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VINTAGE WHOLESALE OF SARASOTA, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 02-002780 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Jul. 10, 2002 Number: 02-002780 Latest Update: Mar. 10, 2004

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner is liable for the tax, penalty, and interest assessed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business located at 2836 North Tamiami Trial, Sarasota, Florida. Petitioner primarily engages in the business of selling classic, vintage automobiles. Petitioner sells automobiles for delivery in-state, interstate, and internationally. Petitioner also engages in the business of selling other collectible items, including jukeboxes. Respondent is the state agency responsible for the administration of the Florida sales and use tax pursuant to Sections 20.21 and 213.05, Florida Statutes (1991). (All references to Florida Statutes are to Florida Statutes 1991 unless otherwise stated.) In accordance with Section 212.34, Respondent audited Petitioner's business records for the period from May 1, 1991, through July 31, 1996 (audit period). Respondent determined a deficiency and assessed Petitioner for $114,878.68, including tax, penalty, and interest through January 26, 1999. Respondent assessed tax in the amount of $55,771.16, penalty in the amount of $26,528.02, and interest through January 26, 1999, in the amount of $32,579.50. Additional interest accrues at the daily rate of $20.97. The assessed tax is based on several alleged deficiencies. Some deficiencies involve alleged failures of Petitioner to comply with taxing provisions. Other deficiencies involve alleged failures of Petitioner to comply with the requirements of claimed exemptions. Taxing provisions are construed narrowly against the taxing authority while the provisions authorizing exemptions are construed narrowly against the person claiming the exemption. The assessment against Petitioner includes tax on $51,353.10 in under-reported retail sales for 1994. Respondent compared the gross income reported by Petitioner for the 1994 tax year with the state sales tax revenues reported by Petitioner for the same year and determined that Petitioner under-reported sales tax revenues in the amount of $51,353.10. Mr. Martin Godbey is a corporate officer for Petitioner and a controlling shareholder. Mr. Godbey testified at the hearing. Mr. Godbey testified that $45,000 of the $51,353.10 was not under-reported gross sales in 1994. According to Mr. Godbey, Petitioner's accountant over-reported gross income for purposes of the federal income tax. Petitioner derives some income from providing brokerage services as an liaison between a buyer and seller. Mr. Godbey testified that Petitioner earned $1,400 in 1994 as a broker for the sale of a 1956 Jaguar XJ140 roadster on behalf of an automobile dealership in Virginia. The testimony is that Petitioner introduced the seller and buyer but never possessed the vehicle or delivered the vehicle. The price of the vehicle was approximately $45,000. Mr. Godbey testified that Petitioner's accountant incorrectly reported $45,000 as gross income under the federal income tax law and reported the difference between $45,000 and $1,400 as the cost of goods sold. The testimony of Mr. Godbey was credible and persuasive. However, the testimony was not supported by documentary evidence of Petitioner's federal income tax return or by testimony of Petitioner's accountant. The unsupported testimony of Mr. Godbey does not rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence. Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner over-reported gross income for the purpose of the federal income tax rather than under-reported gross sales for the purpose of the state sales tax. The testimony of Mr. Godbey did not explain the difference between the $51,353.10 amount determined by Respondent and $45,000 amount testified to by Mr. Godbey. For the period from 1991 through 1993, Petitioner collected sales tax on retail sales but did not remit the tax to Respondent. Rather, Petitioner paid the tax to two automobile dealers identified in the record as International Antique Motors, Inc. (IAM) and Autohaus Kolar, Inc. (AK). Petitioner registered with Respondent as a dealer sometime in 1991. However, Petitioner did not obtain a retail dealer's license from the Department of Motor Vehicles (Department) until late in 1993. From 1991 through most of 1993, Petitioner was licensed by the Department as a wholesale dealer and was not authorized by the Department to engage in retail sales of motor vehicles. Section 320.27(2) prohibited Petitioner from selling motor vehicles at retail and made such sales unlawful. Petitioner asserts that it could not have engaged in retail sales, within the meaning of Section 212.06(2)(c) and (d), because Petitioner had no legal authority to do so. From 1991 through 1993, Petitioner engaged in retail sales within the meaning of Section 212.06(2)(c) and (d). Petitioner engaged in retail sales by selling automobiles at retail in violation of Section 320.27(2). Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner collected sales tax on each sale. Petitioner did not engage in retail sales and collect sales tax on each sale in the capacity of an agent for IAM or AK. Petitioner acted in his own behalf as a principal. IAM and AK had no actual or legal control over the sales conducted by Petitioner. IAM and AK merely processed the title work for each retail sale conducted by Petitioner. Even if Petitioner were an agent for IAM and AK, Petitioner engaged in retail sales as a dealer defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.0066. (All references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code during the audit period.) Petitioner registered the vehicles sold at retail from 1991 through 1993 by way of a business arrangement with IAM and AK. After Petitioner collected sales tax on each retail sale, Petitioner remitted the tax to IAM and AK. IAM and AK then registered the vehicles with the Department. Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner paid to IAM and AK the sales tax that Petitioner collected from each customer. Nor does Respondent dispute that the amount of tax Petitioner paid to IAM and AK was sufficient to pay the tax due. Section 212.06(10) requires IAM and AK to issue a receipt for sales tax with each application for title or registration. IAM obtained title or registration for 21 vehicles sold by Petitioner and at issue in this case. AK obtained title or registration for three vehicles at issue in this case. Section 212.06(10) does not operate to create a factual presumption that IAM and AK paid the sales tax due on the 24 vehicles at the time that IAM and AK applied for title or registration of each vehicle. In practice, the receipt issued by dealers with each application for title or registration contains a code indicating that the dealer has collected the tax and will pay the tax in the dealer's ensuing sales tax return. After IAM applied for title or registration for the vehicles evidenced in Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 4, 6, and 21, IAM remitted taxes to Respondent in an amount sufficient to pay the tax due on those sales by Petitioner. Respondent has no record of any tax deficiencies against IAM. Respondent's admitted policy is to avoid the collection of tax if the tax has already been paid. After IAM applied for title or registration for the vehicles evidenced in Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 3, 5, and 7 through 20, IAM remitted taxes to Respondent in an amount that was insufficient to pay the tax due on those sales. Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that IAM remitted to Respondent the taxes that Petitioner collected and paid to IAM in connection with the sales evidenced in Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 3, 5, and 7 through 20. Petitioner is not entitled to a set-off of the taxes remitted to Respondent by IAM after the sales evidenced in Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 3, 5, and 7 through 20. There is insufficient evidence to show that the taxes remitted by IAM were collected on the sales at issue in this case rather than other sales made by IAM. AK processed three vehicles for Petitioner that are at issue in this case. AK paid to Respondent the sales tax due on the three retail sales at issue. The relevant sales are evidenced in Petitioner's Exhibits 24 through 26. AK remitted taxes in an amount that was more than sufficient to pay the tax due on those sales by Petitioner. Respondent has no record of a tax deficiency against AK. Respondent's policy is to avoid the collection of tax if tax has already been paid. Several deficiencies are attributable to disallowed exemptions for 16 sales that include 14 vehicles and two jukeboxes. Statutory requirements for exemptions are strictly construed against the person claiming the exemption. Petitioner did not satisfy essential requirements for any of the disallowed exemptions. The exemptions asserted by Petitioner in its PRO are discussed in greater detail in the following paragraphs. During the audit period, Petitioner sold a 1972 Italia Spyder automobile, VIN: 50413414, to a Texas automobile dealership identified in the record as North American Classic Cars/Gene Ponder, of Marshall, Texas (North American). Petitioner claims that the sale to North American is exempt because it is a sale for resale to a non-resident dealer. The sale to North American is not exempt. Petitioner failed to obtain a non-resident dealer affidavit at the time of sale in violation of Section 212.08(10). During the audit, Petitioner obtained a Sales Tax Exemption Affidavit (DR-40) from North American. A DR-40 is not appropriate for a sale for resale to a non-resident dealer. The appropriate affidavit would have required the non-resident dealer to attest that "the motor vehicle will be transported outside of the State of Florida for resale and for no other purpose." Hand written notations on the bill of sale for the Italia Spyder indicate the North American representative took possession of the automobile in Florida. In addition, a hand- written letter to Petitioner indicates that the Italia Spyder was purchased for the private collection of the owner of North American rather than for resale. During the audit period, Petitioner sold a 1959 Mercedes Benz 190SL automobile, VIN: 12104-10-95012, to Mike Hiller, of Coral Springs, Florida (Hiller). Petitioner claimed, on the bill of sale, that the sale was exempt because it was a sale to a non-resident dealer for resale. The sale to Hiller is not exempt. At the time of the sale, Petitioner failed to obtain a non-resident dealer affidavit or a resale certificate. The bill of lading lists Hiller as an exporter and indicated that Hiller, as the exporter, took possession of the automobile in Florida. The bill of lading does not show unbroken, continuous transportation from the selling dealer to a common carrier or directly out of Florida as required in Section 212.06(5)(b)1. During the audit period, Petitioner sold a 1959 MGA Roadster, VIN: 54941, to Fabiana Valsecchi, of Rome, Italy. Petitioner claims the sale is exempt as a sale for export. The sale to Valsecchi is not exempt. At the time of the sale, Petitioner failed to obtain a bill of lading, or other shipping documentation that shows unbroken, continuous transportation from Petitioner to a common carrier or directly out of Florida. The bill of sale signed by the purchaser's agent shows that the agent took possession of the automobile in Florida. Petitioner failed to show that the sale was exempt because it was a sale for resale. Petitioner did not provide a resale certificate from the purchaser. During the audit period, Petitioner sold a 1961 Triumph TR3 automobile, VIN: TS753 38L, to Classic Automobile Investors, Inc., of Germany (Classic). Petitioner claims that the sale is exempt because it was a sale for export. The sale to Classic is not exempt. At the time of sale, Petitioner failed to obtain a bill of lading, or other shipping documentation which shows unbroken, continuous transportation from Petitioner to a common carrier or directly out of Florida. During the audit period, Petitioner sold a 1947 Bentley MKVI automobile, VIN: B137B, to Mr. Bob Erickson, of Palmetto, Florida. Petitioner failed to collect and remit Local Government Surtax on the sale and owes the uncollected tax. During the audit period, Petitioner sold two jukeboxes and other items of tangible personal property to Mr. C.P. Loontjens. Petitioner claims that the sales are exempt from sales tax because they were sales for export. At the time of the sale, Petitioner failed to obtain documentation from the buyer to show that items sold were delivered to a common carrier or directly delivered outside of Florida. During the audit period, Petitioner was engaged in the business of selling items of tangible personal property other than vehicles and jukeboxes. Petitioner failed to collect and remit sales tax on the sale of these items of tangible personal property. Respondent properly assessed Petitioner for sales tax due on tangible personal property other than vehicles and jukeboxes in the amount of $3,352.50. Vintage rented commercial real property for its business. Rental payments for such real property are subject to sales tax pursuant to Section 212.031. During the audit period, Petitioner failed to pay sales tax on two payments for the commercial rental of real property. Petitioner is liable for use tax on the use of real property during the audit period. Respondent properly assessed Petitioner for additional use tax in the amount of $108.00. Although Petitioner maintained some books and records of sales and purchases, Petitioner failed to maintain adequate records. Respondent properly conducted an audit by sampling Petitioner's available books and records in accordance with Section 212.12(6)(b) but limited the claimed penalty to a delinquent penalty. The trier of fact cannot determine the taxes, interest, and penalty that are due after eliminating the deficiencies found in paragraphs 21 and 24 not to exist in connection with the sales evidenced in Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 4, 6, 21, and 24 through 26. Only Respondent can make that calculation using the same sampling formula that Respondent used to calculate the tax, interest, and penalty in the assessment.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order ordering Petitioner to pay the tax, interest, and penalty that is due after Respondent recalculates the assessment against Petitioner in accordance with the findings pertaining to Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 4, 6, 21, and 24 through 26. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of March, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrol Y. Cherry, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Martha F. Barrera, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 R. John Cole, II, Esquire Law Offices of R. John Cole, II 46 North Washington Boulevard, Suite 24 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100

Florida Laws (10) 120.569120.5720.21212.031212.06212.07212.08212.12213.05320.27
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FORT MYERS COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, INC. vs. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, 79-002107 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-002107 Latest Update: May 19, 1980

Findings Of Fact Certain hospital equipment ("Equipment") was sold in 1973 and 1974 by Hospital Contract Consultants ("Vendor") to F & E Community Developers and Jackson Realty Builders (hereinafter referred to as "Purchasers") who simultaneously leased the Equipment to Petitioner. These companies are located in Indiana. At the time of purchase, Florida sales tax ("Tax") was paid by the Purchasers and on or about March 18, 1974, the tax was remitted to the State of Florida by the Vendor. However, the Tax was paid in the name of Medical Facilities Equipment Company, a subsidiary of Vendor. In 1976, the Department of Revenue audited Petitioner and on or about April 26, 1976 assessed a tax on purchases and rental of the Equipment. On or about April 26, 1976, petitioner agreed to pay the amount of the assessment on the purchases and rentals which included the Equipment, in monthly installments of approximately Ten Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($10,000.00) each and subsequently paid such amount of assessment with the last monthly installment paid on or about November 26, 1976. On or about December, 1976, the Department of Revenue, State of Florida, checked its records and could not find the Vendor registered to file and pay sales tax with the State of Florida. Petitioner then looked to the State of Indiana for a tax refund. On or about January 4, 1977, Petitioner filed for a refund of sales tax from the State of Florida in the amount of Thirty Five Thousand One Hundred Four and 02/100 Dollars ($35,104.02). This amount was the sales tax paid to and remitted by various vendors for certain other equipment purchased in 1973 and 1974 and simultaneously leased. The amount of this refund request was granted and paid. Relying upon the facts expressed in paragraph 4 heretofore, Petitioner on or about June 2, 1977 filed with the Department of Revenue of the State of Indiana for the refund of the Tax. On or about June 7, 1979, the Department of Revenue of Indiana determined that the Vendor was registered in the State of Florida as Medical Facilities Equipment Company and therefore Petitioner should obtain the refund of the Tax form the State of Florida. So advised, Petitioner then filed the request for amended refund, which is the subject of this lawsuit, on July 16, 1979 in the amount of Seventeen Thousand Two Hundred Sixteen and 28/100 Dollars ($17,216.28). This request for refund was denied by Respondent, Office of the Comptroller, on the basis of the three year statute of non-claim set forth in section 215.26, Florida Statutes. Purchasers have assigned all rights, title and interest in sales and use tax refunds to Petitioner. During the audit of Petitioner in 1976 the lease arrangement on the equipment apparently came to light and Petitioner was advised sales tax was due on the rentals paid for the equipment. This resulted in an assessment against Petitioner of some $80,000 which was paid at the rate of $10,000 per month, with the last installment in November, 1976. The auditor advised Petitioner that a refund of sales tax on the purchase of this equipment was payable and he checked the Department's records for those companies registered as dealers in Florida. These records disclosed that sales taxes on the sale of some of this rental equipment had been remitted by the sellers of the equipment but Hospital Contract Consultants was not registered. Petitioner was advised to claim a refund of this sales tax from Indiana, the State of domicile of Hospital Contract Consultants. By letter on March 18, 1974, Amedco Inc., the parent company of wholly owned Hospital Contract Consultants, Inc. had advised the Florida Department of Revenue that Medical Facilities Equipment Company, another subsidiary, would report under ID No. 78-23-20785-79 which had previously been assigned to Hospital Contract Consultants Inc. which had erroneously applied for this registration. (Exhibit 2) Not stated in that letter but contained in Indiana Department of Revenue letter of April 18, 1979 was the information that the name of Hospital Contract Consultants had been changed to Medical Facilities Equipment Company. The request for the refund of some $17,000 submitted to Indiana in 1976 was finally denied in 1979 after research by the Indiana Department of Revenue showed the sales tax had been paid to Florida and not to Indiana.

Florida Laws (2) 212.12215.26
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs ANNE E. CARR, 93-002600 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida May 10, 1993 Number: 93-002600 Latest Update: Feb. 13, 1995

The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against her, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken, if any.

Findings Of Fact Respondent Anne E. Carr is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0268356. In 1988 Helen B. Moser and her husband, John J. Moser, Jr., obtained their real estate salesman licenses. In 1989 they became real estate brokers. Upon becoming licensed brokers, they decided that they would like to open their own real estate office. They began contacting various real estate brokers seeking advice on how to open and operate a real estate business. Respondent was one of the brokers the Mosers contacted for advice. She and the Mosers already knew each other from previous professional activities. At the time, Respondent was the broker and sole stockholder of Carr Real Estate, Inc. She also was spending a substantial amount of time selling luxury condominiums for a particular developer, which required her to be on-site at the development. Respondent suggested to the Mosers that they join Carr Real Estate, Inc., and run the office for her rather than opening their own office, which would give them immediate access to her listings and many clients and allow her to devote her time to sales for the large real estate development. The Mosers agreed that was a good opportunity for all concerned and joined Carr Real Estate, Inc., as broker/salesmen in October of 1989. The Mosers began running the business for Respondent at her request, providing Respondent with monthly accountings. During 1990 the Mosers earned approximately $90,000 as a result of the listings they took over from Respondent and as a result of the listings Respondent referred to them. Throughout that year Carr Real Estate, Inc., remained a major presence in the Highland Beach area where Respondent was well known both for her flamboyant fashions and her ability to list and sell luxury ocean-front and water-front properties. During the first week of December 1990 Respondent advised the Mosers that due both to financial problems she was experiencing and pressure on her from the developer to devote full time to his sales she would be closing the business on December 31 unless the Mosers wanted to purchase the company from her. They advised Respondent they were interested in doing so and that they would draft the documents for Respondent's signature. Many discussions took place between Respondent and the Mosers over the next several weeks formulating the terms of the sale of the business, and the Mosers submitted to Respondent a number of drafts of documents. While the negotiations were on-going, Respondent filled out and executed on December 12, 1990, the documents necessary for her to file for personal bankruptcy. On December 15 she faxed written instructions to her attorney to not file the bankruptcy petition because she was selling her company. On December 20, 1990, Respondent and the Mosers executed a Purchase and Sale Agreement and a Bill of Sale. It is noted that those documents also involved the sale of Respondent's interest in two other corporations to the Mosers but that portion of the transaction raises no issues involved in this proceeding. The Purchase and Sale Agreement provided that its effective date would be January 1, 1991. The Agreement specifically represented that Carr Real Estate, Inc., was being sold free of any liabilities and encumbrances and that the corporation did not own any tangible assets. The Agreement further provided that Respondent would indemnify the Mosers from all obligations and liabilities incurred by Carr Real Estate, Inc., prior to January 1, 1991. The Agreement provided for no money to change hands as a result of the Mosers' purchase of Respondent's business; rather, the purchase price for the corporation was five percent of all sales commissions received by the corporation for a period of two years. On December 29, 1990, Respondent executed the Seller's Affidavit given to her by the Mosers. The portion of the Seller's Affidavit pertinent to this dispute is that Respondent attested that there were no actions or proceedings then pending in any state or federal court in which "the Affiant or Corporations" are parties, including bankruptcy. It was very clear in Respondent's mind that what she was selling under the Purchase and Sale Agreement and the Bill of Sale and what she was attesting to in the Seller's Affidavit was in regard to the corporation and not her personally. It never occurred to Respondent that she was representing to the Mosers that she personally had no bills and no assets. Respondent had no intention of defrauding the Mosers. Supporting this intent is the clear language contained in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the Bill of Sale, and the Seller's Affidavit that she would personally indemnify and hold harmless the Mosers from any liabilities incurred by the corporation prior to the effective date of the sale. In mid-January 1991, approximately two weeks after the effective date of the sale, the Mosers discovered that a bankruptcy petition had been filed on behalf of Respondent as an individual. Although that petition did not involve the corporation, John Moser immediately contacted Respondent who did not know that her attorney had filed the petition contrary to Respondent's instructions. On January 23, 1991, Respondent wrote to Helen Moser apologizing for the erroneous filing of her bankruptcy petition and assuring her that it would be corrected. Respondent immediately contacted her attorney to ascertain how the petition could be dismissed. She was advised by her attorney that the only way she could dismiss the petition was to not attend the first meeting of creditors which would cause the petition to automatically be dismissed. Respondent did fail to attend the first meeting of creditors. Due to her failure to attend, her bankruptcy petition was dismissed. She immediately contacted Helen Moser to advise her of the dismissal. On February 1, 1991, John Moser called Respondent to inform her that a statement for a monthly automobile lease payment in the name of Carr Real Estate had been received. Respondent immediately sent the Mosers a note indicating that she had contacted G.M.A.C. but that company refused to allow her to transfer responsibility for her automobile lease payments from the corporation to herself. She acknowledged that she was responsible for any of the lease payments and requested that the Mosers acknowledge that the automobile was not an asset of the corporation. At the time Respondent knew that she was responsible for the lease payments because she signed the lease agreement as an individual. Respondent's contact with G.M.A.C. was unnecessary since her automobile had been leased to her as an individual in June of 1988, a date which preceded the existence of Carr Real Estate, Inc. The automobile was insured in Respondent's individual name and was registered in the name of G.M.A.C. at Respondent's address. The Bill of Sale executed by Respondent and the Mosers does not list the automobile as an asset of the corporation that was conveyed. The automobile leased by Respondent was not an asset of the corporation. The only relationship between Respondent's leased automobile and Carr Real Estate, Inc., concerns the deduction of automobile expenses as business expenses on the tax return for Carr Real Estate, Inc. On February 6, 1992, Helen Moser asked Respondent for a copy of the 1990 corporate tax return for Carr Real Estate, Inc., and Respondent provided a copy to her that same day. The return had been prepared in August or September of 1991 by Mary Dorak, a person enrolled with the Internal Revenue Service. It contained an entry entitled "loan from shareholder" in the sum of $107,060. Respondent had been the sole shareholder of the corporation. On February 26, 1992, the Mosers obtained an opinion letter from an attorney advising them that the corporation was not liable to Respondent for any debts. Neither the Mosers nor their accountant ever contacted Dorak or Respondent about the information contained in that tax return. Instead, the Mosers filed an amended corporate tax return for 1990 for Carr Real Estate, Inc. They removed the automobile as a corporate asset while leaving the shareholder's loan because it benefited them tax-wise. Instead of amending the return, the Mosers could have filed a 1991 return showing Respondent's stock exchange for the basis that was left of the stock in the corporation because the transaction took effect on January 1 of that year. Doing so would have caused no adverse tax consequences to the Mosers. Respondent typically provided Dorak with a listing of Respondent's income and expenses for the year and would then simply sign the return after Dorak had prepared it without reviewing the return first. Without any input from Respondent, Dorak had listed the automobile and some personal debts of Respondent on the 1990 corporate tax return because Respondent could take advantage of certain business deductions. That action had no adverse tax consequences for the Mosers. The Mosers never requested a tangible property tax return which would have reflected if there were any assets in the corporation. Had they made this request, they would have been told that there was none in existence because the corporation had no assets. At the time that Respondent and the Mosers executed the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the Bill of Sale, and the Seller's Affidavit in December, all three believed that the corporation had no assets or liabilities and that any assets and liabilities of Respondent were hers personally. As of January 1, 1991, the effective date of the sale, the corporation had no assets or liabilities. There were no tax consequences to the Mosers because of the listing of the shareholder loan in the 1990 corporate tax return because in that Subchapter S corporation the person ultimately adversely affected by the sale would be Respondent since she owned all of the shares in 1990. On the other hand, the filing of an amended 1990 corporate tax return by the Mosers without Respondent's knowledge and consent has resulted in adverse tax consequences to her, an unnecessary result. In November 1988 Respondent was involved in the sale of a condominium unit owned by Mr. and Mrs. Roy Heinz. Due to extended negotiations, the buyer's decision to not purchase the unit, and instructions from Heinz who was her client, Respondent delayed in placing the buyer's deposit check in her escrow account. Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent only and not also against Carr Real Estate, Inc., since that corporation was not yet in existence. After a formal evidentiary hearing, a Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings specifically cleared Respondent of any intentional wrongdoing and of any culpable negligence. Respondent was found guilty, however, of what was specifically characterized to be a technical violation of failure to immediately place the deposit check into her escrow account. The minimum penalty permissible was assessed against Respondent. Respondent was also dismissed from the civil lawsuit filed by Roy Heinz which emanated out of the same circumstances for which the administrative action was brought. The Mosers knew about the disciplinary action and the civil lawsuit pending against Respondent individually prior to their execution of the December 1990 documents transferring Carr Real Estate, Inc., from Respondent's ownership to theirs effective January 1, 1991. The "Roy Heinz matter" was specifically raised by John Moser during the negotiations among the Mosers and Respondent. In April of 1991 Respondent sent Helen Moser a copy of the Recommended Order finding Respondent not guilty of any dishonest conduct or culpable negligence, and Helen Moser failed to even read the entire Order since she considered it unimportant and because she knew the transaction involved occurred prior to the formation of Carr Real Estate, Inc. The Mosers continue to operate Carr Real Estate, Inc. The business has been diminishing, however, since 1991 due to the reduction in the number of salespersons affiliated with the business, John Moser's inability to attract listings and retain clients, and the amount of time the Mosers have been devoting to John Moser's computer business. Respondent's actions and/or inactions have not been the cause of the decline in Carr Real Estate, Inc.'s, business. Moreover, the Mosers have not been harmed financially or in any other way due to any statements contained in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Bill of Sale, or Seller's Affidavit executed by Respondent. The sale of Carr Real Estate, Inc., by Respondent to the Mosers benefited all three of them. In her negotiations surrounding that sale, Respondent agreed to the terms desired by the Mosers, acted honestly, and did not knowingly or intentionally misrepresent any material fact. Those misrepresentations alleged by the Mosers and Petitioner to be contained in the closing documents, such as any statement that Respondent personally had no assets or liabilities, were not material to the sale and purchase of the corporation.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against her and dismissing that Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of December 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-4, 6-11, 13, 15, 18, and 19 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 5, 16, and 17 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 12 and 14 have been rejected as being subordinate. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-29, 31, and 33-36 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 30 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 32 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack McRay, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Theodore R. Gay, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N-607 Miami, Florida 33128 Harold M. Braxton, P.A. Suite 400, One Datran Center 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, Florida 33156-7815

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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TERRY ERNST AND DONNA ERNST vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 95-000907RU (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 28, 1995 Number: 95-000907RU Latest Update: Feb. 14, 1997

The Issue Whether the agency has an unpromulgated statement of general applicability that imposed a requirement not specifically required by statute or by an existing rule, and which has been utilized against Petitioners to their detriment.

Findings Of Fact On March 24, 1994, the Department of Revenue (Department) issued a Notice of Reconsideration (NOR) that claimed the Petitioners, Terry and Donna Ernst, had willfully failed to collect sales tax. Petitioners' assertion of an exemption in connection with the sales tax assessment was denied. The NOR provided that the Petitioners are the president and vice- president of Hussh, Inc., a retail apparel store in Palm Beach, Florida and that such company made sales to customers for delivery in the store and for shipment outside of the State of Florida. At issue were the alleged shipments to out of state destinations. Pertinent to this case is the language in the NOR found at page two which provided: Due to the inadequacy and volume of Hussh's records, the auditor sampled the available records, and assessed Hussh for asserted out of state sales that were improperly documented. According to the auditor, many of the sales receipts or invoices of asserted out of state shipments were missing the top portion of the invoice. Significantly, this portion of the invoice would contain the names, addresses, and asserted export destination information on each sale. Other invoices were stamped, "out of state shipped," but no destination information was present on the invoice. [Emphasis added.] The Petitioners maintain that the portions of the NOR emphasized in the foregoing paragraph constitute an agency statement of general applicability and is, therefore, an unpromulgated rule. The Department does not have a rule which lists all documentation which might establish an exemption for sales tax assessment. Similarly, the Department does not have a rule that lists the type of documentation which would be inadequate to establish an exemption for sales taxes. The Department's existing rule, Rule 12A-1.064, Florida Administrative Code, provides, in part: (1)(a) Sales tax is imposed on the sales price of each item or article of tangible personal property, unless otherwise exempt, when the property is delivered to the purchaser or his representative in this state. However, the tax does not apply to tangible personal property irrevocably committed to the exportation process at the time of sale, when such process has been continuous or unbroken. (b) Intent of the seller and the purchaser that the property will be exported is not sufficient to establish the exemption; nor does delivery of the property to a point in Florida for subsequent transportation outside Florida necessarily constitute placing the property irrevocably in the exportation process. Tangible personal property shall be deemed committed to the exportation process if: The dealer is required by the terms of the sale contract to deliver the goods outside this state using his own mode of transportation. The dealer must retain in his records trip tickets, truck log records, or other documentation reflecting the specific items and export destination; The dealer is required by the terms of the sale contract to deliver the goods to a common carrier for final and certain movement of such property to its out of state destination. Sales by a Florida dealer are exempt when the dealer delivers the merchandise to the transportation terminal for shipment outside this state and secures a dock or warehouse receipt and a copy of the bill of lading. On shipments to points outside the United States, a shipper's export declaration shall also be obtained; [Emphasis added.] Rule 12A-1.093, Florida Administrative Code, requires taxpayers to maintain and preserve records. This rule provides, in part: (2) Each dealer defined in Chapter 212, F.S., each licensed wholesaler, and any other person subject to the tax imposed by Chapter 212, F.S., shall keep and preserve a complete record of all transactions, together with invoices, bills of lading, gross receipts from sales, RESALE CERTIFICATES, CONSUMER EXEMPTION CERTIFICATES and other pertinent records and papers as may be required by the Department of Revenue for the reasonable administration of Chapter 212, F.S., and such books of account as may be necessary to determine the amount of tax due thereunder. The terms "bill of lading," "dock or warehouse receipt," and "invoice" are common terms used in the business community. Each connotes that, at the minimum, certain information will be retained on the face of the document. For example, according to Petitioners' witness, the minimum information expected on a bill of lading would be: the name of the person that the item is being shipped to, the item being shipped, the cost of the shipment, and the terms of the shipment with the value of the item being shipped. Similarly, the minimum information which is expected on an "invoice" would be: a description of the item sold, the amount of the sale, and the name of the person to whom the item was sold. The terms "bill of lading," "dock or warehouse receipt," and "invoice" are not defined by rule. The Department determined whether an exemption was documented based upon the results of this audit.

Florida Laws (4) 120.52120.54120.57120.68 Florida Administrative Code (1) 12A-1.064
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DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE vs WORLD CHAMPIONS AUTO, INC., 15-004710 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Aug. 19, 2015 Number: 15-004710 Latest Update: May 02, 2016

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's Certificate of Registration 46-8015920490-4 should be revoked for the reasons stated in an Administrative Complaint for Revocation of Certificate of Registration (Administrative Complaint) issued by the Department of Revenue (Department) on July 17, 2015.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with administering and enforcing the state revenue laws, including the laws related to the imposition and collection of sales and use taxes pursuant to chapter 212. Respondent is an active for-profit Florida corporation and a licensed motor vehicle dealer located at 613 Southwest Pine Island Road, Suite 14, Cape Coral, Florida. For purposes of collecting and remitting taxes, Respondent is a dealer as defined in section 212.06(2) and is required to comply with chapter 212. Annais German is the president and agent of the corporation. Respondent holds Certificate of Registration number 46- 8015920490-4. A certificate of registration is required in order to do business in the state and requires its holder to collect and remit sales tax pursuant to chapter 212. See § 212.05(1), Fla. Stat. A dealer must file with the Department sales tax returns and remit the tax collected on a monthly basis. See § 212.15(1), Fla. Stat. The Department is authorized to revoke a dealer's certificate of registration for failure to comply with state tax laws. See § 212.18(3)(e), Fla. Stat. Before revoking a certificate of registration, the Department must convene an informal conference that the dealer is required to attend. See § 213.692(1)(a), Fla. Stat. At the conference, the dealer may either present evidence to refute the Department's allegations of noncompliance or enter into a compliance agreement with the Department to resolve the dealer's failure to comply with chapter 212. Id. After a compliance agreement is executed by the dealer, the Department may revoke the certificate of registration if the dealer fails to comply with its terms and conditions. If a breach occurs, the entire amount is due and payable immediately. After Respondent failed to remit taxes that were due, the Department issued tax warrants and rendered judgment liens against Respondent in March, April, and December 2014 and April 2015. An informal conference was conducted with the taxpayer on April 7, 2015. Respondent was represented at the conference by Orlando German, who was given power of attorney by Annais German to represent the corporation. He signed an agreement, which required the entire balance to be paid by the end of the month. Two weeks later, Annais German requested that a new agreement be executed which allowed her to pay the delinquent taxes over a longer period of time. The Department agreed with her request. On April 23, 2015, Ms. German executed an Agreement reflecting that her corporation owes $7,297.52. See Pet'r Ex. 2, p. 1. The Agreement required Respondent to make a down payment of $2,500.00 on or before April 28, 2015, followed by ten monthly payments of 375.00 on the 28th of each month, and a final payment of $671.52 on April 28, 2016. Id. at p. 3. The Agreement required these payments to be made at the Fort Myers Service Center. Id. Payments required under a compliance agreement are always remitted to the local district office, rather than Tallahassee, to allow the Department to track the payment and ensure that it is being made in a timely fashion. The Agreement also required Respondent to "timely remit payment in full for all types of taxes, returns, and reports due from the Taxpayer for the duration of this agreement (and any extensions hereof) or for the next 12 months following the date of this agreement, whichever is longer." Id. at p. 1. In other words, besides making payments for past due taxes, interest, penalties, and fees, Respondent was required to timely file returns and pay current obligations as they became due during the life of the Agreement. The Agreement specifically provides that if the taxpayer fails to comply with the Agreement, revocation proceedings will be initiated without further notice. Respondent paid the $2,500.00 down payment one day late, but as of the date of the hearing in this case, no other payments for past or current obligations have been made. Returns for April and May 2015 were not timely filed. Respondent admits that in April 2015, at least three vehicles were sold, but its April return, when eventually filed, reported that no sales were made. Since filing its June and July 2015 returns, Respondent has filed no other returns. By failing to pay the monthly obligations required by the Agreement or any current obligations, Respondent has violated the Agreement.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order revoking Respondent's Certificate of Registration 46- 8015920490-4. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of February, 2016 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen M. Masterson, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Bureau The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (eServed) Annais German World Champions Auto, Inc. 429 Northwest 38th Place Cape Coral, Florida 33993-5536 Annais German World Champions Auto, Inc. 613 Southwest Pine Island Road, Suite 14 Cape Coral, Florida 33991-1950 George C. Hamm, Acting General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 (eServed) Marshall C. Stranburg, Executive Director Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 (eServed)

Florida Laws (7) 120.68212.06212.15212.18213.692775.082775.083
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IN HIS SERVICE vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 99-000494 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Feb. 01, 1999 Number: 99-000494 Latest Update: Jun. 10, 1999

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner should be issued a sales tax exemption certificate either as a "church" or as a "religious organization."

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, In His Service, is a not-for-profit organization formed to give structure to a Bible study and prayer group Shirley B. Cole leads. Cole is the Petitioner's "pastor," but she is not ordained, does not officiate at weddings or funerals, and has no formal religious training other than participation in similar study groups in the past. The Petitioner is affiliated with an organization called the Federation of Independent Churches, which has an office on East Bird Street in Tampa, Florida. (In a post-hearing submission, Cole asserted that the Petitioner's "outreach is from Greater Ministries International, basically functioning as a satellite church, but there was no evidence regarding Greater Ministries International.) Portions of the Petitioner's by-laws were admitted in evidence at the final hearing. The by-laws make reference to three officers--president, vice-president, and secretary-treasurer--but Cole testified that she was the secretary and that someone else was the treasurer, and she did not seem to know anything about a president or vice-president. In addition, while the by-laws refer to a board of directors and meetings of the board of directors, Cole does not know anything about either. The Petitioner is small (not more than 15 members). It consists primarily of Cole and her friends and neighbors and some others who hear about the meetings. The group has met in various locations, including Cole's home at 5155 20th Avenue North, St. Petersburg, Florida, and the homes of other members of the group. In addition to Bible study and prayer, the group discusses health issues and other topics of interest and shares reading materials and tapes on topics of interest. From time to time, the group collects items of donated personal property for the use of members of the group and others in need who could use the items. In late June 1998, the Petitioner applied for a sales tax exemption certificate as a church. In response to a question from a representative of the Respondent DOR Cole stated that the Petitioner held services in her home every Thursday from 7:30 to 9:30 or 10 p.m. A DOR representative attempted to confirm Cole's representation by attending a meeting in Cole's home on Thursday, October 8, 1998, but no services were being held there, and no one was home. If there was a meeting on that day, it was held somewhere else. On or about December 28, 1998, DOR issued a Notice of Intent to Deny the Petitioner's application because the Petitioner did not have "an established physical place of worship at which nonprofit religious services and activities are regularly conducted and carried on." In January 1999, Cole requested an administrative proceeding on the Petitioner's application, representing that she was holding the Petitioner's meetings at her home every Monday from 7:30 p.m. On Monday, April 5, 1999, a DOR representative visited Cole's home at 7:30 or 7:35 p.m., but no one was home. At final hearing, Cole testified that she went to pick someone up to attend the meeting and was late returning. Cole had an April 1999 newsletter admitted in evidence. It indicates that she holds weekly Bible study meetings on Mondays at her home. It also indicates: "The week of April 19th will be our maintenance [health] meeting." It also indicates that the Monday, April 26, 1999, meeting would be a "covered dish dinner with prayer and praise fellowship afterward." Cole also had a book/tape loan check-out list admitted in evidence. The list indicates that two items were checked out on January 21, one on February 8, two on February 14, one on February 15, one on March 8, one on March 21, two on March 22, one on April 4, one on April 5, and four on April 12, 1999. (Two entries dated April 13 precede two on April 12, so it is assumed that all were on April 12, 1999). Cole owns her home, pays the taxes, and pays the utility bills. Cole also claims a homestead exemption. There are no signs, no physical attributes, or anything else that would identify Cole's house as a church. No part of the home is set aside for the Petitioner's exclusive use. The Petitioner pays no rent to Cole and does not reimburse Cole for any of her expenses (such as taxes and utility bills) of home ownership. Under local City of St. Petersburg zoning ordinances, Cole would have to obtain a special exception from the Environmental Development Commission to use her home as a church. Cole has not attempted to do so. Had she tried, the special exception would be denied because her home does not meet the ordinance's minimum lot and yard size criteria for such a special exception. (It is not clear whether Cole's home would meet the ordinance's parking, maximum floor area ratio, and maximum surface ratio criteria for a special exception for a church.) In light of past discrepancies between the Petitioner's representations and the facts, it was not clear from the evidence presented in this case that meetings have taken place, are taking place, or will take place in Cole's home on a regular basis.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the DOR enter a final order denying the Petitioner's application for a tax exemption certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley Cole, Pastor In His Service 5155 20th Avenue, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33710 Kevin ODonnell, Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100

Florida Laws (1) 212.08 Florida Administrative Code (1) 12A-1.001
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NATION AUTO SALES OF SOUTH FLORIDA, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 14-003136 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jul. 09, 2014 Number: 14-003136 Latest Update: Jan. 02, 2015

The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue's ("Department") assessment of tax, penalty, and interest against Nation Auto Sales of South Florida, Inc., is valid and correct.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the agency responsible for administering the revenue laws of the State of Florida, including the imposition and collection of the state's sales and use taxes. Petitioner, during the period of October 1, 2005, through March 31, 2010 ("assessment period"), was engaged in the business of selling used motor vehicles at retail in Broward County, Florida.1/ Arie Abecasis was Petitioner's president and sole corporate officer. Petitioner was continuously registered with the Department as a "dealer," pursuant to chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was continuously licensed by the State of Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ("DMV") as an independent motor vehicle dealer, pursuant to chapter 320, Florida Statutes. On September 3, 2008, the Department issued correspondence to Petitioner advising that the Criminal Investigations process had received a referral from the Department's collection sub process, concerning Petitioner's possible failure to remit all of the sales tax collected from its customers. In order to determine if a discrepancy existed, the Department requested Petitioner to provide: (1) sales invoices/ buyer's orders; (2) sales journals; (3) cash receipt and disbursement journal; (4) general ledger; and (5) bank statements for all depository accounts. On September 9, 2008, Mr. Abecasis met with Robert Taft, a criminal investigator for the Department. Mr. Taft advised Mr. Abecasis that there were two areas of concern: (1) Petitioner's failure to file returns and remit collected sales tax over several collection periods; and (2) that a comparison of the Department and DMV records appeared to reveal a substantial and repeated underreporting and under-remitting of collected sales tax. Mr. Abecasis advised that he would fully cooperate and provide records from 2005 on or before September 17, 2008. Thereafter, Petitioner provided some 2005 records, which Mr. Taft compared with DMV records. After completing a review of the same, on November 7, 2008, Mr. Taft issued correspondence to Petitioner advising that Petitioner's license was used to transfer vehicles for which Petitioner had failed to provide documentation. The same records indicated sales tax collected but never remitted to the Department. Accordingly, Mr. Taft requested all of the documentation originally requested to be produced on or before December 5, 2008. The Department did not receive the requested documentation. Thereafter, Mr. Taft obtained additional records from the DMV regarding a listing of all vehicles titled during the period from October 1, 2005, through March 31, 2010, using Petitioner's motor vehicle dealer's license numbers. Additionally, certified title applications for each of the title transfer transactions were reviewed. From the documents obtained, the Department was able to determine the following information regarding vehicles sold by Petitioner: the acquisition month, dealer number, acquisition date, title number, owner's last name, vehicle make, vehicle body, vehicle ID, and tax credit. The Department established that Petitioner filed with the Department Sales and Use Tax Returns, Form DR-15, that were not accompanied by payment of the tax due, for the following months: April through July, 2008; and February through August 2009. The Department established that Petitioner did not file with the Department Sales and Use Tax Returns, Form DR-15, for February and March, 2010. Petitioner collected at least $810,063.15 in sales tax. Petitioner remitted to the Department $509,735.53 in sales tax. Petitioner failed to remit to the Department at least $300,327.62 in sales tax collected from its customers. On or about November 1, 2010, the Department referred the matter to the Office of the State Attorney for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit of Florida for criminal prosecution. On October 31, 2012, in the case styled State v. Abecasis, Case No. 11-0002423 CF 10A, Mr. Abecasis entered a plea of no contest to the criminal charge of theft of state funds in an amount of $20,000 or more, a second-degree felony. As a special condition of his probation, Mr. Abecasis was ordered to make restitution to the Department in the amount of $50,000.00. It is undisputed that, on or before April 10, 2014, Petitioner satisfied the restitution ordered. On April 17, 2014, the Department issued to Petitioner a Notice of Jeopardy Finding and a Notice of Final Assessment. The Notice of Final Assessment notified Petitioner that $192,501.80 in tax, $20,190.35 in penalty, and $66,031.36 in interest were due.2/ The Notice of Jeopardy Finding averred that the Department found "one or more of the jeopardy conditions provided in Rule 12-21.005, Florida Administrative Code, which tend to prejudice or render wholly or partly ineffectual the normal conditions for collection of tax, penalty, or interest." The stated jeopardy condition was delay. On April 21, 2014, the Department recorded a warrant for collection of delinquent sales and use tax against Petitioner in the amount contained in the Notice of Final Assessment. Petitioner testified that, due to the nature of his business, it was a frequent occurrence that potential vehicle purchasers would require financing. Petitioner testified that it was Petitioner's practice to allow the customer to obtain the vehicle prior to financial approval from the lending institution. Accordingly, when the customer was not ultimately approved for financing or when the vehicle was repossessed, a true "sale" did not occur, and, therefore, sales taxes were not collected and remitted. The undersigned finds Petitioner's testimony not credible and not otherwise supported by the record evidence.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that The Department of Revenue enter a final order that validates the assessment against Nation Auto Sales of South Florida, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of November, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 2014.

Florida Laws (14) 120.569120.6820.21212.02212.05212.06212.12212.18213.05213.21320.01330.27775.089949.09
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FMG ENTERPRISES, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 11-003548 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Jul. 21, 2011 Number: 11-003548 Latest Update: Dec. 27, 2011

The Issue Whether FMG Enterprises, Inc. must obtain and post security in the amount of $21,250 as a condition of retaining its sales and use tax dealer‘s certificate of registration as alleged in the Department‘s July 14, 2011 Notice of Intent to Revoke Registration.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency of the state of Florida charged with the duty to enforce the collection of taxes imposed pursuant to chapter 212, Florida Statutes, to issue warrants for the collection of taxes, interest, and penalties and, where necessary, to require a cash deposit, bond, or other security, as a condition to a person obtaining or retaining a dealer‘s certificate of registration under chapter 212. Petitioner is a Florida corporation with its principal and mailing address at 9726 Touchton Road, Suite 301, Jacksonville, Florida 32246. At all times material to this case, Petitioner operated a restaurant and club known as Mojitos Bar and Grill at its principal address. Petitioner is a ?dealer? as defined in section 212.06(2), Florida Statutes. Chapter 212 requires specified persons conducting business within the state to register with the Department and to obtain a certificate of registration for purposes of tax collection. Petitioner made application for and received a dealer‘s certificate of registration, No. 26-8015498892-8, for the operation of Mojitos Bar and Grill. The application indicated that the business was to open in March 2011. Mojitos Bar and Grill did not open for business until April 7, 2011. As a dealer, the Petitioner was required to collect sales and use taxes from patrons and customers of Mojitos Bar and Grill, and to submit monthly tax returns and collected taxes to the Department. Sales and use taxes for any given month are due on the first day of the succeeding month, and must be paid to the Department on or before the 20th day of that succeeding month. Petitioner did not file a Sales and Use Tax Return for March 2011. Based on the March 2011 opening date referenced in the application, the Department issued its May 18, 2011 Notice of Intent to Revoke Registration and a Warrant demanding payment in the amount of $5,046.85, which represented the estimated tax liability for March 2011, in the amount of $5,000.00, plus interest and fees. The $5,000.00 monthly tax liability estimate was calculated using an algorithm developed by SAP, a German software company. The algorithm produced the estimate based on the location and type of the business and surrounding businesses. Based on that figure, the Department determined that it was necessary to require Petitioner to post security in the amount of $60,000.00, which represented the projected monthly tax estimate for one year. An informal hearing was held on June 21, 2011. The Department was provided with information that the business was not open in March 2011. As a result, the Department filed a satisfaction of the warrant and release of lien in the official records of Duval County. The Department was also presented with records of tax collections for April and May of 2011. Petitioner filed its Sales and Use Tax Return for April 2011, listing taxes collected for that month in the amount of $2,107.57. The check for the April 2011 taxes was returned for insufficient funds. The April 2011 tax liability has since been paid. Petitioner filed Sales and Use Tax Returns for May 2011, and paid said tax in the amount of $1,437.91. The check was dated June 20, 2011, but the return was filed late. Petitioner was assessed a late penalty of $125.38, although the record contains no evidence that Petitioner had notice of the late penalty before August 15, 2011. Petitioner has not paid the late penalty assessed against it for the May, 2011 taxes. Based on the April and May, 2011 sales and use tax collections, the Department amended the amount of security being required as a condition of Petitioner maintaining its sales and use tax dealer‘s registration certificate from $60,000.00 to $21,250.00. The amended Notice of Intent was issued on July 14, 2011. Pursuant to notice provided in the amended Notice of Intent, an informal conference was convened on August 15, 2011. No representative of Petitioner appeared at the informal conference. Although the Petitioner did not enter into a compliance agreement with the Department as a result of the August 15, 2011 informal conference, all taxes due and owing for the April 2011 and May 2011 collection periods have been paid. Thus, Petitioner has materially resolved its tax liability for those months, with the exception of non-payment of the relatively small late penalty of $125.38. Standing alone, the facts of those two monthly payments are not sufficient grounds to support a revocation of Petitioner‘s sales and use tax dealer‘s registration certificate. The Department has required security in the amount of $21,250.00. That equates to a monthly estimated sales tax collection of approximately $1,770.00. The sales tax collections in April 2011 and May 2011 were for $2,107.57 and 1,437.90, respectively. Therefore, the figure calculated by the Department is reasonable. The Department generally requires that, when security is determined to be necessary, one year of estimated tax collections be posted. That length of time can be shorter based on the circumstances. Given that the first two months of Petitioner‘s operation as a dealer resulted in returned and late payments, and since the May 2011 late penalty remains in arrears, the Department‘s decision to require one year of estimated collections as security is reasonable. The Department raised issues relating to allegations of late or returned payments for taxes collected in June, July, and August, 2011. However, since those issues do not form the basis for the July 14, 2011, amended Notice of Intent to Revoke Registration, and have not otherwise been pled, the undersigned has not made any findings, or formulated any conclusions regarding those issues. An informal drive-by inspection of Mojitos Bar and Grill conducted on September 19, 2011 by Mr. Hartland indicated that it was no longer open for business. That status was confirmed by counsel for Petitioner.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order requiring Petitioner to post security in the amount of $21,250.00 within 30 days of the entry of the final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael R. Yokan, Esquire Post Office Box 40755 Jacksonville, Florida 32203-0755 Timothy E. Dennis, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 400 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Marshall Stranburg, General Counsel Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 204 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Lisa Vickers, Executive Director The Carlton Building, Room 104 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.60120.68212.06212.14212.18
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HIGH-TECH YACHT AND SHIP, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 95-001791 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Hollywood, Florida Apr. 12, 1995 Number: 95-001791 Latest Update: Jan. 08, 1997

Findings Of Fact High-Tech Yacht & Ship, Inc. (Petitioner) is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of retail sales of marine vessels. Also, Petitioner is a registered retail dealer in the State of Florida. The President of Petitioner is its only corporate officer. On or about September 2, 1993, Petitioner, in the capacity of a broker, sold a motor yacht at retail to Regency Group, Inc. (purchaser), through its representative, for $78,000. The motor yacht is described as a 1988, 41' Amerosport Chris Craft, hull Number CCHEU075E788, and called the "Motivator". At the closing of the sale, on or about September 2, 1993, the purchaser refused to pay the sales tax on the purchase, which was $4,680. However, the purchaser agreed to pay the sales tax after being informed by Petitioner that, without the payment of the sales tax, there could be no closing. The purchaser's representative submitted, at closing, a personal check in the amount of $4,680 for the sales tax. All of the necessary documents were completed for ownership and registration to be transferred to the purchaser. Subsequently, Petitioner received notice from its bank that the check for the sales tax had been dishonored by the purchaser's bank. The purchaser's representative had stopped payment on the check. In October 1993, Petitioner submitted its sales and use tax return for the month of September 1993 to Respondent in which the sale of the yacht was reported. Respondent automatically reviews sales and use tax returns. Respondent's review of Petitioner's return revealed a shortage of sales tax collected in the amount of $4,680.. In January 1994, Respondent issued a notice of tax action for assessment of additional tax in the amount of $4,710, plus interest and penalty, to Petitioner. The $4,710 included the loss of Petitioner's collection allowance of $30, which loss resulted from Petitioner's failure to timely remit all taxes due. Having received the notice of tax action, by letter dated January 20, 1994, Petitioner generally informed Respondent of the circumstances regarding the sales tax shortage, including the dishonored check. Petitioner pointed out, among other things, that Respondent had the authority and the means to collect the tax, while it (Petitioner) had limited means, and suggested, among other things, that Respondent cancel the purchaser's Florida registration of the yacht. On or about January 31, 1994, approximately three months after the check for sales tax was dishonored, Petitioner issued a notice of dishonored check to the purchaser, in which Petitioner requested payment of the sales tax. The notice provided, among other things, that Petitioner could seek criminal prosecution and civil action if the monies were not paid to Petitioner. Having not received the $4,680, Petitioner contacted the local law enforcement agency. After investigation, the law enforcement agency informed Petitioner that a civil action would have to be instituted because the purchaser, through its representative, had indicated that it was not satisfied with the yacht. Although Petitioner engaged the services of an attorney for civil action, no civil action was commenced. Additionally, Petitioner did not engage the services of a collection agency for assistance in collecting the sales tax. Subsequent to its notice of tax action, on or about March 12, 1994, Respondent issued a notice of assessment to Petitioner. The notice of assessment provided, among other things, that Petitioner was being assessed taxes in the amount of $4,710, plus penalty and interest in the amount of $2,342.61, totalling $7,052.61. Petitioner protested the assessment. On February 8, 1995, Respondent issued its notice of reconsideration in which Respondent determined, among other things, that the assessment was appropriate and affirmed the assessment of $7,052.61, plus interest and penalty. The interest accrues at the rate of $1.55 per day. Petitioner has not remitted any of the assessed tax, including interest and penalty, to Respondent. Petitioner has not identified on its federal tax return the noncollection of the sales tax from the purchaser as a bad debt. Sales tax is part of the total sale price for an item. Respondent considers the sales tax as collectable by a seller in the same manner as any other debt owed by a purchaser to a seller. A retail dealer, who is also a seller, is considered to be an agent for the State in the collection of sales tax. The burden of collecting the sales tax is placed upon the retail dealer by Respondent. Some of Respondent's employees have been sympathetic to Petitioner's tax assessment matter. However, none of the employees indicated to or advised Petitioner that Respondent was or is in error.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order affirming the assessment of sales tax against High-Tech Yacht & Ship, Inc. in the amount of $7,052.61, plus interest and penalty. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of August 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August 1996.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68212.07
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HMY NEW YACHT SALES, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 94-004909 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 02, 1994 Number: 94-004909 Latest Update: Jul. 17, 1996

The Issue The issue presented is whether HMY New Yacht Sales, Inc., is liable for the payment of use tax, together with penalty and interest, on a yacht which it purchased for resale and for use as a demonstrator.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner HMY New Yacht Sales, Inc., is a Florida cor-poration located in Dania, Florida. It is a franchise and an authorized dealer for several lines of new boats. Petitioner is registered as a dealer for Florida sales tax purposes and has a dealer decal. Petitioner became an authorized dealer for Davis Yachts, a manufacturer located in North Carolina, in 1985. In January 1990 Petitioner purchased a boat from Davis Yachts to be used for demonstration and promotional activities and for resale. The boat was a 47-foot fiberglass sports fisherman named "The Bandit." When the boat was delivered, Petitioner outfitted The Bandit with extensive electronics and fishing equipment, including a tuna tower, outriggers, a fighting chair, rocket launchers, and live wells. It took approximately two months (until the second week in March 1990) to outfit the boat to have it ready for its intended sports fishing purpose. The type of equipping done by Petitioner is typical of that done on every such boat when it is sold since such a boat cannot be used for its intended purpose without the electronics and other equipment. Petitioner, however, wanted the boat to be "ready to go," when Petitioner sold it rather than having the purchaser wait for the outfitting to be done before the purchaser could use the boat. Petitioner paid the factory approximately $520,000 for the boat. Petitioner's payments to local vendors for services and materials used in outfitting the boat brought Petitioner's cost to approximately $590,000. The Bandit was never documented or registered in the state of Florida. It was only operated under Petitioner's dealer registration and decal, as provided in Section 327.13, Florida Statutes. The boat was purchased with the intent to sell it, and it was always for sale from the first moment it was outfitted and ready to be shown. It was never Petitioner's intent to keep the boat. As soon as it was outfitted, the boat had on board, at all times, a file containing a complete inventory of the boat's equipment, including custom and standard options, and a color brochure with pictures of the boat to be given to potential customers. While Petitioner was attempting to sell the boat, it was also used by Petitioner as a sales promotional tool. Petitioner took the boat to various fishing tournaments and exhibited it at boat shows and open houses. Davis Yachts bore some of the expense of those activities since promoting the boat inured to the benefit of Davis as well as of Petitioner. When the boat was being used for promotional or sales activities, it would always have on board employees or salespersons of Petitioner or of Davis Yachts and customers. On occasion, family members accompanied Petitioner's salespersons on board the boat. The manner in which The Bandit was marketed--taking it to fishing tournaments and boat shows and having open house at various events--is typically the way new sport fisherman yachts are sold throughout the industry. The boat was shown to prospective customers at least once a month. Approximately 50 customers were taken on sea trials. The boat was never loaned or rented to anyone. It was used only under the direction of Petitioner or Davis Yachts. The only compensation received by Petitioner relating to the boat resulted from the occasions when Davis Yachts split some of the expenses for the promotional or sales activities. The boat did not sell as quickly as Petitioner hoped. In October 1990 Petitioner placed the boat on the Buck System, a multiple listing service which distributes information to other yacht brokers concerning boats which are for sale. Generally, boat dealers would not put new inventory in the multiple listing system. Petitioner did so in this instance, however, in order to quickly sell the boat because the government had announced a luxury tax proposal which Petitioner feared would result in a downturn in the boat market. Even with all the effort put into attempting to sell the boat, it did not sell until November 1991. In July 1992 the Department began a routine sales tax audit of Petitioner. The audit was completed in September 1992 and covered the period of time from March 1987 through February 1992. The Department auditor determined that Petitioner owed use tax on The Bandit because in November 1990, on the advice of its accountant, Petitioner took the boat out of its inventory account and placed it in its fixed assets account in order to take depreciation for federal income tax purposes. Based solely on Petitioner's treatment of the vessel on its corporate books, the auditor determined that Petitioner converted The Bandit to its own use and was, therefore, responsible for payment of the statutory use tax rate of 6 percent of the value of the boat as reflected on Petitioner's records. Based upon the audit, the Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment, assessing Petitioner $33,921.94 in tax, $8,480.50 in penalty, and $7,085.52 in interest through September 16, 1992. Interest continues to accrue at $11.15 per day.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered determining that Petitioner is not liable for payment of use tax, penalty, or interest on The Bandit, and withdrawing the assessment which is the subject of this proceeding. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-12, 15, and 19 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 13, 14, and 18 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 16, 17, and 20 have been rejected as being unnecessary to the issues involved herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3, 6, 8, and 9 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 4, 5, and 10 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 7 has been rejected as being unnecessary to the issues involved herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Cynthia S. Tunnicliff, Esquire Pennington & Haben, P.A. Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2095 Mark T. Aliff, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Tax Section, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100

Florida Laws (8) 120.57212.02212.05212.06212.0601212.21213.21320.08 Florida Administrative Code (1) 12-13.001
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