Conclusions THIS CAUSE comes before the Agency For Health Care Administration (“the Agency") concerning Certificate of Need ("CON") Application No. 10183, which was filed by Rockledge HMA, LLC/Wuesthoff Medical Center-Rockledge (“Wuesthoff Rockledge”) in the first batching cycle of 2013, and preliminarily denied by the Agency. 1. On July 9, 2013, Wuesthoff Rockledge filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Proceeding contesting the preliminary denial to establish a 15-bed comprehensive medical rehabilitation unit, which was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”). 2. On July 11, 2013, HealthSouth of Sea Pines Limited Partnership d/b/a HealthSouth Sea Pines Rehabilitation Hospital (“HealthSouth”) filed a Petition for Leave to Intervene supporting the Agency’s denial of Wuesthoff Rockledge’s CON application. Filed July 14, 2014 10:32 AM Division of Administrative Hearings 3. On July 23, 2013, DOAH entered an Order Granting Petition to Intervene. 4. On June 18, 2014, Wuesthoff Rockledge filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal. It is therefore ORDERED: 1. The denial of CON Application 10183 is UPHELD. ORDERED in Tallahassee, Florida, on this /7 day of Tetley , 2014. Agency for Heglth Care Administration
Other Judicial Opinions A party that is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to seek judicial review which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the agency clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Final Orger has been furnished by US. Mail or interoffice mail to the persons named below on this [0 day of ety 2014. Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (850) 413-3630 Copies Furnished to: W. David Watkins Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings (Via Electronic Mail) Geoffrey D. Smith, Esquire Susan Crystal Smith, Esquire Corinne T. Porcher, Esquire Smith and Associates Suite 201, 3301 Thomasville Road Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Attorneys for Rockledge HMA, LLC d/b/a Wuesthoff Medical Center-Rockledge (U.S. Mail) R. Terry Rigsby, Esquire Pennington, P.A. Post Office Drawer 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Attorney for HealthSouth of Sea Pines Limited Partnership d/b/a Healthsouth Sea Pines Rehabilitation Hospital (U.S. Mail) Richard Joseph Saliba Assistant General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Facilities Intake Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail)
The Issue Petitioner's charge of discrimination alleges that the Orange County School Board discriminated against her on account of her age and race when the school board dismissed her in July 1994. Although the school board told her that she was dismissed because she did not have a college degree, allegedly another (white) employee without a degree was not dismissed. Petitioner alleges that, in violation of policy, the school board did not assist her to find another position and that since her dismissal younger employees were hired in positions in which she could have worked. The issue in this case is whether Petitioner was discriminated against, as alleged, and if so, what relief is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Ada J. Sims is an African-American female born October 28, 1934. She resides in Orlando, Orange County, Florida. During the 1993/94 school year, Ms. Sims was employed as an occupational specialist by the Orange County School Board (OCSB). She was assigned to Cypress Creek High School. Ms. Sims worked for the OCSB for 26 years; the first 4 or 5 were in clerical positions, and the last 22 years were as an occupational specialist at various schools. Ms. Sims does not have a college degree. Sometime during the 1993/94 school year, Ms. Sims was offered and accepted an early retirement opportunity. She expressed her intent to retire effective December 1994. The last day of school was the end of May 1994. At that time Ms. Sims understood that she still had a job at Cypress Creek High School for the beginning of the 1994/95 school year. Sometime during the early summer in 1994, the superintendent of schools and the OCSB realized the need to reduce instructional positions in order to keep expenditures within an available budget. The certification area, "occupational specialist," was identified for the reduction in force. On or about July 19, 1994, Cypress Creek assistant principal Cathy Thompson spoke to Ms. Sims by telephone to inform her that she was no longer employed and that she should call the personnel department for further information. Ms. Sims was upset and called the personnel office. She also visited the office, wrote letters to the school board chairperson and superintendent, and contacted the Classroom Teacher Association. Ms. Sims felt that people were evasive and non-responsive. No one helped her find other employment. Sometime between August and December 1994, Ms. Sims began receiving her retirement benefits. Since then, she has been employed only part-time: briefly for a newspaper and now with Haitian Social Services. In her complaint of discrimination, Ms. Sims is claiming $15,000 in lost wages and $5,000 for "pain and suffering." Mary Bailey is employed by the OCSB Division of Human Resources. A former classroom teacher and principal, she has worked for the OCSB for 33 years. Ms. Bailey was the supervisor for the reduction in force which eliminated Ms. Sims' position. There were approximately 12-15 occupational specialist positions in the OCSB in May 1994. All but 2 or 3 were eliminated. In determining which positions were eliminated the incumbent's job history was reviewed to determine seniority. White and African-American employees were laid off. The only employees retained were those with college degrees who could obtain a teaching certificate and be placed in a regular instructional position. Ms. Sims, without a college degree, did not qualify for this placement. There was no consideration of age or race; the regular OCSB policy and collective bargaining agreement procedures were applied. No one offered Ms. Sims a clerical position or other non-instructional position; she was told she could apply for another position on her own. Elaine Manfriede, the white employee who Ms. Sims claims was retained, found a clerical position on her own. Ms. Manfriede's occupational specialist position was eliminated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter its final order dismissing Ada J. Sims' charge of discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Ronald Blocker Orange County School Board Post Office Box 271 Orlando, Florida 32802 Ada Sims 1601 Crooms Avenue Orlando, Florida 32805 Frank C. Kruppenbacker, Esquire Post Office Box 3471 Orlando, Florida 32801-3471 Dr. Donald Shaw, Orange County Superintendent of Schools Post Office Box 271 445 West Amelia Street Orlando, Florida 33802-0271
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been an employee of HRS for more than seven years. She has cerebral palsy and uses a motorized wheelchair. During her tenure with HRS, she worked initially as a CETA employee under the supervision of Timothy Myers. She was a Social Work Assistant in a para-professional position requiring minimal paperwork. She did very well and had no problems with her supervisor or cc-workers. She received a promotion to the position of AFDC worker under the supervision of Ann Hauckes in October, 1979, and worked in the HRS Suncoast office in St. Petersburg for approximately six months. During that six-month period, she had problems completing the "on-call" and workload responsibilities of an AFDC worker and was placed on conditional status. Due to her unhappiness with her supervisor and her conditional evaluation, she was transferred from the HRS Suncoast office in St. Petersburg to Pinellas Park under the supervision of Theresa Ruppel. Ruppel supervised Petitioner from March, 1980 to January, 1982. Ruppel was instructed by her superiors to give Petitioner a limited caseload so that Petitioner could perform her job duties as an AFDC counselor, and Petitioner was given a specialized caseload of AFDC foster care cases which required limited client contact and the use of small, lightweight files. Petitioner continues to be assigned a minimal workload of substantially less than other AFDC workers. She is evaluated just within her special work assignment and not within the responsibilities of an AFDC worker. When Petitioner first came to Ruppel's unit, she brought with her unfinished "on-call" work which Ruppel had to transcribe for her. During Petitioner's tenure under Ruppel, she served only as a backup "on-call" worker. Ruppel found Petitioner to be a very difficult employee to supervise. Petitioner had emotional outbursts as a worker in Ruppel's unit but received no disciplinary action, even when on one occasion she left the work site after having an emotional outburst and refused to advise the supervisor as to why she was leaving or when she would return to work. After Ruppel transferred out of the Pinellas Park Service Center, Susan Gilbert became Petitioner's supervisor from January, 1982, until January, 1984. The initial working relationship was good. Gilbert rearranged her office so Petitioner's wheelchair moved easily within it. Gilbert assisted Petitioner by updating Petitioner's policy manual, by making an easy reference chart for Petitioner so that every time Petitioner needed something, she did not have to pull out the HRS manual and read it but could just refer to the chart. Gilbert even assisted Petitioner with a case in which the written narrative had been accomplished by Petitioner, by taking the computer document apart, stapling it, and organizing it so it could be put in the filing cabinet. Gilbert also assisted Petitioner in preparing for the recertification test that all AFDC counselors must take. Gilbert made up some exercises to help Petitioner take the test. She allowed Petitioner 8 hours in which to take the 4 hour test. When Petitioner failed the test, Gilbert gave her 12 hours in which to take it again. The relationship between Gilbert and Petitioner deteriorated when, in March or April of 1982, Petitioner invited Gilbert, her supervisor, to take two days of annual leave and a weekend to accompany Petitioner to a Miss Wheelchair pageant, an invitation which Gilbert declined because she did not want to have a personal relationship with any person she supervised. The relationship then deteriorated, with Petitioner calling Gilbert a snob for refusing to go to the Miss Wheelchair pageant and accusing Gilbert of not liking her due to her handicap. Thereafter, there were emotional outbursts by Petitioner over minor matters. Petitioner served as a backup "on-call" person under Gilbert until December of 1982, when she was removed because she had complained about the amount of paperwork and she did not want to be "on-call" on Fridays. Petitioner was put back on "on-call" duty in June, 1983, due to Petitioner's complaints, and she worked "on-call" with her friend Frances Whittle who was willing to help Petitioner with those duties until Petitioner was moved out of Gilbert's AFDC Unit in January, 1984. Between January, 1983, and December 5, 1983, Petitioner would not accept authority or supervision from Gilbert. Petitioner questioned every decision Gilbert made. She would leave Gilbert's office upset and come back in a matter of minutes, arguing with her supervisor. The problem in the working relationship between Petitioner and Gilbert resulted in high-level District Administration meetings to determine how to resolve the problem. Initially, in early 1983, the high-level District officials met to determine how they could resolve the conflict, and the Deputy District Administrator suggested transferring Petitioner to the Clearwater AFDC Unit under a new supervisor. Petitioner opposed being moved to the Clearwater office, and so the Department did not move her from Pinellas Park to Clearwater. Both Gilbert and Petitioner agreed to try to resolve any problems on their own. As 1983 went on, the work relationship again deteriorated which again resulted in the District Administrator, Deputy District Administrator, Personnel Officer, Gilbert, Petitioner and the Human Services Program Administrator meeting to see if they could resolve the deteriorated relationship. There was a meeting on December 5, 1983, with those persons and another meeting on December 12, 1983. On December 5, 1983, four options were presented to Petitioner: (1), transferring Gilbert to another unit if HRS could find another supervisor willing to trade positions with her; (2), transferring Petitioner to a position in St. Petersburg under a different AFDC supervisor; (3), allowing Petitioner to work at home and equipping her office at home with all the rehabilitation equipment necessary to do her work, under which option she would only have to be involved with Gilbert once a week to have her work reviewed; and (4) having Petitioner stay at the Pinellas Park office but transferring her supervision away from Gilbert, with Petitioner being supervised long distance by Karen Raym Girard who would then drive, initially from Suncoast in St. Petersburg and, when the Wildwood Service Center opened, from the Wildwood office in St. Petersburg once a week or as often as was needed by Petitioner. Option 4 was the option chosen by Petitioner at the December 12 meeting. 2O. The effective date for the transfer of supervision from Gilbert to Karen Raym Girard was to be effective January 3, 1984. Subsequent to December 12, 1983, but before January 3, 1984, Petitioner changed her mind and did not want option 4. Petitioner requested a third meeting with the District Administrator after she had changed her mind about the option she had selected. The District Administrator declined a third meeting and told Petitioner that she could institute an internal grievance if that is what she wanted to do. When the District Administrator did not have yet another meeting, Petitioner filed an internal HRS grievance. Before the grievance committee met, the transfer of supervision did take place on January 3, 1984. During the period January 3, 1984 until February 10, 1984, Petitioner decided she was being segregated because she was working in the Pinellas Park office but was being supervised by Girard who was located in the Suncoast office in St. Petersburg. Petitioner's feelings of segregation were based upon the fact that she was taken off "on-call" duties in Gilbert's office because she was no longer a member of that unit; her name was removed from Gilbert's bulletin board showing the names of the persons in Gilbert's unit; and there was a sign placed on a vacant office in the building reserving it for Girard to use when her supervision of Petitioner required. While Petitioner was under the supervision of Girard from January 3, 1984, until February 10, 1984, Girard had weekly conferences with Petitioner where Girard would come from St. Petersburg to Pinellas Park to the office assigned to her in the Pinellas Park Service Center. Petitioner told Girard that she wanted Gilbert to be a personal friend with her and associate with her after working hours, and that she felt that Gilbert did not like her because Gilbert did not pursue being a personal friend of hers. During the time that Girard supervised Petitioner, she found Petitioner very difficult to supervise. Petitioner would lose her temper, raise her voice, or lose emotional control. The main issue Petitioner always wanted to discuss with Girard was that she wanted Gilbert to be friends with her. Petitioner did not want to discuss work-related issues with Girard. From February 10, 1984 until August 31, 1984, Petitioner was on extended leave -- annual leave, sick leave, and leave without pay. She never physically transferred to Wildwood in St. Petersburg, although her office furniture was moved there while she was on leave. The HRS internal grievance committee consisted of one member of Petitioner's choosing, one of HRS' choosing, and one agreed upon by both HRS and Petitioner. The internal grievance committee found: that an irreconcilable personality conflict existed between Gilbert and Petitioner; that the conflict was based on Petitioner's desire for a relationship that was personal as well as professional and Gilbert's inability to provide that relationship; that Petitioner did not have any problems with performing her job duties and was rated above satisfactory (it did not mention that Petitioner was only evaluated against her own performance) that considerable efforts were made to try to improve and clarify the relationship between Gilbert and Petitioner; that those efforts were not successful and the situation deteriorated rather than improved; that four options or solutions were discussed with Petitioner; that Petitioner participated in the selection of the option to remain in Pinellas Park but transfer her supervision, and that she agreed to that option; that subsequently she experienced a feeling of segregation and decided that the option was not in her best interest; that due to her physical location and supervision, she was segregated from her unit; that the committee was unable to substantiate any instance of discrimination due to Petitioner's handicap on the part of management; that she had been afforded special accommodations due to her handicap not normally given employees; that Petitioner's proposed solution was to return to her previous unit for a 90-day trial period during which all parties should work to improve the relationship. On February 9, 1984, the internal grievance committee recommended that: Both Petitioner and Gilbert be referred to EAP, Petitioner for counseling and more realistic expectations in dealing with management/employee relationships and Gilbert for sensitivity training in dealing with employees with special needs. Petitioner be physically transferred to Girard's unit when the HRS move to the Wildwood Service Center was made for the following reasons: Petitioner was experiencing segregation which could only be alleviated by physically locating her with the unit of which she was a member. The personality conflict between Gilbert and Petitioner could not be solved. The situation was detrimental to Petitioner's emotional and physical well being. By waiting to relocate Petitioner at the time of the HRS move to Wildwood, she would not be singled out as being moved because of a problem. Moving her when others were also being moved would afford her the opportunity to naturally interrelate with staff experiencing the same action. It was hoped that would facilitate her adjustment to her new service center. The Wildwood facility could easily be made accessible for her and a room could be adapted to her needs. Wildwood is on the Interstate and, therefore could be reached from Petitioner's home within a reasonable time frame. In the future, District Management should make every effort to afford Petitioner treatment consistent with treatment afforded all other employees. Special considerations given in the past had exceeded reasonable accommodation and had led Petitioner to have unrealistic expectations and difficulty in adjusting to the normal work setting. The many special considerations had not been to her benefit and, in fact, had been a disservice to her. On February 23, 1984, Petitioner's position was transferred from Pinellas Park to St. Petersburg. The District Administrator accepted the recommendation of the internal grievance committee and agreed to transfer Petitioner from Pinellas Park to Wildwood in St. Petersburg when Wildwood opened in the spring of 1984. The District Administrator was satisfied that Petitioner could drive from Pinellas Park to St. Petersburg where she had previously worked. Petitioner was very unhappy with the HRS internal grievance committee recommendation because she did not want to be transferred from Pinellas Park to St. Petersburg where she had formerly worked. Her preference at that Point was that the District place her back under the supervision of Gilbert and that they attempt to work out any relationship problems. When Gilbert transferred away from her supervisory position in Pinellas Park to a counseling position in the Central Licensing Unit in June, 1984, HRS offered Petitioner the opportunity of coming back to Pinellas Park with a new supervisor, Lawrence R. Raym. Raym supervised Petitioner from July 1, 1984, until February, 1985. During that time, Petitioner's temper tantrums continued. It was estimated that her caseload only took from 2 to 7 days to accomplish each month. Susan McPhee supervised Petitioner from March of 1985 until September of 1986 and also had problems with Petitioner's general acceptance of supervisory authority. During McPhee's supervision of her there were times when Petitioner would not like what McPhee told her and would abruptly terminate the conference by simply wheeling out of the room in anger. Martin Ademy became Petitioner's supervisor in October of 1986 when this case was initially scheduled for final hearing. Ademy has not had any difficulty in supervising her. Ademy estimates that it should take her between 10 to 12 days a month to do the work assigned to her. Any work she does not complete is assigned to another AFDC counselor. Ademy does not have Petitioner do "on-call" work because, in his opinion, she cannot handle those duties. Although Petitioner has applied for some unidentified promotions which she has not received, there is no evidence that Petitioner is able to perform the duties of those unidentified positions with reasonable accommodations being afforded her. Additionally, some of those positions were at locations to which Petitioner had refused to be transferred. Respondent has not discriminated against Petitioner based upon her handicap and has not retaliated against her in any way. HRS has provided Petitioner with much more than reasonable accommodation. To the extent that HRS has treated Petitioner differently than other employees, it has been through pampering rather than discrimination or retaliation. Petitioner has not suffered any physical or emotional illness as a result of any conduct on the part of Respondent. Although Petitioner testified that her absence from work from February until August, 1984, was due to illness brought on by Respondent's discrimination and retaliation, her testimony is simply untrue. Petitioner became ill while she was on annual leave. The minimal medical attention she received was for long- standing medical problems. Although Petitioner had provided HRS with reports from her doctor indicating her medical problems were work-related, those opinions were not those of her doctor. Rather, those reports were "doctored" by Petitioner herself before she gave them to HRS.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and conclusions of Law, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Respondent has not discriminated or retaliated against Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 9th day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Beverly L. Lassor 6333 81st Avenue North Pinellas Park, Florida 34665 Barbara Ann Dell McPherson, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2255 East Bay Drive Clearwater, Florida 33546 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether PAM 98-01, a small scale amendment to the future land-use map ("FLUM") of the Lee County Comprehensive Plan (the "Lee County Plan" or the "Plan"), changing the future land-use designation of approximately 9.9 acres of land on Pine Island from Rural to Outlying Suburban, complies with the requirements of the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Parties Petitioners, Barbara Dubin and William Dubin, are residents and property owners on Pine Island in the portion of Lee County affected by PAM 98-01. Ms. Dubin testified that she and her husband timely participated in the adoption process and made their objections before the Lee County Local Planning Agency (the "LPA") and the Board. No evidence was offered to contest Ms. Dubin’s testimony on this point. Therefore, the Dubins are each "affected persons" as that term is used in Sections 163.3184(1)(a) and 163.3187(3)(a), Florida Statutes, and have standing to file a petition challenging the adoption of PAM 98-01. Ms. Dubin is a member of the Civic Association and knowledgeable regarding its activities. She testified that the Civic Association has been incorporated as a not-for-profit corporation in the State of Florida for at least the past ten years. The purpose of the Civic Association is the preservation and protection of the environment and quality of life of Pine Island. The Civic Association has between 130 and 160 members, all of whom reside on Pine Island. Ms. Dubin testified that the Civic Association owns land and a building on Pine Island, at the intersection of Pine Island Road and Stringfellow Road, near the 9.9-acre parcel that is the subject of PAM 98-01. The Civic Association uses this building for its meetings, conducted monthly for ten months of the year with a break during the summer months. The Civic Association collects member dues within Lee County, and has a bank account in Lee County. It conducts educational activities, monthly meetings, publishes a monthly newsletter containing educational information concerning Pine Island land-use and quality of life issues, and participates in governmental meetings concerning Pine Island. Through members who spoke on its behalf, the Civic Association participated in the adoption process and objected to PAM 98-01 at the LPA hearing and the Board meeting at which the amendment was adopted. The Civic Association is an "affected person" as that term is used in Sections 163.3184(1)(a) and 163.3187(3)(a), Florida Statutes, and has standing to file a petition challenging PAM 98-01. Respondent, Lee County, is the local government whose land-use plan amendment is at issue in this proceeding. Intervenor, Gregory Eagle, is the owner of the real property that is the subject of PAM 98-01, and has standing to participate as a party in this proceeding. Pine Island The Greater Pine Island Area is located in Lee County west of the City of Cape Coral, south of the open waters of Charlotte Harbor, east of Captiva Island, North Captiva Island and Cayo Costa Island, and north of Sanibel Island. The Greater Pine Island Area consists of Pine Island, Little Pine Island, and the historic community of Matlacha, which is located on the Pine Island Road Causeway across the Matlacha Pass Aquatic Preserve between Little Pine Island and the Lee County mainland. The waters surrounding the Greater Pine Island Area are the waters of the Matlacha Pass Aquatic Preserve to the east, San Carlos Bay to the south, the Pine Island Sound Aquatic Preserve to the west, and Charlotte Harbor to the north. Pine Island is a long, narrow, roughly rectangular island, with the long sides running north and south. The island is roughly 16 miles long and two miles wide. Existing communities and residential development on Pine Island are essentially confined to five parts of the island. At the far north end of the island is the fishing community of Bokeelia, where the Dubins live. A golf course sits just south of Bokeelia. A residential development called Pineland is situated on the island’s northwest coast, between Bokeelia and Pine Island Road. At the center of the island, at the junction of Pine Island Road and Stringfellow Road, is the Pine Island Center, which is the main urban area of the island. A residential development called Flamingo Bay is situated between the Pine Island Center and the south end of the island. At the south end of the island is the small fishing village of St. James City. Matlacha is a small historic village that grew up around the Pine Island Causeway, which was built in the early decades of this century to connect Pine Island to the mainland. Lee County has designated parts of Matlacha as an historic district. Lee County statistics indicate a total of 26,393 acres on Pine Island, 13,693 acres of which are reserved for conservation uses. The existing land-uses of the remaining approximately 12,700 acres are as follows: 6,032 acres are vacant or undeveloped; 3,273 acres are used for active and passive agricultural activities; 2,084 acres are used for residential activities, including 822 acres classified as rural; 138 acres are used for commercial activities; 24 acres are used for industrial activities; and 1,148 acres are allocated for public uses. The current permanent population of Pine Island is 10,511 persons, and the seasonal population is 15,900 persons. There are currently 5,954 dwelling units on Pine Island. In 1990, the population of Pine Island was 7,300 persons, and the number of dwelling units was 5,520. The Lee County Plan recognizes and gives priority to property rights previously granted for about 6,800 additional dwelling units in Policy 14.2.2, set forth infra in the discussion of Transportation Need Projections. Lee County Plan In 1984, Lee County adopted its first official FLUM as an integral part of the Lee County Plan. On that initial FLUM, Intervenor’s property was divided into two land-use categories: Urban Community and Rural. The maximum standard density for the Urban Community designation established by the 1984 Plan was six dwelling units per acre (du/ac). Maximum density for the Rural designation was 1 du/ac. In 1985, the Florida Legislature passed the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. In 1987, the Civic Association hired a professional planner to study the Greater Pine Island Area and prepare recommendations that Lee County could incorporate in its 1989 revision of the Lee County Plan, pursuant to the 1985 legislation. In 1988, the Civic Association issued the resulting study, which provided a description of the population, generalized land-use and zoning patterns, historic and archaeological resources, the area’s transportation network, and the availability of public services such as potable water and sewer facilities as of 1987. The "development suitability" of Intervenor’s property was discussed in relation to the listed items as well as hurricane evacuation and the condition of Pine Island and Stringfellow Roads. The study made extensive recommendations to amend the Lee County Plan, and was used by the Civic Association as the basis for initiating amendment PAM/T 88-07 to the Lee County Plan. Lee County staff analyzed and evaluated the recommendations of the study, and incorporated many of them into the 1988/89 update of the Lee County Plan, including what is now Goal 14 relating to Greater Pine Island. As to the property at issue in this proceeding, staff recommended that the land-use category be changed to all Rural. The FLUM was indeed amended to include all of the subject property in the Rural category. William Spikowski, who was the Lee County planner in charge of preparing the 1988/89 update to the Lee County Plan, testified that the intent was to limit most industrial and commercial development on the island to the Pine Island Center, which was given the Urban Community designation allowing the greatest number of mixed and nonresidential uses. Mr. Spikowski testified that the lines around this area were tightly drawn to clearly separate urban from rural uses, with some exceptions where the intensities "stepped down" to recognize existing development. PAM 98-01 Since about 1992, Intervenor has owned 58 acres of vacant land approximately 3/4 of a mile south of the intersection of Pine Island Road and Stringfellow Road. The 9.9-acre property that is the subject of PAM 98-01 is a portion of this 58-acre parcel, and is currently zoned CC and CG, both commercial zoning designations. The 58-acre parcel has been considered for a change in land-use classification three times since 1989, when it was excluded from the adjacent urban center of Pine Island and given a Rural designation. This parcel was the only commercially-zoned property adjacent to the urban center that was excluded from the urban center in 1989. Prior to 1989, as noted above, the subject parcel was designated as Urban Community in the Lee County Plan. The change of the parcel from Urban Community to Rural in 1989 was not challenged at the time it was adopted. On two prior occasions, the Board has considered but not approved proposals that would have returned the full 58-acre parcel to an urban land-use designation; on another occasion, the Board rejected a proposal that would have effectively locked the parcel out of any urban use designation. Greg Stuart, an expert in land-use planning who sits on the LPA, testified that the county’s concern with the earlier proposals was a reluctance to change the entire 58-acre parcel to an urban land-use and thus increase population capacity on the island. PAM 98-01 was in part an attempt to satisfy this concern by proposing a change for a smaller portion of the tract, and to the least intense urban use available. Matt Noble, Lee County’s principal planner, also testified that he believed the smaller area and less intense classification were factors in the Board’s decision to approve PAM 98-01. He added that another factor in the Board's approval of PAM 98-01 was that this property "appears to have been singled out" in the 1988 amendment cycle, in that it was the only commercially-zoned property adjacent to the Pine Island Center not to have been included in the Pine Island Center. Immediately south of the 58 acre parcel is a vacant Rural designated parcel with AG-2 and RM-2 zoning. South of this vacant parcel are three parcels (two Rural designated, one Wetlands designated) owned by the Greater Pine Island Water Association. The Water Association has constructed a reverse osmosis ("RO") plant on one of the Rural parcels. Immediately south of the RO plant site is the Island Acres Subdivision, with a Rural designation. On June 5, 1995, the Board approved a rezoning of this property to RPD, which permits the development of 31 single-family residential dwellings on lots ranging from just over one acre to just over 1/2 acre, the excavation of a 12.23-acre lake, and an 8.55-acre wetland preserve area. As of the submission of the Staff Report on April 13, 1999, the internal roads of Island Acres Subdivision had been constructed but no dwellings had yet been built. Immediately east of Intervenor’s 58-acre parcel are vacant lands designated Rural and Wetlands. To the west is Stringfellow Road, and on the west side of Stringfellow Road is a 134-acre vacant parcel designated Rural. Additional vacant land designated Rural is on the west side of Stringfellow Road. To the north of and abutting Intervenor’s 58-acre parcel is a developed property with a Huntington Bank building. This property is zoned CC and CG, and is split between Urban Community and Rural land-use designations. To the north of the Huntington Bank parcel is a Winn-Dixie Shopping Center, zoned C-1A and located within the Urban Community of Pine Island Center. In summary, while Intervenor’s parcel is the only commercially-zoned property adjacent to the Pine Island Center that does not also have an Urban land-use designation, it is also the case that the only urban or commercial development in the vicinity is to the north of Intervenor’s property, with the exception of the RO plant. Mr. Noble testified that Intervenor’s parcel is served by public services at least to the same extent as the nearby properties included in the Pine Island Center designation. Mr. Noble agreed that the Staff Report’s notation that there is no sewer service available to Intervenor’s property was not a unique characteristic of this property; in fact, there is no central sewer service on Pine Island that property owners at large may tap into. As noted above, there are over 600 acres of land in the Greater Pine Island Area with commercial zoning. This acreage includes vacant land in the Pine Island Center with a current land-use designation of Urban Community, which indicates "a mixture of relatively intense commercial and residential uses," "distinctly urban" but developed at "slightly lower intensities." PAM 98-01 would change the land-use designation of Intervenor’s vacant 9.9-acre parcel from Rural to Outlying Suburban, increasing the permissible residential density from 1 du/ac to 3 du/ac, an increase of 20 dwelling units, assuming the entire parcel is developed residentially. Intervenor’s application proposed 25,000 square feet of commercial development on three acres of the parcel, and 21 dwelling units on the remaining acreage. The Staff Report pointed out, however, that Lee County cannot condition the requested change in land-use designations to limit development potential to this proposed scenario. Therefore, the Staff Report applied the most intensive scenario of retail commercial uses that could occur on the property. At the hearing, Mr. Noble, Lee County’s lead planner on this application, testified that while the staff’s conclusions were based on commercial uses, the residential aspects of the project were also evaluated in the section of the Staff Report dealing with population accommodation. The Staff Report concluded as follows: The subject property has had quite a long history concerning it’s [sic] future land-use designation. The property’s owners have consistently been requesting an increase in density and intensity, while the citizens of Pine Island, just as consistently, have been opposed. This request is the smallest in area to date, with the least intensive increase in density and intensity. The owner argues that, under the current designation, the property is not developable. This contention would appear to be invalid, given the development of the Island Acres subdivision, immediately to the south of the RO plant. Pine Island is a unique place with considerable constraints to development as an urban area. With no increase in land-use designation, the level of service on Pine Island Road and Stringfellow Road will operate below the adopted standard before the year 2020. The thresholds established by Policy 14.2.2 will be exceeded by the year 2005. Limited access and it’s [sic] location in regards to hurricane vulnerability make it difficult to entertain or justify increases in density and/or intensity. There are ample areas currently designated on the island to accommodate the proposed development scenario. The full range of urban services, such as sanitary sewer and mass transit, are not and will not be available to this site. This would be the first land-use amendment on Pine Island since the 1988 Pine Island Land-use Study was incorporated into the Lee Plan. Even though a considerable amount of time has passed since the study’s completion, few changes in the condition of the island have occurred. Staff concludes that there are viable uses allowed on this property. Staff can see no compelling reason to support this proposed land-use amendment. While the impact of ten acres changing from a Rural designation to the Outlying Suburban category, when looked at on a county wide basis, is minimal, the unique circumstances on Pine Island do not support this change. The LPA voted against adoption of PAM 98-01 by a vote of 4-1, with two members (including Mr. Stuart, who worked on the project for Intervenor) abstaining. The LPA adopted the findings of fact set forth in the Staff Report, and added its concern with maintaining the current line of separation between urban and suburban uses. One LPA member did comment that "if there is another shopping center site on Pine Island, it’s probably this property," and in the "long run" there may be a need for another shopping center on Pine Island. The Board voted 3-2 to adopt PAM 98-01, finding that "the request would result in minimal impacts to such services as transportation, public safety, schools, and population accommodation." The petition filed by Petitioners, as amended, raised the following issues of fact and law: Data and Analysis: that PAM 98-01 is unsupported by data and analysis for increased residential and commercial designation on Pine Island and thus is not in compliance with Section 163.3177(8) & (10)(e), Florida Statutes, and Rules 9J- 5.005(2), 9J-5.006(2)(b) & (c), and 9J- 5.006(5)(a) & (g), Florida Administrative Code. Coastal Hazard: that PAM 98-01 is not in compliance with Section 163.3178(2), Florida Statutes, and Rules 9J-5.006(2), 9J- 5.012(3), and 9J-5.012(3)(b)6., Florida Administrative Code, because it directs population to the known or predictable coastal high hazard area. Land-use Suitability: that PAM 98-01 is unsupported by data and analysis supporting the suitability of land for increased residential density or intensity of commercial development and thus is not in compliance with Section 163.3177(6)(a), Florida Statutes, and Rules 9J-5.006(2), 9J- 5.006(2)(b), and 9J-5.006(5)(a) & (g), Florida Administrative Code. Internally Inconsistent: that PAM 98-01 is internally inconsistent with the following Lee County Plan goals, objectives, and policies: Policy 5.1.2 prohibiting residential development where physical constraints or hazards exist, or requiring the density and design to be adjusted accordingly. Constraints or hazards include flood, storm, or hurricane hazards, and environmental limitations. Goal 14 requiring that the management of growth on Pine Island maintain the island’s unique natural resources and character, and insure that island residents and visitors have a reasonable opportunity to evacuate when a hurricane strike is imminent. Objective 14.1 requiring that Pine Island have no unnecessary loss of native upland vegetation or habitat. Policy 14.2.2, set out in full above, concerning future development regulations to limit future development approvals when traffic reaches certain thresholds. Objective 14.3 requiring that county regulations, policies and discretionary actions to recognize "certain unique characteristics" of Greater Pine Island justifies different treatment of existing and future residential areas than in mainland Lee County. Goal 75 protecting human life and developed property from natural disasters. Objective 75.1 and Policies 75.1.2 and 75.1.4 concerning densities in coastal high hazard areas. Objective 77.2 and Policies 77.2.3 and 77.2.6 concerning protection of natural plant communities. Policy 77.4.4 restricting the use of protected plant and wildlife species habitat to that which is compatible with the requirements of endangered and threatened species and species of special concern. Policy 77.8.1 concerning the protection of gopher tortoise burrows. Goal 79 and Objectives 79.1 and 79.2 concerning evacuation times and shelter capacity. Inconsistent with State Plan: that PAM 98-01 is inconsistent with Section 187.201(7)(b)23, Florida Statutes, which concerns protecting life and property from natural disasters such as hurricanes, and Section 187.201(10)(a), Florida Statutes, which concerns protecting natural habitats and ecological systems. Suitability In 1989, Lee County’s Department of Community Development prepared the Pine Island Commercial Study, in response to a general directive by the Board to develop a means of identifying future commercial sites throughout Lee County, and in direct response to issues emerging from the review of two specific commercial zoning cases on Pine Island. The Commercial Study was initiated to research, analyze, and quantify commercial zoning needs for Pine Island, and then identify suitable locations for potential future development. The Commercial Study concluded that in 1989 there were over 600 acres of commercially-zoned property on Pine Island, and that this acreage was "far in excess of any possible need, even at build-out, of Pine Island." The study went on to say: However, it is recognized that not all the lands currently zoned commercially are in advantageous locations, nor are they in appropriate land-use categories. In fact, properties in locations with strong market demand and good transportation access and suitable lot sizes are relatively limited. The Commercial Study also concluded that much of the land already zoned for commercial use was zoned C-1 and C-1A, "carryover" categories from older Lee County ordinances based on "pyramid" zoning, i.e., they also allowed residential uses. The study found that the most desirable solution to this problem would be to rezone these properties to non-commercial categories, but recognized the prohibitive cost of such a "relatively massive undertaking." It recommended the more practical option of modifying zoning regulations to make it clear that retail commercial uses can only be located within "designated commercial nodes," regardless of their zoning categories. The Commercial Study also concluded that additional retail uses would be needed on Pine Island as the population grows, although current uses were adequate to meet existing needs "until the year 2000," and that commercial development should be concentrated in the Pine Island Center, with possible convenience store sites at St. James City and Bokeelia. Approximately 236 acres were identified in the Commercial Study as appropriate commercial areas. The Commercial Study stated that this was more than four times the amount needed for 1990 retail and general commercial uses. Mr. Spikowski testified that it is typical for more property to be zoned commercial than is actually needed, because land owners are attempting to maximize the value of their property. He testified that a "slight surplus," in the range of 15 to 25 percent, is appropriate to avoid giving a few land owners a monopoly on future development. The property at issue in this proceeding was not included in the 236 acres deemed appropriate for commercial development. Despite several efforts from 1990 through 1993, no amendment establishing these commercial nodes was ever adopted by the Board. Ultimately, the Civic Association itself withdrew its support for the commercial nodes plan, stating that the plan as proposed would promote commercial strip development and commercial sprawl. In 1993, the Board adopted Policy 14.4.3, which would have required Lee County staff to update the Commercial Study in 1995. However, no such update was ever undertaken, and in 1998 the Board amended the Lee County Plan to delete Policy 14.4.3. The staff report recommending deletion of the policy noted that current demand for commercial sites had been minimal and did not warrant a full scale update of the Commercial Study, and concluded that the 1989 Commercial Study was "still a current document" not in need of an update. The Lee County Plan incorporates a "planning community" concept through an overlay, commonly referred to as the "FLUM 2020 Overlay," that establishes certain acreage allocations for uses that can occur within 20 discrete planning areas before the year 2020. Pine Island is one of these planning areas. The FLUM 2020 Overlay is intended to allocate development throughout the county and prevent excessive development in particular land-use categories beyond the projected need. The FLUM 2020 Overlay allocates development on Pine Island through the year 2020 as follows: Category Allocation (in acres) Intensive Development (for Residential Development) 5 Urban Commercial (for Residential Development) 526 Suburban (for Residential Development) 636 Outlying Suburban (for Residential Development) 466 Rural (for Residential Development) 1,129 Outer Island (for Residential Development) 37 Wetlands (for Residential Development) 88 Commercial 165 Industrial 64 j. Public 1,722 k. Active Agriculture 2,313 l. Passive Agriculture 960 m. Conservation 13,693 n. Vacant 4,586 Total 26,390 Below this list of allocations is a table called "Non Regulatory Allocations," which shows a total of 26,393 acres, slightly different from the total derived above. The "Non Regulatory Allocations" table lists 13,738 acres as conservation lands, leaving 12,700 acres. An additional 4,586 acres are designated "Vacant" in the "Non Regulatory Allocations," but their land-use designation is not identified. The FLUM 2020 Overlay provides for 165 acres of commercial development on Pine Island by the year 2020. Mr. Spikowski testified that Lee County’s database indicated that as of 1997 there were 138 acres developed commercially on Pine Island, leaving a need of 27 acres of vacant land for commercial development before the year 2020. Mr. Noble, the principal planner for Lee County, testified that his conclusion, reflected in the Staff Report, was that there is no need for additional commercial or urban lands on Pine Island, and that approval of PAM 98-01 would cause unnecessary commercial development on Pine Island. He testified that these conclusions were largely based on the findings of the 1989 Commercial Study of Pine Island. Mr. Noble also testified that, despite his conclusion as to the lack of need for commercial development, the FLUM 2020 Overlay allocates sufficient acreage to accommodate the property involved in PAM 98-01 without requiring an amendment to the overlay. Mr. Noble testified that no effort was made to update the findings of the 1989 study, because none was needed. He testified that there has been very little rezoning or development activity on Pine Island since 1989 aside from some clearing for agricultural uses, and therefore the 1989 study represents the best available data. Mr. Spikowski agreed with this assessment, testifying that while the 1989 study is somewhat out of date, it still provides good information on how much commercial development is needed to serve the community. Mr. Spikowski testified that the study still provides more information than exists for other parts of Lee County regarding the relationship between commercial development and commercial zoning. Mr. Noble admitted that the county’s capabilities in collecting and categorizing data have improved since 1989, but did not agree that revising the study would result in improved information, because the county’s zoning information is so inaccurate that one could not rely on the existing land-use data base to update the study. Thus, despite the fact that the county’s data base is now linked to the property appraiser’s records on a parcel by parcel basis, an accurate revision of the study would require verification of each parcel, and the lack of activity on Pine Island indicated to Mr. Noble that such an expenditure of resources was not needed to assess this application. Mr. Noble testified that the staff recommendation against approval was not a statement that approval of PAM 98-01 would be illegal. Mr. Noble also agreed there was a difference between opining that there is no need for more commercial and urban classifications, and holding that more such classifications are not allowed. He attended the meeting at which the Board approved the amendment, and believed the Board understood staff’s presentation and considered all relevant information in arriving at its decision. Mr. Noble testified that the Lee County Plan is currently in compliance with all applicable legal requirements, and he did not think that PAM 98-01 would place the plan out of compliance. Mr. Stuart, Intervenor’s planner, testified that once he began to understand that Lee County staff had concerns with overcommercialization of Pine Island based on the 1989 study, he took a hard look at that data. He testified that the 602 acres of commercial property set out in the Commercial Study did not appear correct "when you look at the map." Mr. Stuart testified that he performed a specific land- use study using the Lee County Division of Planning geographic information system resources. Mr. Stuart began by looking at the 1989 study, and noted that no information was available to show how the county derived the 602-acre figure. The only thing available in the county’s files was a single sheet aggregating the numbers into a total, without explanation of how the constituent numbers were derived. Mr. Spikowski, who was Lee County’s head planner in 1989, testified that the 602-acre figure was calculated "very carefully," but offered no detail to illumine that conclusory statement. Mr. Stuart testified that, though he suspected the total was inflated, he assumed that it was reasonably accurate for purposes of his analysis. Mr. Stuart considered the currently expected population of Pine Island based upon currently available data, the county’s planning conversion ratio of 2.09 persons per household on Pine Island, the county’s conversion ratio adjusting Pine Island’s population for seasonal residents, and then calculated the projected need for commercial development expressed in acres, using the same ratios that Lee County uses in planning for this purpose. Mr. Stuart also developed a computer table, with the assistance of county staff, of all the commercially-zoned property on Pine Island. He then adjusted the output to correct data entry errors and approximated the commercial acreage determined to be available in the 1989 Commercial Study. Mr. Stuart next examined the properties parcel by parcel to delete those commercially-zoned properties that have already been put to non-commercial use, that are wetlands unlikely to be commercially developed, that are in use as public facilities, and those that may not be developed because they are designated with outdated zoning categories that are restricted under the Lee County Land Development Code. This process derived an estimate of the number of commercially-zoned acres on Pine Island that are either in commercial use or are available for commercial use. Mr. Stuart’s analysis concluded that there is actually a deficit on Pine Island of 69 acres of commercially-zoned property that may as a practical matter be put to commercial use, when the projected demand for such property to serve the projected population of Pine Island is taken into account. In summary, it is found that Petitioners failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the increase in residential density and commercial intensity contemplated by PAM 98-01 is not suited to accommodate the population of Pine Island. The most conservative estimate rendered by the data and analysis indicates a need for an additional 27 acres of commercial development. No amendment of the FLUM 2020 Overlay is needed to effect this small-scale FLUM amendment. Mr. Stuart’s analysis is credited to the extent it supports a finding of substantial need. Petitioners offered no competent substantial evidence regarding residential allocations and the lack of any need for additional residential density, and thus failed to overcome the presumption that the Board’s action in adopting PAM 98-01 was correct on this point. Transportation Vehicular access from the mainland to Pine Island is provided solely by way of Pine Island Road, a two-lane road that proceeds over Matlacha Pass, through the Matlacha community, and over Little Pine Island by a series of bridges and causeways. North/south access on Pine Island is by way of Stringfellow Road, a two-lane road that runs from the community of Bokeelia at the north end of Pine Island to the community of St. James City at the south end of Pine Island. William Spikowski, a planner who testified on behalf of Petitioners, stated that widening the narrow, two-lane Pine Island Road to accommodate more traffic would be at best a difficult and expensive proposition. He testified that the right-of-way through most of the Matlacha community is only about 66 feet wide, and the buildings are often located directly adjacent to the right-of-way. He testified that if the right-of- way were widened to 90 feet to accommodate extra lanes, 75 buildings would have to be removed and several other businesses would lose their parking lots. Mr. Spikowski concluded that Pine Island Road is the biggest limitation on the island’s development. The Lee County Plan designates Pine Island Road as a constrained roadway as it passes through Matlacha, due to the narrow right-of-way and scenic, aesthetic, and environmental considerations. Matt Noble, a Lee County planner, testified that there were no improvements scheduled for Pine Island Road for the next three years, and that the road is projected to operate at Level of Service "F" in the year 2020 based on the applicant’s analysis. Level of Service "F" is below the standard adopted by the Lee County Plan. Mr. James Banks, a professional engineer expert in transportation engineering and planning, testified that the predictive methodology employed by county staff, i.e., assuming no road improvements while loading the system with future traffic demands, would result in a Level of Service "F" rating for nearly every major roadway in Lee County for the year 2020. He testified that this was an improper method for reviewing development permits. Mr. Banks testified that the proper method is to look at the roadway’s capacity at the time of the development application to determine whether there is available capacity today. If there is no capacity available, then the developer must devise a way to mitigate the impact, alleviating any degradation below the road’s adopted level of service. The permitting system is "first come, first serve," meaning that if the capacity is available today, then the permit is issued. Mr. Banks testified that there is no data indicating that the capacity of Pine Island Road will be exceeded by the year 2005. The sole hurricane evacuation route from the Greater Pine Island Area is by way of Stringfellow Road to Pine Island Road, then north on Burnt Store Road. Burnt Store Road is also the evacuation route for the City of Cape Coral. Several Pine Island residents testified as to their concerns that any increase in development on the island will further compromise the ability to evacuate the island in the event of a hurricane. There are no hurricane shelters on Pine Island, and no public services on the island during hurricanes. The Lee County Staff Report for PAM 98-01 raised similar concerns, concluding that the applicant is "seeking to increase density thereby increasing the number of persons at risk, impacting evacuation routes and shelter space." At the hearing, Matt Noble, Lee County’s principal planner and the lead planner working on the Staff Report, testified that the quoted statement in the Staff Report assumed that the development on the 9.9-acre parcel would be residential. He further testified that commercial development of the property would have no effect on evacuation times, which are based on the number of residents attempting to leave the island. Mr. Noble’s testimony on this point conflicts somewhat with the Staff Report’s statement that the application was reviewed using the most intensive scenario of retail commercial uses occurring on the property. However, given that the proposed plan amendment could not limit the development that could ultimately be requested on the property, it was not arbitrary for the county staff to consider both residential and commercial uses as potential development scenarios. James Banks, Intervenor’s transportation planning expert, testified that if residential demand on Pine Island exceeds the capacity of commercial development to satisfy it, there would be an increase in traffic on Pine Island Road as residents leave the island to do their basic shopping. Conversely, if enough commercial development occurs on the island to consume the residential demands, the number of off-island trips would be reduced. Mr. Noble agreed that there might be an increase in trips off the island if there were insufficient commercial development to serve the residents on Pine Island. He testified that there is a planning principle supporting integrated and coordinated land-use development, and part of that principle is to capture as many trips as close to residential development as possible to avoid urban sprawl. Mr. Noble testified that the Board considered this principle in its deliberations, and that one Commissioner expressly stated that having additional commercial capacity on Pine Island might improve the transportation flow on Pine Island Road by decreasing the number of trips off the island. Policy 14.2.2 of the Lee County Plan states as follows: In order to recognize and give priority to the property rights previously granted by Lee County for about 6,800 additional dwelling units, the county shall consider for adoption development regulations which address growth on Pine Island and which implement measures to gradually limit future development approvals. The effect of these regulations would be to appropriately reduce certain types of approvals at established thresholds prior to the adopted level-of- service standard being reached, as follows: When traffic on Pine Island Road between Burnt Store Road and Stringfellow Boulevard reaches 810 peak hour, annual average two-way trips, the regulations shall provide restrictions on further rezonings which would increase traffic on Pine Island Road. When traffic on Pine Island Road between Burnt Store Road and Stringfellow Boulevard reaches 910 peak hour, annual average two-way trips, the regulations shall provide restrictions on the further issuance of residential development orders (pursuant to the Development Standards Ordinance), or other measures to maintain the adopted level of service, until improvements can be made in accordance with this plan. Lee County has not actually adopted regulations restricting rezonings and/or development orders based upon the 810/910 peak hour traffic thresholds on Pine Island Road between Burnt Store and Stringfellow Roads. Mr. Noble testified that the main reason for the adoption of Policy 14.2.2 was the county’s concerns regarding hurricane evacuation. He agreed that, even if the prescribed regulations had been adopted, they would restrict rezonings and development orders, not amendments to the comprehensive plan. Mr. Noble testified that the 810 and 910 vehicle limits are not standard calculations derived by the Department of Transportation, and cannot be mathematically derived from any planning model. Mr. Spikowski testified that the 810 and 910 vehicle per hour thresholds were based on roughly 80 percent and 90 percent, respectively, of the level of service proposed by either the Civic Association or Lee County staff at the time of the policy’s adoption. He further testified that the 810 trip per hour threshold has already been reached. James Banks, Intervenor’s expert in transportation planning, agreed with Mr. Noble that the 810 and 910 vehicle limits were essentially arbitrary thresholds adopted by the Board, and further testified that these thresholds are unrelated to the actual capacity of the road. Mr. Banks testified that Lee County’s own Concurrency Management Inventory and Projections indicate that the actual capacity of Pine Island Road between Burnt Store and Stringfellow Roads is 2,170 vehicles per hour at Level of Service "E", and that the road is currently operating at Level of Service "A," the highest designation. Mr. Banks testified that under any possible development scenario involving the parcel at issue in this proceeding, the impact would be no worse than Level of Service "B" for this portion of Pine Island Road, still well below the road's capacity. In summary, Petitioners failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that PAM 98-01 will compromise evacuation of Pine Island in the event of a hurricane, or that the development that might ultimately be allowed pursuant to the Outlying Suburban designation will strain the operating capacity of Pine Island Road in the critical areas described above. Even assuming the additional traffic generated will push trips per hour beyond the 810 threshold and toward the 910 trip per hour threshold, Policy 14.2.2 by its terms places no restrictions on development; rather, it provides that the Board will consider adopting development regulations "to gradually limit future development approvals." Coastal High Hazard Area Closely related to the transportation and evacuation concerns is the issue of development limitations on barrier islands such as Pine Island. Goal 75 of the Lee County Plan and its implementing objectives and policies addresses development in coastal high- hazard areas. Objective 75.1 limits new development on barrier islands to densities that meet required evacuation standards, and states that allowable densities for undeveloped areas within the coastal high hazard areas will be considered for reduction. Mr. Noble testified that other Outlying Suburban lands and proposed residential development on Pine Island have been found to comply with Objective 75.1, but that there have only been a "couple" of such projects due to the sparse development activity on the island. Policy 75.1.2 prohibits rezonings to allow higher densities on barrier and coastal islands if the capacity of critical evacuation routes would be exceeded. Mr. Spikowski conceded that approval of three homes per acre on the seven acres proposed for residential development by Intervenor would not exceed the Lee County Plan’s stated evacuation times, but argued that taking a narrow view of this project in a vacuum is "the antithesis of planning," which calls for a view of the "big picture" rather than the individual project. Policy 75.1.4 states that density reductions for undeveloped areas within the coastal high-hazard areas will be considered, but does not require such reductions. In 1993, the Florida Legislature amended Section 163.3178(2)(h), Florida Statutes, to require that coastal elements of comprehensive plans designate "coastal high-hazard areas," defined as Category One evacuation zones, i.e., areas that must be evacuated for a Category One hurricane. Rule 9J- 5.003(17), Florida Administrative Code, was subsequently amended to reflect the statutory change. Petitioners contend that PAM 98-01 cannot be adopted at this time because the Lee County plan amendments defining the coastal high hazard area have not been finally adopted. Petitioners contend that adoption of PAM 98-01 would violate Rule 9J-5.002(8), Florida Administrative Code, which provides: Effect of Rule Amendments. No amendment to this chapter shall have the effect of causing plans or plan amendments which were adopted prior to the effective date of the amendment to become not in compliance. Minimum criteria contained in any amendment to this chapter shall be addressed in the first subsequent transmitted plan amendment which is directly related to or requires the application of those criteria. Petitioners contend that the quoted rule provision operates to give effect only to such plan amendments dealing with potential "coastal high-hazard areas" as were adopted prior to the amendment of Rule 9J-5.003(17), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners argue that until the mandated definitions are finally adopted, PAM 98-01 would render the Lee County Plan out of compliance. Petitioners' reading of the quoted rule is strained and not persuasive. They are correct that the first sentence operates to grandfather plan amendments adopted prior to a given rule amendment. The language of the second sentence requires the local government to address rule amendments "in the first subsequent transmitted plan amendment." By its terms, the rule would have the practical effect of prohibiting interim plan amendments dealing with the subject matter of the rule amendments, as urged by Petitioners, because such an interim plan amendment would by definition not be the "first subsequent transmitted amendment." However, the second sentence does not address the situation presented here, of a small-scale plan amendment that is not formally "transmitted" to the Department of Community Affairs for review pursuant to Section 163.3184(3), Florida Statutes. "Transmittal" of a plan amendment triggers an array of procedural requirements that Section 163.3187(1)(c), Florida Statutes, is specifically designed to avoid. Petitioners’ argument on this point would effectively tie the small-scale plan amendment process irrevocably to the more cumbersome "large-scale" amendment process each time the Department of Community Affairs chooses to amend Chapter 9J-5, Florida Administrative Code, in such a way as to require compliant local plan amendments. This would defeat the Legislature’s purpose in disengaging small-scale amendments from many of the formalities of the plan amendment process. In any event, no party to this proceeding seriously contended that the property in question in fact lies outside of the coastal high-hazard area. The Staff Report, while acknowledging that the property is not yet "technically included" in the coastal high-hazard area, expressly treated the property as if it were, applying Goal 75 of the Lee County Plan in its analysis of the project. The Intervenor did not contest this treatment. These findings of fact accept that the subject property lies within the coastal high-hazard area, and that the property was treated by both Lee County staff and the Board as lying within the coastal high-hazard area, rendering moot Petitioners’ procedural arguments regarding the formal adoption of the new statutory definition. In summary, Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that PAM 98-01 does not comply with statutory, rule, or Lee County Plan provisions dealing with development in coastal high-hazard areas. Natural Resources Intervenor’s 9.9 acre parcel, a pine flatwood community dominated by slash pine in the canopy with an understory of saw palmetto and other upland species, contains protected plants and animals. Uniformly distributed over the parcel are 551 beautiful pawpaws, as counted in the survey of the property conducted by Boylan Environmental Consultants on behalf of Intervenor. Petitioners did not dispute this count of the beautiful pawpaws on the site. The beautiful pawpaw has been designated an endangered species by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and the Florida Game and Freshwater Fish Commission (now called the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission). Lee County has designated the beautiful pawpaw as a protected species. Beautiful pawpaws are small plants with deep tubers, and are difficult to relocate. The beautiful pawpaws on the 9.9- acre parcel are currently healthy and viable. Intervenor’s 9.9-acre parcel also contains 10 active, 21 inactive, and 22 abandoned gopher tortoise burrows, as counted by Boylan Environmental Consultants and not disputed by Petitioners. Gopher tortoises are listed as a species of special concern by the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, and are listed as a protected species by Lee County. Gopher tortoise burrows are also appropriate habitat for indigo snakes and gopher frogs, both of which are listed as protected species by Lee County. Betsie Newton Hiatt, a senior environmental planner with Lee County and an expert in environmental planning, testified that she made a "cursory inspection" of the subject property and observed the beautiful pawpaws and gopher tortoise burrows on the site. She did not actually count the plants or burrows, but testified that she observed enough to consider the counts made by Boylan Environmental Consultants to be accurate. Ms. Hiatt testified that a management plan would be necessary prior to development of the parcel, and that it would be possible to submit a detailed management plan meeting all Lee County Land Development Code requirements for property that has beautiful pawpaws and gopher tortoise burrows and that lies within an Outlying Suburban land-use category. Ms. Hiatt testified that part of her duties is the implementation of Policy 77.2.6 of the Lee County Plan, which requires avoidance of needless destruction of upland vegetation communities through consideration during the site plan review process of alternative layouts of permitted uses. She testified that this policy is implemented in the Lee County Land Development Code through open space and indigenous preservation requirements. She finally testified that it would be possible to meet the open space requirement while developing the parcel at issue in this proceeding. Ms. Hiatt testified that the policy requires that approximately one third of the beautiful pawpaws found on a site be preserved in place, one third may be relocated in preservation areas, and one third may be removed. She testified that the open space requirement for commercial use of a 9.9-acre site would be about three acres, and that about 380 beautiful pawpaws could survive in this area. This would be about 69 percent of the 551 beautiful pawpaws found on the site, slightly more than the requisite two-thirds that must be preserved. Rae Ann Boylan, the expert in environmental land-use planning whose company performed the species survey on the property, testified that allowing the site to lay fallow would be as bad for the beautiful pawpaws as development, because other shrubs would eventually overgrow them without management of the site. Ms. Boylan also testified that a management plan would be required prior to development to accommodate the listed species. She testified that Lee County requires a developer to excavate the tortoises that can be found and place them out of harm’s way. She further noted that Policy 77.8.1 of the Lee County Plan provides for off-site mitigation, if unavoidable conflicts make on-site protection of the tortoises infeasible. Policy 5.1.2 of the Lee County Plan prohibits residential development where physical constraints or hazards exist, including hurricane hazards and environmental limitations. Mr. Noble of Lee County testified that residential development has been approved on Pine Island under this policy, and that the decision whether this policy applies to a given project is made at the time of development or site plan approval. Mr. Spikowski agreed that Policy 5.1.2 is a limitation on development, but argued that now is the time to evaluate the matter. He testified that if there are physical constraints or hazards that should stop approval of additional subdivisions on Pine Island, the county should not wait for the development order stage to draw the line. Mr. Spikowski explained that, as a practical matter, the development order stage consists of arguments about the details of the development, not whether it will occur at all. Mr. Spikowski's testimony is credited as a valid statement of planning philosophy, but not as stating a legal barrier to the Board's decision in this matter. In summary, Petitioners failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that PAM 98-01 by its terms will have any adverse impacts on native upland vegetation, wildlife habitat, natural plant communities, or protected plant and wildlife habitat. Even after PAM 98-01 is enacted, the Lee County Plan provisions protecting all these natural resources will remain in place. Any subsequent development will be required to comply with the provisions of the Lee County Plan and the State Comprehensive Plan establishing protection of the resources. Data and Analysis Section 163.3177(8), Florida Statutes, requires that all elements of a comprehensive plan be based upon data appropriate to the element involved. Rule 9J-5.005(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, provides in relevant part: All goals, objectives, policies, standards, findings and conclusions within the comprehensive plan and its support documents, and within plan amendments and their support documents, shall be based upon relevant and appropriate data and the analyses applicable to each element. To be based on data means to react to it in an appropriate way and to the extent necessary indicated by the data available on that particular subject at the time of the adoption of the plan or plan amendment at issue. The local government is not required to engage in original data collection, but the data used must be the best available. Rule 9J-5.005(2)(b) and (c), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 9J-5.006(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code, provides that the Future Land-use Element, including the FLUM and amendments thereto, must include an analysis of the amount of land needed in each category of land-use to accommodate the projected population. This analysis must estimate the gross acreage needed by land-use category and their densities and intensities, and describe the methodology used to arrive at those estimates. The preponderance of the evidence establishes that there was sufficient data and analysis to permit the Board to conclude that PAM 98-01 was justified. As found above, even the most conservative estimate of Mr. Spikowski, the expert retained to oppose the amendment, conceded that the data indicated there remains a need for 27 acres of vacant land for commercial development on Pine Island before the year 2020. The Commercial Study relied upon by Petitioners also concedes that much of the property currently zoned for commercial uses is not in fact appropriate for such uses. The evidence establishes that Lee County itself has historically recognized this fact but has declined to expend the resources needed to update the zoning on Pine Island, largely due to the overall paucity of development activity on the island. The evidence in this proceeding establishes that the property at issue is the only commercially-zoned property adjacent to the Pine Island Center that was not included in that center during the 1989 Plan update process, presumably because it was vacant property at the time. Despite all the testimony regarding properties on Pine Island having inappropriate commercial zonings, not one witness suggested that the property at issue should not be zoned commercially. At least one member of the LPA recognized the appropriateness of this property for development "in the long run," but the LPA voted against the amendment to preserve the clear demarcation between urban and rural uses in the current FLUM. However, even Mr. Spikowski conceded that the clear line between urban and rural uses was compromised at the outset to allow for existing uses, and that the FLUM change contemplated by PAM 98-01 would merely add another "blip" to a line on the map that already contains breaks and changes between urban and rural uses. Mr. Spikowski’s argument that PAM 98-01 would create urban sprawl is thus overstated. PAM 98-01 does not designate uses in excess of demonstrated need. It does not appreciably compromise the clear separation between rural and urban uses. It does not discourage or inhibit infill development. In fact, PAM 98-01 could just as plausibly be said to constitute infill in the vicinity of the Pine Island Center; at the very least, it does not leap over undeveloped lands that are available and suitable for development. The subject property lies between commercial uses to the north and a public facility use, the RO plant, to the south. PAM 98-01 does not fail to protect environmentally sensitive habitat, because the beautiful pawpaws and the gopher tortoise burrows on the site will be dealt with as provided in the Lee County Plan during any subsequent development and site planning of the property. Mr. Spikowski’s ultimate opinion that PAM 98-01 is "illegal" is based on his view, also expressed in the Staff Report, that there is "no compelling reason" to adopt the requested amendment. Mr. Spikowski testified that, because Pine Island has an overallocation of commercial land, anyone wishing to add to the total has "a really high burden to show that this is so much better located than the existing land, or [that] other land should be eliminated in favor of this land, and that burden hasn’t been met." As explained in the conclusions of law below, this is not the standard for judging the legality of a small scale development amendment. Mr. Spikowski’s policy disagreement with the Board’s action has been noted and fully considered, but his judgment that PAM 98-01 is "illegal" cannot be credited. In summary, Petitioners failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that PAM 98-01 is not supported by relevant and appropriate data and analysis as required by Section 163.3177(8), Florida Statutes, and Rule 9J-5.005(2), Florida Administrative Code.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding small scale development amendment PAM 98-01 to be in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas W. Reese, Esquire 2951 61st Avenue, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33712 Thomas L. Wright, Esquire Timothy Jones, Esquire Assistant County Attorneys Lee County, Florida 2115 Second Street Post Office Box 398 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Pete Doragh, Esquire Annis, Mitchell, Cockey, Edwards & Roehn, P.A. Post Office Box 60259 Fort Myers, Florida 33906-6259 Cari L. Roth, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 315 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Steven M. Seibert, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the respective Administrative Complaints, and, if so, whether Petitioner should impose against Respondent an administrative fine, penalty, and survey fee.
Findings Of Fact DOAH Case No. 13-2011: Failure to Properly Train, Supervise, and Perform CPR Pine Tree Manor is licensed by the Agency for Health Care Administration to operate a 24-bed assisted living facility. The facility's license number is 8317, and it expires on November 13, 2014. On February 12, 2013, the date of the incident that provides the basis for the instant action, Aurelia Cristobal was employed as a staff member at the facility operated by Pine Tree Manor. Spanish is Ms. Cristobal's native language, and her ability to speak English is very limited. Brent Sparks, the owner and administrator at Pine Tree Manor, acknowledged, when interviewed as part of the post-incident investigation, that Ms. Cristobal struggles at times with English, especially when under stress. Mr. Sparks was aware of Ms. Cristobal's limitations with English prior to February 12, 2013. Within a few days of B.Y.'s death, Ms. Cristobal left the United States and is believed to be currently living in Mexico. Ms. Cristobal did not testify during the final hearing. For the period June 15, 2011, through June 15, 2013, Ms. Cristobal was certified by the American Safety & Health Institute in the areas of automated external defibrillation (AED), cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), and basic first aid. In the spring of 2011, Ms. Cristobal received training from Pine Tree Manor in the areas of facility emergency procedures and do not resuscitate (DNR) orders. Pine Tree Manor's written emergency procedures provide, in part, as follows: In all emergencies, it is important to remain calm and display a sense of control. Upsetting our residents will only induce undue stress. DIAL "911" EMERGENCY in the following cases: A medical emergency such as serious injuries or life threatening incidences. Fires Bodily harm to staff or residents such as terrorism, robbery, inclement weather. Call the administrator if there is any question concerning injury or illness, a resident is missing, security of facility is in doubt, or inspectors enter the facility. In the case of any significant changes or emergency, call the family, guardian and a health care provider. Also, contact the administrator. In cases of non-emergency need for transportation to the hospital or emergency room, call SUNSTAR AMBULANCE SERVICE @ 530-1234. In all cases, use common sense and remain calm, and remember to contact the administrator if in doubt. Pine Tree Manor's policy regarding DNR orders provides that: In the event a resident with a signed DNR experiences cardiopulmonary arrest, our policy is for staff trained in CPR/AED to withhold resuscitative treatment. Staff will report to the administrator immediately and in turn notify [the] resident's medical providers and resident representative. For example, staff on duty shall call 911 to report the condition, or if on Hospice [place] a call to (727) 586-4432, the Lavender Team Patient Leader. B.Y. became a resident of Pine Tree Manor on or about December 23, 2010. B.Y. did not execute a DNR directive. On February 12, 2013, between the hours of approximately 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., Ms. Cristobal was the only employee on site at Pine Tree Manor. According to J.M., who on February 12, 2013, was a resident at Pine Tree Manor, B.Y. entered a common area of the facility where J.M. and other residents were located. J.M. advised that B.Y. sat on the sofa, and started watching television. While on the sofa, B.Y. stopped breathing. The evidence is inconclusive as to how long B.Y. was incapacitated before others learned of her condition. Although it is not clear from the testimony how Ms. Cristobal was informed of B.Y.'s peril, she did, at some point, learn that B.Y. was incapacitated and was experiencing a medical emergency. After learning of B.Y.'s situation, Ms. Cristobal, according to J.M., became nervous and "didn't know what to do." In fact, Ms. Cristobal was so nervous that she did not call 911, she did not check B.Y. for a pulse, and she did not perform CPR on B.Y. Ms. Cristobal did, however, make several attempts to contact Mr. Sparks. Ms. Cristobal eventually reached Mr. Sparks and advised him of the situation with B.Y. The evidence does not reveal how long B.Y. remained incapacitated before Ms. Cristobal was able to speak with Mr. Sparks. When Mr. Sparks received the call from Ms. Cristobal, he was at his residence in Hillsborough County. Pine Tree Manor is located in Pinellas County. Because Mr. Sparks was in Hillsborough County when he received the call from Ms. Cristobal, he was not able to call 911 and be immediately connected to an emergency operator in Pinellas County. Understanding this limitation, Mr. Sparks called the non-emergency number for the Pinellas County Sheriff's office, who, in turn, contacted the 911 operator and informed them of the emergency. In the course of discussing the emergency situation with Ms. Cristobal, Mr. Sparks learned that she had not called 911. Knowing the emergency nature of the situation and the fact that he could not call Pinellas County 911 directly, Mr. Sparks should have directed Ms. Cristobal to call 911, since she was located in Pinellas County, but he did not. Mr. Sparks should have also instructed Ms. Cristobal to start CPR on B.Y., but he did not. According to the Pinellas County Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Patient Care Report for B.Y., the 911 call was received by the 911 dispatcher at 6:11 p.m. and an EMS unit was dispatched to Pine Tree Manor at 6:12 p.m. The EMS unit arrived at the facility at 6:15 p.m. and commenced treating B.Y. at 6:16 p.m. EMS personnel worked for nearly 30 minutes to revive B.Y., but their efforts were unsuccessful. Richard Sherman (EMT Sherman) is a firefighter and paramedic for the Pinellas Suncoast Fire District. EMT Sherman was the first paramedic to arrive at Pine Tree Manor on the day in question. Upon arrival at the facility, EMT Sherman attempted to enter through the facility's main door, but could not gain immediate entry because the door was locked. EMT Sherman rang the doorbell and knocked on the door in an attempt to gain entry into the facility. Resident J.M. opened the door, and EMT Sherman entered the facility. Upon entry, EMT Sherman noticed that B.Y. was unresponsive on the sofa. He also observed at the same time that there were several residents in B.Y.'s immediate area and that there was no staff present. When EMT Sherman arrived, Ms. Cristobal was in another part of the facility assisting a resident who had become upset because the resident was having difficulty satisfying her toileting needs. Approximately a minute after EMT Sherman started resuscitation efforts on B.Y., Ms. Cristobal appeared in the area where B.Y. was located. Because Ms. Cristobal was wearing scrubs, EMT Sherman correctly identified her as a facility employee. EMT Sherman asked Ms. Cristobal if she knew anything about B.Y. and the circumstances surrounding her collapse. Ms. Cristobal did not respond to EMT Sherman's questions. EMT Sherman testified that Ms. Cristobal, after not responding to his questions, simply "looked at [him] and then turned and walked away" towards the main doors of the facility. While continuing to attempt to resuscitate B.Y., EMT Sherman noticed that Ms. Cristobal appeared to be locking the doors that he had just entered. EMT Sherman instructed Ms. Cristobal several times to not lock the doors because more emergency personnel would soon be arriving. Apparently not understanding EMT Sherman's directives, Mr. Cristobal locked the doors. A few minutes later, district fire chief John Mortellite arrived at the facility. EMT Sherman, while continuing to work on B.Y., heard District Chief Mortellite banging on the locked main doors in an effort to gain entry to the facility. A resident eventually unlocked the doors, and District Chief Mortellite entered the building. When asked why Ms. Cristobal would call him in an emergency situation and not 911, Mr. Sparks explained that it was Ms. Cristobal's practice to always call him in an emergency and that he would, in turn, manage the situation. Mr. Sparks, by allowing Ms. Cristobal "to always call him" in emergency situations instead of 911, created an alternative practice that was directly contrary to the facility's written policy which clearly directs employees to "DIAL '911'" when confronted with a medical emergency. Ms. Cristobal was, therefore, not properly trained. Mr. Sparks, by establishing and, indeed, encouraging a practice that shielded Ms. Cristobal from directly communicating with 911, placed B.Y. in a position where there was an unacceptable delay, though not precisely quantifiable, in contacting emergency personnel on her behalf. In a life or death situation such as that experienced by B.Y., every second matters because, as noted by EMT Sherman, "the longer the delay [in receiving medical treatment] the less probability of a positive outcome." When EMT Sherman arrived at Pine Tree Manor, he was completely unaware of the fact that the only employee on site spoke little, if any English. It is, therefore, reasonable to infer that Mr. Sparks failed to inform either the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office or the 911 operator of Ms. Cristobal's limitations with the English language. By Ms. Cristobal's not calling 911, and Mr. Sparks' not disclosing to the 911 operator that the only employee on site had limited English language skills, decedent B.Y. was placed in the unenviable position of having EMT Sherman's attention divided between resuscitation efforts and worrying about whether Ms. Cristobal was able to comply with his instructions. EMT Sherman testified that Pinellas County EMS, including 911 operators, has protocols in place for dealing with individuals that may not speak English. Had either Mr. Sparks disclosed to the 911 operator Ms. Cristobal's language limitations or had Ms. Cristobal herself called 911, protocols could have been implemented by emergency personnel that would have triggered certain safeguards designed to ensure that Ms. Cristobal's language limitations did not interfere with the delivery of emergency services to B.Y. DOAH Case No. 13-2397: Failure to Remain Generally Aware of the Whereabouts of Resident Most recently, R.D., on September 27, 2010, became a resident of Pine Tree Manor. A demographic data information survey was prepared as part of R.D.'s new resident intake process. R.D.'s intake data showed that he was independent in the areas of ambulation, bathing, dressing, toileting, eating, and transferring. R.D. was identified as needing supervision when performing tasks related to personal grooming. It was also noted that R.D. suffered from anxiety and panic attacks. According to R.D.'s brother Tom, R.D. was under the care of a psychiatrist for many years and "suffered from debilitating panic attacks." When suffering a panic attack, R.D. would often lay on the ground or floor, most often in a fetal position, and remain in this position until help arrived. As a part of the new resident intake process, R.D. was assessed for his risk of elopement. The assessment revealed that R.D. was not at risk for elopement and that he was free to "come and go [from the facility] as he pleases" and that he needed to "sign out" whenever leaving the facility. By correspondence dated March 14, 2011, the administration of Pine Tree Manor reminded R.D. that he needed to adhere to the facility's resident sign-out procedure whenever leaving from and returning to the facility. Approximately ten months after reminding R.D. of the facility's sign-out procedure, Mr. Sparks, on January 2, 2012, updated R.D.'s risk assessment form and again noted thereon that R.D. "may come and go as he pleases" and he "[n]eeds to remember to sign out" when leaving the facility. On May 23, 2012, R.D. was evaluated by a physician and it was noted, in part, that R.D. could function independently in the areas of ambulation, bathing, dressing, eating, grooming, toileting, and transferring. As for certain self-care tasks, the evaluating physician noted that R.D. needed assistance with preparing his meals, shopping, and handling his personal and financial affairs. It was also noted that R.D. needed daily oversight with respect to observing his well-being and whereabouts and reminding him about important tasks. The evaluating physician also noted that R.D. needed help with taking his medication.1/ The evaluation was acknowledged by Mr. Sparks as having been received on May 25, 2012. R.D.'s most recent itemization of his medications shows that on October 10, 2012, he was prescribed Clonazepam and Buspirone. The Clonazepam was administered three times a day at 8:00 a.m., noon, and 8:00 p.m. The Buspirone was administered four times a day at 8:00 a.m., noon, 5:00 p.m., and 8:00 p.m. These medications are often prescribed for anxiety, however, R.D.'s medications listing form does not expressly denote why the drugs were prescribed. At 7:58 a.m., on November 10, 2012, an ambulance from the Pinellas County EMS was dispatched to Pine Tree Manor. When the EMS unit arrived at 8:00 a.m., R.D. was found "on the ground or floor" and was complaining of feeling anxious. While being treated by EMS, R.D. took his 8:00 a.m. dose of Clonazepam and was transported to "Largo Med." Less than 24 hours later, EMS, at 4:29 a.m., on November 11, 2012, was dispatched to 13098 Walsingham Road, because R.D. was again complaining of feeling anxious. This location is apparently near Pine Tree Manor, as the EMS Patient Care Report for this service call notes that R.D. "walked to [the] store." Following the evaluation by EMS, R.D. was again transported to "Largo Med." At 12:24 p.m., on November 18, 2012, EMS was dispatched to a location near Pine Tree Manor where R.D. was found "lying supine on [the] sidewalk." According to the EMS report, R.D. advised that he became lightheaded and fell to the ground. R.D. did not complain of any other symptoms and was transported to a medical facility in Largo for further evaluation. At 1:27 p.m., on November 25, 2012, EMS was dispatched to a 7-11 store near Pine Tree Manor. Upon arrival at the store, EMS personnel found R.D. and, when questioned, he advised that he was again feeling anxious. Per R.D.'s specific request, as noted on the EMS report, he was transferred to St. Anthony's Hospital in St. Petersburg. On November 28, 2012, Mr. Sparks made an entry into R.D.'s file and noted that a neurosurgeon evaluated R.D.'s shunt on that date in an attempt to determine if a malfunction was the cause of R.D.'s panic attacks. Mr. Sparks noted in the record that the doctor advised that the shunt was working properly and that the shunt was ruled out as the "cause of [R.D.'s] panic attacks." As of November 28, 2012, Mr. Sparks was aware that R.D. had recently complained of experiencing panic attacks and that the cause of the same had not yet been determined. It was not confirmed, although it was certainly believed by Mr. Sparks, that R.D. was manipulating medical personnel at local treatment facilities for the purpose of securing medication beyond that prescribed by his regular treating physicians. This belief by Mr. Sparks is reasonable especially in light of R.D.'s request to EMS personnel on November 25, 2012, that he was to be transported to a medical facility other than "Largo Med" for treatment related to his feelings of anxiety.2/ R.D.'s medication record for December 4, 2012, shows that he was given his prescribed medication for the 8:00 a.m. dispensing time. Soon after receiving his medication, R.D. left Pine Tree Manor for the purpose of visiting his local congressman's office. According to the survey notes from the investigation related hereto, the congressman's office is located approximately two miles from Pine Tree Manor. Although it cannot be confirmed, it reasonably appears that R.D. walked to the congressman's office. R.D. did not sign out of the facility when he left Pine Tree Manor on the morning of December 4, 2012. R.D. did, however, inform facility staff that he was going to the congressman's office to discuss an issue.3/ Security video from the building where the congressman's office is located established that R.D. arrived at the congressman's office at 9:50 a.m. At approximately 10:45 a.m., a representative from the congressman's office called Pine Tree Manor and informed them that R.D. was ready to return to the facility. The person receiving the message from the congressman's office contacted Mr. Sparks and informed him that R.D. was requesting a ride back to Pine Tree Manor from the congressman's office. Mr. Sparks was assisting another resident at a local hospital when he received the request to transport R.D. and was, therefore, unable to transport R.D. from the congressman's office. Pine Tree Manor had no obligation to provide transportation services to R.D. Surveillance video from the building where the congressman's office is located confirmed that R.D. exited the building on December 4, 2012, at approximately 10:50 a.m. R.D.'s body was found on December 12, 2012. It is not known what happened to R.D. between the time he left the congressman's office and when his body was eventually discovered.4/ When Mr. Sparks returned to Pine Tree Manor on December 4, 2012, he was advised by staff that R.D. had not returned from the congressman's office. According to the posted work schedule for December 4, 2012, Mr. Sparks worked from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. When Mr. Sparks left Pine Tree Manor on December 4, 2012, R.D. had not returned. Mr. Sparks, upon leaving the facility for the day, instructed staff (Aurelia Cristobal) to call him when R.D. returned. Ms. Cristobal's shift ended at 8:00 p.m. Pine Tree Manor employee Laura Munoz worked from 7:00 p.m. on December 4, 2012, to 7:00 a.m. on December 5, 2012. Ms. Munoz was not responsible for assisting R.D. with his medication, so it is unlikely that she would have known that R.D. missed receiving his medication prior to her arrival at work. Because Mr. Sparks left Pine Tree Manor on December 4, 2012, before Ms. Munoz arrived for work, he called Ms. Munoz after her shift started (precise time unknown) and requested that she call him upon R.D.'s return. There were no instructions given to Ms. Munoz by Mr. Sparks as to what she should do if R.D. did not return by some time certain. On December 4, 2012, Mr. Sparks knew that R.D. had never spent the night away from Pine Tree Manor without someone at the facility knowing R.D.'s whereabouts and that R.D. had never gone unaccounted for a period greater than 12 hours. On December 5, 2012, Mr. Sparks' scheduled work time was from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Prior to reporting to the facility on the morning of December 5, 2012, Mr. Sparks learned that R.D. had not returned to his room during the night shift. The exact time is not known when Mr. Sparks acquired this information, but it was likely sometime around 6:30 a.m. After learning that R.D. was still unaccounted for, Mr. Sparks immediately began canvassing the area near Pine Tree Manor. Around this same time, Mr. Sparks contacted R.D.'s brother and apprised him of the situation. At approximately noon on December 5, 2012, Mr. Sparks contacted the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office and reported R.D. missing. Pine Tree Manor has an elopement and missing residents policy that provides, in part, as follows: Residents may come and go as they please and shall not be detained unless family/resident representative and administrator agree supervision is required. A resident leaving the facility should either sign out by the front door or inform a staff member of their departure and provide an estimated time of return. The staff person should sign the resident out and notify other staff on duty. . . . If a resident . . . is deemed missing, staff shall immediately search the entire facility inside and around the facility grounds. . . . Whenever a resident is not found within the facility or its premises, the Administrator will: Notify the resident's representative. Notify the County Sheriff's Department by calling 911. Provide staff and searching parties with information and photo I. D. Instruct the staff to search inside the facility and the premises, the adjacent residential properties to the facility, up and down 131st Street, 102nd Avenue and the cross streets.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration: Enter in Agency Case No. 2013002572 (DOAH Case No. 13-2397) a final order finding that Respondent, Pine Tree Manor, Inc., d/b/a/ Pine Tree Manor, committed a Class II violation and assessing an administrative fine of $5,000.00 and a survey fee of $500.00. Enter in Agency Case No. 2013004620 (DOAH Case No. 13-2011) a final order finding that Respondent, Pine Tree Manor, Inc., d/b/a/ Pine Tree Manor, committed a Class I violation and assessing an administrative fine of $8,000.00. It is also RECOMMENDED that the final order not revoke Respondent's license to operate an assisted living facility in the State of Florida, but, instead, suspend Respondent's license for a period of 60 days.7/ DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2013.
The Issue The issues presented concern the attempt on the part of the State of Florida, Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to impose a fine against Ron Harrod (Respondent) for willfully or knowingly damaging or removing products from sovereign lands without the consent of DNR or the State of Florida, Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund. The products spoken to is timber allegedly cut and removed from state-owned lands on November 20, 1985, and April 1, 1986. This purported conduct on the part of the Respondent is said to have violated Section 253.04(2), Florida Statutes (1985), and Rule 16Q- 14.03(2) and (6), Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact On September 1, 1985, Blanche Farrow made an agreement with the Respondent which allowed the Respondent as the owner of "Rons Cypress" to cut all the timber on her property. Rons Cypress is a business for cutting cypress slabs. This property is described in the agreement as being located on Highway 48 approximately 1 mile east of Floral City, on both the north and south sides of the road. Further it was stated that the timber contemplated in this arrangement could be found along Daniels Drive. A copy of the statement of agreement between Farrow and the Respondent may be found as Respondent's Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence. The exact nature of the Farrow property which is the subject of the agreement with the Respondent may be found in a copy of the Warranty Deed pertaining to this property, which has been admitted as DNR Exhibit 4. This property is located in Citrus County, Florida. The extent of the property over which Blanche Farrow and her husband, Chester B. Farrow, hold ownership does not extend into Lake Tsala Apopka, Lake Bradley and Little Lake, lakes adjacent to their property. These lakes constitute part of an historically meandered lake system and are subject to the sovereign rights of the State of Florida. In effect, the State of Florida owns those water bodies. The limitations of the boundaries of the Farrow property are made clear in the Warranty Deed in which certain language describes the boundaries of the property owned by the Farrows as being ". . . to the waters of Lake Tsala Apopka; thence Southerly along the water's edge of said Lake Tsala Apopka . . ." and ". . . to the water's edge of Lake Bradley . . ." Therefore, notwithstanding Respondent's protestations to the contrary and any statement made by Chester B. or Blanche Farrow, the legal description of the property does not convey title to those individuals for the several lakes described, nor create any leasehold interest on the part of the Farrows to the lakes. In pursuit of the agreement with the Farrows, Respondent made arrangements with Jerry Lovett, who is in the lumber business, to cut trees, principally cypress trees. Through this agreement, Lovett would write checks to Blanche Farrow which would be given to her by the Respondent. The Respondent in turn would be able to take the stumps left over from the cutting of cypress trees and use them for slabs in his business of selling cypress tree products. Respondent was to pay Ms. Farrow for the stumps from which he cut slabs. Respondent also took cypress knees in this area for use in his business. Respondent's Composite Exhibit 3 describes payment made by Jerry Lovett to Blanche Farrow for trees removed. On October 14, 1985, $600.00 was paid for cypress trees. On October 28, 1985, $1,275.72 was paid, of which 52.31 tons of cypress at $6.00 a ton was included in that purchase. On November 4, 1985, $551.28 was paid for cypress trees. On November 15, 1985, he paid $131.92 for removal of cypress trees. In this endeavor, Lovett in the person of his work crew had cut and removed cypress trees which belonged to the State of Florida. Respondent cut and removed slabs from the stumps left following Lovett's lumbering operation and took cypress knees as well belonging to the state. Respondent's involvement with the stumps and knees was through activities of a crew working for the Respondent. Neither the Farrows, Lovett nor Respondent had permission to take cypress products from this land belonging to the State of Florida. Lovett, in his activities, had operated under the misapprehension that the Farrows owned the disputed cypress trees that were cut from lands of the sovereign. He was led to believe in his discussions with Blanche Farrow that Respondent would point out the places where the cut could be made. Lovett also understood from his conversation with Ms. Farrow that certain monuments identifying the extent of her ownership could be found on the side of the road near Lakes Tsala Apopka and Bradley, described as cement corners. Lovett never located those monuments in that as he understood the outer bounds of the Farrow ownership, as Ms. Farrow described them, he would not approach those outer limits in his activities. Respondent likewise believed that the Farrows owned the property where the cypress cutting was being done. Nevertheless, Lovett cut and removed cypress trees in Lake Tsala Apopka, Lake Bradley and Little Lake and Respondent took stumps and knees from those lakes owned by the sovereign. Lovett sold the cypress logs which he removed from the area in dispute, to include cypress logs belonging to the State of Florida. Lovett removed less than 300 trees from the site and left some cypress logs at the site. Lovett through his crew was operating at the site of the dispute sometime approximately a week before October 14, 1985, through November 15, 1985. Lovett ceased his activities in the cutting of cypress when instructed to do so by the Respondent who mentioned something to the effect that the local zoning board said that this cutting had to cease. In the course of his operations in the three lakes, Respondent took 693 knees and between 800 and 1,200 cypress slabs. DNR became aware of the activities of Lovett and the Respondent based upon an investigation that was prompted by observations which Linda Sanford made. Linda Sanford is a zoning inspector for Citrus County. She also lives adjacent to Lake Bradley. As she describes it in her testimony, she observed work crews in the water cutting cypress "off and on." Among the people that she identified as being a member of the work crew was a James Gunn, who is an employee of the Respondent. The first time she saw the Respondent's crew was on November 13, 1985, around Daniels Road and Highway 48. Three persons were in the water and a chain saw was being operated. On November 16, 1985, while at home, Ms. Sanford received complaints from some neighbors about saws being operated and observed Respondent's crew again. One other time on a date that Ms. Sanford does not remember, which would have been following the first two occasions of her observations, Ms. Sanford asked the work crew if they had permits for the activities. Ms. Sanford never saw the Respondent's work crew remove any of the cypress materials. On November 20, 1985, Lieutenant Louis Feulner, then a Sergeant for the Florida Marine Patrol, went to the area where cypress trees had been cut by Lovett and cuttings from stumps and cypress knees were being taken by Respondent's work crew. This area was described by Feulner as the Lake Tsala Apopka chain. A copy of his report of the incident may be found as DNR Exhibit 7 admitted into evidence. Feulner was sent to investigate by his superior, Major Brown of the Florida Marine Patrol. Feulner arrived at the scene of the cutting activity around 3:30 in the afternoon and saw three subjects in the water. Those persons were James Gunn and Respondent's two sons. Feulner saw that cypress trees had been cut down on the site and some were located in the water. He observed stumps in the water as well. These observations were made of cypress products in knee- deep water. Feulner saw a chain saw being operated by the crew. The cutting that was being done was a slab from a stump. He did not see trees being removed from the site of the cutting. Upon inquiry, Gunn told Feulner that he worked for the Respondent and that the Respondent had gotten permission to cut the cypress trees from Ms. Farrow. Feulner advised Gunn that the activities involved in the cutting violated state law. In fact those activities did involve cutting of property belonging to the State. Major Brown had dispatched Lieutenant Fuelner to the questioned site on November 20, 1985, based upon a request of Gordon Roberts, Assistant Chief of Aquatic Lands for NR. At that time, Roberts was employed in a Division of State Lands, as an administrative assistant involved with investigations and enforcement. He held that position until May 1, 1987. On December 4, 1985, Roberts went to the site and observed that cypress harvesting had taken place in wetlands, in a submerged area. The area he observed was one involving buttress cypress trees. Roberts observed that harvesting was being done in an area below a line which represents the minimum flood plan line, a control line for what is described as the water management division. In conversation which Roberts had with the Respondent following the Feulner visit to the site, Roberts explained to the Respondent that there was some question about whether the cutting was on privately owned land or submerged land belonging to the State. He further advised the Respondent not to cut anymore in that area until a determination could be made about ownership of the property. Roberts wrote to the Respondent on December 13, 1985. A copy of this correspondence may be found as DNR Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence. Respondent says he did not receive this correspondence Nonetheless it was sent to the address utilized in noticing of the Respondent of the final hearing in this cause, as attended by the Respondent. The letter mentions concerns of the State on the subject of the belief held by the State that cutting was being done on its property. It went on to say that a survey was going to be conducted to decide where the line of demarcation between the upland owners property and that of the State would occur. The letter states that DNR preferred to have the matter settled amicably but indicated that trees should not be cut where buttressed cypress were found nor any other trees below the ordinary high water line of the lakes in question. It warned Respondent that a fine of $10,000 could be imposed under the provisions of Rule 16Q-14, Florida Administrative Code, for unauthorized removal of the trees and that the fine could be mitigated. Further it was stated voluntary cessation of the tree cutting would be a consideration on the amount of the fine. Finally, the letter stated that the Respondent could contact the State concerning these issues. By activities of Louis Neuman, Senior Forester for DNR, an attempt was made to ascertain the value of cypress trees which were cut in the areas in dispute. Mr. Neuman is qualified to assess the value of the trees cut. A description of his evaluation may be found in DNR Exhibits 12A-C representing the assessment made in Little Lake, Lake Bradley, and Lake Tsala Apopka. This involves a survey of December 18-20, 1985, as made by Mr. Neuman. He found that value involved in the cutting to be $440, $1,364 and $2,948, respectively, for Little Lake, Lake Bradley and Lake Tsala Apopka. These findings were related to Gordon Roberts in a memorandum of February 25, 1986, a copy of which may be found as DNR Exhibit 2 admitted into evidence. His assumption was that 78 trees, 306 trees and 815 trees had been cut within Little Lake, Lake Bradley and Lake Tsala Apopka, respectively. The total amount for cut cypress trees in all three lakes was $4,752, per Mr. Neuman's observations. Comparing his observations to those of the Respondent and Lovett, there is a disparity in valuation; however, it suffices to say that a substantial dollar amount of product was destroyed and removed from sovereign waters. This was an arrangement in which the Respondent was a knowing participant, who profited from the endeavor. In spite of the conciliatory tone of the letter of December 13, 1985, from Roberts to the Respondent, on March 26, 1986, a notice of violation or administrative complaint was brought against the Respondent concerning the observations made on December 4, 1985 and in view of the $4,752 statement of damages on the part of Mr. Neuman. The State sought to collect that amount of money and $2,000 punitive damages. A copy of the March 26, 1986 complaint letter may be found as DNR Exhibit 3 admitted into evidence. That complaint or notice of violation was subsumed in action of July 2, 1986, which forms the basis of the present dispute and for which the Respondent sought timely hearing. In the present complaint, allegations are made concerning observations of November 20, 1985, and the assessment of an administrative fine of $6,752 for what is described as a first offense. There is set forth in the notice of violation a second count or claim of violation pertaining to events of April 1, 1986, in which Respondent is stated to have willfully and knowingly removed products from the same area in which sovereign lands are said to have been involved. For this alleged second offense, DNR sought the imposition of an additional $10,000 fine. The accusations concerning a second offense arise from an investigation performed by Robert Verlato, an officer with the Florida Marine Control, which was conducted on April 1, 1986. He went to the Bradley Lake site where the cutting had been done in the past and observed three individuals at work. These were members of the Respondent's crew, including James Gunn and Respondent's two sons. He saw them operating a chain saw cutting the base of the stump which was approximately two feet in length. Gunn was operating the saw. Verlato told the individuals to stop work and they did. He arrested them for trespassing and removing state property. Respondent then arrived at the scene and indicated that he should be charged if there were any violations, and that the three men were members of his crew under his supervision and control. Verlato also observed other freshly cut stumps than the one which he had seen crew members working on, which stumps were in the same general area. He collected ten of the these fresh-cut stumps and took them as evidence for the criminal court case. Respondent indicates that the activities of April 1, 1986, had to do with the cleanup of this site requested by Ms. Farrow and not for purpose of further removal of cypress products for Respondent's benefit. The facts lead to the conclusion that while the Respondent may have had in mind accommodating Ms. Farrow, he also was accommodating his financial interests as well. This conclusion is supported by Respondent's Exhibit 2 admitted into evidence which was a letter from Ms. Farrow to Respondent on May 19, 1986, after the April 1, 1986, incident in which she asked the Respondent to observe the state's suggestions that no further cutting and hauling be done related to the cypress trees in question. Composite Exhibit 5A-D constitutes photographs of the site related to Lake Tsala Apopka showing where trees have been removed. DNR Common Exhibits 6 and 14 is an aerial photograph which marks the places where the subject cypress trees have been cut in the three lakes. They are shown in red marking. The findings about cutting that was done in Tsala Apopka Lake are not conclusive because the ordinary high water line for Lake Tsala Apopka was not established. This circumstance is discussed in the following paragraph. DNR commissioned an ordinary high water line study to be performed by Douglas A. Thompson, Professional Land Surveyor, registered in the State of Florida, and other states. He is the Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Survey and Mapping for DNR. Other members of his team included Kenneth M. Campbell, Bureau of Geology, and geologist for DNR; Catherine M. Gilbert, Bureau of Aquatic Plants, and botanist for DNR; and Louis A. Neuman of the Bureau of Mine Reclamation, forester. The details of this study are set forth in DNR Exhibit 11 admitted into evidence which is a copy of the ordinary high water lines survey of Bradley Lake and Little Lake. This study established the ordinary high water line elevation for Bradley Lake at 42.75 feet and for Little Lake at 41.75 feet. Areas where cypress trees were observed to have been cut in the operations of Lovett and the Respondent showed that in Little Lake the maximum elevation for those cuttings was 40.3 feet and at Lake Bradley the maximum elevation was at 41.4 feet. Both of these measurements are below the ordinary high water line elevation for those two water bodies. This confirms that Lovett and the Respondent were destroying and taking products belonging to the State which were below the ordinary high water line and within the boundaries of the sovereign's ownership. Due to the special nature of Lake Tsala Apopka, DNR was unable to establish with exactitude the high ordinary high water line for Lake Tsala Apopka. They were able to approximate that line at 42.75 feet in a setting where the maximum elevation of cuttings of cypress within that lake were found at 41.2 feet.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should be granted an exemption from disqualification from employment with a private contractor providing adult day training to developmentally disabled clients of Respondent.
Findings Of Fact From April 2016 to October 2016, Petitioner Bertha Delaney ("Delaney") was employed by Cypress Place, Inc. ("Cypress"), a private, nonprofit corporation that provides services to developmentally disabled clients, and operates under the regulatory jurisdiction, of Respondent Agency for Persons with Disabilities ("APD"). Delaney was hired by Cypress as a receptionist, and her responsibilities included answering the phones, handling clerical tasks such as maintaining attendance sheets and filing, and assisting other employees as needed. Cypress operates an adult day training program, which offers "adult day training services" to APD clients. Such services include "training services that take place in a nonresidential setting, separate from the home or facility in which the client resides, and are intended to support the participation of clients in daily, meaningful, and valued routines of the community. Such training may be provided in work-like settings that do not meet the definition of supported employment." § 393.063(1), Fla. Stat. There is no persuasive evidence showing that, during her employment with Cypress, Delaney ever had face-to-face contact with a client while performing adult day training services. She was not, therefore, a "direct service provider" as that term is defined in section 393.063(13), Florida Statutes. Delaney did, however, have incidental, in-person interactions with clients, the evidence establishes, occasionally assisting clients in need of immediate help. Thus, although Delaney did not provide training services to clients, she provided some services in the broader sense of "helpful acts." In early August of 2016, an incident involving a client occurred at Cypress's facility, which the Department of Children and Families ("DCF") investigated. In the course of the investigation, the DCF investigator interviewed Delaney and learned that, because the subject client had appeared to be limping on the day in question, Delaney had helped the client walk from the bus to the building. At the time, Delaney had not yet undergone level 2 background screening because Cypress had not instructed her to do so. Rather, in or around April 2016, when she was hired, Cypress had required Delaney to go to the police department for a local criminal background check, which she did. Delaney, in fact, did everything that Cypress asked her to do with regard to background screening. Soon after (and perhaps because of) the DCF investigation, Cypress directed Delaney to submit to a level 2 background review, which she did.1/ And so it happened that in late August 2016, a search of Delaney's criminal history was performed, and the results were forwarded to DCF, which administers the background screening process for APD. By letter dated October 3, 2016, DCF notified Delaney that it had discovered her criminal conviction on a charge of grand theft of the third degree, to which she had pleaded no contest on June 13, 2001. This crime is a "disqualifying offense" under the applicable screening standards, which means that Delaney is ineligible to work as a direct service provider without an exemption from such disqualification. DCF advised Delaney that she needed to quit her job at Cypress and obtain an exemption from disqualification if she wanted to resume working there. Delaney promptly resigned her position with Cypress. Delaney then sought an exemption from disqualification from employment, submitting her Request for Exemption to DCF in November 2016. By letter dated March 17, 2017, APD informed Delaney that it intended to deny her request based solely on the ground that Delaney had "not submitted clear and convincing evidence of [her] rehabilitation." In other words, APD determined as a matter of ultimate fact that Delaney was not rehabilitated, which meant (as a matter of law) that the head of the agency had no discretion to grant an exemption.2/ APD did not, as an alternative basis for its proposed agency action, articulate any rationale for denying the exemption notwithstanding a showing of rehabilitation, assuming arguendo that such had been made. Delaney initiated the instant proceeding, hoping to prove her rehabilitation. The undersigned has considered the evidence as it relates to the statutory criteria for assessing rehabilitation, and makes the following findings of fact as a predicate for the ultimate determination. The Circumstances Surrounding the Criminal Incident. In or around September of 2000, Delaney stole cash receipts from her employer, Blockbuster Video, totaling approximately $13,800.00. She was soon arrested and charged with grand theft of the third degree, a felony offense as defined in section 812.014, Florida Statutes. At the time of the offense, Delaney, then 25 years old, was experiencing financial difficulties raising two young daughters. Although married, Delaney managed the household mostly on her own, as her husband, an interstate truck driver, was often on the road. Exercising what she now acknowledges was poor judgment, Delaney stole her employer's funds to ease her personal financial burden. On June 13, 2001, appearing before the Circuit Court in and for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, Delaney entered a plea of nolo contendere to the criminal charge, was convicted by plea (adjudication withheld), and was sentenced to two years' probation with orders to make restitution in the amount of $13,778.00 to Blockbuster. Delaney completed her term of probation and complied with all of the other conditions imposed by the court, including the payment of restitution. The Time Period That Has Elapsed since the Incident. The disqualifying offense was committed about 17 years ago. Delaney thus has had ample time to restore her reputation and usefulness to society as a law abiding citizen following her conviction, and to mature into an older, more responsible adult. The Nature of the Harm Caused to the Victim. Delaney did not cause personal injury to any person in the commission of her crime. She was ordered to make restitution to the victim, and did, although the details of this transaction are not available in the record. Therefore, the economic harm caused by Delaney's theft appears to have been minimal. The History of the Applicant since the Incident. Since her conviction, Delaney has completed a training program to become a patient care technician and obtained a license to practice in Florida as a certified nursing assistant. She has held positions in these fields and performed admirably. Delaney lives with her two adult daughters, son-in-law, grandson, and fiancé; her current family situation is stable, both emotionally and financially. Her civil rights have been restored. She has not reoffended or otherwise run afoul of the law. APD severely faults Delaney for a so-called nondisclosure in her response to a question on the exemption request form concerning previous employment. The form asks the applicant to "provide your employment history for the last three years." Delaney answered, in relevant part, by stating: "I have not been employed for the last three (3) years." She followed this statement by describing employment predating "the last three (3) years" and explaining that an ankle injury in May 2013 (which required multiple surgeries to repair), together with the attendant convalescence and rehabilitation, had kept her out of the workforce for a couple of years. APD argues that Delaney lied about her employment history——it is undisputed that she had, in fact, worked (for Cypress) during the three years preceding her request for an exemption——and that this alleged "lie" proves Delaney had known not only that she was required to undergo level 2 background screening before taking the job with Cypress, but also that such screening would reveal her disqualifying criminal conviction, and that, therefore, to avoid detection, she had worked without being screened, in knowing violation of law. Put aside for the moment the issue of fact regarding whether Delaney "lied" about her employment history. APD's argument (that this "lie" is proof of Delaney's knowing violation of the background screening law) is illogical. For even if (as a matter of fact3/) Delany were required to be screened, and even if (as a matter of law4/) the background screening statutes were personally violable by an applicant or employee, Delaney's allegedly fraudulent answer to the employment history question does not rationally lead to the conclusion that she knew either of these premises to be true. Moreover, as discussed in endnote 1, it is unacceptable for an agency to rely upon an applicant's alleged violation of a regulatory statute as grounds to deny an exemption request where such alleged violation has never been proved in an enforcement proceeding. This is because any person charged with committing a disciplinable offense must be served with an administrative complaint and afforded clear notice of the right to a hearing, at which, if timely requested, the agency must prove the alleged wrongdoing by clear and convincing evidence. APD wants to skip all that and just have the undersigned find here, for the first time, that Delaney clearly violated section 393.0655 by working at Cypress for at least six months without being screened. See Resp.'s PRO at 9. That's not happening. The only relevant finding in this regard, which the undersigned makes, is that Delaney has never been found to have violated section 393.0655 by working at Cypress for at least six months without being screened. As for the alleged "lie," APD's position that Delaney's response to the employment history question was knowingly and intentionally false (by omitting reference to Cypress) does not make sense, because DCF already knew (from investigating an unrelated matter) that Delaney had worked for Cypress, and Delaney knew that DCF was aware of this fact when she filled out the form. That cat was out of the bag. At hearing, Delaney testified credibly and convincingly that she had not intended to mislead DCF. It is clear that she interpreted the question as asking about her employment during the three years before the job from which she had been disqualified (as opposed to the three years before completing the exemption request form). She misunderstood the question, to be sure, but it was an honest mistake, and the undersigned can appreciate how a person in Delaney's shoes could conclude that the job from which one has recently been disqualified does not "count" towards her employment history for purposes of seeking an exemption from disqualification. Delaney's testimony in this regard is corroborated by the fact that she submitted to DCF, as part of her exemption request package, two letters of recommendation from employees of Cypress, written on Cypress letterhead, attesting to her good character. These letters, taken together, make it clear that Delaney had recently been an employee of Cypress. Obviously, if Delaney had intended, knowingly, to deceive DCF by concealing her employment with Cypress, she would not have provided these letters. APD argues that one of these letters, from Rashard Williams, which is dated October 27, 2016, does not specifically indicate that Delaney ever worked at Cypress——and thus does not bolster Delaney's testimony that she never intended to conceal the fact that she had. To reach this conclusion one must discount the writer's statement that "Ms. Delaney has proven herself to be reliable, trustworthy, and compassionate both as a person and as an employee." If the Williams letter were the only written recommendation from a Cypress employee, however, the undersigned would consider APD's interpretation to be, while certainly not the best or most reasonable, at least plausible in view of Mr. Williams's additional comments about how well Delaney took care of his grandmother in a capacity, apparently, other than as an employee of Cypress. But the companion to the Williams letter, a recommendation from Mark Chmiel dated October 24, 2016, leaves no room for doubt that Delaney was a recent employee of Cypress. A short, two-sentence excerpt suffices to support this finding: "Bertha is an invaluable addition to our agency [i.e., Cypress,] and she has fulfilled the potential of her position far better than anyone before her. Her moral character is beyond reproach and I have no qualms about trusting her with our clients."5/ The letters of recommendation that Delaney furnished DCF refute the notion that she knowingly omitted Cypress from her employment history with the intent to mislead DCF. They prove, instead, that Delaney took for granted DCF's knowledge of her work for Cypress, for she was certain DCF already knew about it. In turn, that foundational assumption (which, in fact, was true) prompted Delaney to provide a history of her employment during the several years leading up to the job with Cypress. The undersigned finds that Delaney is not guilty of knowingly withholding material information from DCF in response to the question about her previous employment. Finally, the undersigned observes that APD, in its preliminary decision-making, impermissibly allowed speculation and conjecture to take the place of facts. In forming its intent to deny Delaney's application, APD took into account the "possibility that Ms. Delaney was trying to protect Cypress Place from demonstrating that they were in violation of the screening laws" as well as the "possibility that Rashard Williams might have tried to hide the fact [sic6/] that there was a violation of the screening requirements by Cypress Place." Resp.'s PRO at 10 (emphasis added). On the basis of this rank speculation, APD conjectured that "Ms. Delaney was willing to collude with [Cypress employees] in order not to spotlight their violation of the licensing law." Resp.'s PRO at 18. APD proved none of this imaginative guesswork. Circumstances Showing Applicant Poses No Danger. Yvonne Ginsberg, the executive director of Cypress, testified in support of Delaney's application. Ms. Ginsberg stated that Delaney was an "excellent" employee and affirmed that she had "no qualms" about Delaney's returning to work at Cypress once an exemption has been secured. The undersigned credits Ms. Ginsberg's testimony as to Delaney's character. In addition, Delaney submitted the written character references of Messrs. Chmiel and Williams, which were discussed above. These documents credibly attest to Delaney's trustworthiness, integrity, and ethical behavior. The undersigned finds without hesitation that Delaney would likely not present a danger in the future if an exemption from disqualification were granted. Ultimate Factual Determination The undersigned has determined, based on clear and convincing evidence, including sufficient persuasive evidence of rehabilitation, that Delaney should not be disqualified from employment because she is, in fact, rehabilitated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order granting Bertha Delaney the exemption from disqualification for which she is, in fact, eligible. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 2017.
