The Issue Whether the Petitioners are entitled to participate in the Florida Retirement System (FRS).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (Respondent or Department), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering the FRS. Accordingly, the Respondent must resolve as part of its normal course of duties whether or not individuals are eligible to participate in the FRS. The Petitioner, Eric Eggen, is an attorney authorized by the Florida Bar to practice law within the State of Florida. Mr. Eggen has practiced law since 1974. On March 15, 1991, Mr. Eggen was appointed by the Chief Judge of the First Circuit to serve as a "part time Child Support Hearing Officer." Mr. Eggen was directed to perform such duties as part of a program that coordinates the enforcement of child support. Although Florida's First Circuit encompasses more than two counties, the vast majority of Mr. Eggen's work has been performed for and funded primarily by Escambia County and Santa Rosa County. The child support program pertinent to these cases is a federally funded program that channels monies from the federal government to local governments through the State Department of Revenue. Local governments are required to "match" a certain percentage in order to receive the federal funds. In these cases, the First Circuit (when the program was initiated) decided to use non-Article V hearing officers to perform the work. This process had been approved by the Florida Supreme Court and allows the judges of the First Circuit more time to perform their other responsibilities. Accordingly, for reasons not fully set forth in this record, Mr. Eggen was selected to be the hearing officer for the First Circuit child support enforcement program. How or by whom Mr. Eggen would be compensated for his efforts was not set forth by any written document. He was simply designated by the Chief Judge to be the person who would do the work. The work consisted of conducting child support hearings to determine whether child support was owed, whether someone had the ability to pay child support, and whether someone might be willfully refusing to pay child support. Issues such as paternity required an Article V judge. Mr. Eggen was not authorized to make such determinations. Initially the work was considered part-time, but as the volume of cases increased over time Mr. Eggen's ability to perform other legal work diminished. He maintains that the child support enforcement work now consumes his full-time schedule. Exactly when Mr. Eggen went to full-time work as a hearing officer was not proved. The contracts governing how monies are treated by Escambia County and Santa Rosa County do not include any specification regarding the Petitioners by name. Presumably any individual performing Mr. Eggen's duties would be entitled to the compensation he receives for the work performed. In fact, when Mr. Eggen substitutes for another hearing officer he is similarly compensated. Mr. Eggen does not have a permanent office within the court facilities, does not receive office supplies through the court or county facilities, and does not have sick leave or annual leave through any agency. When Mr. Eggen performs the work, he is paid by submitting invoices to the counties for whom the work is performed. Neither the First Circuit, the Court Administrator's Office, nor the Department of Revenue pays Mr. Eggen directly for the work performed. In remitting funds to Mr. Eggen the counties do not deduct social security, withholding, or any other amount such as medical insurance costs. There is no evidence that Mr. Eggen receives any benefits such as medical insurance, dental insurance, or deferred compensation through any entity. Further, there is no evidence that those types of benefits were made available to Mr. Eggen but declined by him. Typically those types of benefits are available to full- time state employees. At all times prior to the initiation of these cases, the Petitioner Eggen held himself out as "self-employed." Mr. Eggen's work as a hearing officer did not preclude him from representing private clients on matters not in conflict with his role as the child support enforcement hearing officer. The extent of Mr. Eggen's private practice before the volume of child support enforcement hearings caused him to work full-time as a hearing officer is not proved. Whether or not he could perform other legal work at this time is also unknown. The Petitioner Munro is a full-time employee of Mr. Eggen. She is paid a salary and receives a W-2 from Mr. Eggen. Her services to the child support enforcement program are billed to the counties at a daily rate as "clerical assistance." Mrs. Munro designates herself as a "judicial assistant." Mr. Eggen uses monies from the paid county invoices to partially fund Mrs. Munro's monthly wage. Mrs. Munro was hired by Mr. Eggen in approximately 1975. No one from the counties, the Court Administrator's Office, or the Judges of the First Circuit had any input to Mr. Eggen's selection of Mrs. Munro. No one from those entities can fire Mrs. Munro, discipline her, reward her, or pay her. Her sole source of remuneration flows through Mr. Eggen. How Mrs. Munro accounts for her work time to Mr. Eggen was not proved. Neither Mr. Eggen nor Mrs. Munro is required to account for time spent on child support cases to the Court Administrator's Office, the Judges of the First Circuit, or the Department of Revenue. The Petitioners Eggen and Mrs. Munro set the hearing schedule for the child support cases, coordinate the hearings with court space available to conduct the cases, and complete the paperwork associated with the cases at their own designated pace. No one instructs Mr. Eggen as to when he must work, how he must work, or whether he must work. If Mr. Eggen chose not to work, he would not be paid. The completion of the work drives the payments. No work and no invoice to counties would lead to no compensation to Mr. Eggen. Whether Mrs. Munro would be paid by Mr. Eggen under those circumstances was not proved. Neither Petitioner is identified or specified as an employee of the Court Administrator's Office. Neither Petitioner is identified or specified as an employee of the First Circuit. Neither Petitioner is identified or specified as an employee of the Department of Revenue. Neither Petitioner holds a position or job classification that has been identified, specified, or funded by the Florida Legislature. Prior to the initiation of this action, neither Petitioner had ever publicly claimed to be a "state employee." There is no evidence that either Petitioner received a statement of benefits accrued from any state entity setting forth the Petitioners' entitlements or declined benefits. Whether or not any entity pays workers' compensation, leave, or insurance benefits for the Petitioners was not proved. There is no evidence that any state, court or county agency does so. The Court Administrator of the First Circuit is a state agency as contemplated by Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. When the Petitioners first believed they were entitled to benefits as an "officer" or "state employees" was not proved. Clearly, the first claim for FRS entitlement was not filed until 2001, some ten years after Mr. Eggen had been designated to do the work as a child support enforcement hearing officer. Other child support enforcement hearing officers who are considered "state employees" for purposes of working through the Court Administrator's Office are designated "OPS." As such, those employees are not eligible to participate in the FRS nor do they receive other benefits afforded to state employees.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, issue a Final Order denying eligibility to these Petitioners. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of April 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Sarabeth Snuggs, Interim Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Division of Retirement Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 George R. Mead, II, Esquire Moore, Hill & Westmoreland, P.A. SunTrust Tower, Ninth Floor 220 West Garden Street Pensacola, Florida 32501
Findings Of Fact A Petitioner was tried and found guilty of a violation of Section 794.011, Florida Statutes, related to sexual battery. This finding was in the case of State of Florida vs. Claude Hiller Barton, in the Circuit Court, Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Duval County, Florida, Case No. 85-5199CF. On June 30, 1986, he was sentenced to life with a minimum 25 year mandatory service. He took appeal to the District Court of Appeal, First District, State of Florida, and in the action of Claude Hiller Barton, Appellant vs. State of Florida, Appellee, Case No. BO-45 and by opinion filed September 25, 1987 the judgement and sentence was responded to by per curiam affirmance. The mandate to the Circuit Court concerning disposition of the appeal in Case No. BO-45, was issued on October 13, 1987. Following his conviction, Respondent, by correspondence of May 23, 1986, noticed the Petitioner of his disqualification from continuing employment in a position as a person who works with children. The correspondence reminded the Petitioner of his right to request an administrative hearing to contest the disqualification. It further stated that given that the Petitioner had been convicted of a felony that he was not entitled to exemption from disqualification and could only challenge the accuracy of the records pertaining to his conviction. The case was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for consideration through a formal hearing. At the instigation of the Petitioner and with concurrence of Respondent consideration of this dispute was forestalled pending the outcome of the appeal. The existence of the September 25, 1987 opinion of the First District Court Appeal which affirmed the judgement and sentence was first revealed at the final hearing on August 14, 1990. Prior to that occasion numerous attempts had been made to have the parties provide status reports in the administrative case concerning the outcome of the appeal as reflected in the file in this action, to no avail. Having been unsuccessful in pursuing his ordinary remedies related to the criminal court case, Petitioner sought extraordinary relief through a writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. This was in the action of Claude Hiller Barton, Petitioner vs. Richard Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections and the State of Florida, Respondents, in the District Court of Appeal, First District, Case No. 89-02677. That petition was denied by order of February 7, 1990, and a motion for rehearing was denied on March 16, 1990. Petitioner has made a further attempt to gain relief based upon a claim of ineffectiveness of the counsel employed to pursue his original petition for writ of habeas corpus. Acknowledgment of receipt of the most recent petition for writ of habeas corpus was provided on August 10, 1990 from the Clerk of the First District Court of Appeal.
Recommendation Based upon a full consideration of the facts found and of the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which establishes the disqualification of the Petitioner from acting as a person who is considered as child care personnel at a child care facility or child care program. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Department Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Charlene J. Petersen, Esquire HRS-District 4 Legal Office 5920 Arlington Expressway Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, FL 32231-0083 Claude Barton, #103199 Union Correctional Institution Post Office Box 221 Raiford, FL 32083
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background On July 15, 1992, respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), issued a document entitled "Solicitation of Offers For Legal Service Contracts-Child Support Enforcement Program" inviting legal firms or attorneys to submit proposals for providing legal services and representation of HRS in matters involving child support enforcement cases throughout the State of Florida for a nine-month period beginning on October 1, 1992, and ending on June 30, 1993. Although the solicitation was for services in all counties of the State, this case involves only the solicitation of services for representation in those counties within HRS District II that comprise the Second Judicial Circuit (Circuit). They include Franklin, Gadsden, Jefferson, Leon, Liberty and Wakulla Counties. The solicitation provided that three contracts would be awarded within the Circuit, one for Gadsden and Liberty Counties, the second for Leon and Jefferson Counties, and the third for Franklin and Wakulla Counties. The solicitation called for written offers to be filed with the HRS District II office in Tallahassee by August 17, 1992, and for all such offers to be opened the following day. Thereafter, the offers would be evaluated by a review committee whose role was to make a recommendation to the District II administrator. The administrator would then have the responsibility of making a "final decision" to accept an offer and award a contract with an anticipated award date of September 1, 1992. Finally, in paragraph XVIII of the document, HRS reserved the right "to reject any or all offers received, or to cancel this solicitation, regardless of evaluation, if it is determined to be in the best interest of the department." A total of seven law firms in the Circuit filed proposals in response to the solicitation. They included petitioner, Smith and Thompson, P.A., and intervenor, Knowles and Randolph, both of whom are minority firms located in Tallahassee, Florida. Petitioner and intervenor filed proposals for each of the three pairs of counties within the Circuit although intervenor's proposal for Gadsden and Liberty Counties was technically nonresponsive and was therefore not considered. Both petitioner and intervenor have previously provided services for HRS under similar contracts and both are considered to be technically competent to perform the work. By certified letters dated September 2, 1992, HRS advised each of the law firms filing proposals that it had decided to reject all offers and instead to implement a pilot program to provide in-house legal services in the Second Judicial Circuit. No other explanation was given. The letter granted each firm a point of entry to contest that decision. Thereafter, petitioner and intervenor timely filed notices of intent to protest the decision. However, by letter dated September 10, 1992, HRS advised petitioner and intervenor that its prior letter was in error and that instead "the decision of the department to reject all the responses to our recent solicitation of offers for the 2nd Judicial Circuit cannot be the subject of a protest". Even so, on September 18, 1992, petitioner filed a written protest and request for a hearing. This request was ultimately forwarded by HRS to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH). On November 10, 1992, intervenor was authorized to participate herein as a party. In its order of October 27, 1992, transmitting the request for hearing to DOAH, HRS stated in part that: Since there was no bid award ... there can be no protest of an award. Neither can a right to a bid protest proceeding be created by mistake, whether by HRS or otherwise.... Simply put, no bid protest can be permitted under these circumstances. The action of the agency in rejecting all offers and deciding instead to provide legal services through in-house employees rather than through contract attorneys is agency action as that term is understood in the context of Chapter 120. Petitioner may be entitled to a determination as to whether or not that action was an appropriate exercise of agency discretion. For this reason the pleading filed by petitioner (bid protest) will be considered to be a request for an administrative hearing under the provisions of Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, for the purpose of testing that determination. Prior Contracts for Child Support Services To place this controversy in perspective, it is necessary to review certain events surrounding the award of the contracts in prior years. Petitioner, or individual members of the firm, had held the HRS contract to provide child support enforcement services in Leon and Gadsden Counties during the years 1979 to 1989. The firm is considered to be competent and reliable and was characterized by one District employee as being the "best" of all contract firms in the state. In May 1989, HRS solicited proposals for the following fiscal year and in July 1989 received three proposals, including ones from petitioner and the law firm of Welch, Munroe and Whitley (WMW). In September 1989, the contract was awarded to WMW. It is fair to draw an inference that because Whitley was a former law partner and roommate of the Governor's general counsel, Munroe's wife was the Governor's chief cabinet aide, and an HRS employee had helped the firm complete its bid package, there may have been some favoritism in awarding the contract to that firm. The contract ran from October 1, 1989, through June 30, 1990. Because of problems by WMW in fulfilling the terms of the contract, the contract was terminated by HRS in April 1990. By then, Whitley had become a member of another Tallahassee law firm, Barrett, Bajoczky, Hoffman and Harper (BBHH). Just prior to terminating the contract, HRS found a serious backlog of cases and knew that, in order to process this backlog, an experienced law firm would have to provide the services for the remainder of the contract year. Accordingly, HRS requested that petitioner provide such services. At the same time, however, the HRS program administrator insisted that, as a condition to receiving the contract, petitioner must sign a joint venture agreement with BBHH wherein it agreed to share its fees with that firm because of Whitley's association. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to do so and executed such an agreement on May 7, 1990. The contract was then awarded to petitioner. Under the terms of the agreement, petitioner was obligated to give 26% of total attorney and paralegal fees to BBHH in return for BBHH providing "secondary legal services required by the child support contract". During the remainder of the contract, all warrants were issued to petitioner who deposited the warrants and then issued a check to BBHH pursuant to their agreement. As it turned out, however, BBHH was never sent any case files and performed no work under the contract to earn its fees. Recognizing that it could obtain the new contract for 1990-91 only by continuing to split fees with BBHH, petitioner made a "business decision" to submit a joint response with BBHH to the new solicitation. The previously executed joint agreement remained in effect. In July 1990, a proposal for the contract year 1990-91 was filed in the name of both firms, and the contract for Leon and Gadsden Counties was thereafter awarded to petitioner and BBHH. Petitioner submitted invoices for work performed to HRS and all warrants were thereafter issued by HRS in the names of both firms. However, after obtaining BBHH's endorsement, the checks were deposited in petitioner's bank account, and petitioner then issued a check to BBHH. Although BBHH was supposed to provide "secondary legal services" to earn its 26% of fees, the firm was never sent any case files and it performed no services during the year. Even so, petitioner was obligated to pay $80,000 to BBHH pursuant to their agreement. It should be noted, however, that petitioner exceeded the goals established by HRS under the contract and performed all work in a competent and professional manner. Further, there is no evidence that HRS paid more than was required for the services performed by petitioner. Rather, petitioner's income was reduced by the amount of payments made to BBHH. Petitioner has never taken any legal action against BBHH for failing to perform under the contract. When BBHH declined to perform any work under the contract, petitioner began voicing oral (but no written) complaints about its arrangement to various HRS personnel, all at the District program administrator level or lower, but received no help. It was told by one District employee that he was sorry but it was something they would have to live with given the circumstances. When a new administration took office in January 1991, which was midway through the contract year, petitioner again complained and eventually its complaints caught the ear of the new Governor's inspector-general. It also asked that the joint contract be terminated. After an investigation was conducted by the inspector- general, in which petitioner fully cooperated, a highly critical report was issued on May 29, 1991, and the HRS program administrator was immediately terminated from employment. The matter was then referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for possible federal criminal violations, and thereafter the FBI launched an investigation of the contracts. The federal investigation still remains pending. Although petitioner is not now a target or subject of the investigation, it was once a subject of the investigation and is still a part of the overall investigation. In addition, its members have been given use immunity for their testimony. There has also been fairly widespread newspaper coverage of the investigation, and it is fair to say the investigation gained some public notoriety. Even so, petitioner was allowed to complete the contract year and since July 1991 has continued to provide services for HRS in Leon and Gadsden Counties under an interim contract scheduled to expire on December 1, 1992. Post-1991 Events Leading Up to the 1992-93 Contract As early as the spring of 1991, the HRS Secretary had recommended to the Governor that HRS be allowed to consider an in-house program as an alternative to using contract attorneys. There was also a desire to make the competitive process more cost-effective, free of political considerations, and open to minority participation. This desire was reinforced by the findings in the inspector-general's report. In December 1991 the Governor first expressed an interest in HRS conducting an in-house pilot program and to compare the results of that program with the results being obtained under the various contracts. This interest was founded at least in part on financial considerations since the program involves total annual federal and state expenditures of more than $18 million. At the direction of the Governor and HRS Secretary, in January 1992 a blue ribbon committee began exploring the possibility of HRS performing legal services in-house, and, as noted previously, to develop a new solicitation that was more cost-effective, competitive, free of conflict of interest, and open to minority participation. However, due to a press of time, the committee was unable to sufficiently study the in-house issue so as to incorporate that into the 1992-93 solicitation. Even so, there were on-going, informal discussions by various HRS personnel, including the Secretary, regarding an in-house pilot program prior to the solicitation of offers in dispute here. Further, based on several conversations with the Governor, the Secretary was under the impression that the Governor was "adamant" about implementing such a program. HRS often uses District II as a location for pilot programs because of its proximity to the Tallahassee headquarters and its ideal urban-rural mix. In addition, the Second Judicial Circuit is the only judicial circuit wholly within District II. This meant that HRS would be dealing with only one "set" of judges and thus better results could be obtained in a pilot study. Finally, the excellent work rendered by petitioner on prior contracts provided a good point of comparison for a pilot program. The Evaluation Process After the proposals were filed, on August 18, 1992, an HRS evaluation committee opened the proposals and began its evaluation. The proposals were evaluated on both a technical and cost (but not ethical) basis, and a total score was given to each bidder. Pursuant to the terms of the solicitation, the firm with the highest score would be ranked first. The evaluation committee was made up of four District II employees. After reviewing the proposals, the committee voted to recommend that petitioner be awarded the contracts for all six counties since petitioner's proposals had a higher total score than those submitted by the other firms. Intervenor was ranked second in Leon, Jefferson, Franklin and Wakulla Counties. However, its proposed cost was around 25% higher than that of petitioner. The rankings and scores are reflected on petitioner's exhibit 5 received in evidence. The committee's recommendation, including those for the other counties within the District, was reduced to writing in the form of a report and was given to Dr. John M. Awad, District II administrator. On August 27 and 28, 1992, or after the committee report was prepared, meetings were held in the HRS general counsel's office regarding the contract in issue. Four HRS lawyers attended the meeting. There was a concern over the fact that even though petitioner was the highest ranked contractor, it was a part of the FBI investigation. In addition, one attorney represented to the others that he had been told by the Governor that the contract should not be awarded to petitioner because of that investigation and the Governor's desire to implement an in-house program. The same attorney expressed the view, although unsubstantiated, that petitioner may have had inside information in preparing its proposal. Accordingly, the attorneys discussed alternatives available to the agency in the event it decided not to award the contract to petitioner. One attorney concluded that the agency would not be able to give a valid reason for refusing to award the contract to petitioner, the highest ranking contractor, and thus it should reject all offers and go with a pilot program. Accordingly, it may be inferred that HRS legal counsel's subsequent recommendation to reject all bids was based primarily on legal counsel's inability at that point in time to articulate a valid reason for rejecting petitioner's proposal. These concerns were then presented to Dr. Awad. After he received the committee's recommendations, Dr. Awad awarded contracts for all counties except those within the Circuit. As to those counties within the Circuit, he did not sign off on the recommendation and execute a contract since he says he desired to first ascertain whether the agency intended to implement an in-house pilot program within the Circuit. Although he did not say so, it can be inferred that Dr. Awad's decision to not award the contract was based at least in part on his conversations with District counsel and his awareness that the top bidder was associated with contracts under active federal investigation. Accordingly, he called a meeting for Tuesday, September 1, 1992, to address this issue at the District level. Also, on August 31, 1992, Dr. Awad instructed Mr. William J. McEvoy, the District program administrator, to prepare cost figures for doing an in-house pilot program in the Second Judicial Circuit. This was the first knowledge that Mr. McEvoy had that HRS was considering a pilot program for the 1992-93 contract year. Using information derived from the various proposals as a benchmark, Mr. McEvoy developed a proposed first year cost based on the assumption that HRS could perform the work by hiring three staff attorneys and six support staff. This study, which was prepared over the course of an afternoon, was then given to Dr. Awad on September 1, 1992. It reflected an annualized cost in the first year of $402,599.00 but projected lower costs in the following years. These costs approximated or were slightly lower than the costs proposed by petitioner and were 25% lower than the next highest bidders. However, until the pilot program is actually run, a true comparison of costs cannot be made. A second meeting concerning the contract was held on September 1, 1992. Attendees were Dr. Awad, the HRS Secretary, four HRS staff attorneys, and perhaps an HRS assistant secretary. At that time, a concern was expressed to the Secretary that petitioner was a part of an investigation by the FBI. One HRS attorney advised the participants that, because of the pending investigation of the HRS contracts and petitioner's association with those contracts, and a desire to implement an in-house program, the Governor did not wish the contract to be awarded to petitioner. The participants also discussed the cost and feasibility of implementing an in-house program, the time frame for doing so, and the perameters of the program. At that point, the driving force to go in- house with the services was the fact that the highest ranking contractor was associated with prior contracts being investigated by the FBI. A decision was then made by the Secretary to reject all proposals, withdraw the solicitation, and implement an in-house pilot program within the Circuit beginning on December 1, 1992. As stated by him at hearing, the Secretary rejected petitioner's offer because of his concern with not only the contractor's integrity, but also the integrity of the process as a whole. More specifically, he was concerned with the fact that $80,000 of state funds had been paid to BBHH for doing no work and he questioned the propriety of awarding a contract to a firm under active investigation by the FBI. The associated decision to reject all offers and initiate a pilot program was premised on the notion that (a) the second highest ranking firms submitted proposals having substantially higher costs than petitioner, (b) projected first year in-house costs were equal to or less than that proposed by petitioner, and (c) the Governor had asked that an in-house program be given priority. Accordingly, the Secretary decided to reject all bids and withdraw the solicitation of offers. It is noted that under paragraph 10.b., Part 74, Appendix G of Chapter 45, Code of Federal Regulations, HRS is required to give consideration to the "contractor integrity" in making an award. Thus, even though HRS did not correlate its concern over the contractor's integrity with the above federal regulation until this point in the process, the reliance on the regulation as a reason to reject a contractor was still valid and appropriate. In other words, since there was always a concern with the federal investigation, the fact that HRS did not initially discover that a federal regulation supported its theory was not a fatal flaw in the decision- making process. Finally, the undersigned has rejected as being unsubstantiated the contention by petitioner that an HRS attorney favored another contractor obtaining the award and thus improperly influenced the agency's decision. Is the Solicitation a Bid? The contract in question is funded primarily with federal funds and is thus subject to relevant federal regulations, one of which requires that the contract be awarded through a competitive process. Therefore, even though HRS is exempt from the competitive sealed bid and proposal requirements of Chapter 287, Florida Statutes, when procuring outside legal services, the federal regulations require a competitive process. Accordingly, in soliciting offers from law firms, HRS was obliged to use a competitive process akin to that required under chapter 287. In that vein, it prepared a document which called for sealed competitive bids (offers) from prospective contractors, provided for a competitive evaluation and ranking by an independent committee, and further provided that the contract would be awarded to the highest ranking contractor. In addition, paragraph IX of the solicitation of offers provided that in the event a participant wished to file a protest to an award, it must do so within seventy-two hours after receiving "notice of contract award or intended contract award" and must then file a "formal written notice of protest" within ten days thereafter. The same document also provided that if protests were filed, the agency would seek to informally resolve the dispute within seven calendar days, and if a protest was not resolved by mutual agreement, the protestant was entitled to a formal hearing before DOAH. These procedures essentially track the procedures for resolving bid disputes that are codified in Subsection 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. Therefore, the undersigned has rejected the contention by HRS that the process used herein does not fall within the ambit of a bid dispute.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by respondent dismissing the protests of petitioner and intervenor. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 92-6440BID Petitioner: 1. Partially adopted in finding of fact 1. 2. Rejected as being unnecessary. 3-4. Partially adopted in finding of fact 10. 5. Partially adopted in finding of fact 17. 6. Partially adopted in finding of fact 13. 7. Partially adopted in finding of fact 2. 8-11. Partially adopted in finding of fact 5. 12. Partially adopted in finding of fact 12. 13-14. Partially adopted in finding of fact 13. 15. Partially adopted in finding of fact 2. 16-18. Partially adopted in finding of fact 13. 19. Rejected as being argument. 20. Rejected as being irrelevant. 21-24. Partially adopted in finding of fact 14. 25. Rejected as being irrelevant. 26-27. Partially adopted in finding of fact 14. 28. Partially adopted in finding of fact 15. 29. Rejected as being contrary to the evidence. 30-32. Partially adopted in finding of fact 15. Partially adopted in finding of fact 16. Rejected as being irrelevant. Partially adopted in finding of fact 10. Partially adopted in finding of fact 15. 37-42. Partially adopted in finding of fact 3. 43. Rejected as being unnecessary. 44. Partially adopted in finding of fact 3. 45-48. Partially adopted in finding of fact 5. 49. Partially adopted in findings of fact 5 and 6. 50-57. Partially adopted in finding of fact 6. 58-62. Partially adopted in finding of fact 7. 63-71. Partially adopted in finding of fact 8. 72. Rejected as being uncorroborated hearsay. 73-74. Partially adopted in finding of fact 8. 75. Partially adopted in finding of fact 3. 76-77. Rejected as being irrelevant. 78. Partially adopted in finding of fact 12. 79. Partially adopted in finding of fact 16. 80. Partially adopted in finding of fact 2. Respondent: 1-3. Partially adopted in finding of fact 1. 4. Rejected as being unnecessary. 5. Partially adopted in finding of fact 2. 6-8. Partially adopted in finding of fact 11. 9-10. Partially adopted in finding of fact 16. 11. Rejected as being unnecessary. 12-14. Partially adopted in finding of fact 12. 15. Partially adopted in finding of fact 1. 16. Rejected as being unnecessary. 17-18. Partially adopted in finding of fact 1. 19-21. Rejected as being unnecessary. 22. Partially adopted in finding of fact 13. 23-32. Partially adopted in finding of fact 16. 33-37. Partially adopted in findings of fact 9 and 10. Partially adopted in finding of fact 16. Partially adopted in finding of fact 10. Partially adopted in finding of fact 11. Partially adopted in finding of fact 16. Partially adopted in finding of fact 11. 43-44. Partially adopted in finding of fact 16. 45. Rejected as being unnecessary. 46. Partially adopted in finding of fact 3. 47-57. Partially adopted in finding of fact 5. 58. Partially adopted in finding of fact 7. 59-62. Partially adopted in finding of fact 6. 63. Partially adopted in finding of fact 7. 64-65. Partially adopted in finding of fact 8.. 66-78. Partially adopted in finding of fact 7. 79-83. Partially adopted in finding of fact 8. 84. Partially adopted in finding of fact 9. 85-87. Partially adopted in finding of fact 8. Partially adopted in findings of fact 15 and 16. Partially adopted in finding of fact 8. Partially adopted in finding of fact 13. Rejected as being unnecessary. 92-93. Partially adopted in finding of fact 17. 94. Partially adopted in findings of fact 16 and 17. 95-96. Partially adopted in finding of fact 2. 97. Partially adopted in finding of fact 16. 98-99. Partially adopted in finding of fact 2. 100-101.Partially adopted in finding of fact 13. Partially adopted in finding of fact 15. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially adopted in finding of fact 8. 105-106.Rejected as being unnecessary. 107. Rejected as being cumulative. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially adopted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, not supported by credible, persuasive evidence, subordinate, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert L. Powell, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Building One, Room 407 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John S. Slye, Esquire Building One, Room 407 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 W. Crit Smith, Esquire 1530 Metropolitan Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32308 Harold M. Knowles, Esquire 528 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, FL 32301 Susan P. Stephens, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 1502 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
Findings Of Fact Funway Learning Center is a child care facility licensed by Petitioner for operation at 735 North Thornton Avenue, Orlando, Florida. The most recent license for operation of the center was issued on June 20, 1994, License Number 694-23, and was valid for all relevant times herein. During all relevant times, Hugette Nelson was the owner/director of the facility. On or about February 21, 1995, Lydia Morris began work at Respondent's facility as a member of the child care personnel staff. As of that date the new employee had not completed a good moral character affidavit, nor submitted a fingerprint card or information sufficient to conduct a local, state or federal criminal records check. On February 21, 1995, personnel from Petitioner conducted a routine inspection of Respondent's facility. Several minor discrepancies were noted which have since been corrected. Staff was requested to produce the employee personnel records for two staff members on duty at the time of the inspection. Staff was either unable or unwilling to do so. The owner/director was not present at the facility at the time of the inspection. On February 21, 1995, Nelson was requested to make an appointment, prior to March 6, 1995, with Petitioner and bring with her the personnel file with the requested forms and information relating to the recent hire. On March 7, 1995, Nelson came to the Petitioner's office for a scheduled visit with the personnel file for Morris but was unable to produce a good moral character affidavit or finger print card for Morris. Morris never completed the required information while employed by Respondent. Morris worked only three days at Respondent's facility, thereafter she called in sick and never returned to work. Her last day on the job was February 24, 1995. Nelson officially terminated her on March 13, 1995. Nelson has since closed the facility. Respondent has received one prior citation in the past for a similar violation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered DISMISSING the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Sawyer, Jr., Esq. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-827 Orlando, Florida 32801 Hugette Nelson 2320 Northwest 108 Street Miami, Florida 33168 Robert L. Powell Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Kim Tucker General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
