The Issue This case concerns the propriety of Respondent's abolishment of Petitioner's position of Occupational Specialist within the Gilchrist County School System. In particular, it is to be determined whether Respondent has failed to meet requirements of law in that its action of abolishing the position was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to Petitioner's constitutionally protected rights to free speech and assembly.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the holder of a Rank 111 Teaching Certificate, issued by the State of Florida. The certification recognizes her as an Occupational Specialist. On July 8, 1974, she was granted a continuing contract of employment with the Gilchrist County School Board as an Occupational Specialist in the Trenton and Bell schools within the Gilchrist County School District. A copy of that contract may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 7, admitted into evidence. The contract by its terms states at Paragraph 9, "This contract shall not operate to prevent discontinuance of a position as provided by law." It is the discontinuance or abolishment of the position of Occupational Specialist held by the petitioner that occasioned the formal hearing in this cause. Since being granted the position of Occupational Specialist in permanent status, Petitioner has performed those duties described in the job description, a copy of which is Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. Those functions include career planning for students, considering their personal problems, preparing them for assessment tests and the execution of job application forms. In the school year 1981-82, Petitioner worked three- fifths of her time in Trenton High School and two-fifths in Bell High School. In her capacity, Respondent considered her to be acting as the equivalent of a guidance counselor. She has never been certified by the State of Florida as a guidance counselor. Around the beginning of April 1982, the superintendent of Schools in Gilchrist County, Ray Thomas, decided that the position of Occupational Specialist held by the petitioner should be abolished. At that time, and at all relevant times, this position of Occupational Specialist was the only position of its type in the Gilchrist County School System. The basis for the abolition or discontinuation of the position concerned anticipated revenue shortfalls or budget inadequacy for the upcoming school year 1982-83, pursuant to information from persons within the State of Florida responsible for educational funding. In arriving at his decision, Thomas sought comment from Robert Ervin, the principal at Hell High School and James Surrency, the principal at Trenton High School. Ervin was asked if the guidance responsibility at Bell High School could best be achieved by the provision of a full-time guidance counselor. Thomas gave the impression to Surrency that the basis for requesting the discontinuation of the position of Occupational Specialist pertained to funding. No particulars were revealed to the two principals on the question of the financial position of the school system facing the advent of the 1982-83 school year. Respondent's Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2, admitted into evidence, are the comments of the Trenton and Bell principals on the subject of the abolition of the position of Occupational Specialist. Ervin accepted the idea of abolishing the Occupational Specialist position based upon his belief that a full-time guidance counselor would be provided to his school, as contrasted to the half- time guidance counselor and two-fifths time work of the Petitioner during the school year 1981-82. In his remarks, Surrency indicates reconciliation to the idea of losing the three-fifths time that the Petitioner was spending at Trenton High; however, he indicates his preference to have the Occupational Specialist position remain if it could be afforded. In the school year 1981-82, Trenton had a full-time guidance counselor in addition to the work being done by the Petitioner. After receiving the comments of the principals and in keeping with his choice, the Superintendent of schools wrote to the petitioner on April 21, 1982, advising her that he would recommend to the School Board, effective the beginning of the school year 1982-83 that the position of Occupational Specialist not be filled and offering Bowdoin a leave of absence without pay for one year. A copy of this correspondence may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. On April 22, 1982, the recommendation of the Superintendent was presented to the School Board and in the course of that meeting, the Petitioner was represented by counsel. Action on this recommendation by the Superintendent was tabled. On May 3, 1982, the Superintendent wrote the School Board and modified his position on the question of Occupational Specialist from one recommending that the position of Occupational Specialist not be filled in 1982- 83 school year to one of recommending the discontinuance of the position for economic and curriculum reasons, stating that the duties of that position could be assumed or transferred to the guidance counselor at each school in Gilchrist County. A copy of this correspondence may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. On May 4, 1982, consideration was given to the suggestion of total abolishment of the position of Occupational Specialist and the School Board in a 3 to 2 vote determined to abolish the position of Occupational Specialist. This action was in keeping with Chapter 230, Florida Statutes. Prior to the vote, no specific information was imparted by the Superintendent or other school officials as to the financial benefits to be derived from the action or effect of the abolishment in terms of curriculum changes. The school board simply accepted the Superintendent's word that it was necessary to abolish the position for financial reasons. (The Superintendent, since taking office in 1981, has abolished other positions within the Gilchrist County School System, such as assistant principal at Trenton High School, general supervisor of instruction, food services supervisor, brick and block masonry teacher, librarian at Trenton High School and has left vacant teacher's aide positions.) At the May 4, 1982, meeting, Petitioner asked for and the Board agreed to afford a formal hearing to the Petitioner to challenge the abolishment of the Occupational Specialist position. Again, on June 1, 1982, a request was made in the Petitioner's behalf to have a grievance hearing before the board concerning the board's decision to abolish the job and it was determined that grievance hearing should be held on July 6, 1982. On July 6, 1982, the Board requested the Superintendent to prepare a list of vacancies which Mrs. Bowdoin might be certified for, the salary schedules related to those positions, a list of programs offered other than K-12 and the state certification requirements for those positions and the name of those persons filling the positions at the time. On July 20, 1982, the Board considered the level III grievance of the Petitioner in the presence of the Petitioner's attorney on the topic of an alternative placement of the Petitioner and the salary associated with that placement. On August 3, 1982, the Board entered a written resolution of decision pertaining to the level III grievance pertaining to the Petitioner, a copy of that resolution being found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 5. In this resolution, the School Board properly identified that the Petitioner could not be placed as a guidance counselor in that she did not hold a master's degree required for such position. In lieu of the position of Occupational Specialist which had been abolished by the School Board on May 4, 1982, by its August resolution, the Board offered the position of Teacher's Aide at Trenton Elementary School, with a substantial reduction in salary from approximately $15,000 a year to approximately $6,300 a year. This position of Teacher's Aide was reserved until August 16, 1982. Petitioner did not elect to accept the position of Teacher's Aide and has been unemployed since August 1982. In the course of an August 11, 1982 meeting, the Superintendent reported to the Board that the petitioner had "responded" at a level IV grievance procedure. On August 31, 1982, the Board was asked to consider litigation which had been presented to it by the Superintendent. On September 2, 1982, in an Executive Board session of the School Board of Gilchrist County, discussion was made of certain civil litigation brought by Petitioner against the Board. On October 5, 1982, an update was given to the Board concerning that case of the Petitioner versus the Board. Another update was made on October 5, 1982. On December 7, 1982, the Board was made aware of the fact that the case was to be considered in arbitration. (Various minutes of School Board meetings as described in this paragraph are more completely set forth in Respondent's Exhibit No. 8, admitted into evidence.) The matter was presented before the American Arbitration Association and the Arbitrator in his report absolved the Board of any violation related to the job abolition. The copy of that report may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 6, admitted into evidence. The date of the report is July 21, 1983. As stated before, the Bell High School in 1982-83, employed a full-time guidance counselor in substitution for an approximately half-time guidance and two-fifths time from Bowdoin the prior year. The Trenton school went from a 1981-82 school year in which a full-time counselor and three-fifths of Bowdoin's time was devoted to counseling activities to a full-time counselor, an aide working two-thirds time mostly in a clerical capacity and some assistance by a vocational teacher in school year 1982-83. Bad Bowdoin returned as an aide to the Trenton school in 1982-83, she would have been used in the guidance department in the same role as she had been given as Occupational Specialist. There was a revenue surplus left at the end of the 1982-83 school year and it was sufficient to have allowed the funding of the position of Occupational Specialist for the 1982-83 school year; however, that surplus was less than the 1981-82 school year by approximately 65,000. This funding difference in the face of providing essentially the same services in the school system, pointed out the more difficult economic circumstance that Thomas had made mention of in his initial decision to abolish the position of Occupational Specialist. In the 1982-83 School year, employees in the school system received salary increases. At the conclusion of the 1981-82 school year, there were approximately 900 students at the Trenton school which included grades K-12. According to Petitioner's Exhibit No. 11, excerpts from the standards of the Commission on Secondary Schools of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, schools of a population of 750-999 need two guidance professionals. Therefore, the reduction of one and three-fifths counselors in 1981-82 to one counselor and something less than three-fifths in 1982-83 was contrary to the statement of standards. This excerpt is at 4.10.0, Figure 1, minimum personnel requirements. Respondent replies to that assertion through its Exhibit No. 9, which are excerpts of the standards for unit schools by the Commission on Secondary Schools and Commission on Elementary Schools of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools. At Page 9, 9.16.0-9.16.2, Respondent argues that one guidance counselor suffices for any school with a membership of 500 or more students up to 999 students. Without determining which of these guidelines related to accreditation by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools is correct, it suffices to say that the changes that were made by the School Board in abolishing the position of Occupational Specialist as it might affect accreditation were made in good faith in that it can arguably be said that Trenton school, having 900 students, only needed one guidance counselor to meet conditions of accreditation. There were no curriculum changes made in the 1982-83 school year as a result of abolishing the Occupational Specialist position. There were curriculum changes but they were not the result of any influence provided by the abolishment of the Occupational Specialist job.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a school teacher who has earned an associate's degree from Miami-Dade Community College, a bachelor's degree in education from the University of Miami and a master of science degree from Florida International University. Respondent has a valid and current Florida Teacher's Certificate and is certified in the areas of science and social studies. Respondent has been employed for thirteen years as a teacher by the Dade County School Board. He was employed for one year in 1965-69 re-employed in 1972 and continued his employment until his suspension on July 25, 1984. The Dade County School Board has an official policy of annual performance evaluations of all teachers. The criteria established by the Petitioner for the teacher evaluations are: (1) preparation and planning, (2) knowledge of subject matter, (3) classroom management, (4) techniques of instruction, (5) assessment techniques, (6) teacher-student relationship, and professional responsibility. For the years 1972 through 1983 Respondent was annually evaluated by the Petitioner, his job performance was found to be acceptable, and he was annually recommended for continuing employment with Petitioner. For the school year 1983-84 Respondent received an evaluation of "acceptable" and he was recommended for employment. However principal Henry Pinkney later amended his "acceptable" evaluation recommending that Respondent continue his employment under prescription. During the 1983-84 school year Quentin Collins was a student attending North Dade Junior High School where Respondent was one of his teachers. On May 10, 1984, Quentin Collins was one of approximately 30 students in a class taught by Respondent. On that date Collins was repeatedly talking, misbehaving, and disrupting the class. After several warnings by Respondents the student was directed to go to the teacher's desk in the front of the classroom. For the next several moments while Respondent attended to the other students in the classrooms Collins was at various times sitting, kneeling, squatting and leaning on or against the teacher's desk. After he decided to sit on the floors his back was against the teacher's desk and his legs were extended straight out so as to block the aisle next to that desk. After Respondent finished walking around the classroom and talking with other students, he turned to return to the area of his desk and literally, almost stepped on Collins' legs. As Respondent stepped over (and not on) Collins' legs, Collins raised his knees and grabbed Respondent's legs in such a manner that Respondent feared he was going to be "tripped" by the student. In a brief and sudden instant, Respondent grabbed both of Collins' legs, lifted him in the air, and then lowered Collins back down. During this brief bodily entanglement, Collins' head may have bumped the linoleum floor. The incident was not reported to the school administrators until four days later and Collins did not tell his mother about these events until a later date. Collins was examined by a physician four days after the incident. There is no evidence that the student sustained any injury or has any medical problems as a result of the incident of May 10, 1984. Although Respondent was evaluated as "acceptable" and recommended for employment by the principal of North Dade Junior High School after the incident with Collins and after the principal had been advised of the incident with Collins the May 15, 1984 Annual Evaluation of Respondent was amended by the principal on June 7, 1984 to show that Respondent was unacceptable in the area of professional responsibility. Even the "amended" Annual Evaluation fails to recommend that Respondent be terminated from his employment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained in the Specific Notice of Charges filed against him reinstating Respondent as an employee of the Dade County School Board and awarding to Respondent full back pay for the period of time that he has been suspended from his employment DONE and RECOMMENDED this 8th day of May 1986, at Tallahassee Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank R. Harder Esquire 2750 Galloway Road Suite 100 Twin Oaks Building Miami Florida 33165 Dan J. Bradley Esquire 2950 Southwest 27th Avenue Coconut Grove Florida 33133 Leonard Britton, Superintendent School Board of Dade County 1410 Northeast Second Avenue Miami Florida 33132 Phyllis O. Douglas Assistant Board Attorney Dade County Public Schools 1410 Northeast Second Avenue Miami Florida 33132 APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3 and 6 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting recitations of the testimony, argument of counsel or conclusions of law. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 4 and 5 have been rejected as not being supported by the evidence herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-11, 13, and 14 have been adopted either verbatim or as modified to conform with the evidence or style. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 12 has been rejected as being immaterial. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 15 and 16 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting recitations of the testimony, argument of counsels or conclusions of law.
Findings Of Fact The School Board of Leon County, Florida is an "agency" as defined in Section 120.52(1), Florida Statutes, and is charged by law with direction and control of grades kindergarten through twelve for all public schools in Leon County, Florida. Respondent has enacted an existing rule, Rule 6GX37-3.03, entitled Compulsory School Attendance, which comprehensively addresses the issue of excused or unexcused absences. That portion of the rule which Petitioners challenge in this proceeding imposes an academic penalty for unexcused absences. Specifically, challenged Rule 6GX37-3.03(8)(a), provides as follows: There are no "free cuts" and every unexcused absence may well affect a secondary student's grade, since such work cannot be made up. However, five (5) or more unexcused absences during a six-week period will result in failure for that six (6) weeks in that course. Students sixteen (16) or more years of age, in addition to the above, shall fail any course for that semester in which they have accumulated ten (10) unexcused absences, and such students may be recommended for withdrawal for the remainder of any semester when they have accumulated ten (10) unexcused absences in half or more of their classes. Such provision to be subject to the rights guaranteed students over fourteen (14) years of age in Section 232.01, Florida Statutes. Also challenged in this proceeding is Respondent's Rule 6GX37-7.18 entitled "Unexcused Absences - Penalties," which provides as follows: Any student who shall accumulate ten (10) unexcused absences in any one report period, or twenty (20) unexcused absences in any one semester from any course, shall be construed as having failed said course. Any student sixteen (16) years of age or older who accumulates unexcused absences shall fail the course, and may receive a recommendation to withdraw from class or school for the remainder of the report period or semester. Such provision to be subject to the rights guaranteed students over fourteen (14) years of age in Florida Statute [sic] 231.01. Exception: When a student is absent due to suspension, the principal and school staff shall determine whether a student shall be permitted to make up any missed work as the result of the suspension. Whether the suspended student shall suffer a reduction in grade because of the absence shall be the decision of the principal, after consultation with the individual teacher(s) concerned. It is encouraged that the school's disciplinary action be as much as possible a separate entity from its academic program. On August 19, 1980, Respondent issued a notice of intent to amend Rules 6GX37-3.03 and 7.18. The proposed amendments repeal Rule 6GX37-7.18 and modify Rule 6GX37-3.03. The text of the amendments to this rule, insofar as here pertinent, is as follows: Unexcused Absences: Penalties - (Middle School) There are no "free" unexcused absences. Should an unexcused absence occur the student may not make up the work missed. Five or more unexcused absences in a six week period will result in failure for the six week period in the course or courses involved. Unexcused Absences: Penalties (High School) There are no "free" unexcused absences. Should an unexcused absence occur, a documented effort shall be made to contract the parents immediately. The student shall receive a "0" in that class for that day and detention shall be served. Should a second unexcused absence occur within the grading period the student shall receive a "0" in that class for that day and detention shall be served. In addition, when the student returns to school after the second unexcused absence the student and principal (or designee) shall meet to develop a mutually agreeable educational program designed to eliminate future unexcused absences. At a minimum this educational program shall include: A scheduled conference between the student, the parent or parent's designee, the principal or designee, and other appropriate school personnel, A statement of what steps will be taken should other unexcused absences occur or the student not live up to the agreed upon educational program. These steps may include a failing grade for the six week period in the course or courses involved should an additional unexcused absence occur, A listing of those reasons or circumstances asserted by the student as contributing to or causing the unexcused absences and a statement outlining procedures to overcome these reasons or circumstances. If agreement is not reached following a conference, a third unexcused absence shall result in the student failing for the six week period the course or courses involved. Any student sixteen years of age or older who accumulates six unexcused absences in any one semester for any course may fail such course for the semester and may receive a recommendation to withdraw from class or school for the remainder of the semester. Parents or guardians may grieve under the procedures set out in Board Policy 7.10 the assessment of academic failure if there are circumstances not considered by school level officials when unexcused absences occurred. Petitioner Lisa Kiley is presently enrolled in the ninth grade at Respondent's School for Applied Individualized Learning (SAIL), an educational alternative program operated pursuant to Section 230.2315, Florida Statutes. As a student in the Leon County school system, Lisa Kiley is subject to Florida's compulsory attendance laws and the challenged rules in their present and proposed forms. Petitioner Karen Kiley is also presently enrolled at SAIL, where she is apparently performing and progressing in a highly satisfactory fashion. In the fall of 1978 Karen Kiley attended Lincoln High School, in Leon County, Florida, as a freshman and enrolled in six courses. During the first six week grading period, based solely on her academic performance, she received four D's and two F's. In the second six week period, again based solely on her academic performance, Karen Kiley received one C, one D and three F's. In addition she accumulated six unexcused absences in Physical Education, and was therefore given a mandatory F under Respondent's Rule 6GX37-3.03(8), quoted above. During the third six week period she accumulated additional unexcused absences, and Respondent's policy mandated F's in five of her six classes. In Physical Education she had no unexcused absences, but still received a grade of F. Karen Kiley became ill during the semester exam period in the fall of 1978. She apparently believed that because of the number or her unexcused absences she would receive an F in all her classes and for that reason she did not return to school to take her examinations. Had she taken the final examinations it was possible for her to have passed some of her classes despite the number of unexcused absences. Under Respondent's grading structure, credit for classes is based on semester units. The semester units are divided into three grading periods of six weeks each. A student is given a separate grade for each of the six week periods, and for the final exam in each course. The four grades are then averaged to give a semester total. A grade of D or higher will gain credit for a class. Respondent's grading policy provides that an F in the third six week periods coupled with an F for any other six week period results in an F for the semester. Thus, the F's that Karen Kiley received because of her unexcused absences in the third six week period, combined with her academic F's in other periods and with her nonattendance of the final examinations, resulted in her not receiving credit for any course taken during the fall semester of 1978. Karen Kiley did not receive an F under Respondent's attendance policy for more than one grading period in any class. As a result, the challenged provision of the attendance policy was never the sole cause of Karen Kiley's loss of credit. This record is absent of any showing that Karen Kiley completed her course requirements and would have received credit for these courses but for the effect of the challenged attendance policy. There is no showing in this record that Petitioner, Lisa Kiley, has ever been subjected to Respondent's existing attendance policy, or that it could reasonably be anticipated that either Karen or Lisa Kiley would be subjected to the policy which Respondent proposes to establish by way of the aforementioned amendments to its existing rules. Both Petitioners and Respondent have submitted proposed findings of fact for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that those proposed findings of fact are not incorporated in this order, they have been rejected as being either irrelevant to the issues in this cause, or as not having been supported by the evidence.
Findings Of Fact David B. Clark, Respondent, is employed by the Leon County School Board on continuing contract and was so employed at all times here involved. By Request for Leave dated May 31, 1978 (Exhibit 2) Respondent requested leave without pay from August 1978 through June 1979 for the purpose of continuing education. The request was forwarded approved by the Respondent's principal and approved by N. E. (Ed) Fenn, Petitioner. The principal who recommended approval of Respondent's leave request testified he would not have recommended approval had he not believed Respondent would pursue graduate studies. At the time Respondent submitted his application for leave he had been assured of financial assistance from his family to provide him the necessary funds to be a full-time student at Florida State University in the Masters program in public administration. In July Respondent learned he would be unable to get the financing he had expected to allow him to attend school full time. He proceeded to the school personnel office, advised the personnel director of his dilemma and requested advice. She advised him to go to the school at which he was employed the past school year and ask for his position back for the 1978-79 school year. When he did so he found a new principal had been appointed who was unsure of the job availability but he advised Respondent that his previous year's position had been filled by someone else. Respondent went back to the personnel officer for Leon County School Board where he learned there were no jobs available but he could be listed on the rolls as a substitute. He also was told that he should attempt to take some graduate courses even if he couldn't afford to go full time. Respondent agreed to try and do so. By letter dated 31 July 1978 (Exhibit 5) Respondent applied to be placed on the rolls as a substitute teacher for the 1978-79 school year. Respondent then took a sales job at which he worked in the late afternoon and early evening while also working as a substitute teacher. After the first semester, Respondent quit his sales job and worked full-time as a substitute teacher until the end of the school year. He was then offered a summer job on a construction project in Georgia, which he took. After Respondent reapplied and was employed for the 1979-1980 school year, the charges of gross insubordination and misconduct in office followed. Respondent's evaluation reports (Exhibit 4) contain a satisfactory rating in all categories for the past three years. Only in the year 1974-1975 was a "needs to improve" rating given in any of the categories for evaluation. Subsequent to the 1974-1975 evaluation year Respondent was placed on continuing contract status.
The Issue Whether Respondent’s January 26, 2005 school board vote, adopting the recommendation of Respondent’s Superintendent that a set, single impact fee amount be imposed by the Volusia County Council (the equivalent of the county commission in non- chartered counties) on newly constructed housing in Volusia County, constituted a rule or rule amendment without satisfying applicable due process requirements of Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes, since Respondent’s existing policy determines the impact fee amount through the impact fee calculation report (defined in Section 70-171 of the Volusia County Ordinance Code as the Volusia County School Impact Fee Update Final Report dated December 2004, prepared by Tindale-Oliver & Associates, Inc., and approved by Respondent) which proposed the adoption of a varying impact fee amount for different types of housing.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a not-for-profit corporation, consisting of about 600 builder and associate members. Petitioner’s members are affected by market fluctuations in the home construction industry. Purposes of the corporation with respect to governmental affairs are to forward, or promote, the industry and the values and goals of the industry. Petitioner has specifically taken an active position with respect to the adoption of school impact fees within Volusia County. Petitioner regularly surveys its members and determines their reaction to existing and proposed ordinances and regulations. Testimony of Bob Fitzsimmons, past president and governmental affairs committee chair of the Petitioner, and Sue Darden, executive director of the Petitioner, establishes that members of the Petitioner have been affected by the action of Respondent challenged in this case. A substantial number of members have absorbed the cost of increased school impact fees, while other members have raised prices or found nearby counties to be more attractive to their potential customers. Dr. Mark Soskin, an associate professor of economics at the University of Central Florida, opined that members of Petitioner are affected by increases in school impact fees in three ways: (1) they pay the impact fees directly; (2) the value of their product is determined by the types of expenditures, location and types of services provided to schools in the neighborhood of their product; (3) impact fees add to the cost and therefore affect the bottom line of home builders. The industry’s market is volatile, and subject to rapid swings between profitability and loss based on external cost changes. Respondent is a public body corporate and governing body of the School District of Volusia County. On August 24, 1993, Respondent adopted Policy 612, (Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, originally numbered 609) entitled “Level of Service for Educational Facilities”. The stated reason for the alleged rule was “to determine and declare the policies of the Volusia County School Board for the financing, construction and utilization of educational facilities.” These policies, adopted, reviewed and from time to time revised, constitute the certifications of the Board, which in turn are contemplated in ordinance 92-9 of the Volusia County Council imposing a countywide impact fee. Policy 612 defined a “student station” and prescribed the necessary space for such a station in both existing and new schools, and provided for the temporary expansion of the capacity of any school through the provision of adequate area within portable or modular classrooms. Policy 612 further provided that when an elementary school reaches 100 percent of its capacity and is experiencing an annual growth rate of at least 10 percent, Respondent shall give consideration to planning the redrawing of school attendance areas, or in the case of schools with capacity of 650 or more, planning for implementation of a multi-track modified school calendar. Policy 612 further required that if for two consecutive years, more than 20 percent of Respondent’s elementary school population is enrolled in schools which utilize a multi-track modified calendar; Respondent shall certify that fact to the Volusia County Council for consideration of an appropriate increase in school impact fees. Policy 612 further determined the initial ratio of students per each new dwelling, for purposes of certifying, at the request of the County or any municipality, the expected demand for new school facilities arising from the issuance of county or city development orders. The Policy further authorized Respondent to study and certify any corrections in that ratio, for purposes of adjusting the school impact fees. Policy 612 further established a “cost per student” based on the Respondent’s average cost of each new student station, and initially fixed such costs. The Policy further provided that for purposes of considering any adjustments to the cost of facilities per student to be served under the adopted level of service, Respondent would further certify, biennially commencing in 1994, the proportion of student stations being utilized on a modified multi-track calendar or located in portable classrooms. Policy 612 also provided that the initial school impact fee was calculated on the premise that Respondent would allocate .4 mills of its local capital improvement fund, and 10 percent of state public education capital outlay funds, to new school construction. The policy specified that Respondent would update and certify its actual receipts and allocations at the times required by County Ordinance 92-9. Article VIII(C) of Policy 612 (Petitioner’s Exhibit 1 at page 7) provides formal policy restrictions upon the expenditure of impact fee receipts, restricting their use solely to provide for or reimburse capital improvements necessitated by the growth in student population, and prohibiting use of such funds for any improvement that does not produce a new increase in the student capacity of the school district. On December 13, 1994, Respondent adopted an amendment to Policy 612 (then still numbered 609) “to update the cost per student station of new school facilities for purposes of adjusting the school impact fees in compliance with Volusia County Ordinance 92-9". Except for renumbering, Policy 612 has not been further amended since December 13, 1994. Volusia County Ordinance 92-9 was substantially amended in 1997. That 1997 version was in turn amended by County Ordinance 2005-01 adopted February 24, 2005. Ordinance 2005-01 has been codified in Chapter 70, Article V of the County Code of Ordinances. Section 70-174 of the County Code of Ordinances provides that “this Article is consistent with, and intended to assist in the implementation of, the Volusia County Comprehensive Plan.” The Capital Facilities Element of the Volusia County Comprehensive Plan provides in Policy 15.3.4.4 that “the County has adopted, at the request of the School Board of Volusia County, a level of service standard by reference with the adoption of Chapter 70, Article 5 Code of Ordinances, County of Volusia.” Section 70-175(a) of the County Code of Ordinances provides that “[t]he amount of the impact fee shall be determined by the impact fee calculation set out in the impact fee calculation report...” The impact fee calculation report is further defined in Section 70-171 of the Code as “the report entitled ‘Volusia County School Impact Fee Update Final Report’ dated December 2004, prepared by Tindale-Oliver & Associates, Inc. and approved by the school board.” Section 70-175(b) of the County Code of Ordinances further provides that: On February 1, 2006, and February 1 of every subsequent year thereafter the impact fee shall be adjusted to reflect any inflation or deflation in school construction costs after December 1, 2004, ... the school board shall provide the adjustment rate with the revised impact fee amount to the county by December 1 of the year preceding the effective date for collection of the revised impact fee. Section 70-176 of the County Code of Ordinances provides that “commencing on June 6, 2005, the amount of the impact fee shall be $5,442.52 (including three percent administrative fee) per dwelling. Thereafter, the impact fee shall be the amount calculated under Section 70-175.” Section 70-175 of the County Code of Ordinances further provides for purposes of future calculations, that: The impact fee calculation shall apply the following formula: Impact fee (net capital cost) = Total capital cost - External revenues - Local capital revenues apportioned per dwelling based on the student generation rate.” The definitions of each of the factors in the formula show that the factors are determined by the policies of Respondent as initially expressed in Policy 612 and as revised by the Update, here challenged as an unadopted rule or rule amendment. William C. Kelly, Respondent’s deputy superintendent for financial and business services, was unaware of Respondent’s existing Policy 612 when, in 2004, Respondent determined the necessity to revisit school impact fees. The responsible principal of Tindale-Oliver & Associates was Robert Wallace. Wallace’s firm was engaged by Respondent, through Deputy Superintendent Kelly, to conduct an update of the Volusia County school impact fee data and methodology. The contract between Respondent and Wallace’s firm was paid by the school district. Wallace’s role was to coordinate with the district in the collection of data for subsequent analysis by his subordinate staff, and to also subsequently answer questions from Volusia County staff and Council members. The Tindale-Oliver Update (Petitioner’s Exhibit 4) proposed two alternatives for Respondent’s consideration in adopting an impact fee schedule. At page 15, the Update states that the first option is to adopt a separate and unique impact fee for each land use type (single family, multi-family, mobile home) ranging from $2,354 to $6,905. The second option is to charge a single amount ($5,284) to all housing types, based on a weighted average of student generation ratios from all housing types. The recommendation by the consultant was that Respondent adopt and forward to the Volusia County Council the first option’s varied impact fee. Respondent’s superintendent recommended at the January 26 meeting of Respondent’s Board that the Board adopt and give approval for subsequent presentation to the Volusia County Council at that body’s meeting on February 24, 2005, an increase in the Volusia County School District impact fee to $5,284, based on the Tindale-Oliver and Associates, Inc. study. Respondent, at that meeting, approved the recommendation; an action tantamount to increasing the impact fee to an amount in conflict with the preferred choice of the consultant. Comparison of the Tindale-Oliver recommendation and the Respondent’s action documents that Respondent chose a fee schedule different from that preferred by its consultant. That choice, rather than the Tindale-Oliver recommendation, was ultimately incorporated into Ordinance 2005-01 (together with a County-added 3 percent administrative fee).
The Issue Whether Petitioner has cause to terminate Respondent's employment as a school custodian.
Findings Of Fact At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a school custodian. In the fall of 1994, the Respondent was arrested and charged with the offense of theft. The property in question was a Green Machine weed eater that was owned by the Petitioner. Petitioner assigned John Bell, an investigator employed by the Petitioner's police department, to investigate the alleged theft. Respondent admitted to Mr. Bell that he had possession of the piece of equipment, he knew that it was valued at approximately $300.00, but he asserted that he bought the machine for $100.00 cash from an unknown person Respondent said was a school board employee. Respondent did not have a receipt for the purchase or any other evidence to substantiate his explanation as to how he came into possession of the stolen property. In December 1994, Respondent was found guilty of theft following a bench trial in the criminal proceeding. Adjudication of guilt was withheld and he was fined $105.00 in court costs. He was ordered to pay restitution to the School Board in the amount of $160.82 for the cost of its investigation. The School Board has the authority to terminate Respondent's employment for cause. The School Board's Policy 3.27 pertains to suspension and dismissal of employees. If the Superintendent finds probable cause to recommend to the School Board that a member of the non-instructional staff be suspended without pay and subsequently dismissed, the Superintendent is required to notify the employee in writing. The policy also contains provisions for the information that must be included in the notice to the employee. By letter dated February 9, 1995, the Superintendent advised Respondent that cause existed to terminate his employment on the grounds of theft of school property and misconduct in office. On February 21, 1995, the School Board, based on the Superintendent's recommendation, suspended Respondent's employment without pay pending this termination proceeding. The Superintendent and the School Board followed the pertinent policies in suspending the Respondent's employment without pay pending this dismissal proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order that terminates Respondent's employment as a school custodian. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Lee M. Rosenberg, Esquire Palm Beach County School Board 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5813 Mr. Noyland Francis 7326 Willow Spring Circle Lantana, Florida 33463 Dr. C. Monica Uhlhorn, Superintendent Palm Beach County School Board 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5813
The Issue Whether Respondent's teacher's certificate should be revoked pursuant to Section 231.28, Florida Statutes, for alleged sale of marijuana, as set forth in Petition, dated May 11, 1979. The parties stipulated to the expected testimony of Petitioner's witnesses, and Respondent did not call any witnesses at the hearing. The parties further stipulated to the admission of Petitioner's Exhibits 1-5 and to Respondent's Composite Exhibit 1. This is an administrative proceeding whereby the Petitioner seeks to take adverse action concerning the teaching certificate of the Respondent based on an allegation the Respondent sold marijuana to a police officer on September 1, 1978. The matter was reported by the Superintendent, Polk County Public Schools, to Petitioner by letter of February 21, 1979. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) The Petition herein was thereafter filed pursuant to directions of the State Commissioner of Education who on May 11, 1979, found probable cause to justify disciplinary action under the provisions of Section 231.28, Florida Statutes. Respondent requested an administrative hearing by Answer, dated May 22, 1979. Respondent filed a prehearing Motion to Strike the Petition on the grounds that the Polk County Superintendent improperly referred the matter to Petitioner on the basis of Respondent's nolo contendere plea in a criminal proceeding, and had suspended her from employment without an evidentiary hearing. The motion further alleged that Petitioner based its probable cause finding upon hearsay evidence and that it has no authority to make a finding of criminal guilt without a judicial adjudication of the same. Respondent's Motion is denied. Petitioner's Rule 6A-4.37, Florida Administrative Code, prescribes procedures for revoking or suspending certificates. It provides, inter alia, that when a superintendent has "cause to believe" that a certificate holder is "guilty of any offense" for which the penalty is revocation or suspension, it is his duty to file a "signed report" with any supporting documentation with Petitioner. Such a report merely triggers an investigation by Petitioner's staff for consideration by its Executive Committee and ultimate finding of probable cause by the Commissioner of Education. All of these procedures are preliminary in nature. No definitive action can be taken against a certificate holder and no final adverse action may be taken without an opportunity for an adversary hearing. The cases cited by Respondent in support of the notion deal with evidentiary standards for the issuance of final orders and do not relate to such preliminary matters. Petitioner observed the requirements of its rules procedurally in this case.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Judy A. Cain holds Florida Teaching Certificate No. 339186, Post Graduate Rank II, valid through June 30, 1983, covering the areas of English and junior college. She was employed in the public schools of Polk County at Wahneta Elementary School as a teacher in September, 1978. (Stipulation) During the evening of September 1, 1978, a police officer of the City of Dundee, Florida, who was working in an undercover capacity, had a conversation with a woman later identified as Respondent and another woman named "Candy" at Walker's Bar in Dundee. They told the officer that they were going to buy a "bag" and get "high." The officer asked if they knew where he could pick up a "bag," and Respondent told him that she would have to have money to get it herself. The officer gave Respondent $20.00 and the two women left the establishment. They returned a short time later, and the woman known as Candy took a plastic bag containing a brownish vegetable matter from her purse and both women stated that it was "dynamite dope." Thereafter, laboratory tests established that the bag contained 18 grams of marijuana. (Stipulated testimony of Castro, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) On October 17, 1978, Respondent was arrested for the offense of sale of marijuana. On February 8, 1979, upon Respondent's plea of nolo contendere to sale and possession of a controlled substance, in the Polk County Circuit Court, an order was issued by the Court withholding adjudication of guilt and placing the Respondent on probation for a period of three years. Respondent was dismissed from employment by the School Board of Polk County on May 21, 1979, for immorality based on the sale of marijuana. Evidence concerning the foregoing disposition of judicial and school board proceedings was received at the hearing upon stipulation of the parties, but will not be considered herein for purposes of determining grounds for disciplinary action under Section 231.28, F.S. (Stipulated testimony of Castro, Wilson, Petitioner's Exhibits 1- 2, 5) In the opinion of Respondent's former principal, the Polk County School Board Director of Employee Relations, the Chairman of the School Board, and several parents, a teacher who commits the offense of sale of marijuana would thereby set an improper example for students and seriously reduce the teacher's effectiveness as an employee of the school system. (Stipulated testimony of Miles, S. Wilson, Qualls, D. Wilson, Aggelis, supplemented by Petitioner's Exhibit 4) During the school year 1975-76 in the Polk County School System, Respondent received a "satisfactory" rating on her annual teacher assessment report. She received the highest rating of "good" during the 1976-77 school year, and a "satisfactory" rating for the 1977-78 year. (Respondent's Composite Exhibit 1)
Recommendation That Respondent's teaching certificate be revoked for a period of two years. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: J. David Holder, Esquire 110 North Magnolia Drive Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wallace L. Storey Post Office Box 796 Bartow, Florida 33830 Hugh Ingram, Administrator Professional Practices Council 319 West Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an unpaid leave of absence from employment as a teacher of the Flagler School District, from July 1, 1996 until expiration of her commission as School Board member on November 19, 1996.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a teacher employed by the Flagler County School District. Petitioner has been employed for more than three years, has been recommended by the School Board and reappointed and has become eligible for, and has received, a Professional Services Contract with tenure. Petitioner has been employed by the Flagler County School System for six years. She is enrolled in the Florida Retirement System, and her eligible employment under that system consists entirely of her service in the Flagler County School System. Petitioner was appointed by the Governor as a School Board member on or about September 5, 1995. She had just begun School Year 1995-1996 as an elementary teacher at Bunnell Elementary School. Petitioner was appointed to serve as a School Board member until November 19, 1996. Her appointment expires upon the election and start of a member to fill the remaining two years of the term of a deceased member of the School Board. Following her appointment to the School Board, Petitioner applied for a leave of absence as teacher in order to take her position as a School Board member. Petitioner sought an unpaid leave of absence from the time of her appointment to the School Board until the end of the 1995-1996 School Year. The Superintendent recommended that her request be approved and the School Board approved it. At that time, the Superintendent made clear to her that any leave of absence beyond June 30, 1996 would be subject to the School Board's approval, notwithstanding the Superintendent's current or future recommendations. Petitioner's request for leave of absence near the commencement of School Year 1995-1996 presented no administrative inconvenience to the School District, and minimal disruption of the routine of her students. Petitioner was tendered renewal of her teaching contract for the 1996- 1997 School Year, apparently effective August 13, 1996. Petitioner timely applied to the Superintendent for an extension of her leave of absence as a teacher for that part of School Year 1996-1997 that overlapped the time up to the expiration of her term as a School Board member, November 19, 1996. The Superintendent recommended that Petitioner's request for extension of leave of absence without pay for the applicable portion of School Year 1996- 1997 be granted. In considering Petitioner's request for an extension of her leave of absence into School Year 1996-1997, the Superintendent considered the requirements of efficient operation of the School District, including tentative discussions with his staff about possible positions suitable to Petitioner's experience upon her projected return November 19, 1996 from her requested extended leave of absence. The position to which Petitioner has been appointed at Bunnell Elementary School commencing August 13, 1996 is not being held open by Respondent, but has been filled by another teacher irrespective of these proceedings. There is a tentatively identified position suitable to Petitioner's experience. Mr. Bowen, Director of Personnel, Transportation, and Insurance, opined that if the tentatively identified position were not filled until November 19, 1996, it might be disruptive to good education of the particular type of students targeted for the program. The School District has no imminent need to fill the tentatively identified position, but there is no guarantee it still will be available on November 19, 1996. In the interim, other positions may open through maternity leave, illness, death, etc. or they may not. On average, there are three or four teaching positions that open and that must be re-filled every school year. There is no evidence that a position which opens, if any, will be one for which Petitioner is qualified. If there is no position for which Petitioner is suitable available on November 19, 1996 she cannot be placed in Flagler County. Seniority has no effect; suitability by educational qualifications and credentials does. If Petitioner's leave of absence is not approved and she fails to commence work on August 13, 1996, she will forfeit her contract as a teacher. If, after November 19, 1996, Petitioner is neither a School Board member nor a teacher on approved leave of absence, she will no longer be covered by the Florida Retirement System. If Petitioner is denied leave and returns to the position which is now available she will lose no employment benefits. The Superintendent recommended to the Respondent Board that the extension of Petitioner's leave of absence be approved because of the extraordinary circumstance of her gubernatorial appointment to the position of School Board member, and because the requested leave period was for such a short portion of School Year 1996-1997, (approximately 96 days including weekends and autumn holidays when no teaching occurs), that it was acceptable within his expert educator administrative experience. On April 23, 1996, the Respondent School Board voted to refuse the Superintendent's recommendation to extend Petitioner's leave of absence without pay for the additional time she would otherwise be teaching. Petitioner's request was the only recommended leave request not approved at that School Board meeting. An extended leave for over one school year has not been granted by the Flagler County School Board since 1978. The Respondent Board had no evidence before it other than the Superintendent's recommendation when it considered the extension of Petitioner's leave. During the Superintendent's thirteen-year experience which has been since 1983, the Board has always accepted his recommendations with respect to leaves of absence. Due to the death of another School Board member and the inability of Petitioner to participate in the vote, only three Board members participated in the vote on the Superintendent's recommendation for extension of Petitioner's leave of absence. Member Dance moved that the leave be denied because the Board had never before granted an extended leave for an employee to accept a full time salaried position. The motion was approved by two members, Ms. Dance and Mr. Marier. The only "concerns" expressed by Ms. Dance and Mr. Marier, who testified at formal hearing, related to speculation and assumptions that Petitioner presented a case of first impression, certainly for their School Board and probably for the State of Florida, and that if Petitioner were granted an extended leave of absence, it might be difficult to administer the system in the event of a deluge of similar requests from teachers requesting leave without pay to take other salaried positions. Ms. Dance has served on the School Board for twelve years and felt that in a growing school system, such as the Flagler County School District, it is inefficient to remove teachers and then attempt to have positions made available to them upon return from leave. If extended leave is granted, Petitioner will not teach for roughly 96 days of the 1996-1997 School Year and will only teach in Flagler County if re- employed in a position actually available on November 19, 1996. See, Findings of Fact 12-16 supra. Superintendent Kaupke shared Ms. Dance's concern for orderly administration but still recommended approval of extended leave for Petitioner. On average, leaves of absence of varying duration are recommended and granted for a dozen or more teachers each School Year, and there are three to four permanent teacher replacements each year without any significant effect on efficiency of the system or disruption of the education of even elementary school students. In the past, the Superintendent has consistently denied requests of employees to take other salaried positions and the School Board has not granted any. In one instance, a teacher lied to Dr. Kaupe about his reason for requesting a leave of absence without pay and took a salaried teaching position in another state. The Superintendent would not have recommended a leave of absence be granted had he known the true circumstances. During her employment as a teacher, Petitioner also worked part-time in a separate job as a child care apprenticeship instructor. The School Board has no rules, policies or past precedents which forbid dual employment by school teachers, so long as the second job does not interfere with their responsibilities under their teaching contracts with the School Board. For the balance of 1996, all regular School Board meetings are scheduled to be held at 7:30 p.m. on the third Tuesday of each month. Although this schedule is subject to change, at the time of formal hearing herein, there were no scheduled events for School Board members during a school teacher's normal duty hours. Petitioner's requested extended leave of absence was volitional, but was not submitted for the purpose of accepting another salaried position which would physically prevent the performance of her duties as a teacher. Rather, it was submitted in order to conform to the requirements of Section 112.313(10) F.S. and the holding in Wright v. Commission on Ethics, 389 So.2d 662 (Fla. 1980).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Flagler County enter a Final Order granting Petitioner's request for extension of unpaid leave of absence through November 19, 1996. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 1996.
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this order closing file is entitled to Judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing one copy of a Notice of Appeal with the Agency Clerk of the Department of Management Services, 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950, and a second copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that this Order Closing File was filed in the official records of the Department of Management Services and copies were furnished to: Larry D. Scott, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Management Services, 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950; Jane M. Letwin, Esquire, 5426 SW 25" Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312, and Judge Claude B. Arrington, Division of Administrative Hearings, the DeSoto net Building, 1230 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060, this | a day of Quis, Us? ‘ , 2009. Debbie Shoup Clerk Department of Management Services (850) 487-1082 2 of 2 Jul 11 2009 11:41 a7/11/2889° 12:23 9549617454 PACK-SHIP&BEYOND PAGE 91/03 STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS GLORIA MARSHALL, Petitioner CASE NO: 08-3716 JUDGE ARRINGTON v. DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT. Respondent. / PETITIONER’S AMENDED NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE PETITIONER, GLORIA MARSHALL, through undersigned counsel, hereby files this AMENDED PETITIONER’S NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE, on the following grounds: 1. Petitioner Marshall is not working for the employer since June of 2008, when she retired after a long career as an employee of the Broward County School Board. Most of the documents to be used in this petition are already in possession of Respondent and the attorney for Petitioner. 2. Petitioner patiently and conscientiously worked as an adult ed teacher from 1981 through 2005, a period of some twenty four years. EXHIBIT att Jul 11 2009 11:41 @7/11/2889 12:23 9549617454 PACK-SHIP&BEYOND PAGE 62/83 3. In view of the relationship between the Repondent and Petitioner, who has been enrolled several times in the FRS, Petitioner contends that the Respondent exercise its fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the member by not opposing this dismissal without prejudice. 4. Petitioner contends that no prejudice to Respondent will result. 5. No expenses have been incurred thus far other than the transmission of employment records by the Respondent to undersigned counsel, and those will not change. If a plan has been proposed for the case by Respondent, that plan can be laid aside and will serve the same purpose in the future. 6. In light of the circumstances which prevail, to insist on the prosecution of this petition at this time will not serve the interests of justice. 7. Petitioner has indicated that she is unable to assist in this petition until the month of December 2009. 8, In addition, the goal sought in these proceedings is a very precious one, that is, a pension and social security fund which will influence the comfort or lack thereof of this petitioner’s last years, and is worthy of the Court’s indulgence in acknowledging this dismissal without prejudice. BASED ON THE FOREGOING recitation of facts, Petitioner files this ‘ Amended Notice of Voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Jul 11 2009 11:42 97/11/2009 12:23 9549617454 PACK-SHIP&BEYOND PAGE 43/03 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been fax-filed with the Department of Administrative Hearings and e-mailed to 850 922 6312, to Larry Dz. Scott, Esq., Asst. General counsel to DMS, 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Eleventh day of July, 2009. LAW OFFICE OF JANE M. LETWIN Attorney for Petitioner: Florida Bar Number 990329 5426 SW 25" Avenue, Fort Lauderdale Fl 33312 Phone: 954 245 8495: Fax: 954 301 8401 E-mail; Janeletwintv@aol.com By * ou Jane M. Letwin
