Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of a Recommended Order of Dismissal by Lawrence P. Stevenson, a Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Recommended Order of Dismissal as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction under section 320.643, Florida Statutes. Filed April 28, 2010 11:59 AM Division of Administrative Hearings. ,.j; DONE AND ORDERED this J,J ay of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. arl A. Ford, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motor Vehicles this :J.tlt day of April, 2010. 1JfV,irtiawyak, uo..,.; Admlnisnlor NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. Copies furnished: John W. Forehand, Esquire Kurkin, Forehand, Brandes, LLP 800 North Calhoun Street, Suite lB Tallahassee, Florida 32303 David Barrett Tterra Motorsports, LLC 1020 East Lafayette Street, Suite 101 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dean Bunch, Esquire Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough LLP 3600 Maclay Boulevard South, Suite 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32312 Kurt D. Williams, Esquire Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt LLP 2600 Grand Boulevard, Suite 1200 Kansas City, Missouri 64108 Robert Craig Spickard, Esquire Kurkin, Forehand, Brandes, LLP 800 North Calhoun Street, Suite lB Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jennifer Clark Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Rm. A-308 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Lawrence P. Stevenson Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator Florida Administrative Law Reports Post Office Box 385 Gainesville, Florida 32602
The Issue Did the Respondents offer to sell a business opportunity without filing a disclosure statement with the Department and without providing prospective purchasers a disclosure statement at least three working days prior to the receipt of any consideration for the signing of a business opportunity contract contrary to Section 559.80, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact On March 5, 1994, Star Vision was in attendance at a trade show in Jacksonville, Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibits 3,5) Upon investigating Star Vision's activities at the show, the Department's representatives, Bob James and Bill Bassett, found Star Vision to be offering for sale a business opportunity as defined by Chapter 559, Part VIII, Florida Statutes. (Petitioner's Exhibits 3,5) Star Vision offered to sell a business opportunity representing that one could become a "licensee" upon paying $600. (Petitioner's Exhibits 5) Star Vision had not file a copy of the required disclosure statement with the Department prior to making the offering above. (Petitioner's Exhibits 2,3) Granhan and Bray were given a letter notifying them of the filing requirements together with a business opportunity registration package. (Petitioner's Exhibits 2,3) On March 12,1994, Star Vision attended another trade show in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibits 4) Upon investigating Star Vision's activities at the show, the Department's representative, James R. Kelly, found Star Vision to be offering for sale a business opportunity. (Petitioner's Exhibits 4) Star Vision represented the following while offering to sell a business opportunity: The regular price of the opportunity was $1,495 but they were running a special of $495 for anyone signing up at the show; and Purchasers would receive training tapes and other training that teaches how to market and sell the product. (Petitioner's Exhibits 4) The Department received a consumer complaint against STAR VISION from Mr. Alan Drake. Upon purchasing a business opportunity from Star Vision, Mr. Drake was provided with audio and video tapes which instruct purchasers how to sell and market the product. (Petitioner's Exhibits 1) Upon selling him a business opportunity, Star Vision did not provide Mr. Drake with a disclosure statement, and has never registered with the Department.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ordering that: Respondents to cease and desist selling business opportunities in the State of Florida, Imposing an administrative fine of $5,000 for each violation, in accordance with Section 559.813(2), Florida Statutes, against Terry Granhan and Mike Bray d/b/a Star Vision Direct Cable in the amount of $15,000. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Jay S. Levenstein, Senior Attorney Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Terry Granhan and Mike Bray Star Vision Direct Cable, Inc. 9050 Highway 64, Suite 115 Memphis, TN 38002 Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File by Lynne A. Quimby-Pennock, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Respondent’s Withdrawal of Notice and Motion to Dismiss as Moot, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED and no license will be issued to Subaru of America, Inc. and Boyland Auto Center, LLC d/b/a Subaru of South Orlando for the sale of Subaru vehicles (SUBA) at 9576 South Orange Blossom Trail, Orlando (Orange County), Florida 32837. Filed March 28, 2012 7:52 AM Division of Administrative Hearings DONE AND ORDERED this a | day of March, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. v Lrloen Julie Baker, Chief Bureau of Issuance Oversight Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed in the official records of the Division of Motorist Services this_4_ day of March, 2012. ok Nalini Vinayak, Dealer Hicense Administrator NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. JB/jde Copies furnished: J. Andrew Bertron, ESquire Nelson, Mullins, Riley and Scarborough, LLP 3600 Maclay Boulevard South, Suite 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32312 Kenneth G. Turkel, Esquire Bajo, Cuva, Cohen and Turkel, P.A. 100 North Tampa Street, Suite 1900 Tampa, Florida 33602 Hayden P. Ridore, Esquire Invictus Law Group, P.L. Post Office Box 2209 Orlando, Florida 32802 Dylan M. Snyder, ESquire Dylan Snyder, P.A. 201 North Franklin Street, Suite 2880 Tampa, Florida 33602 Lynne A. Quimby-Pennock Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator
The Issue The issue in this case concerns whether the Petitioner should issue a cease and desist order and/or impose sanctions against the Respondent on the basis of allegations that the Respondent, by failing to have its books, accounts, and documents available for examination and by refusing to permit an inspection of its books and records in an investigation and examination, has violated Sections 520.995(1)(a), (f), and (g), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Sometime during the month of February of 1991, Ms. Jennifer Chirolis, a Financial Investigator from the Department of Banking and Finance, visited the offices of the Barat Company. She spoke with Mr. Roque Barat and determined that the Barat Company was conducting retail installment sales without being licensed to do so under Chapter 520, Florida Statutes. Mr. Chirolis advised Mr. Roque Barat that he needed a license and asked him to cease operations until he obtained the necessary license. The Barat Company thereafter obtained the necessary license and was still licensed as of the time of the formal hearing. Thereafter, the Department received a complaint about the Barat Company from a customer. The customer's complaint was to the effect that the Barat Company had made misrepresentations concerning the fee paid by the customer. The Department initiated an "investigation" of the customer's complaint and also decided to conduct an "examination" of the Barat Company. On April 22, 1992, a Department Examiner, Mr. Lee Winters, went to the office of the Barat Company to conduct the "examination" and "investigation". The Barat Company is operated out of a small office with two employees and a few filing cabinets. When Mr. Winters arrived, employees of the Barat Company were conducting business with two customers. Mr. Winters identified himself to the employees and informed them that he had been assigned to conduct an "examination" and "investigation" of the Barat Company. A Barat Company employee, Mr. Fred Vivar, said that he could not produce the company's records without express authorization from Mr. Roque Barat, that Mr. Roque Barat was out of the country, that he could not get in touch with Mr. Roque Barat at that moment, but that when he did get in touch with him, he would advise Mr. Roque Barat of Mr. Winter's desire to examine the company's books and records. Following a number of telephone calls over a period of several days, on May 1, 1992, Mr. Vivar advised Mr. Winters that he had received authorization from Mr. Roque Barat for the Department to inspect the books and records of the Barat Company. An appointment was made for the Department to inspect the books and records on May 6, 1992, beginning at 10:00 a.m. On May 5, 1992, a letter from an attorney representing the Barat Company was hand delivered to Mr. Winters. The letter included the following paragraph: It is my understanding that you have requested the opportunity to view the records of the above-referenced company, said inspection to take place on May 6, 1992. Please be advised that if this "inspection" is purportedly being done by your agency's authority, pursuant to F.S. 520.996, that no records will be produced absent compliance by your department with F.S. 520.994 including, but not limited to, the Barat Company exercising its right to challenge said subpoena. The Department concluded from the letter of May 5, 1992, that the Barat Company not only refused to produce records without a subpoena, but that, even if served with a subpoena, the Barat Company would resist compliance with the subpoena unless and until ordered to comply by a court. For that reason the Department did not pursue the issuance of a subpoena. Mr. Winters has been involved in over one hundred "examinations" under Chapter 520, Florida Statutes. In the course of those "examinations" there have been only two licensees that did not produce their records. Those two licensees were the Barat Company and another company known as Phase One Credit. Mr. Roque Barat is an officer and director of both Phase One Credit and the Barat Company. The license of Phase One Credit was revoked for its failure to produce its books and records. The refusal to produce the books and records of the Barat Company was occasioned by an effort on the part of Mr. Roque Barat to avoid payment of "examination" fees authorized by Section 520.996, Florida Statutes. In the summer of 1992, the Barat Company filed for bankruptcy, closed down its business operations, and is currently winding up the business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance issue a Final Order in this case to the following effect: Dismissing the charge that the Barat Company has violated Section 520.995(1)(a), Florida Statutes; Concluding that the Barat Company has violated Sections 520.995(1)(f) and (g), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint; Imposing a penalty consisting of: (a) an administra-tive fine in the amount of one thousand dollars, and (b) revocation of the Barat Company's license; and Ordering the Barat Company to cease and desist from any further violations of Chapter 520, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5620 The following are my specific rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraph 1: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law, rather than a proposed finding of fact. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5: Accepted in substance, with the exception of the last five words. The last five words are rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case and as, in any event, not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Paragraph 6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Paragraph 8: First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as inaccurate description of letter. (The relevant text of the letter is included in the findings of fact.) Last sentence rejected as subordinate and unnecessary evidentiary details. Paragraph 9: Rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Paragraph 10: First two sentences rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Last two sentences accepted in substance. Paragraph 11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Paragraph 13: Accepted. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent: As noted in the Preliminary Statement portion of this Recommended Order, the Respondent's proposed recommended order was filed late. The Respondent's proposed recommended order also fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 60Q-2.031, Florida Administrative Code, in that it fails to contain citations to the portions of the record that support its proposed findings of fact. A party's statutory right to a specific ruling on each proposed finding submitted by the party is limited to those circumstances when the proposed findings are submitted within the established deadlines and in conformity with applicable rules. See Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, and Forrester v. Career Service Commission, 361 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), in which the court held, inter alia, that a party is not entitled to more than a reasonable period of time within which to submit its proposals. Because the Respondent submitted its proposals late and because those proposals fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 60Q-2.031, Florida Administrative Code, the Respondent is not statutorily entitled to a specific ruling on each of its proposed findings and no such specific findings have been made. (As noted in the Preliminary Statement, the Respondent's proposed recommended order has been read and considered.) COPIES FURNISHED: Ron Brenner, Esquire Office of the Comptroller 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue Suite 708-N Miami, Florida 33128 Louis J. Terminello, Esquire 950 South Miami Avenue Miami, Florida 33130 Michael H. Tarkoff, Esquire 2601 South Bayshore Drive Suite 1400 Coconut Grove, Florida 33133 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Copies furnished continued: William G. Reeves, General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
The Issue Whether Respondent, Maserati North America, Inc.’s ("MNA"), proposed 2017 Commercial Policy Program ("2017 Program") is a modification of the franchise agreement between MNA and Petitioner, New Country Motor Cars of Palm Beach, LLC, d/b/a Maserati of Palm Beach ("Palm Beach"), or Petitioner Recovery Racing, LLC, d/b/a Maserati of Ft. Lauderdale ("Fort Lauderdale"); and, if so, whether it is fair and not prohibited by section 320.641(3), Florida Statutes (2016). Whether MNA’s proposed modifications to the Existing Franchise Agreements with Petitioners are fair and not prohibited under section 320.641(3).
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented, the Pre-hearing Stipulation of the parties and the record as a whole, the following relevant and material Findings of Fact are made2/:
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: A final order be entered by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles: (1) DISMISSING Petitioners’ claims regarding MNA’s 2017 Commercial Policy Bonus Program; and (2) GRANTING, IN PART, AND DENYING, IN PART, Petitioners’ claims regarding modifications in the Proposed New Agreement, as set forth above. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of January, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 2018.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners are entitled to a proposed motor vehicle dealership in Seminole County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact DOAH provided the parties with adequate notice of the final hearing. On December 3, 2008, DOAH mailed a Notice of Hearing to each of the parties, scheduling the final hearing for April 8, 2009. No Notice was returned as undelivered. No party objected to a final hearing on April 8, 2009. On December 3, 2008, DOAH also issued an Order of Pre- hearing Instructions that, in relevant part, required the parties to file a pre-hearing stipulation, which was to include a list of witnesses and exhibits to be called and submitted at the final hearing. No party complied with the Order. The documents forwarded to DOAH by the Department support the findings. The Notice of Publication for a New Point Franchise Motor Vehicle Dealer in a County of More than 300,000 Population was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 34, Number 43, on October 24, 2008. On behalf of Respondent, Mr. James Sursely timely filed a protest letter dated November 7, 2008, with Ms. Nalini Vinayak, the administrator at the Department responsible for receiving such protests. The remaining facts are undisputed in this proceeding. The proposed new point franchise motor vehicle dealer is for a line-make identified in the record as Chongqing Lifan Industry Group Co. Ltd. (CHOL) motorcycles. The proposed location is in Seminole County, Florida. Seminole County has a population in excess of 300,000. The proposed new point franchise motor vehicle dealer is located at 3311 West Lake Mary Boulevard, Lake Mary, Florida. Respondent owns and operates an existing CHOL dealership that is located at 306 West Main Street, Apopka, Orange, County, Florida 32712. The proposed dealership is within a 12.5-mile radius of Respondent's dealership. Respondent has standing to protest the establishment of the proposed dealership. The petitioners submitted no evidence that Respondent is "not providing adequate representation" of the same line-make motor vehicles in the community or territory.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order denying the establishment of the proposed franchise dealership. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of April, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a franchised truck dealer for three manufacturers, including Respondent. The parties entered into a three-year franchise agreement on September 17, 1986, which agreement took effect on September 15, 1986 (Dealer Agreement). Under the Dealer Agreement, Petitioner is assigned a 12-county area that includes Polk County, Florida. In March, 1987, John Drakesmith entered into negotiations with R. N. Heintzelman for the purchase of all of the stock of Petitioner. The negotiations culminated in the execution on July 8, 1988, of an Agreement for Purchase, Sale and Redemption of Stock in Heintzelman's Truck Center, Inc. (Stock Purchase Agreement). The transaction was closed on the same day, and Mr. Drakesmith, as the new owner of Petitioner, assumed the management of Petitioner's business at that time. The Dealer Agreement provides that, to the extent permitted by local law, Respondent may terminate the agreement prior to its expiration date in the event of "[a]ny change... in the ownership or active management of [Petitioner] from that indicated [as described above], without the prior written consent of [Respondent]." The Dealer Agreement provides that, to the extent permitted by local law, Respondent may terminate the agreement prior to its expiration date in the event of "[a]ny actual or attempted assignment of this Agreement or any right or obligation hereunder." Around the end of May, 1987, one of Respondent's regional sales managers learned of the negotiations between Mr. Drakesmith and Mr. Heintzelman. On June 24, 1987, J. L. Brown, Respondent's director of dealer relations, telephoned Mr. Drakesmith at his Ford truck dealership in Cleveland to discuss his impending purchase of the stock of Petitioner. Mr. Drakesmith confirmed that a sale was taking place. Mr. Brown indicated that he and some other representatives of Respondent were going to be in Cleveland and would like to meet Mr. Drakesmith. They tentatively agreed to meet on July 2, 1987. By letter dated June 24, 1987, Mr. Brown confirmed the conversation of the same day. The letter informed Mr. Drakesmith that the Dealer Agreement "is a personal service agreement which can not be transferred or assigned." Accompanying the letter was an application package for a Western Star franchise. On July 2, 1987, Mr. Brown, Dennis Trittin, Respondent's parts and service representative, Mr. Roland Smith, Respondent's regional sales manager for the region including Florida, and Richard Dean, Respondent's Great Lakes regional sales manager, met with Mr. Drakesmith at his Cleveland dealership. Respondent's representatives told Mr. Drakesmith that they were looking forward to his marketing their product more aggressively than Mr. Heintzelman had in the past. They discussed Mr. Drakesmith's possible interest in handling Western Star trucks in his Cleveland dealership. Mr. Brown left Mr. Drakesmith with another copy of the application package. Following the July 2 meeting, Mr. Drakesmith concluded that Respondent was very favorably disposed toward having him as a dealer, although he recognized that he had not yet been formally approved. By letter dated July 8, 1987, Mr. Brown confirmed their July 2 discussion of Mr. Drakesmith's "interest in representing the Western Star product line in Orlando and possibly Cleveland." He added that he was looking forward to receiving the completed documentation "in order to formally complete the application process for the Orlando Dealership." Mr. Drakesmith mailed the completed application, together with some but not all materials, to Respondent on July 13, 1987. The materials were mailed to Respondent at the address shown in the application as that to which the application should be mailed. Respondent had moved from that address over one year earlier. When the application package was returned to Petitioner a few days later as undeliverable, Mr. Drakesmith had it remailed promptly to Respondent's correct address. The remailed package was never received by Respondent or, if received, lost prior to its delivery to Mr. Brown, who never received it. Two or three weeks after the closing, Mr. Smith visited Mr. Drakesmith at Petitioner's dealership. At the time, Mr. Heintzelman and his former general manager, Harry Gates, were both gone. The purpose of the visit was for Mr. Smith and Mr. Drakesmith to get acquainted with each other. Sometime after his visit and before September 15, 1987, Mr. Smith told Mr. Brown by telephone that Mr. Drakesmith had taken over Petitioner and was operating the dealership. Between Mr. Smith's visit in late July and September 15, 1987, Mr. Drakesmith had one or two telephone conversations with Mr. Smith concerning pending orders for trucks that Petitioner had submitted and sales in general. At no time during the visit or telephone calls did Mr. Smith mention the receipt, nonreceipt, or approval of Mr. Drakesmith's application. In August, 1987, Respondent received an expression of interest from a third party for a dealership including the Polk County area. At the time, Respondent had no dealers in Florida except for a dealer in Jacksonville and Petitioner. By letter dated September 15, 1987, Mr. Brown gave Mr. Heintzelman, addressed at Petitioner's dealership, notice of the termination of the Dealer Agreement, effective 90 days from the date of the receipt of the letter. The grounds for the termination were that Petitioner had breached the Dealer Agreement by assigning or attempting to assign the agreement and changing its active management or selling or otherwise changing its ownership without Respondent's prior written consent. The letter also stated that Petitioner had violated Florida statutory law by changing its executive management or ownership or assigning the agreement without first giving Respondent written notice and without providing Respondent with the opportunity and information necessary to evaluate and, if appropriate, object to the new owner, manager, or assignee. Copies of the letter were provided to Mr. Drakesmith and the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Department). Mr. Drakesmith telephoned Mr. Brown on or about September 17 to object to the termination. Mr. Brown explained that he had felt that Mr. Drakesmith had lost interest in the Western Star franchise because he had not bothered to submit his application. When Mr. Drakesmith replied that he had sent it in, Mr. Brown said that he had not received it and suggested that Mr. Drakesmith resubmit it. On September 22, Mr. Drakesmith resubmitted the application materials that he had mailed on July 13 and remailed a few days later. After additional materials were requested and provided, Mr. Brown offered Petitioner a new dealer agreement with the same territory as in the Dealer Agreement, except that Polk County would be replaced by two less profitable counties. By letter dated September 22, 1987, the Department informed Petitioner of its receipt of a copy of the September 15 letter and informed Petitioner of its right to protest the proposed cancellation. The letter called Petitioner's attention to Section 320.641(3), Florida Statutes, which was cited in full. The letter also contained a copy of Sections 320.60-320.70, Florida Statutes. The letter informed Petitioner that it had 90 days from the date of the September 15 letter within which to file with the Department a "verified (notarized) complaint" for a determination of an unfair cancellation of the Dealer Agreement. By letter dated October 23, 1987, Petitioner notified the Department of its protest of the intended cancellation. The letter was signed by Mr. Drakesmith as president of Petitioner. The letter bore only the signature of Mr. Drakesmith, which was not notarized. The letter did not contain any information beneath Mr. Drakesmith's signature and title. As a result of a conversation between Henry C. Noxtine of the Department and Mr. Drakesmith, Mr. Drakesmith learned that his October 23 letter did not meet the verification requirement. Lacking the original letter, Mr. Drakesmith had an employee of Petitioner, Eileen C. Mercer, retype the letter and add in the lower right-hand corner of the second page the notation, "Signed before me this Oct. 29, 1987." She then signed beneath the notation and added her notary's stamp showing that her commission expires August 28, 1990. The record does not reflect whether Ms. Mercer applied her notary's seal to the letter. However, at no time did Ms. Mercer require Mr. Drakesmith to swear or affirm that the information in the October 23 letter was true and correct. Following the above-described additions, the letter was promptly resubmitted to the Department. By letter dated November 24, 1987, the Department transmitted the file to the Division of Administrative Hearings on the sole issue of the propriety of the cancellation of Dealer Agreement. The Department's transmittal letter, a copy of which was sent to and received by Mr. Drakesmith, noted that the Department had received a "verified" complaint from Petitioner. Mr. Drakesmith personally performs the duties of a general manager at Petitioner's dealership. Mr. Drakesmith is of good moral character. At no time has Respondent filed a verified complaint for a determination of Mr. Drakesmith's moral character.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the complaint of Petitioner for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. ENTERED this 15th day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 1988. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 87-5308 Treatment Accorded Petitioner's Findings 1-2. Adopted in substance. Adopted, except that the last sentence is rejected as contrary to the evidence. Adopted, except that the Stock Purchase Agreement was signed on July 8, 1987, and by other parties as well. Adopted in substance. Rejected as irrelevant and legal argument. 7-9. Adopted. 10-11. Adopted in substance. 12-13. Adopted. Adopted, except that reliance is irrelevant. Adopted in substance. 16,18. Adopted. 17. Rejected as irrelevant. Treatment Accorded Respondent's Findings 1,3,4. Adopted. 2. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in substance. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted. 8,14,16. Rejected as irrelevant. 15. Adopted in substance. 17,18. Adopted. 19-21. Rejected as irrelevant. 22-23. Adopted. Adopted in substance. However, the materials that Mr. Drakesmith sent to Respondent and when he sent them is irrelevant. Rejected as recitation of testimony and cumulative. Adopted, except that second sentence is rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. 28,29. Adopted in substance. 30-32. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted. Adopted in substance. 35-37. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted, except that last 17 words are rejected as irrelevant. Adopted, except that the cause offered for the Issuance of the termination notice is against the greater weight of the evidence. 40-44. Adopted. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in substance. Rejected as unclear. Adopted, except that the last 16 words are rejected as legal argument. 49-51. Adopted in substance. 52-57. Rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph E. Foster, Esquire Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson Post Office Box 231 Orlando, Florida 32802 Dean Bunch, Esquire Rumberger, Kirk, Caldwell, Cabaniss, Burke & Wechlser, P.A. 101 North Monroe Street, Suite 900 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Enoch John Whitney General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Respondent's yacht and ship salesman's license should be disciplined for the reasons set forth in the notice of intent to revoke license dated June 14, 1994.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility to regulate persons pursuant to Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. On April 30, 1993, the Department received an application for a yacht and ship broker or salesman license (the application) submitted by Respondent, Thomas I. Davis, Jr. The application provided, in pertinent part: LICENSES AND CERTIFICATES: Have you now or have you ever been licensed or certified in any other profession such as real estate, insurance, or securities in Florida or any other state? Yes No If you answered yes, please describe: Profession License # First Obtained Status of License (a)Has any license, certification, registration or permit to practice any regulated profession or occupation been revoked, annulled or suspended in this or any other state, or is any proceeding now pending? Yes No (b) Have you ever resigned or withdrawn from, or surrendered any license, registration or permit to practice any regulated profession, occupation or vocation which such charges were pending? Yes No If your answer to questions (a) or (b) is Yes, attach a complete, signed statement giving the name and address of the officer, board, commission, court or governmental agency or department before whom the matter was, or is now, pending and give the nature of the charges and relate the facts. In response to the application questions identified above, Respondent entered the following answers: "No" as to questions 11, 12(a), and 12(b). As a result of the foregoing, Respondent was issued a yacht and ship salesman's license on May 10, 1993. Thereafter, the Department learned that Respondent had been censured by the NASD. In a decision entered by that body accepting Respondent's offer of settlement, Respondent was given a censure, a fine of $20,000.00, and a suspension in all capacities from association with any member for a period of two (2) years with the requirement that at the conclusion of such suspension that he requalify by examination for any and all licenses with the Association. The censure also provided a specific payment plan for the $20,000 fine which was assessed. To date, Respondent has not complied with that provision of the settlement. From 1973 through 1991, Respondent was registered with several different firms pursuant to Chapter 517, Florida Statutes. Additionally, Respondent has been licensed to sell securities in the following states: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, and New York. Respondent has also been licensed in Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico. Respondent has been a licensed stock broker with the Securities and Exchange Commission since 1971. Respondent answered questions 11 and 12 (a) and (b) falsely. Respondent knew he was licensed to sell securities and knew of the sanction from the NASD at all times material to the entry of the answers. Pursuant to Rule 61B-60.003, when the Department receives an application for licensure which is in the acceptable form, it is required to issue a temporary license. Had the Respondent correctly answered questions 11 and 12 on the application, the Department would not have issued Respondent's license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, enter a final order dismissing Respondent's challenge to the notice of intent and revoking his license. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 13th day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-4258 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1 through 9, 11, 13, and 15 through 17 are accepted. Paragraph 10 is rejected as repetitive. Except as to findings reached above, paragraphs 12 and 14 are rejected as irrelevant. It is found that Respondent falsely answered question 11. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Respondent's proposed findings of fact are rejected as they do not comply with Rule 60Q-2.031(3), Florida Administrative Code. However, to the extent findings do not conflict with the findings of fact above, they have been accepted. Such proposed findings of fact are paragraphs: 1, 7 and 8. The remaining paragraphs are rejected as they are not supported by the record cited (none), irrelevant, argument, or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 E. Harper Field Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 David M. Goldstein LAW OFFICE OF DAVID M. GOLDSTEIN 100 S.E. 2nd Street Suite 2750 International Place Miami, Florida 33131
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application to relocate B.O.O., Inc., d/b/a Acura of South Florida (Acura of South Florida) from its current location in Hollywood, Florida, to its proposed location in Pembroke Pines, Florida, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Parties American Honda is a licensee and manufacturer as defined by Section 320.60(8) and (9), Florida Statutes. Acura of South Florida and Case Acura are motor vehicle dealers as defined by Section 320.60(11)(a)1., Florida Statutes. At all relevant times, Acura of South Florida's principal is Craig Zinn (Mr. Zinn); Case Acura's principals are Rick and Rita Case (Mr. Case and Mrs. Case, respectively, and collectively, the Cases). Notice and Standing With respect to notice and standing, the parties have stipulated as follows: On October 15, 2004, notice of American Honda's intent to relocate Acura of South Florida (proposed relocation) to Pembroke Pines from its current location in Hollywood was duly-noticed by publication in the Florida Administrative Weekly. Case Acura has standing to protest the proposed relocation, and timely filed its protest. The Community or Territory The parties have stipulated that the Community or Territory (generally referred to in the industry as a "comm/terr" ) relevant to this proceeding is the area defined by American Honda as the Pembroke Pines comm/terr (Pembroke Pines comm/terr or comm/terr). Both Acura of South Florida and Case Acura are located within the comm/terr, as is the proposed relocation site. The proposed relocation site is located west of both Acura of South Florida and of Case Acura. The Proposed Relocation and Related Market Studies Case Acura is, at all relevant times, centrally located in Ft. Lauderdale in Broward County, Florida. Major Broward County traffic arteries provide ready access to Case Acura from the north, south, east and west within the comm/terr. Acura of South Florida is located south of Case Acura, and just north of the Broward County line. Unlike Case Acura, Acura of South Florida does not offer customers ready access from any direction within the comm/terr. Both Case Acura and Acura of South Florida are located well east of the proposed location. From time to time, as circumstances warrant, American Honda evaluates specific existing or proposed comm/terrs, including the Pembroke Pines comm/terr, by performing a so-called market study. American Honda's market studies are an integral part of the company's strategic and long-range planning process. American Honda's market studies are conducted by teams of experienced and appropriately credentialed experts (market study team(s)). With reference to this case, market studies in the Pembroke Pines comm/terr were conducted in 1997 and again in 2003. The proposed relocation grew out of the results and recommendations of the 1997 market study team. The same results and recommendations were reached again by the 2003 market study team, based upon updated information concerning relevant data which emerged between the two market studies. Both studies documented that Broward County's population had been and would continue for the foreseeable future to "trend west" within the comm/terr. This westward population trend has been and is predicted to continue and to be particularly pronounced among affluent households. Because American Honda manufactures luxury vehicles under the Acura brand, American Honda and its dealers seek to "capture" or "conquer," i.e. attract the business, of such households, while maintaining their existing customer base of affluent households. The teams which conducted both market studies determined that the present configuration of Acura dealers within the comm/terr (dealer network) did not provide adequate representation for American Honda's Acura brand (adequate representation). The lack of adequate representation was a function of the westward population trend. To remedy the situation, and in accordance with Florida law concerning dealer relocation, both market study teams reasonably recommended that Acura of South Florida be relocated to western Broward County. The recommendation was not implemented following the 1997 market study; at that time, and for some years before and after, the owners of Acura of South Florida (Mr. Zinn's predecessors) were beset by illness and management difficulties, and not in a position to undertake the recommended relocation. Likewise American Honda was not in a position to force a relocation upon Acura of South Florida, because it had neither contractual rights nor statutory rights to do so. The 2003 market study team revisited the comm/terr in order to verify or refute the conclusions and recommendations of the 1997 study team in light of all that had transpired since 1997. Upon careful consideration of updated data, the 2003 study team reasonably concluded that the dealer network as it was then configured still failed to afford adequate representation. American Honda's market study teams, as a matter of course, conduct informal interviews with all dealers in the comm/terr when assembling market study data. The 1997 and 2003 market study teams followed this practice. During the 2003 interview with him, Mr. Case was asked whether he would like to move his dealership. Mr. Case replied unambiguously that he was well-satisfied with his present location, where he had become one of Acura's most successful dealers. It is noted that Acura dealers are permitted to market and to sell Acuras anywhere, both within and without the comm/terr in which they are located. The Cases have taken particular advantage of this opportunity, a factor which contributes to Case Acura's significant profitability. Dealer input, and the present success or lack thereof of dealers within a comm/terr, are data considered by market study teams in the context of all the other data. Upon consideration of all relevant data, including the input of the dealers within the Pembroke Pines comm/terr, the 2003 market study team adhered to the conclusion of the 1997 team and recommended implementation of the relocation of Acura of South Florida as proposed in 1997. As Acura of South Florida and American Honda set out to implement the relocation recommendation, Mr. Case had a change of heart and came forward to insist that he was entitled to be the dealer to be relocated. He also insisted that Acura of South Florida remain where it was. In support of these late- asserted demands, Mr. Case testified that he had previously been informed by the "zone manager" for the comm/terr, one Ray Mikiciuk (Mr. Mikiciuk) that Case Acura (and not Acura of South Florida) would be relocated. According to Mr. Case, Mr. Mikiciuk was authorized by American Honda to so advise Mr. Case on American Honda's behalf. Mr. Case also claims that Case Acura would have been the dealership relocated but for a threat by Mr. Zinn to sue American Honda should Case Acura be relocated. Contrary to Mr. Case's testimony regarding the foregoing, the persuasive evidence established that since 1997, American Honda executives supported the market study recommendations for the Pembroke Pines comm/terr, including the proposed relocation. Mr. Mikiciuk is a low level employee; there is no persuasive evidence that Mr. Mikiciuk ever had authority to speak for American Honda with reference to dealer relocations, let alone to bind the company. These facts were well known to Mr. Case. Mr. Case had unfettered access to the highest level American Honda executives over decades of mutually lucrative dealings with American Honda and related subsidiaries. Mr. Case had no reluctance to use these open lines of communication with regard to matters of minor as well as major importance to Case Acura. Yet, he now posits that American Honda, speaking through zone manager Mikiciuk, intended to overrule its 1997 and 2003 market study teams and relocate Case Acura, and reneged only because of Mr. Zinn's threat to litigate. The foregoing scenario is charitably described as counterintuitive. No corroborating evidence was provided. Mr. Case's testimony concerning his dealings with American Honda in regard to the proposed relocation is uncorroborated, unbelievable, and not credited by the fact-finder. Mr. Zinn initiated his purchase of Acura of South Florida in the spring of 2003. By the time the transaction was finalized in December 2003, anticipated future change(s)-- including the westward population trend identified in the 1997 market study--had become substantially more pronounced. Other changes had developed, or were reasonably anticipated to develop in the foreseeable future. For example, Acura of South Florida is presently and permanently foreclosed from providing customers and staff even the basic amenity of on-site parking, inasmuch as the Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) has taken by condemnation a 23-foot strip along the entire dealership frontage. Thirty parking places have been lost. Signage advising the public that they had reached Acura of South Florida is no longer permitted. At its present location, it is impossible for Acura of South Florida to be brought into compliance with Acura's so-called Design Image Standards (DIS) because the dealership property is too small to allow for the expansion required by DIS. American Honda and its network of dealers deem implementation of DIS at every dealership to be crucial to Acura's future success or failure in the marketplace. Additionally, the dealership is a prime candidate to be declared a "non-conforming use" by local zoning authorities. Such designation would render it impossible to obtain necessary permits to make needed improvements in the future. An Objective, Reasonable Standard In order to assess the adequacy of representation afforded by the existing dealer network in the comm/terr and to measure the level of opportunity available in the market, it is necessary to develop an objective, reasonable standard against which to compare the actual market penetration achieved by the existing dealer network, which includes, in this case, Acura of South Florida and Case Acura. A standard is a measure of the level of performance a brand can reasonably expect to achieve in the market with an adequately performing dealer network; that is, an adequate number of dealers performing competitively. The most objective data available for measuring the performance of a dealer network is market penetration data. Market penetration is the ratio of a brand's performance against the competitive industry. Market penetration is a direct measure of both inter-brand and intra-brand competition. Intra- brand competition is competition between competitors of the same brand. Inter-brand refers to competitors of different brands. The first step in developing a reasonable standard is to select a suitable comparison area. When choosing a comparison area, it is essential to select an area that is itself adequately represented. In determining whether a proposed comparison area is adequately represented, national average market penetration is an extremely conservative benchmark, because it includes all of the adequately represented, inadequately represented, and unrepresented areas within the United States. By contrast, the State of Florida is not an appropriate standard comparison area against which to judge the performance of Acura in the Pembroke Pines comm/terr because at relevant times the brand performs below national average in Florida. This is so because Florida has a disproportionate number of areas in which Acura has no dealer representation as well as a disproportionate share of underperforming dealers. National average market penetration is, under all the facts and circumstances of this case, the appropriate starting point for developing a reasonable standard for the Acura brand. The national average must be adjusted, however, to take into account unique consumer preferences over which the dealer network has no control, which can affect market share. Unique consumer preferences in the local market can be accounted for through a process called segmentation analysis. In this process, groups of vehicles in the segments to be analyzed are far more comparable with each other than with other vehicles not in the segments. Consequently, segments contain a group of similar vehicles that, by their design and physical characteristics, meet a certain set of consumer transportation needs. American Honda arranges its Acura vehicles into seven segments: small sporty, sporty luxury coupe, mid-size luxury sedan, full size luxury sedan, near luxury, exotic, and mid- luxury. The segmentation analysis process employed by American Honda accurately reflects the demographic features--including age, income, and education--of consumers who have actually purchased the vehicles in Acura's seven segments. In addition, the segmentation analysis employed by American Honda takes into account other factors which are unrelated to any particular consumer. Such factors include the state of the economy, product quality, and design features. Under all the facts and circumstances revealed in the record, the national average performance for Acura as adjusted for local consumer preferences in the Pembroke Pines comm/terr (the expected standard) is the appropriate standard for measuring the adequacy of representation being provided by existing Acura dealer networks and for establishing the level of opportunity available to Acura dealers in the Pembroke Pines comm/terr. At all relevant times, national average penetration, adjusted for local consumer preferences, produces an expected standard in the comm/terr of 10.58 percent, while the comm/terr is 10.3 percent of the retail industry segments in which Acura competes. For the year 2005 through June 30, the expected standard for the Pembroke Pines comm/terr is 11.37 percent while the Pembroke Pines comm/terr is 10.92 percent of the retail industry segments in which Acura competes. The reasonableness of the expected standard is confirmed by the fact that Acura has achieved or exceeded the standard in the recent past or currently meets or exceeds the standard in several markets in Florida; a sixth market in recent years has missed the standard only once, by four-tenths of a point in 2004. The persuasive data established that the expected standard is reasonable and can be achieved in the comm/terr if the Acura brand is adequately represented. Taking the foregoing factors into account, national average, adjusted for local consumer preferences, is the appropriate standard by which to judge the adequacy of representation being provided by the existing Acura dealer network and the level of opportunity available in the comm/terr. Impact on Manufacturer American Honda's Acura brand is, at relevant times, losing available sales in the comm/terr due to the inability of the existing Acura dealer network to penetrate the comm/terr at reasonably expected levels in light of the opportunity available. The persuasive evidence established that the gap between reasonably expected levels of penetration and the actual dealer network performance will grow. Taking reasonably anticipated future changes into account, the evidence of record established that the manufacturer will enjoy increased sales and overall increased customer convenience as a result of the proposed relocation. Investment of and Potential Impact Upon Existing Dealers Mr. Zinn and the Cases have invested significant dollar amounts to perform their obligations under their respective American Honda/Acura franchise agreements. They have likewise invested significant sweat equity, and expect to continue to manage their dealerships in a hands-on manner. The Cases contend that their investment in their Acura dealership will be at risk should the proposed relocation proceed. There was no persuasive evidence to support this contention. Rather, Case Acura is well positioned; well capitalized; and highly likely to respond positively to inter-brand competition arising from the proposed relocation. The Cases are aggressive and highly experienced dealers. It is reasonable to anticipate that the Cases will not lose sales; profit; reasonable opportunity for growth; or growth in the value of their multi-million dollar investment in Case Acura. Likewise, other existing dealers in the comm/terr are reasonably expected to grow and to maintain the value of their investments if the proposed relocation goes forward. Additionally and more specifically, the evidence is sufficient to establish that existing dealers in the comm/terr will be positively impacted by increased sales and service opportunities if the proposed relocation goes forward. Based upon the foregoing, the evidence is sufficient to establish that the proposed relocation is warranted and justified based on economic and marketing conditions, including future changes and present, accelerating trends in the comm/terr, which continues to grow rapidly in terms of population and of affluent households, which factors present increased sales and service opportunity for dealers. These opportunities are likely to be captured if the proposed relocation goes forward, and unlikely to be captured if it does not. Coercion of Existing Dealers There have been no efforts by American Honda to coerce any existing dealer to consent to the proposed relocation. Protesting Dealer Compliance with Dealer Agreement Case Acura is at all relevant times in compliance with the terms of its dealer agreement. Distance and Accessibility Congested traffic conditions in the western portion of the comm/terr militate heavily in favor of the proposed relocation. The proposed relocation will provide consumers with an increased level of convenience, and stimulate inter-brand competition. The market studies and common sense demonstrate that affluent consumers will not travel substantial distances to purchase an Acura when a variety of other luxury cars are more conveniently available. Other luxury vehicle dealers have taken note of the rapid growth of affluent homes in west Broward, and have provided and continue to provide improved accessibility. Acura's current dealer network in the comm/terr has not kept pace with American Honda's need to offer its existing and prospective customers an adequate level of accessibility, convenience and service. Benefits to Consumers Obtained by Geographic or Demographic Changes The evidence is sufficient to establish that consumer benefits will occur as a result of the relocation of Acura of South Florida. Such benefits cannot be obtained by expected demographic or geographic changes in the comm/terr. Adequacy of Interbrand and Intrabrand Competition and Consumer Care The evidence is sufficient to establish that the performance of Acura in the comm/terr is below reasonable levels under the appropriate standard, thereby reflecting inadequacy of inter-brand and intra-brand competition. With regard to consumer convenience, the evidence is sufficient to establish that it is necessary to locate a dealership within in the western portion of the comm/terr, where existing and potential Acura customers have moved and continue to move in large numbers, in order to provide them adequate customer care, including sales and service facilities. Relocation Justification Based on Economic and Marketing Conditions The evidence is sufficient to establish that the proposed relocation is warranted and justified based on economic and marketing conditions, including future changes. Western Broward County continues to grow at a rapid rate in terms of affluent population, households, and increased sales and service opportunities which are likely to be captured if the proposed relocation goes forward. Volume of Existing Dealers Registrations and Service Business The evidence is sufficient to establish that the volume of registrations and service business is hindered by the present configuration of the dealer network in the comm/terr, and that the volume of registrations and service business by existing Acura dealers in the comm/terr will improve if the proposed relocation goes forward.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles issue a final order approving American Honda's application to relocate Acura of South Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Adams, Esquire Adams, Quinton & Paretti, P.A. 80 Southwest 8th Street, Suite 2150 Miami, Florida 33130 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0635 Alan N. Jockers, Esquire Craig Zinn Automotive Group Corporate Offices 2300 North State Road 7 Hollywood, Florida 33021 Dean Bunch, Esquire Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, LLP 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32312-1267 Fred O. Dickinson, III, Executive Director Department of Highway, Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0635 Judson M. Chapman, General Counsel Department of Highway, Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0635
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to these proceedings, Respondent, Private Money Mortgage Company (PMMC), was a mortgage brokerage business in the State of Florida holding License Number HB592732699 that had been issued by Petitioner. At all times pertinent to these proceedings, Frank Donahue was a licensed mortgage broker in the State of Florida holding License Number HA267474770 that had been issued by Petitioner. The Department of Banking and Finance, the Petitioner in these proceedings, is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of enforcing the provisions of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. In 1985, Mr. and Mrs. A. Charles Cinelli bought a house in Palm Beach County, Florida, and moved from upstate New York to Palm Beach County, Florida. Respondent, Frank Donahue, assisted Mr. and Mrs. Cinelli in obtaining financing for the home the Cinellis purchased in Palm Beach, County. In connection with this 1985 transaction, Mr. Donahue forwarded to the Cinellis an "Exclusive Broker Agreement", which they executed and returned to him. Because this 1985 transaction involved a purchase, Mr. Donahue ordered an appraisal for this property and charged its cost as a part of the Cinelli's closing costs. Subsequent to that transaction, Mr. Donahue and his wife, Brenda, saw Mr. and Mrs. Cinelli at occasional social events. Franklin T. Smith is a certified public accountant who performed professional services for Mr. and Mrs. Cinelli and for Mr. and Mrs. Donahue. Mr. Smith referred the Cinellis to Mr. Donahue in 1985 and advised the Cinellis during the transaction that is the subject of this proceeding. Prior to December 2, 1988, Mr. Cinelli contacted several mortgage brokers in the Palm Beach County area to discuss the possibility of obtaining a mortgage on certain real property located in upstate New York. Mr. Cinelli contacted Mr. Donahue by telephone and discussed with him his desire to raise capital to begin a business in Florida. Mr. Cinelli estimated that he would require approximately $1,000,000 to start this business. Mr. Cinelli told Mr. Donahue that he and Mrs. Cinelli owned certain commercial real property in upstate New York and that State Farm Insurance Company held an option to purchase this property for the sum of $1,450,000. Mr. Cinelli did not want to wait to learn whether State Farm intended to exercise this option to purchase and he discussed with Mr. Donahue the possibility of obtaining the desired capital by securing a mortgage on this property. Mr. Donahue advised Mr. Cinelli that he could expect to secure a mortgage for approximately $700,000 (which was approximately 50% of the amount of the option contract) and that he would need a current appraisal. Mr. Donahue also informed Mr. Cinelli that he would require the sum of $2,500 as a non-refundable deposit to begin seeking such a commitment. On or about December 2, 1988, Mr. Cinelli provided Mr. Donahue with a copy of the option agreement with State Farm and with a copy of the agreement dated September 21, 1988, which extended the time within which State Farm could exercise its option for an additional six months. Mr. Cinelli reiterated to Mr. Donahue that the option price was for $1,450,000 and that he wanted to mortgage the property for $1,000,000. Mr. Cinelli also provided Mr. Donahue with the name, address, and telephone number of Mr. Wayne Lupe, who was represented by Mr. Cinelli to be his MAI appraiser in Schenectady, New York. On December 15, 1988, Mr. Donahue sent to Mr. Cinelli a letter which attached an "Exclusive Broker Agreement" that had been executed by Mr. Donahue on December 15, 1988. This was the same "Exclusive Broker Agreement" form that Mr. Donahue had used for the 1985 Cinelli transaction. The body of the letter provided as follows: Enclosed please find a copy of my exclusive brokers agreement detailing the probable terms of the loan which you are seeking. This agreement is the same agreement which you signed when you purchased your current resi- dence. The agreement calls for both you & Joan to sign and return along with a nonrefundable deposit in the amount of $2500.00 to Private Money Mortgage Corp. The above noted deposit shall be credited towards your closing costs at the time of closing, if a commitment is offered. I have spoken to several of my investors about your concerns and I am awaiting confirmation of their substantial interests prior to ordering the appraisal. I will contact you as soon as I have received the return of this agreement along with your deposit in order to fill you in on our efforts to secure you the most competitive loan on your desired terms. The Exclusive Broker Agreement reflected that the amount of the mortgage would be $700,000 and disclosed that the total estimated costs that would be incurred in securing the mortgage was $78,346, which included a broker's fee of $35,000 and an estimated appraisal fee of $3,500. The Exclusive Broker Agreement, signed by Mr. Donahue on December 15, 1988, contained the following provision: DEPOSIT: In consideration of the sum of $2,500, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and in compliance with Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, Broker accepts this application and agrees to exert his/her best effort to obtain a commitment for loan in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein. This deposit shall be credited toward closing costs at the time of closing the permanent loan or commitment, less Broker's expenses. Among the "Standards" which were incorporated as terms and conditions of the Exclusive Broker Agreement was the following: Deposit. Client simultaneously with execution of this agreement has deposited with broker the amounts stated in this agreement in order to secure the obligations owed by client to broker in the event of default of client as provided in the agreement and to reimburse broker of any and all expenses, including telephone charges, lodging, and administrative fees for credit checks and processing appraisals and the like, including upon any cancellation by client, reimbursement for broker's time expended incurred by broker, whether or not a loan commitment is obtained by broker. Mr. Cinelli was concerned that he would be incurring substantial fees and costs if Mr. Donahue obtained a commitment and Mr. Cinelli decided not to accept it. Mr. Smith advised Mr. Cinelli that the estimated expenses were not abnormally high, but he suggested that his liability should be limited. In response to those concerns, Mr. Donahue prepared and delivered between December 15, 1988, and the end of the year an addendum to the Exclusive Broker Agreement that would have limited Mr. Cinelli's liability to the sum of $7,500. That addendum provided, in pertinent part, as follows: It is hereby understood and agreed by the parties that in the event a loan commitment is offered to the applicants & they decide to refuse this commitment, the applicants liability will be limited to the sum of Five Thousand Dollars plus the original deposit of $2,500.00 for a total amount of $7,500.00. It is further understood that said commitment must bear approximately the same terms and conditions as the attached agreement. Mr. and Mrs. Cinelli gave Mr. Smith the sum of $2,500 in cash to deliver to Mr. Donahue, but there is conflicting testimony as to when this money was delivered to Mr. Smith for delivery to Mr. Donahue. Mr. Cinelli testified that the money was delivered before the Exclusive Broker Agreement dated December 15, 1988, was prepared. Mr. Donahue testified that the money was delivered after both the Exclusive Broker Agreement and the addendum thereto had been delivered to Mr. Cinelli. Mr. Donahue also testified that the statement contained in the Exclusive Broker Agreement that he signed on December 15, 1988, acknowledging his receipt of the $2,500 deposit was false. He did not explain why the addendum referred to the sum of $2,500 as "the original deposit". Mr. Smith did not recall when he delivered this money to Mr. Donahue, but he did recall having delivered the cash the same day he received it from the Cinellis. While his testimony is that he received the $2,500 during his initial meeting with Mr. and Mrs. Cinelli (which would be before Mr. Cinelli received the Exclusive Broker Agreement) this testimony lacks credibility because of Mr. Smith's lack of certainty as to dates. In addition, this testimony conflicts with the letter Mr. Smith wrote to Mr. Donahue at Mr. Donahue's request on August 28, 1989, which clearly indicates that the $2,500 was not paid until after the addendum to the Exclusive Broker Agreement had been prepared. This conflict is resolved by finding that the greater weight of the evidence establishes that the sum of $2,500 was delivered by Mr. Smith to Mr. Donahue after Mr. Cinelli had received both the Exclusive Broker Agreement and the addendum thereto. Mr. Donahue did not provide the Cinellis with any type of written agreement, other than his letter of December 15, 1998, the Exclusive Broker Agreement, and the addendum when he received the cash from Mr. Smith. There was no written receipt for these funds, nor was there any written memorandum of understanding between Mr. Donahue and the Cinellis as to whether payment for the appraisal that Mr. Donahue and Mr. Cinelli had discussed would be made from the $2,500. Mr. Cinelli was of the belief that $2,000 of the $2,500 deposit would be earmarked for the payment of the appraisal. Mr. Donahue was of the belief that the $2,500 was a non-refundable retainer and he treated that sum as an earned fee. There was no meeting of the minds between Mr. Cinelli and Mr. Donahue as to the nature of the $2,500 deposit, other than it was non-refundable. Specifically, there was no agreement as to what costs, if any, would be paid from that deposit. Mr. Donahue's normal business practice in transactions involving a refinance of property is different than his practice in transactions involving a purchase of property. In purchase transactions (such as the 1985 Cinelli transaction), Mr. Donahue arranges for the appraisals and treats the costs of the appraisal as an expense to be paid by the purchaser at closing. In refinance transactions (such as the 1988 Cinelli transaction), it is his practice to require his customer to deal directly with the appraiser in ordering and paying the costs of the appraisal. Respondents failed to establish that in the subject transaction, Mr. Donahue made it clear that Mr. Cinelli would be responsible for ordering and paying the cost of the appraisal. Mr. Cinelli believed that $2,000 of the $2,500 he later gave Mr. Donahue would be earmarked for the payment of the appraisal. Neither Mr. Donahue's letter of December 15, 1998, the Exclusive Broker Agreement, nor the addendum clearly resolved the dispute. There was a dispute between Mr. Donahue and Mr. Cinelli as to who ordered the appraisal. Mr. Cinelli denied that he ordered the appraisal and that his calls to his appraiser, Mr. Lupe, was only to advise him of Mr. Donahue's forthcoming call. Mr. Donahue denied that he ordered the appraisal and that his contacts with Mr. Lupe were after Mr. Cinelli had ordered the appraisal. Mr. Donahue contends that his contacts with the appraiser were merely to give the appraiser instructions as to the information that should be reflected by the appraisal. This dispute is resolved by finding that Mr. Cinelli ordered the appraisal through Mr. Lupe and that Mr. Donahue advised Mr. Lupe as to the information that should be reflected by the appraisal. It was determined from conversations between Mr. Donahue and Mr. Lupe that Mr. Lupe was not qualified to perform the appraisal and that Mr. Lupe would engage Albert L. Friedman, MAI and William J. McEvoy of Capitol Real Estate and Appraisal Company of Schenectady, New York, on Mr. Cinelli's behalf to perform the work. Messrs. Friedman and McEvoy prepared the appraisal and certified the same to Mr. Cinelli on March 13, 1989. The appraised value of the property was $2,100,000. As of the date of the formal hearing, the appraiser's bill of $2,000 had not been paid. Capitol Real Estate and Appraisal Company had billed both Mr. Donahue and Mr. Cinelli and an attorney representing Capitol Real Estate and Appraisal Company had written Mr. Cinelli a demand letter. It was the dispute over the payment of the appraiser's fee that prompted the complaint the Cinellis filed against Respondents. The Cinellis did not execute the Exclusive Broker Agreement and the addendum because they wanted to wait on the appraisal to see if the appraised value would permit them to borrow more than $700,000 and because they were not satisfied with the amount of the projected costs of consummating the transaction. Mr. Cinelli misled Mr. Donahue as to his intentions to execute these agreements. Mr. Donahue made several requests to the Cinellis that they execute the Exclusive Broker Agreement and addendum and return them to him. Despite the absence of an executed brokerage agreement, Mr. Donahue exerted considerable effort to seek a commitment consistent with the Exclusive Broker's Agreement and succeeded in securing such a commitment in April 1989. No part of the $2,500 Mr. Donahue received from Mr. Smith on behalf of the Cinellis was placed in escrow by Mr. Donahue. Respondents have made no accounting of the $2,500 and have paid no part of the appraisal bill. Mr. Donahue claims the deposit as a non-refundable earned fee, despite the absence of a written agreement to that effect. The Cinellis sold the subject property to State Farm in June 1989.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered by Petitioner which finds: that Respondents violated the provisions of Rule 3D-40.006(5), Florida Administrative Code, by accepting the $2,500 deposit from the Cinellis without a written agreement as to the disposition of those funds; that Respondents violated the provisions of Section 494.055(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and Rule 3D-40.006(6)(a), Florida Administrative Code, by failing to place said deposit in escrow; and that Respondents violated the provisions of by Section 494.055(1)(f), Florida Statutes, by failing to account for said deposit. It is further recommended that an administrative fine be levied against Respondents in the total amount of $1,000.00 for said violations. It is further recommended that the final order place the licenses of Respondents on probation for a period of one year with three special conditions of probation. The first special condition of probation would require Respondents to pay Capitol Real Estate and Appraisal Company the sum of $2,000 within sixty days of the Final Order. The second special condition of probation would terminate Respondents' probation upon timely compliance with the first special condition of probation. The third special condition of probation would prohibit Respondents from conducting any business as mortgage brokers within the State of Florida for a period of six months should Respondents fail to timely comply with the first condition of probation. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 9th day of January, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-4708 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 3-10, and 13 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 2 and 11 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, and are rejected in part as being contrary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 12 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, and are rejected in part as being argument. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-3 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 4-6, 14, and 17 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 7 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order. The characterization of the Cinellis having a "long standing relationship" with Mr. Donahue is rejected as being ambiguous and unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 8 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 9-11 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, but are rejected to the extent that they are subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 12 and 13 are rejected as being recitation of testimony or as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 15 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made or as being contrary to the findings made or to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 16 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, and are rejected in part as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah Guller, Esquire Office of the Comptroller 111 Georgia Avenue, Suite 211 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401-5293 Marie A. Mattox, Esquire Douglass, Cooper, Coppins & Powell Post Office Box 1674 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1674 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel The Capitol Plaza Level, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
