The Issue Whether Petitioner is eligible for Florida Petroleum Liability Insurance and Restoration Program (FPLIRP) coverage for petroleum discharges on March 10, 1992 and June 22, 1992.
Findings Of Fact Realadyne is a Florida corporation. The current president of Realadyne is Mary J. Martin. Realadyne was the owner and operator of a facility located at 4846 4th Street North, St. Petersburg, Florida (Save-A-Step Food Store #7) (the "Facility"). The Facility was registered with the Department and was assigned DER Facility No. 52-8624627. The underground petroleum storage system located at the Facility included five underground petroleum storage tanks - four 4,000 gallon tanks and one 10,000 gallon tank. The date(s) that the tanks were installed at the Facility is unknown. At all times material, the Department has delegated to Pinellas County the authority to perform certain types of inspections with regard to underground petroleum storage systems. These inspections are performed by the Pinellas County Public Health Unit ("PCPHU"). Realadyne filed three (3) individual applications for eligibility for restoration coverage under FPLIRP for the Facility for petroleum discharges reported July 30, 1990, March 10, 1992, and June 22, 1992. The applications were all denied by the Department, for reasons articulated by the Department in individual responses to each application all dated September 3, 1993. Realadyne applied for FPLIRP coverage on or about July 25, 1991. Realadyne obtained FPLIRP coverage for the Facility for the period of October 7, 1991 to October 7, 1992. The July 30, 1990 discharge is not eligible for restoration coverage since it occurred outside the FPLIRP coverage period (prior to October 7, 1991). The parties have reviewed the grounds for FPLIRP restoration coverage ineligibility. The parties stipulate and agree that the sole remaining basis for a determination of ineligibility is the following: Failure to upgrade petroleum storage system in accordance to the schedule required by Section 17-761.510(6), F.A.C. The parties also stipulate and agree that if either discharge from the Facility shall be determined eligible for FPLIRP restoration coverage, then the Facility shall be eligible for reimbursement under the restoration program. Under the aforementioned regulations, the petroleum storage system at the Facility was required to be retrofitted on or before December 31, 1989. On July 13, 1990, a PCPHU Inspector (Arthur Caden) performed a compliance inspection at the Facility. A Pollutant Storage Tank System Inspection Report Form was prepared by the Inspector and a copy of the report was provided to Ms. Martin. On July 19, 1990, Ms. Martin had a phone conversation with Moghadam regarding the Facility. As noted, Moghadam's job duties included review of alternative procedure requests under Rule 17-761.850, Florida Administrative Code. As a result of the phone conversation, Martin sent correspondence to John Svec, an employee with the Department's Bureau of Waste Cleanup. The referenced letter requested the Department to grant an "alternate technical proceedings to be able to apply for FDER/FPLIRP" (the "Proceeding"). The July 19, 1990 letter signed by Martin provided in part: The above facility has not been in compliance for over a year, due to company not being able to afford or support a loan for the removal of and replacement of the tanks. By correspondence dated July 25, 1990, the PCPHU directed Petitioner to file a Discharge Notification Form (DNF) concerning a potential discharge of petroleum product. On August 1, 1990, Ms. Martin met with the PCPHU inspector concerning the results of the compliance inspection conducted on July 13, 1990. At that time, PCPHU informed Ms. Martin that "she had to . . . line/replace the old tanks which are unknown as to date of installation." On August 1, 1990, Petitioner filed a DNF with the PCHPU concerning a potential discharge of petroleum product. On or about September 12, 1990, the PCHPU sent Petitioner a Warning Letter concerning the issue of whether Petitioner intended to reline or replace the underground storage tanks. On September 25, 1990, Petitioner provided PCPHU with a copy of a contract proposal for removal and replacement of the underground storage tanks. The contract proposal was from Adams Tank and Lift dated September 4, 1990. Attached to the proposal was a "SNAP-A-GRAM" signed by Ms. Martin which provides in part: Regarding the above facility please be advised that I should be able to give you a date as to when the work will be started the first week of October. I am enclosing a copy of a proposal from Adams Tank and Lift of work to be done at this location. The work contemplated under the proposal from Adams Tank was never performed. On June 5, 1991, a PCPHU Inspector (Joyce Welch) performed a compliance inspection at the facility. A Pollutant Storage Tank Inspection Report Form was prepared by the Inspector and a copy of the report was provided to Ms. Martin. On or about July 8, 1991, the PCPHU sent Petitioner a Warning Notice concerning the DNF that Petitioner filed on July 30, 1990. On July 8, 1991, PCPHU sent Petitioner another warning letter concerning the DNF which Petitioner filed on August 1, 1990. The warning letter provided in part: On August 1, 1990, this agency received a discharge notification form with a discovery date of June 1990. The discovery was based upon the manual sampling of a monitor well. A routine compliance inspection on July 13, 1990 verified the presence of free product in well number 3. Said free products present in the groundwater confirms your site has excessively contaminated as defined in . . . Chapter 17-770. You are instructed to initiate a contamination assessment report (CAR) in accordance with . . . Chapter 17-770 within thirty days of receipt of this letter to determine the extent of contamination. On or about July 19, 1991, Ms. Martin had a phone conversation with Mr. Moghadam. The July 19 letter, which was received by the Department on or around July 22, 1991, requested that the Department grant "alternate technical proceedings to be able to apply for FDER/FPLIRP." (the "Proceeding") Petitioner requested the Proceeding in an effort to bring the Facility into compliance with applicable underground storage tank regulations. After filing the Proceeding, Petitioner applied for FPLIRP coverage on July 25, 1991. The Department never responded, in writing, to the request for the "Proceeding". On February 11, 1992, PCPHU performed another compliance inspection at the facility. On February 17, 1992, PCPHU sent Petitioner a Final Non- Compliance letter concerning the results of the inspection conducted on February 11, 1992. The above-referenced PCPHU noncompliance letter provides in part: Storage tanks do not meet storage tank standards. Please upgrade tanks to meet applicable storage tank standards. On March 10, 1992, Petitioner filed a second DNF for the Facility, based upon evidence of a discharge discovered while inspecting and repairing a portion of the storage tank system. On June 22, 1992, Petitioner began closure activities with regard to removal of the underground petroleum system. On that date, Petitioner filed a third DNF based on evidence of a discharge discovered during its closure activities. On June 23, 1992, Petitioner concluded closure activities with regard to removal of the underground petroleum storage system. Petitioner was not required to obtain the Department's approval of an alternate procedure as a condition precedent to the removal of the underground storage tanks. Removal of the tanks would have brought Petitioner into compliance with the requirements of Rule 17-761, Florida Administrative Code. On or about September 12, 1992, after the tanks were removed, PCPHU sent Petitioner a warning letter concerning the issue of whether Petitioner intended to reline or replace the underground storage tanks. The warning letter provided in part: . . . Chapter 17-61.061(1)(b)2, requires all tanks to be lined or replaced before certain dates. In the case of your facility, since the installation date is unknown, you are required to have the tanks relined or replaced by December 31, 1989. You were previously advised of this violation during an inspection by one of our staff, Arthur L. Caden, on July 13, 1990, and by letter dated July 25, 1990. You requested and obtained a meeting with our staff on August 1, 1990 at which time you were directed to submit a discharge notification form (DNF), and to advise this office whether you would reline or replace the tanks. The DNF had been filed, but staff has not been formally advised of your decision regarding the tanks. Therefore, since you have not responded formally to this office, we have no alternative than to advise you that we will proceed with an appropriate enforcement action if you ignore this letter of warning. Please be advised that the subject tanks shall be relined or replaced no later than November 30, 1992. Petitioner's request for the "proceeding" seeks an after-the-fact "exception" to the retrofit requirements of Rule 17-761.510, Florida Administrative Code. The basis for Petitioner's request for an exception is "financial inability". When Petitioner's request for a "proceeding" was filed, the Department had a policy of not proceeding with the review of any request for an alternative technical procedure if the facility submitting the request was then out of compliance with the retrofitting requirements of Chapter 17-761, Florida Administrative Code. The request for a "proceeding" was not a viable procedure to extend the December 31, 1989 retrofitting deadline even assuming the request otherwise complied with Rule 17-761.850, Florida Administrative Code. Likewise, the Department lacked authority to extend the December 1989 retrofitting deadline. The Department received Petitioner's application for FLIRP coverage on July 29, 1991, approximately three days after the Department received Petitioner's request for the "Proceeding". 1/ On July 26, 1991, Ms. Martin executed a FLIRP affidavit on behalf of Petitioner as part of its application for coverage under FLIRP. The introductory portion of the FLIRP affidavit provides in part: In order to be eligible for the. . . restoration program, a facility owner or operator must sign this affidavit to affirm that the facility is in compliance with the Department's storage tank rules. . . and Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and that he/she has read and is familiar with these rules and statutes. The attestation portion of Petitioner's FLIRP affidavit, as executed by Ms. Martin, provides in part: The petroleum storage systems, as defined under Chapter 376.301, Florida Statutes, located at the facilities listed on the application, are now in compliance and shall maintain compliance with the applicable provisions of Chapter 376.303, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 17-761. . . including, but not limited to, those provisions: * * * (b) The installation, maintenance and repair of new and existing underground petroleum storage system; * * * (e) Notification of sale, abandonment, replacement or upgrading of petroleum storage systems. The attestation portion of Petitioner's FLIRP affidavit, as executed by Martin, also provides in part: I, Realadyne, Inc. have read Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Rule 17-761 and the facility or facilities listed on the attached application meet the requirements for the participa- tion in the Florida Petroleum liability insurance and restoration program as described in Chapter 376.3072, Florida Statutes. In executing the affidavit, Ms. Martin knew, or should have known, that the facility was not in compliance with the Department's applicable storage tank regulations. On December 4, 1991, Petitioner contacted the Department, via telecommunique, concerning its request for the "proceeding" to apply for FDER/FPLIPA. At that time, the Department informed Petitioner that the Department would not proceed with the review of the request of an alternate technical proceeding because the facility was already out of compliance with applicable retrofitting requirements. On that day, Petitioner informed the Department that it could not afford to have the underground storage tanks removed. At that time, the Department requested that Petitioner take the tank out of service, pending a decision by it as to whether the tanks would be removed and/or replaced. Also, the Department requested that Petitioner provide it with an updated storage tanks registration form reflecting that the tanks had been taken from service. Petitioner informed the Department that the underground storage tanks would be taken out of service, pending its decision whether it would remove or replace the tanks. Petitioner also agreed, at that time, to provide the Department with an updated storage tank registration form reflecting that the tanks had, in fact, been removed or taken out of service. The Department requested that the tanks be taken out of service to minimize the potential for a discharge of a petroleum product. If Petitioner had taken the underground tanks out of service as requested (and as agreed), the facility would have been in compliance with the requirements of Rule 17-761.510, Florida Administrative Code. On September 11, 1991, PCPHU sent Petitioner another warning letter concerning its failure to comply with the retrofitting requirement. The above-referenced warning notice provides in part: On July 13, 1990, agency personnel inspected your storage tank facility for compliance with Florida's tank regulations and violations were noted. Then on July 25, 1990, this office sent you a letter requesting that you provide the Division with a written explanation of your failure to comply with F.A.C. Chapter 17-61, and to proceed with certain steps. This agency has received no response from your company. On September 25, 1991, the Department contacted Petitioner, by phone, concerning the request for an alternate technical proceeding. During the course of the conversation, Petitioner indicated that it had scheduled a meeting with PCPHU concerning the removal and/or replacement of the tanks. On September 25, 1991, the Department requested that Petitioner provide it with an updated registration form reflecting that the tanks had been taken out of service. On that date, Petitioner agreed to provide the registration form reflecting that the tanks had been taken out of service. On September 30, 1991, the Department again contacted Petitioner concerning its request for an alternate proceeding. At that time, the Department again requested the updated registration form reflecting the tanks had been taken out of service. On that date, Petitioner telecopied the Department a letter and a copy of a contract proposal from UST Engineering for the relining of the underground storage tanks. The contract was dated June 28, 1991, and was signed by Martin on behalf of Petitioner. Petitioner's letter dated September 30, 1991, to the Department was also signed by Martin. The above-referenced letter provides in part: "UST has assured me they will be able to complete the work before the first of the year." The document submitted by Petitioner to the Department on September 30, 1991, included a copy of a check issued by Petitioner made payable to UST Corrosion Engineering. The work contemplated under the UST contract proposal was never performed. Petitioner did not inform the Department of its decision not to have the work performed. A release of petroleum product occurred prior to removal of the petroleum storage system. Petitioner failed to comply with the retrofitting requirements set forth under Rule 17-761.510, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner continued to sell petroleum products until mid June, 1992.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for restoration coverage under the Florida Petroleum Liability Insurance and Restoration Program. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 7th day of December, 1994. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 1994.
The Issue Whether Rules 10D-6.072(3)(d), (e), and (f), Florida Administrative Code, are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority on the ground that these three rules enlarge, modify, or contravene the specific provisions of law implemented, in violation of section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner applied for septic tank contractor registration in July 1996. On September 6, 1996, the Respondent issued its intent to deny his application on the grounds that he failed to meet the required qualifications listed in Rules 10D-6.072(3)(d), (e), and (f), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 10D-6.072(3)(d) provides that an applicant is not qualified to take the registration exam to become a licensed septic tank contractor if a previous registration issued by the Respondent has been revoked within the last 5 years. Rule 10D-6.072(3)(e) provides that an applicant is not qualified to take the registration exam to become a licensed septic tank contractor if he has a disciplinary case pending with the Respondent involving septic tank contracting. Rule 10D-6.072(3)(f) provides that an applicant is not qualified to take the registration exam to become a licensed septic tank contractor if he has been convicted of a crime in any jurisdiction which is directly related to the practice of contracting. Petitioner filed a request for a hearing, in which he alleged Rules 10D-6.072(3)(d), (e), and (f) constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority in that these rules enlarge, modify, or contravene the specific provisions of law implemented, in violation of section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). Rules 10D-6.072(3)(d), (e), and (f) formally took effect on January 3, 1995. There is no material failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, in the promulgation of these rules. 9. Sections 154.06, 381.0011, 381.006, 381.0065, 489.553, and 489.557, Florida Statutes, grant the Respondent specific authority to adopt rules implementing the statutes. Petitioner does not dispute the Respondent’s rulemaking authority. Rules 10D-6.072(3)(d), (e), and (f) implement sections 154.01, 381.001, 381.0011, 381.0012, 381.0025, 381.006, 381.0061, 381.0065, 381.00655, 381.0066, 381.0067, Part I of Chapter 386, and Part III of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. Part III of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), is the chapter governing septic tank contractor registration. Chapter 10D-6, Florida Administrative Code, are the rules pertaining to Standards for Onsite Sewage Treatment and Disposal Systems, which include septic tank systems. A person who becomes a registered septic tank contractor has the authority to install, maintain, repair, and perform site evaluations for repairs of onsite sewage treatment and disposal systems. There are an estimated 1.4 million septic systems in use in Florida. The onsite sewage treatment program impacts public health in that it prevents and corrects sanitary nuisances; prevents pollution to groundwater, which is the primary drinking water source in the state; prevents pollution to surface water; and eliminates risks to public health from exposure to improperly treated human waste. Untreated or improperly treated human waste contains many significant disease-causing organisms injurious to human health. A “sanitary nuisance” is the “commission of any act, . . . or the keeping, maintaining, propagation, existence, or permission of anything, . . . by which the health or life of an individual, or the health or lives of individuals, may be threatened or impaired, or by which or through which, directly or indirectly, disease may be caused.” Section 386.01, Florida Statutes (1995). “Improperly built or maintained septic tanks” and “untreated or improperly treated human waste” constitute “prima facie evidence of maintaining a nuisance injurious to health.” Section 386.041(1), Florida Statutes (1995). The training, regulation, and registration of septic tank contractors, who install and repair such systems, is directly related to public health. An improperly installed or repaired system may result in untreated human waste or raw sewage either surfacing on the ground, backing up in the owner’s house/business, contaminating groundwater, and contaminating nearby surface water. The Respondent regularly receives complaints from citizens detailing installation problems, including complaints regarding improper workmanship, the premature failure of their septic tank system resulting in sewage on the ground around their house, and the contractor’s failure to honor his/her warranty. The impetus behind regulating contractors came primarily from the industry itself (i.e., the Florida Septic Tank Association). The qualification outlined in Rule 10D-6.072(3)(d), which provides that an applicant is not qualified to become a registered septic tank contractor if the Respondent has revoked his prior septic tank registration within the last 5 years, protects the public from sanitary nuisances caused by the improper installation and repair of septic tank systems. This qualification is, moreover, an indicator of an applicant’s “good moral character.” The qualification outlined in Rule 10D-6.072(3)(e), which provides that an applicant is not qualified to become a registered septic tank contractor if the applicant has a disciplinary case pending with the Respondent involving septic tank contracting, fits into what the septic tank contracting program under chapter 489 and Chapter 10D-6 is designed to accomplish. This qualification protects the public by denying licenses to those persons who have demonstrated they are not complying with the rules or statutes. The qualification outlined in Rule 10D-6.072(3)(f), which provides that an applicant is not qualified to become a registered septic tank contractor if he has been convicted of a crime in any jurisdiction which is directly related to the practice of contracting, fits into what the septic tank contracting program under Chapter 489 and Chapter 10D-6 is designed to accomplish. This qualification protects the public by denying licenses to those persons who are not law abiding and do not follow the standards. “Good moral character” is not defined in Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. Each of the three qualifications established by Rules 10D-6.072(3)(d), (e), and (f) make specific or interpret an individual’s good moral character. The Department’s statutory authority for Rule 10D- 6.072(3)(d), Rule 10D-6.072(3)(e), and Rule 10D-6.072(3)(f) comes from: (a) section 489.553(2), which requires the Department to “provide qualifications for applicants;” (b) section 489.553(4)(a), which says the applicant “must be of good moral character’” (c) section 489.558(2), which says the Department may deny registration if it determines the applicant “has violated any provision of this part [Part III of Chapter 489];” and (d) section 489.556, which authorizes the Department to suspend and revoke licenses. The Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC) has neither filed an objection nor voted on an objection to the three rules at issue in this case. Although a staff member of JAPC, in response to Petitioner’s complaint, recently made a preliminary inquiry into the validity of these rules, the committee did not adopt the staff member’s recommendation.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether, under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, Respondent is liable for attorneys' fees and costs incurred by Petitioner in an earlier proceeding. The purpose of the earlier proceeding was to determine the eligibility of Petitioner's site for state-administered cleanup of discharge from a petroleum storage system under the Early Detection Incentive program described in Section 376.3071(9), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner informed Respondent of a pollutant discharge at Petitioner's gasoline station by filing a Discharge Notification Form on March 9, 1987. The form states that the discovery was made on March 5, 1987, as a result of a manual test of one or more monitoring wells. The form is marked "unknown" in response to questions concerning the estimated gallons lost, the part of storage system leaking, the type of tank, the cause of leak, and the type of pollutant discharged, although next to the last response are the typewritten words: "appears to be motor oil." A cover letter from Petitioner dated March 5, 1987, accompanied the Discharge Notification Form. The letter restates that the source of pollution is unknown, but adds that "there is a possibility that [the pollution] is the result of a septic tank, drain field discharge." The letter discloses that Blackhawk Environmental Services, Inc. ("Blackhawk") and NEPCCO/IT are investigating "to determine the extent of the contamination as well as the source." The letter provides the name and telephone number of the Blackhawk employee for further information. A separate cover letter from the Blackhawk employee to Respondent states that the notification was being submitted for consideration for Site Rehabilitation Reimbursement Costs. The letter also states that the site has been the subject of groundwater contamination from an "unknown source." Following the notification, Orlando Laboratories, Inc. submitted to Blackhawk a written analysis of the groundwater at the site. The report, which is dated March 19, 1987, contains quantitative data without any interpretation and was submitted without interpretation to Respondent on March 20, 1987. Petitioner applied to participate in the Early Detection Incentive ("EDI") Program by filing an EDI Program Notification Application dated March 23, 1987, together with a cover letter of the same date. The application supplied no more information than did the notification form. In response to the question as to the type of product discharged, Petitioner circled the choice, "used oil," but added the word, "possibility." Although the application may not have been immediately filed, Respondent received it prior to July, 1987. As part of a site inspection, an employee of Respondent prepared an Early Detection Incentive Program Compliance Verification Checklist, which was dated April 28, 1987. The checklist notes that Blackhawk "is looking into problem [and] will forward results from lab when available." The checklist also states: Odor found in E[ast] & W[est] M[onitoring] W[ells]. No other contamination found on site. Site has old waste oil tank on site that could possibly be contaminating drainfield next to tank. Also old abandoned tank (since 1967) on site. Asked owner to investigate tank's conditions. If not needed, he will remove & adjust registration accordingly. Floordrain in shop area dumps into on-site septic tank which could also contribute. The repeated mention of motor oil is due to at least two factors. First, a Blackhawk employee had mentioned to Belvin Marr, who owns and operates Petitioner, that the contaminant "looked like" motor oil. Second, Mr. Marr knew that he had, for many years, discarded used motor oil down a floordrain leading into a septic tank with an onsite drainfield. By letter dated July 22, 1989, Respondent informed Petitioner that its site was ineligible for state-administered cleanup under for the EDI program described in Section 376.3071(9), Florida Statutes. The letter states that the decision was "based upon information given in this [Notification Application] and a compliance verification evaluation of your reported site." The July 22 letter explains that the site is ineligible because, according to the application and district inspection: the source of contamination at Marr's Exxon has been attributed to used oil. Petroleum, as defined by Section 376.301(9), Florida Statutes (F.S.), included [sic] only crude oil and other hydrocarbons in the form in which they are originally produced at the well. Petroleum product, as defined by Section 376.301(10), F.S., means fuel in its refined state which is similar in nature to fuels such as diesel fuel, kerosene, or gasoline. Used oil cannot be considered "petroleum" or "petroleum products" because it has become unsuitable for its original purpose due to the presence of impurities or loss of original properties. Therefore, your site, which is contaminated by unrefined used oil, is not eligible for participation in Early Detection Incentive (EDI) Program. The July 22 letter advises Petitioner that he could obtain administrative and judicial review of the decision by filing a petition within 21 days of the date of receipt of the letter. The letter thus provided Petitioner with a clear point of entry. By letter dated July 30, 1987, Petitioner requested a 30-day extension to allow for retesting. Additional testing took place in early August, 1987. However, there is no indication that the resulting data, which again omit textual interpretation, were submitted to Respondent until the filing of the more definite statement described in the following paragraph. The next communication between Petitioner and Respondent took place when Petitioner requested a formal hearing by filing a Petition for Hearing dated August 26, 1987. By Order for More Definite Statement entered September 14, 1987, Respondent ordered Petitioner to file a more definite statement. By Response to Order for More Definite Statement dated September 28, 1987, Petitioner filed a more definite statement. The additional test data were attached to the more definite statement, although they are not in the DOAH case file. The Response offers the following chronology with all dates being approximate dates. March 5, 1987: Respondent notified of groundwater contamination from unknown source. March 20, 1987: analysis of contamination conducted by Orlando Laboratories, Inc. and forwarded to Respondent. March 23, 1987: Petitioner applied for participation in Early Detection Incentive ("EDI") program, and the application is attached to the More Definite Statement. April 27, 1987: Compliance Verification checklist issued. July 22, 1987: Respondent denied Petitioner's application. July 30, 1987: Petitioner requested 30-day extension to conduct further testing, the results of which are attached to the More Definite Statement. August 26, 1987: Petitioner requested formal administrative hearing. Following receipt of the more definite statement, Respondent forwarded the pleadings to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of a Hearing Officer to conduct a hearing. The pleadings were received on October 9, 1987, and the file was assigned DOAH Case No. 87-4448. In a Motion for Continuance filed on January 14, 1988, Respondent asserted that the case involves the issue whether "used oil," which was what had been discharged at Petitioner's facility, is a "petroleum product." The motion refers to a pending case, Puckett Oil v. Department of Environmental Regulation, and states that this case, which had been heard in September, 1987, involves the same question. By Motion for Continuance filed on May 13, 1988, Respondent requested a continuance on the same grounds as previously cited and represented that Petitioner had no objection. An internal memorandum of Respondent dated March 17, 1988, acknowledges that Petitioner requested a review of the available data based on an "inaccurate assessment by his contractor." Reviewing the data, some of which had been provided after July 22, 1987, the memorandum notes that the majority of the contamination is from gasoline, but the involvement of the drainfield as the source of contamination "is the reason eligibility was denied." After the issuance of the final order in Puckett Oil v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 10 FALR 5525 (September 1, 1988), Respondent, filing a Motion to Set Hearing Date, disclosed that "[Respondent's] review of the Final Order indicates that Petitioner's site remains ineligible for SUPER Act funding." However, on July 28, 1989, the parties filed a fully executed Joint Stipulation and Motion to Dismiss. An Order Closing File, which was entered the same date, returned the matter to Respondent for final disposition consistent with the stipulation. The Joint Stipulation and Motion to Dismiss states: On July, 22, 1987, [Respondent] denied eligibility for the [EDI] Program, Section 376.3071(9), Florida Statutes, to [Petitioner's) site . . .. The basis for the denial was that the site was contaminated with used oil. Subsequent to [Respondent's] denial, Petitioner conducted a series of ground water tests to more accurately determine the nature and extent of contamination at the site. The results of that testing indicate that the site was contaminated with significant amounts of gasoline constituents and minor amounts of used oil constituents emanating possibly from a septic tank drainfield and a used oil storage facility. The gasoline constituents exist at levels many times that of the other constituents. Based upon the overwhelming contribution to the overall contamination presented by the gasoline constituents, [Respondent] agrees that the presence of minor amounts of contaminants from something other than a tank should not preclude [Petitioner's] site from being eligible for the EDI Program. [Respondent reserves the right not to pay for the cost of cleanup of contamination not related to discharge from a tank.] WHEREFORE Petitioner . . . and Respondent request that the hearing officer adopt this stipulation . . . and retain jurisdiction for an award of attorney's fees and costs (Fla. Stat. Sect. 57.111 (1986 Supp.) and Fla. Admin. Code Rule 22I-6.035). . .. The parties stipulated that Petitioner was a small business party. The parties also stipulated to reasonable attorneys' fees of $6625 and costs of $4690. Following the final hearing, Petitioner filed supplemental affidavits showing, in connection with the prosecution of the subject case and not the earlier proceeding, additional attorneys' fees of $1875 and costs of $490.85.
The Issue The issue here presented concerns an alleged violation of Rule Subsection 5F-2.01(1)(c)1, Florida Administrative Code, related to the permissible ten percent (10 percent) evaporated temperature for which gasoline shall not exceed 140F, and penalties to be imposed for such violations, in keeping with Section 525.06, Florida Statutes (1980), and Rule Subsection 5F-2.01(1)(c)1, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. The Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, is an agency of State government which has the obligation to inspect petroleum products in keeping with the provisions of Chapter 525, Florida Statutes (1980). The Respondent is a corporation which sells petroleum products in the State of Florida at an outlet located at 3411 U.S. 19 North, Pasco County, Tarpon Springs, Florida. On November 23, 1981, a sample of the petroleum product, super unleaded gasoline (which was offered for sale) was taken from the Respondent's facility as indicated above. A subsequent analysis of that product by Petitioner's mobile laboratory revealed that the ten percent (10 percent) evaporated temperature was 153F. This reading exceeded the ten percent (10 percent) evaporated temperature of 140F as set forth in Rule Subsection 5F-2.01(1)(c)1, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner's inspector, Jamie Gillespie, advised Respondent's agent that the premium unleaded gasoline was illegal due to its "stale" condition and the Respondent was given an option of either confiscation of the product or posting of a bond. The product is presently under a Stop Sale Notice and is under seal. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 1.) A subsequent analysis by Petitioner's laboratory in Tallahassee revealed that the evaporation level of the product was found to be approximately 163F. Ben Bowen, Petitioner's Assistant Bureau Chief in charge of petroleum inspection, indicates that the discrepancy in the evaporation levels as analyzed by the two laboratories was most probably due to the seal which was on the product and the approximate seven (7) day delay in the transfer of the product from Tarpon Springs to the laboratory in Tallahassee. Respondent's supervisor, Mark Ordway, 1/ was shown how the product could possibly become stale due to a "venting" problem from the roof of the storage tank where the product was stored. Sam Puleo, a lab technologist employed in Petitioner's mobile laboratory, analyzed the sample of the product taken from Respondent's facility. According to Mr. Puleo, "stale" products such as that taken from Respondent's tanks would make it difficult to start an automobile engine.
The Issue Whether Respondent’s license as a septic tank contractor should be disciplined.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is registered with Petitioner as a septic tank contractor and authorized to provide septic tank contracting services, holding Registration No. SR0890264 and Authorization No. SA0900453. David B. Grimes is employed by Bay County Health Department as an inspector responsible for the inspection of on- site sewage systems. On August 22, 2007, Mr. Grimes inspected an on-site sewage treatment disposal system (OSTDS) being constructed by Respondent at 5431 John Pitts Road, Panama City, Florida. The OSTDS failed to meet the minimum rule requirements due to a defective tank and improperly installed drainfield. The tank was defective because its dimensions were smaller than the dimensions required to enable the tank to have sufficient liquid capacity for the system being installed. Mr. Grimes told Respondent that he could not approve the system. Upon learning that the system would not be approved, Respondent, who is a large man and larger than the inspector, threatened to do bodily harm to Mr. Grimes and stated, “I am going to whip your ass”. He also used other profanity in a threatening and serious voice. The inspector began to put his tools into the tool container on the back of his truck. When the inspector attempted to close the container’s lid and leave, Respondent blocked the path of the inspector and would not let him close the truck-bed lid. Respondent insisted the system be inspected and approved so he could finish the job. Other than blocking his path, Respondent did not take any other physical action towards harming Mr. Grimes. Other than with his hands, the evidence did not show that Respondent had the means to cause serious harm to Mr. Grimes. However, Mr. Grimes felt some fear for his safety and was very uncomfortable. He refused to approve the system and left the premises. He called his supervisor to report the incident and request a second inspection by his supervisor. Later that day, Mr. Grimes and his supervisor inspected the OSTDS. Respondent was not present. The inspector concurred with Mr. Grimes’ findings and the system was not approved. On August 23, 2007, Mr. Grimes made a second visit to the property to continue the inspection of the OSTDS. The drainfield was corrected and a new and larger tank was installed. The dimensions of the tank were again smaller than required to meet the liquid capacity of the tank. Additionally, the tank had a gap in the seal around the intake feed line. It was, therefore, defective and could not be approved. Mr. Grimes told Respondent that he could not approve the system. Respondent again grew angry when he was told the new tank was also defective and would not be approved. Respondent stated that Mr. Grimes was the worst inspector in the area and made other derogatory remarks towards him. Respondent also threatened to make trouble with the inspector’s employment and/or “get him fired” unless the system was passed. The evidence did not show that Respondent made any physical moves toward Respondent or otherwise impeded his inspection. The inspector was again fearful for his personal safety although the evidence did not demonstrate a reasonable basis for such fear. The OSTDS was not approved and Mr. Grimes left the work site. There was no evidence that Respondent followed through with interfering with Mr. Grimes’ employment. At best, the evidence showed that Respondent’s threat to interfere with the inspector’s employment was mere hyperbole. Such comments are common. While silly and rude, the mere threat of an employment action does not rise to the level of being unlawful and does not demonstrate misconduct sufficient to impose discipline on Respondent’s license. On the other hand, the actions of Respondent towards the inspector when he threatened to do bodily harm to the inspector, and blocking his attempts to leave unless he approved the system, did constitute gross misconduct on the part of Respondent. Even though Respondent’s actions were unsuccessful, Respondent’s words coupled with his conduct go beyond mere hyperbole and constitute an unlawful threat towards a public official to influence the official’s actions. Respondent’s actions did not cause physical or monetary harm to any person. In the past, Respondent was disciplined by letter of warning in Case Number SC0478 in 2000, for covering a new installation in violation of the system construction standards and by citation in Case Number SC0591 in 2001, for creation of a sanitary nuisance, negligence, misconduct, and falsification of inspection report. The instant violation is a second violation for misconduct and a repeat violation of the rules of the Department.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that Respondent's license be disciplined for violations of the Florida Administrative Code Rule 64E-6.022 and that his Septic Tank Contractor License No. SR0890264 and Authorization No. SA0900453 be fined in the amount of $500.00 and suspended for 90 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of May, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of May, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney M. Johnson, Esquire Department of Health Northwest Law Office 1295 West Fairfield Drive Pensacola, Florida 32501 G. D. Yon, Jr. Yon Septic Tank Co. 2988 Hwy 71 Marianna, Florida 32446 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Dr. Ana M. Viamonte-Ros, Secretary Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Josefina M. Tamayó, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Larry C. Garner, should be fined $500 for misstating the size of a septic tank and drain field.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Larry C. Garner, is the licensed septic tank contractor who owns and operates A. Carver Septic Tank. (The Citation for Violation erroneously referred to the company as “E. Carver Septic Tank,” but the error was corrected without objection at final hearing. There was no evidence to support Respondent’s suggestion that the Department may have taken disciplinary action against him because it erroneously thought Respondent was another licensee.) On December 6, 2001, an employee of Respondent pumped out a septic tank and measured a drain field located at 847 Matthews Road, Maxville, Florida. The resident there wanted to enlarge her residence and needed Respondent's services in order to obtain Department approval of the existing septic tank system for the enlarged residence. After services were provided, Respondent's office gave the resident a receipt stating that Respondent's company had pumped out a 900 gallon septic tank and that the drain field measured 360 square feet. (Respondent's office actually dealt with the resident's adult daughter.) Respondent's office staff also prepared Form 4015 (a Department form entitled “Onsite Sewage Treatment and Disposal System Existing System and System Repair Evaluation”) and gave it to the resident for use in getting approval of the system for the enlarged residence. The form stated that the septic tank was 900 gallons and that the drain field was 360 square feet. When the resident applied for approval of her septic tank system for her enlarged residence, the Department inspected the system and found that the septic tank actually was 750 gallons and the drain field actually was only approximately 110 square feet. The Department issued the Citation for Violation based on the magnitude of the discrepancy. Respondent denied that he personally had any contemporaneous knowledge of the services provided by his employee or the receipt of Form 4015 prepared by his office, and there was no evidence that he did. Respondent personally investigated after issuance of the Citation for Violation. At final hearing, Respondent questioned whether the Form 4015 actually stated that the septic tank was 900 gallons. From the handwriting on the form itself, it appears possible that the number could read 700, not 900. But based on the written receipt, which either was prepared contemporaneously with the Form 4015 or was the basis for preparation of the Form 4015 by Respondent's office staff, the greater weight of the evidence was that the Form 4015 stated and was intended to state 900 gallons as the size of the septic tank. As further support for this finding, Respondent himself testified to a conversation he had with his employee during which the employee explained that he sized the septic tank at 700 gallons based on its apparent depth and Respondent admonished him that the employee knew better--i.e., knew it was necessary to measure height, width, and depth to accurately measure the size of a septic tank. Respondent also attempted to explain how his employee may have made a forgivable error in measuring the drain field. According to the Form 4015, the employee measured the drain field as a rectangular bed, 12 feet by 30 feet. Actually, the drain field consists of two trenches (one 26 feet long and the other 29 feet long), which the Department's inspector measured as being two feet wide. Respondent testified that the drain field began at a distribution box and was approximately ten feet wide within a few feet of the distribution box. Respondent testified that it would be easy to incorrectly assume that the approximate ten-foot width continued as a bed for the entire length of the drain field, as his employee apparently did. However, the greater weight of the evidence was that the employee's error was not reasonable; to the contrary, to determine the configuration and size of a drain field, it is necessary to probe the ground at more than just one distance close to the distribution box. When Respondent himself went to the site to investigate the allegations against him, he probed both near the distribution box and further away southeast of the distribution box. He testified that he found solid rock ten feet in width near the distribution box; to the southeast, his probing revealed a trench which Respondent measured at between three and a half and four feet in width. Based on those measurements, Respondent assumed two trenches approximately 30 feet long and four feet in width each, for a total of approximately 240 square feet. It is difficult to reconcile Respondent’s testimony as to the width of the southeast trench with the testimony of the Department's inspector. The Department's inspector probed approximately ten feet and 20 feet from the septic tank and found two-foot wide trenches in four different places. The Department's inspector also testified without contradiction in response to Respondent's questions on cross-examination that backhoes used at the time this drain field was installed in 1973 generally had two-foot wide excavation buckets. Based on the greater care taken by the Department's inspector in measuring the drain field, and the kind of backhoe in general use in 1973, it is found that the Department's inspector's measurements were more accurate. Even if Respondent's measurements were accurate, and the Department inspector's were inaccurate, the measurements recorded on the receipt and on Form 4015 still would have been seriously overstated. While not seriously disputing the inaccuracy of the Form 4015 submitted in this case, Respondent stated "anyone can make a mistake" and that the Department should have asked Respondent to re-check the measurements instead of issuing a citation, especially in view of Respondent's disciplinary record in 29 years in the business in Clay County. (Respondent testified that his only "issues in Tallahassee" were one incident--not fully explained--involving a cow on someone's property and another when he had someone take a re- certification examination for him at a time when his mother was ill. The Department did not controvert this testimony. As already mentioned, there was no evidence to support Respondent's initial suggestion that the Department may have taken disciplinary action against him because it erroneously thought he was another licensee.) But the Department's witness testified that issuance of the citation was appropriate and consistent with agency policy because of the magnitude of the discrepancies on the Form 4015. Respondent testified that the employee involved in this case was his stepson, who has worked for Respondent for 14 years, since he was 11 years old, seven to eight years as a full-time employee. Respondent also testified that he recently fired his stepson, but the reasons for firing him were not directly related to his conduct in this case. Respondent also testified that he felt compelled to insist on a hearing although he knew the Form 4015 was inaccurate because he perceived the Department to be acting in this case as if it had "absolute power" over him. He apparently viewed his request for a hearing as a necessary challenge to government's assertion of "absolute power" over him.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a final order finding Respondent guilty as charged and imposing a fine in the amount of $500. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ______________________________ J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. John O. Agwunobi, Secretary Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 John D. Lacko, Esquire Department of Health 420 Fentress Boulevard Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Larry C. Garner 13950 Normandy Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32221
The Issue The issue is whether the application of Petroleum Products Corporation for reimbursement of the cost of assessment and clean-up of soil and groundwater contamination at its site in Broward County, Florida, under the State Underground Petroleum Environmental Response Act of 1986 should be granted.
Findings Of Fact The Legislature provided a system for the clean-up of sites contaminated as the result of the storage of petroleum or petroleum products in the State Underground Petroleum Environmental Response Act of 1986 (Super Act), Chapter 86-159, Laws of Florida, codified primarily as Section 376.3071, Florida Statutes. The Super Act contains a reimbursement program funded by the Inland Protection Trust Fund. Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes, permits reimbursement of allowable costs for the rehabilitation of sites contaminated from discharges related to the storage of petroleum or petroleum products. Petroleum Products Corporation owns a parcel of land located at 3130 Southwest 17th Street, Pembroke Park, Florida. From 1959 to 1970 Petroleum Products Corporation operated a facility on that land which collected used oil from service stations and automobile dealerships, processed it, and sold it either as fuel oil or lubricating oil. About 90% of 150,000 gallons of used oil processed monthly at the facility was sold as fuel; the remaining oil was sold as lubricating oil, but even when sold as lubricating oil, it was sometimes burned as fuel because re-refined oil makes good fuel. The storage tanks were located on the southeastern portion of the property, near Carolina Road. The facility used a two-phase distillation process. Used oil was distilled to remove water, after which it could be sold as fuel oil. If processed in the second phase, for sale as lubricating oil, it was distilled further, and treated with sulfuric acid and clay to remove additives and residue, and change color. This phase produced a waste consisting of acid/clay sludge. This sludge is generally very black, and has a pH of approximately 3. It is very viscous, and has the consistency of roofing cement; laymen would describe it as tar. It does not flow easily, but is liquid enough to be pumped. This processing also occurred in the southeast part of the property. While the recycling facility produced lubricating oil using the acid/clay treatment from 1959 to 1970, the acid sludge was hauled to a municipal dump, or placed in pits dug into the ground on the north and east of the plant site. When the pits were dug, they were dug below the water level, and there was water in the pits before the sludge was dumped in them. The disposal of sludge in pits on the recycling site was a prevailing industry practice, and violated no regulatory requirements at the time. Operators considered on-site disposal of sludge preferable to hauling sludge to a landfill. During periods of heavy rain, some of the sludge may have overflown the pits and spread to nearby land, where it would become mixed with the surface soil. Petroleum Products Corporation ceased making lubricating oil in 1970, but continued to process used oil into fuel oil. The local Broward County Pollution Control Agency asked Petroleum Products Corporation to remove the acid/clay sludge from its property, and to refill the pits with other fill material. Petroleum Products Corporation acceeded to this request, and a great volume of sludge, perhaps hundreds of thousands of gallons, was removed from the pits, which were then refilled under the supervision of the Broward County Pollution Authority. Receipts Petroleum Products Corporation produced at the hearing, or thereafter from the custody of the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, show that more than 150 truck loads of sludge were removed and hauled to landfills operated by Metropolitan Dade County or by the City of Surfside. Some pockets of the sludge remain at the site of the pits because they were not completely emptied. The backfill was clean fill, and the area was then bulldozed so that warehouses could be constructed in the area. This filling and bulldozing changed the contour of the land from what it had been in the past. The Department contends that much of the sludge was spread out over an extended area of the site, and not removed to landfills. The evidence is persuasive that almost all of the sludge from the pits was removed to landfills. The testimony of Mr. Blair denying that the sludge was spread was credible. In addition, on-site spreading of the sludge would have been impracticable. As a tar-like substance, if spread out, it would have been tracked everywhere. It would stick to the tracks or wheels of any vehicles operating on the surface, and was so acidic it would burn or irritate the skin of anyone who came in contact with it. It would be extremely difficult to perform maintenance on equipment used to spread the sludge because of the need to clean the sludge off, so that the mechanic would not be burned. In addition, there are a large number of receipts evidencing the systematic hauling of the sludge to landfills. The logic of Mr. McDonnell's testimony is persuasive: If you have the alternate, which they obviously did, of hauling it away and simply dumping it, no one would go out and deliberately choose to do a very difficult job [spreading the sludge over the property] where there is an easy alternative available to them. (Tr. 285) Although the facility ceased its re-refining of lubricating oil in 1970, it continued to collect, process, and sell used oil as a fuel until 1984. About 150,000 gallons per month of used oil were processed and sold as fuel. The oil was typically crank case engine oil which contained the substances normally found in used oil of that type. There is no persuasive evidence that Petroleum Product Corporation ever received any hazardous waste, or mixed used oil with any hazardous waste. Used oil is not listed as a hazardous waste by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency or by the Department. The used oil collected and recycled at Petroleum Product's facility was pumped into and stored in above-ground storage tanks. There were, over time, from 10 to 25 tanks, which ranged in size from 12,000 to 20,000 gallons. Normally, the facility stored between 400,000 and 500,000 gallons of used oil. Occasionally, the facility also received virgin oil, but it was processed quickly or sold because of its higher value. At the peak of its operation, the facility had 25 to 35 storage tanks. Recycling operations had slim profit margins and were small operations. Storage tanks, pumps, and other equipment were bought used, often from other businesses dealing in virgin petroleum products. That used equipment was often rusty or deteriorating. Tank bottoms could have holes in them as the result of rust from standing water; tanks were sometimes riveted, and would have side or bottom leaks. The tanks had virtually no overfill protection. When oil was pumped in, it would overflow from the top and run down the sides. Operators were typically not careful with the oil, because it had a very low value, about 2 to 5 cents a gallon. A spill of a few thousand gallons was regarded as an inconsequential matter. The pumps used in storing oil often had leaks in packing seals, or had screw joints which would leak. Tank valves, also usually bought as used equipment, were often installed without new stem packing, and also would leak during operation. Almost no preventive maintenance was done, because it was not cost-effective to do so. Equipment was repaired only if its current state of repair interfered with operations, which usually meant that leaks were not repaired until they created a fire hazard. Leaks and spills from used oil storage tanks, including their pumps, valves, and piping, were common. A great volume of used oil leaked or spilled from Petroleum Products Corporation's tanks, pumps, and piping over its 25 year operation. There were also large oil spills resulting from four or five major fires at the facility in the 1960s. The fire in 1963, which may have been the result of vandalism, caused 40,000 to 60,000 gallons of use oil to spill from storage tanks; 8 or 10 tanks were destroyed. There were no dikes, so that the oil flowed freely. When firemen used water on the fire, the oil was absorbed into the soil. Another major fire occurred in October, 1966 in which three oil storage tanks collapsed spilling about 50,000 gallons of oil. Another 25 foot high oil tank collapsed on a firetruck. There is no way to know, with certainty, the volume of used oil, virgin oil, and lubricating oil which spilled or leaked into the ground on the site. It is reasonable to believe that 9 to 12 gallons of oil would have leaked or spilled each day at the facility, which would have resulted in spill of over 100,000 gallons of oil. This estimate, made by Mr. McDonnell, is credible and is conservative, given the volume of oil also spilled during the fires. Petroleum Products Corporation does not contend that the leaks and spills from process tanks, rather than from storage tanks, are eligible for reimbursement of site assessment and cleanup costs. Oil leaked from both, however, and once in the ground, the oils are indistinguishable. Due to the capacity of the tanks and the years they were in use, however, it is reasonable to assume that 15% or less of the leaks and spills were attributable to process tanks. After processing, most of the oil was burned as fuel. Some was used as a lubricant. The only difference between used oil sold as fuel or lubricant was that the lubricating oil had the additives removed and the color changed. Both burn well. There is an insufficient basis in this record to justify the Department's interpretation excluding this site from eligibility for cleanup because oil processing ocurred at the site to produce lubricating oil. Section 376.3071 does not disqualify all or part of a site from eligibility for cleanup reimbursement because a portion of the used oil stored there was ultimately used as lubricants. In 1984 a Department investigator asked Petroleum Products Corporation to install exploratory wells to determine whether there was contamination at the site. Petroleum Products engaged the firm of Dames & Moore to undertake a preliminary investigation, which revealed that there was groundwater contamination in the form of floating hydrocarbons. On April 1, 1985, the United States Environmental Protection Agency and Petroleum Products Corporation entered into a consent order agreement which required the removal of 17 above-ground tanks leaking used oil into the ground, which constituted a continuing source of contamination. Petroleum Products Corporation contracted with Conversion Technology Corporation to recover and recycle the oil and wastes, with Waldron's tank cleaning services to clean the empty tanks and drum the sludge, with Cuyahoga Wrecking Service to make the tanks inoperable, and with Seven & Seven Transporters to remove the waste to a disposal facility. The employee of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency who was in charge of the site commended Petroleum Products Corporation for its cleanup effort, and wrote as the OSC [on- scene coordinator] for this EPA-monitored cleanup I may say that [Petroleum Products Corporation] exemplified industrial cooperation and responsibility in combating the vexing problem of hazardous waste management. (Petitioner's Exhibit 9) Petroleum Products Corporation cooperated with the Environmental Protection Agency and with the Department in determining how to deal with the contamination. It has already spent approximately $150,000 to perform remedial action. Contamination at the site is of three types: oil floating in the groundwater, soil contamination, and groundwater contamination. It is not possible to clean any individual phase of the contamination without affecting the other phases. Attempts at remediation must be monitored to prevent an influx of organic contaminants into the aquifer. Similarly, the cost related to the cleanup of an individual phase of contamination cannot be isolated because of the inter-related nature of the cleanup phases. The creation of a cone of groundwater depression is necessary for any recovery of the free or floating oil. The cost of recovery of the free product cannot be separated from groundwater cleanup because it is necessary to treat large quantities of groundwater involved in creating a cone of depression. To the extent that a proportion of the cost might be estimated, the cost associated with the recovery of free product would be a minor portion of the overall cleanup. There is currently a free product recovery effort in place at the site, which is intended to prevent further migration of the product off-site. This ongoing action is not considered an element of the site cleanup. The most feasible method of cleanup for the free product will involve the excavation of the soils to create a trench. The free product and ground water will be recovered as they flow into the trench. During October and November of 1984, Environmental Science and Engineering, Inc., a consulting firm working under contract with the Department, assessed the extent of free floating oil in the groundwater under the Petroleum Product Corporation's site. Those consultants found a free floating layer of oil from 5" to 30" thick under approximately one-half of the one acre site Petitioner still owns. The free product generally mirrors the location of the former recycling facility and its storage tanks. The viscosity of the free product is comparable to about 40-weight engine oil. Environmental Science and Engineering estimates that the floating layer of oil contains 20,000 to 60,000 gallons of recoverable petroleum product. The direction of ground water flow and the migration of contaminants off-site is to the east or southeast. The soil above the oil layer has been saturated with oil because of the fluctuations of the layer with movement of the water table as the area experiences heavy rains or dry spells. Wells drilled in the location of the former sludge lagoons to the north and east of the plant site reveal a heavy slightly liquid type of sludge. The oil in the lagoon sites is immobile, and no free product collects in the wells after 24 hours. One sample collected in the mason jar shows a slight degree of oil separation after 24 hours. This anecdotal evidence of separation is not very informative, and is not persuasive that oil separates from the remaining sludge on-site. See, Finding 32, below. A second assessment of soil and groundwater contamination was done by another consulting firm under contract with the Department, Ecology and Environment, Inc. That study showed free floating product at the site. The only calculation of the amount of free floating oil was that done by Environmental Science and Engineering, Inc., see, Finding 29, estimating that there would be 20,000 to 60,000 gallons of recoverable oil. That calculation understates the amount of oil in the ground. The estimate given by George McDonnell of 103,000 gallons is more persuasive. It is consistent that the large amounts of oil which leaked or spilled at the site over a 25 year period. It is unlikely that any appreciable portion of the approximately 103,000 gallons of floating oil has its genesis in the separation of oil from the acid/clay sludge which had been disposed in the two lagoons for the following reasons: Oil associated with acid/sludge would be quite acidic, and have a pH between 2 and 4. The pH scale is not a linear scale, so differences in pH are quite dramatic as the pH values change. Samples of free product shows a uniform pH of approximately 6 or 7. In almost all 31 monitoring or observation wells the pH is consistent with the characteristics of used oil, (a pH of 6 or 7), not the pH of sludge (a pH of 2 to 4). The only sample which disclosed a low pH was that taken in monitoring well number 3 which was located in the former sludge lagoon site. The groundwater flows to the east or southeast. This does not explain the presence of free product to the west and southwest of the sludge pits nor the absence of free product to the east of the pits. The viscosity of the oil is similar to that of 40-weight engine oil and not highly viscous, as the tar-like sludge would be. The oil in the sludge pits is basically immobile and no free product surfaced in the monitoring well after waiting 24 hours. The pH of the free product is nearly neutral. The Department believes that the sludge was mixed with lime rock or fill and spread over the site to increase the pH of the oil. This is unpersuasive. Mixing with lime rock would increase the pH of the sludge (tend to bring it towards neutral) but it would not cause the dramatic lowering of acidity which would bring the sludge to a pH of 6 or 7. In addition, the viscosity of the sludge would not be so changed by mixing the sludge with fill that its viscosity would become similar to that of 40-weight engine oil. To believe that the free product results from sludge disposal rather than leaks ignores the normal operating practice of used oil recovery facilities in the late 50s and 60s where spills from storage tanks, pumps, and piping were very common. Little of the free product has been recovered through the current remediation efforts. If not recovered, over time the approximately 103,000 gallons of floating oil will spread to adjacent property. To recover this oil by conventional trench or well recovery operations will probably cost $250,000 or more. The capital cost of the groundwater recovery/discharge system, with monitoring wells, will be about $85,000; cost of operating and maintenance are approximately $180,000. The firm of Ecology & Environment, Inc., collected soil samples at 56 locations in two phases in its remedial investigation. Forty-six of the samples were taken at shallow depths (27 at 8 inches, 19 at approximately 10 inches); 10 more samples were taken in the old disposal pit sites at depths between 0 and 35 feet). The two primary classes of contaminants found in the soil were lead and organics (hydrocarbons associated with petroleum products). Both contaminants are found in used oil. The lead and organic contaminants were found in the shallow soils over the southern half of the site. Very little contamination was found beyond the main area of site activity. The soil contamination was concentrated in the plant and former disposal pit areas. Samples with high lead concentrations were found in the former disposal pit sites. Contamination extended to a depth of 25 feet in one soil sample from a former pit, where oily plastic sludge was found with fine sand or clay. The two former pit sites are the only places with documented contamination below a 10 foot depth. Although the organic contamination extended laterally further than the lead contamination, Environment & Ecology concluded that the wider distribution did not reflect contamination from Petroleum Product Corporation's activities. The general area has long been the site of commercial and industrial activities, and there are many other possible sources for contamination including a firing range, which would have been disposing of lead bullets fired at the range, a generator plant, and a former spray-painting facility. Solvents and other chemicals used in these activities would contribute to soil and groundwater contamination. The consultants had been told by area businesses that small scale dumping of industrial chemicals in the vicinity has been common. Soil samples revealed a "great deal of heterogeneity." There was no uniform distribution of soils in the shallow zone. This probably occurs because after the reprocessing operations ended in 1970, the land was cleared and filled, so that many of the warehouses now in the area could be constructed. Most of the upper 8 to 10 feet is fill material. The ground water was monitored by installing 38 wells on the site, most of which were screened at depths of 10 to 12 feet. Five intermediate wells with depths of 50 feet and two deep wells of 100 to 200 feet were also installed. Every sample exhibited a pH of between 6.4 and 7.4. The primary contaminants were lead, organics, and chromium. The evidence does not indicate the source of the chromium. It is unrelated to Petroleum Product Corporation's activities. The groundwater contamination, both metal and organic, was only in the shallow zone. It extends laterally roughly to the same extent of the shallow contamination found in the soil. This suggests that the contaminants in the soil migrated due to seepage from rainfall or fluctuation in the water table into the groundwater. The water table is about five feet below the land surface. The Department has argued that the contaminants in the soil and groundwater were caused by mixing and spreading of the sludge material during the early 1970s over the surface of the area. This hypothesis has already been rejected for the reason stated in Findings 7 and 8, above. It is more likely that the soil contamination resulted from frequent spills and leaks of oil from storage tanks years ago. The soil contaminants are those found in used oil. The area generally is flat. There was no impediment to oil spills flowing over a large surface area, following the contour of the land at that time. Depending on the method used to clean up the site, the cost of rehabilitating the area will range between two and forty-six million dollars. It will cost over one million dollars to recover and treat contaminated groundwater. Approximately 110,000 cubic yards of contaminated soil must be removed and treated, the majority of that coming from the area outside the former sludge pits. The presence of contamination at the site is to be expected, given the site's former use. All of the 8 turnpike facilities and 8 maintenance yards operated by the Florida Department of Transportation report petroleum contamination from tanks, and the Department of Transportation has estimated cleanup cost will range from $20 to $30 million, although DER believes the cost may be $5 million. The cleanup will be funded by the Inland Protection Trust Fund, as would the reimbursement in this case. The cost of rehabilitation is in the range of estimates that the Department has received for other petroleum contamination sites. In summary, the Petitioner's site is contaminated primarily from leak and spills of used and virgin oils processed or unprocessed and from storage tanks, pumps and integral piping. Small spills were continuous and some associated with fires were massive. The only portion of the site not contaminated due to leaks and spills is the residual soil and groundwater contamination from the sludge disposal pits, which is a small part of the overall contamination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Petroleum Products Corporation fo eligibility to participate in the cleanup program funded by the Inland Protection Trust Fund be granted. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of July, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX Rulings on Findings of Fact proposed the Petitioner: As will be obvious, the proposed order submitted by Petroleum Products Corporation comported closely with the Hearing Officer's view of the evidence, and with some modification was essentially adopted as proposed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9 and 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10, to the extent necessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as unnecessary and subordinate. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 31. Adopted in Findings of Fact 31 and 32. Adopted in Finding of Fact 33 Rejected as repetitious of Finding of Fact 6. Rejected, see Findings of Fact 25 and 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. Adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. Adopted in Finding of Fact 40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 41. The spreading theory is rejected in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. See also the stipulation of the parties entered as Exhibit 22. Rejected as unnecessary. Rulings on Findings of Fact proposed by the Department. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted as modified in Finding of Fact 2. Discussed in the Conclusions of Law, see page 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Implicit in Findings of Fact 3 and 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected as unsupported by the transcript references given. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5 Rejected as unnecessary. Generally rejected; see Finding of Fact 6 concerning the filling of the disposal pits. While some pockets of sludge remain at the site of the pits, the volume is difficult to determine. In an absolute sense, those pockets may contain a substantial amount of sludge, but on a comparative basis, by far the greatest part of the sludge was removed. Rejected as unnecessary. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 32(1), but see the final sentence of (1). Generally adopted in Findings of Fact 25, 28, and 34. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 28, since the recycling facility and storage tanks were on the southern part of the property. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Implicit in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected because the process tanks necessarily store the product being processed, serving as a vessel to contain the product. Rejected, see Finding of Fact 3 with respect to the turnover in the volume of used oil processed at the facility. Only about 10 percent of the oil was reprocessed as lubricating oil. This is more significant than the volume of the tanks. See also Tr. 24 with respect to the storage capacity, and Finding of Fact 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected because the surficial drainage has probably been changed by the filling and regrading of the property in preparation for building the warehouses. See Finding of Fact 6. The current surficial flow says little about the flow when the facility operated in the late 1950's and throughout the 1960's. Adopted in Findings of Fact 15 through 19. Adopted in Findings of Fact 17 and 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Generally rejected, the evidence is persuasive that about 50,000 gallons of oil were lost in the 1966 fire. (See Tr. 36-37.) Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Rejected, the free product covers approximately one-half acre. Rejected, the more persuasive evidence is the 103,000 gallons estimated by Mr. McDonnell. See Finding of Fact 31. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. See Findings of Fact 28 and 34. Rejected because it is unlikely that sludges are separating in the former sludge lagoon. See Finding of Fact 30. The source of the oil is more likely the substantial loss of oil which occurred from the fires and from leaks over the years which is now floating above the ground water. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Rejected as unpersuasive. Rejected, the source of the free product is not leaching from the disposal pit, but the oil from over flows and leaks during operation as well as large inundations during fires. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected, see Finding of Fact 30. Rejected because oil does not separate from the sludge. Rejected for the reason given for rejecting Finding of Fact 63. Rejected, the seepage is not the result of separation in the disposal pits, but from the plume of free product in the ground above the ground water. Rejected as unnecessary, but the similarity of the oil seeping from the sludge pit area to waste oil is consistent with its source as leaks and spills inicident to fires. Rejected because the sludge does not separate. Rejected because the sludge does not separate. Rejected because the sludge does not separate, see Finding of Fact 30. Rejected as unnecessary; obviously as there is no more storage, so there is no more source for leaks or spills. 71-73. Discussed in Finding of Fact 30. Rejected because liquid product will not accumulate. Rejected because the sludge does not separate. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32(1). Adopted in Finding of Fact 32(5). Adopted in Finding of Fact 32(1). Rejected for the reason stated in Finding of Fact 32(5). Rejected for the reason stated in Finding of Fact 32(5). Rejected as unnecessary and for the reason stated in Finding of Fact 32(5). Adopted in Finding of Fact 32(1), which is consistent with the source of the free product being used oil rather than separation from sludge remaining onsite. 83-84. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected because the testimony of Mr. McDonnell has been accepted. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Rejected as redundant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Implicit in the finding that lead is a contaminant found in used oil. See Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected as unnecessary. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary; see also, Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32(1). Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary, although there were disposal pits in the north and eastern parts of the property. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34 with respect to location, but the testimony with respect to spreading of the sludge is rejected. See Finding of Fact 7. It is unlikely that sludge was spread over the site. The more likely explanation for the appearance of sludge in the lithologic logs for the southern end of the site is that the disposal lagoons periodically overflowed after heavy rains and provided a mechanism for the active transport of sludge out of the disposal pits into some areas on the southern end of the site. Apparently the northern area now occupied by the warehouses was higher, because no sludge was found in observation wells 4, 5 and 19. Rejected, page 41 of DER's Exhibit 3 shows no sludge at observation well 5, which the proposed finding implies. 107-112. Generally rejected because the testimony with respect to the surface flow from the tank area being to the south is rejected because the grading of the property as the warehouses were built likely changed the contour of the land. Mr. Levin's testimony was not particularly strong; for example, at page 25 of his prefiled direct testimony he states, "And for the shallow soil contamination I would still have to lean towards the fact that the materials were mixed and spread." 113-114. The sludge contamination is not the predominant or source of contamination. Rather, it is the oils which floated across the land and were carried into the soil and resulted from the leaks and spills. 115-120. Generally accepted in Finding of Fact 36, although subordinate to that finding. 121. Generally accepted, although the soil contamination by lead is attributable to leaks and spills from the used oil. 122-124. Rejected as unnecessary. Accepted in Finding of Fact 25. Accepted in Finding of Fact 38. 127-128. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 36, especially the last sentence, and 38. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 39. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 39, especially the last sentence. Rejected as unnecessary. 132-134. Accepted in Finding of Fact 39. 135. Rejected because the soil contamination is the result of leaks and spills of oil. 136-137. Rejected, it is more likely that the neutral pH of the ground water is the result of the essentially neutral contaminant, the used oil. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary, although consistent with Finding of Fact 39 that the lateral extent of ground water contamination mirrors the soil contamination which has resulted from leaks and spills. 140-141. The predominant source of contamination is leaks and spills. 142. Rejected, the area affected by the leaks and spills is large, due especially to the fires and consequent loss of large amounts of oil from tanks. See Finding of Fact 41. 143-144. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 145. Although true, not relevant. 146-148. Rejected, whether the Environmental Protection Agency is correct or not in its assessment is not at issue here. This site was contaminated by used oil. 149-150. Although true, not relevant. Implicitly accepted in that no finding with respect to "bias" has been made. Rejected as legal argument. Rejected because the predominate source of contamination is an eligible source. Rejected, but the source here falls within the statutory directive. Rejected. The site here is predominantly contaminated by used oil, which is eligible. The eligible portion is not a minor part of the entire of the contamination. COPIES FURNISHED: R. L. Caleen, Jr., Esquire OERTEL, HOFFMAN, FERNANDEZ & COLE Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 Gary Early, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should correct a health violation and have a $500.00 fine imposed for violating an agency rule and statute, as alleged in the Citation for Violation issued by Petitioner on December 22, 1999.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This case involves an allegation that Respondent, Steve DeLuca, violated an agency regulation and statute by making repairs to a drainfield on property located at 1444 East New York Avenue, Deland, Florida, without obtaining the necessary permits from the Volusia County Department of Health (Health Department). That department is under the direction and control of Petitioner, Department of Health (Department). Respondent denies the charge and, as clarified for the first time at hearing, contends that the repairs were minor in nature and thus did not require a permit, no authorization was given to the excavation firm which performed the repairs, and the Citation was not issued to the actual owner of the property. On October 29, 1999, William N. VanderLugt (Vanderlugt), a Health Department environmental specialist, received a complaint regarding a septic tank repair being undertaken at 1430 East New York Avenue, Deland, Florida. During the course of inspecting that property, Vanderlugt observed excavation activities on the drainfield located next door at 1444 East New York Avenue. More specifically, Vanderlugt observed an area in the back yard approximately 6 feet by 20 feet in size which had been recently excavated and a large pile of sand nearby. In the excavated site, he saw a rock bed of the size commonly used in drainfields, "clean" and "newly installed" rocks, and a "black paper" covering a part of the rocks. Therefore, he concluded that the excavating firm had just installed a new rock drainfield. This type of activity constitutes a repair to an existing drainfield and requires that such work be performed by a licensed septic tank contractor. It also requires that appropriate permits be obtained from the Health Department. Although Respondent contended that the work was merely to correct a "minor structural flaw" which would not require a permit, Vanderlugt's testimony is more persuasive on this issue, and it is found that a more substantial repair to the drainfield was made. Further inquiry by Vanderlugt revealed that no permits had been obtained for the repair of a drainfield from the Health Department by the excavating company, Collier Enterprises. After a brief conversation with a Collier Enterprises employee, the substance of which is hearsay in nature and cannot be used, Vanderlugt visited the offices of Delco Oil Company and spoke with Respondent, who is employed by that firm. In doing so, Vanderlugt was under the impression that Respondent owned the property in question. During his brief conversation with Repondent, Vanderlugt pointed out that he had to issue a citation because no permit had been obtained for the work at the property in question. DeLuca responded with words to the effect that "they [Collier Enterprises] broke a pipe and they fixed what they broke." Apparently, there was no discussion as to whether Respondent or someone else actually owned the property. Vanderlugt returned to the property in question and performed a second inspection on November 3, 1999. Because no permits had been obtained by that date, and the drainfield site had been covered, a recommendation for a citation was prepared by Vanderlugt. A Citation for Violation was later issued by the Department on December 22, 1999, alleging that Respondent had failed to obtain permits before making a drainfield repair. The Citation was delivered to Respondent at Delco Oil Company. Because Collier Enterprises was not licensed to perform the work, it was given a first violation "warning" letter by the Health Department, as required by a Department rule. During later meetings with Respondent and others, Vanderlugt learned that the actual owner of the property in question was Deluca Properties, Inc., and not Steve DeLuca. For some reason, however, the Department declined to amend its citation and charge the actual owner with the alleged violation. Although Petitioner asserted at hearing and in its Proposed Recommended Order that Respondent is the owner's registered agent, there is no competent evidence of record to support this assertion. According to the general manager of Delco Oil Company, which is apparently owned by Steve Deluca and others, no permission was given to the excavating company to make any repairs. Indeed, Deluca Properties, Inc. has a licensed septic tank contractor who makes all septic tank repairs, when needed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Bin A02 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Charlene J. Petersen, Esquire Department of Health 420 Fentress Boulevard Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Christopher R. Ditslear, Esquire Post Office Box 41 Deland, Florida 32721-0041 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health Bin A02 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
Findings Of Fact Based upon the prehearing statement, the testimony of the witnesses, and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Petitioner is a Florida corporation in good standing, authorized to do business in this state. The Petitioner owns and controls the site which is the subject matter of these proceedings. Such site is located in Brevard County, Florida. The Department has identified the subject site as DER facility no. 05- 8500985 (the facility). At all times material to this case, the facility consisted of: three underground storage tanks (UST), one 3000 gallon UST used for storing diesel fuel, one 1000 gallon UST used for storing diesel fuel, and one 1000 gallon UST used for storing gasoline; five monitoring wells; and pipes and pumps related to the foregoing system. The facility constituted a storage tank system as defined in Section 376.301, Florida Statutes, and Rule 17-761.200(38), Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioner holds, and is named insured for, third party pollution liability insurance applicable to the facility. Such insurance was issued pursuant to Section 376.3072, Florida Statutes. The policy for the foregoing insurance, policy no. FPL7622040, was in force from March 22, 1991 through March 22, 1992. The Department issued a notice of eligibility for restoration insurance to Petitioner for the above-described facility. Based upon the foregoing, the Petitioner is a participating owner or operator as defined in Chapter 17-769, Florida Administrative Code. Pursuant to Section 376.3073, Florida Statutes, Brevard County operates a local program that has been approved by the Department. Such local program is managed by the Brevard County Office of Natural Resources Management (County). In July, 1990, a discharge of diesel fuel occurred at the Petitioner's facility. Petitioner's employees estimated that approximately twenty gallons of diesel fuel filled the pump box overflowed from the pump box across the seawall into the adjacent waters. Upon discovering the discharge, Petitioner shut down diesel fuel dispensing until repairs could be made to the apparent cause of the leak. Additionally, the diesel fuel remaining in the pump box and on top of the tank area was removed. Contaminated soil in the pump box was also removed. The apparent cause of the discharge described above was attributed to cracked pipe fittings which were repaired by Glover Oil Co. within a few days of the discharge. No detailed inspection was made to the system to determine if additional sources of discharge existed. Petitioner did not complete a discharge reporting form (DRF) for the above-described incident until April 18, 1991. The April DRF was completed after Petitioner was directed to do so by Ms. DiStasio, an inspector employed by the County. From August, 1990 until May, 1991, at least one monitoring well at the Petitioner's facility showed free product accumulating in the well pipe. The exact amounts of the free product found are unknown, but reports estimated the level at 100 centimeters. From August, 1990 until September, 1991, the Petitioner did not undertake any measure to explore the origin of the free product found in the monitoring well. Further, the Petitioner did not report the monitoring well testing results as a suspected or confirmed discharge. In April, 1991, an inspection of the Petitioner's facility was performed by Ms. DiStasio. That inspection resulted in a letter to the Petitioner that outlined several violations at the facility. Among those violations listed was the Petitioner's failure to report a suspected or confirmed discharge. At the time of the April, 1991 inspection, Petitioner had reported neither the July, 1990 discharge (a known discharge) nor the monitoring well test results (at the minimum a suspected discharge). In connection with the July, 1990 discharge, following the repairs made by Glover Oil, Petitioner did not have the system pressure tested. Only the area visible from the pump box was checked for leakage. In July, 1991, when Ms. DiStasio performed a re-inspection of the facility, she found Petitioner had not (in the interim period, April through July, 1991) taken any steps to test the system or to remove the fuels from the suspect tanks. Since the free product continued to appear in the monitoring well, a pressure test of the system would have definitively answered the discharge question. Alternatively, the removal of the fuels would have prevented further seepage until the system could be pressure tested. On August 6, 1991, the Petitioner issued a letter that advised the County that it had stopped dispensing fuel at the facility. The tanks were not drained, however, until on or about September 11, 1991. Further, the August, 1991, letter acknowledged that the Petitioner "had proposals for initial remedial cleanup related to diesel contamination in the tank field area." Obviously, the Petitioner must have contemplated a need for such cleanup. On September 11, 1991, at the Petitioner's request, Petroleum Equipment Contractors, Inc. attempted to pressure test the 3000 gallon diesel tank. The purpose of the pressure test was to determine if the diesel system had a leak. The company could not even run the test on the tank because of the defective system. A similar test on the Petitioner's gasoline tank passed without incident. Once the Petitioner learned the results of the test, it initiated Initial Remedial Action (IRA) as described on the IRA report filed by Universal Engineering Sciences. The IRA consisted of the removal of the excessively contaminated soil, approximately 74 cubic yards, and the removal of the USTs. The foregoing work was completed on or about September 15, 1991. On October 4, 1991, the Petitioner filed a discharge reporting form dated October 2, 1991, that identified September 11, 1991, as the date of discovery for the discharge. This discharge discovery was allegedly made incidental to the diesel tank pressure testing failure. No reference was made to the months of monitoring well reports showing a free product. On October 8, 1991, Ms. DiStasio prepared a Florida Petroleum Liability Insurance and Restoration Program Compliance Checklist that reported the Petitioner was not in compliance with applicable statutes and rules. When Petitioner applied for restoration coverage under the statute on January 31, 1992, such request was denied by the Department on March 6, 1992. The basis for the denial was as follows: Failure to notify the Department of a positive response to sampling within three working days of testing, pursuant to the rule in effect at the time of the initial response (17-61.050(1), Florida Administrative Code). An inspection by Brevard County on April 17, 1991, revealed that free product had been detected in one monitoring well since July 1990. The discharge reporting form was not submitted until October 2, 1991.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a final order denying Petitioner's claim for restoration coverage under the Florida Petroleum Liability Insurance and Restoration Program. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of December, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1992. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 92-2121 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER: Paragraphs 1, 2, 8, 12, 15, 16, 17, and 18 are accepted. Except as found above, paragraph 3 is rejected as not supported by the record cited. It is accepted that Brevard County acted as the local agent in this case. Paragraph 4 is rejected as not supported by the record. With regard to paragraph 5, substituting "A" for "The" and "confirmed" for "discovered" the paragraph can be accepted; otherwise rejected as contrary to the record. Similarly, with the substitution of the word "confirmation" for "discovery" in Paragraph 6, the paragraph can be accepted; otherwise rejected as contrary to the record. No suitable explanation was offered by the Petitioner for why, if a discharge were not reasonably suspected, it retained the company to immediately remove the USTs upon the failed pressure testing. Clearly, the Club had a notion the tanks were a discharge problem. Paragraph 7 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. While there was some confusion as to the exact volume of free product in the monitoring well, there was clear evidence that such was reported for many months prior to the confirmation in September, 1991. Further, the main confusion regarding the product found in the well was not as to its existence, but as to the individual's knowledge of the metric measurement of it. One hundred centimeters of product in a two or three inch pipe would not be a minute amount. Except as addressed in the foregoing findings, paragraph 9 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Petitioner did not undertake all repairs necessary to abate a discharge problem. Paragraph 10 is rejected as not supported by the weight of credible evidence or irrelevant. Clearly, as early as August, 1990, Petitioner knew or should have known of a discharge problem based upon the monitoring well report; that all of the discharge did not necessarily flow from the fittings that had been repaired is irrelevant. Further, Petitioner did no testing to verify that the replaced fittings had solved the discharge problem (especially in light of the well reports). Paragraph 11 is rejected as an inaccurate restatement of the exhibit. Paragraph 13 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Incidentally, the hearing in this case was in the year 1992. Paragraph 14 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: Paragraphs 1 through 11 are accepted. Paragraph 12 is rejected as a misstatement of the exhibit cited. Paragraphs 13 through 27 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Brigette A. Ffolkes Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Scott E. Wilt MAGUIRE, VOORHIS & WELLS, P.A. 2 South Orange Plaza P.O. Box 633 Orlando, Florida 32802 Carol Browner, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Health properly denied Petitioner’s application for a master septic tank contractors (MSTC) registration.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Health is the agency responsible for the registration of septic tank contractors, the authorization of septic tank companies, and the enforcement of the statutes of rules pertaining to the registration and authorization of septic tank contractors and companies pursuant to Chapters 381 and 489, Part 3, Florida Statutes and Chapter 10D-6, Florida Administrative Code. The registration as a master septic tank contractor was recently enacted by the Legislature. Master septic tank contractor is held to a higher standard of scrutiny by the Department because a MSTC can perform certain functions in the field without Department of Health supervision. Further, a MSTC can advertise his special certification to the public. Gregory Thompson, Petitioner, applied to the Department of Health to be registered as a MSTC. At the time of his application, Petitioner was registered with the Florida Department of State as the president of Rayco Properties, Inc. At the time the cases against the corporation referenced above were brought, the Petitioner was the president of Rayco; however, the requested contractor who was the company’s qualifier was Donald P. Roberts, who was the sole qualifier for the company. See paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Recommended Order in Case Numbers 95-5973 and 96-0573 Final Order issued 2/28/97. At the time of the Petitioner’s application for MSTC, Rayco had been found guilty of several septic tank contracting violations and an enforcement action was taken by the Department against Rayco and Donald R. Roberts. See DOAH Case Numbers 95-5973 and 96-0573. Pursuant to the Final Order, penalties were assessed against Rayco including a fine of four thousand four hundred fifty dollars ($4,450.00) and suspension of the corporation's Certificate of Authorization for one hundred-twenty (120) days. At the time of the application by the Petitioner, neither of these penalties had been resolved. The previous action was against Rayco and its qualifier, Donald R. Robert. As the Administrative Law Judge concluded in paragraph 82 of her order, “Revocation of the company’s authorization would effect the livelihood of numerous company principals and employees not directly involved in any of the proven violations.” The Department denied the Petitioner’s application for MSTC for three (3) reasons. The Petitioner’s corporation had been adjudicated guilty of minor or moderate infractions pertaining to on site sewage treatment and disposal systems (See paragraph 82 of the Recommended Order in Case Numbers 95-5973 and 96-0573), a copy of which is attached as Appendix 1. There was an outstanding fined assessed against Rayco Properties and the one hundred-twenty (120) day suspension of Rayco had not been resolved as required by the Florida Administrative Code. At the time of the formal hearing, the fine had been paid and the corporation had served and completed the one hundred-twenty (120) days' suspension.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department grant the request for certification by the Petitioner for master septic tank contractor. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory B. Thompson Post Office Box 251307 Holly Hill, Florida 32135 Charlene Petersen, Esquire Volusia County Health Department 420 Fentress Boulevard Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Building 6 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Dr. James Howell, Secretary Department of Health Building 6, Room 306 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700