The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Respondents committed the violations alleged in the amended administrative complaint, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating fire extinguisher dealers. Respondent, Ricardo Cabrera, holds a fire extinguisher permit class 03 license (No. 109176000192) and is the qualifier for the company, B.C. & A.B.C. Fire Extinguisher Maintenance (license No. 702193000190 - Fire Extinguisher Dealer Class "C"). At all times material to the amended administrative complaint, Carlos Javier Gonzalez-Clavell was employed by Respondent but was not licensed or permitted to service fire extinguishers. In August, 1995, Respondents were placed on probation for a period of two (2) years. A special condition of Respondents' probation required Ricardo Cabrera to supervise all activities undertaken by the company to insure its employees complied with all regulations. In response to a complaint unrelated to the quality of Respondent's work performance, Ms. Barrow directed an investigation of the Respondent's business premises. Mr. Parks was assigned the investigation of whether Respondents were employing unlicensed workers to perform servicing or recharge of fire extinguishers. On January 29, 1996, Mr. Parks went to Respondent's place of business and observed someone loading a vehicle with fire extinguisher equipment and supplies. He also observed the male near a tank which he presumed was nitrogen. He assumed the person was recharging a fire extinguisher. During the described activity Respondent was not in sight. The person described in paragraph 7 later identified himself as Carlos Javier Gonzalez-Clavell. The vehicle being loaded belonged to Mr. Clavell. Respondent was on the business premises at all times noted above. He was out of view but supervising Mr. Clavell's activities. Mr. Clavell did not recharge fire extinguishers and was not permitted to perform license activities.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order dismissing the amended administrative complaint. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of February, 1997. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Joe Demember, Esquire Division of Legal Services 512 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Ricardo Cabrera 3340 South Lake Drive Miami, Florida 33155 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, LL-26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issues are whether Respondents have violated various statutes and rules governing persons licensed to install and service fire extinguishers and fire suppression systems and, if so, what penalties Petitioner should impose.
Findings Of Fact General Respondents hold Class A and C licenses as fire extinguisher dealers, Class D licenses as pre-engineered systems dealers, Class 01 licenses as fire extinguisher permittees, and Class 04 licenses as pre-engineered systems permittees. Respondent Todd Jacobs (Jacobs) is the qualifier for Respondent National Fire and Safety Corporation (NFS). NFS has been in the fire-safety business for about 15 years. Jacobs received his first permit about ten years ago. Neither Respondent has been disciplined prior to the suspension of all of their licenses and permits effective May 15, 1997, for the incidents described below. The suspension has remained continuously in effect through the present. Pre-engineered systems are custom installations of fire-suppression systems. These pressurized systems, which are activated by heat-sensitive fusible links and small cylinders known as cartridges, feature large metal cylinders that supply the powder through pipes to specific hazard areas. Pre-engineered systems must be installed in accordance with pretested limitations and configurations. Petitioner has cited various violations of the standards of the National Fire Protection Association. As noted in the conclusions of law, violation of these standards, which are incorporated into the rules, provide the basis for discipline. The relevant standards of the National Fire Protection Association are divided into two sections: one governs persons dealing with fire extinguishers and the other governs persons dealing with pre-engineered systems. National Fire Protection Association 10 is titled, “Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers.” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 1-3 defines a “portable fire extinguisher” as a “portable device carried on wheels and operated by hand containing an extinguishing agent that can be expelled under pressure for the purpose of suppressing or extinguishing a fire.” National Fire Protection Association 10 applies to fire extinguishers, not pre-engineered systems. National Fire Protection Association 10, Chapter 4 governs the inspection, maintenance, and recharging of fire extinguishers. National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 4-1.4 provides that “[m]aintenance, servicing, and recharging” of fire extinguishers shall be performed by trained persons “having available the appropriate servicing manual(s), the proper types of tools, recharge materials, lubricants, and manufacturer’s recommended replacement parts or parts specifically listed for use in the fire extinguisher.” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 4-5.1.2 requires that persons recharging a fire extinguisher shall follow the “recommendations of the manufacturer.” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 4-5.3.1 requires that persons recharging fire extinguishers use “[o]nly those agents specified on the nameplate or agents proven to have equal chemical composition, physical characteristics, and fire extinguishing capabilities ” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 4-5.3.2 prohibits persons recharging fire extinguishers from mixing “[m]ultipurpose dry chemicals” with “alkaline-based dry chemicals.” National Fire Protection Association 10, Chapter 5 governs the hydrostatic testing of fire extinguishers. Table 5-2 provides that the longest hydrostatic test interval for fire extinguishers is 12 years. National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 5-1.2 provides that the hydrostatic testing of fire extinguishers shall be performed by trained persons “having available suitable testing equipment, facilities, and appropriate servicing manual(s).” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 5-5.1.1 requires that persons hydrostatically testing fire extinguishers first conduct an internal examination of the cylinder. National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 5-5.1.2 requires that persons hydrostatically testing fire extinguishers do so in accordance with the “procedures specified in the pamphlet Methods for Hydrostatic Testing of Compressed Gas Cylinders (CGA C-1), published by the Compressed Gas Association.” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 5-5.2 provides that the testing procedures for low-pressure cylinders, shells, and hose assemblies are detailed in Appendix A. Appendix A contains detailed material, but, according to a prefatory statement, “[t]his Appendix is not part of the requirements of this National Fire Protection Association document but is included for informational purposes only.” National Fire Protection Association 17 is titled, “Standard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 1-4 defines “pre- engineered systems,” in part, as [t]hose having predetermined flow rates, nozzle pressures, and quantities of dry chemical [with] specific pipe size, maximum and minimum pipe lengths, flexible hose specifications, number of fittings and number and types of nozzles prescribed by a testing laboratory.” National Fire Protection Association 17 applies to pre- engineered systems, not fire extinguishers. National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 1-4 defines “inspection” as a “’quick’ check to give reasonable assurance that the extinguishing system is fully charged and operable.” The definition adds that this is done by “seeing that the system is in place, that it has not been activated or tampered with, and that there is no obvious physical damage or condition to prevent operation.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 3-8.3.1 requires that the dry chemical container and expellant gas assemblies of a pre-engineered system shall be located “so as not to be subjected to severe weather conditions or to mechanical, chemical, or other damage.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 3-9.1 provides that, for pre-engineered systems, the “pipings and fittings shall be installed in accordance with good commercial practices.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Chapter 9 governs the inspection, maintenance, and recharging of pre- engineered systems. National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-1.1 provides that, when dry chemical pressure containers are not attached to piping or hand hose lines, the discharge outlet shall have a protective diffusing safety cap to protect persons from recoil and high-flow discharge in case of accidental activation. The caps shall also be used on empty National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9- 1.4 provides that “[a]ll dry chemical extinguishing systems shall be inspected in accordance with the owner’s manual and maintained and recharged in accordance with the manufacturer’s listed installation and maintenance manual and service bulletins.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-3.2 provides that “[f]ixed temperature-sensing elements of the fusible metal allow type shall be replaced at least annually from the date of installation. They shall be destroyed when removed.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-3.2.1 provides that the “year of manufacture and date of installation of the fixed temperature-sensing element shall be marked on the system inspection tag[,]” and the “tag shall be signed or initialed by the installer.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-4.2 provides that “[s]ystems shall be recharged in accordance with the manufacturer’s listed installation and maintenance manual.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-5 requires that trained persons hydrostatically testing pre- engineered systems have “available suitable testing equipment, facilities, and an appropriate service manual(s).” This standard requires hydrostatic testing at 12-year intervals for the dry chemical container, auxiliary pressure containers (unless less than two inches in outside diameter and two feet in length or unless they bear the DOT stamp, “3E”), and hose assemblies. National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-5.1 requires that persons hydrostatically testing pre- engineered systems subject the tested components of hydrostatic test pressure equal to the marked factory test pressure or the test pressure specified in the manufacturer’s listed installation and maintenance manual. This test prohibits any leakage, rupture, or movement of hose couplings and requires test procedures in accordance with the manufacturer’s detailed written hydrostatic test instructions.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-5.2 requires that persons hydrostatically testing pre- engineered systems remove and discard the dry chemical agent from the containers prior to the test. Page Field (Counts I and II) In March 1997, Rick Clontz, a Lee County employee, asked Roland Taylor, an NFS employee, to service components of the fire-safety system at the Lee County Hazardous Materials Facility at Page Field in Fort Myers. This fire-safety system protects an area at which Lee County stores corrosive, flammable, and poisonous materials. Initially, Mr. Taylor removed three ten-pound ABC fire extinguishers. These are small portable cylinders, whose “ABC” designation refers to their ability to suppress a broad range of fires. According to the National Fire Protection Association standards, Class A fires involve “ordinary combustible materials, such as wood, cloth, paper, rubber, and many plastics.” Class B fires involve “flammable liquids, oils greases, tars, oil-based paints, lacquers, and flammable gases.” Class C fires involve “energized electrical equipment . . . .” On April 1, 1997, Mr. Taylor returned the three 10- pound ABC fire extinguishers. Later inspection revealed that Mr. Taylor had properly removed and discarded the ABC powder from each cylinder, but he had refilled only one of the three cylinders entirely with ABC powder. He erroneously filled the other two cylinders with mixtures of 75 percent and 50 percent BC powder. The improper filling of two of the fire extinguishers at the Page Field Hazardous Materials Facility threatened the public health, safety, and welfare. Meeting Mr. Taylor at the Page Field facility when Mr. Taylor returned the three small cylinders, Mr. Clontz asked him to remove the 50-pound Ansul SPA 50 cylinder and hydrostatically test it. Mr. Taylor noted that the cylinder was not yet due for this test, but quoted a price to which Mr. Clontz agreed, and Mr. Taylor disconnected the cylinder from the pre-engineered system and transported it from the site. Hydrostatic testing is a hydraulic interior pressurization test that measures ductility, which is the ability of cylinder walls to expand and contract. The purpose of hydrostatic testing is to determine the suitability of a cylinder for continued service. Hydrostatic testing requires the tester to release the pressure and empty the contents of a cylinder. Using specialized equipment, the tester then fills the cylinder with water, pressurizing it to twice the service pressure or, for the systems cylinders involved in this case, 1000 pounds per square inch. Cylinder failure from the loss of structural integrity can result in a dangerous rupture, possibly causing an improperly bracketed cylinder to launch like an unguided missile. A cylinder that passes its hydrostatic test does not have to be retested for 12 years. Three days later, Mr. Taylor returned the Ansul cylinder with a tag stamped to show the date on which NFS had hydrostatically tested the cylinder. Mr. Taylor reconnected it to the pre-engineered system, changing the three fusible links. However, Mr. Taylor did not tighten the actuation piping wrench-tight, as required by the manufacturer’s specification. Instead, Mr. Taylor left the actuation piping sufficiently loose that it might cause a failure of the pre- engineered system to activate. As Respondents conceded, the loose actuation piping threatened the public health, safety, and welfare. Finished with his work, Mr. Taylor gave Mr. Clontz a receipt, but no diagram or report, as Mr. Clontz usually received after such service. Consistent with the work requested by Lee County, the receipt stated that NFS had hydrostatically tested and recharged the three ten-pound and one 50-pound cylinders. However, NFS had not hydrostatically tested the 50- pound Ansul SPA 50 cylinder. NFS had not even changed the powder in the cylinder. Jacobs was personally aware of these facts and personally authorized the deceitful stamping of the tag to show a hydrostatic testing. The fraudulent misrepresentation concerning the hydrostatic testing of the Ansul SPA 50 cylinder threatened the public health, safety, and welfare. Additionally, NFS had replaced the three fusible links with three other fusible links. Petitioner failed to prove that there are material differences between the two types of links so as to justify discipline. There are two differences between the links. First, NFS used Globe links rather than Ansul links. However, Ansul links are manufactured by Globe. The Ansul expert testified that Ansul subjects the links to an additional inspection. However, the record does not reveal whether Globe does not also subject its brand-name links to another inspection that it does not perform for the links that it manufactures for Ansul. The Ansul expert did not testify as to the defect rate resulting from the Ansul inspection or any difference between the performance of the “two” links. On this record, then, there is no demonstrated difference in the two brand-named fusible links. The second difference is that NFS installed an ML link rather than the newer K link currently in use. Ansul approved the ML link in the Ansul SPA 50 pre-engineered system until five years ago. At that time, Ansul authorized use of the older ML link until dealer inventories were depleted. Even assuming that the K link represents a safety advance, compared to the ML link, Ansul’s gradual introduction of the new link precludes a finding that the difference was material, unless one were to assume that Ansul disregarded public safety when authorizing the gradual introduction of the new link. Respondents conceded that they did not have a copy of the Ansul SPA 50 manual when they serviced the Ansul SPA 50 system. They have since obtained the manual. Petitioner failed to show that the failure to have the manual threatened the public health, safety, or welfare. Respondents conceded that they did not produce the inspection form for the system. They had provided such a form previously. Petitioner failed to show that the failure to produce an inspection form threatened the public health, safety, or welfare. At the hearing, Petitioner agreed not to pursue the claim against Respondents regarding the LT10R cartridge. Petitioner effectively conceded that Respondents were not required to hydrostatically test the cartridge because it is exempt from such testing. Petitioner evidently elected not to pursue the recharging issue for other reasons. Mobile Service Units (Counts III-V The service truck operated by Mark Thackeray did not have a conductivity tester, certified scales, or proper manuals. The conductivity tester ensures that the braiding is intact on carbon dioxide hoses. The certified scales ensures that the cylinder is filled with the proper amount of dry chemical. The manuals ensure that the person servicing a pre- engineered system understands all of its components and how it works. Additionally, one cylinder in the truck had a drill bit instead of a safety pin installed in the head of the bottle. Petitioner also proved that the fire extinguisher and pre-engineered system tags bore the Naples and Fort Myers addresses for NFS. As noted below, the Fort Myers location was inactive, used only for storage and drop-offs and not for shop work or retail sales activity. For several years, Petitioner’s representatives knew that the tags bore both addresses and knew that the Fort Myers location was inactive, but never objected to Respondents’ practice. The only violation involving Mr. Thackeray’s truck that threatened the public health, safety, or welfare was the failure to have certified scales. The service truck operated by Ward Read lacked an operational inspection light, six-inch vise, and proper manuals. Additionally, Mr. Read’s truck had tags with the Fort Myers and Naples addresses for NFS. However, none of these violations involving Mr. Read’s truck threatened the public health, safety, or welfare. Petitioner failed to prove that Mr. Read’s truck lacked leak testing equipment. The truck had a bottle of Leak Tech with which to detect leaks in fire extinguishers. The truck also had a cable-crimping tool. The truck lacked a Kidde tool, but Petitioner failed to prove that Mr. Read installed Kidde systems off this truck or that the crimping tool present on the truck could not service adequately Kidde installations. The service truck operated by Donald Zelmanski lacked an inspection light, a six-inch vise, certified scales, leak-testing equipment, and proper manuals. Mr. Zelmanski’s truck contained tags with the Fort Myers and Naples addresses. The only violation that threatened the public health, safety, or welfare was the failure to have certified scales. Naples and Fort Myers Facilities (Counts VI-VII) The NFS Naples facility lacked operational hydrostatic test equipment on April 9, 1997. Respondents claim that they were having the equipment upgraded and calibrated at the time of the inspection. Ordinarily, this defense might be creditable, but not in this case. While the hydrostatic test equipment was out of service, NFS accepted the Page Field cylinder for hydrostatic testing and returned it to service, fraudulently representing that the cylinder had been hydrotested. This is precisely the practice against which the requirement of operational testing equipment is designed to protect. The Naples facility also lacked certified gauges for low-pressure testing. Respondents claim that the equipment upgrade described in the preceding paragraph would allow them to test high- and low-pressure cylinders on the same machine. However, due to Respondents’ fraudulent handling of the Page Field cylinder during the equipment downtime, this defense is unavailing. The Naples facility lacked an adapter to allow Respondents to recharge an Ansul SPA 50 cylinder. Jacobs drove the Page Field cylinder to St. Petersburg to have the cylinder recharged by a competitor that had such an adapter. However, the requirement that a facility have an adapter reduces the risk that a licensee will ignore its professional responsibilities and simply return a cylinder to service without first discharging it and performing a visual internal inspection. Respondents’ failure to discharge their other professional responsibilities underscores the materiality of the requirement that they keep an adapter for the Ansul SPA 50 that they elected to accept for service. Respondents kept tags at the Naples facility with tags containing addresses of the Naples and Fort Myers facilities. At the time of the inspection, Respondents also lacked documentation for two of eight scales, including a scale in 1/4-pound increments. Jacobs’ claim that they sent the two uncertified scales for servicing immediately after the inspection does not obviate the fact that, at the time of the inspection, they were available for use and in disrepair. Respondents failed to include serial numbers of serviced fire extinguishers on the relevant invoices. Respondents also failed to include the necessary permit number on inspection forms. Respondent falsely represented that they had hydrotested the Page Field Ansul SPA 50 cylinder at the Naples facility when they had not done so. Respondents stored cylinder bottles without safety caps in place. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondents did not post DOT certification near the hydrostatic testing equipment or that they stocked nitrogen cylinders without an acceptable blow-out disk in place. The blow-out disks were not Ansul brand, but Petitioner failed to prove that the disks were not UL listed or the substantial equivalent of Ansul disks. Respondents concede that the Fort Myers location lacked the items alleged by Petitioner. However, the Fort Myers location is inactive and serves merely as a drop-off or storage facility. All shop work and retail sales activities occur at the Naples location. At the time of the April 1997 inspection, Respondents surrendered the license for the inactive Fort Myers location. Other Jobs (Counts VIII-XI) Respondents installed a pre-engineered system at the SunTrust Bank in Naples. The cylinder is in the bank vault, which it is designed to protect. Petitioner charged that Respondents improperly located the cylinder in the hazard area, but Petitioner did not discuss the fact that the cylinder at Page Field was in the hazard area. Obviously, the corrosive effect of the hazardous materials at Page Field represents a greater risk to the cylinder than the corrosive effect of money and other valuables in the vault at the SunTrust. Additionally, some language in the Ansul manual cautions not to locate the cylinder in the hazard area, but only if the hazard is corrosive. Respondents replaced the fusible links at SunTrust annually. However, they failed to record the year of manufacture of the fusible links on the system tag when last servicing the system in October 1996. There is no evidence as to whether Respondents had suitable Ansul manuals and adapters when it serviced the system at that time. Respondents installed a pre-engineered system at the VFW Post in Naples. In doing so, their employee, who also misfilled the three fire extinguishers at Page Field, left the end-pipe-to-nozzle loose, so as to risk a loss of pressure in case of fire. This condition threatened the public health, safety, and welfare. Although Respondents fired this employee shortly after discovering his poor performance, this action does not eliminate the safety violations for which he, and they, are responsible. Petitioner also proved that Respondents located the 260 nozzle over the griddle in the wrong location. This condition threatened the public health, safety, and welfare because the system might not extinguish a fire on the griddle. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondents located the 230 nozzle in the wrong location. The Ansul manual allows this nozzle to be located anywhere along or within the perimeter of the fryer, if aimed to the center of the fryer. The 230 nozzle was so located and aimed. Respondents installed two pre-engineered systems at Mozzarella’s Café in Naples. In the course of this job, Respondents committed several violations governing documentation. Respondents improperly combined two pre- engineered systems on one inspection report, failed to include in the inspection report references to the manufacturer’s drawings and page numbers, failed to list in the inspection report a second gas valve on the front hood of one system, and failed to include in the inspection report Respondents’ permit number. However, Petitioner failed to prove that Respondents failed to list in the inspection report the type of fusible links in each hood. Respondents serviced a pre-engineered system at Kwan’s Express in Fort Myers in December 1996. Respondents failed to list in the inspection report the degree and types of fusible links installed and a reference to the drawing and page number in the manufacturer’s manual. However, Respondents listed in the inspection report the model number of the system. Red Lobster (Count XII) Several months after Petitioner had suspended Respondents’ licenses and permits, counsel for both parties negotiated a settlement agreement. Under the agreement, Petitioner would immediately lift the suspension. Jacobs and his general manager, Judson Schroyer, learned that Respondents’ counsel had received an unsigned, final draft settlement agreement on Monday, August 18, 1997. The settlement conditions were acceptable to Respondents, and Jacobs knew that Respondents’ counsel had signed the agreement and faxed it back to Petitioner’s counsel for execution by Petitioner’s representative. On August 18, the general manager of the Red Lobster in Naples called NFS and spoke with Jacobs. The general manager described a job involving the installation of a new oven, which would necessitate the relocation of other kitchen equipment a few feet. Thinking that the settlement agreement would be fully executed by then, Jacobs agreed to visit the general manager at the site the following morning. The next morning, Jacobs and Mr. Schroyer met the general manager at the Red Lobster. Giving the general manager NFS business cards with their names, Jacobs and Mr. Schroyer briefly examined the pre-engineered system in the kitchen, as the three men walked through the kitchen, and assured the general manager that there would be no problem doing the work in the short timeframe that the customer required. The purpose of the visit was much more for marketing than it was for preparation for the relatively simple job that the general manager envisioned. Shortly after leaving the Red Lobster, Mr. Schroyer realized that Respondents might not have their licenses and permits reinstated in time to do the job. He conveyed this concern to his supervisor, Jacobs, who spoke with Respondents’ counsel on the evening of August 19 and learned that they could not do the job. Jacobs instructed Mr. Schroyer to call another company in Fort Myers, FireMaster, to which Respondents had referred work during their suspension. Mr. Schroyer called a representative of FireMaster, and he agreed to perform the work. FireMaster assigned the job to Ward Read, who, as is authorized by Petitioner, held a dual permit, which means that he was permitted to work for two licensed dealers. One was NFS, and the other was FireMaster. Mr. Read reported to the Red Lobster in the predawn hours of August 21, as requested by the general manager of Red Lobster. Because his FireMaster truck had insufficient supplies, Mr. Read used an NFS truck, the equipment tags, inspection report, and invoice all bore the name of FireMaster.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the State Fire Marshal enter a final order suspending the licenses and permits of both Respondents for two years, commencing from the effective date of the earlier emergency order of suspension. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Attorney Mechele R. McBride Attorney Richard Grumberg Department of Insurance and Treasurer 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Mark H. Muller Quarles & Brady, P.A. 4501 North Tamiami Trail Naples, Florida 34103 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's application for a Class 09 04 permit should be approved.
Findings Of Fact On or about August 16, 1999, the Petitioner, Joseph M. Toth, executed an application for a Class 09 04 permit. The application represented that the Petitioner had previously possessed a permit, number 788995000196, and worked for a company identified as Fire Tech Equipment (Fire Tech). A review of the agency's record determined Fire Tech did not possess a valid license subsequent to December 31, 1998. Any work performed by that company subsequent to that time would have been without proper authorization from the Department. All companies in the business of servicing, repairing, recharging, testing, marking, inspecting, or installing any fire extinguisher or pre-engineered system in this state must possess a valid license. All individuals employed by a licensed business must hold a valid permit in order to perform such work. The Petitioner was the only "Joe" employed by Fire Tech subsequent to December 31, 1998. An individual using the Petitioner's expired permit number (and who was identified as "Joe") performed activities requiring licensure for Fire Tech subsequent to December 31, 1998. It is an individual's responsibility to ascertain the status of a permit and to timely renew. The Department does not question the expiration of permits if the holder does not timely renew it. As a former permit holder (and the former qualifier for a licensed business) the Petitioner knew or should have known his responsibilities regarding permit renewal. It is undisputed that Fire Tech continued to perform activities requiring licensure after December 31, 1998, and that the Petitioner was employed by the company. A pending criminal investigation of Fire Tech's unlicensed activities encompasses at least eighty (80) instances of jobs performed without proper authorization. Further, some of the jobs were performed so inexpertly that the client incurred additional expenses in order to correct the work.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order denying the Petitioner's permit application. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Elenita Gomez, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Joseph M. Toth 2420 Hayes Street Hollywood, Florida 33020 Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated October 22, 2001, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Office of the State Fire Marshall is the governmental entity responsible for regulating fire safety in Florida, including the installation, maintenance, and inspection of fire protection systems. Section 633.01, Florida Statutes (2000). Mr. Cabrera is currently licensed by the State Fire Marshall as a Class C and D fire equipment dealer (Class 0703 and 0704) and as a fire extinguisher and preengineered systems permittee (Class 0903 and 0904).2 At the times material to this proceeding, Mr. Cabrera was issued preengineered systems permit number 435249000198. At the times material to this proceeding, Mr. Cabrera was the qualifier for A Fire Prevention Company, was authorized to act for the business organization in all matters connected with the business, and was required to supervise all activities undertaken by A Fire Prevention Company. A Fire Prevention Company has been in business since 1998. Prior to this time, a company referred to as "South Florida Fire" employed Mr. Cabrera. Mr. Cabrera currently holds, and, at the times material to this proceeding, held jointly with A Fire Prevention Company, a certificate qualifying A Fire Prevention Company to engage in business as a fire equipment dealer. At the times material to this proceeding, A Fire Prevention Company and Mr. Cabrera engaged in the business of servicing, repairing, recharging, testing, inspecting, and installing fire extinguishers and preengineered fire suppression systems. At the times material to this proceeding, Banner Beef and Seafood operated an industrial food processing facility in Miami, Florida. In the facility, meat and seafood moved through an industrial deep fat fryer on a conveyor belt and were then frozen, packaged, and sold for resale. An oil-heating unit, located in an alcove off the room containing the deep fryer, was attached to but separate from the deep fryer, and hot oil moved from the oil-heating unit through a filter into the deep fryer. The oil-heating unit held 200 gallons of oil, which was heated to 460 degrees Fahrenheit before flowing into the deep fryer. The oil-heating unit was made of stainless steel, with a stainless steel lid. The oil-heating unit was protected by a Kidde Sentinel HDR 25DC, DOT E-7042-360-K, Serial #33996, ("Kidde HDR 25DC") preengineered dry chemical fire protection system. On June 19, 2000, approximately three months after Mr. Cabrera performed a semi-annual inspection and maintenance of the Kidde HDR 25DC system, a fire originating in the oil- heating unit destroyed much of the Banner Beef facility. The Kidde HDR 25DC system was probably installed at Banner Beef in or around 1981. Mr. Cabrera was not involved in the installation of the system, but he began inspecting and maintaining the system approximately ten years before the fire. He occasionally performed the semi-annual inspection and maintenance of the Banner Beef system when he was employed by South Florida Fire, and he performed all of the semi-annual inspections and maintenance subsequent to March or July 1998, after he left South Florida Fire and established A Fire Prevention Company. Mr. Cabrera completed an inspection report and an invoice each time he inspected the Kidde HDR 25DC system. Mr. Cabrera was, however, able to produce to the State Fire Marshall only an invoice for a semi-annual inspection on October 5, 1998; an invoice and "Range Hood Inspection Report" for a semi-annual inspection on April 12, 1999; an invoice and "Range Hood Inspection Report" for a semi-annual inspection on September 27, 1999; and an invoice for a "semi-annual inspection and maintenance" on March 15, 2000. The Kidde HDR 25DC is a preengineered system, which means that components manufactured by Kidde were put together into a system designed to protect against a particular hazard. Kidde publishes a manual, bulletins, and memoranda that specify how the Kidde HDR 25DC system is to be installed, serviced, repaired, maintained, tested, and inspected. The Kidde HDR 25DC system was submitted to the Underwriters Laboratory ("UL") for testing. The system was found to be effective and to operate as specified, and the system and the manual for the system received UL approval. Once the system and manual received UL approval, the components of the system could not be changed except in accordance with the UL listing and the approved manufacturer's specifications. The Kidde HDR 25DC system uses a dry chemical as a fire suppressant. The NFPA Standard 17 contains requirements for the installation, maintenance, operation, and care of dry chemical fire suppression systems. The Kidde HDR 25DC system is approved by the UL to protect commercial cooking installations, specifically hoods, ducts, and cooking appliances. Cooking appliances are classified into two categories in the manufacturer's specifications, surface appliances and broilers; deep fryers are considered surface appliances. Commercial cooking installations are used in food preparation areas of restaurants. The oil-heating unit and deep fryer used by Banner Beef are considered industrial appliances because they were designed to process a high volume of food to be sold for resale rather than to be consumed on the premises. The Kidde HDR 25DC system was composed of several components, including a cylinder containing dry chemical fire suppressant under 360 pounds of pressure; a valve assembly attached to the cylinder; a manual release mechanism; an elbow mounting bracket that connected the cylinder to discharge piping; a nozzle attached to the discharge piping through which the dry chemical fire suppressant would be discharged on the hazard protected by the system; a fusible link designed to melt at a specified temperature; a control head, with a control head cover, that was attached to the cylinder valve assembly; cables running from the fusible link to the control head; electrical metal tubing protecting the cables; and corner pulleys that allowed the cables to change direction at a 90-degree angle. The Kidde HDR 25DC system was designed so that, when the fusible link melted, the cables would release, causing the system to actuate and discharge the dry chemical fire suppressant. Banner Beef's 200-gallon oil-heating unit protected by the Kidde HDR 25DC system was located in an alcove opening off of a larger room that housed the deep fryer. The cylinder containing the dry chemical fire suppressant was mounted on the outside wall of oil-heating unit, at the far end of the alcove, only a few inches away from oil that was maintained at 460 degrees Fahrenheit when the oil-heating unit was in operation. The oil-heating unit was turned off at the end of each workday, and the cylinder was regularly exposed to a cycle of high temperatures when the unit was in operation and cooler temperatures when it was not. Because it was attached to the hazard it was intended to protect, the cylinder would be exposed to any fire that originated in the oil-heating unit, and, in fact, the exterior of the cylinder at Banner Beef was damaged by the fire and covered in grease when it was inspected after the fire. NFPA Standard 17-8, Section 3-8.3, 1994 edition,3 specifies that "[t]he dry chemical container and expellant gas shall be located near the hazard or hazards protected, but not where they will be exposed to a fire or explosion in those areas." NFPA Standard 17-8, Section 3-8.3.1, provides that "[t]he dry chemical container and expellant gas assemblies shall be located so as not to be subjected to severe weather conditions or to mechanical, chemical, or other damage." The location of the cylinder at Banner Beef was not consistent with these NFPA requirements. A manual release handle, or manual pull station, is used to manually actuate the Kidde HDR 25DC system. At Banner Beef, the manual release handle was located on the far end of the oil-heating unit, at the top of the dry chemical cylinder and next to the controls used to operate the oil-heating unit. The means of exiting the alcove containing the oil-heating unit was through the room containing the deep fryer, although Banner Beef advised Mr. Cabrera that someone was always standing at the controls of the oil-heating unit whenever the unit was in operation. NFPA Standard 17-8 provides in pertinent part: 3-7 Operation and Control of Systems 3-7.1 Methods of Actuation. Systems shall be provided with both automatic and manual means of operation. 3-7.1.1 Operation of any manual actuator shall be all that is required to bring about the full operation of the system. At least one manual actuator shall be provided for each system. * * * 3-7.1.3 At least one manual actuator shall be located no more than 5 ft (1.5 m) above the floor and shall be convenient and easily accessible at all times, including the time of fire. Although only one manual actuator was required, the location of the manual release handle was not consistent with NFPA Standard 17-8, Section 3-7.1.3. The date of manufacture was stamped into the metal of the cylinder containing the dry chemical fire suppressant. The system's serial number and a United States Department of Transportation exemption code, DOT-7042, were also stamped into the metal of the cylinder. The Kidde Guidelines for Hydrostatic Retest & Qualification of Kidde Models HDR, IND, WHDR, and DRS- 700 System Cylinders provides that "[d]ry chemical and wet chemical agents, when super-pressurized with nitrogen, are classified as hazardous materials and must be shipped in DOT approved cylinders (containers). The United States Department of Transportation has jurisdiction during cylinder manufacturer, testing, marking, retest and shipment." According to the information contained in the Guidelines, Kidde cylinders manufactured under the DOT E-7042 exemption must be hydrostatically tested, using "the water jacket volumetric expansion method or the direct expansion method," at least every 12 years by a retester authorized by the United States Department of Transportation. According to the Guidelines, after the hydrostatic retest, the federal Department of Transportation requires that the cylinder must be stamped, "'plainly and permanently,'" with a marking that includes the date of the retest and the designation "3AL"; such a stamp is usually imprinted into the metal of the cylinder. The Guidelines include a warning, identified as such and set off from the rest of the text, that provides: "Use of pressure sensitive hydrostatic test labels, in lieu of stamping the cylinder, DOES NOT comply with the DOT requirements." (Emphasis in original.) Because the cylinder installed with the Kidde HDR 25DC system at Banner Beef was manufactured in 1981, the cylinder should have been hydrostatically tested in 1993. The cylinder did not, however, bear a permanent stamp with the "3AL" designation and the date of a hydrostatic test. Mr. Cabrera nonetheless reported on the Range Hood System Report dated April 12, 1999, that the system had been hydrostatically tested in April 1998, and he reported on the Range Hood System Report dated September 27, 1999, that the system had been hydrostatically tested and recharged in 1998. Mr. Cabrera obtained this information from labels carrying the name of South Florida Fire that were affixed to the outside of the cylinder; a few remnants of the labels remained on the outside of the cylinder after the fire. Pursuant to the federal DOT requirements and the manufacturer's specifications, Mr. Cabrera could not rely on these labels as proof that the cylinder had been subjected to hydrostatic testing. An examination of the cylinder after the fire revealed that the outlet valve on the cylinder and the elbow mounting bracket attached to the valve were completely blocked by a caked, rock-hard white substance, and the area around the cylinder's relief valve was also coated with white powder. In addition, there were chunks of hardened white powder loose in the discharge piping that connected the cylinder to the nozzle inside the oil-heating unit, although the discharge piping was not blocked. The white powder was identified as dry chemical fire suppressant, which had discharged from the cylinder but had not been discharged through the nozzle into the oil-heating unit because of the complete blockage of the valve outlet and elbow mounting bracket. Finally, there was a residue of what appeared to be grease in the discharge piping connected to the elbow mounting bracket. The manufacturer's specifications require that, at the semi-annual inspection of the Kidde HDR 25DC system, the person providing the maintenance should "[c]heck the discharge piping for obstructions. Remove cylinder and valve. Blow out piping with clean dry air or nitrogen." Mr. Cabrera blew out the piping with nitrogen to clear obstructions each time he performed a semi-annual inspection of the Banner Beef system. The discharge piping was clear when he completed the semi-annual inspection and maintenance on March 15, 2000. In the Banner Beef system, approximately six inches of discharge piping ran from the elbow mounting bracket through the exterior wall of the oil-heating unit, where it emerged just above the level of the oil when the oil-heating unit was full. The discharge nozzle for the system was attached to a portion of the pipe that extended a few inches into the oil-heating unit, where it would be exposed to grease splatter. The male coupling on the discharge nozzle should have threaded into a female coupling in the pipe. However, the inside of the pipe was not threaded to receive the nozzle, and it appeared that the person installing the system had "screwed" the nozzle into a smooth pipe. Because the seal was not tight, grease had accumulated on the threads of the nozzle, and the nozzle might have blown off if the system had actually discharged. There are four nozzle configurations available for the Kidde HDR 25DC system, two of which are relevant to this proceeding: The SP-2 nozzle is designed to protect the plenum4 and exhaust duct of a commercial cooking installation; the SW-2 nozzle is designed to protect surface cooking appliances. One SP-2 nozzle was used with the Kidde HDR 25DC system at Banner Beef, which was inconsistent with NFPA Standard 17-6, Section 2- 3.1, which requires that "[d]ischarge nozzles shall be listed for their intended use," and with the manufacturer's specifications for the system. First, there is no recognized nozzle configuration for the system using only one SP-2 nozzle. Second, the SP-2 nozzle was not appropriate for the Banner Beef system: Deep fryers are classified in the manufacturer's specifications as surface appliances, and the proper nozzle was the SW-2 nozzle. The discharge pattern of the SP-2 nozzle is horizontal, and, had the dry chemical fire suppressant actually been discharged through the nozzle into the oil-heating unit, the dry chemical would have blown across the surface of the hot grease; the SW-2 nozzle is designed to be installed above the appliance, so that its discharge pattern is vertical, with the spray distributed over the surface of the oil. Protective grease covers are required by the manufacturer's specifications and by NFPA Standard 17-6, Section 2-3.1.4, which provides: "Discharge nozzles shall be provided with blowoff caps or other suitable devices or material to prevent the entrance of moisture or other environmental materials into the piping. The protective device shall blow off, open, or blow out upon agent discharge." When Mr. Cabrera inspected the Banner Beef system in March 2000, a grease cover protected the discharge nozzle, but, after the fire, no grease cover for the nozzle could be located. In addition, an examination of the nozzle and discharge piping after the fire revealed grease build-up on the inside of the nozzle and in the discharge piping. Protective nozzle covers are easily lost; Mr. Cabrera had advised Banner Beef to call him if they needed a replacement cover, but he was never asked for a replacement cover. To the best of Mr. Cabrera's recollection, there was always a grease cover on the nozzle whenever he conducted his inspections of the system. A fusible link is designed to melt at a specific temperature, releasing cables that run from the fusible link to a control head attached to the dry chemical cylinder; this is the means by which the system is actuated. The fusible link of the Kidde HDR 25DC system at Banner Beef was located in the duct venting the oil-heating unit to the roof. The invoice for the September 27, 1999, semi-annual inspection at Banner Beef reflects that Mr. Cabrera replaced the 500-degree fusible link in the Kidde HDR 25DC system. He used the 500-degree link because the oil-heating unit heated the oil to 460 degrees Fahrenheit. The manufacturer's specifications provide that "[t]he fusible link assembly . . . is used to detect excessive temperatures in the area above cooking appliances and in the duct. The actuation temperature is 360ºF (182ºC). For higher temperatures use a 500ºF quartzoid bulb, or fusible link." The manufacturer's specifications also provide: The exposure temperature is the maximum temperature to which a fusible link may be exposed for any period of time, no matter how short. After reaching the exposure temperature, the link will eventually release even though it may never reach the rating temperature. WARNING: To avoid accidental system discharge, a temperature survey must be made of all locations where the fusible link will be installed. Links must have an exposure temperature rating above the maximum peak survey temperature. The maximum exposure temperature for any fusible link is 300ºF. If the peak survey temperature is above 300º F, use a quartzoid bulb link. (Emphasis in original.) Only two fusible links were available for the Kidde HDR 25DC system, a fusible link with a rating temperature of 350 degrees Fahrenheit and a maximum exposure temperature of 300 degrees Fahrenheit and a quartzoid bulb, also referred to as a fusible link, with a rating temperature of 500 degrees Fahrenheit and a maximum exposure temperature of 475 degrees Fahrenheit. The exposure temperature at the location of the fusible link is not known, but the convected heat in the duct over the oil-heating unit, where the fusible link was installed, would not have reached the 460-degree temperature of the oil. However, the fusible link was installed only six inches above the maximum level of the oil in the oil-heating unit, and, had the 350-degree fusible link been used, it would have continually actuated the system. Pursuant to the manufacturer's specifications, the fusible link on the system should have been mounted using Kidde fusible-link brackets. The fusible link installed on the Banner Beef system was housed in a welded metal bracket fabricated by whoever installed the system. The fusible link is connected to the system's control head by a system of cables. The manufacturer's specifications require that the fusible link be attached to the cables using Kidde cable crimps crimped with a Kidde crimping tool. Mr. Cabrera did not use either a Kidde cable crimp or a Kidde crimping tool when he installed the new fusible link on the Banner Beef system during the September 27, 1999, inspection. The manufacturer's specifications require that the cables connecting the control head to the fusible link be "housed and protected by 1/2-inch electrical metal tubing." The portion of the cable running on the outside of the oil-heating unit, from the control head mounted near the cylinder into the exterior wall of the oil-heating unit was housed in electrical metal tubing; that portion of the cable running inside the oil- heating unit, from the fusible link to the exterior wall of the oil-heating unit, was not housed in electrical metal tubing but was left bare. According to the manufacturer's specification, all cable in the Kidde HDR 25DC system must run either horizontally or vertically. Consequently, corner pulleys are used to make 90-degree changes in direction. Three corner pulleys were used in the Banner Beef system; one was manufactured by Kidde, but two were manufactured by Pyro-Chem. In addition, the first corner pulley was clogged with grease, indicating that the system was not properly maintained. The cables leading from the fusible link are attached to a control head, and the system actuates when the fusible link melts and the cables are released. A cover plate protects the control head, and is attached to the control head with five screws. Kidde Field Memo #84-8, provides as follows: When installing the cover plate on any preengineered system control head, remember to install all five cover screws. The fifth screw that attaches to the hex post just above the local manual release handle is important for the stability of the cover plate when operating the handle. Leaving out the fifth screw could cause movement of the cover plate and render the local manual release handle inoperative. . . . Three of the five screw holes on the control head cover plate recovered from Banner Beef were covered with grease; only two of the five screw holes were clean. This indicates that the cover plate was attached to the control head by only two screws at the time of the fire. Mr. Cabrera did not note any discrepancies or deficiencies in the Kidde HDR 25DC system installed at Banner Beef in the inspection reports that he completed after his April 12, 1999, and September 27, 1999, inspections, which were the only reports provided to the State Fire Marshall and introduced into evidence at the final hearing. In these two reports, Mr. Cabrera checked the "Yes" boxes for the following items, among others: All appliances properly covered w/ correct nozzles System installed in accordance w/ MFG UL listing Inspect cylinder and mount Clean nozzles Check fuse links and clean Piping and conduit securely bracketed System operational & seals in place Clean cylinder and mount Mr. Cabrera signed the two reports, thereby certifying that "[o]n this date, the above system was tested and inspected in accordance with procedures of the presently adopted editions of NFPA Standard 17, 17A, 96 and the manufacturer's manual and was operated according to these procedures with results indicated above." The licensure files maintained by the State Fire Marshall for A Fire Prevention Company indicated that the company's insurance policy with Frontier Insurance Company expired on March 25, 2000. Mr. Cabrera testified, however, that the company did have insurance at the time of the fire, and this testimony is unrefuted. Summary The State Fire Marshall's expert witnesses disagreed as to whether the system could have controlled the fire had it functioned properly. They each conceded, however, that all components of the system functioned perfectly and actuated the system. They attributed the sole cause of the system's failure to the blockage in the valve outlet and elbow mounting bracket that prevented the dry chemical fire suppressant from discharging out of the cylinder. The State Fire Marshall's experts and Mr. Cabrera agreed that the cause of the blockage was dry chemical in the cylinder valve assembly and elbow mounting bracket that had hardened into a rock-hard substance. All of the State Fire Marshall's experts and Mr. Cabrera agreed that the chemical hardened as a result of its coming into contact with a significant amount of moisture and/or grease. No one, however, provided a satisfactory explanation of the time within which the chemical would have hardened after it came into contact with the moisture and/or grease. In Mr. Cabrera's opinion, the blockage was caused when grease and/or moisture entered the system at the time of the fire and caused the dry chemical to immediately harden. On the other hand, the State Fire Marshall's expert witnesses opined that the moisture and/or grease causing the blockage of the cylinder valve outlet and elbow mounting bracket did not necessarily accumulate in the system over an extended period of time but, rather, could have been introduced into the system all at once. They also agreed that the dry chemical would harden gradually over time and that the blockage was probably present at the time Mr. Cabrera performed the March 2000 inspection. However, none of the State Fire Marshall's experts provided a persuasive basis to support a finding that the blockage had been present in the system at the time Mr. Cabrera inspected the system in March 2000, and the evidence is, therefore, insufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Mr. Cabrera should have discovered the blockage when he performed the inspection and maintenance in March 2000. The evidence presented by the State Fire Marshall is likewise not sufficient to establish that Mr. Cabrera deviated from the requirements of the manufacturer's specifications by installing a 500-degree fusible link in the system in September 1999. The evidence presented by the State Fire Marshall is, however, sufficient to establish clearly and convincingly that the Kidde HDR 25DC preengineered fire protection system installed at Banner Beef was not designed to protect an industrial oil-heating unit containing approximately 200 gallons of hot oil, that the system was not installed in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications, that the system contained parts that were not manufactured by Kidde, that the system was not properly maintained with respect to the build-up of grease in and around the discharge nozzle and in the corner pulleys, and that Mr. Cabrera did not use the appropriate crimp and crimping tool when he replaced the fusible link in September 1997. The evidence presented by the State Fire Marshall is also sufficient to establish clearly and convincingly that Mr. Cabrera did not provide the State Fire Marshall with proof of insurance subsequent to March 25, 2000, although the evidence is insufficient to establish that he did not, in fact, have insurance coverage subsequent to that time. Finally, the evidence presented by the State Fire Marshall is sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that the reports Mr. Cabrera prepared following his semi-annual inspections in April and September 1999 did not accurately reflect the condition of the system and did not include a statement of the system's deficiencies. In addition, Mr. Cabrera's failure to provide the State Fire Marshall with copies of the inspection reports for the semi-annual inspections he performed on the Kidde HDR 25DC system at Banner Beef for the three years prior to the fire supports the inference that he failed to retain copies of the inspection reports in his records. However, Mr. Cabrera's testimony that he always prepared the necessary reports is uncontroverted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Fire Marshall enter a final order: Finding Hector Cabrera and A Fire Prevention Company guilty of having violated Sections 633.061(9), 633.065(1)(c), 633.065(2), 633.071(1), and 633.162(4)(c) and (e), Florida Statutes (2000), as well as Rules 4A-21.302 and 4A-21.304(1) and (2), Florida Administrative Code; and Suspending the licenses and permits of Hector Cabrera and A Fire Prevention Company for a period of two years, pursuant to Section 633.162(1) and (4), Florida Statutes (2000). DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 2002.
