The Issue Whether the Respondent used excessive force to subdue a prisoner, and whether the Respondent made false official statements about the incident.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Tony V. Walker, was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on July 7, 1989, and issued Corrections Certificate No. 05-89-502-01; and on October 9, 1990, was issued Law Enforcement Certificate No. 05-90-222-01. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 1.) At the time of the incident described in the Amended Administrative Complaint, the Respondent was working as a certified correctional officer at the Liberty Correctional Institution in Bristol, Florida. On or about November 12, 1990, the Respondent was working in the E and F dormitories of the Liberty Correctional Institution supervising inmates with Correctional Officer Wanda Terry/Rogers and Sgt. Smith. While Officer Terry/Rogers was on the phone with the medical department of the institution, the dining hall attempted to notify dormitories E and F to release their inmates for the noontime meal. When the dining hall was unable to contact dormitories E and F, dormitories G and H were called and told to release their inmates for the meal. When the inmates in dormitory E realized that dormitories E and F had been skipped in the feeding schedule, they became rowdy and belligerent. The inmates gathered around the dormitory control station cursing and complaining at Officers Terry/Rogers and Walker. Sgt. Smith was not present, having been requested by the lieutenant to assist him in the dining hall during the meal period. Officer Walker, the Respondent, attempted to calm the inmates by entering dormitory E and explaining the situation, emphasizing that the E and F inmates would be the next to go to lunch. This calmed some of the inmates, but Owen Dampier continued his verbal remonstrations about being skipped. After Walker returned into the dormitory's control room, Dampier approached the voice screen to the control room and became increasingly verbally abusive to both Walker and Terry/Rogers. His actions were causing the other inmates to again become rowdy and both Terry/Rogers and Walker felt that if Dampier's acting-out continued, it would foment an inmate disturbance. Walker had picked up an inmate's walking cane which was kept in the office for security reasons. Walker was preparing to issue the cane to the inmate to whom it belonged when Dampier screamed at Terry/Rogers and him. Walker slammed the cane against the plexiglass window and whistled at Dampier, who had turned and was walking towards the inmates clustered near the control room. Walker called Dampier back to the control room, and told Dampier that he was going to be placed in the laundry room in isolation. Terry/Rogers observed that Walker at this time was calm and was not upset by Dampier. Having told Dampier that he was going to be placed in isolation, Walker opened the door to the control room to let in Dampier. The control room door was hinged on the left side and opened into the control room. It was secured by a dead bolt lock located over the door handle on the right side of the door. As Dampier entered the room, Terry/Rogers left the desk and moved to the laundry room door to open it. Dampier stepped into the control room and stopped immediately inside the room. At this point, Dampier attempted to engage in a debate with Walker about the meal delay and refused to proceed into isolation. Dampier was facing Walker, and Walker, still holding onto the door, was standing partially behind the door, holding the door handle with his left hand. Walker released the door and it closed but was not locked. The statements of Walker, Terry/Roger and Dampier about what occurred next differ in their specifics. The following findings are based upon the testimony of Walker and Terry/Rogers and the written statement of Dampier which is corroborative of both of their statements. Dampier described his posture at this juncture as "being in Walker's face." Both Walker and Dampier were in close proximity with one another. Walker reached with his left hand to lock the door which had closed, but which had not been locked. As Walker started to reach for the door lock, Dampier perceived that he was grabbing for him and slapped Walker's hand away. Terry/Rogers, observing from across the room, saw Walker reaching for the door and assumed that he was reaching for Dampier who was standing in front of the door handle and lock. When Dampier slapped Walker's hand away, Walker felt threatened and pushed Dampier away from him with his right hand. Terry/Rogers, across the room, perceived Walker's action as an effort by Walker to grab Dampier. However, because of the location of the two men and the laundry room, it would have been extremely awkward for Walker to have grabbed at Dampier with his right hand in an effort to lead him to the laundry room which was to Walker's right and Dampier's left. Dampier's statement confirms that when Walker pushed him, Dampier pushed Walker back. Walker described Dampier's pushing him, and stated that, at this point, he struck Dampier on the chin with his closed right fist and then wrestled Dampier to the floor. Both the testimony of Terry/Rogers and the statement of Dampier confirm this. After both men fell to the floor, Terry/Rogers first locked the door to the control room, and then called the main control room for assistance. Two correctional officers supervising the yard immediately outside the dormitory responded in seconds. With their assistance, the tussle between Dampier and Walker was stopped. The Superintendent of Liberty Correctional Institution appointed an investigating officer, Inspector Stone, who interviewed Terry/Rogers, Walker and Dampier on the afternoon of November 12, 1992. Walker denied grabbing Dampier. Walker stated that he struck Dampier after Dampier pushed him. Dampier stated that Walker had grabbed him (page 4 of Dampier's statement), and also that Walker grabbed at him (page 6 of Dampier's statement). Walker admitted physical contact with Dampier and admitted striking Dampier; however, Walker stated consistently that he no recollection of grabbing Dampier by the arm. Both Walker and Dampier describe the same occurrences. Dampier's statement reports "he (Walker) grabbed at me (when) I was in his face." (Emphasis supplied.) "Then he told me to come. . . (page 6) "I pulled back like this, here, I was going to walk a little bit." (page 4, paragraph 5) "When I snatched my arm back, that's when he came up to me and pushed me." (page 4, paragraph 6) "I thought maybe he was going to swing, so I kinda like shoved him back, and he came up to be mad and he swung . . . he hit me." (page 4, paragraph 13) Walker states, "I asked him to step to me (inside the officer's station), and when he did he, uh, bowed up and he walked over to me and I opened up the door[.] I asked him to step on back to the laundry room[.] [W]hen he did, he slapped my hand back, and pushed me back and things went from there. . ." (page 3). "I hit the glass to get his attention[.] [T]hen I came down and I asked him to step inside the officer station[.] I told him to step on back to the laundry room[,] and that is when he slapped my hand and pushed me back, and started swinging[.]" Page 4. "I had my hand out to open the door, and as he stepped in[,] I let it,. . . the door[,] go back in behind me, . . . I took my hand [and] put it by my side like this, and he slapped my hand back, and pushed me back. . . I have [sic] not touched him then, until, up until then, 'til the actual squabble itself. . . . No, sir, I didn't grab him by the arm." (page 5 and 6) "He pushed me backwards, . . . finally I pushed him back and he reared back and I hit. It happened mighty fast." (Walker, page 6). In summary, both men testified to the same events, in the same order. Just after Dampier entered the room, Walker made some motion with his hand, and Dampier slapped it away. Walker pushed Dampier away from himself after Dampier slapped his hand, and a scuffle ensued in which Walker struck Dampier. What Terry/Rogers observed from across the room was not Walker grabbing Dampier with his right hand, but Walker pushing Dampier away. The slapping of Walker's left hand by Dampier with his right hand, which occurred first, was not observed by Terry/Rogers.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the charges against the Respondent, Tony V. Walker, be dismissed. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of February, 1993. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The Respondent did not file proposed findings. The proposed findings filed by the Petitioner were read and considered. The following states which of those findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Findings Recommended Order Paragraphs 1-9 Paragraphs 1-9 Paragraphs 10,11 Walker advised Dampier he was going to be isolated before letting Dampier into the Control Room, and it was only after Dampier entered the Control Room that they had an argument. Paragraph 12 The testimony that Walker grabbed Dampier is rejected as being contrary to that of Walker's testimony which is corroborated by Dampier's statement. Paragraphs 13-15 Paragraph 17,18 Paragraphs 16 See Comments to Paragraph 12, above. Paragraphs 17,18 Irrelevant. Paragraphs 19-21 Paragraphs 19 and 23. Paragraph 22 The testimony of Stone, as quoted in the proposed finding, makes it appear that Walker changed his story. This is incorrect. Walker never denied striking Dampier, although, he denied having grabbed Dampier by the arm at the commencement of the altercation. Paragraph 23 Irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Dawn Pompey Whitehurst, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Tony V. Walker 7002 Lois Street, Apt. B Callaway, FL 32404 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302
Findings Of Fact The following facts are stipulated by the parties and are incorporated herein: The Respondent has been the clerk of court for Collier County since June of 1986. The Respondent was the clerk of court at all times material to this complaint. In July of 1990, the Respondent's wife was issued a citation for having glass bottles on the beach, a violation of municipal ordinance No. 16.30, City of Naples. On August 21, 1990, upon failure to timely pay the fine for the violation of the above-described ordinance or to appear in court on this date, an arrest warrant for Theresa Giles was issued. On August 30, 1990, on or about 4:30 p.m., police officers arrived at the Respondent's residence to arrest Ms. Giles for her failure to appear or to pay fine. The officers allowed Ms. Giles to make a telephone call to her husband at the clerk's office. The Respondent went to one of his deputy clerks, Lorraine Stoll and discussed the situation with her. As a result, Ms. Stoll called the officers at the Respondent's home and informed them that the bench warrant for Ms. Giles was recalled. Ms. Giles was not taken into custody as a result of Ms. Stoll's action. These facts are derived from the evidence presented, weighed and credited: Respondent, James Giles was the Collier County finance director, performing the pre-audit function for the county, when he was appointed county clerk to finish a two year term in 1986. He was then elected to a four year term ending in January 1993, and was not reelected. His prior employment experience was as a private certified public accountant, an employee of St. Johns County, and an auditor for the State of Florida. On August 30, 1990, when Theresa Giles called her husband, she was very upset. He had promised to pay the fine, but had forgotten. She was home alone with her young child and her elderly mother when the deputies came to serve the warrant and arrest her. The ticket, or "Notice to Appear" issued to Ms. Giles for her infraction plainly provides notice that if the fine is not paid or the person fails to appear in court at the appointed time, an arrest warrant shall be issued. (Advocate Exhibit No. 2) James Giles immediately called his misdemeanor division and Kathleen Heck answered the phone. After he briefly explained the situation, she went to find the supervisor, Lorraine Stoll. As the two women were at Ms. Stoll's desk, bringing Ms. Giles' case up on the computer, Mr. Giles appeared in person. This was a very unusual situation because the clerk rarely came back to the misdemeanor office. He was Lorraine Stoll's immediate supervisor. He asked if there was anything that could be done and Ms. Stoll responded that the warrant could be recalled. Before she could explain any further, he handed her a paper with his home phone and asked her to make the call. Ms. Giles answered the phone and put the deputy on; Ms. Stoll told him the warrant was recalled, and Ms. Giles was not arrested. Ms. Stoll then told Mr. Giles that the fine and court costs had to be paid. He said the whole thing was ridiculous, that he could not believe a warrant could be issued for such a minor offense. By this time it was after 5:00 p.m. and the cashier's office was closed. Giles paid the $36.50 fine the next day and paid the $100.00 court costs on September 13, some two weeks later. (Respondent's exhibits nos. 1 and 2). James Giles admits being upset at the time that the phone call was made, but was trying to calm down because he knew Lorraine Stoll to be excitable. He was flabbergasted that someone could be arrested for having bottles on the beach. He denies that he pressured Ms. Stoll, but claims he was trying to be rational and get sound advice. He wanted her to make the call because he felt it would "look bad" if he did. James Giles did not raise his voice but both Ms. Stoll and Ms. Heck perceived he was upset and in a pressure situation. Ms. Stoll had never been involved in a circumstance where the warrant was recalled while the deputies were getting ready to make an arrest. She has worked in the misdemeanor section of the clerk's office for eleven and a half years, as deputy clerk. No ordinary citizen could have received the advantage that the clerk and his wife received. Judge Ellis, a Collier County judge, has a written policy providing that a bench warrant may be set aside after payment of costs and fine. Another county judge, Judge Trettis, requires that his office or the State's Attorney be called, and does not have a written policy. Ms. Stoll does not have the authority to recall a warrant without following the proper procedure. This situation was out of the ordinary. She made the telephone call because her boss told her to, and their main concern was that the warrant needed to be recalled so Ms. Giles would not go to jail. On the other hand, Ms. Stoll did not tell Mr. Giles that he was pressuring her, nor did she have the opportunity to tell him the proper procedure before making the telephone call. James Giles' explanation that he was simply seeking advice of his staff and then acting on it without wrongful intent is disingenuous. Whatever his actual knowledge of proper procedures for recalling a warrant, he knew or should have known that what he was doing was not an opportunity available to other citizens. His experience in the clerk's office and in prior public service should have clued him that no one else could simply get a deputy clerk to intercept an arrest with a telephone call.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Commission on Ethics enter its final order finding that James Giles violated Section 112.313(6), F.S., and recommending a civil penalty of $250.00. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 27th day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-4942EC The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Advocate's Proposed Findings 1. Adopted as stipulated facts in paragraphs 1-5. Adopted in substance in paragraph 9. Adopted in substance in paragraph 12. 8.-10. Adopted in substance in paragraph 10. 11. Adopted in substance in paragraph 13. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1. A.-E. Adopted as stipulated facts in paragraphs 1-5. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 8 and 12. Rejected as the sequence suggested is contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as misleading. The evidence shows the process was incorrect and both staff knew it was incorrect. The clerk was informed about the correct procedure after the phone call. The procedure is set out in paragraph 13. The evidence is not clear that the fine and costs could not have been paid the same day. By the time Mr. Giles finished complaining, it was after 5:00. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence, considering the totality of Ms. Stoll's testimony as well as Ms. Heck's. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Rejected as immaterial. 3. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. More specifically, this proposed finding suggests that the culpability was Ms. Stoll's rather than Respondent's. That suggestion is supported only by Ms. Stoll's timid admissions that she should not have made the phone call without having received the payment from her boss. Ms. Stoll's acceptance of blame does not relieve the Respondent of his responsibility. COPIES FURNISHED: Craig B. Willis Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 1502 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Raymond Bass, Jr., Esquire Bass & Chernoff 849 7th Avenue, South - Suite 200 Naples, Florida 33940-6715 Bonnie Williams, Executive Director Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against him and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at "formal hearing," and the record as a whole, including the parties' Joint Stipulation, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since February 19, 1998, certified as a correctional officer in the State of Florida. He holds Correctional Certificate Number 178896. On February 19, 1982, Respondent was certified as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida and issued Law Enforcement Certificate Number 34142, which has since expired. Respondent is now, and has been since shortly after receiving his bachelor of science degree in education from Slippery Rock University, certified as a teacher in the State of Florida. From the early 1980's until 1993, Respondent worked as a police officer for various law enforcement agencies in Florida. In 1985, Respondent was physically arrested and charged with battery in Pinellas County. He was acquitted of the charge following a jury trial. After the acquittal, at Respondent's request, records relating to the matter were ordered sealed. In the mid 1990's, Respondent worked for Wackenhut Corporation as a teacher at correctional facilities in Moore Haven and South Bay, Florida. While working for Wackenhut in South Bay, Respondent was asked to assist in the "start up" of a "work release center" in Broward County, Florida, that Wackenhut was going to operate for the Broward County Sheriff's Office. Pursuant to Wackenhut policy, Respondent had to "go through a correctional academy" before assuming his new duties. After graduating from the "correctional academy," Respondent relocated to Broward County and began his new assignment for Wackenhut. Respondent's primary tasks were to "draw[] up all the rules and regulations for the [soon to be opened] facility" and "interview[] people for jobs." Respondent was housed in a "temporary [Wackenhut] office" in Lauderdale-by-the-Sea, Florida, along with others involved in the effort to open the facility, including Richard Fortenberry, who was going to be the facility administrator. On September 26, 1997, Respondent was accused of stealing a "couple of packs of playing cards" from a retail establishment in Palm Beach County, Florida. The Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office deputy on the scene issued Respondent a notice to appear2 in lieu of physically arresting Respondent. As directed, Respondent subsequently appeared in the Criminal Division of Palm Beach County Court to respond (in Palm Beach County Court Case No. 97-024167 MM A04) to the retail theft accusation made against him. On November 17, 1997, Respondent signed a Deferred Prosecution Agreement in Palm Beach County Court Case No. 97- 024167 MM A04,3 which provided that, if Respondent complied with the[] "conditions [set forth in the agreement] during the [three-month] period of Deferred Prosecution, no criminal prosecution concerning this charge [of retail theft] [would] be instituted " On December 22, 1997, the Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office issued a Nolle Prosse in Palm Beach County Court Case No. 97-024167 MM A04. The Broward County "work release center" was scheduled to open in February of 1998. Respondent was to occupy a "lead supervisor" position at the facility when it opened. Before he was able to assume this position, however, Respondent needed to fill out an "extensive" application (even though he was already employed by Wackenhut) and pass a pre- employment review conducted by the Broward County Sheriff's Office. Respondent filled out the application, "to the best of [his] ability," in October of 1997. On the application, he mentioned the 1985 Pinellas County battery charge of which he was acquitted, but not the notice to appear that he had received the previous month.4 Deputy James Diefenbacher was the Broward County Sheriff's Office "contract manager" for the Broward County "work release center" project. In November of 1997, after Respondent had entered into his Deferred Prosecution Agreement in Palm Beach County Court Case No. 97-024167 MM A04, Mr. Fortenberry told Respondent that Deputy Diefenbacher needed from Respondent certain documents concerning the 1985 Pinellas County battery charge in order for Deputy Diefenbacher to complete his pre-employment review of Respondent's background. Respondent promptly furnished Deputy Diefenbacher the requested documents. On December 31, 1997, Deputy Diefenbacher "showed up" at Respondent's office in Lauderdale-by-the-Sea and told Respondent that he "needed to talk to [Respondent] real quick." It was New Year's Eve. The "handful of people," including Respondent, who were there, were finishing up there work for the day so the office could close early. After he and Respondent "looked over [Respondent's] application" together, Deputy Diefenbacher turned on a tape recorder, "swore [Respondent] in," presented Respondent with a document, and told Respondent, "I need you to sign this document here. It means that you don't have any other arrest history."5 The document, which was typed on Broward County Sheriff's Office letterhead, read as follows: I swear under oath that all information regarding my criminal history has been presented to the Broward Sheriff's Office. My criminal history consists of a charge of simple battery, of which I was found not guilty of all charges by the court. Not [sic] other criminal history exists. SWORN AND ATTESTED TO BY TIMOTHY J. MILLER ON THIS 31ST DAY OF DECEMBER NINETEEN HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN. Signed By: DEPUTY JAMES DIEFENBACHER OF THE BROWARD SHERIFF'S OFFICE Signed CCN# Respondent signed the document without reading it. Respondent took Deputy Diefenbacher at his word that, by signing the document, Respondent was attesting that he had no other arrests other than his 1985 arrest in Pinellas County for battery. Respondent did not intend to deceive anyone in signing the document. He believed that the information contained in the document (as explained to him by Deputy Diefenbacher) was true.6 He did not consider his having been given a notice to appear (on September 26, 1997, in Palm Beach County) to have constituted an arrest.7 Nonetheless, "a couple [of] years later," Petitioner was charged with and tried for perjury in connection with his signing the document; however, he was acquitted of the charge.8
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent in the instant case. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 2004.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent violated Sections 943.13(7), 943.1395(6), and 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner certified Respondent as a correctional officer on February 14, 1986. Since that time, Respondent has held Correctional Certificate Number 81761. On or about May 8, 1994, Respondent was in the front yard of his residence. Police officers pulled into Respondent's driveway and requested that Respondent approach the patrol car. Respondent walked away from the police car. As he walked away, Respondent dropped an item from his pocket. The item that Respondent dropped was a bag containing white powder. The white powder was cocaine. Respondent was aware of the presence of the bag on his person. Respondent's possession of the bag containing cocaine was unlawful. One of the police officers advised Respondent that he was under arrest. The police officer instructed Respondent to put his hands behind him. Respondent refused to put his hands behind him. The police officers physically restrained Respondent. Respondent subsequently entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offenses of attempted possession of cocaine and resisting officer without violence. On July 17, 1995, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of these two offenses by the county court judge, in and for Putnam County, Florida, in Case Number 95-2767MM06. The court suspended any fine or cost which might be imposed for the conviction of resisting officer without violence. The court ordered Respondent to pay a fine of $241.50, prosecution costs of $50, and an investigation cost of $50 for the conviction of attempted possession of cocaine.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order revoking Respondent's certification as a correctional officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Amy J. Bardill, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Johnnie Holcy, Jr. Route 6, Box 300 Palatka, Florida 32177 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489
The Issue Should the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (the Commission) impose discipline on Respondent in association with her correctional certificate?
Findings Of Fact Taken in the context of other facts found, at times relevant to the inquiry Respondent was a correctional officer assigned to the Institution referred to in the Administrative Complaint. On March 2, 2004, Diadenis Suarez was an inmate incarcerated in the Institution. The Institution is part of the prison system in Florida. Respondent was on duty at that time in her capacity as a correctional officer. Respondent and Ms. Suarez engaged in a conversation in the officer's station between two open-bay dormitories in the Institution. They were the only ones inside the officer's station while they talked. Respondent had a lunch box with food items that she had brought with her to the Institution. Out of the food brought in, Respondent offered Ms. Suarez sliced apples. Respondent offered Sweet Tarts (candy) to Ms. Suarez. Respondent had been eating chicken. The leftover chicken was also offered to Ms. Suarez. Respondent handed the apples and candy to Ms. Suarez. The inmate picked up the chicken resting on a paper towel atop a counter in the officer's station. The food that has been described was not food provided to the inmate through the prison facility. It was not provided through ordinary channels. Respondent did not have permission from the prison authorities to provide the food to the inmate. The food items were carried away from the officers station and turned over to Inspector Lewis Conrad, an official with the Florida Department of Corrections. Inspector Conrad was investigating Respondent and was aware that Inmate Suarez would make contact with Respondent on March 2, 2004, and that the possibility existed that Respondent would offer food items to Inmate Suarez. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 3 is a Polaroid photograph taken of the food items, the sliced apples, chicken and Sweet Tarts. Following the incident Respondent was interviewed by the State of Florida, Department of Corrections, Office of the Inspector General. There were two interviews. The first interview took place on March 5, 2004. The second interview took place on March 16, 2004. In each interview Respondent was placed under oath and informed that the interview was related to administrative matters, and was not intended for use in a criminal prosecution. Respondent was reminded pursuant to Florida Administrative Rule 33-208.002, that as an employee of the Department of Corrections she could not refuse to truthfully answer questions relating to the performance of her official duties. The consequence of her failure to truthfully answer questions could lead to disciplinary action being taken against the Respondent. The March 5, 2004, interview was conducted by then Inspector Bobby Ruise. A transcription of the taped interview is found as Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5. In this interview Respondent denied giving inmate Suarez any food items. The March 16, 2004, interview was conducted by Inspector Conrad. A written transcription of the taped interview is found as Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 6. When asked if Respondent offered inmate Suarez chicken, apples and Sweet Tarts, Respondent replied that she did not.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered finding violations pertaining to Sections 837.02(1), 943.1395(7), and 944.47(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B- 27.0011(4)(a), while dismissing the violations in relations to Sections 837.06 and 943.1395(6), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(b), and revoking the correctional certificate held by Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of May, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeanie Howell Nine Pine Place Ocala, Florida 34472 Michael Crews, Program Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent should deny Petitioner's application to be licensed as a resident personal lines insurance agent.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing insurance agents in the state pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2004). On October 29, 2004, Respondent received Petitioner's application to be licensed as a resident personal lines insurance agent (insurance agent). On October 13, 2005, Respondent issued a Notice of Denial to Petitioner. Respondent based the denial on several grounds that fall into three categories. The first category is based on Petitioner's prior criminal history. In relevant part, the Notice of Denial denies the application because Petitioner pled nolo contendere to a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more. The Notice of Denial further states that the crime was one of moral turpitude and that Subsection 626.611(14), Florida Statutes (2004), makes denial of the application compulsory. Even if the crime were not one of moral turpitude, the Notice of Denial states that the plea of nolo contendere provides a discretionary ground to deny the application pursuant to Subsection 626.621(8), Florida Statutes (2004). The Notice of Denial states a second category of grounds that are also compulsory. The second category of grounds may be fairly summarized as alleging a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance. The second category of grounds generally relates to turpitude inherent in the criminal offense and an inaccurate application answer stating that Petitioner had no prior criminal record. The Notice of Denial states that Petitioner lacks one or more qualifications for the license, that Petitioner committed a material misstatement or misrepresentation on her application, and that Petitioner demonstrated a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance as provided in Subsections 626.611(1), 626.611(2), and 626.611(7), Florida Statutes (2004). The third category of grounds relates to waiting periods. The Notice of Denial states that Petitioner must wait 17 years from the date she pled nolo contendere before applying for a license as an insurance agent. The waiting period is based on agency rules in Florida Administrative Code Rules 69B-211.042(4)(b) and 69B-211.042(8) that are promulgated pursuant to Subsection 626.207(1), Florida Statutes (2004). The remaining Findings of Fact address the factual sufficiency of the second category of grounds for denial. The conclusions of law, in relevant part, address the legal sufficiency of the remaining grounds for denial. The criminal record of Petitioner is not disputed. On October 4, 2004, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to a third degree felony of grand theft in the Circuit Court in and for Pasco County, Florida, Case No. CRCO4-1177-CFAES. The court withheld adjudication of guilt and imposed fines and costs of $395. Petitioner served 30 days in the Pasco County jail. The court placed Petitioner on supervised probation for 18 months, which Petitioner successfully terminated early on September 27, 2005. Petitioner contests neither the inaccuracy of the application answer stating she had no prior criminal record nor the materiality of the inaccuracy. However, Petitioner does contest the agency's assertion that Petitioner possessed the culpable knowledge or scienter required to misstate, misrepresent, or commit fraud in attempting to obtain a license within the meaning of Subsection 626.611(2), Florida Statutes (2004). Petitioner also contests the assertions that she lacks one or more qualifications for licensure and that she lacks fitness or trustworthiness within the meaning of Subsections 626.611(1), 626.611(2), and 626.611(7), Florida Statutes (2004). Petitioner testified that her employer submitted her application electronically. Petitioner testified that she gave her employer accurate information concerning her application, but she did not review the application before transmission. The trier of fact finds the testimony concerning Petitioner's lack of culpable knowledge to be credible and persuasive. Petitioner testified with extraordinary candor. Her demeanor was frank and unguarded. Her denial of culpable intent to mislead the agency is consistent with the totality of evidence in this proceeding and with Petitioner's demonstrated fitness and trustworthiness after November 2002. After Petitioner gave birth to a son on March 20, 2002, her treating physician advised her to undergo a tubal ligation, and the subsequent surgery was successful. The resulting inability to bear more children, however, led Petitioner into a mental state that was subsequently diagnosed as severe clinical depression. Petitioner returned to work approximately 12 weeks after surgery. From August 2002 through November 2002, Petitioner engaged in an episode of compulsive spending in which she incurred approximately $70,000 in credit card debt that she charged to personal and business credit cards. In order to pay the debt, Petitioner began taking money from her employer. Petitioner describes her hedonistic offense in her own words: [T]his incident occurred when I was suffering from severe depression that was [subsequently] diagnosed by a physician. I have been under the treatment of a psychiatrist and also a psychologist. I still see my psychiatrist quarterly to make sure that all is well with my medications . . . . The psychologist released me from her care because she felt that I can now deal with everyday stress. . . . So in order to fill that void [of no more children] I started shopping. And I would - I would go to the mall in a day and I would spend several thousand dollars on absolute garbage, you know, when you look. I mean. I started buying clothes; I bought furniture. I just was a shopaholic. I would go every Saturday and Sunday and spend time at the mall and just shop like crazy. [M]y husband had no idea of our finances. He just gave the paycheck and said: You do what you need to do. As long as he could have cash he didn't care. So he had no idea. He didn't even know how much money I made; he didn't know how much our mortgage was; he didn't know anything about our finances. And then once I started having all these credit card bills then I was, you know, robbing Peter to pay Paul . . . . And then it just got where I snapped . . . . And . . . unfortunately it looked like the easy way out. It was an answer to my problems and I could continue doing what I needed to do. [T]he attorney [employer] pretty much left me to do what I needed to do. I wrote all of his court motions, and I wrote all of his pleadings, and accountings, and inventories, and he didn't even look at them. He would just sign them. He didn't review them at all. And so when I would give him checks to sign . . . I would just take him the check and say, "I need you to sign a check," and he would sign the check and wouldn't even look to see . . . it was [to me]. Transcript (TR), pages 15 and 24-26. After November 2002, Petitioner voluntarily disclosed her offense to her employer. Petitioner's effort to reclaim her integrity and trustworthiness was both epiphanic and Herculean. The effort is best described in her own words: I started contemplating suicide and said: Oh, well, this will take care of all the problems. But then I had read up and didn't want my kids to grow up without a parent or think that for some reason they caused me to do it. So at that point in time I was just - I didn't know what to do or where to turn. I was just completely lost. And so I hadn't been to church in like a year. For whatever reason the Sunday before the Monday that I went to [an] attorney I went to church and they told a story. And I said: You know, I'm willing to confess to what I've done at whatever cost because I can't - I can't keep going like this, and I can't keep pretending like nothing is wrong, and laying in bed and the couch all day. So I went to [an] attorney the very next day. Q. Do you need a moment? A. I'm okay. * * * In January 2003, I'm sorry. This is hard reliving it. THE COURT: That's okay. Take your time and if you need a recess just let me know. A. This is the first time that I just really said it out loud. THE COURT: Yes. A. In January of 2003, I contacted [an attorney]. I informed him . . . that I had done something wrong and I didn't know where to turn to or who to turn to. At this point in time I hadn't told my family and nobody knew. All they knew is that something was wrong with me. I wasn't myself. I was withdrawn and I stayed in bed . . . all day. The attorney immediately contacted my former employer to advise that there was a problem with his accounting system. Up until this time he had no knowledge of any . . . problems. My attorney also contacted a doctor for me to see immediately because he could tell that something was not right with me. At this time that my attorney contacted my former employer I offered to make immediate restitution, which I did [over time]. At this point in time my employer said that he did not want to contact any authorities because he didn't want the publicity in a small town. And as far as I knew, the situation was taken care of. I was making restitution and I thought it was over. At some point in time my former employer contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). After meeting with the FBI, I agreed to assist them because my former employer was billing my time as the attorney's time in guardianship cases. This would cause clients to run out of money and become eligible for Medicaid and other state governmental services. The federal government ended up dropping the charge against me and I . . . agreed to assist them in any cases against my employer. When things were not moving along in the federal case my former employer also contacted the local authorities. I was arrested on May 1 of 2004. And this was almost - this was almost a year-and-a-half after I had first come forward. And then in September 2004, my attorney was ready to go to trial. At the last minute the State Attorney offered a plea deal. I was told that I could finally put this nightmare behind me by pleading no contest and I would have no criminal record because the court would withhold adjudication. [T]he judge made a point to mention that adjudication was being withheld so I would have no felony criminal record. And also at this time there was no restitution ordered because I had already paid it all back. TR at 15-18. Petitioner paid approximately $85,000 in restitution. Restitution was a Sisyphean effort, as Petitioner explains: I paid back cash. I had taken - I had calculated $40,000. He said that I calculated - that I had taken $60,000 and then he raised it to $80,000 for his time. But I - I paid back $45,000 in cash. The credit card companies, he contacted every credit card company that I paid and they all reversed all of their [charges]. So I ended up owing, you know, another $45,000 back in credit cards that he had . . . all the payments reversed. . . . So I paid a total - it was $85,000. * * * [W]e sold everything we had. . . . We sold our home. I had bought my husband a third vehicle. We sold that. We had a motorcycle that sold. We had a lot of toys. TR at 27-28. The trier of fact is not persuaded that Petitioner would have lied on her license application in October 2005 after voluntarily disclosing her offense in January 2003. When Petitioner exercised a conscious choice to confess her offense, she knew with certainty that shame would follow her exposure to her husband and children. Petitioner also knew that her choice would subject her family to the financial hardship and social upheaval inherent in selling everything they owned to make restitution to her former employer. Petitioner learned a new occupation, contributed to her family's recovery, and testified candidly and frankly about her offense. When the court sentenced Petitioner to 30 days in jail, Petitioner requested that she be allowed to serve the sentence every other weekend. Petitioner worked during the week and did not want to be away from her children all week and every weekend. The judge granted the request. The trier of fact finds that Petitioner neither misstated nor misrepresented her criminal record on her license application. Nor did Petitioner commit fraud in answering the questions on the application within the meaning of Subsection 626.611(2), Florida Statutes (2004). The trier of fact finds that Petitioner does not lack one or more of the qualifications for licensure required in Subsection 626.611(1), Florida Statutes (2004).1 Nor does Petitioner demonstrate a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance within the meaning of Subsection 626.611(7), Florida Statutes (2004).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order determining that Petitioner's license application has been granted by operation of law. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2006.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of failing to maintain good moral character and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is 60 years old. Petitioner certified Respondent as a correctional officer on May 5, 1989. Respondent holds Correctional Certificate Number 99065. On February 27, 1994, several officers of the Melbourne Police Department were conducting a prostitution sting in the area of U. S. Route 1 and Irwin Street in Melbourne. This is an area frequented by prostitutes. In the role of the prostitute was a female detective, who wore jeans, tennis shoes, and a tank top without a bra. She was walking the streets when, around 5:45 p.m., Respondent turned off U. S. Route 1, down a short side street, and into a field, where he turned his car around. He stopped the car and, after waiting a couple of minutes, motioned for the detective to approach. As the detective approached the car, Respondent mouthed the words, "open the door," while pointing to the front passenger door. The detective did so, but did not get in. Respondent asked the detective if she was working. She replied that she was and asked what was he looking for. He asked for a "blow job," which means oral sex. The detective asked how much and Respondent replied "$10." The detective said that was fine. She gave the signal for her backup officers to approach the vehicle and arrest Respondent. A marked patrol car drove up to Respondent's car. Respondent started to pull out, but did not make it far. The uniformed officers took Respondent to a nearby police van where he was provided with the arrest paperwork and a notice to appear in court. The arrest report cited a violation of Section 796.07, Florida Statutes. In the police van, Respondent was very upset and asked if they would please let him go because he was a correctional officer. He added: "I've given up cigarettes and smoking. I've given up alcohol. But I'm not going to give up sex. I'm a lonely old man. Can't you please just give me a break? If you give me a break, you'll never see me in your city again." Fifteen days before his criminal trial on misdemeanor prostitution charges, Respondent filed a complaint against the police officers, alleging that they were lying about the prostitution. At the nonjury trial, the court found Respondent guilty of the charge and sentenced him to six months' probation, fined him $200 plus court costs, and ordered him to submit to an tests for sexually transmitted diseases, and to attend an AIDS awareness class. Respondent's employer, the Department of Corrections, disciplined Respondent by suspending him without pay for ten days. The Department later reduced the suspension to five days. Respondent is currently employed by the Department at the Kissimmee Community Correctional Center. Respondent receives high praise from his employer. By letter dated June 4, 1996, Lt. Patricia M. Gilmore of the Kissimmee Community Correctional Center, stated, "with profound pleasure," that Respondent exceeds the demands placed on him and that he is "intelligent, personable, intuitive, and goal- oriented." By letter of the same date, Sgt. Bill Solomon, also of the Kissimmee Community Correctional Center, stated that, since Respondent's employment at the Center on August 19, 1994, he has been "loyal, dedicated and most of all an asset to this facility." Sgt. Solomon reported that Respondent is the senior correctional officer on the third shift and serves as officer in charge when the sergeant is off duty. Respondent has no disciplinary history. The presentence investigation revealed no prior convictions, except for a conviction (or possibly only an arrest) for skinny dipping 40 years ago. Other mitigating circumstances are detailed in the next section. There are no aggravating circumstances. However, Respondent has had some difficulty accepting responsibility for the poor judgment that he displayed on February 27, 1994. Respondent testified at the hearing that his attorney advised him to file the complaint against the police officers. Respondent claimed that his attorney had him so confused that he testified differently at his criminal trial about his intentions to stop and talk to the detective. Respondent also testified during the hearing that his attorney may have improperly influenced his testimony at the criminal trial. Respondent claimed that the criminal trial was flawed by the failure of his attorney to make objections. Respondent testified that he could not convince his attorney to raise an entrapment defense because he was friends with the female detective who had arrested Respondent. However, the criminal trial transcript reveals that the attorney argued entrapment.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 943.1395(7) and suspending his certificate for three months. ENTERED on July 10, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on July 10, 1996. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-3: adopted or adopted in substance. 4-8: rejected as subordinate. 9: adopted or adopted in substance. 10-18: rejected as subordinate. 19: adopted. 20-25: rejected as subordinate. 26: adopted. 27-31: rejected as subordinate. 32-33: adopted or adopted in substance. 34: rejected as subordinate. 35: adopted. 36-37: rejected as recitation of testimony. 38-41: adopted or adopted in substance. 42-43: rejected as recitation of testimony. 44-48: adopted or adopted in substance. 49-55: rejected as subordinate and irrelevant. 56: adopted. 57-58: rejected as subordinate. 59-61: adopted or adopted in substance. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-2: adopted or adopted in substance. 3-13: rejected as subordinate or irrelevant. 14-19: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 20: adopted or adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen D. Simmons Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Attorney Joan Stewart Police Benevolent Association, Inc. 300 East Brevard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramagep, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, a certified law enforcement officer, failed to maintain good moral character by knowingly making a false statement in writing with the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official duties, a failure that, if proved, would warrant the imposition of discipline upon Respondent's certificate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Pablo Barrios ("Barrios") is a Florida- certified law enforcement officer and, as such, falls under the regulatory and disciplinary jurisdiction of Petitioner Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission ("Commission"). At the time of the final hearing, and at all times relevant to this case, Barrios was employed as a police officer by Florida International University ("FIU"). The events giving rise to this proceeding took place on July 17, 2003. That morning, Barrios attended an in-service training class taught by Sgt. Alfonso. There were about a dozen other FIU police officers in the class. Shortly after the class began, Barrios and Sgt. Alfonso got into an argument over Barrios's use of a digital recorder. (Sgt. Alfonso was apparently offended that Barrios would record the lecture; Barrios claimed that he was merely using the device to keep track of the time.) Sgt. Alfonso asked Barrios to leave the classroom. Barrios did leave, remarking on his way out that if he (Barrios) had intended to turn on the recording device, he would first have told everyone in the "fucking room." Barrios later returned to the classroom and sat in the back. The lesson proceeded to conclusion uneventfully. When the class ended, Capt. Wright entered the room. Someone had reported the verbal altercation between Barrios and Sgt. Alfonso, and Capt. Wright was there to find out what had happened. To that end, Capt. Wright asked each of the officers present to prepare a statement describing the incident and stating specifically whether "improper language" had been used. In response to Capt. Wright's request, Barrios wrote the following statement: I was single[d] out by Sergeant Alfonso for taking out [sic] a personal recorder out of my laptop bag. Capt. Wright considered Barrios's statement to be incomplete. He therefore wrote the following question beneath Barrios's description of the event: Lt. Barrios, was improper language ever used during the incident. Barrios answered the captain's query, in writing, with one word: "No."1 Ultimate Factual Determinations The undersigned infers (and is convinced) that Barrios knew, when presented with Capt. Wright's imprecisely drafted question regarding the use of "improper language," that this interrogatory, though ambiguous and open to interpretation, was meant to require Barrios to either admit or deny using the "f" word during the incident. The undersigned further infers (but is not convinced) that Barrios was likely aware that Capt. Wright would misinterpret Barrios's negative answer as an affirmation that no one (including Barrios) had uttered the word "fuck" or any of its cognates. The undersigned is not clearly convinced, however, that Barrios intended to mislead Capt. Wright.2 Rather, since admitting that his language had been "improper" would have been tantamount to confessing misbehavior,3 Barrios likely intended to deny having engaged in inappropriate behavior. The undersigned is also not clearly convinced that Barrios's statement was false, for two reasons. First, the undersigned is not convinced that Barrios believed his language to have been improper.4 To the contrary, the evidence persuades the undersigned that Barrios subjectively believed his words were justified. It is likely, in other words, that Barrios made what was, for him, a true statement. Second, Barrios's statement has not been clearly and convincingly falsified——that is, shown via ordinary evidence to be objectively untrue. Because the adjective "improper" reflects an opinion or judgment about something, such an opinion could be falsified only if5 (among other things) there were a clear objective standard against which to measure or judge the thing in question.6 The Commission offered no evidence regarding such an objective standard for determining that Barrios's language was improper and hence failed objectively to falsify Barrios's denial that improper language had been used.7 In sum, the Commission failed clearly and convincingly to prove, as was its burden, that Barrios made a "false statement" with the intent to mislead Capt. Wright.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Barrios not guilty of failing to maintain good moral character by knowingly making a false statement in writing with the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official duties. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 2005.
Findings Of Fact On March 28, 1978, Kenneth Williams submitted application for employment to Duval County School Board (Exhibit 24) in which he acknowledged prior arrest for auto theft in 1968 and indicated he was placed on parole. This application was never signed by Williams but was treated for all purposes, including his employment, as a complete application. Due to administrative error, the normal police name check was not accomplished on this application and Respondent was hired as a science teacher by Duval County school system. On 24 March 1978 Respondent applied to the Florida Department of Education for a teacher's certificate (Exhibit 12). On this application in Item V which inquired if applicant had been arrested, Respondent checked the "Yes" block and on the two lines below he showed the place, date, nature of charge and disposition of the two most serious charges for which Respondent had been arrested and convicted. He there showed a 1968 auto theft and a 1969 robbery. Disposition of both was that he is on parole. At the time this application was approved and issued on 23 May 1978, Petitioner was certainly aware that Respondent had been convicted of at least two felonies. Had inquiry been made to determine Respondent's full criminal record, it would have been disclosed that in 1965 Respondent was found guilty of petty larceny (Exhibit 13) and sentenced to six months; in 1967 he was convicted of two counts of larceny of a motor vehicle (Exhibit 14) and sentenced to seven years imprisonment; in 1969 he was convicted of robbery and sentenced to 25 years confinement to start after the seven-year sentence was terminated (Exhibit 15); that a probation of October 7, 1966, was set aside and Respondent was sentenced to serve six months for resisting an officer (Exhibit 16); that in 1974 Respondent was found to be in violation of Florida's Financial Responsibility Law and fined $25 (Exhibit 17); that in 1975 he was found guilty of attempted petty larceny and sentenced to 60 days, of which 45 were suspended (Exhibit 18); that in 1976 he was charged with battery and the charge was nol- prossed (Exhibit 19); and that in 1976 and 1977 he had three convictions for driving with a suspended license (Exhibits 20, 21 and 22). The three offenses for which Respondent had been sentenced to prison for 25 and seven years, i.e., robbery and two larcenies of vehicles, had been reported. Those not reported carried a total sentence of less than six months in jail. Following Respondent's arrest in 1979 on a charge of battery (Exhibit 19), this was reported to the Duval County school system, security division, with the information that Respondent had a lengthy arrest record. The information was then passed by the security division to the Personnel Department with the recommendation that Respondent not be employed in a position requiring contact with children (Exhibit 26). The information on the arrest record was also passed to the Florida Department of Education for appropriate action. At the time of this arrest, the Respondent was assigned as science teacher at Forrest High School. The battery charge was nol-prossed in 1980. Upon receipt of Respondent's arrest record at the Department of Education, the case was assigned to a staff member for investigation and recommendation. His report (Exhibit 31) states that Respondent does not deny the arrest record and "indeed recorded same in his application for certification." As noted above, Respondent reported the three most serious offenses of which he had been convicted in the space provided on the application form. The fact that arrests for the less serious offenses of petty larceny were not included by Respondent on his application was evidently known and considered by this investigator in reaching his conclusion that the issue of fraudulent application for certification does not arise in this application. At the time Exhibit 31 was prepared, the procedure for processing complaints against teachers was being revised and neither the old system nor the new system was followed to its proper conclusion. As a result no final action was taken by Petitioner on the recommendation of the investigator that no probable cause for disciplinary action existed on the allegation that Williams was unfit to retain his certification. At the time this recommendation was made (and without the prescribed follow-up to a final agency action), Respondent's record, as known by Petitioner, showed Respondent had been paroled in 1973, to remain on probation until 1986; that he enrolled at the University of North Florida and graduated with a BA degree in 1978 with a major in natural science; that he had been teaching with satisfactory evaluations in the Duval County school system for over a year; and that the battery charge stemmed from a domestic dispute. On 31 October 1980 Respondent proceeded to the apartment of his former girlfriend, Shirley Hall, and the mother of his eight-year-old son to take the boy a Halloween costume. When Ms. Hall would not allow the Respondent to see the boy, angry words were exchanged and Respondent departed. He was later seen shortly after midnight, November 1, 1980, in the vicinity of Ms. Hall's car which was parked in a lot near her apartment by both Ms. Hall's mother, who was visiting, and by a neighbor. By mid-morning on November 1, 1980, Ms. Hall became aware that the interior of her car had been burned during the night and she called the police. When she parked the car on the evening of October 31, 1980, Ms. Hall locked the car as she did every time she left the car unattended. Williams, two or three years ago when on friendly relations with Ms. Hall, had been given a key to Ms. Hall's car. No evidence was presented that he had returned the key or that he still had the key. Upon arrival, the police found the car unlocked and two plastic milk cartons of one-gallon capacity inside the car. Both of these cartons contained gasoline and one was melted about one-third away from the top. The physical evidence indicates that one carton with gasoline and rolled paper wick had been placed under the steering wheel and one placed on the back seat of the car. The wicks had been lighted, the door closed and the ensuing flames and smoke had blackened the windows and cause serious damage to the upholstery and overhead of the car. Lack of oxygen in the car caused both fires to become extinguished before enough heat was generated to cause the gas to explode or to blow out the windows. Approximately two days later Respondent was arrested and charged with arson (Exhibit 23). Following a mistrial the case was nol-prossed. This charge against Respondent received publicity in the Jacksonville papers and at least once was reported on TV news. While these charges were pending, Respondent was removed from his position at Forrest High School and assigned to the media center for the duration of that school year. In September 1981 Respondent was assigned to Ribault Junior High School as a science teacher. In March 1982 he received an overall evaluation of satisfactory from his principal at Ribault.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Jose Iglesias (Petitioner or Iglesias) is entitled to attorney's fees and costs from the Complainant/Respondent, Robert Nieman (Respondent or Nieman), pursuant to Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact On August 14, 2003, the Respondent executed a Complaint that was filed with the Ethics Commission against the Petitioner. The Complaint alleged: Vice Mayor Iglesias is constantly interfering with Police Department’s day-to- day operations, and spreading false rumors about Police Department personnel. (Document #1) Vice Mayor Iglesias is causing a hostile work environment with constant complaints about officers. Vice Mayor Iglesias is constantly encouraging racism, pitting hispanics against white and black officers of the Department. Vice Mayor Iglesias filed false police reports (verbally) constantly for his own gain and benefits. Vice Mayor Iglesias’s 16-year-old son works part time in Town Hall. (Nepotism) Vice Mayor Iglesias improper use of his title by instructing the Town Manager to take actions on the police department, and even retaliation against the Police Chief and myself. Vice Mayor Iglesias ordered public records about himself not to be released, and then when they were released he insisted the secretary releasing the records be fired. (Document #1) Mr. Iglesias is falsely using the title of M.D. and in fact used this title to gain his seat on the council and then becoming Vice Mayor. When Mr. Iglesias has been questioned on this matter by residents in the past he has stated he was a brain surgeon, a foot doctor, and a chiropractor, and could not list a hospital where he did his residency to become M.D. (Document #2) At all times material to this case the Petitioner was Vice Mayor serving on the Town’s governing council. As such, the Petitioner was subject to the ethics provisions governed by the Ethics Commission. The Respondent is a town employee and serves as a police sergeant within the police department. Mr. Nieman has been so employed for over 20 years. After an investigation of three of the allegations set forth in the Complaint (only three were deemed legally sufficient to warrant investigation) and consideration of the Advocate’s recommendation, the Ethics Commission entered a Public Report on March 16, 2004. The Public Report dismissed the Complaint and closed the matter. On April 14, 2004, the Petitioner filed the instant Fee Petition pursuant to Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes (2004). The Fee Petition alleged that the Complaint “is based on eight allegations, all of which are false and were known to be false by Complainant when he filed the Complaint.” Additionally, the Fee Petition stated the Complaint “was filed by the Complainant with the knowledge the Complaint contained one or more false allegations, or with reckless disregard as to whether the Complaint contained false allegations. ” At hearing, the Petitioner presented evidence as to the three allegations of the Complaint that were investigated and deemed legally sufficient to require an ethics investigation. Those allegations were: whether the Petitioner had filed false police reports for his personal benefit; whether the Petitioner had attempted to prevent the release of a public record or insisted on the firing of the person who had released the record; and whether the Petitioner had caused his son to be employed by the Town. The false police reports allegation stemmed from the Petitioner’s use of public roads for rollerblading. The Petitioner is an avid rollerblader and likes to rollerblade for exercise. The Petitioner opined that rollerblading puts less stress on his back and has less impact than jogging. The Petitioner frequently rollerblades on the public road within the Town. Automobile traffic on the road must go around the Petitioner in order to pass. It is the Petitioner’s position that since there is no sidewalk or shoulder suitable to rollerblade, he is entitled to use the road surface just as a pedestrian might use the road surface. The Petitioner skates toward the middle of the lane and not on the edge of the road surface because the roadway is better there for the rollerblades. The record in this case does not clarify whether the Petitioner skates with or against the traffic. In connection with the rollerblading, the Respondent believes that the Petitioner is not entitled to use the road as he does and that if the Petitioner did not use his position as a councilman for influence, he would be cited for rollerblading down the road as he does. Further, the Respondent maintains that the Petitioner has made verbal complaints against motorists who passed too close to him. The Respondent maintains that the verbal complaints are false in that the Petitioner is not entitled to use the roadway as he does and therefore cannot complain against motorists as he does. The Petitioner does not deny the activity. The Respondent has observed the Petitioner rollerblading down the road. The Respondent has not issued a citation to the Petitioner because he is assigned an administrative position within the police department and he believes he is not allowed to issue such citations. The Respondent based the allegation regarding this claim upon statements he has heard from police officers within the Town’s police department. The Respondent did not subpoena the officers to the hearing because he did not want to involve other Town employees in the matter. The Respondent does not have any evidence to support the allegation other than what he believed he had been told in his experience as a police officer for the Town. The record does not demonstrate any written record of either the Petitioner being cited for improper rollerblading or making a report against a vehicle. As to the second allegation that was investigated, a memo purportedly from the chief of police was released to a member of the public by accident. It was included within a stack of documents that had been requested by a private citizen. The document stated in part: SUBJECT: Ethics violations and continual interference of day-to-day police operations by the Vice Mayor Iglesias This memorandum is to inform you [Mayor Michael Addicott] of constant harassment of police personnel and interference in daily operations by the new vice mayor. The Petitioner admitted that he was concerned that the document had been released in error and that the person who wrongly released a document should be disciplined. The Petitioner did not know about the document before it was released. He did not attempt to prevent the release of the document. Instead, the Petitioner sought to, after-the-fact find out why the document had been released, if the document was in fact a public record subject to release, and if the employee should be disciplined for the release. The document in question was a public record, was subject to public release, and the employee was not disciplined for its release. Nevertheless, the Petitioner did require a second (and arguably third opinion) regarding whether the document constituted a public record. In the meanwhile, the controversy within the Town over whether the document should have been released was widely discussed among Town employees. The Respondent filed his claim based upon several reports that the Petitioner wanted the secretary who released the report fired. One of the Respondent’s sources was the Chief of Police. The Respondent did not question the veracity of the police chief. At hearing, the Petitioner did not deny that discipline would have been appropriate if the release of the document were shown to be erroneous. The Petitioner acknowledged that the Town pursued a full review of the matter and that he was among those who called for the review. As to the third allegation (that the Petitioner caused his son to be hired by the Town), the Respondent believed that once the Petitioner was elected as a councilman that the son was not eligible to work for the Town. The Respondent thought that rules prohibiting nepotism applied to the Petitioner’s son and that as such the son could not continue to work for the Town. The Respondent based this interpretation on a general but un- researched idea about nepotism. He also discussed this matter with another Town employee who also thought the son was not eligible to work for the Town. In fact, the Petitioner’s son, Joseph, started working for the Town in a part-time position prior to the Petitioner being elected to office. After the Petitioner became Vice Mayor, the son continued with his duties but was moved from an independent contractor status to part-time employee status. The son then received a raise in his hourly rate of pay when the Town employees also received a raise. The Petitioner did not supervise the son’s employment and did not direct the son’s work. The record is unclear as to whether the Petitioner voted on the pay raise or not. At hearing the Respondent maintained that he had had numerous conversations with persons at the Ethics Commission who recommended that he add the information regarding the nepotism claim to his allegations. He admitted that he did not independently check any laws or rules that might pertain to nepotism before filing the claim. Much of the Respondent’s attitude and comments in connection with the Petitioner must be viewed in the context of the happenings within the Town. For unknown reasons, the Town, its employees, and the governing council were in a state of change and confrontation. The Respondent and the Petitioner apparently do not relate well to one another personally. The Respondent is suspicious of the Petitioner’s medical credentials and is uncertain as to why the Petitioner holds himself out as an “M.D.”, when he is not licensed nor is he eligible to be licensed as a medical doctor. The Petitioner believes the Respondent holds some animosity toward him for unknown reasons. Further, because the Respondent admitted he believes the Petitioner is arrogant, that belief somehow that demonstrates malice toward the Petitioner. The questions of whether the Petitioner is credentialed to be a medical doctor, whether the Petitioner attempted to interfere with the police department, or whether the Petitioner spread false rumors regarding the police department were not investigated and do not support, if true, an ethics violation. If attorney's fees and costs are entered in this cause the beneficiary of an award will be the Town. The Petitioner has incurred no expenses or costs associated with the defense of the Complaint. The Town agreed to pay and has paid all attorney's fees and costs associated with this case. The Petitioner presented several invoices from the Law Offices of Stuart R. Michelson that were alleged to pertain to the instant case. The Petitioner also presented testimony from an expert witness who was to be paid by the Town. That witness, an attorney, was to be paid $200.00 per hour for his efforts in this matter. Although the Petitioner’s expert testified that the hourly rates for fees applied in this cause were reasonable, there was no evidence that the time was actually expended in connection with the instant case. There is no way to know if the services were performed for the defense against the Respondent’s Complaint. The expert merely opined that the invoices he reviewed were reasonable. He maintained that the Petitioner should recover $27,455.53 in this matter.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Fee Petition in this case. S DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Kaye Starling, Agency Clerk Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phillip C. Claypool, General Counsel Commission on Ethics 3600 Mclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Bonnie J. Williams, Executive Director Commission on Ethics 3600 Mclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 James J. Birch, Esquire Law Office of Stuart R. Michelson 200 Southeast 13th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Robert Nieman 9731 Southwest 12th Street Pembroke Pines, Florida 33026
