Findings Of Fact On December 20, 1991, the Petitioner, Douglas Adams, filed a Petition to Determine the Invalidity of an Existing Rule. In the Petition, the Petitioner challenged Rules 33-22.005(5) and 33- 22.007(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the Challenged Rules. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. Rule 33-22.005(4), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: Section III. Report of Investigation. Upon receipt of the Disciplinary Report, the Senior Correctional Officer shall review the report and, when the facts suggest that the alleged violations is significant, he shall cause the report to be forwarded to the Correctional Officer Chief. Upon approval of the Correctional Officer Chief, or in his absence the Senior Correctional Officer, an impartial investigation of the charge against the inmate shall be conducted. This investigation shall be completed without unreasonable delay. Any delay at any state must be justified in the report. The Correctional Probation Supervisor shall review the report and cause an impartial investigation to be conducted for inmates participating in the Supervised Community Release Program. The investigating officer is responsible for obtaining the inmate's version of the offense as well as contacting the charging officer and any other staff members or inmates who have information pertaining to the allegation and the charge. The inmate charged shall be offered staff assistance and asked if he has any material witnesses to offer in his behalf. If the inmate has no witnesses, it must be noted in the report. If names of witnesses are given, the investigating officer shall then interview both inmate and staff witnesses and, if appropriate, have the Witness Statement Form DC4-856 completed. If inmate witnesses or staff witnesses are not contacted, a statement as to why they were not contacted must be included. Opinions as to innocence or guilt shall not be made by the investigating officer. The investigator shall sign and date the report. Rule 33-22.007(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: (2) The Hearing Officer or Disciplinary Team can request further investigation or evidence, the appearance of additional witnesses or the statements of unavailable witnesses. . . . . Witnesses shall not be called or certain information disclosed if doing so would create a risk of reprisal, undermine authority or otherwise present a threat to the security or order of the institution. The inmate witnesses must be willing to testify but may offer an oral or written statement to the investigating officer in lieu of personal appearance. Notations shall be made in the report with reasons for declining to call requested witnesses or for restricting any information. The Petitioner has alleged that the Challenged Rules are invalid because the rules are "contrary to due process contained in enabling legislation. Section 20.315, Florida Statutes (1989)" and are vague, arbitrary and capricious. The Petition does not include any alleged facts supporting the Petitioner's assertion that the Challenged Rules are "arbitrary and capricious."
The Issue Whether the Petitioner' termination from employment was in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On March 9, 1999, the Petitioner was an employee of the State of Florida, Department of Corrections (Department) working as a correctional officer at the Santa Rosa County Correctional Institution in Milton, Florida. The Petitioner was employed as a Correctional Officer, on probationary status. On February 25, 1999, the Petitioner was arrested for a purported traffic violation by a law enforcement officer in Escambia county. An officer of the Escambia County Sheriff's Department, at approximately 1:08 a.m., on that day, observed the Petitioner's blue Toyota Tercel run a stop sign. The officer pulled in behind the vehicle and the vehicle made a quick turn off the road behind a closed business establishment and turned off its lights. The officer stopped near the vehicle and approached the driver's side and asked the driver for identification. The driver was later identified as the Petitioner, Perry Foster. Mr. Foster told the officer that his one-year-old son had torn up his driver's license. While the officer was talking with the Petitioner the officer detected a strong odor of marijuana emanating from inside the vehicle. Believing a narcotic violation was taking place the officer summoned another officer with a drug-detecting dog. The dog detected marijuana in the vehicle. Both the Petitioner and his passenger, Eric Adams, were placed outside the vehicle while the investigation was continuing. Officer Price, who brought the dog to the scene, detected the odor of marijuana on the person of Eric Adams. Ultimately, Eric Adams allowed a search and Officer Price retrieved a small package of marijuana from Mr. Adams shirt pocket. Mr. Adams was arrested for "possession of marijuana under 20 grams." The officer found no marijuana or drugs inside the vehicle although the dog strongly alerted on the driver's seat where the Petitioner had been sitting. There was the odor of marijuana along with signs of blunt cigar usage. Blunt cigars are typically used, hollowed out and packed with marijuana to smoke marijuana, without revealing its presence and use. In any event, the Petitioner was not arrested for possession or use of marijuana, none was found on his person, and he was given a traffic citation and released. The friend or family member who was his passenger was arrested for possession of marijuana. The evidence is unrefuted that the Petitioner was driving the vehicle with a passenger, knowing that that passenger possessed and was using marijuana in his presence. The Petitioner's employer, specifically Warden Ardro Johnson, was made aware of the Escambia County Sheriff's Office offense report that detailed the above facts and circumstances concerning the Petitioner's arrest and the arrest of his companion on the night in question. While the Petitioner remonstrated that he only was charged with running a stop sign and had not been using drugs and that he later passed a drug- related urinalysis, that position misses the point that his termination was not because of drug use. Rather, the Petitioner was dismissed by Warden Johnson from his position as a probationary employee pursuant to Rule 60K-4.003(4), Florida Administrative Code, because his employer believes that he committed conduct unbecoming a correctional officer. The true reason the Petitioner was terminated was because, as delineated by Warden Johnson in his letter to the Petitioner of March 23, 1999 (in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 1), the Petitioner made a personal choice to overlook, ignore, or fail to report a criminal violation occurring in his immediate presence. Warden Johnson thus explained that this leaves a clear question as to whether the Petitioner had, or would in the future, perform his correctional officer duties in the same manner by ignoring, overlooking or failing to report infractions. Because of this and because he was a probationary employee and thus had not yet established his full job qualifications, the Petitioner was terminated. There is no evidence that he was terminated based upon any considerations of his race. There is also no evidence that he was replaced in his position. Moreover, there is no evidence that if he was replaced he was replaced by a new employee who is not a member of the Petitioner's protected class. The evidence that the Petitioner was in the car at approximately 1:00 a.m., on the morning in question with a passenger who was possessed of and using marijuana is unrefuted and is accepted as credible.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the subject Petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark J. Henderson Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Perry A. Foster 1882 Gary Circle Pensacola, Florida 32505 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Did Respondent violate the provisions of Section 817.567, Florida Statutes (2004), or any lesser included offenses, Section 943.1395(6) and/or (7), Florida Statutes (2004), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(b) and/or (c), by failing to maintain the qualifications established in Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2004), requiring maintenance of good moral character?
Findings Of Fact Undisputed Facts: Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on September 5, 1995, and was issued Correctional Certificate Number 157626. Additional Facts: Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A11 is a copy of an interoffice memorandum from Respondent to the "Personnel Dept." This reference to the personnel department is taken to refer to the Florida Department of Corrections, in view of other proof in this record. The interoffice memorandum goes on to describe as the subject "transcript and diploma." The interoffice memorandum says "I have enclosed a copy of my diploma and transcript. Please place these in my personnel file and update my records and incentive. Thank you, W.S.D." The exhibit reflects in a handwritten note of unknown origins, "This diploma & transcript are ineligible for CJIP because this is not an accredited college." Nothing else in this record describes the nature of the transcript and diploma referred to in the interoffice memorandum concerning the particulars of the transcript and diploma that was mentioned on January 31, 1999, nor can it be reasonably inferred. As evidenced by Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A15, Respondent prepared and signed an employment application with the Florida Department of Corrections for the position of Correctional Probation Officer on June 14, 2004. In the course of this application Respondent listed under the section related to college university or professional school "Southern Mississippi" at "Hattiesburg, Mississippi", which he allegedly attended from August 1996 through August 2003, participating in a course of study referred to as "Criminal Justice" at which, according to the application, he earned an M.S. degree. In fact Respondent had never attended the University of Southern Mississippi as explained in correspondence dated July 6, 2004, from Greg Pierce, University Registrar at the University of Southern Mississippi directed to Terry Foskey, a payroll specialist with the Department of Corrections, Region I Service Center, who had inquired of the University of Southern Mississippi concerning Respondent's status as a student. This correspondence is Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A9. Moreover, a transcript, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A3, which Mr. Foskey had supplied a verification specialist in the registrar's office at the University of Southern Mississippi, Trudy Stewart or Steward, was found not to resemble a transcript from that university, as explained by Mr. Pierce in his correspondence. The transcript, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A3, had been received by Mr. Foskey on June 28, 2004. Mr. Foskey was uncertain of the information contained in the transcript. This led to his inquiry to the University of Southern Mississippi, with the determination being made that the transcript did not come from that university. While Mr. Foskey was attempting to clarify the status of the transcript with the University of Southern Mississippi, he was contacted by Respondent who asked if Mr. Foskey had received the transcript. Mr. Foskey replied that he had and asked what Respondent wanted done with that transcript. Respondent answered that he had pulled up information on a program known as ATMS, which the Florida Department of Law Enforcement uses to track certified officers, Respondent among them. As a result Respondent said that he needed this document, meaning the transcript, entered into the ATMS because he was transferring from his present position into another position he referred to as security. There was a series of e-mails as reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A8 from Respondent to Mr. Foskey. The first was on July 1, 2004. It says "Per telephone call, please place information in ATMS 2 and in my personnel file Thanks." Then the name and position of Respondent as Classification Officer at Santa Rosa CI-119 is provided. On that same date another e-mail was dispatched from Mr. Foskey back to Respondent which said "Thank you for the follow-up." As reflected in the exhibit, on July 7, 2004, Respondent sent an e- mail to Mr. Foskey, with the subject line being "Re: Transcript," which said in its text, "Mr. Foskey, how long does it take for the information to be entered into ATMS 2?" The change in employment position by Respondent that was being described for Mr. Foskey related to the application, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A15. Pertinent to this inquiry, the Correctional Probation Officer job being sought by Respondent required a bachelor's degree level of education as a prerequisite to filling the position. The reference made by Respondent to the M.S. degree from University of Southern Mississippi is perceived as Respondent's attempt to show that he had the necessary level of education to apply for the job. In relation to his pursuit of the Correctional Probation Officer position, on June 8, 2004, Respondent had filed a request for demotion with the Regional I Service Center Department of Corrections for personal reasons, requesting permission to move from his position of Senior Classification Officer to that of Correctional Probation Officer. This is reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A15A. As a result of the incident concerning the purported transcript from the University of Southern Mississippi, the Department of Corrections, Office of the Inspector General investigated. That investigation was conducted by David Ellis. In a discussion between Mr. Ellis and Respondent concerning the subject transcript, Respondent acknowledged that he had the documentation sent to personnel, taken to mean the personnel office with the Department of Corrections. Respondent told Mr. Ellis that he had requested that the transcript be sent to personnel and had supplied information to a company to have it sent. Respondent did not remember the name of the company, as he explained to Mr. Ellis. Respondent told Mr. Ellis that he had read a personnel memorandum on the Department of Corrections website about a university in southern Florida that would accept life experience for college credits and that he, meaning Respondent, searched the web and found that the University of Southern Mississippi did likewise. The memorandum about the university in southern Florida, refers to Florida Southern College, and is found to be that as reflected in Respondent's Exhibit numbered A5. Respondent then sent an e-mail to the internet company requesting information about college degrees. The company sent him a package explaining the process and he sent something back about his life experiences, with a check of $800.00 and a list of other college credits earned elsewhere. Respondent told Mr. Ellis that he then received the subject transcript at his home from the University of Southern Mississippi on a later date. This is found to be as arranged through the internet company. The transcript that he received at home, Respondent compared to the one that had been received by Mr. Foskey and Respondent told Mr. Ellis they were the same with the exception that his transcript copy had a seal in the middle. Respondent acknowledged to Mr. Ellis that he had not taken any of the courses on the transcript that has been described and had not earned any grades for any of those courses reflected on the transcript. When Mr. Ellis asked Respondent why he would send something to personnel that he had never officially done, Respondent replied because he thought it was all right. Mr. Ellis asked Respondent to give him information about the internet company that Respondent had referred to and any information regarding payment to that company by Respondent. Respondent called Mr. Ellis back and told him that the name of the company was CustomDegrees.com. It is found that Respondent's Exhibit numbered 4 is information from CustomDegrees.com that Respondent relied on. Nothing about this information from CustomDegrees.com provided to Respondent, and for which Respondent paid a service fee, could reasonably be interpreted to serve as the functional equivalent of having earned the degree from the University of Southern Mississippi for which Respondent intended to take credit. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered A3A constitutes a handwritten educational history which Respondent provided to CustomDegrees.com for them to provide the degree which was falsely portrayed as having been issued by the University of Southern Mississippi.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered finding violations of the Statutes and Rules referred to and suspending Respondent's Correctional Certificate Number 157626 for 60 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of April, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 R. John Westberry, Esquire Holt & Westberry, P.A. 1308-B Dunmire Street Pensacola, Florida 32504 Michael Crews, Program Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent, a certified correctional officer, failed to maintain good moral character by pleading guilty to the felony charge of child neglect pursuant to Subsection 827.03(3), Florida Statutes (2002), as set forth in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Veronica A. Smith, is a certified correctional officer in the State of Florida. She was issued Correctional Officer Certificate No. 135464 on December 11, 1992. Respondent was employed by the Lee County Sheriff's Office as a correctional officer during the period September 21, 1992, through June 24, 2002. On or about June 12, 2002, Respondent was charged by Information with two counts of felony child neglect in violation of Subsection 827.03(3), Florida Statutes (2002), by the state attorney for the Twentieth Circuit Court, Lee County, Florida. On or about May 27, 2003, Respondent, while represented by counsel and in open court, withdrew her previous plea of "not guilty" to the Information and entered a plea of guilty to one count of felony child neglect before the circuit court for Lee County, Florida, State of Florida v. Veronica Smith, Case No. 02-1878CF. Said plea was accepted and the court entered an Order Withholding Adjudication dated May 27, 2003, which withheld adjudication of guilt but placed Respondent on probation for a period of two years under the supervision of the Department of Corrections. Following notification of her arrest, the Lee County Sheriff's Office opened an internal affairs investigation relating to the underling charges which resulted in her termination on June 24, 2002, from her position as Bailiff Corporal with the Lee County Sheriff's Department. By pleading guilty to felony child neglect, Respondent has failed to uphold her qualifications to be a correctional officer by failing to maintain her good moral character. Although Respondent's employment record does not show any prior disciplinary violations, she has failed to produce any evidence in explanation or mitigation of the conduct which resulted in her arrest and plea before the circuit court or in her termination of her employment with the Lee County Sheriff's Office.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order as follows: Respondent be found guilty of failure to maintain good moral character as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2002). Respondent's certification as a correctional officer be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Veronica A. Smith Post Office Box 6812 Fort Myers, Florida 33911 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Theodore Lazier, Jr., committed the violations alleged in an Administrative Complaint issued by Petitioner, the Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, and dated June 18, 2004, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact The Commission is charged with the responsibility for, among other things, certifying individuals for employment or appointment as a law enforcement officer and investigating complaints against individuals holding certificates as law enforcement officers in the State of Florida, pursuant to Section 943.3195, Florida Statutes. At the times pertinent to this matter, Respondent, Theodore Lazier, Jr., was certified by the Commission as a law enforcement officer, having been issued Law Enforcement Certificate Number 138687 on August 20, 1993. Since being certified, Mr. Lazier as been employed as a correctional officer at the Dade Correctional Institution (hereinafter referred to as the "Correctional Institution"), a state facility. On and between November 14, 1999 and September 24, 2003, Mr. Lazier, while working as a recreational supervisor, brought items declared to be contraband into the Correctional Institution. Those items included movies, candy, razor blades, and one pair of athletic shoes with cleats. When the items of contraband were discovered by Correctional Institution officials, Mr. Lazier admitted bringing the items to the facility, a fact which he also admitted at the final hearing. He also explained why he had introduced the items into the facility and, while his explanation does not exonerate him from the charges in this case and apparently constituted grounds to terminate his employment at the facility, his explanation at least dispelled any thought that he had introduced the items for any purpose other than assisting him in the discharge of his duties. As for the movies, Mr. Lazier testified convincingly and without any evidence to the contrary being offered by the Commission that he had been given specific permission to show movies to inmates as long as those movies did not contain sex or violence. That permission was given by the individual who served as warden prior to the current warden's employment. The candy consisted of small pieces of primarily hard candy which Mr. Lazier used to reward inmates that assisted him as "aides" and other inmates who gave him "thoughts for the day." The razor blades, which are the most troublesome items of contraband he brought into the facility, were used by inmates, under Mr. Lazier's supervision to work on sports equipment, like the weight-lifting benches. The razor blades were collected, accounted for, and stored under lock and key after their use. Finally, the one pair of shoes introduced into the facility by Mr. Lazier was used by inmates participating in football. The bringing of the items of contraband into the Correctional Institution, other than the movies, constituted an act which would constitute a felony offense as specified in Section 944.47(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Commission finding that Theodore Lazier, Jr., violated Section 943.1395(7); dismissing the allegation that he violated Section 943.1395(6); and suspending his certification for a period of one year. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Theodore Lazier, Jr. 225856 South West 132d Court Naranja, Florida 33032 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Crews, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent, a police officer, violated section 951.22(1), Florida Statutes, by conspiring to introduce, take, or attempt to take contraband into the Hamilton County Jail for an inmate of the jail, so as to result in a finding that Respondent has not maintained good moral character; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the entity within the Florida Department of Law Enforcement responsible for the execution, administration, implementation, and evaluation of the powers, duties, and functions established under sections 943.085 through 943.255, Florida Statutes, and is charged with certifying and revoking the certification of law enforcement officers in Florida. § 943.12, Fla. Stat. Pursuant to section 943.1395, Petitioner is authorized to investigate incidents in which certified law enforcement officers are alleged to have failed to maintain compliance with the minimum qualifications for certification, and to take disciplinary action against law enforcement officers found to have failed to maintain those qualifications. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was certified by Petitioner as a law enforcement officer, and holds Law Enforcement Certification Number 313297. She was initially certified on January 8, 2014. On March 11, 2019, Respondent served responses to Petitioner’s First Set of Requests for Admission. Respondent acknowledged at the hearing that her responses were accurate. As discussed at the final hearing, and as reflected in the preliminary statement, Requests for Admissions 1 through 17 were accepted. Respondent has not previously been the subject of any disciplinary action. On February 28, 2017, Respondent was employed as an officer with the City of Jasper Police Department. On that date, Respondent was in a romantic relationship with Derrick Harris. On the morning of February 28, 2017, Mr. Harris turned himself in on an active warrant for what was apparently a misdemeanor offense in Duval County, and held in the Hamilton County Jail in Jasper, Florida. On February 28, 2017, from roughly 10:00 a.m. to roughly 4:35 p.m., Respondent and Mr. Harris spoke by telephone on nine separate occasions, for a total of roughly one hour and 50 minutes.2/ In addition, Respondent visited Mr. Harris in the jail visitation area, separated by glass and using a telephone handset, from 10:23 a.m. until 10:53 a.m. Thus, during the day, Respondent and Mr. Harris spoke for about two hours and 20 minutes. Much of the discussion between Respondent and Mr. Harris centered on how he would be able to come up with a $3,500 cash bond to get him released, and getting money put on the phone so he could make calls from the jail. During telephone call 713077714, which started at 2:17:32 p.m. on February 28, 2017, Respondent was upset that Mr. Harris’s mug shot had appeared on an unofficial website. She was also upset that a rumor was going around that she was responsible for Mr. Harris’s arrest. The tone of her voice ranged from angry to upset to tearful. During the call, Mr. Harris complained of being hungry. It was not the first time he made that complaint. He also stated, “I wish I had a cell phone -- if I had a cell phone I’d talk to you all night.” After a brief discussion, initiated by Mr. Harris, of how Respondent could slip a sack of Arby’s and a phone in her police vest, the idea was quickly shot down, with Mr. Harris stating that “I don’t want you to do nothing to jeopardize your job.” The entirety of the discussion lasted scarcely more than 90 seconds, and quickly reverted to a continuation of the discussion of how to raise bond money. Neither Arby’s nor a cell phone was brought up again. Respondent testified convincingly that “I didn’t -- I really didn’t plan on actually taking [anything in] -- I was just explaining over the phone because I was upset.” Her testimony is accepted. Idle chatter does not manifest intent to commit a crime, nor does it evince an agreement to do so. The evidence in this case establishes clearly, and it is found that Respondent had no actual intent to bring Arby’s or a cell phone, to Mr. Harris at the jail, that Respondent and Mr. Harris made no agreement to do so, and that she did not attempt to do so. Captain Bennett established that the Hamilton County Jail has: standing policy as per the Sheriff. When we come -- when an inmate comes into the jail facility, and they are indigent and don't have any money on them at the time, or they come in before commissary has arrived, he allows for a one-time initial issue, if there is someone that can bring underwear, socks, T-shirts, boxers, soap, deodorant, and basically hygiene items as for someone to, you know, be able to survive in the jail setting for -- you know, until they can get money there. Because everything else after that is usually purchased off of commissary, sir. Mr. Harris was new to the jail. He stated on several occasions during his conversations with Respondent that he did not have any “canteen.” Thus, despite the fact that “clothing” is listed as an item of contraband in section 951.22(1), and that Petitioner pled Respondent’s conspiracy to introduce clothing as an element of the second Amended Administrative Complaint, the evidence firmly establishes that Respondent’s delivery of underwear, t-shirts, socks, and hygiene items to the jail for the benefit of Mr. Harris was done through regular channels as duly authorized by the Sheriff or officer in charge. During the course of telephone call 71307815, which started at 3:15:45 p.m. on February 28, 2017, Mr. Harris can be clearly heard, on more than one occasion, asking jail staff what could be brought to him. The replies of jail staff were indistinct. However, Mr. Harris told Respondent that he could have socks, a t-shirt, deodorant, and the like. It was reasonable, based on Mr. Harris’s recitation, for Respondent to (correctly) understand that clothing, including socks and a t- shirt, were authorized by the correctional officer in charge. Mr. Harris stated that the correctional officer “didn’t say nothing about food.” He suggested that Respondent bring a couple of packs of ramen noodles and “see if they’ll let you give them to me.” Later during that call, Mr. Harris stated that Respondent would have “to ask them could I get the noodles.” It is clear that Mr. Harris wanted some ramen noodles, and that Respondent was willing to bring them. It is equally clear from the evidence as a whole that neither Respondent nor Mr. Harris intended to introduce the ramen noodles, or any other item, into the jail without permission from the correctional officer in charge. In order to avoid bringing anything improper into the jail, Respondent decided, “I’m going to message Captain Bennett over the Facebook because I was friend with him on Facebook. And I asked him what was allowed to be brought in.” At 4:07 p.m. on the afternoon of February 28, 2017, Respondent sent a direct message to Captain Bennett asking (verbatim): Would i be able to bring him some soap and deodorant and something to eat in there If they gonna pick him up for transport will i be able to see him before he go? Captain Bennett responded that “You can take him some soap and deodorant. I’m sure they will if the bond isn’t posted. Will have to see what’s going on about a visit.” The first and third sentences of the response are fairly straightforward, and directed towards Respondent’s first request (soap and deodorant), and her last request (a visit). The second sentence is ambivalent if not confusing, and could reasonably be understood to her second request, and to mean that jail staff would allow Respondent to bring Mr. Harris some food “if the bond isn’t posted.” In the context of the questions asked by Respondent, that is the most logical meaning, since soap and deodorant and a possible visit were already specifically addressed. Respondent gathered some items, including boxers, t-shirts, socks, body wash, deodorant, and the like, and placed them in a plastic bag with several packages of ramen noodles. There was no evidence that Respondent attempted to conceal the noodles. Respondent took the plastic bag to the jail. She drove her personal vehicle and was not in uniform. She tapped on the glass behind, which the correctional officer on-duty sat, and asked the correctional officer if the items could be taken to Mr. Harris. Respondent did not ask to take the bag to Mr. Harris herself. A correctional officer came from within the secured area, “and took out of the bag what was allowed in there.” There was no testimony as to which of the items, including the ramen noodles, made their way to Mr. Harris, and which, if any, were returned to Respondent. Nonetheless, Respondent was not trying to, and did not attempt to introduce contraband into the jail outside of regular channels and without the actual knowledge and authorization of the correctional officer in charge.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the second Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2019.
The Issue Whether the Respondent used excessive force to subdue a prisoner, and whether the Respondent made false official statements about the incident.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Tony V. Walker, was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on July 7, 1989, and issued Corrections Certificate No. 05-89-502-01; and on October 9, 1990, was issued Law Enforcement Certificate No. 05-90-222-01. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 1.) At the time of the incident described in the Amended Administrative Complaint, the Respondent was working as a certified correctional officer at the Liberty Correctional Institution in Bristol, Florida. On or about November 12, 1990, the Respondent was working in the E and F dormitories of the Liberty Correctional Institution supervising inmates with Correctional Officer Wanda Terry/Rogers and Sgt. Smith. While Officer Terry/Rogers was on the phone with the medical department of the institution, the dining hall attempted to notify dormitories E and F to release their inmates for the noontime meal. When the dining hall was unable to contact dormitories E and F, dormitories G and H were called and told to release their inmates for the meal. When the inmates in dormitory E realized that dormitories E and F had been skipped in the feeding schedule, they became rowdy and belligerent. The inmates gathered around the dormitory control station cursing and complaining at Officers Terry/Rogers and Walker. Sgt. Smith was not present, having been requested by the lieutenant to assist him in the dining hall during the meal period. Officer Walker, the Respondent, attempted to calm the inmates by entering dormitory E and explaining the situation, emphasizing that the E and F inmates would be the next to go to lunch. This calmed some of the inmates, but Owen Dampier continued his verbal remonstrations about being skipped. After Walker returned into the dormitory's control room, Dampier approached the voice screen to the control room and became increasingly verbally abusive to both Walker and Terry/Rogers. His actions were causing the other inmates to again become rowdy and both Terry/Rogers and Walker felt that if Dampier's acting-out continued, it would foment an inmate disturbance. Walker had picked up an inmate's walking cane which was kept in the office for security reasons. Walker was preparing to issue the cane to the inmate to whom it belonged when Dampier screamed at Terry/Rogers and him. Walker slammed the cane against the plexiglass window and whistled at Dampier, who had turned and was walking towards the inmates clustered near the control room. Walker called Dampier back to the control room, and told Dampier that he was going to be placed in the laundry room in isolation. Terry/Rogers observed that Walker at this time was calm and was not upset by Dampier. Having told Dampier that he was going to be placed in isolation, Walker opened the door to the control room to let in Dampier. The control room door was hinged on the left side and opened into the control room. It was secured by a dead bolt lock located over the door handle on the right side of the door. As Dampier entered the room, Terry/Rogers left the desk and moved to the laundry room door to open it. Dampier stepped into the control room and stopped immediately inside the room. At this point, Dampier attempted to engage in a debate with Walker about the meal delay and refused to proceed into isolation. Dampier was facing Walker, and Walker, still holding onto the door, was standing partially behind the door, holding the door handle with his left hand. Walker released the door and it closed but was not locked. The statements of Walker, Terry/Roger and Dampier about what occurred next differ in their specifics. The following findings are based upon the testimony of Walker and Terry/Rogers and the written statement of Dampier which is corroborative of both of their statements. Dampier described his posture at this juncture as "being in Walker's face." Both Walker and Dampier were in close proximity with one another. Walker reached with his left hand to lock the door which had closed, but which had not been locked. As Walker started to reach for the door lock, Dampier perceived that he was grabbing for him and slapped Walker's hand away. Terry/Rogers, observing from across the room, saw Walker reaching for the door and assumed that he was reaching for Dampier who was standing in front of the door handle and lock. When Dampier slapped Walker's hand away, Walker felt threatened and pushed Dampier away from him with his right hand. Terry/Rogers, across the room, perceived Walker's action as an effort by Walker to grab Dampier. However, because of the location of the two men and the laundry room, it would have been extremely awkward for Walker to have grabbed at Dampier with his right hand in an effort to lead him to the laundry room which was to Walker's right and Dampier's left. Dampier's statement confirms that when Walker pushed him, Dampier pushed Walker back. Walker described Dampier's pushing him, and stated that, at this point, he struck Dampier on the chin with his closed right fist and then wrestled Dampier to the floor. Both the testimony of Terry/Rogers and the statement of Dampier confirm this. After both men fell to the floor, Terry/Rogers first locked the door to the control room, and then called the main control room for assistance. Two correctional officers supervising the yard immediately outside the dormitory responded in seconds. With their assistance, the tussle between Dampier and Walker was stopped. The Superintendent of Liberty Correctional Institution appointed an investigating officer, Inspector Stone, who interviewed Terry/Rogers, Walker and Dampier on the afternoon of November 12, 1992. Walker denied grabbing Dampier. Walker stated that he struck Dampier after Dampier pushed him. Dampier stated that Walker had grabbed him (page 4 of Dampier's statement), and also that Walker grabbed at him (page 6 of Dampier's statement). Walker admitted physical contact with Dampier and admitted striking Dampier; however, Walker stated consistently that he no recollection of grabbing Dampier by the arm. Both Walker and Dampier describe the same occurrences. Dampier's statement reports "he (Walker) grabbed at me (when) I was in his face." (Emphasis supplied.) "Then he told me to come. . . (page 6) "I pulled back like this, here, I was going to walk a little bit." (page 4, paragraph 5) "When I snatched my arm back, that's when he came up to me and pushed me." (page 4, paragraph 6) "I thought maybe he was going to swing, so I kinda like shoved him back, and he came up to be mad and he swung . . . he hit me." (page 4, paragraph 13) Walker states, "I asked him to step to me (inside the officer's station), and when he did he, uh, bowed up and he walked over to me and I opened up the door[.] I asked him to step on back to the laundry room[.] [W]hen he did, he slapped my hand back, and pushed me back and things went from there. . ." (page 3). "I hit the glass to get his attention[.] [T]hen I came down and I asked him to step inside the officer station[.] I told him to step on back to the laundry room[,] and that is when he slapped my hand and pushed me back, and started swinging[.]" Page 4. "I had my hand out to open the door, and as he stepped in[,] I let it,. . . the door[,] go back in behind me, . . . I took my hand [and] put it by my side like this, and he slapped my hand back, and pushed me back. . . I have [sic] not touched him then, until, up until then, 'til the actual squabble itself. . . . No, sir, I didn't grab him by the arm." (page 5 and 6) "He pushed me backwards, . . . finally I pushed him back and he reared back and I hit. It happened mighty fast." (Walker, page 6). In summary, both men testified to the same events, in the same order. Just after Dampier entered the room, Walker made some motion with his hand, and Dampier slapped it away. Walker pushed Dampier away from himself after Dampier slapped his hand, and a scuffle ensued in which Walker struck Dampier. What Terry/Rogers observed from across the room was not Walker grabbing Dampier with his right hand, but Walker pushing Dampier away. The slapping of Walker's left hand by Dampier with his right hand, which occurred first, was not observed by Terry/Rogers.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the charges against the Respondent, Tony V. Walker, be dismissed. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of February, 1993. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The Respondent did not file proposed findings. The proposed findings filed by the Petitioner were read and considered. The following states which of those findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Findings Recommended Order Paragraphs 1-9 Paragraphs 1-9 Paragraphs 10,11 Walker advised Dampier he was going to be isolated before letting Dampier into the Control Room, and it was only after Dampier entered the Control Room that they had an argument. Paragraph 12 The testimony that Walker grabbed Dampier is rejected as being contrary to that of Walker's testimony which is corroborated by Dampier's statement. Paragraphs 13-15 Paragraph 17,18 Paragraphs 16 See Comments to Paragraph 12, above. Paragraphs 17,18 Irrelevant. Paragraphs 19-21 Paragraphs 19 and 23. Paragraph 22 The testimony of Stone, as quoted in the proposed finding, makes it appear that Walker changed his story. This is incorrect. Walker never denied striking Dampier, although, he denied having grabbed Dampier by the arm at the commencement of the altercation. Paragraph 23 Irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Dawn Pompey Whitehurst, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Tony V. Walker 7002 Lois Street, Apt. B Callaway, FL 32404 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302
Findings Of Fact The following facts are stipulated by the parties and are incorporated herein: The Respondent has been the clerk of court for Collier County since June of 1986. The Respondent was the clerk of court at all times material to this complaint. In July of 1990, the Respondent's wife was issued a citation for having glass bottles on the beach, a violation of municipal ordinance No. 16.30, City of Naples. On August 21, 1990, upon failure to timely pay the fine for the violation of the above-described ordinance or to appear in court on this date, an arrest warrant for Theresa Giles was issued. On August 30, 1990, on or about 4:30 p.m., police officers arrived at the Respondent's residence to arrest Ms. Giles for her failure to appear or to pay fine. The officers allowed Ms. Giles to make a telephone call to her husband at the clerk's office. The Respondent went to one of his deputy clerks, Lorraine Stoll and discussed the situation with her. As a result, Ms. Stoll called the officers at the Respondent's home and informed them that the bench warrant for Ms. Giles was recalled. Ms. Giles was not taken into custody as a result of Ms. Stoll's action. These facts are derived from the evidence presented, weighed and credited: Respondent, James Giles was the Collier County finance director, performing the pre-audit function for the county, when he was appointed county clerk to finish a two year term in 1986. He was then elected to a four year term ending in January 1993, and was not reelected. His prior employment experience was as a private certified public accountant, an employee of St. Johns County, and an auditor for the State of Florida. On August 30, 1990, when Theresa Giles called her husband, she was very upset. He had promised to pay the fine, but had forgotten. She was home alone with her young child and her elderly mother when the deputies came to serve the warrant and arrest her. The ticket, or "Notice to Appear" issued to Ms. Giles for her infraction plainly provides notice that if the fine is not paid or the person fails to appear in court at the appointed time, an arrest warrant shall be issued. (Advocate Exhibit No. 2) James Giles immediately called his misdemeanor division and Kathleen Heck answered the phone. After he briefly explained the situation, she went to find the supervisor, Lorraine Stoll. As the two women were at Ms. Stoll's desk, bringing Ms. Giles' case up on the computer, Mr. Giles appeared in person. This was a very unusual situation because the clerk rarely came back to the misdemeanor office. He was Lorraine Stoll's immediate supervisor. He asked if there was anything that could be done and Ms. Stoll responded that the warrant could be recalled. Before she could explain any further, he handed her a paper with his home phone and asked her to make the call. Ms. Giles answered the phone and put the deputy on; Ms. Stoll told him the warrant was recalled, and Ms. Giles was not arrested. Ms. Stoll then told Mr. Giles that the fine and court costs had to be paid. He said the whole thing was ridiculous, that he could not believe a warrant could be issued for such a minor offense. By this time it was after 5:00 p.m. and the cashier's office was closed. Giles paid the $36.50 fine the next day and paid the $100.00 court costs on September 13, some two weeks later. (Respondent's exhibits nos. 1 and 2). James Giles admits being upset at the time that the phone call was made, but was trying to calm down because he knew Lorraine Stoll to be excitable. He was flabbergasted that someone could be arrested for having bottles on the beach. He denies that he pressured Ms. Stoll, but claims he was trying to be rational and get sound advice. He wanted her to make the call because he felt it would "look bad" if he did. James Giles did not raise his voice but both Ms. Stoll and Ms. Heck perceived he was upset and in a pressure situation. Ms. Stoll had never been involved in a circumstance where the warrant was recalled while the deputies were getting ready to make an arrest. She has worked in the misdemeanor section of the clerk's office for eleven and a half years, as deputy clerk. No ordinary citizen could have received the advantage that the clerk and his wife received. Judge Ellis, a Collier County judge, has a written policy providing that a bench warrant may be set aside after payment of costs and fine. Another county judge, Judge Trettis, requires that his office or the State's Attorney be called, and does not have a written policy. Ms. Stoll does not have the authority to recall a warrant without following the proper procedure. This situation was out of the ordinary. She made the telephone call because her boss told her to, and their main concern was that the warrant needed to be recalled so Ms. Giles would not go to jail. On the other hand, Ms. Stoll did not tell Mr. Giles that he was pressuring her, nor did she have the opportunity to tell him the proper procedure before making the telephone call. James Giles' explanation that he was simply seeking advice of his staff and then acting on it without wrongful intent is disingenuous. Whatever his actual knowledge of proper procedures for recalling a warrant, he knew or should have known that what he was doing was not an opportunity available to other citizens. His experience in the clerk's office and in prior public service should have clued him that no one else could simply get a deputy clerk to intercept an arrest with a telephone call.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Commission on Ethics enter its final order finding that James Giles violated Section 112.313(6), F.S., and recommending a civil penalty of $250.00. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 27th day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-4942EC The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Advocate's Proposed Findings 1. Adopted as stipulated facts in paragraphs 1-5. Adopted in substance in paragraph 9. Adopted in substance in paragraph 12. 8.-10. Adopted in substance in paragraph 10. 11. Adopted in substance in paragraph 13. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1. A.-E. Adopted as stipulated facts in paragraphs 1-5. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 8 and 12. Rejected as the sequence suggested is contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as misleading. The evidence shows the process was incorrect and both staff knew it was incorrect. The clerk was informed about the correct procedure after the phone call. The procedure is set out in paragraph 13. The evidence is not clear that the fine and costs could not have been paid the same day. By the time Mr. Giles finished complaining, it was after 5:00. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence, considering the totality of Ms. Stoll's testimony as well as Ms. Heck's. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Rejected as immaterial. 3. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. More specifically, this proposed finding suggests that the culpability was Ms. Stoll's rather than Respondent's. That suggestion is supported only by Ms. Stoll's timid admissions that she should not have made the phone call without having received the payment from her boss. Ms. Stoll's acceptance of blame does not relieve the Respondent of his responsibility. COPIES FURNISHED: Craig B. Willis Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 1502 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Raymond Bass, Jr., Esquire Bass & Chernoff 849 7th Avenue, South - Suite 200 Naples, Florida 33940-6715 Bonnie Williams, Executive Director Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006
The Issue Whether petitioner should suspend or revoke respondent's certification as a correctional officer for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact Respondent Edward L. Bonifay, III has held a correctional officer's certificate at all pertinent times. From October 1, 1980, till November 3, 1982, he worked for the Escambia County Sheriff's Department. When he left, his certificate automatically became inactive. (Testimony of Frick) Except in emergency circumstances not pertinent here, the Escambia County Sheriff's Department has a firm, written policy against male correctional officers entering the female housing area in the Escambia County Jail unless accompanied by a female correctional officer. The Jail Operations Manual, which Mr. Bonifay purported to have read more than once, states the policy. He was told about it. Everybody who works at the jail is aware of the policy. (Testimony of Eddings) The Jail Operations Manual also stated the requirement that any escape attempt be reported in writing. Nell Vaughn shared a cell with several other women at the Escambia County Jail in September of 1982, at a time when Minnie Squires had the adjacent cell to herself. On several occasions, including at least two in September of 1982, Ms. Squires asked other inmates to summon respondent Bonifay. At least twice in September of 1982 he arrived at her cell door alone and touched her when she came to the door undressed. Ms. Vaughn, who sometimes monitored events next door through a peephole, observed this. Bonifay admitted as much to two fellow officers, although he claimed, in one rendition, that she was trying to escape and that he was obliged to grab her breast to prevent the escape, although, he conceded, maybe he did leave his hand on her breast "too long" and maybe his hand did "slide down her stomach." To Nell Vaughn it looked like he was fondling her breasts while they were both inside the cell, after any conceivable risk of escape must have been well past. Nor does the escape hypothesis explain why Ms. Vaughn saw his hand in Ms. Squires' crotch. Respondent Bonifay never made any written report of an escape attempt on Ms. Squires' part, and made no written report of having visited a woman prisoner's cell unaccompanied by a female correctional officer. Once the events of September came to light, his superiors lost confidence in him and he was unable to function as a correctional officer in the jail. His credibility was called into question and his effectiveness was lost. (Testimony of Eddings, Jones) Petitioner filed its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the proposed findings of fact have been adopted, in substance for the most part. To the extent they have been rejected, they have been deemed immaterial, cumulative, subordinate or unsupported by the weight of the evidence.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner revoke respondent's certification as a correctional officer. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis S. Valente, Esquire Post Office Fox 1849 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Edward L. Bonifay, III 228 Cordoba Street Gulf Breeze, Florida 32561 Robert Dempsey, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact On December 3, 1991, the Petitioner, Douglas Adams, filed a Petition to Determine the Invalidity of an Existing Rule. In the Petition, the Petitioner challenged Rule 33-22.012, Florida Administrative Code, pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the Challenged Rule. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent, an agency of the State of Florida, adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. Chapter 33-22, Florida Administrative Code, contains rules governing "inmate discipline." Those rules provide the general policy of the Respondent concerning inmate discipline (Rule 33-22.001), terminology and definitions (Rule 33-22.002), the procedures for taking disciplinary action against inmates (Rules 33-22.003-33-22.010), and the "Rules of Prohibited Conduct and Penalties for Infractions (the Challenged Rule). Rule 33-22.012, Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part, the following: 33-22.012 Rules of Prohibited Conduct and Penalties for Infractions. The following table shows established maximum penalties for the indicated offenses. As used in the table, "DC" means the maximum number of days of disciplinary confinement that may be imposed and "GT" means the maximum number of days of gain time that may be taken. Any portion of either penalty may be applied. "All GT" includes both earned and unearned gain time. In addition to the penalties listed below, inmates may be required to pay for damaged, destroyed or misappropriated property under the provisions of rule 33-22.008(2)(b)13. . . . . Rule 33-22.012, Florida Administrative Code, includes a table listing of various offenses for which disciplinary action may be taken and the maximum penalty for such offenses. The Petitioner has alleged, in part, that the Challenged Rule is invalid because it: provides maximum penalties for major violations, but fails to designate, or define minor infractions, or provide sufficient guidelines to guide the agency in exercise of its discretion to designate minor infractions as opposed to major infraction listed by the rule. More particularly, the rule provides in part that "any portion of either penalty may be applied." Applying either penalty listed in this rule, which provides for loss of gaintime or disciplinary confinement, is definitionally a major violation. . . . The Petition and the Amended Petition do not included any alleged facts supporting the Petitioner's assertion that the Challenged Rules are "arbitrary and capricious."
