres Section 1, Page 1," and dedicated to all the lot owners in Pine Key Acres. The simple fill road established in 1973, and still existent, through in disrepair, when the County's Land Use Plan became effective, was a private accessway designed and maintained, if at all, to provide access to Pine Key Acres property, of relatively low average traffic volume, of limited continuity and not for through traffic. As such, although a private accessway, the road meets the definition of "local road," as defined by 16-21(5), Monroe County Code. By the work already performed by the County on the subject road, it has changed the character and function of the roadway from a local road, primarily used by residents who lived along its length, to a "collector road." As such, the road now gathers an increased traffic volume from local roads within the eastern subdivisions of Big Pine Key, and moves it at increased speeds to arterial roads, which are, like Key Deer Boulevard and Wilder Road, main traffic arteries carrying relatively heavy volumes of traffic for long distances. Had the County not been halted from paving the road, the change in character and function would have been intensified. Because the County's construction activities were not designed to maintain, and did not maintain, the character and function of the road as a private accessway, they cannot be considered as "maintenance" of a private accessway, but were "development" as that term is defined by the County's Land Use Plans. 5/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered requiring the following corrective actions: Monroe County cease any and all construction on the subject road and refrain from commencing any further construction to create an arterial access road on Big Pine Key until it has complied with the provisions of its Land Use Plan and Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. That until such time as Monroe County has complied with its Land Use Plans and Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, that it erect such barriers, signs or other impediments, or take such other action as may be necessary, to limit the volume and speed of traffic on the road it has developed to those conditions which existed prior to its development. Monroe County carry out the Big Pine Key focal point planning program as required by Section 11-109, MCLDR, and strictly adhere to and enforce section 11-109D, MCLDR, which prohibits development in the area of Critical County Concern, except for single family detached dwellings, until its land use regulations are amended in accordance with Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 9th day of May 1989. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 1989.
The Issue The issues presented are whether Respondent, Smallwood Design Group/Smallwood Landscape, Inc. (Smallwood or the company), owes Petitioner $12,817.17 for agricultural products and, if so, whether the surety is liable for any deficiency.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation licensed by the Department as a “dealer in agricultural products,” within the meaning of Subsection 604.15(2), Florida Statutes (2006) (agricultural dealer).1 The license number and business address of Petitioner are 68954 and 3930 14th Street North, Naples, Florida 34103. Smallwood is a Florida corporation licensed by the Department as an agricultural dealer pursuant to license number 68513. The sole shareholder and registered agent for Smallwood is Ms. JoAnn Smallwood. The business address for Smallwood is 2010 Orange Blossom Drive, Naples, Florida 34109. Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Hartford) is the surety for Smallwood pursuant to bond number 21BSBCI1473 issued in the amount of $100,000 (the bond). The term of the bond is December 9, 2005, through December 9, 2006. Petitioner conducts a garden center business that, in relevant part, sells agricultural products, defined in Subsection 604.15(1). Petitioner sells products at wholesale and retail to businesses and consumers in the Naples area. Smallwood purchased agricultural products from Petitioner from 1983 until sometime in 2006. The purchases were made in the ordinary course of Smallwood's architectural landscape construction and horticultural management business (landscape business). The terms of purchase required payment from Smallwood within 30 days. Any monthly balance that remained unpaid after 45 days was subject to interest at a monthly rate of 1.5 percent and an annual rate of 18 percent.2 With one exception, Smallwood paid Petitioner within 60 days of delivery. The exception to Smallwood's payment history with Petitioner is the subject of this proceeding. From May 11 through September 26, 2006, Smallwood did not pay Petitioner $12,817.17 for 66 invoices involving 440 items (pallets or pieces) of sod that Petitioner delivered to Smallwood.3 The sod consisted of varieties identified in the record as: Floratam, Seville, Zoysia, Croton, and Fountain Grass.4 Smallwood does not deny that Petitioner should be paid $12,817.17. However, Smallwood alleges that Petitioner has filed its claim against the wrong party. Smallwood alleges that, on June 13, 2006, another corporation purchased the assets of Smallwood, including the right to conduct the landscape business in the name of Smallwood, and assumed Smallwood's liability to Petitioner for any prior purchases. Subsequent purchases are allegedly the obligation of the successor corporation. Ms. Smallwood filed a Response to Amended Claim with the Department on January 7, 2007 (the Response). The Response identifies the successor corporation as Spartan Partners, Inc., an Illinois corporation, located at 350 Pfingsten Road, Suite 109, Northbrook, Illinois 60062 (Spartan), and alleges that Petitioner’s claim is not valid because: [Smallwood] sold its assets and has not been engaged in business since June 13, 2006. Specifically, pursuant to an Asset Purchase Agreement, [Smallwood] sold its assets (including its name) to Spartan . . . , and thereafter, Spartan continued operating the business for a period of time and then sold some of the assets and ceased operations. (emphasis supplied) Smallwood . . . does not have knowledge of the accounts of Spartan, which continued doing business under the Smallwood name after the sale of assets on June 13, 2006. If items purchased from [Petitioner] have not been paid for, Spartan is the responsible and liable party. (emphasis supplied) The Response filed in January of 2007 was not the first time Petitioner had seen the Smallwood defense. Smallwood sent Petitioner a form letter, dated September 14, 2006, that: contained a salutation addressing “All Vendors of [Smallwood],” referenced the "Termination of Credit Arrangements and Guaranties," and was signed by Ms. Smallwood on behalf of Smallwood (notice letter). The notice letter provided in relevant part: The purpose of this letter is to advise you that the assets of [Smallwood], including the company name, were sold to Spartan . . . as of June 13, 2006. Since [Smallwood] sold all of its assets, that corporate entity is no longer actively engaged in any business. The business known as [Smallwood] is now conducted by [Spartan]. (emphasis supplied) As a result of the sale of assets and the fact that [Smallwood] is no longer actively engaged in business, the relationship or agreement you had with that particular corporate entity is hereby terminated and of no further force and effect. If you are continuing to do business with [Spartan], you should, if you have not done so already, make or confirm your business arrangements with that entity. Furthermore, if I signed any document that could be construed as a personal guaranty of payment for any obligations of [Smallwood], please consider this letter to be a formal revocation, cancellation and termination of any such document. (emphasis supplied) Petitioner's Exhibit 3 (P-3). Part of the Smallwood defense is supported by the evidence. Smallwood did sell its assets to Spartan. The Asset Purchase Agreement between Smallwood and Spartan was admitted into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 (P-2). The Agreement shows that Spartan purchased the assets of Smallwood on June 13, 2006, for $1.030 million, of which $883,602.11 was allocated to accounts receivable due the seller. The seller is identified in the Asset Purchase Agreement as Ms. Smallwood and the company. The seller received $895,500.00 in cash at the closing. The remaining part of the Smallwood defense involves two allegations. First, Smallwood alleges that Spartan assumed a liability of $3,834.43 for 23 purchases of sod by Smallwood from May 11 through June 13, 2006. Second, Smallwood alleges that Spartan owes Petitioner $8,982.74 for 43 purchases of sod from June 14 through September 26, 2006. If the evidence were to support both allegations, the result may effectively deprive Petitioner of an administrative remedy. The corporate documents attached to the Asset Purchase Agreement do not show that Spartan complied with the bond and license requirements in Subsection 604.19 prior to conducting the landscape business in the name of Smallwood. Spartan sold the assets needed to satisfy a judgment against Spartan, Spartan is a foreign corporation, and Spartan no longer conducts the landscape business in Florida. It would be unnecessary to determine whether Smallwood or Spartan is liable for the $12,817.17 if: the terms of the bond were to allow an assignment of the bond to Spartan, and the Asset Purchase Agreement were to show that the bond was one of the contracts assigned to Spartan or one of the assets purchased by Spartan. The bond would cover both Smallwood and Spartan in such a case, and a determination of which shell hid the proverbial pea would be moot. A copy of the bond did not find its way into the record. Petitioner did not submit a copy of the bond for admission into evidence, and the Department did not transmit a copy of the bond when the agency referred the matter to DOAH. The copy of the Asset Purchase Agreement admitted into evidence does not include a schedule of the contracts assigned to Spartan or a schedule of the assets sold to Spartan. A finding that Spartan expressly assumed Smallwood's liability to pay Petitioner $3,834.43 for sod delivered from May 11 through June 13, 2006, is not supported by the evidence. In relevant part, the Asset Purchase Agreement provides: At Closing, Purchaser shall assume those liabilities of Company specifically defined and listed on the Schedule 1.6(b) attached hereto (“Assumed Liabilities”), and Purchaser shall not assume, incur, guarantee, or be otherwise obligated with respect to any liability whatsoever of Company other than as so stated. . . . (emphasis not supplied) Purchaser shall cause Stockholder [Ms. Smallwood] to be released as guarantor or obligor under the Assumed Liabilities. . . . P-2 at 2. Schedule 1.6(b) is missing from the copy of the Asset Purchase Agreement that was admitted into evidence. Even if a complete exhibit were to show that Spartan assumed Smallwood's liability to Petitioner, neither of the respondents submitted evidence or cited legal authority to support a finding that such an assumption released Smallwood from its obligation to Petitioner or otherwise extinguished that obligation. Nor is there any evidence that Petitioner acquiesced in an assumption by Spartan or otherwise released Smallwood from the obligation to pay Petitioner for sod delivered prior to June 13, 2006. The remaining allegation in the Smallwood defense is that Spartan, rather than Smallwood, purchased the sod Petitioner delivered between June 13 and September 26, 2006. It allegedly is Spartan that owes Petitioner $8,982.74. The remaining allegation implicitly argues that, after June 13, 2006, Smallwood was no longer a viable corporation with the legal capacity to purchase sod from Petitioner because the asset sale resulted in what courts describe as a “de facto merger” of Smallwood into Spartan or a “mere continuation of business” by Spartan. The law pertaining to these two doctrines is discussed in the Conclusions of Law, but certain factual findings are relevant to both doctrines. The Smallwood defense is a mutation of the doctrines of "de facto merger" and "mere continuation of business," either of which have been utilized by courts to hold a successor corporation liable for the obligations of the corporate predecessor. The Smallwood defense takes the relevant judicial doctrines a step further. The defense implicitly assumes that if a "de facto merger" or "mere continuation of business" occurred as a result of the asset sale, Smallwood "merged" into Spartan, and Smallwood was no longer a viable corporate entity with the legal capacity to purchase sod from Petitioner. Two facts preclude the application of either judicial doctrine to the sale of Smallwood's assets. First, there is no commonality or continuity of ownership interests between Smallwood and Spartan. Spartan did not acquire some or all of the stock of Smallwood, and Ms. Smallwood did not become a shareholder in Spartan. The two corporations do not share common directors or officers. The second fact involves the purchase price paid for the Smallwood assets. The purchase price does not suggest a cozy relationship between Smallwood and Spartan that otherwise may have persuaded a court to disregard the separate corporate existence of Smallwood after the asset-sale. No evidence suggests that the price paid was not the fair market value of the Smallwood assets negotiated at arms length between a willing buyer and a willing seller. Smallwood remained in existence as a viable Florida corporation after the asset-sale on June 13, 2006. No legal impediment prevented Smallwood from purchasing sod from Petitioner, and Smallwood had the legal capacity to do so. The purchases may have breached the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement, but the legal capacity of Smallwood to purchase sod from Petitioner is not driven by contractual arrangements between Smallwood and private third parties. Smallwood remained in existence as a Florida corporation at least through January 7, 2007, when Ms. Smallwood filed the Response with the Department. The Response does not allege as a factual matter that Smallwood had been liquidated and was no longer in existence as a Florida corporation; or that the $895,500 the seller received for the sale of assets was not in corporate solution and available to pay invoices submitted by Petitioner. The Response merely states that Smallwood was not actively engaged in the conduct of business. Smallwood was actively engaged in the landscape business after June 13, 2006. Smallwood maintained its customary banking account; continued to issue checks imprinted with the company name; paid Petitioner for goods that Petitioner delivered to Smallwood before May 11, 2006; accepted without objection or disclaimer 43 invoices totaling $8,982.74 that were billed to the company for sod delivered to the company at the company's business address; issued the notice letter to its creditors; and purported to terminate credit agreements and guarantees. Prior to receiving the notice letter, Petitioner had no reason to believe that Smallwood was not conducting the landscape business. The face of Smallwood remained unchanged. Ms. Smallwood continued to operate the landscape business pursuant to a long-term employment contract with Spartan. Spartan signed Mr. Keith Whipple, another key employee of Smallwood, to a similar contract. Copies of the employment contracts are attached to the Asset Purchase Agreement.5 Between June 13 and September 14, 2006, Ms. Smallwood continued to sign Smallwood checks imprinted with the company name and issued on the Smallwood business account. Ms. Smallwood signed the checks as the authorized representative of Smallwood. Smallwood accepted 35 invoices issued to the company for $7,007.13 and deliveries of the sod at the company's customary business address. The notice letter was dated September 14, 2006, but Petitioner received the letter on or about September 26, 2006. Between September 14 and 26, 2006, Smallwood accepted eight invoices for sod purchased for $1,975.61. The evidence does not show when Smallwood actually mailed the notice letter, and Petitioner did not stamp the notice letter with the date it was received. The chief operating officer for Petitioner testified at the hearing but does not recall the date Petitioner actually received the notice letter. However, the witness testified that Petitioner stopped all sales to Smallwood immediately upon receipt of the notice letter to allow time for Petitioner to complete a credit check of Spartan. The trier of fact finds the relevant testimony to be credible and persuasive. The failure to timely disclose the identity of Spartan as a successor entity operating in the name of Smallwood misled Petitioner, if not other creditors.6 Between June 13 and September 26, 2006, Petitioner extended credit for purchases of $8,982.74 before Petitioner had the opportunity to ensure the credit worthiness of Spartan and, if desired, to obtain a written guarantee from the individual officers and shareholders.7 Smallwood, rather than Spartan, purchased sod from Petitioner from May 11 through September 26, 2006. Smallwood owes Petitioner $12,817.17. Hartford does not claim that the terms of the bond do not ensure payment of the purchases made by Smallwood. Hartford’s sole objection in its PRO is that the bond proceeds must be paid directly to the Department rather than to Petitioner. Hartford correctly cites Subsection 604.21(8) in support of its objection.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order directing Smallwood to pay $12,817.17 to Petitioner, and, in accordance with Subsection 604.21(8), requiring Hartford to pay over to the Department any amount not paid by Smallwood. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of August, 2007.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the respective Administrative Complaints, and, if so, whether Petitioner should impose against Respondent an administrative fine, penalty, and survey fee.
Findings Of Fact DOAH Case No. 13-2011: Failure to Properly Train, Supervise, and Perform CPR Pine Tree Manor is licensed by the Agency for Health Care Administration to operate a 24-bed assisted living facility. The facility's license number is 8317, and it expires on November 13, 2014. On February 12, 2013, the date of the incident that provides the basis for the instant action, Aurelia Cristobal was employed as a staff member at the facility operated by Pine Tree Manor. Spanish is Ms. Cristobal's native language, and her ability to speak English is very limited. Brent Sparks, the owner and administrator at Pine Tree Manor, acknowledged, when interviewed as part of the post-incident investigation, that Ms. Cristobal struggles at times with English, especially when under stress. Mr. Sparks was aware of Ms. Cristobal's limitations with English prior to February 12, 2013. Within a few days of B.Y.'s death, Ms. Cristobal left the United States and is believed to be currently living in Mexico. Ms. Cristobal did not testify during the final hearing. For the period June 15, 2011, through June 15, 2013, Ms. Cristobal was certified by the American Safety & Health Institute in the areas of automated external defibrillation (AED), cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), and basic first aid. In the spring of 2011, Ms. Cristobal received training from Pine Tree Manor in the areas of facility emergency procedures and do not resuscitate (DNR) orders. Pine Tree Manor's written emergency procedures provide, in part, as follows: In all emergencies, it is important to remain calm and display a sense of control. Upsetting our residents will only induce undue stress. DIAL "911" EMERGENCY in the following cases: A medical emergency such as serious injuries or life threatening incidences. Fires Bodily harm to staff or residents such as terrorism, robbery, inclement weather. Call the administrator if there is any question concerning injury or illness, a resident is missing, security of facility is in doubt, or inspectors enter the facility. In the case of any significant changes or emergency, call the family, guardian and a health care provider. Also, contact the administrator. In cases of non-emergency need for transportation to the hospital or emergency room, call SUNSTAR AMBULANCE SERVICE @ 530-1234. In all cases, use common sense and remain calm, and remember to contact the administrator if in doubt. Pine Tree Manor's policy regarding DNR orders provides that: In the event a resident with a signed DNR experiences cardiopulmonary arrest, our policy is for staff trained in CPR/AED to withhold resuscitative treatment. Staff will report to the administrator immediately and in turn notify [the] resident's medical providers and resident representative. For example, staff on duty shall call 911 to report the condition, or if on Hospice [place] a call to (727) 586-4432, the Lavender Team Patient Leader. B.Y. became a resident of Pine Tree Manor on or about December 23, 2010. B.Y. did not execute a DNR directive. On February 12, 2013, between the hours of approximately 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., Ms. Cristobal was the only employee on site at Pine Tree Manor. According to J.M., who on February 12, 2013, was a resident at Pine Tree Manor, B.Y. entered a common area of the facility where J.M. and other residents were located. J.M. advised that B.Y. sat on the sofa, and started watching television. While on the sofa, B.Y. stopped breathing. The evidence is inconclusive as to how long B.Y. was incapacitated before others learned of her condition. Although it is not clear from the testimony how Ms. Cristobal was informed of B.Y.'s peril, she did, at some point, learn that B.Y. was incapacitated and was experiencing a medical emergency. After learning of B.Y.'s situation, Ms. Cristobal, according to J.M., became nervous and "didn't know what to do." In fact, Ms. Cristobal was so nervous that she did not call 911, she did not check B.Y. for a pulse, and she did not perform CPR on B.Y. Ms. Cristobal did, however, make several attempts to contact Mr. Sparks. Ms. Cristobal eventually reached Mr. Sparks and advised him of the situation with B.Y. The evidence does not reveal how long B.Y. remained incapacitated before Ms. Cristobal was able to speak with Mr. Sparks. When Mr. Sparks received the call from Ms. Cristobal, he was at his residence in Hillsborough County. Pine Tree Manor is located in Pinellas County. Because Mr. Sparks was in Hillsborough County when he received the call from Ms. Cristobal, he was not able to call 911 and be immediately connected to an emergency operator in Pinellas County. Understanding this limitation, Mr. Sparks called the non-emergency number for the Pinellas County Sheriff's office, who, in turn, contacted the 911 operator and informed them of the emergency. In the course of discussing the emergency situation with Ms. Cristobal, Mr. Sparks learned that she had not called 911. Knowing the emergency nature of the situation and the fact that he could not call Pinellas County 911 directly, Mr. Sparks should have directed Ms. Cristobal to call 911, since she was located in Pinellas County, but he did not. Mr. Sparks should have also instructed Ms. Cristobal to start CPR on B.Y., but he did not. According to the Pinellas County Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Patient Care Report for B.Y., the 911 call was received by the 911 dispatcher at 6:11 p.m. and an EMS unit was dispatched to Pine Tree Manor at 6:12 p.m. The EMS unit arrived at the facility at 6:15 p.m. and commenced treating B.Y. at 6:16 p.m. EMS personnel worked for nearly 30 minutes to revive B.Y., but their efforts were unsuccessful. Richard Sherman (EMT Sherman) is a firefighter and paramedic for the Pinellas Suncoast Fire District. EMT Sherman was the first paramedic to arrive at Pine Tree Manor on the day in question. Upon arrival at the facility, EMT Sherman attempted to enter through the facility's main door, but could not gain immediate entry because the door was locked. EMT Sherman rang the doorbell and knocked on the door in an attempt to gain entry into the facility. Resident J.M. opened the door, and EMT Sherman entered the facility. Upon entry, EMT Sherman noticed that B.Y. was unresponsive on the sofa. He also observed at the same time that there were several residents in B.Y.'s immediate area and that there was no staff present. When EMT Sherman arrived, Ms. Cristobal was in another part of the facility assisting a resident who had become upset because the resident was having difficulty satisfying her toileting needs. Approximately a minute after EMT Sherman started resuscitation efforts on B.Y., Ms. Cristobal appeared in the area where B.Y. was located. Because Ms. Cristobal was wearing scrubs, EMT Sherman correctly identified her as a facility employee. EMT Sherman asked Ms. Cristobal if she knew anything about B.Y. and the circumstances surrounding her collapse. Ms. Cristobal did not respond to EMT Sherman's questions. EMT Sherman testified that Ms. Cristobal, after not responding to his questions, simply "looked at [him] and then turned and walked away" towards the main doors of the facility. While continuing to attempt to resuscitate B.Y., EMT Sherman noticed that Ms. Cristobal appeared to be locking the doors that he had just entered. EMT Sherman instructed Ms. Cristobal several times to not lock the doors because more emergency personnel would soon be arriving. Apparently not understanding EMT Sherman's directives, Mr. Cristobal locked the doors. A few minutes later, district fire chief John Mortellite arrived at the facility. EMT Sherman, while continuing to work on B.Y., heard District Chief Mortellite banging on the locked main doors in an effort to gain entry to the facility. A resident eventually unlocked the doors, and District Chief Mortellite entered the building. When asked why Ms. Cristobal would call him in an emergency situation and not 911, Mr. Sparks explained that it was Ms. Cristobal's practice to always call him in an emergency and that he would, in turn, manage the situation. Mr. Sparks, by allowing Ms. Cristobal "to always call him" in emergency situations instead of 911, created an alternative practice that was directly contrary to the facility's written policy which clearly directs employees to "DIAL '911'" when confronted with a medical emergency. Ms. Cristobal was, therefore, not properly trained. Mr. Sparks, by establishing and, indeed, encouraging a practice that shielded Ms. Cristobal from directly communicating with 911, placed B.Y. in a position where there was an unacceptable delay, though not precisely quantifiable, in contacting emergency personnel on her behalf. In a life or death situation such as that experienced by B.Y., every second matters because, as noted by EMT Sherman, "the longer the delay [in receiving medical treatment] the less probability of a positive outcome." When EMT Sherman arrived at Pine Tree Manor, he was completely unaware of the fact that the only employee on site spoke little, if any English. It is, therefore, reasonable to infer that Mr. Sparks failed to inform either the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office or the 911 operator of Ms. Cristobal's limitations with the English language. By Ms. Cristobal's not calling 911, and Mr. Sparks' not disclosing to the 911 operator that the only employee on site had limited English language skills, decedent B.Y. was placed in the unenviable position of having EMT Sherman's attention divided between resuscitation efforts and worrying about whether Ms. Cristobal was able to comply with his instructions. EMT Sherman testified that Pinellas County EMS, including 911 operators, has protocols in place for dealing with individuals that may not speak English. Had either Mr. Sparks disclosed to the 911 operator Ms. Cristobal's language limitations or had Ms. Cristobal herself called 911, protocols could have been implemented by emergency personnel that would have triggered certain safeguards designed to ensure that Ms. Cristobal's language limitations did not interfere with the delivery of emergency services to B.Y. DOAH Case No. 13-2397: Failure to Remain Generally Aware of the Whereabouts of Resident Most recently, R.D., on September 27, 2010, became a resident of Pine Tree Manor. A demographic data information survey was prepared as part of R.D.'s new resident intake process. R.D.'s intake data showed that he was independent in the areas of ambulation, bathing, dressing, toileting, eating, and transferring. R.D. was identified as needing supervision when performing tasks related to personal grooming. It was also noted that R.D. suffered from anxiety and panic attacks. According to R.D.'s brother Tom, R.D. was under the care of a psychiatrist for many years and "suffered from debilitating panic attacks." When suffering a panic attack, R.D. would often lay on the ground or floor, most often in a fetal position, and remain in this position until help arrived. As a part of the new resident intake process, R.D. was assessed for his risk of elopement. The assessment revealed that R.D. was not at risk for elopement and that he was free to "come and go [from the facility] as he pleases" and that he needed to "sign out" whenever leaving the facility. By correspondence dated March 14, 2011, the administration of Pine Tree Manor reminded R.D. that he needed to adhere to the facility's resident sign-out procedure whenever leaving from and returning to the facility. Approximately ten months after reminding R.D. of the facility's sign-out procedure, Mr. Sparks, on January 2, 2012, updated R.D.'s risk assessment form and again noted thereon that R.D. "may come and go as he pleases" and he "[n]eeds to remember to sign out" when leaving the facility. On May 23, 2012, R.D. was evaluated by a physician and it was noted, in part, that R.D. could function independently in the areas of ambulation, bathing, dressing, eating, grooming, toileting, and transferring. As for certain self-care tasks, the evaluating physician noted that R.D. needed assistance with preparing his meals, shopping, and handling his personal and financial affairs. It was also noted that R.D. needed daily oversight with respect to observing his well-being and whereabouts and reminding him about important tasks. The evaluating physician also noted that R.D. needed help with taking his medication.1/ The evaluation was acknowledged by Mr. Sparks as having been received on May 25, 2012. R.D.'s most recent itemization of his medications shows that on October 10, 2012, he was prescribed Clonazepam and Buspirone. The Clonazepam was administered three times a day at 8:00 a.m., noon, and 8:00 p.m. The Buspirone was administered four times a day at 8:00 a.m., noon, 5:00 p.m., and 8:00 p.m. These medications are often prescribed for anxiety, however, R.D.'s medications listing form does not expressly denote why the drugs were prescribed. At 7:58 a.m., on November 10, 2012, an ambulance from the Pinellas County EMS was dispatched to Pine Tree Manor. When the EMS unit arrived at 8:00 a.m., R.D. was found "on the ground or floor" and was complaining of feeling anxious. While being treated by EMS, R.D. took his 8:00 a.m. dose of Clonazepam and was transported to "Largo Med." Less than 24 hours later, EMS, at 4:29 a.m., on November 11, 2012, was dispatched to 13098 Walsingham Road, because R.D. was again complaining of feeling anxious. This location is apparently near Pine Tree Manor, as the EMS Patient Care Report for this service call notes that R.D. "walked to [the] store." Following the evaluation by EMS, R.D. was again transported to "Largo Med." At 12:24 p.m., on November 18, 2012, EMS was dispatched to a location near Pine Tree Manor where R.D. was found "lying supine on [the] sidewalk." According to the EMS report, R.D. advised that he became lightheaded and fell to the ground. R.D. did not complain of any other symptoms and was transported to a medical facility in Largo for further evaluation. At 1:27 p.m., on November 25, 2012, EMS was dispatched to a 7-11 store near Pine Tree Manor. Upon arrival at the store, EMS personnel found R.D. and, when questioned, he advised that he was again feeling anxious. Per R.D.'s specific request, as noted on the EMS report, he was transferred to St. Anthony's Hospital in St. Petersburg. On November 28, 2012, Mr. Sparks made an entry into R.D.'s file and noted that a neurosurgeon evaluated R.D.'s shunt on that date in an attempt to determine if a malfunction was the cause of R.D.'s panic attacks. Mr. Sparks noted in the record that the doctor advised that the shunt was working properly and that the shunt was ruled out as the "cause of [R.D.'s] panic attacks." As of November 28, 2012, Mr. Sparks was aware that R.D. had recently complained of experiencing panic attacks and that the cause of the same had not yet been determined. It was not confirmed, although it was certainly believed by Mr. Sparks, that R.D. was manipulating medical personnel at local treatment facilities for the purpose of securing medication beyond that prescribed by his regular treating physicians. This belief by Mr. Sparks is reasonable especially in light of R.D.'s request to EMS personnel on November 25, 2012, that he was to be transported to a medical facility other than "Largo Med" for treatment related to his feelings of anxiety.2/ R.D.'s medication record for December 4, 2012, shows that he was given his prescribed medication for the 8:00 a.m. dispensing time. Soon after receiving his medication, R.D. left Pine Tree Manor for the purpose of visiting his local congressman's office. According to the survey notes from the investigation related hereto, the congressman's office is located approximately two miles from Pine Tree Manor. Although it cannot be confirmed, it reasonably appears that R.D. walked to the congressman's office. R.D. did not sign out of the facility when he left Pine Tree Manor on the morning of December 4, 2012. R.D. did, however, inform facility staff that he was going to the congressman's office to discuss an issue.3/ Security video from the building where the congressman's office is located established that R.D. arrived at the congressman's office at 9:50 a.m. At approximately 10:45 a.m., a representative from the congressman's office called Pine Tree Manor and informed them that R.D. was ready to return to the facility. The person receiving the message from the congressman's office contacted Mr. Sparks and informed him that R.D. was requesting a ride back to Pine Tree Manor from the congressman's office. Mr. Sparks was assisting another resident at a local hospital when he received the request to transport R.D. and was, therefore, unable to transport R.D. from the congressman's office. Pine Tree Manor had no obligation to provide transportation services to R.D. Surveillance video from the building where the congressman's office is located confirmed that R.D. exited the building on December 4, 2012, at approximately 10:50 a.m. R.D.'s body was found on December 12, 2012. It is not known what happened to R.D. between the time he left the congressman's office and when his body was eventually discovered.4/ When Mr. Sparks returned to Pine Tree Manor on December 4, 2012, he was advised by staff that R.D. had not returned from the congressman's office. According to the posted work schedule for December 4, 2012, Mr. Sparks worked from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. When Mr. Sparks left Pine Tree Manor on December 4, 2012, R.D. had not returned. Mr. Sparks, upon leaving the facility for the day, instructed staff (Aurelia Cristobal) to call him when R.D. returned. Ms. Cristobal's shift ended at 8:00 p.m. Pine Tree Manor employee Laura Munoz worked from 7:00 p.m. on December 4, 2012, to 7:00 a.m. on December 5, 2012. Ms. Munoz was not responsible for assisting R.D. with his medication, so it is unlikely that she would have known that R.D. missed receiving his medication prior to her arrival at work. Because Mr. Sparks left Pine Tree Manor on December 4, 2012, before Ms. Munoz arrived for work, he called Ms. Munoz after her shift started (precise time unknown) and requested that she call him upon R.D.'s return. There were no instructions given to Ms. Munoz by Mr. Sparks as to what she should do if R.D. did not return by some time certain. On December 4, 2012, Mr. Sparks knew that R.D. had never spent the night away from Pine Tree Manor without someone at the facility knowing R.D.'s whereabouts and that R.D. had never gone unaccounted for a period greater than 12 hours. On December 5, 2012, Mr. Sparks' scheduled work time was from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Prior to reporting to the facility on the morning of December 5, 2012, Mr. Sparks learned that R.D. had not returned to his room during the night shift. The exact time is not known when Mr. Sparks acquired this information, but it was likely sometime around 6:30 a.m. After learning that R.D. was still unaccounted for, Mr. Sparks immediately began canvassing the area near Pine Tree Manor. Around this same time, Mr. Sparks contacted R.D.'s brother and apprised him of the situation. At approximately noon on December 5, 2012, Mr. Sparks contacted the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office and reported R.D. missing. Pine Tree Manor has an elopement and missing residents policy that provides, in part, as follows: Residents may come and go as they please and shall not be detained unless family/resident representative and administrator agree supervision is required. A resident leaving the facility should either sign out by the front door or inform a staff member of their departure and provide an estimated time of return. The staff person should sign the resident out and notify other staff on duty. . . . If a resident . . . is deemed missing, staff shall immediately search the entire facility inside and around the facility grounds. . . . Whenever a resident is not found within the facility or its premises, the Administrator will: Notify the resident's representative. Notify the County Sheriff's Department by calling 911. Provide staff and searching parties with information and photo I. D. Instruct the staff to search inside the facility and the premises, the adjacent residential properties to the facility, up and down 131st Street, 102nd Avenue and the cross streets.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration: Enter in Agency Case No. 2013002572 (DOAH Case No. 13-2397) a final order finding that Respondent, Pine Tree Manor, Inc., d/b/a/ Pine Tree Manor, committed a Class II violation and assessing an administrative fine of $5,000.00 and a survey fee of $500.00. Enter in Agency Case No. 2013004620 (DOAH Case No. 13-2011) a final order finding that Respondent, Pine Tree Manor, Inc., d/b/a/ Pine Tree Manor, committed a Class I violation and assessing an administrative fine of $8,000.00. It is also RECOMMENDED that the final order not revoke Respondent's license to operate an assisted living facility in the State of Florida, but, instead, suspend Respondent's license for a period of 60 days.7/ DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2013.
