Elawyers Elawyers
Ohio| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
DOWNTOWN PARK AVENUE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC., AND DANA PLUMMER vs CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, BARNETTE W. ALLEN, AND SALLY P. ALLEN, 97-005738 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 05, 1997 Number: 97-005738 Latest Update: Oct. 13, 2000

The Issue Whether Petitioners have standing to initiate formal proceedings under the City of Tallahassee Code of Ordinances. Whether the Planning Commission has jurisdiction to consider a challenge to the City's vested rights determination. Whether the Respondents Barnette W. Allen and Sally P. Allen's (Allens) proposed development, known as the Allenwoods Apartments project, is exempt from the consistency and concurrency requirements of the City of Tallahassee's (City) Comprehensive Plan.

Findings Of Fact Parties Petitioner Downtown Park Avenue Neighborhood Association (Neighborhood Association), Inc., is not-for-profit corporation organized on August 18, 1997, and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. The Neighborhood Association's principal office is located at 858 East Call Street, Tallahassee, Florida. The purpose of the Neighborhood Association is to preserve the residential nature and stability of the members' neighborhood. The members of the Neighborhood Association reside in close proximity to the property upon which the Allenwoods Apartments project is proposed to be constructed. Some members of the Neighborhood Association own property within 500 feet or less of the subject property. Petitioner Dana Plummer resides at 133-9 Oak Street, Tallahassee, Florida, which is in close proximity to the property upon which the Allenwoods Apartments project is proposed to be constructed. Mr. Plummer owns property less than 300 feet from the subject property. Plummer is the President of the Neighborhood Association. Respondent City of Tallahassee is a municipal corporation of the State of Florida. The City's DRC approved a Type B Site Plan application for the Allenwoods Apartments project. Respondents Allens are the owners of the property on which the proposed Allenwoods Apartments are to be located, and which property is designated as Blocks D and F in the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division. Allenwoods Apartments The Allenwoods Apartments is proposed to be constructed in approximately 8.64 acres, and is located on the north side of Call Street. The Allenwoods Apartments is proposed to consist of 88 apartment units. The apartments will be located within three three-story buildings and one two-story building, with a total of 202 parking spaces. The density of the proposed Allenwoods Apartments project is approximately ten units per acre. On October 24, 1996, the Planning Department issued Land Use Compliance Certificate No. CC960429 which stated that: This site is eligible for development of 110 multi-family dwelling units developed at the RM-1 standards in Hays Subdivision, an exempt subdivision. Type B review required in proximity with existing low density residential uses. Notice of the Planning Department's decision to issue Land Use Compliance Certificate No. CC960429 was not provided to any members of the Neighborhood Association nor to Plummer. In May 1997, the Allens submitted a Type B Site Plan application for the Allenwoods Apartments project. In mid-June 1997, during the City's review of the proposed project, the City determined that the Allens' two lots qualified as lots located within a subdivision recorded as of July 16, 1990, and all infrastructure required for the development of the property was completed prior to that date. Accordingly, the City staff determined that, pursuant to Section 18-103(1)(a)(1) of the City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance, the proposed Allenwoods Apartments project did not have to comply with the concurrency and consistency requirements of the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Consequently, the City staff did not review the Allenwoods Apartments project for consistency with the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan, nor did the City review the project for concurrency. On August 11, 1997, the City's Development Review Committee approved the Type B Site Plan application for the Allenwoods Apartments project. Single-family residences are the primary use of the properties immediately adjacent to the Allens property. All existing multi-family units that have been constructed in the neighborhood were constructed prior to the adoption of the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan. History of the Subject Property On May 1, 1910, J. L. Hays recorded a subdivision known as the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division. The plat for the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division is recorded at Deed Book "KK," page 600, of the Public Records of Leon County. The plat depicted a street running between Blocks F and G. The plat also depicted a street between Blocks D and F. These streets were never constructed. On January 15, 1946, H. H. Wells acquired certain Blocks of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division, including all of Blocks D and F, and a portion of Block E. On March 11, 1946, H. H. Wells and Susye Bell Wells replated all of Block C and a portion of B, D, E, F, and G. The new subdivision was named "Magnolia Manor," and is recorded at Plat Book 3, page 6, of the Public records of Leon County. On January 6, 1948, H. H. Wells and Susye Bell Wells sold all of Blocks F and G, and Lots 9, 10, and 11 in Block D, of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to the Glover Construction Company. On July 22, 1948, the Glover Construction sold its portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to Willie Mae Hampton. On November 1, 1963, Glover Construction Company sold a portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to Harlem J. Allen, Clyde P. Allen, Barnette W. Allen, and Sally Procter Allen. On February 13, 1964, Willie Mae Hampton sold her portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to Canal Timber Corporation. On December 2, 1964, Barnette W. Allen and Sally Procter Allen entered into an agreement to purchase that portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division owned by the Canal Timber Corporation. On November 20, 1972, Canal Timber Corporation sold its portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to Grace H. Gibson. On December 26, 1974, Grace H. Gibson transferred her portion of Blocks D and F of the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division to Barnette W. Allen and Sally Procter Allen. On December 15, 1976, Barnette W. Allen and Sally Procter Allen acquired whatever property interests that Harlem J. Allen and Clyde P. Allen possessed by virtue of the acquisition that occurred on November 1, 1963. The City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance The City adopted its 2010 Comprehensive Plan on July 16, 1990. Concurrently with the adoption of its 2010 Comprehensive Plan, the City adopted its Vested Rights Review Ordinance, Ordinance No. 90-O-0043AA. This ordinance was codified as Article VII of Chapter 18 of the Code of Ordinances. Article VII (Sections 18-101 through 18-106) of the Tallahassee Code of Ordinances establishes the standards by which a property owner may demonstrate that private property rights have vested against the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Section 18-101 of the Code is a statement of intent in regard to the Vested Rights Ordinance, which reads: This article establishes the sole administrative procedures and standards by which a property owner may demonstrate that private property rights have vested against the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Said administrative procedures shall provide determinations of consistency of development with the densities and intensities set forth in the 2010 Comprehensive Plan and that development is not subject to the concurrency requirements of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. The City established three categories for which property owners could apply to establish their vested rights to continue development of their property without complying with the consistency and concurrency requirements of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. These categories are contained in Sections 18-104(1) and (2), Code of Ordinances. The three categories were denominated as "common-law vesting," "statutory vesting," and developments of regional impact, which were approved pursuant to Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 18-103(2), property owners who contended that they had vested rights pursuant to one of these three categories were required to request a determination of vested rights by filing an application with the Planning Department within 120 calendar days of July 16, 1990. The failure to timely file an application for a vested rights determination within the prescribed time limits constituted a waiver of any vested rights claims. The city's Vested Rights Review Ordinance also expressly states that a property owner cannot receive vested rights based upon a zoning classification. In addition to the three categories for which property owners could apply to establish vested property rights, the City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance included a provision by which certain property owners were presumptively vested and, therefore, were not required to file an application for a vested rights determination. Section 18-103(1) reads, as follows: The following categories shall be presumptively vested for the purposes of consistency with the 2010 Comprehensive Plan and concurrency as specified in the 2010 Comprehensive Plan and shall not be required to file an application to preserve their vested rights status: All lots within a subdivision recorded as of July 16, 1990, or lots in approved subdivisions for which streets, stormwater management facilities, utilities, and other infrastructure required for the development have been completed as of July 16, 1990. The Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department shall maintain a listing of such exempt subdivisions. All active and valid building permits issued prior to July 17, 1990. All technically complete building permit applications received by the building inspection department on or before July 2, 1990, and subsequently issued, shall be vested under the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, regardless of date of issuance. Any structure on which construction has been completed and a certificate of occupancy issued if a certificate of occupancy was required at time of permitting. All lots of record as of July 1, 1984, not located within a subdivision, but only to the extent of one (1) single-family residence per lot. If a property qualifies as an exempt or vested property pursuant to the City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance, the property owner does not have to comply with the consistency and concurrency provisions of the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Such properties are allowed to be developed pursuant to the 1971 zoning code that was in effect until the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan was adopted. The City staff and DRC determined that the subject property was vested because it fulfilled the requirements of Section 18-103(1)(a)(1) as a lot "within a subdivision recorded as of July 16, 1990." The basis for this determination was that the property was located within the plat for the Magnolia Heights Addition of the Hays Division which was recorded in 1910. The plat does not contain any statements as to use or density, however. The subdivision, known as Magnolia Manor, plated in 1946, has its own separate subdivision number, and consists of a portion of property that was originally part of the Magnolia Heights Addition to the Hays Division. A small portion of the Allens' property is located within the Magnolia Manor subdivision. Although from 1948 to 1974, Blocks D and F were both divided and transferred in a manner differently than that depicted on the 1910 Plat, all conveyances of the property subject to the Site Plan have been by reference to the lot and block of Magnolia Heights Addition. Subsequent purchasers of the property conveyed the lots subject to the Site Plan to the Allens, and described the lots as part of the original subdivision rather than by any reference to "Magnolia Manor." The replatting of certain lots within the subdivision to create "Magnolia Manor" did not affect or otherwise change any of the property subject to the Site Plan. On August 20, 1990, the City determined that the Magnolia Heights Addition was an exempt subdivision pursuant to the provisions of Section 18-103(1)(a)(1) of City Code of Ordinances, and was placed on the Planning Department list of exempt subdivisions. As such, the subdivision was exempt from the consistency and concurrency requirements of the Comprehensive Plan. The subdivision is one of more than 300-350 subdivisions determined to be exempt as recorded subdivisions. The exemption was based upon the fact the project was located in a subdivision recorded as of July 16, 1990, and all infrastructure required for the subdivision and for development of the property was in place and complete as of that date. The City staff has been guided in its interpretation and application of the City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance by a memorandum dated August 27, 1990, written by then Assistant City Attorney John Systma. The August 27 memorandum states, in pertinent part, that: This memo is in response to your questions about the proper procedure to follow in determining if a subdivision recorded in 1906 should be declared exempt under the provisions of the Vested Rights Review Ordinance. The critical element that must exist for the subdivision to be exempt is that the current subdivision must be identical to the plat that was created when the subdivision was initially recorded. Any resubdivision, replatting or other changes made to the original recorded plat invalidates that plat. An excellent example of an invalid plat is the original plat recorded for the Pecan Endowment, which has subsequently been changed many times, thereby invalidating it. The subdivision was recorded as of July 16, 1990. The resubdivision of a part of an exempt recorded subdivision, which does not affect the property under review and subject to development approval, has never been the basis of denial of the recorded subdivision exemption provisions of the Vested Rights Ordinance. City staff have never denied the exemption or vesting based upon a replatting of other lots in a subdivision which were not included in the proposed exempt development. Respondents clearly established that such replatting has not been a basis for denial of the exemption by City staff in applying the Vested Rights Ordinance since its adoption in 1990. The development approvals for the Allenwoods Apartments are valid if it is determined that the project is exempt or vested under the Vested Rights Ordinance. The property, at the time of adoption of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, was zoned RM-1, and allowed development of a multifamily project at the density approved for the Allens. The current zoning of the property is MR1 and would permit the development of the property as a multifamily project at the density approved for the Allens.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of RECOMMENDED that the Planning Commission find that Respondents Allens' lots are vested for the purposes of consistency and concurrency with the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, and, it is further RECOMMENDED that the Planning Commission approve the Site Plan for the Allenwoods Apartment Project, as consistent with the requirements of Chapter 27, Article XXI, Section 21.4.G.8. of the Code of Ordinances. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles A. Francis, Esquire Francis & Sweet, P.A. Post Office Box 10551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 David A. Theriaque, Esquire 909 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Linda R. Hurst Assistant City Attorney City Hall 300 South Adams Street Second Floor Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark Gumula Director of Planning Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department 300 South Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jean Gregory Clerk of the Planning Commission Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department 300 South Adams Street, City Hall Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert B. Inzer City Treasurer-Clerk 300 South Adams Street, City Hall Tallahassee, Florida 32301

# 1
PARHAM PLEASURE OAKS, UNRECORDED SUBDIVISION vs CLAY COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, 96-000814VR (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 12, 1996 Number: 96-000814VR Latest Update: Jul. 01, 1996

Findings Of Fact Purchase of the Subject Property. The property at issue in this proceeding consists of approximately fifty-two acres (hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Property"). The Subject Property was acquired by Charles L. Parham in 1988 from Forest Hills, Inc. The Subject Property is located in a rural, undeveloped portion of southern Clay County (hereinafter referred to as the "County"). The Subject Property was part of a larger tract of undeveloped, real property known as "Forest Hills." The southwestern corner of Forest Hills is bounded by State Road 100. At the time the Subject Property was purchased it was zoned Agriculture. This classification allowed use of the Subject Property for single-family residential development at a density of one unit per acre. The Subject Property was purchased by the Applicants for development as single-family sites which they intended to sell or rent and to use for their own residential purposes. Access to the Subject Property was obtained through easements (Forest Hills Road and Lone Pine Trail) from State Road 100. It is approximately one and three-quarters of a mile from State Road 100 to the Subject Property. At the time of purchase of the Subject Property by Mr. Parham, Mr. Parham was provided with a certified Boundary Survey map by Forest Hills, Inc. The Boundary Survey was certified by a land surveyor and was dated November 2, 1978. The Boundary Survey provided to Mr. Parham represented the Subject Property as consisting of forty-four tracts of approximately one acre each and four lots of approximately two acres each. Neither the Subject Property nor Forest Hills has ever been platted. That is, there is no plat of record in the Official Records of Clay County, Florida. The Applicants made the erroneous assumption that the Subject Property was platted. They made this assumption because of the Boundary Survey they were provided by Forest Hills, Inc., which depicted the division of the Subject Property into lots. The Applicants also believed that the Subject Property was platted because no one at County offices where they showed the Boundary Map told them differently. The evidence failed to prove, however, that any employee of the County told them that the Subject Property was in fact platted. The evidence also failed to prove that the County was responsible for the assumption of the Parhams that the Subject Property was platted. Development Activities on the Subject Property. The Applicants cleared and graded roads through the easements to the Subject Property. Applicants also maintained two other roads located in Forest Hills: Cactus Hill Road and Lone Pine Trail. The Applicants also cleared and graded two interior roads which dissect Forest Hills. Applicants named the interior roads "Viking Street" and "Valhalla Street". The clearing and grading of roads was performed by Applicants in order to gain access to the Subject Property for themselves and potential renters. The Applicants also cleared part of the Subject Property for their own use. Mr. Parham purchased a bulldozer prior to the purchase of the Subject Property. The bulldozer was purchased for use in developing the Subject Property for use by the Applicants as a residence, for use in developing the Subject Property for rental and for use in Mr. Parham's business. All labor in developing the roads to and on the Subject Property has been provided by Applicants. Expenses for maintenance, repair and use of the bulldozer were incurred by Applicants. Applicants purchased fill dirt and clay which was used in clearing and grading access and interior roads. Prior to the enactment of the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan"), Applicants sold two two-acre tracts to Inger Robertson and to Julian Wood. Although the deeds on the sale of these lots mentioned the tract numbers, they also described the property sold by metes and bounds. The property would not have been described in this manner if the property were part of a platted subdivision. Applicants were left with forty- eight tracts. Inger Robertson applied for and received a mobile home permit for her two-acre parcel in 1990. Applicants also applied for and received mobile home permits for two one-acre tracts. One mobile home was used as their residence. The three mobile home permits issued for part of the Subject Property were issued prior to enactment of the Plan. They were also issued consistent with then existing law allowing single family units on one acre parcels. Petitioners' Alleged Detrimental Reliance. At the time the Applicants obtained their two permits, the Boundary Survey showing the lot division of the Subject Property was shown to County staff and the Applicants' plans with regard to development of the Subject Property were disclosed. At the time of the acquisition of the permits from the County, the Applicants' intended use of, and development plans for, the Subject Property were consistent with County laws. No approval or other permits were required by County law in order for the Applicants to utilize and develope the Subject Property in the manner they intended. They were only required to comply with existing zoning requirements, which restricted residential use of property to one residence per acre. This the Applicants did with regard to their residence and two other tracts. They failed to obtain permits, however, for the other tracts on the Subject Property. The evidence failed to prove that the Applicants' were informed by the County that their proposed use and development of the Subject Property was "approved" or otherwise "authorized." The Applicants have not asserted that the County took any affirmative action which led them to believe that their planned development of the Subject Property was "approved". Instead, the Applicants have asserted that the County was under an obligation to tell them that the Subject Property was not, in fact, platted, and they were required to take certain actions to insure that they could develop the Subject Property as planned. The evidence failed to prove that the County was under any such obligation. The evidence also failed to prove that the Applicants asked County staff what steps they were required to take in order to insure the immediate development of the Subject Property. In 1988, the Applicants informed the County of the naming of the two roads created on the Subject Property and were given street addresses for each of the tracts identified on the Boundary Survey. The Boundary Survey was left with County staff to make a copy of for the County's records. Each of the tracts was identified for the County's 911 emergency telephone service. The assignment of names to the interior streets and street numbers to the lots was consistent with then existing law. These County actions are not the type of actions which would justify a conclusion that density limitations with regard to the Subject Property would not change. Rights That Allegedly Will Be Destroyed. On January 23, 1992, the County's Board of County Commissioners adopted the Plan. Included in the Plan is a Future Land Use Element, including Future Land Use Maps (hereinafter referred to as the "FLUM"). The Subject Property (and all of Forest Hills) is located in an area classified on the FLUM for "Agriculture/Residential Land Use". This designation allows the use of the Subject Property for single-family residential development. Density, however, is limited to one unit per ten acres. As a result of the Plan and the designated land use classification of the Subject Property, the Subject Property may not be developed as one-acre single-family residences. The result of this restricted land use, the number of individual, developable lots on the Subject Property has been reduced. This reduction in developable lots adversely impacts financing of the Subject Property. The Applicants learned of the adoption of the Plan and its impact on the Subject Property in November of 1992 when they attempted to obtain additional permits for the Subject Property.

Florida Laws (3) 120.65163.3167163.3215
# 2
GOLDEN/JACKSONVILLE COMPANY (HERITAGE COMMONS SHOPPING CENTER) vs CLAY COUNTY, 92-006947VR (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Green Cove Springs, Florida Nov. 23, 1992 Number: 92-006947VR Latest Update: Feb. 12, 1993

Findings Of Fact The Subject Property. The property at issue in this case had previously been owned by an individual who had begun development of the subject property and adjoining property (hereinafter referred to as the "Dawkins' Property"), in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Part of the Dawkins Property was developed and has been sold (hereinafter referred to as the "Bank Tract"). The subject property (hereinafter referred to as the "Golden Tract"), was acquired by Golden/Jacksonville Co. in December, 1986. Development of the Property; Government Action Relied Upon by the Applicant. Most of the Dawkins Property, including most of the Golden Tract, was approved and zoned in 1977 by Clay County for development as a shopping center. A part of the Golden Tract (hereinafter referred to as the "Multifamily Tract"), however, was not zoned for development as a shopping center at that time. Part of the Dawkins Property (the Bank Tract) was fully developed as a bank. Various environmental permits required to further develop the Dawkins Property, less the Bank Tract and the Multifamily Tract, as a shopping center were acquired by the previous owner of the property. Permits were issued by the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation and the St. Johns Water Management District. Prior to purchasing the Golden Tract, the Applicant sought assurance of Clay County that the Golden Tract (but not the Multifamily Tract) was zoned for development as a shopping center. Clay County, in a letter dated December 9, 1985, confirmed that development of the Golden Tract as a shopping center was consistent with the then current zoning for the property. In confirming the zoning of the Golden Tract, Clay County notified the Applicant that it would be necessary that a traffic signal be installed at an intersection on Blanding Boulevard which would be impacted by the shopping center. In 1987, the Applicant sought and obtained approval of the rezoning of the Multifamily Tract for development as a shopping center. The Applicant submitted a revised site plan for the proposed shopping center dated August 27, 1987 to Clay County for approval in connection with the request to rezone the Multifamily Tract. The site plan included the development of 264,000 square feet of commercial space. The August 27, 1987 revised site plan was approved by Clay County in November, 1987. In May, 1988, the Applicant applied with the Florida Department of Transportation (hereinafter referred to as "DOT"), for a drainage connection permit and a driveway connection permit in connection with providing access to the proposed shopping center. As a condition of issuing the required permit, DOT required that Clay County construct certain intersection improvements on Blanding Boulevard, the main traffic artery adjacent to the Golden Property. The Applicant entered into negotiations with Clay County in order to get the Blanding Boulevard intersection improvements required by DOT completed. On January 9, 1990, the Applicant and Clay County entered into an agreement wherein the Applicant agreed to pay Clay County 50% of the costs (up to a total of $23,000.00) of the DOT-required intersection improvements. The Applicant's Detrimental Reliance. In reliance on Clay County's actions in informing the Applicant that it would be required to provide a traffic signal in order to proceed with the development of the Golden Tract, the Applicant had the traffic signal installed at a cost of $7,500.00. Following approval of the August 27, 1987 revised site plan by Clay County, the Applicant spent approximately $128,000.00 to construct a stormwater retention pond required by the St. Johns River Water Management District. Part of the costs of intersection improvements required by DOT were incurred by the Applicant. The weight of the evidence failed to prove how much the Applicant actually spent, however. The Applicant also proceeded with the development of the Golden Tract, incurring architecture and engineering fees and other costs associated with the proposed development of the Golden Tract. A detailed breakdown of various expenses incurred by the Applicant was included at tab 25 of the documentation filed in support of the Application. Although not all of the expenditures listed at tab 25, i.e., taxes and costs associated with the purchase of the Golden Property, are relevant to the issues in this proceeding, some of the expenditures were incurred in reliance on the actions of Clay County other than approval of zoning of the Golden Tract. Rights That Will Be Destroyed. Pursuant to the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan, there are insufficient "peak hour trips" available on the roads impacted by the Golden Tract to accommodate the peak hour trips required for the Golden Tract if it is developed as a shopping center. Procedural Requirements. The parties stipulated that the procedural requirements of the Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, adopted by Clay County Ordinance 92-18, as amended by Clay County Ordinance 92-22 have been met.

Florida Laws (3) 120.65163.31678.08
# 3
JOSEPH L. NACCA vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING, 05-003208 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Sep. 02, 2005 Number: 05-003208 Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2006

The Issue The issues are: (1) whether Petitioner is qualified for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license; and (2) whether Petitioner is entitled to waiver of his felony conviction in accordance with Chapter 550, Florida Statutes (2006).

Findings Of Fact Petitioner submitted an application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license as a racehorse owner on or about March 30, 2005. On his application, Petitioner accurately reported that he had been convicted on one count of Conspiracy to Transport Stolen Property and Evade Taxes, a felony. Due to Petitioner’s felony conviction, his application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license was subject to denial. Consequently, Petitioner also requested that a waiver be granted so that he could obtain the license. Petitioner's application and his request for waiver failed to include any information which would establish his rehabilitation or demonstrate that he is of good moral character. In the regular course of the Division's review of Petitioner's application and request for waiver, on or about April 11, 2005, Petitioner was interviewed by Dennis Badillo, an investigator for the Division. During the interview, Mr. Badillo completed a waiver interview form based upon the answers provided by Petitioner. Petitioner was afforded a full and fair opportunity to present information to establish his rehabilitation and to demonstrate his present good moral character, but Petitioner did not provide such information. In light of the information regarding Petitioner’s felony conviction, which is undisputed and admitted by Petitioner on his application form and at the final hearing, Petitioner does not meet the eligibility requirements for the license he seeks. At hearing, Petitioner attempted to minimize his role in the crime of which he was convicted, and expressed the view that he "doesn't have much time" to fulfill his desire to "participate in the racing industry" in Florida, inasmuch as he has passed his 70th birthday. Petitioner failed to present any testimony from friends, relatives, associates, employers, probation officers, or other individuals to establish good conduct and reputation subsequent to the date of his felony conviction. Absent such evidence, the Division has no basis upon which to conclude that Petitioner is rehabilitated or that Petitioner is of present good moral character.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order denying Petitioner’s application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license and his request for waiver. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Thomas Peavey Hoffer Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Joseph L. Nacca 268 West Walk West Haven, Connecticut 06516 David J. Roberts, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202

Florida Laws (3) 10.001550.0251550.105
# 4
K. S. RAVINES CORPORATION, vs CLAY COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, 99-003955VR (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Green Cove Springs, Florida Sep. 21, 1999 Number: 99-003955VR Latest Update: Dec. 01, 1999

The Issue Whether Petitioner, K. S. Ravines Corporation, has demonstrated, pursuant to the Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, Florida, that a vested rights certificate to undertake development of certain real property located in Clay County should be issued by Clay County, notwithstanding the fact that part of such development will not be in accordance with the requirements of the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan?

Findings Of Fact The Property. The Applicant, K. S. Ravines Corporation, is the owner of real property located in Middleburg, Clay County, Florida. The Applicant's property, known as the "The Ravines," is being developed as a 435-acre residential and golf course development. Development of the Property; Government Action Relied upon by Silver Sands. On or about June 1, 1990, the Applicant entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement agreeing to purchase The Ravines. Subsequent to the execution of the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the Applicant pursued a due diligence effort. In particular, the Applicant contacted Clay County to confirm that The Ravines had been zoned as a Planned Unit Developed as represented by the seller of The Ravines. The Applicant also sought to confirm that the property possessed the development capabilities associated with the zoning. In response to the Applicant's inquiries, Keith I. Hadden, then Director of Development for Clay County, informed the Applicant of the following in a letter dated August 7, 1990: The property commonly known as The Ravines, as shown on that certain map of J. M. Ard & Associates, Inc., dated May 30, 1990, (Job No. 3751B), together with a parcel commonly referred to as the McCumber Contracting Parcel as shown on said map, and the access road from County Road 218 to the main property of The Ravines commonly known as Ravines Road (all hereinafter "The Ravines") is currently zoned "PUD" Planned Unit Development. . . . Mr. Hadden also confirmed that The Ravines was approved for development of 261 single family lots, 49 condominiums, 107 hotel units, and 60 patio homes; a total of 477 units. Silver Sands' Detrimental Reliance. In reliance upon Mr. Hadden's representations as Clay County Director of Planning, the Applicant purchased The Ravines for $10,709,423.00. At the time of the purchase the golf course was valued at $6,900,000.00. The Applicant purchased 168 single-family lots (44 developed and 124 undeveloped) and 60 undeveloped patio home lots. The undeveloped lots and the existing developed single- family lots purchased by the Applicant were valued at $3,943,000.00. The Applicant also spent $495,115.00 to make capital improvements to The Ravines after it purchased The Ravines. Rights that will be Destroyed. In January 1992 Clay County adopted a comprehensive plan pursuant to Part II, Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. The Ravines was designated with a land use designation in the plan of "Rural Residential." The "Rural Residential" land use classification of the Clay County Comprehensive Plan allows development of one residential unit per one acre of land. As a result, The Ravines may be developed at a total of 435 units instead of the 477 units that Clay County informed the Applicant The Ravines could be developed for in the August 7, 1990, letter from Mr. Hadden. As a result of the "Rural Residential" land use classification, the total developable lots at The Ravines would be reduced from 228 lots to 186 lots, or a reduction of 42 lots. This reduction represents a reduction of 18.4% of the total lots purchased by the Applicant. It is possible that this reduction could result in an 18.4% loss of the $3,943,000.00 paid for the lots, or approximately $496,000.00. Procedural Requirements. The parties stipulated that the procedural requirements of Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, adopted by Clay County Ordinance 92-18, as amended, have been met.

Florida Laws (2) 120.65163.3167
# 5
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs JOHN SAMUEL SORANNO, 93-002244 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Inverness, Florida Apr. 22, 1993 Number: 93-002244 Latest Update: Jun. 14, 1993

The Issue The issue is whether respondent's license as a title insurance agent should be disciplined for the reasons cited in the administrative complaint filed on April 6, 1993.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: On November 30, 1992, respondent, John Samuel Soranno, signed and executed his application for licensure as a title insurance agent with petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department). In section 6 of the application, respondent was asked to disclose his record of employment for the last five years. Respondent indicated that he had been employed by Land Title Insurance of Citrus County, Inc. (Land Title) since March 7, 1982. In section 8 of the application, respondent was required to sign a notarized statement declaring himself eligible to qualify by prior experience for licensure with the Department. Respondent signed the notarized statement indicating he had been a "substantially full-time bona fide employee" of Land Title from March 7, 1982, to the time he signed the application. The application and a resume were later hand-delivered to Tallahassee, and Department records indicate the application was stamped as received on December 31, 1992. Relying on the representations in the application, the Department issued respondent a title insurance agent license on an undisclosed date in January 1993. On January 13, 1993, the president of Land Title, William J. Hudson, wrote the Department a letter in which he stated that: At no time has . . . John Soranno been employed as a substantially full-time bona fide employee of Land Title Insurance of Citrus County, Inc., or of William J. "Skip" Hudson. To my certain knowledge, neither . . . (has) John Soranno devoted full time to title insurance during the last five (5) years. Further, John Soranno has (not) performed the functions of preparation of title insurance policies, preparing closing statements and conducting closings, handling of escrow or trust funds including the disbursement of trust funds, preparation of documents or gained knowledge of title insurance work and office management in a title insurance office in the past five years. Hudson went on to recommend that the Department investigate respondent "for possible criminal violations". Acting on this advice, the Department conducted an investigation and later suspended respondent's license on an emergency basis. It also issued an administrative complaint charging respondent with violating various statutes on the ground he had made a material misrepresentation on his application. The license remains suspended pending the outcome of this proceeding. Respondent has been involved in the title insurance business for the last twenty-one years. He first worked for Citrus Title Company, Inc. from March 15, 1973, through September 15, 1975, as a title researcher. Beginning in October 1975, he worked with Coastal Bonded Title Company, Inc., first as assistant manager and then as manager of the Crystal River office. His main responsibilities were performing title searches and examinations, issuing commitment letters, handling closings, and making escrow disbursements. From August 1, 1977, through January 22, 1982, respondent was employed by Crystal River Title Company in Inverness. In that job, he was responsible for conducting title searches and examinations. In early 1982, Hudson approached respondent and asked him to work for Land Title to perform title searches and examinations. Because Hudson did not want to incur the additional costs associated with hiring an "employee", he hired respondent as an independent contractor. Respondent was also required to execute a contract with Hudson whereby he agreed to work exclusively for Land Title. As compensation, respondent received a flat fee for a base title search and a larger fee for those cases requiring a full search. Respondent began employment with Land Title under this arrangement on March 7, 1982. For tax purposes, respondent created a Subchapter S corporation named JOKAR, Inc. and had his paychecks from Land Title made payable to his corporation. Respondent did not work in the offices of Land Title. Instead, he worked at the county courthouse in Inverness and in his home. Under a special arrangement with courthouse personnel, he typically began work each morning (Monday through Friday) at 7:30 a.m. in the courthouse (before it officially opened for business each day) searching through courthouse records. Depending on his workload, which averaged between five and seven files per day, respondent left the courthouse anywhere between 12:30 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. and returned to his home where he spent time on the telephone with underwriters, attorneys or Land Title employees regarding title and underwriting problems and language to be used in closing documents. He also prepared written reports for Land Title, and he spent several hours reviewing the files for the next day's work. At 6:00 p.m. each workday, a Land Title employee came by his house and picked up his day's work and dropped off new files. Based upon the amount of time respondent devoted to his job, which averaged more than eight hours each work day, it is found that respondent worked "full-time" for Land Title. As a part of respondent's job responsibilities, he was required to speak with underwriters on a recurring basis to resolve various underwriting problems which arose as a result of his research. It was generally accepted that respondent was the most experienced and competent Land Title employee with regard to title searches, examinations and underwriting. Indeed, respondent did the title search and underwriting on well over 10,000 files while employed with that firm. During his tenure with Land Title, respondent was covered under the same health insurance policy as other Land Title employees, and he made various claims under his policy. Although Hudson denied that respondent was an employee of his firm, it is found that from March 1982 until January 1993, respondent was a bona fide, full-time employee of Land Title. In late 1988, Scott Lyons was hired as an employee by Land Title. He was later elected a vice-president of the corporation by its board of directors and assumed the role of manager of the Crystal River office. Although Hudson denied Lyons had any authority as a corporate officer, it is found that Hudson did not place any limitation on Lyons' authority and he was a bona fide officer of the corporation. In the fall of 1992, Lyons began considering the possibility of opening his own title company in Citrus County and approached respondent about joining such a venture. Although respondent gave Lyons no assurance that he would work with him, respondent considered this possibility. On December 4, 1992, Lyons told Hudson of his plans to start a new title company named Nature Coast Title Company, Inc. Immensely displeasured at the thought of competition, Hudson immediately fired Lyons effective that date. Because Hudson thought that respondent might also be intending to leave the firm, he initially decided to terminate respondent. After learning that respondent had no firm commitment with Lyons, Hudson changed his mind. In early January 1993, Hudson made a new and more lucrative job offer to keep respondent on his payroll but withdrew it a short time later. On January 21, 1993, Hudson learned that respondent had accepted Lyons' offer to join the new title company and severed respondent's relationship with Land Title that day. It may be reasonably inferred from the evidence that Hudson's motivation in sending the complaint letter to the Department was his desire to eliminate competition rather than having the law enforced. In 1992, the legislature enacted Chapter 92-318, Laws of Florida, which provided, among other things, for the licensure by the Department of title insurance agents. The law stipulated that those "who had been actively engaged with responsible duties in the title insurance business in the state for 5 consecutive years before the date of application for examination" would not have to take an examination for a license if an application for licensure was filed with the Department no later than March 31, 1993. Respondent decided to "protect his career" and apply for licensure under the grandfather provisions of the law. Accordingly, on November 30, 1992, respondent had a friend type his application for licensure. The application form required those who sought to qualify for licensure by experience to have their employer verify that the applicant had been working as a "substantially full-time, bona fide employee" during the time indicated. Because no other officers of Land Title were in the office at the time respondent sought to obtain written verification of his employment history, respondent got Lyons, as a corporate officer of Land Title, to acknowledge that he was a "bona fide full-time employee" of Land Title from March 1982 until that date. Although Lyons had worked at Land Title only since late 1988, he had knowledge that respondent had been employed full-time by Land Title since March 1982 and he was aware of respondent's job responsibilities during that period of time. Respondent was described by the district manager of a large title insurance underwriter as being "very knowledgeable" in the area of underwriting. Also, based upon his dealings with respondent over the last eight years, he rated respondent as "very high" in the area of title searching and examination. A co-worker at Land Title since 1985 also considered respondent to be "very knowledgeable" in the business, pointed out that Hudson had given her instructions to call respondent on any questions regarding document preparation, and was under the impression respondent was a full-time employee of Land Title. Respondent's representation on the application regarding his employment history was not false. Rather, he worked full-time as a bona fide employee of Land Title from March 1982 to January 1993. By virtue of his experience over the last twenty-one years, he is qualified for licensure as a title insurance agent.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the administrative complaint with prejudice, vacating the emergency order of suspension, and reinstating respondent's license as a title insurance agent. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2244 Petitioner: 1-3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 5-6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Rejected as being contrary to the evidence. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. The last sentence has been rejected as being contrary to the evidence. Respondent: Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 1a-b. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 1c. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 2a. Rejected as being unnecessary. 2b-c. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 2d. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 3a-b. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 5-6a. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary, irrelevant, subordinate, not supported by the more credible and persuasive evidence, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, Esquire Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Joseph D. Mandt, Esquire 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 James F. Spindler, Jr., Esquire 3858 North Citrus Avenue Crystal River, FL 34428

Florida Laws (5) 120.57626.8414626.8417626.8437626.844
# 6
VILLAGES OF FIRESIDE SUBDIVISION vs CLAY COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, 93-007071VR (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 10, 1993 Number: 93-007071VR Latest Update: Feb. 14, 1994

Findings Of Fact The Subject Property. During 1973, Mode, Inc., applied for and obtained approval of Planned Unit Development (hereinafter referred to as "PUD") zoning for approximately 620 acres of real property known as Ridaught Landing located on County Road 209 in Clay County. In December of 1986, Mode, Inc., sold approximately 470 acres of Ridaught Landing to Village of Fireside, Inc. This 470 acre parcel (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"), is the subject of this proceeding. Purchase money financing and construction financing for the purchase and development of the Property was provided by Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, N.A. (hereinafter referred to as "Barnett"). In November of 1988 Barnett assigned its interest in the Property to the Petitioner simultaneously with the closing of financing by the Petitioner on the Property to Villages of Fireside, Inc. Villages of Fireside, Inc., subsequently defaulted on its indebtedness to the Petitioner and in April, 1992, the Petitioner accepted a Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure for the Property. Development of the Property; Government Action Relied Upon by the Petitioner. In November of 1985, the PUD was amended. As a condition of the amendment, Clay County required that 212 acres of uplands and associated wetlands be dedicated to a homeowner's association associated with the Property. The 212 acres were to be used as preservation area and for the construction of nature walks, gazebos and recreational areas. In January of 1988 Villages of Fireside, Inc., applied for approval of a further amendment to the PUD. Among other things, approval of a separate entrance to the Property was requested. The amendment was approved. As a result of the January, 1988 amendment, the PUD properties are to be developed as two separate subdivisions, known as Ridaught Landing and the Villages of Fireside. Development of the Villages of Fireside subdivision was approved for up to 400 single-family dwelling units within the residential portion, (b) 16 acres of recreational and private services uses, including a day-care center and a private park, and (c) the 212 acre preservation area. Villages of Fireside, Inc., submitted a plat to Clay County for the Villages of Fireside subdivision Unit One in 1988. The final plat for Unit One was approved March 22, 1988. Clay County required that the entrance to Unit One be constructed with an 80 foot right of way to accommodate the development of the entire project as approved by the PUD, as amended. The Petitioner's Detrimental Reliance. In reliance upon Clay County's approval of the PUD and amendments thereto and approval of the final plat of Unit One Villages of Fireside, Inc.: Constructed master infrastructure improvements (water and sewer systems, master roads and an oversized drainage facility) for the project at a cost of approximately $706,427.00. These improvements were made between February and October of 1988. Constructed entry features for the project at a cost of approximately $21,465.00. These improvements were made between December of 1988 and June of 1989. Constructed a nature walk through the 212 acre preservation area at a cost of approximately $97,593.00. These improvements were made between November of 1988 and January of 1989. Upon the assignment of Barnett's interest in the Property to the Petitioner in November of 1988, financing by the Petitioner for the Property to Villages of Fireside, Inc., closed. The Petitioner, therefore, refinanced construction of improvements made by Villages of Fireside, Inc., in reliance on Clay County's approval of the PUD, with amendments, and the final plat for Unit One. The Petitioner refinanced the project in reliance upon Clay County's approval of the PUD, with amendments, and the final plat for Unit One. The Petitioner considered the PUD zoning to be true and correct at the time of refinancing and the Petitioner's loan officer believed that the Property was approved for development of at least 400 single-family residential units at the time of refinancing. In reliance on Clay County's actions, proceeds were distributed by the Petitioner for construction of the nature walk through the 212 acre preservation area. The Petitioner also released the 212 acre preservation area from the lien of its mortgage on the Property so that it could be conveyed to the homeowner's association as common area. This release was made in reliance on Clay County's actions. Rights That Will Be Destroyed. Development of the Property will impact County Road 220. Pursuant to the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan, there is insufficient capacity on the portion of County Road 220 that will be impacted by development of the Property to accommodate traffic projected to be generated by the Property as approved. If the Petitioner must comply with the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan it will be required to delay completion of the project until County Road 220 is improved. Such a delay will have a substantial adverse financial impact upon the Petitioner. Procedural Requirements. The parties stipulated that the procedural requirements of Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, adopted by Clay County Ordinance 92-18, as amended, have been met.

Florida Laws (3) 120.65120.68163.3167
# 7
NANCY BOLES, D/B/A HAPPY DAYS GUEST RANCH vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 87-002988 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-002988 Latest Update: Oct. 20, 1987

Findings Of Fact Nancy Boles owns and has operated Happy Days Guest Ranch for some 14 years. This facility is licensed as an ACLF and has no record of complaints other than those contested at this proceeding. On or about March 4, 1987, DHRS received a report from an undisclosed source that a resident at the Happy Days Guest Ranch ACLF had been abused by the proprietor, Nancy Boles, and an investigator was sent to the ACLF. Apparently the allegation was that Respondent had slapped a resident. At this time there were approximately 6 residents at the ACLF. After talking to these residents and with Respondent, the investigator, Katherine Massaro, concluded that a substantiated report of abuse had occurred. The HRS Division of License and Certification was notified and a decision was made to relocate the six residents and place a moratorium on further admissions to the ACLF. Additionally, Respondent's application to renew her ACLF license was denied. No evidence was presented that the HRS Division of Adult Services, filed a notification of a confirmed report of abuse against Respondent and placed her on the abuse register. Accordingly, this is not a proceeding challenging a confirmed report of abuse of the aged but is a license revocation proceeding. It is apparent that HRS notified the State Attorney's Office of the alleged abuse and the charges disposed of in Exhibit 1 were preferred. No adjudication of guilt was made in that case. Petitioner's eye witnesses to the alleged abuse were two elderly women. The younger, Mardell Surrency, whose deposition is Exhibit 2, was 75, and the other, Alice Beasley, whose deposition is Exhibit 3, was 86. Both of these women testified that they saw Respondent slap Fowler Simmons, another resident of the ACLF who is senile or has other mental impairment that led these witnesses to conclude that mentally Simmons was "real bad" with the mind of a child who had to be told everything to do. Both witnesses gave an indication (pantomined) of how Respondent slapped Simmons. Unfortunately, a verbal description of this act is not contained in their deposition. Surrency testified that Beasley "was 86 years old so she didn't pay much attention to anything." Beasley, on the other hand, testified that she and "Modelle" were sitting alongside each other when the incident occurred and she and "Modelle" had often talked about how mean Respondent talked to Simmons. Neither ever saw any bruise on Simmons' face or body or ever saw Respondent strike Simmons other than this one time. Both testified Respondent told Simmons to not sit there "like a damn fool." Respondent's version of the incident was that she did indeed slap Simmons, but gently on the mouth, to get him to eat the meal she had prepared. She demonstrated a very light slap with the palm of her hand on the lips. This evidence is deemed more credible than the often rambling and disjointed testimony of the two female residents of the ACLF.

Florida Laws (6) 415.102415.10361.20784.0390.80190.803
# 8
SCOTT S. CARSWELL vs CITY OF TALLA, 91-000248VR (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jan. 10, 1991 Number: 91-000248VR Latest Update: Aug. 29, 1991

The Issue Whether Scott S. Carswell, The Moon Property (Petitioner), has demonstrated that development rights in certain real property it owns have vested against the provisions of the Tallahassee-Leon County 2010 Comprehensive Plan.

Findings Of Fact Chronology The property on which "The Moon" building is located was initially purchased by Grant Peeples and Scott S. Carswell in 1984. The Peeples/Carswell partnership filed bankruptcy in December 1986, and "The Moon" was closed in April 1987. In December 1987, Moon Management, Inc. (Scott S. Carswell and Tallahassee Entertainment Facility, Inc.) executed a partnership agreement to reopen "The Moon" and continue its operations. In December 1988, Scott S. Carswell, Moon Management, Inc., repurchased the Moon property from the Florida National Bank. In November 1989, the Respondent City of Tallahassee published a caveat announcing the preparation of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan and advising that land use designations would be changed pursuant to the Plan. On February 1, 1990, the Respondent submitted its 2010 Comprehensive Plan to the Florida Department of Community Affairs. In March 1990, Petitioner entered into a 50 year lease agreement for the property at issue, which is vacant property immediately east of the property on which "The Moon" building is located. This agreement also provided for Petitioner's purchase of a 10 foot by 330 foot parcel immediately west of the "Moon" property. Zoning History The property at issue in this proceeding is part of a portion of property located on the south side of Lafayette Street between Seminole Drive and Magnolia Drive in the City of Tallahassee. The development project Petitioner seeks to have vested would involve commercial development of vacant land located between the existing "Moon" building and an existing strip shopping center. With the exception of the vacant property, the entire parcel on the south side of Lafayette Street between "The Moon" building and parking lot and Magnolia Drive to the east, is currently developed and houses commercial business enterprises. Petitioner leased the subject property from Alban Stewart in March 1990. This property has been zoned for commercial uses since 1955. The Stewart family began developing property within the tract in 1960. The building occupied by "The Moon" was constructed in 1962. "The Moon" building was originally constructed for, and occupied by, a super market. Since this building was sold to Scott S. Carswell and his partners in 1984, the building has been occupied by "The Moon" and, with the exception of a short period while "The Moon" was in bankruptcy, has operated as a commercial entertainment facility. In 1988 Petitioner Carswell attempted to obtain approval from the Respondent City of Tallahassee to expand "The Moon" operation on property west of the existing building. Petitioner's requested variance was not granted because the proposed expansion encroached into a buffer zone between "The Moon" facility and Seminole Drive. During negotiations with Respondent regarding this 1988 zoning variance request, City officials suggested that Petitioner consider developing east of "The Moon" facility, which was at that time zoned for commercial use. When Petitioner Carswell was unable to obtain a variance to proceed with his plans to expand west of "The Moon" building, he began plans and negotiations to develop east of the existing facility. Theee plans and negotiations culminated in the lease agreement which Carswell entered into with Alban Stewart in March 1990. In the meantime, the 2010 Comprehensive Plan was adopted by the Respondent and submitted to the Department of Community Affairs in February 1990. Land use provisions within the Plan changed the zoning of the property at issue to a designation of residential preservation. The residential preservation designation does not permit the Petitioner's development for commercial purposes. The property at issue does not meet any of the Comprehensive Plan criteria for residential preservation designation. Permitting Construction for the proposed expansion has not been undertaken. No permits have been issued for any structures on the proposed development. There have been no plat approvals for the structures in the proposed development. Petitioner's Application for Vested Rights On or about October 3, 1990, Scott S. Carswell filed an Application for Vested Rights Determination (hereinafter referred to as the "Application"), with the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department. (Application VR0082T) The following information concerning the development of The Moon property was contained on the Application: "Scott S. Carswell is listed as the President, Tallahassee Entertainment Facility, Inc." The project is described as consisting of "existing commercial uses of property as well as uses proposed for property." The property location is described as "on Lafayette Street between Seminole Drive and Magnolia Drive and contains approximately 9.39 acres as shown in Exhibit 4, site plan." as: "Progress . . . Toward Completion" is described plans (R 2, p. 20, Line 9-21, Line 13). purchase of fixtures (R-2, p. 21, Line 22, p. 22, Line 10). lease of property (R-2, p. 23, Line 9-17). Expenses for proposed facility March 31, 1990, lease agreement for $3,200 per month. (R-1, Exhibit 8c) July 19, 1990, The Moon Expansion for $5,000. (R-1, Exhibit 8c) March 6 - April 30,1990,"Club Development $9,231.83." (R-1, Exhibit 8d) May 25,1990,Planning cost.(R-1, Exhibit 8e) Planning Dates September18,1990,Captain Tony's proposal. (R-1, Exhibit 5d) May 25,1990, letter of interest for Captain Tony's. (R-1, Exhibit 7 A-4) April 4, 1990, completed plans for project, estimate of costs. (R-1, Exhibit 7 A-5) The Application lists substantial additional expenses which were in fact associated with the original structure and operation of "The Moon" and do not relate to Petitioner's proposed expansion/development. Common Law Vesting Petitioner seeks approval of the Application for Vested Rights based upon the common law vesting provisions pursuant to the City of Tallahassee Ordinance 90-0-0043AA. Petitioner does not assert a claim of statutory vesting.

Florida Laws (2) 120.65163.3167
# 9
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. RALPH B. SNYDER, JR., 82-002410 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-002410 Latest Update: May 04, 1984

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Ralph B. Snyder, Jr. ("Respondent"), is a licensed broker having been issued license No. 0082998. At all times material hereto, Respondent was the qualifying broker for Home Hunters V, Inc., at 2829 Okeechobee Boulevard, West Palm Beach, Florida. At all times material hereto, Respondent had employed Greg Howle as "office manager" at the above-mentioned location. Mr. Howle was at no time licensed as a broker or salesman by the Florida Real Estate Commission. On January 29, 1982, William Konwinski visited Respondent's office looking for an apartment to rent for the month of February, 1982. During his visit, Konwinski spoke with Ilana Frank, an office employee of Respondent who was licensed as a salesperson by the Florida Real Estate Commission. During his conference with Ms. Frank, Konwinski signed a rental agreement and gave Ms. Frank $60 as payment for rental services. That contract contained the following clause: If the rental information provided under this contract is not current or accurate in any material aspect, you may demand within 30 days of this contract date a return of your full fee paid. If you do not obtain a rental you are entitled to receive a return of 75 percent of the fee paid, if you make demand within 30 days of this contract date. The contract also contained the clause which provided that ". . . [n]o refunds are made during 30 day period when vacancies can be provided in the area and price range of tenants as indicated in above agreement." In the rental agreement, Mr. Konwinski indicated that he sought a one- bedroom furnished efficiency apartment that would accept pets. After executing the contract and paying the rental fee, Mr. Konwinski was given the names and addresses of two prospective rentals. Mr. Konwinski took the rental listings and within the next two or three days checked the listings and found that one did not accept pets. Konwinski failed to keep an appointment to meet with the landlord at the second property. Thereafter, Mr. Konwinski returned to Respondent's office and spoke again with Ilama Frank concerning available rentals. Ms. Frank apparently checked for additional listings but could locate none that met with Mr. Konwinski's specifications. However, Ms. Frank penciled in on the agreement between Home Hunters V, Inc., and Mr. Konwinski that he would be returned $30 of his $60 fee should Home Hunters V, Inc., be unable to find an apartment for him by January 31, 1982. Gregory Howle, the office manager, signed this addendum to the contract on behalf of Home Hunters V, Inc. On at least two separate occasions thereafter Mr. Konwinski returned to Respondent's office seeking a refund of his deposit, each time speaking to Mr. Howle, the office manager. Howle first told Konwinski that his refund check was in the mail, but later explained that Respondent had instructed him to make no refund. Konwinski never obtained a rental unit through Respondent, but did ultimately receive a partial refund. There is no credible evidence of record in this proceeding to establish that Respondent at any time shared real estate commissions with Gregory Howle. Although there are checks which were introduced into evidence made payable from Home Hunters V, Inc., to Mr. Howle, the record in this cause is devoid of any showing as to what the salary structure between Respondent and Mr. Howle was, or for specifically what services Mr. Howle was compensated. Further, other than speaking with Mr. Konwinski on his initial visit to Respondent's office and obtaining his signature on the rental agreement, referring him then to a licensed salesperson, and again speaking with Mr. Konwinski concerning a refund of his fee, there is no credible evidence of record to establish any other activities engaged in by Mr. Howle while employed by Respondent.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57475.01475.25475.42
# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer