The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioners have been guilty of violation of pertinent statutes and rules governing qualification and capability to hold a foster home license and to operate a foster home, in this case a "therapeutic foster home" and, if so, whether their application for renewal of licensure should be denied.
Findings Of Fact The above-named Petitioners were licensed as operators of a therapeutic foster home and as therapeutic foster parents. Due to an alleged abuse report, they became involved in a revocation proceeding with the Department concerning their previously-held license. Upon advice by personnel with Camelot, Inc. (Camelot), a private provider which provides services to the Department for therapeutic foster care, by contract, they voluntarily relinquished their previous license on February 6, 2006, in the belief that they would still be entitled to a formal proceeding to contest that the alleged abuse occurred, and their licensure entitlement. The Department declined to afford them a hearing on the issue, and they appealed to the District Court of Appeal for the First District. The Department was upheld. They then applied for a renewal of their therapeutic foster care license on August 10, 2006, for Lake County, Florida. An evaluation of the application was launched by the Department and ultimately the Department issued a denial of the license application. A timely request for an administrative proceeding to contest denial of that license was filed by the Giegers. The license denial was based initially upon the Department's determination that the Giegers had allegedly inappropriately punished children in their home and that they had some sort of business interest or income interest in being licensed foster parents, purportedly a violation of foster parenting rules. Sometime thereafter a supplemental basis for denial was served upon them by the Department wherein the Department alleged that the Petitioners had also violated Section 409.175(4) and (12)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), because they had a child placed in their home through a guardianship agreement that had not been approved by a court and were therefore acting as an unlicensed foster home. A response to that supplemental denial notice was made by the Petitioners. Therapeutic foster parents are trained to provide for children with difficult behavioral problems. The Giegers received this training and remained in compliance with the training updates and continued education necessary in order to continue their licensure in good standing. In addition to this, Mrs. Geiger is a trained mental health specialist, with a master's degree, who works for Lifestreams, a mental health provider, providing services to disturbed children. The Giegers were previously affiliated, as therapeutic foster parents, with the private provider, Camelot, which provides services to the Department for therapeutic foster care. They were licensed as therapeutic foster parents at that time, and accepted a number of severely disturbed children into their home over the years while they were affiliated with Camelot. When a foster parent has a child placed in their home, Camelot has a therapeutic system whereby a therapist is assigned to that child and is available for consultation at any time of day. If the primary therapist is unavailable, the supervisor of that therapist is available for consultation. Camelot's therapeutic personnel and various mental health professionals have been frequently in the Giegers' home to consult, monitor, and assist with the care and therapy of foster children placed there. A number of those therapeutic personnel testified. They established that the Giegers are excellent parents who have provided exemplary care to the foster children placed in their home. These people have training in mental health and related fields. Some hold master's degrees and have been trained to recognize abuse or evidence of it. Some are psychologists, specifically assigned as the mental health professional working with particular children placed in the Giegers' home. In 2005, a child, J.D., was placed in the Giegers' home by the Department. In addition to J.D., there were other children in the home, including Tyler, a non-foster care child placed privately by Camelot with the Giegers, as well as the Giegers' own adopted son. All of the children in the home had been abused prior to their placement with the Giegers. J.D.'s previous situation before coming to the Giegers' home was particularly egregious. He had been starved, locked in a closet, had his fingernails removed by his parents and otherwise was the victim of severe parental abuse before coming into foster care. His was a case of high public notoriety and appears to have been thus treated with a heightened level of attention by the Department, as compared to the case of other children. When J.D. arrived at the Giegers' home after his initial rescue from his earlier situation, he purportedly weighed 58 pounds and was only 4 feet 8 inches tall, at the age of 17 years. During the time he resided with the Giegers, he grew several inches and gained almost 80 pounds due to the care given him by the Giegers. He was placed on special vitamins and formula, in addition to his regular meals, in order to restore him to appropriate physical condition. Because of his physical condition, extra efforts were made by the Petitioners to assure his safety. They even placed him in a private school because they felt he would be at risk attending a large public high school, which he would otherwise have been required to attend. J.D. did well at the Giegers' home initially and it was planned for him to remain in their home after he reached 18 years of age, if he continued to adjust favorably to being a member of their family. He began "acting out" more severely, however, with problematic behaviors. Ultimately it was determined by both the Giegers and Camelot that he should not remain in their home after he turned 18 because of the adverse impact he was having on other children residing in the home. Before the determination was made that J.D. would not remain in the Giegers' home after he reached 18 years of age, the Department had praised the Petitioners' care of J.D. After that decision was made, an attorney for the Department suggested to Mrs. Gieger that she be hired by the Department to provide special services to J.D. Apparently there was a funding problem with regard to continuing J.D. in private school, and this was suggested as a means of funding the private school. Mrs. Gieger, however, did not feel this funding was appropriate because she was already being paid by Camelot for these services, and expressed this to the attorney, she therefore declined that offer. In December 2005 the Department decided to have J.D. re-evaluated by his original evaluator, a psychologist, Dr. Dykel. During his meeting with Dr. Dykel, J.D. apparently told Dr. Dykel that the Giegers had cursed in his presence and in the presence of other children, used racially derogatory language concerning Black children in the foster childrens' presence and that Mrs. Gieger had sat on him as a means of restraint or punishment. He also stated that he was being deprived of food. This meeting occurred on a Friday afternoon. After the meeting J.D. returned to the Giegers' home and made statements about what he had said to Dr. Dykel. Initially the Petitioners thought nothing about the statements, but on the following Tuesday an abuse report was called in indicating that the Giegers had inappropriately punished J.D. in the manner he had related to Dr. Dykel. The child Tyler, who had been placed in the Giegers' home was a child who suffered from severe mental health issues. He had been placed privately with Camelot by his father. He had set his father's and step-mother's bed on fire the previous Christmas because he did not receive a toy, a "PS2," that he asked to be given him for Christmas. There was testimony that he was told by J.D. that if he would make a statement against the Giegers to the Department that he would get the PS2 toy that he wanted. He was taken by Erica Summerfield, an investigator assigned by the Department to the case concerning the abuse report, to the "Child Advocacy Center," for a statement. He apparently made such a statement, of the above import, but then recanted it. Nonetheless, based only on the statement made by J.D. and by Tyler, Erica Summerfield made a determination that the abuse report should be determined to be "founded." As a result of her report (and apparently a past history of abuse reports concerning the Giegers' foster care facility, none of which had been proven to be "founded"), Camelot apparently suggested to the Giegers that they voluntarily relinquish their license, purportedly telling them that they would still have the ability to challenge the abuse report through a Chapter 120 hearing. They sought to obtain a Chapter 120 hearing and the Department denied their request. An appeal ensued and the denial by the Department was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal. During the pendency of that appeal, the Giegers filed an application to renew their license, which was denied. This proceeding ensued after that denial, when the Giegers requested a formal proceeding. The Department offered the testimony of Erica Summerfield who was a child protective investigator assigned to the investigation. She was the supervisor of the person who interviewed J.D. and Tyler, apparently the only sources of investigative information leading to her finding that abuse had occurred. Ms. Summerfield testified that her concerns about the Giegers led her to make a report finding that abuse had occurred because alarms had been placed on the bedroom doors of childrens' bedrooms in the Giegers home; that the Giegers had used excessive restraint against J.D. (allegedly held him on the floor and lay on him or sat on him); and that J.D. had been mentally injured by the Giegers and not provided with sufficient food. She also opined that Mrs. Gieger had made inappropriate statements to J.D. None of these purported findings are supported by credible evidence. Initially it is found that J.D.'s and Tyler statements to the interviewer, who then apparently related them to Ms. Summerfield, constitute, at best, "second-hand" hearsay. Neither the interviewer nor J.D., nor Tyler testified at the hearing, and Tyler later recanted his statements made to the interviewer. The Respondent's exhibits two, three, and four, the interview reports, were offered into evidence and were only admitted regarding a basis for the Department's course of conduct in the matter, but not for the truth of any facts depicted on the face of those exhibits. Concerning the alleged complaint, related to the interviewer, regarding lack of food, the credible persuasive evidence shows that J.D. actually grew several inches after being placed with the Giegers, even though doctors had opined that he would not grow much, if at all, because of the starvation that had occurred early in his life. He also gained substantial weight while being cared for by the Giegers, so that he essentially looked like a normal child by the time he left their care. He had been emaciated when he came to the Giegers' care and had been described as looking like a "concentration camp victim." He was described as being far smaller than a child of his age when he came to the Giegers' care, but seven months later appeared to be essentially a normal child in physical appearance. The evidence, in fact, clearly supports the determination that the Giegers did provide J.D. with appropriate nutrition during their care of him. The basis for the alleged abuse regarding his not being properly fed is simply not credible. The Giegers had also been accused by J.D. or Tyler, or both, with using inappropriate language, racial slurs and cursing in J.D.'s presence, purportedly causing him mental harm. However, mental health experts present in the Giegers' home on a weekly and almost daily basis had never heard any inappropriate language, including any inappropriate racial language or inappropriate cursing in the childrens' presence during their visits to the Giegers' home. Many of these visits were unannounced. Two of the counselors or mental health professionals often present in the home were African-American. They found no evidence of racial tension or racially derogatory language being used by the Giegers or in the Giegers' home. It was their belief that the Giegers did not exhibit any behavior which suggested racism. Further, there were no Black children placed in the Giegers' home during the time that J.D. was there. There is simply no credible evidence to support any finding that inappropriate language was used by Mr. or Mrs. Gieger in J.D.'s or other childrens' presence, of a racially derogatory nature or otherwise. Part of the basis for the abuse finding (and the reason for license denial) was excess restraint or "sitting on" J.D. as punishment. This position was based on the statements of the two children, J.D. and Tyler. One of them, Tyler, tearfully recanted his story shortly after he made the statement. Erica Summerfield testifying for the Department, admitted in her testimony that she was aware of his recantation. She also admitted that Tyler's parents had asked her more than once to allow him to be placed back in the Giegers' home. They also had disclosed to her that he had a habit of making inappropriate statements and lying. There is evidence that J.D. had told him that he would receive a toy he wanted very much if he would make a statement to the Department that J.D. had been abused by the Giegers. Most importantly, J.D. had identified the point in time when Ms. Gieger was supposed to have sat on him as during an occasion when he broke a window at the house. Other mental health providers who were in the home around that time reported never seeing any bruise marks or other evidence of injury to J.D. or at any other time. They also reported that Mrs. Gieger was especially careful of his safety because of the seriously debilitated condition of his body. Most importantly, however, during the time that the window was broken by J.D. and he was severely acting out, Mrs. Gieger was on the phone with a professional from Camelot who was helping her to calm or "de-escalate" J.D. and who remained on the phone with Mrs. Gieger during the entire incident. That expert heard nothing which indicated that Mrs. Gieger had sat on the child or in anyway inappropriately restrained him. Mrs. Gieger denied using physical restraints on the foster children at the hearing. The Department maintains, however, that in two prior reports discussed in Camelot's letter, report 1999-127436 and 2002-007021, the Giegers had admitted restraining foster children. In the 1999 incident the child purportedly sustained rug burns on the face while being restrained on the floor by Mr. Gieger. These reports are at best second-hand hearsay. Moreover, they are not reasons of which the Petitioners were provided notice, as part of the basis for the denial of their licensure application which triggered this proceeding. Moreover, both of those incidents were immediately reported by the Giegers themselves to the Department and, ironically, the Department did not see fit to make any determination at the time, or since, that those incidents amounted to abuse. No finding was made that those alleged incidents were "founded" abuse episodes. Moreover, the Department relies upon an incident where Mrs. Gieger purportedly stated that she used force against J.D. when he tried to grab her neck. She purportedly told Ms. Summerfield in an interview that she gave J.D. a "therapeutic bear hug" by grabbing his arm and turning him around. He fell to the floor as a result. Parenthetically, not even the Department claims that she forced him to the floor. Mrs. Gieger's testimony at hearing concerning this event was to the effect that she grabbed J.D.'s wrist in order to prevent him from striking her or grabbing her neck and that he just collapsed to the floor. The Department then maintains that foster parents are not permitted to use such "force" on foster children, such as grabbing J.D.'s wrist, because it equates this to the use of corporal punishment and that grabbing a child's arm or wrist could "traumatize" an already vulnerable foster child. Mrs. Gieger's testimony, however, indicates that the use of "therapeutic bear hug," even if it occurred, is part of an approved method of training which she had, which is designed to safely manage children who are acting out in a potentially dangerous way, until they can calm down. She testified that Camelot, the Department's contracting agent, had approved this training for her. Moreover, when a foster parent is in danger of attack by a 17-year-old, even a somewhat debilitated child, who threatened striking or grabbing the foster parent by neck or throat, to grab his arm or wrist to prevent such conduct is reasonable and does not constitute unreasonable restraint. Assuming this event occurred, to characterize the grabbing of a child's wrist, to prevent injury or potential injury to a foster parent or another, as excessive force or "corporal punishment" is nonsensical. There is no credible, persuasive evidence that either Mr. or Mrs. Gieger engaged in any excessive force or restraint amounting to abuse. A concern was raised by Dr. Dykle, the psychologist, who was fearful of the fact that alarms had been placed on childrens' rooms in the foster home. Ms. Summerfield based her finding that abuse had occurred, in part, on the report that the alarms had been placed on the doors of some of the childrens' rooms. Ms. Summerfield, however, admitted in her testimony that alarms are often and routinely placed on childrens' rooms in therapeutic foster care homes. The mental health experts who testified clearly established that in every therapeutic foster home such alarms must be placed on bedroom doors because of a safety concern for other children. Children who are placed in this type of home are often serious safety risks for themselves or for other children. They have often been found themselves to be perpetrators of inappropriate or violent conduct. Many times they are children who have been sexually abused and have themselves become sexual perpetrators. In fact, there was a child in the Giegers' home at the time J.D. was there who had set his parents' bed on fire because he did not get a desired toy for Christmas. Dr. Dykle's apparent grave concern about alarms being placed on the childrens' bedroom doors is surprising since it appears to be completely contrary to generally accepted, safe practice for therapeutic foster homes, something that he should have been aware of if he is indeed an expert in child abuse issues. Ms. Summerfield admitted that she was aware that this was a virtually universal safety practice in therapeutic foster homes and yet, paradoxically, used it as a factor in support of her finding that abuse had occurred, as a basis of denial of re-licensure. Ms. Summerfield also admitted that she had spoken with Camelot professionals who assured her that the Giegers had been exemplary foster care parents. She acknowledged that J.D. had made untrue statements in the past about other foster placements. She admitted that the only evidence of improper restraint, or any kind of abuse or neglect in the home, was essentially predicated on the statements of the two children who did not testify in this proceeding. She conceded that one of them had recanted and she knew of this well before the hearing. Mental health experts from Camelot who testified, established that it is a very frequent event for foster children placed in therapeutic foster homes to act out and to make false statements and accusations concerning their care-givers. They also indicated that J.D. had made such false allegations in the past against other caregivers. This was all information that a thorough investigation would have made known to the Department, at the time it was making the determination that there was a basis for a finding of abuse. The only witness other than Ms. Summerfield, presented by the Department, was Amy Hammett, the licensing official who actually signed the letter denying the license application. She testified that she did not review all of the documents that made up the Giegers' license application. Some other department employee had been assigned to the case and it had been later transferred to Ms. Hammett before the final decision was made. She had reviewed five relevant forms, but nothing else. She had no evidence to support the Department's position that the Giegers had relied upon the foster care services they provided for income to support their own family, other than the fact that they had taken a legal position in the appeal from the previous attempt at a Chapter 120 proceeding, to the effect that they had something in the nature of a property interest in their foster care license. This may have been a necessary position to take in an attempt to establish jurisdiction or standing in that proceeding, but other than that, and one statement attributable to Mr. Gieger that there was an adverse financial effect on the Giegers related to that proceeding, it was not established that the Giegers were relying on the income from foster care services to support their family. Rather, in the context of that statement and the Giegers legal position during the course of their appeal, the reference was most likely made in the context that the hiring of an attorney, with related expense, in prosecuting the first case, including an appellate proceeding, caused an adverse financial effect, which is understandable. That does not constitute credible, persuasive evidence that the Giegers were relying upon foster care services as income to support their own family and themselves in violation of any Department rule. Mrs. Gieger, indeed, testified under oath that they did not rely upon foster care income to support their family. Her testimony and that of others showing that they have successfully operated a well- managed, licensed home for a substantial period of time, shows that the Petitioners are financially capable of operating safely and successfully under a new license. There is no persuasive evidence to the contrary. The greater weight of the credible evidence is persuasive in establishing that the Giegers provide quality therapeutic foster care and have not engaged in the abuse with which they are charged. Even J.D. expressed the desire to come back and live with the Giegers and, after he reached 18 years of age, he did so. This certainly does not support the existence of abuse. Moreover, Earnest Thomas, J.D.'s guardian ad litem established that the Giegers provided J.D. with excellent care. He was a frequent visitor in their home and paid close attention to J.D.'s well-being during times pertinent to this case. Further, the caseworker, Sheila Donato, was the person who took J.D. from the Giegers' home when he was removed by the Department. On this occasion she stated that he was tearful and crying when he left the Giegers' home and asked if he would be able to come back to their home for Christmas. There were no bruises or other evidence that he had been harmed in any way. She established that the fact that he returned to the Giegers home after he turned 18 years of age is evidence that he had never been abused while there. After the Giegers' foster care license had been relinquished voluntarily by them under the above-referenced circumstances, Tyler's parents executed "guardianship papers" placing Tyler in the custody or guardianship of the Giegers and they continue to allow Tyler to reside in their home. The Department maintains that this was an illegal placement because the Giegers were not a licensed foster care facility at that time and had not secured a court order allowing Tyler to be in their guardianship. The circumstances were, however, that Ms. Giegers' mother was the attorney who prepared the guardianship papers for the Giegers and for Tyler's parents to execute. She rendered an opinion to them that that was sufficient to justify allowing Tyler to remain in the Giegers' home. Ms. Gieger testified that she knew of other teachers and other individuals who had used similar documents to establish a basis to take custody of a child in their home. She believed that what she was doing was legal. There was no intent by her, or Mr. Gieger, to engage in any kind illegal custody, guardianship or circumvention of the foster care licensure requirements, or any other illegal act. There is no evidence that Tyler had been adjudicated dependent and subject to the custody of the Department.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Family Services granting a foster home license to the Petitioners, authorizing their operation as a therapeutic foster home. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerri A. Blair, Esquire Lockett & Blair Post Office Box 130 Tavares, Florida 32778 Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John J. Copelan, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert A. Butterworth, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent should deny Petitioners' application for a license to provide foster home care for dependent children pursuant to Section 409.175, Florida Statutes (1999). (All statutory references are to Florida Statutes (1999) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster care in the state. Petitioners were foster care parents until October 5, 2000, when Petitioners voluntarily surrendered their foster care license for medical reasons. Prior to October 5, 2000, Mrs. Williams suffered from high blood pressure and dizziness. She was physically unable to care for foster children and asked that Respondent remove all foster children from her home. Before her medical problems began, Mrs. Williams complained to Respondent that she could not provide foster care for children with behavior problems. Mrs. Williams asked Respondent to remove certain children from her home because they presented behavioral problems with which she could not cope. In March of 2001, Petitioners applied for a new license to provide foster care. Petitioners did not provide any medical evidence, during the hearing or the application process, that Mrs. Williams has recovered from her medical problems. Her medical problems have a long medical history and come and go each year. Mrs. Williams is 62 years old. On the family profile sheet filed with Respondent, Mrs. Williams lists her occupation as "disabled."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioners' application for a license to provide foster care to dependent children. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Wilbert and Estella Williams 412 Pine Avenue Sanford, Florida 32771 Craig A. McCarthy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services, District 7 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue Whether Petitioner’s request for a foster home license should be denied due to her alleged failure to comply with foster care licensing requirements.
Findings Of Fact Since 2006, Petitioner has held a foster care license, issued by the Department through Citrus, which is a child placing agency ("CPA"). Since becoming a foster parent, there have never been any concerns raised as to the care Petitioner provided to the foster children. Every year, Petitioner entered into a Bilateral Service Agreement with Citrus. The Agreement identifies the responsibilities of both the foster parents and Citrus on behalf of the children served in the foster care program. Under the heading “Foster Parent Responsibilities to the CPA” the Bilateral Service Agreement provides that the foster parent is required: To notify the CPA immediately of a potential change in address, living arrangements, marital status, family composition (who is in the home), employment, significant health changes or any other condition that may affect the child’s well-being. To notify the CPA promptly of all contacts the family or any member of the home has with police or any law enforcement agencies. In the summer of 2010, Citrus sent a letter to all foster parents reminding them that all family members or visitors who frequent the home on a daily basis, or sleep overnight, or have constant contact with the foster children, must have background checks completed. In the fall of 2010, for the annual review for the upcoming year of 2011, Citrus conducted a home study, which included an announced visit and inspection of the home. The Citrus consultant who conducted the home study recorded that Warren Clark (Clark), Petitioner’s son, was living in the home. Petitioner’s daughter was listed as a family member that did not live in the home and was not a frequent visitor. She conducted a background screening on Clark, and discovered that Clark had been arrested twice for battery/aggravated assault charges in May, 2010. If Petitioner’s daughter had been listed as a household member or frequent visitor, the consultant would have conducted background screening on the daughter as well. During her announced visit, the consultant saw Clark’s room, and only noticed male belongings. She did not see any kind of female items, such as jewelry, makeup, or female clothing. Petitioner never reported Clark’s arrests to Citrus. At the hearing, she testified that she was unaware of her son’s arrests, and was only made aware of the arrests when the Citrus consultant told her about them. Her son testified that he had never told his mother about the arrests because he was embarrassed. The undersigned does not find this testimony credible, as it is self-serving in nature and is not plausible, given that Petitioner’s son lived with Petitioner and was arrested twice in one month. It was ultimately Petitioner’s duty to be informed of any involvement between a household member and law enforcement, and to promptly notify the Department. On January 27, 2011, a foster care licensing staffing was held. Petitioner agreed to have her son move out of her home, due to the nature of the arrests. To memorialize the agreement reached during the meeting, Petitioner signed a statement indicating that she would have her son move out of the foster home, and that she understood that if her daughter was going to be a frequent visitor, her daughter needed to be fingerprinted. The statement also indicated that any violation of this agreement might result in revocation of her foster home license. This statement was dated February 22, 2011. During the exit interviews of two of Petitioner’s foster care children, the children reported that Petitioner’s daughter lived at the foster home. Citrus and the Department conducted an unannounced home visit on March 10, 2011. Dulce Pupo, a Citrus Foster Care Licensing Supervisor, and Ada Gonzalez, a Department Licensing Specialist, conducted the visit. Present at the home were two foster children, Petitioner, Petitioner’s daughter, and a tutor for one of the foster children. One foster child, who was approximately 12 years old, told Ms. Gonzalez that Petitioner’s daughter lived in the home, and pointed out her bedroom. When Ms. Gonzalez approached the room that had been indicated, Petitioner asked her not to enter that room, because it was messy. Ms. Gonzalez entered the bedroom, and found items that belonged to a woman; she photographed women’s jewelry, skin products, perfumes, women’s clothing, women’s shoes, and a curling iron that she saw in the room. Petitioner told Ms. Gonzalez that the items were her daughter’s items, but that her daughter did not live at the foster home. On March 11, 2011, a staffing was held. Petitioner attended and admitted that her daughter was living at her home. At the hearing, Petitioner explained that during this staffing, she was very upset, and misspoke when she stated that her daughter lived in her foster home. She, did, however, admit that her daughter was a frequent visitor, and that she should have reported that fact to Citrus. On May 9, 2011, the renewal of Petitioner’s foster care license was denied by the Department.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order finding that Petitioner violated section 409.175(9), Florida Statutes, and deny Petitioner’s request to renew her foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JESSICA E. VARN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2011.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should deny Petitioners' application to be licensed as foster parents.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster parents in the state. Respondent first licensed Petitioners as foster parents on June 29, 2003, and renewed the license on June 29, 2004. The last license expired on June 28, 2005. Petitioners allowed their license to expire on June 28, 2005. They wanted to make improvements to a new home they had moved into before bringing foster children into the home. Petitioners submitted a completed application for a new license on March 20, 2006. By letter dated April 27, 2006, Respondent denied the application for licensure. Petitioners did not receive the notice of denial until May 3, 2006, because Respondent sent the notice to the address of record in the old license application files instead of the correct address in the application for a new license that is at issue in this proceeding. The letter denying the application for licensure incorrectly stated that Respondent intended to revoke Petitioners' license. The misstated literal terms of the letter nevertheless provided Petitioners with adequate notice of the actual proposed agency action to deny the license application. Contrary to the literal terms of the letter, Petitioners understood that the letter constituted notice of Respondent's proposed denial of their license application. Petitioners timely requested an administrative hearing by letter dated May 7, 2006. The request for hearing stated, in relevant part: [W]e received notice advising us that [Respondent] has initiated proceedings to revoke our foster home license. . . . Please note that we are not a licensed foster home at this time. Our license expired in June, 2005. So, we are somewhat confused about proceedings to revoke something that does not exist. Please be advised that we did [sic] however, complete an application for a 'new' foster care license. . . . We were also told that, [sic] our application would be denied and that we would have the right to request an administrative hearing to contest the 'denial'. If the letter that we received is in regard to our application for licensure, and if that application has been denied, then we are requesting an administrative hearing to contest that decision. Respondent's Exhibit 1C. Respondent gave the request for hearing to the agency clerk to forward to DOAH to conduct the hearing. However, the agency clerk was confused by the literal terms of the denial letter. When the agency clerk could not ascertain an existing foster home license to revoke, the agency clerk merely "sat" on the request for hearing and did not forward it to DOAH. By letter dated November 13, 2006, Respondent corrected the literal terms of the previous letter. The letter dated November 13, 2006, correctly notified Petitioners of Respondent's proposed denial of the license application. By letter dated November 23, 2006, Petitioners again requested an administrative hearing to contest the proposed denial of the license application. In addition, the request for hearing notified Respondent of Petitioners' intent to rely on the so-called default license provisions in Subsection 120.60(1), Florida Statutes (2006).1 Respondent gave the request for hearing to the agency clerk. This time, the agency clerk referred the matter to DOAH. However, the agency clerk did not refer the request for hearing to DOAH within the 15 days mandated in Subsection 120.569(2)(a). Rather, DOAH received the referral from the agency clerk on March 6, 2007; approximately 103 days after the date of the second request for hearing and approximately 303 days after the date of the first request for hearing. The delays in referring the requests for hearing to DOAH did not impair either the fairness of the proceeding or the correctness of the agency action. It is undisputed that when Petitioners were previously licensed as foster parents they repeatedly administered corporal punishment to a foster child who was approximately four years old at the time. It is also undisputed that Petitioners punished the child by requiring the child to stand for one hour to one hour and a-half almost daily. Both types of discipline violate applicable standards for foster care and evidence Petitioners disqualification to be foster parents. The parties spent most of the evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the four-year-old female suffered from a condition identified in the record as reactive attachment disorder (RAD). However, the trier of fact finds evidence concerning RAD to be irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of whether Petitioners are qualified to be foster parents. The evidence that Petitioners administered unauthorized discipline to a four-year-old foster child in their care clearly evidences their lack of qualification. No medical evidence established a nexus between the alleged disorder and illicit discipline of a young child.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a final order denying Petitioners' application to be licensed as foster parents. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2007.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster homes. Mrs. Sampson operated a Childrens' Medical Services ("CMS") medical foster home for children with special medical, emotional and physical needs, and was licensed by the Department as either a CMS medical foster home or as a regular foster home from 1990 until November 1997. At some point in 1996 or 1997, Mrs. Sampson voluntarily ceased operating as a CMS medical foster home, but continued to operate as a regular foster home. There was conflicting evidence as to the precise date of this change, but the date is not relevant to this phase of the bifurcated proceeding. On March 2, 1998, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint that sought to revoke Mrs. Sampson's foster care license. On October 6, 1999, the Department filed an Amended Administrative Complaint. The Department also denied Mrs. Sampson's application to adopt one of the foster children in her care. Mrs. Sampson requested a formal administrative hearing on both the revocation of her foster care license and the denial of her adoption application. The cases were consolidated, and a formal administrative hearing was held over several dates in April, May, and June 2000. Mrs. Sampson prevailed on all issues in the consolidated cases. A Recommended Order in her favor was entered on August 11, 2000. A Final Order adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Recommended Order was entered on October 2, 2000. Mrs. Sampson contends that she is a "small business party" as defined in Subsection 57.111(3)(d)1.a, Florida Statutes, which provides that the term "small business party" includes: A sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, including a professional practice, whose principal office is in this state, who is domiciled in this state, and whose business or professional practice has, at the time that action is initiated by a state agency, not more than 25 full-time employees or a net worth of not more than $2 million, including both personal and business investments. . . . At all times relevant to this case, Mrs. Sampson was domiciled in the State of Florida. At all times relevant to this case, Mrs. Sampson was licensed as a Licensed Practical Nurse ("LPN"). The determinative issue is whether Mrs. Sampson's operation of a foster home establishes her as the sole proprietor of an unincorporated business or professional practice. Mrs. Sampson initially operated her medical foster home for the benefit of one child, who was admitted to Tampa General Hospital while Mrs. Sampson worked there as a contract nurse. The child was born prematurely and was not expected to live longer than six weeks. Mrs. Sampson became a licensed foster parent to take this child home and care for him. Under her care, the child thrived. Though he survived the initial crisis, the child continued to require full-time nursing care. Mrs. Sampson was not able to return to full-time employment as a contract nurse outside the home. Mrs. Sampson testified that she advised the Department's case workers that she would need to take in additional medical foster children to supplement her income while she worked at home caring for the children. Over a period of eight years, the Department placed at least 14 medically needy foster children in Mrs. Sampson's home. The Department establishes foster home care board rates, which are standard reimbursements to foster parents for the expenses incurred for the foster children, such as food, clothing, medical care, and transportation. The board rates are minimums that can be increased by the Department if the needs of the foster child cannot otherwise be met. Mrs. Sampson received an enhanced board rate for at least some of the children in her care. The Department conducts orientation meetings for and training of prospective foster parents. The Department emphasizes that the purpose of foster parenting is to provide temporary surrogate parenting for the foster children. The prospective parents are informed that they are considered volunteers and will not be paid for their services. The parents are told that the board payments are for the childrens' expenses. Foster parents sign an agreement acknowledging that the board payments are "on behalf of the child." Rule 65C-13.011(4), Florida Administrative Code, expressly provides that substitute care parents must have sufficient income to assure the stability and security of their own families without reliance on the board payments, and that the substitute family must have sufficient income to absorb four to six weeks of a foster child's care before receiving a board payment. If the Department removes a child from a foster home, the board payment to the foster payment ceases. If the child is placed with a new foster parent, then the board payment goes to the new foster parent. In addition to the regular and enhanced board payments, a CMS medical foster parent may receive payments from Medicaid as reimbursement for medically necessary services rendered to the foster children. Mrs. Sampson was a designated Medicaid provider from April 1992 through March 1997. Mrs. Sampson contended that these Medicaid payments were for the nursing services she provided to the children, just as physicians receive Medicaid payments for treatment of eligible patients. However, medical foster parents are not required to be licensed medical professionals. Mrs. Sampson offered no evidence that the Medicaid payments were for her services as an LPN, or that private, residential LPN services even qualify for Medicaid reimbursement absent prior authorization. CMS-administered medical foster care services are authorized for Medicaid reimbursement, and the best evidence is that Mrs. Sampson was reimbursed as a medical foster care provider, not as an LPN. The Department established that Mrs. Sampson did not hold herself out as running a business, nor did she report as income on her federal tax return the payments received in connection with providing foster care. Mrs. Sampson testified that she hired part-time employees to assist her in caring for the children, but she did not withhold federal income tax or Social Security taxes from their pay and did not file W-2 wage statements for them. Mrs. Sampson explained her failure to report her board payments as income by reference to 26 U.S.C. s. 131, which excludes foster care payments from reportable gross income. This citation justifies her failure to report, but also supports the Department's contention that foster care payments should not be considered business income. Mrs. Sampson implicitly conceded that her foster home did not possess any of the common indicia of a business. Her chief contention was that from 1970 to 1990, she worked as an LPN through nursing agencies, caring for sick children in hospitals or in their homes, and that from 1990 to 1997, she worked as an LPN caring for medical foster children in her own home. In other words, Mrs. Sampson contended that by operating the foster home, she was continuing to practice her profession in a different setting. She gave up the income from her practice as an LPN through nursing agencies in favor of the income she received as an LPN acting as a medical foster parent.
The Issue The issue presented is whether the Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed in this case and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Kathy Bergerson, held a family foster home license for her residence issued by the Children, Youth and Family Program Office of Petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. As it relates to the license at issue, Respondent was first licensed by Petitioner in April 1987. In her home, Respondent was responsible for several developmentally disabled children and a developmentally disabled adult. Respondent's mother lives in an apartment adjoining the home and has access to the residence. Respondent's mother is a registered nurse. During the period since the licensure, the several incidents described in the following paragraphs occurred. Because the incidents involved Respondent or her home and the incidents were unexplained, Petitioner became concerned for the safety of the children in Respondent's care. The incidents at issue are as follows: Sometime during 1987 while one of the children was hospitalized, the child was discovered in what appeared to be a drug-induced sleep during a visit by Respondent. No harm to the child was demonstrated from the incident, and Respondent relayed the incident to Petitioner during her relicensure interview in 1988. Also, sometime in 1987, a housekeeper, provided by Metro-Dade County, allegedly assaulted Respondent's mother while attempting to steal toys and bed sheets from the home. No harm to the children was shown from the incident, and Respondent reported the incident to Petitioner during her relicensure interview in 1988. Then, early in 1988, Respondent received a delivery of medication which did not contain full amounts of the prescribed contents. The medication was delivered by a representative sent by Petitioner. No harm to the children was proven from the incident, and Respondent reported the incident to Petitioner. In July 1988, a report of the sexual abuse of the developmentally disabled adult living with Respondent was filed with Petitioner. The final disposition of the incident was not shown; however, neither Respondent nor Respondent's mother were classified as perpetrators of the alleged abuse. In September 1988, a child under Respondent's care, and custody was hospitalized after she became, untypically, lethargic and unresponsive when Respondent gave the child a dose of Panadol for her fever. Fearing that the child was allergic to the medicine, Respondent brought the bottle from which she had administered the medicine with them to the hospital, and reported her fear to the medical personnel at the hospital and to Petitioner. Although Petitioner asserted that the bottle of medicine was tested for its contents, the proof failed to demonstrate that a test was performed or the results of any such test. Respondent kept the medication for the children in a locked cabinet in her kitchen. Included in the drugs in the cabinet were Panadol, Valium and Benedryl. In addition to Respondent, Respondent's mother and nurses provided by Petitioner, on occasion, had access to the cabinet. While Petitioner contended that the Panadol given to the child was adulterated with Valium and Benedryl, the proof failed to indicate that the Panadol was altered, or that the child suffered from the ingestion of the medication. Petitioner asserted that it was unusual for a foster parent, such as Respondent, to have as many unexplained events reported within an almost two- year period. Therefore, based on the above incidents and what Petitioner perceived to be a pattern of unexplained incidents involving Respondent and her home, and after ordering a psychological evaluation of Respondent and her mother, Petitioner issued its notice of intent to revoke Respondent's family foster home license on February 14, 1989. Petitioner alleged that Respondent was not capable of handling the stresses associated with maintaining a family foster home. At the hearing Respondent demonstrated a tendency to become overly excited; however, the proof failed to demonstrate that she is unable to handle the stresses of her life. Respondent is a caring person who has an obvious interest and concern for the children in her charge. She expressed deep concern over each of the incidents recited above and, in fact, reported the majority of the incidents to Petitioner. Although the incidents described above generate concern, was not shown that the safety of the clients was endangered by the incidents.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: Recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issue a Final Order withdrawing its intent to revoke Respondent's family foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of December 1989. JANE C. HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Park way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December 1989.
The Issue The issue is this case is whether revocation of Respondent's Foster Care license privilege for his past and present conduct, determined by the Department of Children and Family Services (hereinafter Agency) to be inappropriate, was proper under Section 409.175, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Under Section 409.175, Florida Statutes, the Department of Children and Family Services is the State Agency responsible for evaluating, qualifying, licensing, and regulating family foster care homes. On or about November 5, 1999, the Agency, after Mr. Thibodeau's successful completion of the Agency's evaluation and qualifying procedures, determined Mr. Thibodeau to be of good moral character. At all times material to the application process, Mr. Thibodeau answered completely and truthfully each question contained on each standard application form and other documents presented to him by the Agency during the foster care home application process. Based upon its determination, the Agency granted Provisional Certificate of License, No. 1999-110-002, for Substitute Family Home care privilege to Mr. Thibodeau. Thereafter, the Agency placed three minor children in Mr. Thibodeau's home: two teenaged brothers, David M. and Daniel M., and seven-year-old Steve. After an unspecified period of time together, bonding began to develop between the brothers, Daniel and David, and Mr. Thibodeau. As a result of a mutual agreement, Mr. Thibodeau submitted an adoption application to the Agency to become the adoptive parent of the brothers David M. and Daniel M. At all times pertinent hereto, Mr. Thibodeau answered completely and truthfully each question contained in the standard application forms and other documents presented to him by the Agency during the adoption application process. Ms. Georgia Alezras, trainer for the Model Approach to Partnership in Parenting (MAPP) classes and Mr. Kelvin Birdsell, family therapist and continuity specialist, made a home-study visit to the Thibodeau residence at some time between early July and August 15, 2000. Mr. Birdsell testified that he confined his conversations to the brothers, David M. and Daniel M. during the visit. Mr. Birdsell further testified that his conversations with the brothers were separate and away from the presence and hearing of Ms. Alezras and Mr. Thibodeau, who conversed privately. On July 26, 2000, after Mr. Thibodeau submitted his adoption application, and after the home study visit by Ms. Alezras, the Agency received a confidential telephonic abuse report, Petitioner's exhibit number one.1 The abuse report contains an interpolation of the private conversation between Ms. Alezras and Mr. Thibodeau during the earlier home-study visit. Ms. Carolyn Olsen, Family Counselor Supervisor, testified that Ms. Georgia Alezras reported her private conversation with Mr. Thibodeau to her Agency supervisors. The Agency's interpolation of the Alezras-Thibodeau conversation formed the factual allegations contained in the Agency's August 18, 2000, revocation letter. Sergeant Hagerty, Pasco County Sheriff's Office, testified that she and Sergeant O'Conner investigated the abuse allegations, consisting solely of the Agency's interpolation of Ms. Alezras' earlier and prior conversation with Mr. Thibodeau, by checking with authorities in Washington and checking with the National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) with negative results. The removal of the children from Mr. Thibodeau's home was based upon a joint decision to be safe and take a preventative approach in this matter. Petitioner's exhibit number two, a composite of eight letters, contained a "Closing of Foster Home For Children" report form, with a "foster home closing date" of August 18, 2000, and the caseworker and supervisor's signature on the date of August 22, 2000. The report, under "reason for closing" heading, contains the following comments: [H]is license was revoked because he recently divulged information about his past, that, had we known these facts prior to licensing, would have disqualified him to act as a foster parent---namely, he stated that some years ago he left the state of Washington with an unrelated male child without parental or state permission and lived with him for years under false identification. Ms. Georgia Alezras did not testify. Mr. Thibodeau's testimony is the only evidence of the private conversation with Ms. Alezras. Mr. Thibodeau's recollection of his responses to Ms. Alezras' questions was: [I]n 1975 he moved to the State of Washington; in 1976-77 he met Daniel L.; in 1976-77 he left the State of Washington and moved with Daniel to Pennsylvania where Daniel enrolled in school using his Washington school records; Daniel's mother visited them in Pennsylvania and maintained contact by telephone; Daniel, at age nineteen returned to Washington. He used a friend's birth certificate to secure his Pennsylvania driver's license. His video business2 considerations were subsequently dismissed and he advised the Agency of his decision by letter to his caseworker. Ms. Carolyn Olsen, Agency Representative, testified that one member of every MAPP team always asks a general, catchall question of every [foster care parent] applicant: "Is there anything else we need to know [about you], please tell us, [because] we will probably find out?" Ms. Olsen's candor and purpose comes into question on this point. She was not present during the Alezras-Thibodeau private conversation. Ms. Olsen does not know the identity of the team member who would have asked her catchall question nor does she know of a rule, guideline, or checklist requiring that specific question to be asked of every foster care license applicant, and there was no corroboration of her testimony. The Agency presented no evidence in support of its allegation that during the application process, its failure to inquire and Mr. Thibodeau's failure to disclose activities 20 years earlier in his life resulted from negligence or from the malicious intent of Mr. Thibodeau, and materially affect the health and safety of the minor children in his foster care. The Agency has failed to establish that Mr. Thibodeau left Washington with an unrelated minor child without parental consent and obtained false identification for the child. While it is true that Mr. Thibodeau "left Washington with an unrelated minor child," the Agency produced no evidence that his leaving was "without [minor child's] parental consent." Agency's investigators were unable to make contact with either the child or his mother. No investigation was made of the State of Washington's Motor Vehicle Department. No contact was made with the Pennsylvania authorities. Assuming argunendo, the Agency intended upon establishing this element by "an admission by Mr. Thibodeau"; they presented no evidence Mr. Thibodeau, in fact, uttered words to the effect of or acknowledged the comment "without parental consent." The undisputed evidence is Mr. Thibodeau's testimony that the minor child's mother not only approved of the child leaving Washington with him, but she also visited them in Pennsylvania and had telephone conversations with her child during his stay there. On this issue the Agency failed to carry its burden by clear and convincing evidence. Mr. Thibodeau admitted his use of another's birth certificate to secure a Pennsylvania driver's license more than 20 years ago. Since that time, Mr. Thibodeau's conduct, foster care parenting skills, helping problem young boys, and good moral conduct has been, as testified by the several witnesses, exemplary.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order reinstating to Stanley Thibodeau his foster care home license privilege. DONE AND ENTERED 21st day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2001.
The Issue Whether Respondent's foster home license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact There is no dispute that, at all times material hereto, Ms. Azulphar had a foster home license issued by the Department. Ms. Azulphar became a foster parent in January 1999. As with all new foster parents, Ms. Azulphar was required to complete 30 hours of Model Approach to Partnership Parenting (MAPP) training. Among other things, the MAPP training involves discussions regarding duties and responsibilities of a foster parent, the sexual problems of foster care children, and what to do if a foster care child runs away. Ms. Azulphar and the Department entered into a Bilateral Service Agreement regarding foster care. Both of them agreed to abide by the terms of the Bilateral Service Agreement. The Bilateral Service Agreement provided, among other things, the following: The Department's responsibilities to the foster parents include: * * * j. Support will be shown by responding within 24 hours to telephone messages, written correspondence or any other requests the foster parents may have. * * * Commitment to the Child The decision to accept a child into the home is a major one. . . Most foster children have experienced severe emotional, sexual and/or physical abuse as well as trauma. It is not unusual for children who have been sexually abused to act out in sexual inappropriate ways. Foster parents must be aware that these children need extra monitoring, teaching and showing of appropriate affection in order to grow into healthy children. . . By accepting a child into the home, the foster parent(s) agree to the following responsibilities: * * * d. To ensure that the child has supervision appropriate to his/her age and developmental level. * * * Foster parents have responsibilities and duties to both the department [sic] and the child. Responsibilities to the department [sic] include: * * * k. To notify the Department immediately if a child runs away, is missing or does not return home, even if the foster parent knows where the child is. * * * s. To know where and with whom the child is staying and the type of supervision the child is receiving when foster parents approve an outing or overnight activity. . . Non-compliance with any of the above provisions can result in termination of this service agreement by either the foster parents or the Department. Non-compliance with any of the above [sic] provisions may also result in the department [sic] revoking the home's license to provide foster care pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. . . . Any person living with a foster parent is subject to a background check by the Department because such person would have contact with any foster child placed with the foster parent. Such person must not have a disqualifying criminal record1 in order for the person to remain in the foster home during the licensure of the foster home. Ms. Azulphar had a tenant, Louis Bryant, who lived in an attached room to her home, which was converted from a garage. He had his own private entrance to his room. In January 2002, the Department informed Ms. Azulphar that Mr. Bryant, not only had a criminal record, but also had a disqualifying criminal drug record and that, therefore, if she wanted to keep her license, he would have to move. Ms. Azulphar informed Mr. Bryant that he had to move. Mr. Bryant moved, and Ms. Azulphar provided documentation to the Department indicating that he had moved. Ms. Azulphar described Mr. Bryant as a long-time friend and someone that she had relied upon when she first came to the United States. Mr. Bryant was also Ms. Azulphar's former supervisor. Further, even though he was a drug addict, who was skinny and dirty, smelled bad, and needed reminding to bathe, Ms. Azulphar described Mr. Bryant as the only person upon whom she could call when she had an emergency. She also indicated that Mr. Bryant was a handy man who performed repairs for her. Ms. Azulphar admitted that, as to Mr. Bryant, she was a "co-partner." She further admitted that Mr. Bryant was someone she "needs to continue what she was doing." In spite of her reliance upon Mr. Bryant as indicated, Ms. Azulphar showed a willingness to comply with the Department's requirements by requiring Mr. Bryant to move. On or about May 8, 2002, a foster child, F.D.,2 was placed with Ms. Azulphar. F.D. was 12 years of age at the time. F.D. was a special needs foster child because she had a history of being sexually abused at an early age and because F.D.'s father was deceased and her mother had voluntarily surrendered her parental rights. F.D. was the subject of disciplinary action at school. She was suspended for ten days from school for pulling a knife on another student. During the suspension, Ms. Azulphar took F.D. to work with her. F.D. left Ms. Azulphar's workplace without Ms. Azulphar's permission and knowledge. F.D. called her friends who came to Ms. Azulphar's workplace and F.D. left with them. Ms. Azulphar discovered that F.D. was dating a young man who was much older than F.D. Ms. Azulphar believed that the young man was approximately 26 years of age because he "looked" 26 years of age and F.D.'s friends were dating young men who also looked 26 years of age. Ms. Azulphar believed that the young man was among the friends that F.D. contacted to leave Ms. Azulphar's workplace. Also, during F.D.'s suspension, on the afternoon of May 16, 2002, her Guardian Ad-Litem came to Ms. Azulphar's home to visit F.D. The Guardian Ad-Litem knocked but no one answered. F.D. emerged from a neighbor's house. Ms. Azulphar had left F.D. alone at home. Ms. Azulphar had instructed F.D. to wait for the Guardian Ad-Litem at home and to not go outside of the home. Ms. Azulphar talked with the Guardian Ad-Litem on the telephone that same day. She expressed to the Guardian Ad-Litem that she wanted F.D. out of her home. That evening on May 16, 2002, F.D. became so distraught and volatile that she took a knife and threatened to harm herself. Ms. Azulphar called the Department's emergency telephone number and was told to call the Crisis Center for Mobile Children (CCMC). Ms. Azulphar telephoned CCMC, which told her how to talk to F.D. Ms. Azulphar did as she was instructed and F.D. did not harm herself. The next day, May 17, 2002, sometime in the evening after bedtime, which was around 9 p.m., F.D. slipped out of Ms. Azulphar's home. Ms. Azulphar had taken a sleeping pill and was not aware that F.D. was gone. Around 4 a.m. on May 18, 2002, Ms. Azulphar received a telephone call from F.D., who wanted Ms. Azulphar to come and get her. Ms. Azulphar did not want to drive at that time because she had taken the sleeping pill, so Ms. Azulphar asked F.D. to have an adult come to the telephone. Ms. Azulphar believed that F.D. was at a party because of the background noise that she heard, which sounded like a party. Ms. Azulphar recognized that the person who came to the telephone was not an adult, but Ms. Azulphar requested that F.D. be permitted to stay at the person's home until 6 a.m. when she (Ms. Azulphar) would pick-up F.D. F.D. did not wait for Ms. Azulphar. She returned to Ms. Azulphar's home before Ms. Azulphar could get her. Ms. Azulphar did not call the police when she discovered that F.D. was leaving her (Ms. Azulphar's) workplace with the young man who was 26 years of age and when she received the telephone call from F.D. The reason that Ms. Azulplhar did not call the police is that she believed that the police would do more harm than good to F.D., that F.D. had had enough trouble, and that F.D. was a Haitian as she was. After F.D. returned to Ms. Azulphar's home on May 18, 2002, Ms. Azulphar contacted the Guardian Ad-Litem and requested the removal of F.D. from her home. The Guardian Ad-Litem reported the incident to the court and the court ordered an investigation and the removal of F.D. from Ms. Azulphar's home. The Guardian Ad-Litem did not know the results of the court's investigation. During the time that F.D. was in Ms. Azulphar's home, Ms. Azulphar also had, in addition to her own child, T.A., two other foster children, A.A. and her sister, V.A.3 All of the other children agree that F.D. could not be trusted, was a thief, and did not tell the truth. After F.D. was removed from her home, Ms. Azulphar had another foster child placed in her home, who ran away. However, this time, Ms. Azulphar contacted the police and the Department when she discovered that the child had run away. Sometime during the first two weeks that F.D. was placed with Ms. Azulphar,4 the Department's social worker for F.D., Luis Muriel, was making arrangements with Ms. Azulphar to pick-up F.D. Ms. Azulphar requested Mr. Muriel to come to her workplace since F.D. would be there with her; however, he wanted Ms. Azulphar to leave F.D. at home alone. Ms. Azulphar reminded him that she was not to leave F.D. at home alone. However, Mr. Muriel instructed Ms. Azulphar to leave F.D. at home alone and informed Ms. Azulphar that he would be arriving at her home in 30 minutes. Ms. Azulphar contacted a male friend, who was approximately 50 years of age, for assistance and requested that he wait at her home for Mr. Muriel, who would be arriving in 30 minutes. However, she instructed her friend to wait outside in his car, not in her home, and he agreed to do so. When Mr. Muriel arrived at Ms. Azulphar's home and knocked on the door, Ms. Azulphar's friend opened the door. Ms. Azulphar's friend had not complied with her instructions and had gone into her home while F.D. was in the home. The Department had not performed a background check on Ms. Azulphar's friend. There was no reason for the Department to perform a background check on Ms. Azulphar's friend since it was never intended by Ms. Azulphar that he would have contact with the foster children placed with her. As to the incident, Ms. Azulphar had made it clear to her friend that he was not to go inside the home. On May 29, 2002, around 8 p.m., the licensing counselor for Ms. Azulphar's case, Reynaldo Gonzalez, made an unannounced visit to her home after being contacted by F.D.'s Guardian Ad-Litem regarding F.D.'s situation. By that time, F.D. had been removed from Ms. Azulphar's home. Mr. Gonzalez noticed a car parked outside of the house. He knocked on the door. The foster child A.A., who was approximately 15 years of age at the time, looked through the window and informed Mr. Gonzalez that Ms. Azulphar was not at home. Mr. Gonzalez returned around 8:30 p.m. and A.A. was still at home alone. Ms. Azulphar had left A.A. at home alone. However, Mr. Gonzalez's primary concern was not A.A.'s being at home alone. On the following day, around 6:20,5 Mr. Gonzalez returned to Ms. Azulphar's home because the Department had received anonymous information that no food was in the home. The same car was parked outside Ms. Azulphar's home, but the front of the car was parked in a different direction. Ms. Azulphar was not at home, but a relative, who was there, permitted Mr. Gonzalez to enter. Mr. Gonzalez found that there was adequate food in the home. None of the foster children were at home; they were with Ms. Azulphar. Mr. Gonzalez's testimony failed to indicate whether the car was parked along the street or in the driveway. An inference is drawn that the car was parked along the street. Ms. Azulphar voluntarily admitted to Mr. Gonzalez that Mr. Bryant was the owner of the car. She wanted Mr. Bryant to park his car outside her home to make it look as if someone were at home because her home had been burglarized when no one was at home. Further, on one of the days referred to, Mr. Bryant's car was either in disrepair or out of gas.6 According to the Department, Mr. Bryant should not have parked his car in front of Ms. Azulphar's home on the street. However, the evidence fails to demonstrate that such conduct by Mr. Bryant involved contact with the foster children. Ms. Azulphar admits that, at times, Mr. Bryant accompanied her shopping even when the foster children were with her. Ms. Azulphar also admits that Mr. Bryant has cut her grass, but only when she was at home. Ms. Azulphar testified that she obtained the approval of the Department for cutting the grass even though no Department witness recalled approving the action. Ms. Azulphar's testimony is found to be credible. Ms. Azulphar used poor judgment as it relates to Mr. Bryant. At first, Ms. Azulphar believed that, even though Mr. Bryant could not continue to be a tenant, she could continue to have Mr. Bryant to assist her with some things. She now knows that, as long as she has foster children, the Department does not want him to be around the children at any time. Ms. Azulphar believed that nothing was wrong with Mr. Bryant parking or leaving his car at her house. Now, she knows that the Department does not want him to be near her home when she has foster children. A.A. and V.A. were removed from Ms. Azulphar's home when the Department decided to revoke her foster home license. Both A.A. and V.A. want to return to Ms. Azulphar's home. Ms. Azulphar's daughter is in complete agreement with her mother being a foster parent and wants A.A. and V.A. to return.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order dismissing the revocation action of the foster home license of Marie Claire Azulphar. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2003.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Delores Wilson, committed the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, whether her foster care license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was first licensed as a foster parent in Florida, in or about 2003, after she applied for and was granted a foster care license through Camelot Community Care, Inc. (Camelot), a foster parent licensing agency located in Tampa, Florida. Prior to receiving a foster care license through Camelot, Respondent signed a Letter of Agreement with Camelot. Pursuant to the terms of the Letter of Agreement, Respondent agreed to comply with Camelot's policies. Additionally, the letter advised Respondent that if she violated the policies, foster children would be removed from her home, and the Department would make decisions regarding the revocation of her license. After Respondent was licensed, two foster children, T. and D., were placed in her home. T., a girl, was placed in Respondent's home in November 2003, and D., a boy, was placed there in December 2003. In November 2004, Camelot staff met with Respondent to discuss the foster children who had been placed in her home. At the time of this meeting, D. was 15 or 16 years old and T., who was about 18 years old, was pregnant and due to deliver the baby in a few months. D. had a history of sexually acting out. Because of D.'s history, Camelot's policy was that D. not be placed in a home with younger children. In light of D.'s history and Camelot's policy related thereto, during the November 2004 meeting, Camelot staff told Respondent that when T.'s baby was born, the baby could not live in the same house with D. Therefore, Camelot staff advised Respondent that she would have to choose whether she wanted to continue to work with D. (have D. remain in her home) or assist T. with her baby. Respondent was also told to notify Camelot when the baby was born. In December 2004, Respondent was informed that it was likely that T.'s baby would be adopted or put in foster care upon birth due to T.'s extensive disabilities. Respondent had also been told that the baby would not be given to the mother while she was in the hospital. On January 29 or 30, 2005, T., who was then 19 years old, gave birth to her baby at a hospital. It is unknown what happened at the hospital to alter the proposed adoption or foster care plan for the baby. However, while T. was in the hospital, the baby was given to her. On or about February 1, 2005, T. and the baby left the hospital. Both T. and her baby then went to Respondent's home and lived with her. The reason Respondent allowed T. and the baby to stay with her was because she wanted to help T. Despite regular communications with Camelot staff during the time period after the baby was born, Respondent never told anyone associated with Camelot or the Department that T. had given birth to the baby. Camelot found out about the birth of the baby only after being notified "indirectly" by another waiver support coordinator. D's initial placement with Respondent remained unchanged until February 7, 2005, when Camelot first received reports that T.'s baby was living with Respondent. On that day, Camelot removed D. from Respondent's home. On February 16, 2005, Camelot staff, D.'s waiver support coordinator, a Hillsborough Kids, Inc., case manager, and Respondent met to discuss the situation which resulted in D.'s being removed from Respondent's home on February 7, 2005. At this meeting, the subjects of the November 2004 and December 2004 meetings described in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 above, were also reviewed and discussed. A summary of the February 16, 2005, meeting was reported in a letter dated February 28, 2005, written by Camelot's clinical director, who attended that meeting. A copy of the letter was furnished to several persons who attended the meeting, including Respondent. The letter expressly stated that anyone who had further comments or concerns should contact the clinical director. Respondent never contacted the clinical director or anyone at Camelot regarding the contents of the February 28, 2005, letter. The discussion at the February 16, 2005, meeting focused on D. and the circumstances surrounding his removal from Respondent's home. Camelot staff specifically discussed Respondent's decision to allow T. and T.'s baby to live with Respondent, after being told that this should not happen and her failure to notify Camelot that the baby had been born and was in her home. During this meeting, Respondent never denied the foregoing facts. Rather, Respondent explained that she allowed T. and her baby to stay with her was so that she (Respondent) could help T. As a result of Respondent's failure to disclose to Camelot staff that T. had given birth to the baby and that both T. and the baby were living with Respondent, Camelot placed Respondent's foster home license on inactive status in or about late February 2005. Camelot advised Respondent of this decision at the February 16, 2005, meeting. In addition to placing Respondent's license on inactive status, Camelot also recommended that Respondent not be re-licensed as a foster parent. Respondent's foster care license was set to expire on July 31, 2005. After Respondent's foster care license issued by Camelot expired, she applied to Florida Mentor, another foster care licensing agency, for licensure as a foster parent. Florida Mentor reviewed Respondent's application for foster care licensure. As part of its review, Florida Mentor conducted a home study, the results of which were summarized in a report titled, "Annual Re-Licensing Home Study-2005" (Home Study Report or Report), which was completed on or about October 27, 2005. During the review process, Florida Mentor learned that Respondent had been previously licensed by Camelot and that the license had been placed on inactive status and allowed to expire. Based on information obtained from the Department's licensure file on Respondent and/or information provided by Respondent, Florida Mentor also learned about the circumstances discussed in paragraph 13, that caused Camelot to remove a foster child from Respondent's home and to place her foster care license on inactive status. Florida Mentor staff met with Respondent and discussed the situation involving D., T., and T.'s baby that occurred when she was licensed by Camelot. Respondent did not deny that she had violated Camelot's policy and had brought T. and T's baby to her home when D. was still there. Instead, Respondent acknowledged that she realized that her decision to bring T.'s baby home resulted in her clients being removed from her home and Camelot's decision to place her license on inactive status. Notwithstanding Respondent's admitting that she had failed to adhere to Camelot's policy regarding allowing T.'s baby in her home when D. was still there, she expressed to the Florida Mentor staff her desire to continue to work as a foster parent. Florida Mentor staff acknowledged Respondent's desire to serve as a foster parent. However, in light of her failure to comply with Camelot's policies and procedures, Florida Mentor staff discussed with Respondent the importance of communication and honesty with the foster care agency and the adherence to the policies and decisions of the agency. Florida Mentor considered several factors in its review of Respondent's application for a foster care license. These factors included Respondent's prior foster care experience with Camelot, including her admission that her violation of Camelot's policy was the reason her license was placed on inactive status; Respondent's statement of her desire to be a foster parent; and her apparent understanding that it was important that she comply with the policies of the foster care agency. Based on its review of the application and the findings and conclusions in the home study report, Florida Mentor recommended that Respondent be re-licensed as a therapeutic foster parent. Based on Florida Mentor's recommendation, Respondent was granted a new foster parent license, which was effective on November 1, 2005. It is that license which is at issue in this proceeding. Prior to issuance of Respondent's November 1, 2005, foster care license, Respondent was required to sign a Bilateral Service Agreement (Bilateral Agreement). That Bilateral Agreement set forth the terms and conditions with which all affected parties, the Department, the foster care agency, and Respondent must comply. The Bilateral Agreement was executed by Respondent and by a Florida Mentor staff person, on behalf of the Department, on October 4, 2005. Pursuant to the Bilateral Agreement, Respondent agreed to "notify the Department immediately of a potential change in . . . living arrangements or family composition (who is in the home), employment, significant health changes or any other condition that may affect the child's well being." In November 2005, after Respondent received her new foster care license, foster children were placed in Respondent's home. One child, M.J., was placed with Respondent on November 15, 2005. Two other children, S.C. and M.C., who were brothers, were place with Respondent on December 19, 2005. On January 8, 2006, M.J., S.C., and M.C., the three foster children who had been placed with Respondent in November and December 2005, were still living in Respondent's home. On January 8, 2006, a child protective investigator with the Department conducted a home study of Respondent's home. The purpose of the home study was to determine whether Respondent's home was a safe placement for her two grandchildren, and, if so, should the grandchildren be placed with Respondent. A placement for the two children was necessary because they had been taken from their mother, Respondent's daughter, for alleged abuse, neglect, or abandonment. The child protective investigator completed the home study on January 8, 2006, and reported the information she obtained during the home study on a seven-page Department form titled, "Caregiver Home Study." The completed Caregiver Home Study document was signed by Respondent and her son-in-law, Richard Davis, on January 8, 2006. Two categories included on the Caregiver Home Study form required Respondent to provide information regarding members of her household. One of the categories on the form required Respondent to provide the names of adults living or frequently in the prospective caregiver's home. The other category required that Respondent also list or provide the names, sex, and ages of children living in her home. On the Caregiver Home Study form, Richard Davis, Respondent's son-in-law, was listed as an adult who lived in or was frequently in Respondent's home. Based on information Respondent provided to the child protective investigator on January 8, 2006, the child protective investigator recorded on the Caregiver Home Study form that there were two foster children living in Respondent's home, A.C. and his brother, M.C. On January 8, 2006, in addition to A.C. and M.C., there was a third foster child, M.J., also living with Respondent. However, although there were three foster children living with Respondent on January 8, 2006, she never told the child protective investigator that M.J. was living in her home. Therefore, M.J. was not listed on the Caregiver Home Study form as a child living in Respondent's home. The Caregiver Home Study form required that Mr. Davis, the other adult living or frequently in the prospective caregiver's home, and Respondent sign the completed form. Both Respondent and Mr. Davis signed the Caregiver Home Study form on January 8, 2006. By signing the form, both Respondent and Mr. Davis acknowledged that to the best of their knowledge, "I have given the Department truthful information on all questions asked of me." On March 14, 2006, the assigned caseworker for A.C. and his brother M.C., two of the three foster children in Respondent's home, made an unannounced home visit to Respondent's home to check on those two children. During this visit, the case worker observed A.C. and M.C., as well as two other children there. The other two children the caseworker observed were Respondent's grandchildren who had been placed in Respondent's home after the Caregiver Home Study was completed on January 8, 2006. Respondent's two grandchildren had been placed with her since January 2006 and were still living with her on March 14, 2006. However, during the case worker's unannounced visit on March 14, 2006, Respondent told the caseworker that the two grandchildren did not live with her, but that she was babysitting them until their mother got off from work. After the March 14, 2006, visit to Respondent's home, the caseworker searched HomeSafe Net to determine the status of Respondent's grandchildren. That search revealed that the grandchildren were actually sheltered and living with Respondent. The caseworker also contacted an employee of the Safe Children Coalition, an agency which has a contract with the Department, to obtain information regarding the status of Respondent's grandchildren. An employee with Safe Children Coalition confirmed that the Sheriff's Office had placed Respondent's grandchildren with Respondent on January 8, 2006, and that, as of March 14, 2006, Respondent's grandchildren were still living with her. At the time of the March 14, 2006, 30-day visit, and at no time prior thereto, Florida Mentor was unaware that Respondent's grandchildren were living with Respondent. Respondent never notified Florida Mentor or the Department that her grandchildren had been placed with her and were living in her home. By failing to notify the Department or Florida Mentor of the change in the family composition, the people living in the home, Respondent violated the terms of the Bilateral Agreement. In order to provide for the safety and health of all the children placed in Respondent's care, it is imperative that the agency placing the foster children be immediately advised of any potential or actual change in the family composition, those living in the home. Since being licensed as a foster parent in Florida, Respondent repeatedly disregarded her obligation to advise the foster care agency of important and required changes. In three instances, Respondent failed to inform the appropriate agency of the changes in the composition of persons living in her home. The second and third incidents occurred after and while Respondent was licensed by Florida Mentor, after she had been specifically advised of the importance and need to communicate and be honest with the foster care agency and to adhere to the agency's policies. First, Respondent failed to advise Camelot staff when T.'s baby was born, and Respondent allowed T. to bring her newborn baby to Respondent's home to live. Respondent ignored or disregarded the directive of Camelot staff, who had told her that T.'s baby could not live in Respondent's home because of the sexual history of D., a foster child placed in Respondent's home. Respondent testified that D. was not in her home on February 1, 2005, when T.'s newborn baby was brought home, because Camelot had placed D. in respite care. According to Respondent, D. returned for one day, before he was permanently removed from her home and placed in another foster home. Respondent's testimony, discussed in paragraph 45 above, is not credible and is contrary to the competent evidence which established that D. was removed from Respondent's home on February 7, 2005, and then placed in another home. Even if D. were not physically in Respondent's house when T.'s baby was there, because D. was still a foster child placed in Respondent's home, she was responsible for notifying the Department of the change in the composition of her household. However, Respondent failed to notify Camelot or the Department and, in doing so, violated a Department rule and a specific directive of the foster care agency. In the second incident, Respondent failed to disclose to the child protective investigator that she had three foster children. Respondent testified that she was not untruthful to the child protective investigator about the number of foster children who were living in her home. According to Respondent, she never said how many foster children lived in her home. Instead, Respondent testified that the child protective investigator made that presumption after she (the investigator) saw two "yellow jackets" (files about the foster children) on a table in Respondent's house. Respondent's testimony, discussed in paragraph 47, is not credible and ignores the fact that Respondent signed the Caregiver Home Study form indicating that she had only two foster children living in the home. Moreover, having served as a foster parent for about ten years and in two states, Respondent knew the importance and significance of providing accurate information regarding the composition of the family and how that information might impact additional placements (i.e., the placement of her grandchildren) in Respondent's home. In the third instance, while licensed by Florida Mentor, Respondent failed to notify that agency or the Department of a change in the family composition (i.e., who is in the home) that occurred on January 8, 2006, when Respondent's two grandchildren were placed in her home. The agency first learned that Respondent's grandchildren lived with her only after a case worker made an unannounced visit to Respondent's home on March 14, 2006, and saw Respondent's grandchildren there, and later verified that the grandchildren were living with Respondent. Respondent does not deny that she failed to notify the Department that her grandchildren were living with her. However, Respondent testified that she never told the case worker that her grandchildren did not live with her and that she was babysitting them while their mother worked. This testimony by Respondent is not credible and is contrary to the credible testimony of the case worker and the supporting documentary evidence. Respondent was aware of the policy that required her to immediately notify the Department or foster care agency of a potential change in family composition. In fact, Respondent signed a Bilateral Agreement in which she agreed to provide such notification to the Department or the Department's representative. Nonetheless, on two occasions, after being licensed by Florida Mentor and having foster children placed in her home, Respondent failed to notify the Department of actual changes in her family's composition. Respondent deliberately violated the terms of the Bilateral Agreement that required her to notify the Department or the foster care agency of any potential, and certainly any actual, changes in her family composition. This provision is designed to better ensure the health and safety of the foster children placed with foster parents, such as Respondent. There is no indication that the children placed in Respondent's home at the time relevant to this proceeding were harmed or injured. Nonetheless, the harm which the Department's policy is designed to prevent is not only possible, but more likely to occur when the composition of the foster parent changes and the Department is not notified of that change. Without such knowledge, the Department lacks the information it needs to make decisions regarding the placement and/or continued placement of foster children in a particular foster home. As a result of Respondent's failing to provide information relative to her family composition, she also failed to provide information necessary and required to verify her compliance with the Department's rules and regulations.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Children and Family Services, enter a final order revoking Respondent, Delores Wilson's, foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2007.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for renewal of her family foster home license should be denied on the grounds set forth in the June 20, 1995, letter from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), Respondent's predecessor, to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is (as was its predecessor, HRS) a state government licensing and regulatory agency. From September of 1989 to June 30, 1995, Petitioner was licensed by HRS (on a yearly basis) to operate a family foster home at her residence in Palm Beach County. In May of 1994, as part of the licensure renewal process, Petitioner signed an "Agreement to Provide Substitute Care for Dependent Children" (Agreement). In so doing, she agreed that she would, as a licensed foster parent, among other things, "comply with all requirements for a licensed substitute care home as prescribed by the department," "immediately report any injuries or illness of a child in [her] care," and "abide by the department's discipline policy." The previous day (May 23, 1994), Petitioner had received and signed a copy of HRS's "discipline policy," which provided as follows: FOSTER PARENT(S): You are aware that for some time, Health and Rehabilitative Services has discouraged the use of Physical punishment, including spanking, for children in foster care. Now, however, we have an Administrative Rule statewide which prohibits foster parents from using corporal punishment on foster children. This section of administrative Rule 10M- 6, which deals with discipline is reproduced in the following paragraph. "Licensing and relicensing procedure developed by the Department shall include the presentation of written foster care disciplinary policies to applicants and licensed foster parents to ensure that appropriate nonabusive disciplinary practices are used in dealing with foster children's behavior. Discipline is a training process through which the child develops the self- control, self-reliance and orderly conduct necessary for them to assume responsibilities, make daily living decisions and live according to accepted levels of social behaviors. The purpose of discipline is education and rational. It focuses on deterring unacceptable behavior by encouraging the child to develop internal controls. Foster parents are expected to define rules which establish limits and types of acceptable behavior. These rules must be clearly explained to each child and applied equally to all children. Prohibited disciplinary practices include group punishments for misbehavior of individuals; withholding of meals, mail or family visits; hitting a child with an object; spanking a child; physical, sexual, emotional and verbal abuse; humiliating or degrading punishment which subjects the child to ridicule; being placed in a locked room; and delegation of authority for punishment to other children or persons not known to the child. The use of isolation shall be used only for short periods of time as a therapeutic measure when a child's behavior is temporarily out of control. Such periods of isolation shall be observed and supervised by the foster parent to ensure the safety of the child." If you have problems with this new rule, please discuss this with your licensing counselors who will be able to help you work out alternative disciplinary techniques for each child, according to his/her needs. My signature acknowledges that I have read this statement, that I understand the content and agree to abide by it. A. G. is a 12 year-old foster child who currently resides in Boys Town in Tallahassee. Before entering the foster care system, he had been the victim of abuse. In 1994, A. G. lived in Petitioner's family foster home along with three other male foster children, J. W., M. M., and B. P., all of whom were teenagers with troubled pasts and juvenile records. On or about December 15, 1994, the day before A. G. was scheduled to leave Petitioner's home for another foster home, the other boys angrily reported to Petitioner that A. G. had misappropriated a gift certificate that belonged to M. M. and a watch that belonged to B. P. M. M. was particularly upset and angry about what A. G. had done. Upon receiving this report, Petitioner instructed the boys to "take care of" the matter. The boys then went to A. G.'s room and proceeded to hit A. G. with their hands and a belt. A. G. sustained a number of bruises on his buttocks and the back of his legs as a result of the attack. A. G. yelled and screamed as he was being hit. Petitioner was in her bedroom, which was adjacent to the room where the beating took place. At no time during the attack did she leave her bedroom to tell the boys to stop beating A. G., nor did she take any other action to stop the beating. Petitioner exercised extremely poor judgment in instructing the older boys to "take care of" the matter. She should have realized that the carte blanche she gave J. W., M. M., and B. P., who were upset and angry with A. G., placed A. G.'s physical safety at risk. She compounded her error by not carefully monitoring the older boys subsequent activities to make sure that they resolved the matter appropriately without harming A. G. The following morning, A. G. left Petitioner's home for another foster home, that of Janet Kerimoglu and her husband. A. G. arrived at the Kerimoglu home with very few belongings. Moreover, his physical appearance concerned Ms. Kerimoglu. A. G. appeared to be very thin. Furthermore, he had head lice and fresh bruises on his body. When asked about the bruises, A. G. explained that he had been beaten up by some teenagers the day before at Petitioner's home. A report that A. G. had been the victim of abuse while at Petitioner's home was made to HRS's abuse registry. The report was investigated by HRS's protective services investigative unit. On January 10, 1995, following the completion of the investigation, FPSS Report No. 94-117809 issued. The report classified as "proposed confirmed" the allegation that Respondent was guilty of neglect in connection with the beating that A. G. received at her home on or about December 15, 1994. According to the report, the beating occurred "because of [Petitioner's] lack of supervision and [her] failure to protect [A. G.]," a finding which is supported by the preponderance of the record evidence in the instant case. A request to expunge or amend the report was denied on June 6, 1995. By letter dated June 20, 1995, Petitioner was advised that her foster family home license would not renewed because of the finding of neglect made in FPSS Report No. 94-117809.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for renewal of her family foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of September, 1998.
