The Issue The issue in this cause is whether the prerequisites of Section 154.314, Florida Statutes, have been met. That section governs withholding of funds due to the county under revenue sharing or tax-sharing in order to forward said funds to a regional referral hospital to compensate the hospital for services rendered to an out-of-county indigent patient. Specifically, the parties stipulated and agreed that all prerequisites had been met except whether Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center exhausted its administrative and legal remedies, as provided in Chapter 120, prior to certifying to the Comptroller's Office the amount due from Suwannee County. Suwannee County presented the testimony of Frank C. Davis and had one exhibit admitted in evidence. The Department of Banking and Finance (Department) had one exhibit admitted into evidence. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center (TMRMC) had six exhibits admitted into evidence. The Department waived the filing of a proposed order. Suwannee County and TMRMC submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. All proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law have been considered. A ruling has been made on each proposed finding of act in the Appendix attached hereto and made a part of this Recommended Order.
Findings Of Fact TMRMC is a regional referral hospital located in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. From May 15, 1985, to July 2, 1985, TMRMC provided medical care to Doris M. Cherry. The total bill for these services was $68,182.75. On July 10, 1985, TMRMC wrote to Suwannee County and requested reimbursement in the amount of $3,827.83 for the treatment rendered to Doris M. Cherry. This amount represented the maximum reimbursement which can be sought under Section 154.306, Florida Statutes. Reimbursement is limited to payment for 12 days of services at the per diem reimbursement rate currently in effect for the regional referral hospital under the medical assistance program to the needy under Title XIX of the Social Security Act. On July 23, 1985, Suwannee County, through its county coordinator, Frank C. Davis, refused TMRMC's request for payment and disputed whether the patient was entitled to the benefits under Chapter 154, Part IV. The letter from Suwannee County did not advise TMRMC of its right to request a formal hearing pursuant to Chapter 120 and it did not provide a point of entry as required in Rule 28-5.111(1), Florida Administrative Code. On December 20, 1985, TMRMC wrote to Suwannee County requesting an administrative proceeding to determine the issues and liability of Suwannee County to TMRMC for the claimed services. TMRMC also filed a formal Request for Hearing. TMRMC requested that the matter be referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a hearing to be conducted according to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Suwannee County failed to take any action on TMRMC's Request for Hearing. In an abundance of caution, TMRMC again wrote to Suwannee County on January 17, 1986, pointing out that no response had been received to the Request for Hearing and again requesting a hearing. TMRMC attached a copy of the Request for Hearing to this letter. As evidenced by the return receipt, the Board of County Commissioners received this letter on January 22, 1986. Suwannee County neither granted nor denied TMRMC's Request for Hearing. Instead, Suwannee County chose to ignore the request. The February 4, 1986, meeting of the Suwannee County Board of Commissioners shows that the Board voted unanimously to wait before responding to the request. No response was ever made. Suwannee county did not give written notice to TMRMC of their decision to ignore the request for hearing. TMRMC took no judicial action by mandamus or certiorari to enforce its right to a hearing. Further, TMRMC did not petition the District Court of Appeal for review of this matter. After waiting several months for a response from Suwannee County, on August 13, 1986, TMRMC certified to the Division of Accounting and Auditing, Comptroller's Office, the sum of $3,827.83 to be withheld from revenue-sharing or tax- sharing funds allocated to Suwannee County. The Department of Banking and Finance sent Its Notice of Intent to Withhold Funds to the Board of County Commissioners of Suwannee County on August 29, 1986. It was only in response to this action by the Comptroller's Office, acting through the Department of Banking and Finance, that Suwannee County requested a formal hearing. By its Request for Formal Hearing, Suwannee County attempted to raise and litigate the eligibility of Doris M. Cherry to the benefits of Chapter 154, Part IV. However, it is undisputed that these disputed issues the fact cannot be litigated in this proceeding because this hearing is limited in scope to determine only, if the prerequisites of Section 154.314, Florida Statutes, have been satisfied. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center, et al., v. Lewis, 399 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order determining that all prerequisites to Section 154.314, Florida Statutes, had been met and forward the amount certified to the Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center from the revenue-sharing or tax-sharing funds due to Suwannee County. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3901 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner Suwannee County Proposed findings of fact 1, 3, and 4 are rejected as unnecessary. Proposed finding of fact 11 is rejected as being unsupported by the competent, substantial evidence. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance or as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed findings of fact: 2(11); 5(1); 6(2); 7(3); 8(4); 9(5); 10(6); 12(9); and 13(10). Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Intervenor, TMC Proposed finding of fact 8 is rejected as being argumentative and conclusory. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance or as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(3); 2(4); 3(4); 4(4); 5(5 and 6); 6(7); 7(8); 9(10); and 10(9). COPIES FURNISHED: Walter W. Wood, Esquire Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jesse F. Suber, Esquire Post Office Box 1049 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ernest A. Sellers, Esquire James W. Prevatt, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 8 Live Oak, Florida 32060 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent, Florida State Hospital, is an "employer" as statutorily defined at Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes (2007).
Findings Of Fact Behavioral Health Solutions LLC is a private business entity (BHS). The Petitioner was employed by BHS as a clerk- typist beginning on October 6, 2006, and until February 6, 2007, when she was terminated. BHS and the Department of Children and Family Services/Florida State Hospital entered into a contract on September 16, 2006, whereby BHS was to be responsible for providing staff for various positions for the provision of services to residents of Florida State Hospital. One of those positions was that occupied by the Petitioner, at times pertinent to this proceeding. The contract provided that BHS would be responsible for hiring, transferring, promoting, discipline, and discharge/termination of BHS staff. BHS was also responsible for providing its staff with salaries, benefits, compensation packages and training. BHS has its own organizational structure which was not integrated into that of the Respondent Florida State Hospital's organizational structure. The Respondent Florida State Hospital was charged with supervising BHS's staff and with recommendations where required, for disciplinary action or removal from the work site. BHS had the final authority to reassign, discipline or terminate BHS staff, however, by the terms of the contract. The Petitioner was hired by BHS as of October 6, 2006. The offer of employment which she accepted came from BHS. The Petitioner was told later that she was terminated in February 2007 by Angie Burge, the BHS Human Resources Manager. The Petitioner's date of employment were October 6, 2006, through February 6, 2007. The testimony of Angie Burge and Amy Bryant establishes that BHS employees such as the Petitioner, were trained by BHS. Ms. Bryant established through her testimony, as the Operations and Management Consultant for the Department of Children and Families (Department) that neither the Department nor Florida State Hospital had controlling responsibility over employee relations matters regarding BHS's staff/employees, such as the Petitioner. Although she and Florida State Hospital worked in conjunction with Ms. Burge and BHS on employee training requirements, BHS employees, including the Petitioner, were trained by BHS and its staff. BHS and the Respondent Florida State Hospital had a contract for BHS to provide staff for the forensic unit at Florida State Hospital, where the Petitioner was employed by BHS and the contract included the requirement that BHS operate that unit. At orientation, BHS provided its employees or new hires, including the Petitioner, all polices and procedures of BHS and trained them as to such policies and procedures. Ms. Burge, a BHS staff member, provided that training. BHS had authority to hire employees or to terminate them or discipline them and to make final decisions on the performance of the duties of the staff it hired, including the Petitioner. Florida State Hospital and the Department did not have final authority on such matters but could only recommend to BHS. The salary and benefits plan of BHS was very different from that of Florida State Hospital. It was based upon the parent company's pay and benefits scheme, the parent company being Lakeview Center, Inc. The administrators of Florida State Hospital did not have any decision-making authority in employee regulation, discipline, hiring, and termination decisions. Ms. Burge, the BHS Human Resources Manager, made the decision and informed the Petitioner of her termination. The Petitioner has not presented persuasive evidence that Florida State Hospital had sufficient control over the terms and conditions of the Petitioner's employment, or the employment of other BHS staff members, so that such staff members, including the Petitioner, could be deemed employees of the Respondent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and the arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety due to lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Corrine Hamilton 440 South Cone Street Quincy, Florida 32351 Jacqueline H. Smith, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 1000 Chattahoochee, Florida 32324-1000
Appeal For This Case Unless expressly waived by a party such as in a stipulation or in other similar forms of settlement, any party substantially affected by this final order may seek judicial review by filing an original Notice of Appeal with the Agency Clerk of the Department of Management Services, and a copy, accompanied by. filing fees prescribed by law, with the Clerk of the appropriate District Court of Appeal. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days of rendition of this order, in accordance with Rule 9.110, Fla. R. App. P., and section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Certificate of Clerk: Filed in the office of the Clerk of the Department of Management Services on this 96% day of December » 2012. MLE Agency Clerk Page 3 of 3 STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS MICHAEL GLEN O’BRIEN, Petitioner, DOAH Case No. 12-3396 vs. Department of Management Services, Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Division of State Group Insurance, Respondent. / This Respondent files this notice of voluntary dismissal on behalf of both parties, and states: This matter was held in abeyance, pending an external medical review. Based upon that report, the Petitioner has chosen to dismiss his appeal . See Attachment A. Wherefore, the Parties request that this matter be dismissed with prejudice. I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by U. S. mail, this 10th day of December 2012, to 1833 Halstead Blvd., Apt. 214 Tallahassee, Florida 32309. Respectfully submitted, onja’P. Mathews Florida Bar ID No. 163680 Allison Deison Florida Bar ID No. 0143855 Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 850-922-9665- Telephone 850-922-6312- Telecopier Page 1 of 1 Filed December 10, 2012 1:06 PM Division of Administrative Hearings Mathews, Sonja . From: O'Brien, Michael Sent: Monday, December 10, 2012 11:18 AM To: Mathews, Sonja Subject: appeal Ms. Mathews, | have received MCMC’s review of my case and am hereby dropping my appeal. Thank you, Mike O’Brien Michael O’Brien GIS / Data Services Florida Natural Areas Inventory Florida State University 850-224-8207 ext. 211 mobrian@fsu.edu A\odewact A STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS MICHAEL GLEN O’ BRIEN, ) Petitioner, ) vs. Case No. 12-3396 SERVICES, DIVISION OF STATE ) ) DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT ) ) GROUP INSURANCE, ) Respondent. ) ORDER CLOSING FILE AND RELINQUISHING JURISDICTION This cause having come before the undersigned on the parties’ Notice of Voluntary Dismissal filed December 10, 2012, and the undersigned being fully advised, it is, therefore, ORDERED that the file of the Division of Administrative Hearings is closed. Jurisdiction is relinquished to the Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance. DONE AND ORDERED this llth day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Unw We SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 2012.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, John Harris, should be granted an exemption from disqualification from employment pursuant to Chapter 435, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, John Harris, was employed at the Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida, from October 1977 to January 15, 1998. The Florida State Hospital is a residential facility for mentally ill adults. Mr. Harris was employed as a Unit Treatment and Rehabilitation Specialist. Mr. Harris was involved in the provision of direct care to residents of Florida State Hospital. During 1997 the Department of Children and Family Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department") pursuant to Chapter 435, Florida Statutes, conducted background screening of employees involved in the provision of direct care to residents of Florida State Hospital. As a result of a background screening check of Mr. Harris, it was determined that Mr. Harris had pled nolo contendere to possession of cocaine, a felony pursuant to Chapter 893, Florida Statutes, in 1989. As a result of the determination that Mr. Harris had pled nolo contendere to a felony under Chapter 893, Florida Statutes, Mr. Harris was notified by the Department that he was disqualified from employment in his position with Florida State Hospital. The following are the pertinent facts concerning the 1989 nolo contendere plea: During the afternoon of September 11, 1989, Mr. Harris was traveling by automobile from Tallahassee, Florida, where he had picked up the automobile from his wife, to Quincy, Florida, where he lived; Mr. Harris was traveling at a speed of 100mph while being chased by law enforcement. He was stopped by other law enforcement personnel waiting for him just outside Quincy; The automobile that Mr. Harris was driving was searched and cocaine was discovered; Mr. Harris was charged with possession of a controlled substance in violation of Chapter 893, Florida Statutes, and reckless driving in violation of Chapter 316, Florida Statutes; Mr. Harris pled nolo contendere to the charge of possession of cocaine, a felony, and was adjudicated guilty of the offense on or about February 21, 1990; and Mr. Harris was sentenced to probation for a period of one year. Although not listed in the letter informing Mr. Harris of the results of his background screening, Mr. Harris also was charged and pled nolo contendere to the offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell in 1981 and driving under the influence of alcohol and possession of cannabis in 1995. The following are the only pertinent facts concerning the 1981 offense offered at hearing: On or about May 24, 1982, Mr. Harris pled nolo contendere to possession with intent to sell cocaine in violation of Chapter 893, Florida Statutes, a second degree felony, as a result of an incident that took place in 1981; and Mr. Harris was adjudicated guilty and was sentenced to probation for a period of eight years. The following are the pertinent facts concerning the 1995 offenses for driving under the influence of alcohol and possession of cannabis: Mr. Harris was driving an automobile in or near Bainbridge, Georgia, when he was stopped by law enforcement; Mr. Harris was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and possession of cannabis that was found in the glove compartment of the automobile; Mr. Harris was adjudicated guilty of both offenses; and Mr. Harris was sentenced to probation for a period of one year and a number of week-ends in jail. At the time of the formal hearing Mr. Harris was 44 years of age. Mr. Harris' immediate supervisor, Rollean Lloyd (Ms. Lloyd indicated at the hearing that her first name is spelled "Rollean") testified at the formal hearing in support of Mr. Harris' continued employment at Florida State Hospital. Ms. Lloyd also signed a letter (Ms. Lloyd's first name is spelled "Rollene" on the letter) supporting his continued employment at Florida State Hospital. Ms. Lloyd's supervisor also testified at the formal hearing and signed a letter supporting his continued employment at Florida State Hospital: I have known John Harris for approximately eight years as an employee of Unit 4, Florida State Hospital. I have observed Mr. Harris over this time and he had become a concientious [sic] worker who relates well to the residents and to the staff in Unit 4. His recent attendance record has been good and Mr. Harris performs his job to the best of his ability. Mr. Harris is cooperative with his supervisors and supportive of his co-workers. For the past eleven years Mr. Harris has been, and was at the time of the formal hearing, married to Ollie Harris. Mr. Harris has two sons, one twenty years of age and the other eighteen years of age.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Children and Family Services denying John Harris' request for an exemption from disqualification from employment pursuant to Section 435, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben R. Patterson, Esquire Patterson and Traynham 315 Beard Street Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-4289 John Perry, Esquire District 2 Legal Office Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard A. Doran, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Henry L. Curry, was employed by Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, from October 26, 1970 to March 3, 1988. Petitioner was employed at Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, as a Human Services Worker I, Forensics, Unit 20, during the winter of 1988. The position was part of the Career Service System in which the Petitioner had attained "permanent" status. On February 1, 1988, Petitioner telephoned a person named Grady James, another employee at Florida State Hospital. (R-1) Petitioner informed Mr. James that, due to illness, Petitioner was not able to work and would bring a "sick slip" when he was able to return to work. Petitioner had no further contact with Respondent until March 28, 1988, when Petitioner's letter, dated March 24, 1988, was received by Florida State Hospital. (P-1) In the letter, Petitioner stated that he was "an inpatient at the VA Medical Center" and that "a letter of verification" of his hospitalization was forthcoming. On March 30, 1988, Florida State Hospital received a letter from the Atlanta Veterans Administration Medical Center's Alcoholism and Drug Dependence Treatment Unit in Decatur, Georgia. The letter, dated March 28, 1988, stated that Petitioner had been hospitalized March 16 - 28, 1988, in said unit. (P-2) There is limited information indicating Petitioner's physical location or functional ability during the period of time between February 1, 1988, when he contacted Mr. James, and March 16, 1988, when he was hospitalized. Petitioner testified that he was not in his "right mind", that he "was possessed", "drugged out", and "couldn't cope". Petitioner slept "in the car, in the crack houses and everywhere". (Testimony of Petitioner) Petitioner was seen once during that time by his father in Quincy, Florida, (Testimony of Perman Curry) and apparently was hospitalized for unexplained reasons in "Montgomery" for some period (Testimony of Petitioner) While Petitioner states that he did not intend to resign from his position, no contact was made with his employer from February 1, 1988 to March 28, 1988, a period of 56 days. Prior to February 1, 1988, Petitioner had been counseled on several occasions, and his attendance had been closely monitored, due to unscheduled absences. (R-1) On February 9, 1988, Dorothy N. Stinson, the supervisor of the unit in which Petitioner worked, sent by certified mail, appropriately addressed, a letter to Petitioner noting the lack of communication from Petitioner and stating that, unless medical certification for the unauthorized absence was provided within three days of receipt of the letter, Petitioner would be considered to have abandoned his position and resigned from employment. The letter was returned as "unclaimed" by the postal service on February 25, 1988, after two unsuccessful attempts to effect delivery. (R-3) On March 4, 1988, Faye H. Alcorn, Deputy Hospital Administrator, sent by certified mail, appropriately addressed, a letter (dated March 3, 1988) to Petitioner which stated that due to his absence without authorized leave from February 2 - March 2, 1988, during which time there had been no contact with Petitioner, he was deemed to have abandoned his position and resigned from the state's career service system pursuant to rules related to separation from employment resulting from abandonment of position. The letter was returned as "unclaimed" by the postal service on March 20, 1988, after two unsuccessful attempts to effect delivery. (R-2) In or around December, 1987, Ms. Stinson became aware that Petitioner had a substance abuse problem. Ms. Stinson testified that it is possible to take "leave without pay" for a period of up to one year and that such leave could possibly be granted to an employee who is ill due to a drug and alcohol addiction. A person seeking to take such leave would either submit a written letter of request or would submit medical certification indicating that the employee was unable to work. Petitioner did not request to be placed on "leave without pay" status. The "leave without pay" status assigned to Petitioner during that period was assigned for administrative purposes and did not indicate that the leave had been authorized or approved. The medical certification submitted by Petitioner is for the period of March 16 - 28, 1988. No medical certification was submitted for the period of February 1 - March 16, 1988.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued concluding that the Petitioner abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of August, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 1988. APPENDIX The following constitute rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the panties to this case. Petitioner Accepted. Accepted, however, letter indicated that continued absence would constitute abandonment. Accepted, insofar as the absence from 2/2/88 to 3/2/88, however, Petitioner did not notify Respondent of his situation until 3/28/88, (or 26 days following termination). Accepted. Accepted. Rejected, irrelevant. Accepted, however, such leave must receive prior approval. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected, irrelevant. Rejected. If Petitioner was unable, as counsel asserts, to form the intent to resign from his position he was likewise unable to form the intent to return. Respondent Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected, irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected, unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathy R. Newman, Esquire Legal Services of North Florida, Inc. 211 East Jefferson Street Quincy, Florida 32351 Dennis X. Crowley, Esquire Florida State Hospital Administration Building Chattahoochee, Florida 32324 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether J. Glenn Brown, Jr., was an "employee" of Northwest Florida Community Hospital for purposes of the State of Florida retirement system?
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, Board of Trustees of the Northwest Florida Community Hospital (hereinafter referred to as the "Board of Trustees"), is the governing body of the Northwest Florida Community Hospital. Petitioner, Board of County Commissioners of Washington County, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "County Commissioners"), is the governing body of Washington County, Florida, and the owner of the Northwest Florida Community Hospital. The Respondent, the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (hereinafter referred to as the "Division"), is the agency charged with responsibility for administering the Florida retirement system established by Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. Operation of Northwest Florida Community Hospital Prior to February of 1988. The Northwest Florida Community Hospital (hereinafter referred to as the "Hospital"), is a small, rural acute-care hospital located in Chipley, Washington County, Florida. During the mid-1980's, the Hospital suffered from a financial crisis that threatened its continued existence. As a consequence thereof, it was concluded that the Hospital should be sold. A contract was negotiated and entered into for the sale of the Hospital to National Healthcare, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "NHI"). As a part of the contract entered into with NHI, NHI was to operate the Hospital before the contract for sale was completed. J. Glenn Brown was an employee of NHI. NHI assigned Mr. Brown to the Hospital to act as the administrator of the Hospital. As administrator of the Hospital, Mr. Brown was the top manager of the Hospital. Mr. Brown, while employed by NHI, acted as the administrator of the Hospital from September 1986, until approximately September or October of 1987. At some time prior to February 1988, the contract for sale of the Hospital to NHI was cancelled and the Board of Trustees began to operate the Hospital. The Consulting Contracts. On or about February 1, 1988 the Hospital and Mr. Brown entered into a Consulting Contract (hereinafter referred to as the "First Contract"). Petitioner's exhibit 1. Mr. Brown agreed in the First Contract to operate the Hospital. Mr. Brown operated the Hospital pursuant to the First Contract until its expiration. Although the term of the First Contract ended January 31, 1991, Mr. Brown continued to operate the Hospital. A second Consulting Contract (hereinafter referred to as the "Second Contract"), was entered into on or about May 29, 1992 between Mr. Brown and the Hospital. The Second Contract applied to the period February 1, 1992, through February 1, 1993. Mr. Brown continued to perform services for the Hospital between the end of the First Contract and the beginning of the Second Contract. The differences between the First Contract and the Second Contract (hereinafter referred to jointly as the "Consulting Contracts"), were not substantial other than the amount of the annual fee to be paid to Mr. Brown. The Treatment of Mr. Brown for Purposes of the Florida Retirement System. During the period of time that Mr. Brown operated the Hospital from February 1, 1988 until he departed in the fall of 1992, the Hospital treated Mr. Brown as an "independent contractor" and not an "employee" for purposes of the Florida retirement system. Although the Hospital could have requested a determination of Mr. Brown's status for purposes of the Florida retirement system, the Hospital was not required to do so. The Hospital, as it was authorized to do pursuant to Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, made the initial decision to treat Mr. Brown as an independent contractor. After Mr. Brown had left the Hospital, an audit of the Hospital was conducted by the management review section of the Division. As a result of the audit, the Division raised a question about the status of Mr. Brown for purposes of the Florida retirement system. As a result of the audit of the Hospital, the Division required the Hospital to submit a Florida Retirement System Employment Relationship Questionnaire form requesting a determination of Mr. Brown's status as an employee or independent contractor. The Hospital did so. See Respondent's exhibit 2. The Division reviewed the Questionnaire and determined that Mr. Brown was an "employee" for purposes of the Florida retirement system, and so notified the Hospital. The Hospital filed a request for a formal administrative hearing to contest the Division's determination that Mr. Brown was an employee. Based upon the foregoing, it is the Division that is attempting to change the status quo in this matter. But for the Division's audit and requirement that the Hospital file a Questionnaire, the Hospital's treatment of Mr. Brown as an independent contractor for purposes of the Florida retirement system would have been final. Services to be Provided by Mr. Brown Pursuant to the Consulting Contracts and Mr. Brown's Relationship with the Board of Trustees. Mr. Brown, referred to as the "consultant" in the Consulting Contracts, agreed to provide the following services: 1:1 The Hospital hereby contracts with Consultant to provide services to the Hospital to perform such services as may be necessary to properly and efficiently run the Hospital for the purpose of providing quality healthcare to the citizens of Washington County and a more productive business operation. 1:2 Consultant hereby contracts with the Hospital to perform such services as may be necessary to provide the Hospital advice, expertise and a more efficient and productive business operation. The Consulting Contracts also contained the following provision pertaining to Mr. Brown's operation of the Hospital: 2:1 Consultant agrees to devote such of his time and efforts to the performance of such services as are necessary to perform and achieve the objectives set forth in Article I above. Consultant agrees that he will not directly or indirectly render any service of a business, commercial or professional nature to any other Hospital in Northwest Florida, whether for compensation or otherwise, during the term of this Agreement without the prior written consent of the Board of Trustees of the Hospital. Consultant agrees to comply with the Hospital's policies, rules and regulations as determined from time to time by the Board of Trustees of the Hospital. It was the intent of the Hospital and Mr. Brown that he would act as an independent contractor, and not an employee, in performing the services contemplated by the Consulting Contracts. Mr. Brown was to, and did, provide his services personally. Mr. Brown did not operate through a corporation or other business entity. Between February 1988 and the Fall of 1992, Mr. Brown administered the Hospital in essentially the same manner that he had prior to 1988 while employed by NHI. The Board of Trustees established policies for the operation of the Hospital during the term of the Consulting Contracts. Mr. Brown carried out policies adopted by the Board of Trustees. Mr. Brown was involved in the formulation of policies by the Board of Trustees and he advised the Board of Trustees concerning policies it adopted. The Board of Trustees had little experience in operating the Hospital. The day- to-day operations of the Hospital had been handled by NHI prior to entering into the First Contract. Prior to NHI's operation of the Hospital, the Hospital was administered by Hospital Corporation of America (hereinafter referred to as "HCA"). HCA had operated the Hospital through an employee, Buel Sapp. The Board of Trustees, therefore, relied heavily on Mr. Brown and his expertise in developing polices and for his efficient operation of the Hospital. The manner in which Mr. Brown administered the Hospital was also largely the same as the manner in which the Hospital has been administered by the person who replaced by Mr. Brown. The new administrator has been treated as an "employee" by the Hospital. Training. Mr. Brown was a professional hospital administrator with a number of years of experience operating hospitals, including the Hospital. In light of Mr. Brown's experience, especially at the Hospital, training was not required when Mr. Brown undertook the services contemplated by the First Contract. Integration. The services to be performed pursuant to the Consulting Contacts were integral to the operation of the Hospital. Mr. Brown performed services normally performed by an "administrator" or top manager of any hospital. Manner In Which Mr. Brown Performed Services. Mr. Brown did not hire any assistants or employees to assist him in the performance of the services required by the Consulting Contracts. The Consulting Contracts did not prevent Mr. Brown from using the services of others to carry out the services to be provided. Although Mr. Brown was ultimately obligated to insure that the services contemplated by the Consulting Contracts were provided, the manner in which services required by the Consulting Contracts were to be carried out was not specified. Continuing Relationship. Mr. Brown was required, as a condition of the Hospital entering into the First Contract, to move to Washington County. Pursuant to the First Contract, Mr. Brown was obligated to perform services for the Hospital for a period of four years. The First Contract expired February 1, 1991. The Second Contract obligated Mr. Brown to perform services for the Hospital for a period of one year. The Second Contract was effective February 1, 1992. Mr. Brown continued to perform services for the Hospital between February 1, 1991 and February 1, 1992, although the First Contract had expired and the Second Contract had not yet been entered into. The evidence failed to prove why Mr. Brown continued to perform services for the Hospital between February 1, 1991, and February 1, 1992. Mr. Brown performed services for the Hospital after he left NHI for between 3 and 4 years. Mr. Brown's Working Hours. Mr. Brown's working hours were not specified in the Consulting Contracts. Mr. Brown, therefore, was not legally required to perform services during any set period of time. Mr. Brown generally performed services for the Hospital from the early morning until the early evening. Mr. Brown's hours were consistent with the hours worked by employees of the Hospital. Mr. Brown did not keep time-sheets indicating the hours he worked. Nor did Mr. Brown use, or "punch," a time-clock which employees of the Hospital used. Full-Time or Part-Time Work. Mr. Brown was not required to work any set amount of hours pursuant to the Consulting Contracts. The services expected of Mr. Brown pursuant to the Consulting Contracts reasonably contemplated that Mr. Brown would perform services full- time, only if necessary. The Consulting Contracts also provided that Mr. Brown was not required to perform services on days he attended seminars or meetings to improve his position. The Consulting Contracts also required that Mr. Brown make himself available "for all reasonable meetings, engagements, and any and all other reasonable attempts by the Hospital to promote the Hospital." Mr. Brown did not receive annual or sick leave. Mr. Brown did not work at the Hospital every day of the week. During some weeks, he only worked three or four days. Where Mr. Brown Performed Services. Although not specifically required to do so, Mr. Brown performed the services contemplated by the Consulting Contracts essentially on the premises of the Hospital. In order to effectively administer the Hospital, it was necessary that Mr. Brown be available at the Hospital. Reports from Mr. Brown to the Hospital. Mr. Brown regularly reported to the Board of Trustees and kept the Board informed of his actions. Compensation for Mr. Brown's Services. Pursuant to the First Contract, Mr. Brown was paid an annual fee of $70,555.00. The annual fee was paid biweekly in twenty-six equal installments. Payments were made on the last day of every other week. The annual fee to be paid to Mr. Brown pursuant to the First Contract was agreed upon during negotiations based upon the average salary paid to administrators of similarly sized hospitals who were serving as employees, and adding thereto the amount of withholding tax, retirement contributions and other amounts which would be paid on behalf of an "employee." Had Mr. Brown been hired as an "employee", presumably he would have only been paid an amount based upon the average salary of other employee/administrators. Pursuant to the Second Contract Mr. Brown was paid an annual fee of $98,770.00. The annual fee was paid monthly on the first day of each month and upon the submission of an invoice from Mr. Brown. The Consulting Contracts also provided the following: Consultant hereby acknowledges and agrees that he is an independent contractor individually liable for self employment and all other taxes of any nature due on the fees paid by the Hospital to Consultant. Payments of Mr. Brown's annual fee were made to him by the Hospital out of a separate account and not the Hospital's "payroll" account from which Hospital employees were paid. Payments were made at the same time that Hospital employees were paid. The Hospital also paid for group health insurance for Mr. Brown. Health insurance benefits provided to Mr. Brown were the same benefits provided to Hospital employees. The Hospital also paid for disability insurance for Mr. Brown and a life insurance policy larger than provided to Hospital employees. Mr. Brown's Expenses; Tools and Materials; Investment. Pursuant to the Consulting Contracts, the Hospital paid dues Mr. Brown was required to pay to maintain "membership in applicable organizations or associations deemed necessary for promotion of the Hospital " The Hospital paid expenses incurred by Mr. Brown to attend meetings and seminars on new federal and state health care regulations which impacted the operation of the Hospital. The Hospital paid Mr. Brown a vehicle allowance of $250.00. The Hospital also provided Mr. Brown with an office, furniture, office supplies, a secretary (who was an employee of the Hospital) and with telephone and other services necessary to operate as the administrator of the Hospital. The office provided to Mr. Brown was the office used by the Hospital administrator. Other then Mr. Brown's education, Mr. Brown did not have any substantial investment in his position with the Hospital. Capital investment necessary for Mr. Brown to carry out his duties was provided by the Hospital. Profit and Loss Potential. In light of the fact that Mr. Brown was guaranteed payment for his services and the lack of investment and expenses Mr. Brown was required to provide, there was no reasonable potential Mr. Brown would incur a loss. Mr. Brown operated as an individual. Offer of Services to the General Public. The Consulting Contracts prohibited Mr. Brown from providing his services to others in "Northwest Florida." Mr. Brown was, therefore, free to perform services elsewhere. During the term of the Consulting Contracts, Mr. Brown did perform services for other companies located outside of Florida. Article X of the Consulting Contracts provided, in pertinent part, the following: . . . . Consultant further agrees that he shall not participate, directly or indirectly, individually or as a partner, shareholder, employee, agent, consultant, officer, director or otherwise, in any other business where such participation will in any manner interfere (as reasonably determined by the Board of Trustees and Consultant) with the business of the Hospital or which ultimately, in the final opinion of the Board of Trustees, could result in the integrity of the Hospital being subject to doubt. Right to Terminate Mr. Brown and Mr. Brown's Right to Quit. Pursuant to the Consulting Contracts, the Hospital had the right to terminate Mr. Brown's services for "good cause" as determined by majority vote of the Board of Trustees and "upon sixty (60) calendar days written notice of termination to the Consultant." The Hospital was required, however, to pay Mr. Brown for four months of service. The Hospital also had the right to terminate Mr. Brown's services if he were convicted of a felony, required to take treatment for drug or alcohol abuse, engaged in activity harmful to the reputation of the Hospital or failed to comply with the terms of the Consulting Contract. Mr. Brown was authorized by the Consulting Contracts to terminate his services upon sixty days written notice. The Consulting Contracts provide that the agreement terminated upon the death of Mr. Brown. Weighted Consideration of the Facts. Several of the facts in this case indicate that Mr. Brown was an independent contractor of the Hospital and several of the facts indicate that he was an employee. Based upon a weighted consideration of the facts in this case, it is concluded that Mr. Brown operated as an independent contractor, and not an employee, for the Hospital.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order concluding that J. Glenn Brown, Jr., was not a compulsory member of the Florida retirement system pursuant to Section 121.051, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1635 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Hospital's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1. Accepted in 2 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 7-8. Accepted in 28. Accepted in 10. See 11-13 and 38-39. The First Contract expired January 31, 1991, and not January 31, 1992. Accepted in 16 and 24. Accepted in 35. Accepted in 54 and hereby accepted. The last sentence is not relevant. 9 Accepted in 26, 42-43, 52, 57 and 63. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 68. Accepted in 48. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 30-31. Accepted in 3. The Division's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 4-6. Accepted in 7. Accepted in 9 and hereby accepted. 4 Accepted in 10,53-54, 58-59 and 62. Accepted in 28. Accepted in 23. Accepted in 23 and 69. The first sentence is not relevant. 8 Accepted in 41-42, 44, 47, 52-53 and 63. See 41-43 and hereby accepted. Although Ms. Ward did testify consistent with this finding of fact, the testimony was not sufficiently detailed to conclude that Mr. Brown and Mr. Mason provided services in exactly the same manner. Accepted in 61. 12 Accepted in 11-14, 38-39 and 55. Accepted in 14, 25 and 66. Accepted in 23. Accepted in 60-61. See 73. See 53-62. The conclusion on page 10 is not supported by the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald Holley, Esquire Post Office Box 268 Chipley, Florida 32428 William S. Howell, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 187 Chipley, Florida 32428 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Division of Retirement Department of Management Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Building C Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Sylvan Strickland, Esquire Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 309 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner in September 1999.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Because of a "gut feeling that something was wrong" when he was not hired, Petitioner, Ausbon Brown, Jr. (Petitioner), an African-American male born on April 25, 1943, filed a complaint alleging that Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services (Department), unlawfully refused to hire him for any one of four positions he applied for on account of his race, gender, and age. The Department denies the allegation and contends that it hired the most qualified employee in each instance. After a preliminary investigation was conducted by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission), which took over twenty months to complete, the Commission issued a Determination: No Cause on August 18, 1999. Although not specifically established at hearing, it can be reasonably inferred from the evidence that Respondent employed at least fifteen employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year and thus is an employer within the meaning of the law. Petitioner received a Bachelor of Science degree in biology in 1965 from Florida A&M University, a Master of Science degree in wildlife and fisheries science in 1978 from Texas A&M University, and a doctorate in wildlife and fisheries science in 1991 from Texas A&M University. Petitioner's job applications reflect that from June 1965 until April 1994, he worked in various positions for the U. S. Department of Commerce, National Marine Fisheries Service, including as a "survey statistician," "operations research analyst," "chief turtle headstart," "fisheries biologist," "fisheries technician," and "equal opportunity employment counselor." Petitioner then apparently retired from federal service. Beginning on July 28, 1995, and continuing for several years, he was employed as a child support enforcement case analyst with the Florida Department of Revenue (DOR). His current employment is not of record in this case. Although Petitioner says he applied "continuously" for at least fourteen positions with the Department after leaving federal service, only four applications are in issue here. They involve positions 012123, 10081, 60287, and 60288. Position 012123 was a Management Review Specialist in the Department's Tallahassee district office ; position 10081 was an Operations and Management Consultant II at the Northeast Florida State Hospital in Macclenny; position 60287 was an Operations and Management Consultant II in the Department's Daytona Beach district office; and position 60288 was an Operations and Management Consultant II at the Department's central office in Tallahassee. Position 60287 was originally assigned to the Family Safety and Preservation Program in District 12 and required that the applicant have experience in child neglect and foster services. It was first advertised through a Job Opportunity Announcement (JOA) published on December 24, 1996. Because it was a "highly responsible" position that more closely fit within District Administration, the position was later "pulled" from the Family Safety and Preservation Program and transferred to District Administration. On January 8, 1997, Jane Miller (Miller), a black female and at that time a Program Administrator for the Family Safety and Preservation Program, submitted an interoffice memorandum requesting that she be given a 2-step demotion from pay grade 25 to 23, so that she could fill the position. It can be inferred from the evidence that her request for a demotion was due to a legislatively-mandated reorganization in 1997 that eliminated or transferred a number of positions. Because it was in the best interest of the Department, and Miller was fully qualified to assume the position, the Department decided to fill the slot through a demotion rather than from the applicant pool, and Miller's request was granted. After the position was transferred to District Administration, however, she demoted into another position involving day care licensure, rather than 60287. In response to the JOA, Petitioner timely filed his application. On January 14, 1997, he received a letter from the Department which advised that the position was being "filled by an employee who has taken a voluntary demotion with the department to assume this role." Although this ultimately turned out not to be true, when the letter was sent, the Department did in fact intend to fill the position through Miller's demotion, and thus it was an accurate representation at that time. The undersigned rejects the contention that the above letter, without a second letter to applicants explaining what actually occurred later, proves that there was discrimination. As noted above, after the January 14 letter was sent, the position was transferred to District Administration. A short time later, the reorganization of the Department was implemented, and Betsy Lewis (Lewis), a female whose age and race are unknown, filled the slot through a lateral reassignment that became effective on October 27, 1997. Prior to her reassignment, Lewis had held a similar position and was fully qualified. There was no evidence that the Department accepted Miller's demotion, then transferred the position to District Administration, and then laterally reassigned Lewis in order to deny Petitioner employment on account of his age, race, or gender. Position 60288, also an Operations and Management Consultant II, was located at the Department's central office in Tallahassee, Florida. Under current record retention requirements for that office, the Department purges "all records for employment received from individuals seeking employment but [who] were not hired" two years after the application deadline. Because more than two years have gone by since the application deadline, all of the records pertaining to the applicants who sought that position have been purged; therefore, a complete file relating to this position was not available at the final hearing. Position 60288 involved the compilation, analysis, and reporting of substance abuse data for the Department's substance abuse program. After he filed his application, Petitioner was given a telephone interview by Dr. L. E. Stivers, Program Administrator for Policy Integration & Information Systems. Although Petitioner says he had a "congenial interview" with Dr. Stivers, he was not considered because of a lack of proficiency in substance abuse language. Because Petitioner did not believe that knowledge of substance abuse was a prerequisite for a computer-related job in the substance abuse program, he asserted that Dr. Stivers was biased towards him, was "stretching for a reason to eliminate [him]," and used the lack of proficiency in drug abuse language as a pretext for not hiring him. These assertions have been rejected as not being credible. Of the candidates interviewed for the job, only three names were submitted to the Assistant Secretary for Substance Abuse for further consideration. Petitioner was not one of the three. Ultimately, a male (Robert Morrell) whose age and race are unknown, was hired for the job. That individual had direct experience in performing substance abuse data collection in the same department where the position was located, and he was the most qualified candidate. Position 10081, an Operations and Management Consultant II, was assigned to the Northeast Florida State Hospital in Macclenny, Florida. According to the vacancy announcement, the position's duties included "the support, consultation and guidance of the Unit Treatment and Rehabilitation Directors in the development and implementation of policies and procedures in the multi-discipline treatment and rehabilitation of mentally and physically ill residents in the area of Unit Operations." Thus, the position required that the individual have a working knowledge of the treatment of mental health patients and preferably a background in mental health. Petitioner met the minimum qualifications stated in the job announcement document and, along with seven other candidates, was given an interview. All candidates were asked the same questions. Petitioner contended that none of the questions asked were relevant, and most dealt with the "treatment of patients." This is hardly surprising, however, since the facility treats the mentally ill. A contention that the questions were unfair and were framed so as to exclude all "external" candidates has been rejected. The position was ultimately filled by Mary Jane Hartenstein (Hartenstein), a white female who was younger than Petitioner, and who received the highest score of all the applicants. At the time she was hired, Hartenstein served as a Unit Treatment Rehabilitation Director at the facility and was familiar with the treatment of mental health patients. She was the most qualified applicant because of her prior experience. The final position was 012123, a Management Review Specialist in the Tallahassee district office. The position called for familiarity with "planning, information resource planning, legislative budget requests, performance of needs assessment and knowledge of health and human services." John Girvin (Girvin), a white male whose age was the same as Petitioner, was ultimately selected for the job. Girvin had prior experience as a deputy secretary and assistant division director for the Department of Commerce and also served with the Historical Preservation Society. The evidence supports a finding that he was the most qualified person for the job. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Petitioner pointed out that when he had previously submitted his qualifications to his former employer (DOR) in 1996, he received a letter from DOR indicating that DOR "felt" that he qualified for a number of positions within the agency, including a Management Review Specialist. Therefore, Petitioner contended that this affirmation of qualifications by DOR also qualified him for the same type of position with another state agency, including the Department's position 012123. Assuming this to be true, it merely means that Petitioner met the minimum qualifications for such a position; it does not mean that he was the best qualified person for the job. As noted above, a more qualified individual was selected for the position. Petitioner further contended that nothing in the basic job announcement for position 10081 indicated that skills in "psychosocial" services were needed. That document, however, merely identified the minimum qualifications, and further details concerning the specific job requirements could have been obtained from the hospital's human resources office. Petitioner has also contended that existing employees of an agency have an advantage over "external" candidates since they can more easily obtain direct experience in the desired area as well as information about "vital criteria" for the job. Even if this is true, it does not equate to a discriminatory practice within the meaning of the law. Moreover, the evidence here shows that the most qualified person was hired in each instance. Finally, Petitioner asserts that the Department violated various Department of Management Services rules in the hiring process, such as failing to timely notify him after Wilson did not actually demote into position 60287, and ignoring the generic minimum qualifications which apply to similar positions in all agencies. The latter claim has been rejected, but even if a technical error occurred, such as the Department failing to send a second letter regarding position 60287, such action was harmless and was not taken with discriminatory animus. In summary, there was no credible evidence that the Department "chang[ed] classifications and var[ied] conditions of employment" in an effort to deny Petitioner employment, or that the Department's actions were a pretext for discrimination, as alleged in the Petition for Relief. Further, there is no evidence that the employment decisions were grounded on discriminatory animus in any respect, or that a discriminatory reason motivated the Department in its actions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing, with prejudice, the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of April, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Ausbon Brown, Jr. Post Office Box 289 Daytona Beach, Florida 32636 Kevin E. Hyde, Esquire Natasha A. Garrison, Esquire Foley & Lardner 200 Laura Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Daniel T. Medved, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 210 North Palmetto Avenue, Suite 412 Daytona Beach, Florida 32114-3269 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
