The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is qualified to take the examination for licensure as a mental health counselor.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner executed an application for licensure as a mental health counselor on June 13, 1989. He filed the application with the Board of Clinical Social Workers, Marriage & Family Therapists, and Mental Health Counselors on July 6, 1989. The application was accompanied by the appropriate fee and disclosed that Petitioner satisfied all of the educational requirements for taking the examination. However, Respondent determined that the application was incomplete because Petitioner failed to show that he had had the requisite clinical experience under the supervision of a qualified person. By letter dated July 17, 1989, Respondent informed Petitioner that his application was incomplete pending receipt of, among other things, documentation of the requisite clinical experience under the supervision of a qualified person. A second letter dated January 17, 1990, from Respondent to Petitioner restated that the application was still missing the items set forth in the prior letter. By Order of Intent to Deny filed April 12, 1990, Respondent informed Petitioner that it was denying his application on the grounds set forth above. Petitioner obtained a master's degree in clinical psychology from the University of Central Florida on December 20, 1985. From October 4, 1985, through October 20, 1988, Petitioner worked full- time as a psychological specialist at the Polk Correctional Institution under the supervision of Gerd Garkisch, Ph.D., who was head of the mental health department at the prison. Petitioner's work qualifies as clinical experience in mental health counseling. Dr. Garkisch does not hold any Florida professional licenses, such as a mental health counselor or psychologist. He is not so licensed in any other state, although he is licensed as a psychologist in Puerto Rico. Dr. Garkisch does not meet the education criteria required for licensure as a mental health counselor. Dr. Garkisch earned a master's degree in clinical psychology, which would otherwise satisfy the educational requirement for licensure as a mental health counselor. However, he received his degree from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, Institute of Psychology, which is located in Brazil. The school is not accredited by an accrediting agency approved by the U.S. Department of Education, Council on Postsecondary Accreditation, or Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Professional Regulation deny Petitioner's application for licensure as a mental health counselor. ENTERED this 11th day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Linda Biederman, Executive Director Board of Mental Health Counseling 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Vytas J. Urba, Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Suresh Paul Pushkarna, pro se 309 Hidden Hollow Court Sanford, FL 32773
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a long-time Florida resident, having moved to the state when she was five, and thereafter was reared and educated in Dade County, Florida. Petitioner received an AA degree from Dade County Junior College, a BA from Florida Atlantic University in Boca Raton Florida, and a Masters Degree from Lone Mountain College in San Francisco, California via an external program based in the Miami/Dade area. In pursuit of a Ph.D. in psychology, Petitioner applied to Union, was accepted and matriculated there from 1981 through 1983, and received her Ph.D. in psychology on June 29, 1983. Upon receipt of her Ph.D. degree in psychology, Petitioner was required to fulfill a one-year post-doctoral supervision prior to applying for certification to take the psychology licensure examination. Section 490.005, Florida Statutes (1983). Petitioner satisfied this requirement from June 30, 1983 to June 30, 1984 by engaging in psychotherapy under the supervision of Dr. Ted Aidman. Petitioner then applied to the Board for certification to take the psychologist licensure examination. Petitioner applied to take the examination under the provisions of Section 490.005(1); Florida Statutes (1983) and in pertinent part is quoted below: Any person desiring to be licensed as a psychologist shall apply to the department to take the licensure examination. The department shall license each applicant who the board certifies has: * * * (b) Submitted proof satisfactory to the Board that he has received a doctoral degree with a major in psychology from a university or professional school that has a program approved by the American Psychological Association or that he has received a doctoral degree in psychology from a university or professional school maintaining a standard of training comparable to the standards of training of those universities having programs approved by the American Psychological Association or the doctoral psychology programs of the state universities. (Emphasis supplied) The Board adopted Rule 21U-11.06, Florida Administrative Coded to implement Section 490.005, Florida Statutes (1983) and essentially codified the criteria for American Psychological Association (APA) approved programs for the first time in this rule. The rule took effect on April 5, 1984. The pertinent part of the rule is quoted below: In order to be certified by the Board as eligible for examination pursuant to Section 490.005(1), Florida Statutes, an applicant must: * * * (b) Submit proof of the completion of a doctoral degree with a major in psychology from a university or professional school that has a program approved by the American Psychological Association or a doctoral degree in psychology from a university or professional school maintaining a standard of training comparable to those universities having programs approved by the American Psychological Association. For the purpose of determining whether an applicant's doctoral degree in psychology was received from a university or professional school maintaining a standard of training comparable to those universities having programs approved by the American Psychological Association the Board will apply the following criteria: (emphasis supplied) 1. Education and training in psychology must have been received in an institution of higher education accredited by one of the regional accrediting bodies recognized by the Counsel on PostSecondary Accreditation. * * * 5. The doctoral program must be an organized, integrated sequence of study designed by the psychology faculty responsible for the program. The American Psychological Association Accreditation Handbook, Criteria For Accreditation of Doctoral Training Program and Internship in Professional Psychology (Handbook), adopted in January 1979 and amended in January 1980, sets out criteria that the doctoral programs must meet to be eligible for accreditation by APA and in pertinent part are listed below: A. Training in professional psychology is doctoral training offered in an institution of higher education accredited by one of the six regional accrediting bodies recognized by the Council of Postsecondary Accreditation (COPA). * * * The faculty of the program must have clear authority and primary responsibility for all aspects of the program (even if the program cuts across institutional administrative lines). The program must include an integrated, organized plan of study and must ensure a breadth of exposure to the field of psychology. In the Introduction of A Handbook of Accreditation (Petitioner's Exhibit 7, page 1) accreditation is defined as both a process and a result and in pertinent part is quoted below: As a process, it is a form of peer review in which educational institutions establish a set of criteria and procedures by which they and their fellows are judged. As a results it is a form of certification by which the quality of an educational institution; as defined by the accrediting body's criteria; is affirmed. The forms of Affiliations are discussed in A Handbook of Accreditation and in pertinent part quoted below: Postsecondary educational institutions may be affiliated with the Commission on Institutions of Higher Education, and through it with the Association, in either two ways. One is membership, which is synonymous with accreditation; the other is candidacy, a preaccreditation status. [page 3] . . . an institution continues its candidacy for accreditation for a fixed period of time - usually no longer than six years - until it either fulfills the Criteria for Accreditation or has its affiliation with the Commission terminated. [page 3] . . . Candidacy indicates that an institution meets the Criteria for Candidacy for Accreditation and is progressing toward accreditation; it does not, however, automatically assure eventual accreditation . . . [page 3, 4] The North Central Association of Colleges and Schools' evaluative criteria for candidacy highlight that such standards differ from accreditation standards. A Handbook of Accreditation explains the second evaluation criteria as follows: This criteria differs from the second evaluative criterion for accreditation in that it speaks of a candidate's accomplishing its immediate purposes. The difference is meant to acknowledge that a candidate is not yet fully developed to the point at which it has the ability to accomplish all of its purposes. [page 19] The fourth criteria for candidacy status indicates that candidacy status is not equivalent to accreditation. The fourth evaluative criteria reads in pertinent part: 4. The institution has the potential to achieve accreditation within the candidacy period. In making this judgment, the candidate's present condition, its plans and its timetable for developing to the point where it meets the Criteria for Accreditation must be examined. Candidacy is of a limited durations and the Commission seeks to determine through this criterion that the candidates current plans are likely to allow it to achieve accreditation within this limited period. [page 20] Union received formal accreditation on February 25, 1985 by the North Central Association for Colleges and Schools, Commission on Institution of Higher Education ("Commission"), a regional accrediting body recognized by the Counsel on Postsecondary Accreditation. During Petitioner's matriculation at Union, and at the time she graduated, Union was in a candidacy status or a preaccreditation status but was not accredited. Union was in candidacy status from 1979 to 1985, a period of six (6) years which is considered the maximum period without special Commission action for extension. Union had to satisfy all thirteen (13) general institutional requirements and all four (4) evaluative criteria to be granted candidacy status. To achieve accreditation, Union had to sustain and maintain the same thirteen (13) institutional requirements and satisfy a similar, but different, group of four (4) evaluative criteria. The same general institutional requirements and basically the same evaluative criteria are required for both candidacy status and accreditation but candidacy and accreditation are not the same. In candidacy status the institution is trying to assure the Commission of its ability, financial and otherwise, to maintain a viable program. In accreditation the certification has been affirmed. No evidence was presented to show that APA, in its approval process, would substitute candidacy status for accreditation status. In fact, the evidence was conclusive that regional accreditation was an important standard and a reasonable criterion in the evaluation and approval of psychology programs by the APA. The evidence is clear that the accreditation requirement of the rule in question is comparable to the requirement of regional accreditation by APA in its approval process. To demonstrate that a program is able to produce qualified health professionals the APA requires that a program must articulate what the program is and what that program requires. A pertinent section in the Handbook under Training Models and Curricula, page 5, is quoted below: C. The foundation of professional practice in psychology is the evolving body of knowledge in the discipline of psychology. While programs will vary in emphasis and in available resources, sound graduate education in general psychology is therefore essential in any program. The curriculum shall encompass the equivalent of a minimum of three academic years of full-time resident graduate study. Instruction in scientific and professional ethics and standards, research design and methodology, statistics, psychological measurement, and history and systems of psychology must be included in every doctoral program in professional psychology. . . (emphasis supplied) The requirement of a sequenced course of study is an important and essential criteria of the APA in the training of a psychologist. The evidence is clear that the requirements of Rule 21U-11.06(1)(b)5., Florida Administrative Code, are comparable to the standards for APA approval of a doctoral program with regard to the design of study by the faculty even though the language "sequence of study" does not appear in the APA standards. Rule 21U-11.06, Florida Administrative Code and the standards for approval of programs by the APA contemplated that a program designed to produce qualified health care professionals must articulate a plan of study for those future health care professionals that would achieve the objectives of training that are specified by the program. A plan, designed by the faculty responsible for the program, by which you get from here to there, which involves the faculty providing the student with a sequence of experience such as that one builds on the other in an orderly way; an organized integrated sequence of study. Petitioner failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove that Union's doctoral psychology program was an organized integrated sequence of study. Union has a committee on Psychology that is chaired by Dr. Harold Gollishan and an identifiable psychology faculty with members located in different areas of the United States. Union offers a single graduate degree -- the Doctor of Philosophy Degree. Union offers a self-directed program of studies for its students. There are no prescribed courses, although an individualized plan (Learning Agreement) may include the use of university courses (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4, Pages 4 and 18). The process for obtaining a doctoral degree at Union is described in the Union Graduate School Learner Handbook (Learner Handbook) which applies to all doctoral degrees, not just psychology. The Learner Handbook does not state additional or specific requirements or what Union refers to as core requirement, for the Union doctoral psychology programs. The core requirement is not specifically addressed in USG Program Summary (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6) which Petitioner presented as a prototype for a psychology program but was no more than a summation and documentation of one student's learning process at Union. Neither the Learner Handbook nor the Program Summary articulate an organized, integrated sequence of study designed by the psychology faculty of Union. Once admitted to Union's doctoral program the general process is for the student to: (a) attend a 10-day entrance colloquium; (b) form a doctoral committee; (c) develop a learning agreement; (d) fulfill the terms of the learning agreement through independent learning; (e) complete a Program Demonstrating Excellence (PDE); and (f) prepare a program summary. Although the testimony of Drs. Crawford and Benjamin was that the core requirements for the doctoral psychology program were articulated at this colloquium, the weight of the evidence shows that there are no specific core requirements for the Union doctoral psychology program as such but that the core requirements are determined at the colloquium after the students present their program to other students and faculty. This process does not constitute an organized integrated sequence of study designed by the faculty responsible for the program. The testimony at the hearing does not establish that the Union psychology program is memorialized in written documents. There is no formal written design of the Union psychology program. If there are any written documents of Union psychology program, they were not produced at the hearing. The Union psychology program's integrated sequence of study was never described at the hearing. The Union psychology program was variously described as a set of precedents, as a set of expectations, and as an "understanding of the faculty." The vague "expectations" or "understandings", absent a formal written program, are insufficient to constitute an organized integrated sequence of study. A psychology program based on "expectations" and "understandings" is particularly insufficient at a school, such as Union, where the faculty and students are spread out across the country, and meet together sporadically. The testimony of Dr. Aidman, an adjunct professor and Petitioner's doctoral committee chairman, highlights how little interaction there is between faculty. The testimony of Dr. Benjamin further reflects that much of the faculty does not know who, when, where or how the psychology program was designed. In the absence of a formal written psychology program, and in the absence of a cohesive, centrally located faculty and student body; the lack of an organized, integrated sequence of study designed by the faculty becomes apparent. A sequenced course of study is important in educating psychologists and is required by Rule 21U-11.06(1)(b), Florida Administrative Code. The psychology program at Union is not an organized, sequenced program. There are no psychology departments at Union. The Union has five psychology programs", plus individualized "programs" in general psychology. The five "programs" are Adlerian psychotherapy, Gestalt and clinical psychology, humanistic and clinical psychology, marriage and family therapy, and psychoanalysis. Petitioner was not in one of the above- named "programs", but was in an individualized, general "program" in psychology. There is no evidence that there is an organized integrated sequence of study designed by the faculty for any of the five named psychology "programs", and even less evidence that there is any organized integrated sequence of study for the individualized, general "program" in psychology. Petitioner's testimony at the hearing and before the Board on June 25, 1985 indicates that Petitioner was responsible for her doctoral psychology program at Union. Petitioner's Learning Agreement and Program Summary may have thrown some light on whether her individual program was an organized integrated sequence of study but neither was introduced into evidence. The record reflects that Petitioner wrote and designed her own program, which was then approved by her doctoral committee which she assembled. The Petitioner did not present evidence of a set of standards for the psychology programs of state universities of Florida. The Petitioner did demonstrate that Union does have some similarities with psychology programs of the state universities. There is evidence that the psychology programs of the state universities are in regionally accredited institutions, and that they constitute organized, integrated sequences of study designed by the faculty. The Petitioner avoided comparison between Union and the state university programs in these areas. The Petitioner did not graduate from a psychology program of the state universities. Dr. Charles A. Brownfield graduated from Unions Antioch College, receiving his Ph.D. in psychology on October 1, 1971 and was licensed by the Florida State Board of Examiners in 1973 under a statute with language similar to that of Section 490.005(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1983). The evidence is insufficient to show that APA was approving doctoral psychology programs in 1971 or, if it was, whether the standards used at that time were the same as those standards adopted by APA in 1979 and amended in 1980. The statute under which Dr. Brownfield was licensed was repealed, effective July 1, 1979, by Chapter 77-457, Section 1, Laws of Florida and he was then licensed by exception under the new statute in 1982. The evidence is insufficient to show that any person graduating from Union between 1979 when APA adopted its standards for approving doctoral psychology programs and the effective date of the rule on April 5, 1984 was permitted by the Board to take the examination for licensure.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the board enter a final order DENYING Petitioner, Melodie K. Moorehead, certification to sit for the licensure examination in psychology. Respectfully submitted and entered this 8th day of January 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 84-3782 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings f Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 1 with last sentence rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2 with last two (2) sentences rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5 with the quoted language of subsections 1(a)(c)(d) deleted as unnecessary and the last sentence rejected as a legal argument. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Rejected as not based upon competent substantial evidence. There was no evidence in the record that April 5, 1984 was the first time accreditation was an absolute prerequisite to taking the examination or that prior to that time applicants from schools in candidacy status were allowed to take examinations. Adopted, but clarified in Finding of Fact 12. Sentence 1-3 rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. Sentence 4 adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Sentence 5 rejected because the more competent evidence shows 6 years as maximum period of candidacy (Petitioner's Exhibit 7, page 22). Sentences 6-7 adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Sentences 8-10 adopted but clarified in Findings of fact 10 and 14. Sentence 11 rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. Adopted in Findings of Fact 10 and 14 but clarified. Rejected as cumulative, immaterial and unnecessary. Sentence 1 adopted in Findings of Fact 9, 10 and 12 but clarified. Sentences 2 and 3 rejected as legal argument. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence. The first paragraph rejected partly as hearsay and partly as not supported by substantially competent evidence. The second paragraph rejected partly as hearsay and partly as immaterial. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence. Sentence 1 rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence. The evidence was insufficient to prove "established policy of the Board." Sentence 2 adopted in Finding of Fact 20 but clarified to show Brownfield's graduation from Union, Antioch College not as Union exists presently. Sentence 3 rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence. No evidence that Union, Antioch College was not accredited, only that Union, in its status before February 25, 1985, was not accredited. Sentences 1 and 2 and the quoted statutory language not listed as a finding of fact but covered in the conclusion of law and mentioned as language similar to the present statute in Finding of Fact 20. Sentence 3 rejected as immaterial due to repeal of statute and changed facts. Sentence 1 rejected as immaterial because of changed fact. Sentences 2 and 3 rejected as arguments. Graduates from schools other than Union may also be denied on same circumstances. Covered in Background. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence. Rejected as legal argument. Rejected in part as legal argument and in part as not supported by substantial competent evidence. Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4; 5 (except for first sentence which is adopted in Findings of Fact 22), 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 (except for first sentence which is adopted in Finding of Fact 23) and 12, (except first sentence which is adopted in Finding of Fact 23), are rejected as immaterial, cumulative and unnecessary. Paragraph 7 is rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence. Paragraphs 1 and 2 rejected as immaterial. Paragraphs 3 and 4 adopted in part by Finding of Fact 24, otherwise rejected as immaterial. Paragraph 1 and the first and last sentences of paragraph 2 rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence. The second sentence of paragraph 2 rejected as immaterial. The first part of paragraph 3 adopted in Finding of Fact 23 but otherwise rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence. Rejected as immaterial. Rejected partly as a conclusion of law and partly as a legal argument. Sentences 1 and 2 rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence. The last sentence rejected as a legal argument. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Covered in Background and in Findings of Fact 4 and 5. Covered in Background. Covered in Background. Covered in Background. Covered in Background. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8 and 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10 and 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12 and 15. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in Findings of Fact 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29 but clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 31. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Biedermann, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Board of Psychological Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Randall A. Holland, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Suite 1601, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Melissa Fletcher Allaman, Esquire Post Office Box 1170 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1170
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner should be granted an exemption from disqualification for working in a position of trust with disabled adults and children pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 435, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Since 1979, Petitioner, Vernon Jackson (Petitioner), has been employed by the Department of Children and Family Services (Respondent) or its predecessor government agency, with the exception of a period in 1996-97. He is presently classified as a psychiatric aide. Petitioner worked in a unit of the Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida, which provides care to the patients of the facility, and he is a caregiver. It is in that capacity that he is subject to the employment screening requirements of Chapter 435 of the Florida Statutes. On August 23, 1980, Petitioner's girlfriend, Willie Thomas, got into an argument with a 17-year-old girl named Gwendolyn Arnold. When the argument between Thomas and Arnold escalated into a physical fight, Petitioner became involved in the fray. Arnold's 15-year-old brother also joined in the activity. As a result of the incident, Petitioner was charged with the misdemeanor offenses of disorderly conduct, resisting arrest without violence, and battery. Petitioner pled guilty to all three of the charged offenses. Adjudication of guilt was withheld by the court. Petitioner paid a fine of $50, plus costs, for the first two counts, disorderly conduct and resisting arrest without violence, and a fine of $100, plus costs, for the battery charge. In conjunction with the battery charge he was placed on probation for a period of one year. Petitioner's next criminal episode also involved Willie Thomas, his earlier girlfriend. On April 16, 1981, Petitioner was arrested and pled guilty to trespassing at Thomas’ home. He was required to pay a fine of $50. Although, adjudication was again withheld, he was placed on probation to run concurrently with his earlier probation sentence. Some months later, on November 19, 1981, Petitioner pled guilty to disorderly conduct involving a public brawl with two men. He paid a fine of $75 and adjudication of guilt was withheld. Employment screening at the Florida State Hospital was commenced in 1997 for positions of employment similar to that held by Petitioner. Petitioner's 1980 offense and 1981 plea was overlooked until this year. On or about April 20, 2002, after discovery of the battery offense, a decision was made to remove him from a caregiver position pending resolution of his request for an exemption. With a birth date of January 21, 1960, Petitioner was 20 years of age at the time of his first offense and 21 years of age when he last committed a criminal offense. Several supervisors of Petitioner testified that he was at all times a caring and diligent worker. Those supervisors included Karen Alford (“He was good.”); Freddie Culver (described Mr. Jackson as showing a lot of care and kindness); and Helen Conrad (“Excellent”). The parties stipulated that Julia Thomas and Barry Moore would testify to similar conclusion and opinions as to the quality of Petitioner's employment. Petitioner’s performance appraisals were at least satisfactory.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered granting Petitioner an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 2002.
The Issue By agreement of the parties, the issues to be resolved herein are as follows: Whether or not Alachua County denied Petitioner promotion to the position of Drug Counselor II because of her race (black) over her white counterpart. Whether Alachua County denied Petitioner promotion to the position of Victim Advocate Director and revised the position qualifications to preclude Petitioner because of her race (black). If either of these issues were resolved in Petitioner's favor, Alachua County would be guilty of an unfair employment practice pursuant to the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended [Section 760.10 et seq. F.S.].
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black female. She was 41 years of age at the time of formal hearing. Between April 20, 1984 and approximately April 30, 1989, Petitioner was employed by Metamorphosis. Metamorphosis is an organization that was part of the Alachua County Department of Corrections. The Alachua County Department of Corrections was subsequently renamed the Department of Criminal Justice. Petitioner initially was hired as a Drug Counselor I. Metamorphosis' primary goal is to provide long-term, multi-disciplinary treatment and rehabilitation for chronic substance abusers. It accepts only adults with an on-going history of substance abuse with any drug, other than alcohol, as the primary addictive agent. The program's main goal is to help such people become socially functional again. Petitioner initially testified that she had applied for the position of Drug Counselor II on six separate occasions, but testified in detail to only five. Petitioner never received the position of Drug Counselor II. Petitioner professed that she first applied for the Drug Counselor II position in October 1984, approximately six months after she began employment as a Drug Counselor I. However, Petitioner's Alachua County personnel file, which is required to be kept intact for 75 years, does not contain any application by Petitioner for the position of Drug Counselor II in 1984. Petitioner first stated that she was interviewed for the Drug Counselor II position in 1984 by James Whitaker, a white, and Ed Royal, a black. Petitioner later testified that Jim Whitaker and Scott Simmons, a black, interviewed her in 1984. Mr. Simmons did not testify. Mr. Royal did not testify. Mr. Whitaker did not confirm interviewing Petitioner for the Drug Counselor II position in 1984, but he stated that he had participated with Ed Royal in the hiring interview for Petitioner when she was initially hired as a Drug Counselor I from outside the program approximately April 20, 1984. The Drug Counselor II position was filled in 1984 by James Santangelo, a white, who was hired from outside the program to begin work in 1985. Historically, the Drug Counselor II positions within Metamorphosis were the senior therapist positions which required background in community clinical therapy. Petitioner's qualifications for Drug Counselor II as of 1984 were as follows: She received of Bachelor of Science Degree in Criminal Justice from Florida Memorial College in Miami with a minor in Urban Services. She had acted as Vice-president of the Board of Directors for Sexual Abuse Resources Center and was also a public speaker for the Commission on "status of women family violence". At the time Petitioner allegedly applied for the position of Drug Counselor II in 1984, she had been a Drug Counselor I for approximately six months. As Drug Counselor I, Petitioner had counseled individually and in groups, facilitated therapeutic and pre-vocational groups, supervised clients in employment training, vocation, and mock job interviews. She assisted in the intake process and coordinated and provided recreational activities for the clients. She distributed medication to the residents, handled negative attitudes of residents, monitored urinalysis testing, wrote letters to probation officers and judges, kept records, and maintained files for residents, and other work-related duties. Petitioner completed intake interviews, qualified individuals for acceptance or denial into the Metamorphosis Program, supervised and conducted structured groups, trained Drug Counselor Aides for the night shift, signed-off on clients' psycho/social evaluations, and assisted newly hired Drug Counselor II's. James Santangelo, who received the Drug Counselor II position in 1984, had qualifications as follows: Prior to coming to Metamorphosis, he worked for five years in a forensic mental hospital, the North Florida Evaluation and Treatment Center (NFETC). Four of those five years he was a therapist supervisor in a psychiatric unit. He ran therapy groups, scheduled concerns with the staff, held individual sessions with clients, taught adjunctive therapies to the clients, such as stress management, anger management, and drug abuse techniques. Prior to that, he was a school teacher. Santangelo received a Bachelor of Arts with honors from the College of Education at the University of Florida, majoring in psychology. Santangelo also served as an outreach worker for the Alachua County School Board from January through June 1978. In this position he was the first person to contact families whose children were having problems with truancy or whose children were suspected of being victims of child abuse or neglect. He also had an employment history of extensive special skills. Mr. Santangelos's qualifications for the Drug Counselor II position were superior to Petitioner's in 1984, if, indeed, she applied in that year. Petitioner professed that the second time she applied for the Drug Counselor II position was in 1986, when she had approximately two years experience as a Drug Counselor I within the Metamorphosis program. Again, neither Petitioner nor Respondent (by way of Petitioner's personnel file) had any copy of such an application. Petitioner testified that she was interviewed for the position of Drug Counselor II in 1986 by either Jim Whitaker and James Santangelo or by Jim Whitaker and Ed Royal. Neither Whitaker nor Santangelo confirmed that an interview of Petitioner for Drug Counselor II occurred in that year. Ed Royal did not testify, but it was shown that Ed Royal, a black, actually made the appointment of Tootie Richey, a white female, to the Drug Counselor II position which was open in 1986. Ms. Richey was hired from outside the program. Petitioner had "heard" Ms. Ritchey was a licensed clinical social worker but actually had no way of comparing her own qualifications with Ritchey's. Sometime in 1986, the State of Florida had established a means by which persons working with addiction rehabilitation could become "Certified Addiction Professionals" (CAPs) if they had a college degree, or "Certified Addiction Associate Professionals" (CAAPs) if they did not have a college degree. Mr. Whitaker became a CAAP in 1986 and Santangelo became a CAP in 1987. Petitioner never received such certification. In 1987, Metamorphosis was somewhat restructured so that Drug Counselor II positions became supervisory positions in the program. There were then two Drug Counselor II positions. One Drug Counselor II would supervise the Drug Counselor I's and the other Drug Counselor II would supervise the Drug Counselor Aides. Petitioner's first documented application is dated February 2, 1988. She was applying at that time for a position as an Evaluation Rehabilitation Case Worker I, not Drug Counselor II. Petitioner was referred for that position as a qualified candidate, but Edward Woodbury, also black, was selected for that position. In her testimony, Petitioner professed to have applied for Drug Counselor II, Rehabilitative Case Worker, and Program Coordinator by way of "Applicant Update Sheets" filed on June 27, 1988, October 4, 1988 and November 29, 1988. The greater weight of the credible evidence shows that Petitioner's June 27, 1988 application (P-1) was for promotion to be Program Coordinator of the Metamorphosis Program. This document, filled out at that time entirely by Petitioner, asserts that she had previously applied for Rehabilitation Case Worker and Drug Counselor II, but does not state when she applied. At that time, Jim Whitaker, a white, was the Program Coordinator. During the 1987 reorganization, the Program Coordinator position had been changed from clinical duties to administrative duties which Whitaker did not want to do and did not feel capable of handling. Whitaker therefore requested a "downward promotion" from Program Coordinator to some clinical position. Since there was no vacant clinical position (either as Drug Counselor II or otherwise) in the program, the Alachua County Personnel Director, Colleen Hayes, suggested that the position of Program Coordinator be posted as needing to be filled but that the job posting be made only within the Metamorphosis program itself so that only Metamorphosis staff would be allowed to apply. Ms. Hayes further suggested that when the promotional decision was made, Whitaker should be allowed to go into the lower position vacated by whatever Metamorphosis staff member was promoted into the Program Coordinator position currently held by Whitaker. It was understood that Whitaker would suffer no decrease in pay in the lower position of Drug Counselor II. Ms. Hayes' suggestion was followed, and ultimately, James Santangelo, then a Drug Counselor II, was selected to replace Whitaker as Program Coordinator. Whitaker exercised his option to take Santangelo's vacated Drug Counselor II position. Contrary to Petitioner's testimony, Santangelo's Drug Counselor II position was never advertised nor open to competitive interviewing at that time, and therefore there was no Drug Counselor II position vacant for which Petitioner could have applied. However, Mr. Whitaker's qualifications for the Drug Counselor II position were clearly superior to Petitioner's, anyway. At the time of Whitaker's "downward promotion," Whitaker's qualifications (for Drug Counselor II) included 15 years of experience on the Metamorphosis staff, beginning on October 14, 1974, as an entry level Drug Counselor I on night shift for one and a half years. He had served on the day shift for one year and then been promoted to Drug Counselor II where he had served until 1976. He had life experience as a drug abuser, including 13 months of Metamorphosis residential care for drug abuse, which was and is considered very valuable in a drug addiction counselor. He also had, over time, worked every shift, every level of group with every client from clients #86 to #1100 sequentially, and with every staff person in Metamorphosis to that date. Whitaker also had been Program Coordinator from 1978 to 1988. At the time of Whitaker's "downward promotion," Santangelo's qualifications for Program Coordinator included all of those set out supra in Finding of Fact 11, plus approximately two years as a Drug Counselor II. By the time of Whitaker's "downward promotion", both Whitaker and Santangelo had been state certified through examination. (See Finding of Fact 15). At the time of Whitaker's "downward promotion", Petitioner had the same qualifications set out supra in Finding of Fact 10, plus an additional two years as a Drug Counselor I. She was not state certified as an addiction professional. By comparison, James Santangelo's qualifications for the Metamorphosis Program Coordinator position were clearly superior to those of Petitioner. Also, the record reflects no persuasive evidence that Respondent's downward transfer process, which on this occasion accommodated Mr. Whitaker, was contrary to, or unique within, the standard operating procedure of the Respondent's personnel department. There likewise is no persuasive evidence that the downward transfer process required the promotion of a Drug Counselor II (Santangelo) over a Drug Counselor I (Petitioner) into the Metamorphosis Program Coordinator position, so as to be "rigged" to prohibit Petitioner, as a minority employee, from being promoted. The greater weight of the credible evidence shows that Petitioner next applied for a Drug Counselor II position on October 4, 1988 (P-2). That document, made out solely by Petitioner, asserts she previously applied for Drug Counselor II and Program Coordinator without stating any dates. Lennard Perry, a black, who was seeking a downward transfer from Evaluation and Rehabilitation Case Worker I was ultimately hired for the Drug Counselor II position, but he was hired on a competitive basis. Petitioner's November 29, 1988 "Applicant Update Sheet" (P-3), again made out solely by herself, asserts she had previously applied for the Drug Counselor II position in September 1988. There is no documentary evidence of any kind of September 1988 application by Petitioner. Petitioner herself testified that the Drug Counselor II position was unfunded after her first 1988 application and then stated it was unfunded after her third 1988 application. This confusion may account for her saying at one point that she had applied for Drug Counselor II six times. However, Respondent's witnesses were credible and persuasive that the Drug Counselor II position was phased out after Petitioner last applied due to lack of funding and further reorganization. In making the foregoing findings of fact, the undersigned has rejected the testimony of Petitioner and Warren A. McCluney that a white man named Alan Pappas ever filled the Drug Counselor II position after any of Petitioner's 1988 applications. Their unsupported testimony on this issue is not probative that Alan Pappas was ever employed full-time and paid by Metamorphosis, even though Mr. McCluney stated that he saw Mr. Pappas receive a paycheck at the same time Mr. McCluney himself did. Mr. McCluney did not specify that the check Pappas allegedly received was a Metamorphosis or county check. He also testified that Mr. Pappas was only present at Metamorphosis for nine months during 1987, and that period bears no relationship to Petitioner's not being promoted in 1988. Other witnesses clearly testified that Mr. Pappas never worked for Metamorphosis in any capacity at any time. There is no evidence or pleading of record to support Petitioner's allegations that she filed any formal discrimination claim before 1988. The position of Victim Advocate Director was advertised by posting of the job description from February 13 to February 17, 1989. Petitioner applied for the position on February 16, 1989. Respondent received so few applicants in response to the February 1989 Victim Advocate Director job posting that the Respondent's Personnel Director feared the hiring procedure would be compromised. No one was hired for the Victim Advocate Director at that time. The dearth of applicants was believed to be the direct result of the low number of Victim Advocate Programs statewide so that, in turn, few people could meet the job position requirement of a minimum of one year's supervisory experience in a Victim Advocacy Program. It was ultimately decided to rewrite the minimum qualifications and re-advertise. At no time material did Petitioner have one year's supervisory experience in a Victim Advocacy Program. The only pertinent revision of the minimum position qualifications was that one year of supervisory experience in any related area was acceptable the second time the Victim Advocate Director position was advertised. The second time the Victim Advocate Director position was advertised, an applicant's supervisory experience did not have to be specifically in a Victim Advocate program. The job position revision was reviewed by Ida Rawls-Robinson, the Director of the Alachua County Equal Opportunity Office prior to publishing it. Ms. Rawls-Robinson, a black, approved the amended requirements because the amendment broadened the base of the pool of qualified people, thus inferentially making the position more accessible to minorities. Before the second job-posting, Petitioner received a letter dated April 14, 1989 from Personnel Director, Colleen Hayes, advising Petitioner that the job criteria for the position of Victim Advocate Director had been revised. In Colleen Hayes' April 14, 1989 letter, Petitioner was asked to complete the enclosed application update sheet if she felt she was still qualified after the revision of the minimum qualifications, but she did not do so. Instead, Petitioner forwarded a memorandum to Colleen Hayes to the effect that since her original application was less than six months old, Petitioner would not submit an application update in response to the revised job description, although she remained interested in the position. The second job-posting with the broadened minimum qualifications was posted from April 17 to April 29, 1989. Petitioner was not referred for the position of Victim Advocate Director because she did not have the minimum one year supervisory experience in the revised category either. The requirements had always required one year of supervisory experience in any event. The position of Victim Advocate Director was never actually filled by Respondent. It was ultimately moved to, and funded by, the State Attorney's Office.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Human Relations Commission enters a final order dismissing the petition for relief filed herein. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of July, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: 1 Covered under preliminary matters 2-5, 7-8, 17-18, 20-21 23-26, 29-39 Accepted 6, 9, 15-16, 19, 27-28 Accepted in substance but modified to more accurately reflect the record as a whole, to eliminate hearsay, and to describe and resolve the issues as raised by Petitioner. 22 Rejected as stated. Petitioner initially testified to this. Later, she professed that the budget cuts occurred after the third application. The RO reflects all reconciled, competent, credible evidence. Respondent's PFOF: Respondent waived filing posthearing proposals. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce W. Smith, Esquire Post Office Box 450 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Mary Marshall, Esquire Alachua County Attorney's Office Post Office Box 2877 Gainesville, Florida 32602-2877 Margaret A. Jones, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4113 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4113
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Karen L. Ehlers was wrongfully terminated from her position with Respondent, Florida Employers Insurance Service Corporation because of her handicap or perceived handicap in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: FEISCO is a Florida corporation which is in the business of providing insurance-related services to insurance companies, self-insurer funds and self- insured employers, and is an employer as that term is defined in Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. FEISCO has a department called Information Services (formerly known as Management Information Services) which is responsible for providing the computer information systems within FEISCO and maintaining the many applications and data bases used by other FEISCO departments. The Petitioner, Karen L. Ehlers, was employed by FEISCO from July 17, 1989, to November 15, 1990, as a computer programmer in the Information Services department. The minimum education requirement for the position of computer programmer was two years' computer science education or equivalent Micro/Mini exposure. Petitioner holds a bachelor's degree in mathematics with an emphasis in computer science. As a computer programmer, Petitioner's job duties included writing computer programs, designed by analysts, using several computer languages and working and communicating with analysts and program users to correct design problems to assure the final program fit the user's needs. At all times during her employment with FEISCO, Petitioner was supervised by Joan Zare, Production Supervisor, Information Services department. Zare was responsible for overseeing Petitioner's training during her probationary period and for all formal evaluations of Petitioner's work. John Keegan, Manager of FEISCO's Information Services department, was Zare's immediate supervisor at all times relevant to this proceeding. Keegan reviewed and approved the written evaluations of Petitioner by Zare, but did not review Petitioner's work. Keegan did not have any direct knowledge of Petitioner's competence, and did not interview either Zare or Petitioner regarding the evaluations. Jim Venza, Director of Information Services for FEISCO, was Keegan's immediate supervisor at all times relevant to this proceeding. Venza had no direct knowledge of Petitioner's work performance. Upon being hired by FEISCO, Petitioner was subject to a ninety-day probationary period. After this probationary period (July 7, 1989 to October 13, 1989), Zare gave Petitioner a positive evaluation which included ratings of "Achieves" in all performance standards. Zare viewed Petitioner's overall performance during her probationary period as satisfactory and recommended Petitioner for full employee status. In January, 1990, Petitioner received a salary adjustment upward from $20,000.00 to $20,500.00 In June, 1990, Petitioner received a congratulatory memorandum and a $50.00 bonus for successfully completing a Property and Liability Insurance course and examination. FEISCO encouraged its employees to take course work to increase their knowledge of insurance and to join Toastmasters, a group organized to help its members improve self-confidence and public speaking skills. Petitioner participated in outsider course work and Toastmasters. On July 4, 1990, Petitioner was diagnosed as having chronic fatigue syndrome. This condition did not restrict Petitioner in her job as a computer programmer or effect her work negatively. On July 9, 1990, Petitioner advised Zare that she had chronic fatigue syndrome. On July 17, 1990, Zare gave Petitioner her first annual performance evaluation. Although Petitioner had experienced some problems with her work during the period after her probationary performance evaluation, Zare felt that her job performance in the latter part of the evaluation period indicated that Petitioner had overcome those problems. Zare rated the Petitioner as achieving at or above the standards expected of her in all areas of her job performance. In one area of work Petitioner was rated as "Exceeds". While Zare considered Petitioner as performing satisfactory at the time of her first annual performance evaluation, it was understood between Petitioner and Zare that continued improvement by the Petitioner would be necessary in order for Petitioner to maintain a satisfactory performance rating. On October 15, 1990, Keegan and Bob Burgoon, a program analyst, assigned Petitioner to the extra duty of Problem Manager. The duties of Problem Manager involved reviewing and solving problems with programs which were called in by users, and required being on-call to assist operations during off-hours. The job of Problem Manager had previously been rotated among analysts and not assigned to programmers. However, the job of Problem Manager was assigned to Petitioner because Keegan and Burgoon felt that she could handle the job. On October 16, 1990, Petitioner advised Keegan of her previously diagnosed medical condition, and presented Keegan with a written statement from her doctor recommending that Petitioner restrict herself to a forty-hour week. Petitioner advised Keegan that she still wanted to try the Problem Manager's job. However, Keegan decided not to "second guess" the doctor and removed Petitioner from the Problem Manager duties. There is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that Keegan at any time, including the meeting with Petitioner on October 15, 1990, advised the Petitioner that her medical condition would adversely affect her job with FEISCO. Petitioner became concerned about her job after the meeting with Keegan on October 15, 1990 and discussed this matter with Frances White in personnel on October 22, 1990. Petitioner also shared these same concerns about her job with Zare on October 23, 1990. At this meeting with Zare there was no reference to Petitioner's job performance by Zare. On this same day, Zare met with Venza and Keegan together and with White individually in regard to Petitioner's concerns. On October 24, 1990, Petitioner met with Zare and White. At this meeting, Zare and Petitioner discussed concerns about Petitioner's job performance. They also discussed Zare's intention to develop a detailed list of skills necessary for the satisfactory performance of the programmer position which would be used to revise the current programmer position description, and would involve a self-assessment by all programmers. The purpose of the self- assessment was to identify the areas in which the programmers felt they needed improvement. After each programmer finished their respective self-assessment, Zare reviewed the self-assessment individually with each programmer. In reviewing Petitioner's self-assessment, Zare concluded that Petitioner had overrated her abilities in several areas. After Zare concluded the review of the individual self-assessments with each programmer, Zare prepared a memorandum of her findings to all programmers. The memorandum outlined a proposed training project that was to be given in conjunction with the individual self-assessment. As with other programmers, Petitioner was assigned a series of projects to be completed as part of this training. As each part of the project was completed, Zare orally evaluated the Petitioner's performance and tested the program and reviewed the coding used by Petitioner. Errors were pointed out to Petitioner and she was given an opportunity to correct the errors. On November 14, 1990, after completion of the entire project, Zare reviewed Petitioner's work and prepared a written appraisal of Petitioner's performance on the project. The written appraisal described Petitioner's shortcomings but also included some positive criticism. Zare concluded that Petitioner's work on the project was below the expected standard. Basically, the written appraisal was contradictory to all performance evaluations previously given to Petitioner by Zare. The programmers, other than Petitioner and Chris Brady, were unable to begin work on the project due to prior work commitments before Zare was transferred to another department. After Zare was transferred this project was terminated. While Zare did verbally counsel Brady about his work, Brady did not receive a written appraisal by Zare before her transfer. Therefore, Petitioner was the only programmer to receive a written appraisal of her work on the project. On November 14, 1990 when Petitioner met with Zare to review Zare's written appraisal of her performance, the Petitioner became upset and defensive. Therefore, Zare suggested that the Petitioner review the appraisal overnight and come back the next day to discuss the appraisal. Petitioner did not return to discuss the appraisal with Zare. Petitioner's failure to return and discuss the appraisal with Zare resulted in Zare concluding that Petitioner was unwilling to accept constructive criticism of her performance. This precluded Zare from working with Petitioner to attain any progress. Therefore, Zare concluded that nothing could be accomplished in attempting to work with Petitioner in the future. Therefore, Zare recommended to Keegan and Venza that Petitioner be terminated. Although Zare considered Petitioner's work performance to be below standards, Zare would not have recommended Petitioner's termination had it not been for Petitioner's very negative reaction and her unwillingness to discuss the appraisal with Zare. Petitioner's employment with FEISCO was involuntarily terminated on November 15, 1990. Between being terminated with FEISCO and being re-employed, Petitioner lost ten weeks of pay at $418.00 per week, an annual bonus equal to one month's pay and other monetary damages in the form of lost medical benefits. Although FEISCO had several employees that suffered a medical condition during times relevant to this proceeding, there was no evidence that FEISCO discriminated against any of these employees because of their medical condition. There was insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that FEISCO discriminated against Petitioner because of her medical condition, chronic fatigue syndrome, when FEISCO terminated Petitioner on November 15, 1990.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Commission enter a Final Order finding that the Petitioner, Karen Ehlers, was not discharged due to her handicap or perceived handicap in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, and that the Petition For Relief be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 26th day of May, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-3782 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Proposed Findings of Fact 1 through 31 have been adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order, except where they may be subordinate, cumulative, unnecessary, irrelevant, immaterial or a restatement of testimony, with the exception of the second sentence of Proposed Finding of Fact 30 which is rejected as not being supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed Findings of Fact 1 through 18 and 22 through 55 have been adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order, except where they may be subordinate, cumulative, unnecessary, irrelevant, immaterial. Proposed Findings of Fact 19 through 21 are rejected as not being supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. COPIES FURNISHED: Snowden S. Mowry, Esquire KANETSKY, MOOR & DEBOER, P. A. Post Office Box 1767 Venice, Florida 34284-1767 David J. Stefany, Esquire HOGG, ALLEN, NORTON & BLUER, P. A. S. Hyde Park Avenue, Suite 350 Tampa, Florida 33606 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahasse, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint (as limited by the Notice of Limitation of Issues dated June 15, 2004) are correct, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent was a licensed mental health counselor, holding Florida license number ME 5853. In approximately July 2001, the Respondent began to counsel a five-year-old female, allegedly the victim of sexual abuse by an uncle, the brother of the child's mother. The Respondent believed, based on information provided by the father, that the uncle resided with the child's mother. The child's father had custody of the child, and the mother had some type of visitation rights. In approximately November of 2001, the Respondent began counseling the child's father and his girlfriend for various family-related issues. Towards the end of 2001 or early 2002, the father and his girlfriend married. Although the Respondent testified at the hearing that the couple "seemed to have plenty of money to do certain things," including personal care and entertainment expenses, she apparently believed, based on what she was told by the couple, that they had financial difficulties. The couple resided in a home owned by the child's father. Apparently based solely on the couple's representations, the Respondent believed that the father was in arrears on house payments. One of the issues addressed in counseling was the father's concern that, were he to lose his house, the child would be returned to the mother's custody, where the uncle resided. Also apparently based solely on the couple's representations, the Respondent believed that the couple wanted to purchase a new house and that they needed $7,000 to buy the house. In March of 2002, the Respondent loaned the couple $7,000. The couple repaid within a few weeks a total of $9,000 to the Respondent. At the time of the $7,000 loan, the clients owed to the Respondent a balance of approximately $3,200 in unpaid professional fees related to therapeutic services provided to them by the Respondent. The Petitioner asserts that the $9,000 repaid to the Respondent included interest charges of $2,000. Petitioner's Exhibit number one is a copy of a document dated March 20, 2002, and apparently notarized on March 21, 2002. The document appears to require that the couple repay to the Respondent by not later than May 16, 2002, a principal amount of $7,000 plus $2,000 in "interest" for a total of $9,000. The genesis of the document is unclear. At the hearing, the wife testified that the document memorialized the agreement between the Respondent and the couple. The Respondent testified that she did not require preparation or execution of any loan documentation. The Respondent testified that the funds received from the couple included repayment of the loan plus payment of $2,000 towards the unpaid professional fees. Based on the candor and demeanor of the witnesses at the hearing, the Respondent's testimony as to the basis for the payment of the $2,000 is credited. Subsequent to the loan and repayment transactions, the therapeutic situation deteriorated between the Respondent and the couple, particularly as to the wife, who began to believe that the Respondent was romantically involved with the husband. The therapeutic relationship between the couple and the Respondent dissolved acrimoniously within a few months after the loan. At the hearing, the Petitioner presented the expert testimony of Dr. Owen Wunderman, a Florida-licensed mental health counselor, and Dr. Andrew Wenger, a Florida-licensed psychologist. Both testified as to the Florida Statutes and as to ethical standards adopted by the American Counseling Association (ACA) applicable to the fact situation at issue in this proceeding. The Respondent presented the expert testimony Dr. Barbara Herlihy, a professor at the University of New Orleans and a licensed professional counselor in Louisiana and Texas. Dr. Herlihy has been involved with the adoption of the existing ACA standards and has written texts related to the issue of dual relationships in counseling situations. As identified during the hearing, the ACA standards address the issue of dual relationships as follows: Avoid when possible. Counselors are aware of their influential positions with respect to clients and they avoid exploiting the trust and dependency of clients. Counselors make every effort to avoid dual relationships with clients that could impair professional judgment or increase the risk of harm to clients. (Examples of such relationships include, but are not limited to, familial, social, financial, business, or other close personal relationships with clients.) When a dual relationship cannot be avoided, counselors take appropriate professional precautions such as informed consent, consultation, supervision, and documentation to ensure that judgment is not impaired and no exploitation occurs. Both Dr. Wunderman and Dr. Wenger testified that by making the $7,000 loan to her clients, the Respondent entered into a dual relationship (counselor and creditor) with the couple, and that in doing so, the Respondent failed to meet minimum standards of performance in professional activities when measured against generally prevailing peer performance, as well as violated the ACA standards. Dr. Wunderman testified that there was a meaningful risk of non-repayment of the $7,000 loan, given that the clients were several thousand dollars in arrears in paying professional fees, thereby increasing the likelihood that the therapist/creditor would have to take legal action against the clients for repayment, an action likely to impair professional judgment or increase the potential risk of harm to the clients, whether or not legal action was actually initiated. Dr. Herlihy testified that she did not regard the fact situation at issue in this case as a dual relationship because she viewed it as a "one-time" short-term loan and that there was no evidence that the counseling relationship between the parties was harmed. Dr. Herlihy testified that she viewed the situation as a "boundary crossing." Dr. Herlihy acknowledged that short of loaning a client a small sum for cab fare, she was unaware of any mental health counselor making a loan to a client such as occurred in this case. She also acknowledged that she was not familiar with professional performance standards as specifically applied to Florida practitioners. The weight of the evidence establishes that Drs. Wunderman and Wenger are more familiar with the minimum standards of professional performance as measured against generally prevailing peer performance within the State of Florida. The testimony of Dr. Wunderman and Dr. Wenger is credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a final order finding the Respondent has violated Subsection 491.009(1)(r), Florida Statutes (2002), and imposing a fine of $1,000, a reprimand, and a one-year period of probation. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Ellen M. Simon, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 William N. Swift, Esquire William N. Swift, Attorney at Law 901 Southwest Martin Downs Boulevard Suite 208 Palm City, Florida 34990 Susan Foster, Executive Director Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy & Mental Health Counseling Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 R.S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Quincy Page, Acting General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's license as a teacher in the State of Florida should be disciplined.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent, Daniel Klahn, was the holder of Florida teaching certificate 634054. The certificate is for the area of Social Studies and was valid through June 30, 1994. During the 1990-1991 school year, Mr. Klahn was employed as a teacher by the Taylor County School Board. Mr. Klahn and his wife have two sons, Daniel M. Klahn, II, and John D. Klahn. During the 1990-1991 school year, Mr. Klahn and his wife decided they wanted to adopt a female child. Toward this end, they agreed to be foster parents for the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. L. S., a nine-year-old female child was placed as a foster child in the Klahns' home during the 1991-1992 school year. L. S. was born on May 3, 1982. She underwent surgery for ruptured blood vessels in her brain shortly after she was born. L. S. suffers from epilepsy. In approximately 1987, L. S. lived with her mother, step-father and two half-brothers. L. S. reported that her step-father had been sexually abusing her. L. S. was taken out of the home and placed in foster care as a result of her allegations against her step-father. L. S. ultimately admitted that it had been one of her step-brothers, Nathan Wheeler, that had abused her and not her step-father. Nathan was approximately 16 or 17 when the incident was reported by L. S. L. S. had originally accused her step-father because she had been told by Nathan that he would kill or otherwise harm her mother and step-father if she ever told on him. Nathan was eventually moved out of L. S.'s home. L. S. was not, however, allowed to go back to her mother for two years. During the two years that L. S. was in foster care she lived in four different foster care households, including Mr. Klahn's. Mr. Klahn's home was the fourth foster care home L. S. was placed in. She stayed in the home for approximately 3 months. L. S. was approximately 8 or 9 years old while she lived with Mr. Klahn. L. S., as a result of having been sexually abused, having been taken away from her mother and having been placed in various foster homes, was anxious to get back to her mother. When she was unhappy about a foster home, she would act out and become unruly. L. S. did not like being in Mr. Klahn's home. She believed that Mr. and Ms. Klahn treated her harder than they did their two sons. Mr. and Ms. Klahn were not very understanding of her situation and treated her as a child who simply lacked discipline. As a result of these facts and those described in finding of fact 13, L. S.'s grades started to slip and she became more troublesome. While in Mr. Klahn's home, L. S. continued to visit on occasion with the family that she had previously lived with, the Bennetts. At some point, L. S. reported to the Ms. Bennett that Mr. Klahn was abusing her. She eventually reported the alleged incidents to her mother. The alleged incidents reported by L. S., which form the bases of the Administrative Complaint against Mr. Klahn, are as follows: the Respondent inappropriately touched L. S. in the chest and vaginal area. when L. S. misbehaved the Respondent and his wife held down L. S. and attempted to place pepper in her mouth. The Respondent and his wife then placed liquid soap on L. S.'s mouth; the Respondent applied medication to L. S.'s vaginal area; the Respondent made inappropriate suggestive comments in front of L. S. Alleged Inappropriate Touching. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Klahn "touched L. S. in the chest and vaginal area", except as discussed, infra. Pepper and Soap Incident. On one occasion, L. S. was in the dining room doing homework. Mr. Klahn was attempting to assist her when she became angry and threw a temper tantrum. L. S. called Ms. Klahn a "mother fucking witch." When she did, Ms. Klahn picked up a pepper shaker and told L. S. to stick out her tongue. L. S. refused. Ms. Klahn then went into the kitchen and got the dish washing liquid soap and returned to the dining room. Ms. Klahn then put soap on L. S.'s lips. Mr. Klahn had to hold L. S. in order for Ms. Klahn to put the soap on L. S.'s lips. Vaginal Medication. Shortly after being placed in Mr. Klahn's home, L. S. was diagnosed as suffering from a yeast infection. Medication for the infection was prescribed by a physician. Mr. Klahn applied the medicine to L. S.'s vaginal area. L. S. felt that she was old enough to put the medicine on herself or that Ms. Klahn should have put the medicine on rather than Mr. Klahn. L. S. did not, however, tell Mr. Klahn how she felt. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Klahn put the medicine on L. S. because she refused to do it herself or because she refused to let anyone except Mr. Klahn put the medicine on. Suggestive Comments. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Klahn made inappropriate suggestive comments in front of L. S.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Daniel Klahn. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 1995, in Tallahassee Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert J. Boyd, Esquire Post Office Box 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 J. Victor Africano, Esquire Post Office Box 1450 Live Oak, Florida 32060 Karen B. Wilde Florida Department of Education The Florida Education Center Room 301 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Kathleen M. Richards, Administrator Professional Practices Services 352 Florida Education Center 325 Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this final order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Sections 120.68 and 766.311, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the original of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the appropriate District Court of Appeal. See Section 766.311, Florida Statutes, and Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association v. Carreras, 598 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.
