The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner is entitled to licensure as a clinical laboratory technologist in microbiology.
Findings Of Fact Applications for licensure as a medical technologist in microbiology are available from the Board's office. With the application, the Board staff sends directions for completing the application form, a copy of the relevant statutes and Board rules, the names and addresses of accredited and Board-approved medical technology training programs, and other materials. Petitioner's application for licensure as a medical technologist is dated January 20, 1999. She submitted that application and all required fees for licensure to the Board. Petitioner received her degree as a doctor of medicine from the Higher Institute of Medical Sciences in Havana, Cuba. That degree satisfies the educational requirements for licensure as a medical technologist in the State of Florida. In addition to minimum educational requirements, licensure as a technologist requires certain minimum experience working in a clinical laboratory performing a wide array of tests or completion of a technologist-level accredited or Board- approved medical technology training program. This requirement is clearly set forth in the materials the Board forwarded to Petitioner as part of her application package. The training program Petitioner completed in Cuba is not on the list of the Board's approved or accredited medical technology training programs. Petitioner acknowledges that she has not enrolled in, or completed, a technologist-level accredited or Board-approved technology training program. Therefore, in order to take the licensure examination and qualify for licensure Petitioner must have completed three years of full-time employment in a clinical laboratory performing a wide array of tests. None of Petitioner's work experience has been in the United States. With her application, Petitioner did not submit any employment verification forms from her employers. Instead, Petitioner submitted affidavits from people who knew her in Cuba and in Nicaragua. These affidavits conflict with each other, with Petitioner's resumé she submitted to the Board along with her application, and with Petitioner's testimony at the final hearing. On her application, Petitioner represented under oath that she was employed from June 1994 to July 1996 at the Institute of Tropical Medicine Pedro Kouri in Havana, from August 1996 to July 1997 at the Julio Trigo General Hospital in Havana, and from October 1997 to July 1998 at the National Center of Diagnostic and References in Managua, Nicaragua. She represented that she performed a wide variety of testing at each of these institutions, processing patient samples. However, on her resumé, which she submitted to the Board along with her application, Petitioner represents that at these three institutions, she was employed as a laboratory supervisor, charged with assessing laboratory personnel, and as a researcher. Her resumé also lists extensively the research studies she performed and her teaching experience. In support of her testimony at the final hearing that she possesses the required three years of pertinent clinical experience performing the required testing, Petitioner presented the testimony of Caridad Gonzalez and Biarda Villaverde. Ms. Gonzalez is a licensed medical technologist currently employed in the State of Florida. She testified that she worked with Petitioner at the Institute of Tropical Medicine Pedro Kouri from 1994 through 1996 and at the Julio Trigo General Hospital from 1996 through 1998. These dates conflict with those set forth in two affidavits Gonzalez provided to the Board as part of Petitioner's application for licensure. Further, in her own sworn application for licensure filed with the Board, Gonzalez never mentioned having been employed at the Institute of Tropical Medicine Pedro Kouri. Additionally, Gonzalez left Cuba and came to the United States in April 1997 and was not, therefore, employed in Cuba with Petitioner through 1998. Her testimony at final hearing, therefore, lacks credibility. Biarda Villaverde testified that she worked with Petitioner at the Institute of Tropical Medicine Pedro Kouri from June 1994 to June 1995 in a clinical setting. However, Villaverde and Petitioner worked in different laboratories at that institution. Villaverde, therefore, cannot support Petitioner's testimony as to the work performed by Petitioner since she did not work in the same laboratory. Further, the facility was a diagnostic, research, and teaching facility, where some tests were performed on animals, depending upon the type of research conducted. Villaverde testified that Petitioner was assigned to the research division at this facility. Research does not qualify for the work experience required for licensure as a medical technologist. Even if some of Petitioner's research experience could be counted toward the required clinical experience, Petitioner both admitted and denied at the final hearing that she performed research, primarily representing that she worked full-time performing the required array of testing on patient samples. Several of the accredited or Board-approved technologist training programs are located in South Florida, where Petitioner resides. A training program takes one to two years to complete, depending upon the program. Although Petitioner expressed her unhappiness with the length of time her application for licensure has been pending, she could have completed a program, thus obtaining the minimum required experience for licensure, had she chosen to do so upon learning the minimum requirements for licensure. Petitioner's argument that she should be given credit for her work in the laboratories in Cuba and Nicaragua since they complied with World Health Organization quality control standards is without merit. The World Health Organization does not regulate or set quality control standards for clinical laboratories. The World Health Organization only gathers statistical data and publishes studies.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a clinical laboratory technologist in microbiology. DONE AND ENTERED this 4thday of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Zenia Flores de Apodaca 1698 West 65th Street Hialeah, Florida 33012 Mary S. Miller, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Joe Baker, Jr., Executive Director Board of Clinical Laboratory Personnel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A07 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3257 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issues in this proceeding is whether Petitioner was the subject of unlawful sexual harassment by Respondent and whether Petitioner was subjected to unlawful retaliation for participation in an activity protected under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Julie Hembrough, was a female employee of Respondent, Sikorsky Support Services. She was employed as a senior calibration technician at the Pensacola Naval Air Station (Pensacola NAS). As part of her duties she was in charge of monitoring the quality of the work her section performed and the employees who performed that work. Petitioner came to work at Pensacola NAS with Sikorsky’s predecessor, Lear Siegler (LSI). Sikorsky is a “drug free” workplace and has a written policy, entitled "Sikorsky Support Services, Inc. Strike Pensacola, Florida Drug-Free Work Force and Work Place Manual,” as part of its collective bargaining agreement. The drug free workplace policy requires periodic random drug testing of employees. The policy states: An employee who refuses to take a drug test under Section . . .V.5 Random Testing will be terminated for violation of this policy. Petitioner went through an initial drug test when Sikorsky took over the Pensacola NAS maintenance contract and hired the LSI workers. Petitioner was aware that random drug testing occurred and was required by Respondent. She knew that there had been previous random drug tests at the Pensacola NAS. Petitioner was considered a hard worker and competent technical leader of her calibration section. However, there were personality conflicts throughout the section in which Petitioner worked. The problems in the section stemmed from a weak supervisor, who was eventually terminated, who did not hold employees to the performance standards for the section, and who did not support the technical leaders, like Petitioner, when they tried to enforce those performance standards. The supervisory problems resulted in various factions in the work place. The factions were comprised of both male and female employees. Petitioner had particular conflicts with two employees, Roger York and Leon Mills. Petitioner herself testified that her conflicts with Roger York stemmed from a work disagreement regarding the repair of certain Navy radios. Mr. Mills did not want to perform certain tests on Navy radios that Petitioner thought were required for thorough testing of the radios. Petitioner also felt, with some factual basis, that Mr. Mills was not honest with her when he represented to her that he had performed such tests. Petitioner’s problems with Leon Mills were of a similar nature to those with Mr. York. However, Mr. Mills accused Petitioner of fraud in relation to trying to get rid of him. The evidence did not demonstrate that any of the difficulties with these men were related to Petitioner’s gender, but what little unspecified name-calling or derogatory statements there were was the result of animosity toward Petitioner and her supervisory role. Some workers considered Petitioner a “spy” for the Respondent. Other workers accused Petitioner of trying to “get rid of” Leon Mills through fraudulent means. Indeed Mr. Mills complained to the union about Petitioner and that he thought she was trying to get rid of him. Feelings against Petitioner were so strong that, even though she was a member of the union, she was asked by the union shop steward to not attend a union meeting. Respondent had no input or control over the union’s request to Petitioner. In September 2000, Petitioner orally complained to her manager, Joe Diehl, that another male worker used the word "bitch" and talked about his sex life and that someone else told her to put on some makeup. The details of the facts surrounding these comments were not introduced into evidence. Therefore, it is unclear if they were harassing in nature. Petitioner was never physically grabbed or groped by anyone at Sikorsky, was not sexually propositioned, and no one ever threatened her with adverse action if she refused to perform any type of sexual activity. She did not see open pornography in the workplace. Moreover, such sporadic comments do not constitute sexual harassment. She again complained in August 2001. The actual written complaints were not introduced into evidence. In essence, the bulk of the oral complaints revolved around the work problems in the section and the multi-gender employee animosity toward Petitioner. Sikorsky took Petitioner’s complaints seriously and investigated the complaints. During the investigation, people from the “upper echelon” of the company were brought in to investigate. However, the investigators could not corroborate Petitioner’s claims of sexual harassment. They did find that the section had various problems as described above. Nevertheless, to make sure that everyone understood the seriousness of sexual harassment issues, the site manager held a training session on Sikorsky’s sexual harassment policies. Petitioner attended the training session. The site manager also personally delivered the findings of the investigators to Petitioner, to show he was involved and to make Petitioner understand that Sikorsky was taking the issue seriously. Petitioner was invited to come forward with any complaints she may have at any time. After advising Petitioner of the results of the investigation, the site manager spoke to her several times encouraging her to come forward with any issues. He stopped by Petitioner’s work area in the section and asked if she was having any problems. Petitioner told him things were going okay and that she was not having any problems. Petitioner testified that sometime in May, she advised her supervisors that she intended to file another internal complaint because of actions by the union and because she had found “hot sauce” on her vehicle. Petitioner complained that the union accused her of committing fraud and that she was excluded from a union meeting. However, as indicated above, it was the union steward, not Sikorsky, that asked Petitioner not to attend the union meeting. Sikorsky was not involved in the union meeting or any accusations of fraud by the union against Petitioner. These facts do not support a finding of sexual harassment by Sikorsky. The “hot sauce” incident occurred while her vehicle was parked in an open, unfenced parking lot owned by the U.S. Navy. The Navy was responsible for security in the parking lot. Petitioner discovered that someone had poured hot sauce over her vehicle. Upon seeing the substance, Petitioner got in her vehicle and drove home. She called her manager from her vehicle to inform him about the incident. He advised her it was probably “too late” to do anything since she had left the scene. Petitioner did not see anyone put the substance on her vehicle, and does not know who did it, although she strongly suspects it was a particular coworker. Petitioner never reported the incident to Navy security. Without more detail and given the animosity in the workplace with allegations of spying and fraud, the incident does not support any finding that Petitioner was sexually harassed or that Sikorsky was responsible for such alleged harassment. On May 6, 2002, seventeen Sikorsky employees were selected for random urinalysis at Sikorsky; five employees were selected as alternates. Petitioner was one of the employees selected. Sikorsky employs a third-party contractor, Professional Health Examiners (PHE), to select the individuals to be drug tested and to administer the drug test. PHE and Sikorsky use a “name blind” system to select individuals for testing. Before a test day, Sikorsky’s administrative manager sends a list of partial social security numbers to PHE. Sikorsky does not give names to PHE, but only partial social security numbers. PHE then inputs the partial social security numbers into a computer program, which randomly selects a percentage of the numbers. Once the numbers are selected, PHE sends the list of numbers to Sikorsky. The administrative manager then matches the selected numbers with an employee list to determine the employees named. On the day of the test, those selected are called to take the test at a specific time and location. Petitioner was notified of her selection at approximately 7:15 a.m. and told to immediately report to the test site to take the test. She did not go to the drug test site, but went directly to the office of her manager, Joseph Diehl. Petitioner refused to take the drug test at the time the test was scheduled. At the time, Petitioner had no knowledge of the drug testing selection procedures and did not ask what the procedures were; she also wanted to speak with her attorney. Joseph Diehl called the administrative manager. At approximately 7:30 a.m., the administrative manager went to Diehl’s office. Since neither had been confronted with a situation similar to this one, Diehl and the manager allowed Petitioner to call her lawyer. However, her lawyer was unavailable. The morning of the drug test, the site manager and Diehl’s supervisor, Joe Colbert, had jury duty and had not arrived. Therefore, Mr. Diehl called Dan Pennington, the program manager, for guidance. Mr. Pennington stated in more colloquial language, that Petitioner must either immediately submit to the drug test per corporate policy or be terminated. Mr. Diehl, again in more colloquial language, passed the direct order to Petitioner to take the test or face termination. Petitioner said she would not take the test without calling her lawyer. Later in the morning, Petitioner spoke with Michael Neri, her supervisor, and told him she was quitting. Mr Neri had been hired only three weeks earlier and was familiar with the drug test policy. Mr. Neri told Petitioner to take the test, and that if she did not take the test, she would be terminated. Petitioner met with the site manager, Joe Colbert, after 9:00 a.m. He told her to take the test or she would be terminated. He told her that once she took the test, her lawyer could take whatever steps she wanted to take, but that she needed to take the test. All of Petitioner’s supervisors wanted Petitioner to take the test because she was a good employee whom they did not want to terminate. Petitioner did not take the test. Mr. Colbert then suspended Petitioner and gave her a letter of suspension, pending termination. The letter stated that the reason for the suspension was her refusal to take the drug test at the appointed time. Because Petitioner suggested that she had been targeted for selection for the drug test, Mr. Colbert assigned one of his managers, Frank Eggleton, to conduct an investigation of the procedures. Mr. Colbert told Petitioner that if the investigation came back clean, she would be terminated. Later in the morning, at approximately 11:00 a.m., on May 6, 2002, Petitioner called Joe Diehl and informed him that she had spoken to her lawyer and was willing to participate in the random drug testing. However, it was too late. Mr. Colbert refused to allow Petitioner to take the test at that time because she had already been suspended. Mr. Colbert testified that Petitioner had had her opportunity more than once to participate. He was concerned that if he made exceptions to the mandatory random drug testing policy, then it would open the door for everyone to seek to defer taking a random drug test. This rationale was reasonable and not pretextual. Mr. Colbert told Mr. Eggleton to investigate how individual employees were selected for the random drug test and to determine if Petitioner had somehow been targeted. Mr. Colbert did not pressure Mr. Eggleton to reach any particular conclusion and told him to conduct a thorough, open investigation. Mr. Eggleton visited the facilities of PHE to determine how individuals were selected. After conducting his investigation, Mr. Eggleton reported to Mr. Colbert that the drug-testing contractor used a name-blind system for selection and that there was no indication that Petitioner had been targeted. PHE had nothing to do with the decision to terminate Petitioner and Sikorsky did not pressure PHE to select Petitioner for the drug test. In fact, there was no evidence at the hearing that Petitioner was targeted for drug testing. After receiving the investigation report, Mr. Colbert decided to terminate Petitioner’s employment based on her refusal to take the drug test at the appointed time. He obtained the approval of the necessary authorities at Sikorsky. On May 10, 2002, Petitioner’s employment was terminated. In April 2002, employee Brian McHenry was selected for random drug testing. Mr. McHenry, prior to discovering he was going to be drug tested, used the restroom just before he was told of the drug test. As a result, Mr. McHenry was unable to produce a sufficient urine sample to allow PHE to perform a the test. He took part, tried to produce a sample, and actually produced a urine sample, but it was not enough for testing purposes. After a few hours of drinking fluids Mr. McHenry still could not produce a sufficient urine sample. Mr. Colbert wanted Mr. McHenry to stay late until he could provide a sample, but Mr. McHenry had a serious child care problem that day and needed to pick up his child in Alabama. Because Mr. McHenry had tried to complete the drug test, and because of the child care problem, Mr. Colbert told Mr. McHenry to go to the test facility in the morning. Unlike Petitioner, McHenry did not refuse the drug test; he could not provide a sufficient urine sample. The McHenry case is not similar to Petitioner’s situation. Moreover, Mr. Colbert testified that if Mr. McHenry had refused to take the test, he would have been fired. Likewise, there was no evidence at the hearing that Petitioner was terminated because of her previous internal complaints. There was no evidence Petitioner was selected for drug testing because of her previous complaints. In fact Mr. Colbert did not have knowledge of Petitioner’s two complaints, since both complaints were handled by the previous site manager. Mr. Colbert was aware of Petitioner's complaint about hot sauce thrown on her car, but said he did not even consider it a sexual harassment issue. Petitioner did not put forth sufficient evidence to prove a claim of sexual harassment. She did not introduce evidence that any conduct she complained of was severe or pervasive, or that the allegedly harassing conduct was because of her gender, as opposed to some other reason such as thinking she was a spy. Likewise, Petitioner failed to establish that she was terminated for any complaints she had made to Respondent. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gregor J. Schwinghammer, Esquire Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A. Phillips Point, East Tower 777 South Flagler Drive, Suite 500 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Debra Cooper, Esquire Law Offices of Debra Cooper 1008 West Garden Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, by denying Petitioner employment with Respondent because of her sex (female).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a female and a member of a protected class, completed an application for employment with Respondent in or about February of 2002 for the position of Wastewater Operator "C." The particular position she applied for was a night shift position which runs from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. In February of 2002, Respondent had an opening for a Class "C" Wastewater Operator's position. Prior to that time, this position had been open for approximately one year. Respondent's standard interview process for a wastewater position is that Charles McDonald ("McDonald"), the Wastewater Production Supervisor, reviews the applications to see if they have the minimum qualifications for the open position. If the applicant possesses the minimum requirements, McDonald will schedule an initial appointment with the applicant. At this initial appointment, McDonald reviews the duties of the position with the applicant and finds out some general background on the applicant. Once that is accomplished, McDonald will arrange for an interview with his superior, James Anselmo ("Anselmo"), the Division Chief over the water and wastewater treatment facilities of Respondent. Anselmo, in his capacity as a Division Chief, oversees the operations of the water and wastewater treatment facilities of Respondent, as well as all the personnel matters in those departments. Anselmo has served as a supervisor for Respondent for fourteen (14) years, and during that time has not had any grievances or complaints of discriminatory treatment filed against him. The Wastewater Operator "C" that Respondent was seeking to hire was to perform chemical analysis and perform general preventative maintenance work. This chemical analysis work on the water samples consists of performing "solids determination, chlorine residual and pH determination; perform [ing] sludge volume tests; measure dissolved oxygen levels; perform [ing] chlorine residual test; turbidity and telemetry monitoring." These chemical testing duties consist of more than gathering samples, but also include taking them to the lab, actually performing the tests and then reading and recording the results. These lab-testing duties are considered an essential function of this position. The job description for this position also states that an operator "performs general preventive maintenance work" on machines. Anselmo considered this requirement to include changing packing on pumps, changing oil, greasing motors and pumps, making adjustments on machines and fixing broken lines. He feels this requirement is important because it is necessary to have all of his wastewater employees cross-trained to perform multiple functions. Petitioner's application was initially forwarded to Anselmo, who reviewed it and was impressed with the fact that the applicant possessed an "A" license. As a result, he forwarded the application to McDonald to initiate the interview process. It made no difference to Anselmo whether the applicant was a male or a female. In or about March 2002, McDonald contacted Petitioner by telephone and arranged for her to come meet him for an initial interview. During this initial interview with McDonald, Petitioner indicated to him that she did not perform any maintenance duties at her previous employment with the City of Orlando. McDonald mistakenly understood Petitioner to say that she did not do any lab work at the City of Orlando, but rather it was done at the laboratory by others. After the initial interview with McDonald, he spoke with Anselmo and informed him that he had a lady that had put in for the Wastewater Operator "C" position, and suggested that he interview her. McDonald did not emphasize the fact that Petitioner was a female, but rather made his usual comment that it was either a lady or a guy that was coming in for the interview. Anselmo indicated that McDonald should bring her over immediately for the second interview. Petitioner then had an interview with Anselmo in his office later that same day. This interview began by Anselmo and Petitioner shaking hands. McDonald was present and handed Anselmo a copy of Petitioner's application. Prior to this meeting, Anselmo had not been in possession of a copy of Petitioner's application, other than his very brief initial review of it. Before getting into the substantive interview, Anselmo initially said to Petitioner "Carmen Christensen, that's a very unique name. I went to school with a friend, and his name was Carmen also." Anselmo intended this comment simply to be small talk, and to serve as an "ice breaker." Anselmo and McDonald both testified that Anselmo never stated to Petitioner: "I thought you were a man with the name Carmen." They also denied that Anselmo stated "I went to school with a twin by that name." Anselmo made no references to Petitioner's gender during the interview. This testimony is credible. After this initial "ice breaker," Anselmo then reviewed Petitioner's application and began asking her questions about it. As a result of not seeing the application prior to this, Anselmo got a few of the minor items on her application wrong. On her application, Petitioner indicated that her duties at the City of Orlando had required her to "grab samples." In reading this, Anselmo assumed that this meant that Petitioner simply gathered water and did not perform any laboratory tests on the sample. Thus, Anselmo was hoping that Petitioner would elaborate and demonstrate to him that she had actually performed laboratory testing on these samples. During the interview, Anselmo asked Christensen questions about her duties at the City of Orlando. Petitioner responded that she simply collected samples and carried them to the lab, and occasionally, ran a few tests. Petitioner did not share any specific types of tests that she had done while at the City of Orlando. Anselmo encouraged Petitioner to take the opportunity during the interview to elaborate on these duties, but she failed to do so. When he asked her whether she had performed specific tests, she respondent that she did not because laboratory employees had performed those tests at the City of Orlando. Petitioner also did not present Anselmo with any of the written certificates that she now claims she possesses. At no time during the interview did Petitioner give Anselmo sufficient reason to believe that she did more than gather water samples at her previous job and bring them to the lab. During the interview, Anselmo also asked Petitioner questions about her maintenance duties while at the City of Orlando. Petitioner responded that maintenance work at the City of Orlando was done by maintenance personnel and, thus, she had not done any such work. Finally during the interview, Anselmo asked Petitioner about the reasons for her termination by her previous employer, the City of Orlando. Petitioner informed Anselmo that she had been terminated from the City of Orlando based on allegations of "falsified records." The City considers allegations of falsification of records to be a serious violation. Anselmo was not able to verify the reasons for Christensen's termination from the City of Orlando because she had indicated on her application that they could not contact her previous employers. Based on this request by Petitioner, Anselmo made no independent efforts to verify the reason for her termination. At no time during the interview did Anselmo ever tell Petitioner that he did not want females working at the facility. In fact, Anselmo testified that he hires employees based simply on their qualifications, not their gender; although no other female operator is employed by Respondent. Other than the alleged comment about her name, Petitioner did not offer any other evidence that Anselmo had any problem with women working in the wastewater facility. Instead, Petitioner gave her "opinion" that she was not hired because she is a female. At the end of the interview, Anselmo informed Petitioner that Respondent was still accepting applications for the position. Following the interview, Anselmo and McDonald discussed Petitioner's qualifications as a candidate. They agreed that she appeared to be inexperienced based on her responses during the interview. In particular, they were concerned with her lack of maintenance and laboratory testing experience. Anselmo completed an Applicant Referral form on or about March 12, 2002, in which he indicated that Petitioner had been "rejected" for the position of Wastewater Operator "C." On that form, Anselmo indicated that Petitioner had been rejected for employment because she "said she had no lab experience or did not perform any maintenance. Performing lab tests and maintenance is crucial to this position." Anselmo testified that this form accurately sets forth the reasons on which he made the decision to reject Petitioner for employment. Subsequent to Petitioner's interview, McDonald and Anselmo had the opportunity to interview two additional candidates, Richard Neitling ("Neitling") and Richard Burns ("Burns"). Neitling set forth more laboratory testing experience than Petitioner in his interview and on his resume. He indicated during his interview with Anselmo that he had done the specific laboratory tests that Respondent does at its wastewater facility, including BOD's, suspended solids, mixed liquid suspended, sludge samples and TSS. He also indicated during his interview that he had maintenance experience, including tearing down pumps, changing filters and oiling and greasing machines. Based on these expressed qualifications and experience set forth in his application and presented during his interview, as well as the fact that he was a "C" Operator and that was the actual position being offered, Neitling was offered the position of Operator "C." It was later discovered, however, that Neitling had provided false information on his application, and, therefore, he was never actually hired for the position. Respondent then turned its attention to the application of Burns. On his application and resume, Burns indicated that he could perform "all aspects of treatment plant op's." In addition, he indicated that he had 15 years experience as a wastewater plant operator, and that he possessed a Level "A" operator's license, the same license possessed by Petitioner. After submitting his application for employment to Respondent, Burns received an interview from McDonald and the lead operator, Tad Blazer ("Blazer"). During this interview, Burns informed McDonald and Blazer that he had previously done laboratory testing including OUR's, BOD's, fecal's and others. They also asked Burns about his maintenance skills, and he informed them that he had received cross-training in maintenance, preventive maintenance and pulling of pumps while at Orange County. Approximately a week after this initial interview, Burns had an interview with Blazer, McDonald and Anselmo. In this second interview, Burns again shared his laboratory testing experience, his maintenance skills and his cross-training. In particular, Burns represented that he could do all of the laboratory testing that the position required, and that he had extensive background in equipment maintenance. Burns also indicated to Anselmo that he had 15 years of experience in all aspects of the treatment process, including lab work and maintenance duties. In addition, Burns informed them that he had spent two months at Orange County in a cross-training program that consisted of him performing strictly maintenance duties. During this interview, Burns also shared with Anselmo the reasons for his leaving Orange County. He informed Anselmo that he had been terminated by mutual agreement, but that the reasons for the termination involved a conflict with one supervisor, not actual performance problems. Following this interview, but prior to hiring him, Anselmo and McDonald visited Orange County's personnel department and reviewed Burns' file. In reviewing his file, they discovered that he had exceptional evaluations except for his last year, and that the only negative comments in his file involved failure to give proper notice prior to taking a vacation. There were no allegations of falsification of any records in Burns' file at Orange County. Based on his background and hands-on experience, Burns was eventually hired by Respondent for the Operator "C" position in May of 2002. At the time he was hired, Burns could perform all of the functions set forth on Respondent's job description for the position of an Operator "C." More importantly, he had conveyed to McDonald and Anselmo that he was capable of performing all of those duties. Respondent's wastewater facility is smaller than the facility that Petitioner worked at while with the City of Orlando. In fact, the City of Orlando's facility has a capacity of 25 million gallons of water a day, while Respondent's facility can handle only 750,000 gallons per day. In addition, the City of Orlando employs two or three times more employees that Respondent. William Hurley ("Hurley"), the Section Manager for the Orange County Wastewater Utility, testified that he has been employed in the wastewater industry for 28 years, and has worked at four different facilities during that time. In his experience, larger facilities often require different tasks from their operators than smaller facilities require of operators. Hurley also testified that he plays a role in the hiring of operators at Orange County. In this capacity, he would consider it a serious violation, and it would give him serious concern, if an applicant revealed to him during the interview process that there were allegations of her committing a falsification of records at her previous employer.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order which DENIES the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Carmen Christensen 5419 Shiloh Drive Adamsville, Alabama 35005 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul J. Scheck, Esquire Shutts & Bowen LLP 300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1000 Post Office Box 4956 Orlando, Florida 32802-4956 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues in this bid protest are whether, in making a preliminary decision to award a contract for drug screening services, Respondent acted contrary to a governing statute, rule, policy, or project specification; and, if so, whether such misstep(s) was/were clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious, or contrary to competition.
Findings Of Fact The evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. The Request for Proposals On March 14, 2001, the Board authorized the issuance of a request for proposals to solicit offers on a contract for drug screening services. Soon, Request for Proposals No. 149-AA10 (the “RFP”) was issued. The purpose of the RFP, as stated on the first page thereof, was [t]o obtain the services of an organization to conduct applicant and employee specimen collection and drug screening services both to meet the general requirements for collection and drug screening services; and the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act (OTETA) requirements for collection and drug screening services. These professional services are described in the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (M-DCPS) Drug-Free Workplace Technical Guide (Attachment A). The deadline for submission of proposals in response to the RFP was April 10, 2001. Page 3 of the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (M-DCPS) Drug-Free Workplace Technical Guide (the “Guide”) explained that applicants and employees are tested in the following circumstances: (1) upon application for full-time employment; (2) when "reasonable suspicion"1 exists to believe that an employee has impermissibly used drugs or alcohol; (3) as part of routine "fitness for duty" medical examinations2; and (4) as a "follow up" to an employee's completion of a drug rehabilitation program. Because the District employs persons performing safety- sensitive functions and persons who hold commercial driver licenses, the District must comply with a federal law known as the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act (“OTETA”). Employees covered by OTETA are subject to pre-employment testing, post-accident testing, random testing, reasonable suspicion testing, "return-to-duty" testing (after a positive test), follow-up testing, and annual testing. Guide, pp. 10-14. Unlike other employees, persons falling under OTETA are not subject to blood alcohol screening. Guide, p. 22. The type of drug test that the District most frequently requests involves urinalysis. For alcohol testing, breath analysis is the normal practice. Blood alcohol testing is used infrequently. The RFP did not explicitly disclose the District’s relative demand for these various types of tests. Section V of the RFP prescribed the technical requirements with which proposers needed to comply. Subsection C thereof stated, in pertinent part: The collection site is a place where individuals present themselves for the purpose of providing urine or blood specimens to be analyzed for the presence of drugs or alcohol. Page 15 of the Guide added that "[c]ollection sites shall have all of the necessary personnel, materials, equipment, facilities, and supervision to provide for the collection, security, temporary storage, and shipping or transportation of urine specimens to a certified drug testing laboratory." Section V, subsection K set forth four “location parameters [as] examples of locations which shall comprise the areas for collection and drug screening to insure [sic] convenience for applicants and employees.” These “location parameters” essentially divided the Miami-Dade County service area into quadrants. Section V, subsection L, provided in relevant part: “Mobile collection of specimens will be required at some of the Regional Transportation Centers[.]” The Guide, at page 15, further mandated that "[m]obile collection sites" be equipped and staffed "the same as" other collection sites. Section V, subsection M stated, in part: “A collection site is preferred in the area of 1500 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida 33132, for the convenience of any potential employees who wish to provide specimen collection concurrent with a scheduled interview by the Office of Human Resources.” Section V, subsection N, stated: At least one site in the North end and [sic] of Miami-Dade County and one site in the South end of Miami-Dade County must be available to perform reasonable suspicion testing of employees. The hours of operation of these facilities must be from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 midnight. Section VI of the RFP, which addressed the cost of proposed services, instructed that [p]roposals must include an itemization of charges for collection of specimens, initial and confirmatory tests. Such itemized charges will be used in the event a retest is necessary. Retests required as a result of defective equipment, incorrect analysis, or misinterpretation shall be done at the expense of the provider. Section VIII provided that proposals would be “evaluated by [a] selection committee . . . comprised of representatives of the school district, in order to ascertain which proposal best meets the needs of the School Board.” The selection committee (hereafter, “committee”) was to be composed of one administrator each from five separate offices, which were designated in section VIII. Section VIII also established the evaluation criteria to be used by the committee, stating: Evaluation considerations will include, but not be limited to, the following: Responsiveness of the proposal clearly stating an understanding of the work to be performed meeting all the technical guidelines in [the Guide]. Cost may not be the dominant factor, but will have some significance. It will be a particularly important factor when all other evaluation criteria are relatively equal. Documentation of current certification by DHHS; qualifications of laboratory staff members; past experience and record of performance; verification of references. Location of the laboratory and planned method of pick-up from designated collection sites and transportation of specimens according to chain of custody protocol to the drug testing laboratory; turnaround time relative to volume of expected need; accessibility relative to volume of expected need. Primary emphasis in the selection process will be placed on the independence, background, experience, and service of staff to be assigned to the project. Expertise in the areas addressed in the RFP, and the ability to respond in a timely, accurate manner to the district’s requirements is essential. Vendor must have a specific comprehensive plan in place to delineate OTETA collection/testing from general collection/testing. The School District reserves the right to reject any and all proposals submitted and to waive irregularities. . . . . Relevant Details About the Proposals Two proposers, Global and RN, submitted timely responses to the RFP. The following is a look at certain terms in their respective proposals. Global’s Proposal Global was the incumbent provider pursuant to a contract that had been entered into on June 11, 1997. Even before the establishment of the expiring contractual relationship, from 1995 forward, Global had provided general drug testing services for the District. In addition to that, Global had performed fingerprint analyses for the District prior to 1995. Thus, Global had a history with the District. In a Fee Schedule included at page VIII-1 of its proposal, Global quoted the following prices for services: Federal Drug Testing for OTETA covered employees $30.00 * * * Breath Alcohol Testing $25.00 After hour Services Flat fee per donor/employee . $75.00 plus regular testing fee Monday — Friday: 5:00 p.m. — 8:30 a.m. Saturday and Sunday All Day Florida Drug Free Work Place for general employee drug testing $25.00 * * * At page V-1 of its proposal, Global listed ten collection facilities, providing their addresses and hours of operation. According to the proposal, only one of these facilities stays open until midnight. Five of them close each weekday at 4:00 p.m., and four at 5:00 p.m. None is open on weekends. Global offered collection sites in each of the quadrants specified in subsection V.K. of the RFP. It offered a site in the area of 1500 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida, as recommended in subsection V.M. And Global offered at least one site each in the north and south ends of Miami-Dade County, satisfying the geographic requirements of subsection V.N. Global’s south-end site, however, closes at 5:00 p.m. and thus fails to satisfy the requirement, also prescribed in subsection V.N., that such facility remain open until midnight. In addition to these stationary facilities, Global offered the services of a mobile unit. Its proposal stated: ON-SITE COLLECTION After Hours Emergency24 hours Operating hours: Monday — Sunday Via Mobile Unit Global described its mobile unit, at page V-2, as a “self contained air conditioned motor coach equipped with 2 bathrooms, blood drawing chair, urine collection equipment, computerized breach alcohol analyzer with ample facilities for a physician to conduct physical exams on DOT (OTETA) employees and yearly re- certification.” Global, in fact, has three of these mobile units. The vans are available for use by all of Global’s clients. Two vehicles are maintained in Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida, and thus are in position to respond to service calls for the District. The third van is maintained in western Palm Beach County. Because after-hours tests generally are needed in post-accident and reasonable suspicion circumstances, which require a rapid response (within two hours of the incident), the Palm Beach County-based van would not, as a practical matter, likely be deployed for the District. Global does not maintain a mobile unit in Miami-Dade County. B. RN’s Proposal Included in RN’s proposal was the following schedule of costs: RN Expertise charges $27.80 for a 5 panel NIDA drug screen. This charge includes an adulterant panel, 5 panel drug screen, collection of the specimen, transportation charges and MRO charges. There will not be a charge for confirmation tests. RN Expertise charges $26.00 for an 8 panel drug screen. This charge will include an adulterant panel, 8 panel drug screen, collection of the specimen, transportation charges and MRO charges. If the School Board does not elect to have an adulterant panel performed on general tests the charge will be $25.00. RN Expertise charges $25.00 for a breath alcohol test. This also includes on- site testing charges. There will not be a charge for confirmation tests. RN Expertise will charge $30.00 for a blood alcohol test. RN Expertise will submit monthly invoices. These invoices will be submitted to the Office of Operation and Records and/or the Office of Professional Standards (OTETA) through a purchase order. The invoices shall reflect service provided to the Board in the prior month. Regarding collection sites and locations, RN’s proposal stated, at pages 12 through 13: Quest Diagnostics [the laboratory that RN proposed to use] has 14 collection sites in the Miami-Dade County area. Please see Appendix B for all maps of locations and zip code map with all locations that have been highlighted for your convenience. RN Expertise, Inc. will provide all on- site drug screen collections and breath alcohol tests. We have numerous certified collectors and breath alcohol technicians throughout the state who specialize in on site testing. All collectors and BATS have been certified by Christine Steele. Please see Appendix C. for certificates of RN Expertise, Inc. and insurance and licenses. Three Quest patient care centers are located very close to the area of 1500 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida, 33232. The hours of operation are 7:00 am to 4:30 pm. RN Expertise has arranged three third party sites in the North end of Miami-Dade county and one site in the south end of Miami-Dade County that are available to perform reasonable suspicion and post- accident testing. The hours of operation are from 8:00 am to 12:00 midnight. These addresses are: Workers Compensation Medical Center 17601 N.W. 2nd Avenue Ste S Miami, Florida 33169 Workers Compensation Medical Center 6504 N.W. 77th Court Miami, Florida 33166 Homestead Hospital 160 NW 13th Street Homestead, FL 33030 If these sites are not convenient we can arrange additional sites or provide these tests on an on-site basis. RN offered collection sites in each of the quadrants specified in subsection V.K. of the RFP. It offered sites in the area of 1500 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida, as recommended in subsection V.M. And RN offered at least two sites in the north end of Miami-Dade County and one in the south, all three of which were open from 8:00 a.m. until midnight, thereby satisfying both the geographic and hours of operation requirements of subsection V.N. The Evaluation Committee(s), Mr. Bevan’s Comparison Chart, and the Evaluations A. The Original Committee To evaluate the proposals, a five-person committee was appointed in accordance with the RFP. Its members were Nelson E. Diaz, Deputy Superintendent, Personnel Management and Services; Gwendolyn Jennings Kidney, Assistant Superintendent, Employee Support Programs; Jose Montes de Oca, Assistant Chief Auditor, Management and Compliance Audits; Michael Fox, Risk Analyst, Risk and Benefits Management; and Patricia Freeman, Director, Business Development and Assistance. This committee arranged to meet for the first time on April 11, 2001. Notice of the meeting was not published in advance; the committee would convene in private. The following staff persons were asked to be present at the April 11 meeting to provide technical expertise, if needed: Vera Hirsh, Administrative Director, Personnel; William Bevan, Executive Director, Personnel Operations and Records; Frederic F. Conde, Executive Director, Office of Professional Standards; and Barbara Jones, Director, Procurement. B. Mr. Bevan’s Comparison Chart Before the April 11, 2001, meeting, Ms. Hirsh asked Mr. Bevan, as a technical advisor to the committee, to prepare a comparison of the two proposals. At the time, Mr. Bevan was most knowledgeable about the District’s procedures for drug testing, because he had been directly involved in the general drug testing program. Also, through his work experiences, Mr. Bevan had acquired personal knowledge concerning Global. Indeed, Global had listed Mr. Bevan as a reference in its proposal. Mr. Bevan prepared a comparison chart that was distributed to all the members of the committee. The following table contains the substance of Mr. Bevan's comparison chart:3 Item No. GLOBAL RN EXPERTISE 1 TURNAROUND TIME IS NEXT BUSINESS DAY 5 DAYS ON POSITIVE 24 HOURS FOR NEGATIVES 48 HOURS FOR POSITIVES 2 LOCATION IS FORT LAUDERDALE ALTAMONTE SPRINGS 3 PLAN TO DELINEATE OTETA FROM GENERAL GOOD PLAN PLUS ICON BASED DRUG TEST FORM VERY WEAK PLAN VERY WEAK ANALYSIS 4 COST $30.00 DOT BLIND SAMPLES ARE INCLUDED COST $27.80 NO MENTION OF BLIND SAMPLES 5 POLICE $25.00 ALL ALCOHOL TESTS BOTH BREATH & BLOOD ARE $25.00 $26.00 8 PANEL TEST BREATH ALCOHOL $25.00 BLOOD ALCOHOL $30.00 6 COLLECTION SITES 10 TOTAL SITES 14 TOTAL SITES LESS 4 IN BROWARD, 6 FOR BLOOD DRAW ONLY = 4 NET SITES 7 MOBILE COLLECTION DONE BY MOBILE VAN "WILL PROVIDE ON-SITE COLLECTION" 8 EXPERIENCE 4 YEARS WITH M-DCPS NO SUCCESSFUL LEGITATION [sic] AGAINST M-DCPS US SUGAR ? 9 LABORATORY LAB CORP OF AMERICA LATE IN REPORTING RESULTS ONE TIME IN FOUR YEARS QUEST LABORATORIES QUESTIONABLE 10 ADULTERANT TESTING IS PERFORMED BY LAB CORP AT A STANDARD COURSE OF PROTOCOL WITH NO CHARGE FOR THIS PROCEDURE TESTSURE IS BROKEN OUT AS A SEPARATE ENTITY Because of his personal knowledge of and experience with the drug screening program, Mr. Bevan's opinions carried great weight with the committee members. As will become clear, moreover, Mr. Bevan operated as a de facto evaluator. Thus, for good reasons, his comparison chart drew RN’s close and critical attention. It will be examined in detail below. Item No. 1. This item is helpful as a contrast to the others, for here Mr. Bevan did exactly what a technical advisor should do: provide a concise, accurate, and objective summary of details contained in the proposals without making a subjective judgment as to which proposal is superior. Item No. 2. As Mr. Bevan admitted at hearing, the RFP did not include, as an evaluation criterion, the location of a proposer's base of operations. Testifying, he explained that, "in [his] mind, [a proposer's location] was not something that was in the RFP, but it was important to me." Hearing Transcript (“T.”) 59. Of course, it was not Mr. Bevan's place to make subjective judgments about what was valuable in the proposals—— that was for the evaluators. Further, even the evaluators could not properly take into account undisclosed evaluation criteria. Thus, this comparison was irrelevant and consideration thereof was contrary to the RFP and contrary to competition. Item No. 3. This comparison pertained to the evaluation criterion specified in section VIII, subsection F, which provided: Vendor must have a specific comprehensive plan in place to delineate OTETA collection/testing from general collecting/testing. Mr. Bevan dubbed RN's proposal "very weak" and Global's "good" primarily because Global's prototype OTETA form had a transparent drawing of a school bus superimposed over the writing, and its sample form for use by school police officers had a simple, freehand outline of an officer drawn on its face, whereas RN's forms did not have such "icons." Mr. Bevan believed that the pictures of the school bus and police officer would prevent the less intelligent applicants and employees from using the wrong form.4 Although reasonable people might disagree with Mr. Bevan's analysis of the respective merits of the proposals on this criterion, his conclusion was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The problem, however, is that Mr. Bevan was not a member of the committee, and his qualitative judgment went well beyond an even-handed explanation of a technical term or process, or an objective summary of the proposals' details. In other words, as this item clearly shows, Mr. Bevan assumed the role of evaluator. Item No. 4. Mr. Bevan's comparison of "blind sample testing" is interesting because the purpose of focusing on this discrete point, among all others relating to the proposers' price quotes for OTETA testing, seems to have been to blunt the advantage that RN otherwise would enjoy for having offered the lower price. (The comparison effectively says, RN's OTETA test is cheaper, yes, but Global adds value by performing blind samples, whereas RN may not provide this service.) Mr. Bevan could have written, however, with equal accuracy, that RN's price for OTETA testing "includes an adulterant panel" while Global's proposal makes "no mention of adulterant panels," which would have made RN's price quote appear even more attractive as against Global's. RN, however, did not complain about this aspect of Mr. Bevan's analysis; consequently, the undersigned has paid little attention to, and based no ultimate factual determinations or legal conclusions on, this item. Item No. 5. According to the Guide, at page 21, school police officers are required to be tested for eight drugs or classes of drugs. This is called an "8 panel" test or screen. Other employees, in contrast, need only be tested for five drugs or drug classes, using a "5 panel" screen. In his comparison, Mr. Bevan balanced Global's supposed price of $25.00 for police tests against RN's quote of $26.00 for an 8 panel drug screen. Yet, in its Fee Schedule, Global did not specify a separate charge for police tests, 8 panel tests, or 5 panel tests.5 Rather, Global quoted a price of $25.00 for "general employee drug testing." Based on his previous experience with Global, however, Mr. Bevan assumed that Global's charge for police tests would be $25.00, the same as the cost of testing other non-OTETA employees. Mr. Bevan's assumption was dubious at best, even assuming that Global previously had been charging $25.00 for police tests.6 At worst, if Global's historical pricing were ignored (as it should have been, being a fact extrinsic to Global's proposal), Mr. Bevan's assumption was bereft of factual or logical support; it was simply arbitrary. At a minimum, though, Mr. Bevan should have stated, on the comparison chart he provided to the committee, that he was making an assumption in Global’s favor. Without such a qualification, the chart——which purported to compare "apples to apples"——unfairly depicted RN's as unequivocally the costlier proposal on this item, for RN was shown truthfully to have quoted $26.00 for an 8 panel test. Moreover, significantly, Mr. Bevan omitted the fact that RN also had offered a price of $25.00 for an 8 panel screen without an adulterant panel. Thus, not only had Mr. Bevan potentially compared "apples to oranges," he had compounded the problem by making RN's quote for police testing appear higher than it necessarily would need to be. Making the matter worse still, Mr. Bevan represented that Global's price for blood alcohol testing was $25.00 versus $30.00 for the same procedure with RN. Global, however, had not offered to perform blood alcohol tests for $25.00 apiece; it had not quoted any price for such testing. Mr. Bevan assumed that Global's price would be $25.00 based on his past experience with the company. The validity of Mr. Bevan's assumption, again, is questionable;7 at the very least, his assumption should have been disclosed to the committee on the comparison chart. As drafted, without disclosure of Mr. Bevan's Global-friendly assumption, the comparison chart was grossly inequitable to RN, creating the possibly false impression that RN's price for blood alcohol testing was 20% higher than Global's. Finally, in comparing the cost proposals, Mr. Bevan failed to note that Global had quoted a hefty $75.00 surcharge for all "after hour services," meaning tests performed on weekdays between 5:00 p.m. and 8:30 a.m., and anytime on Saturday or Sunday. RN, in contrast, did not similarly propose a 400% price increase for after-hours work, and thus would have been favored by the comparison Mr. Bevan chose not to make. Item No. 6. The issue of collection sites would become crucial. Mr. Bevan's ultimate opinion——that RN had proposed "4 net sites" as against the "10 total sites" offered by Global——was highly subjective and clearly erroneous. To begin, RN's proposal in fact described a total of 17 collection sites——not 14 as Mr. Bevan incorrectly represented. At pages 12 and 13 of its proposal, RN responded sequentially to RFP section V, subsections K (collection sites desired in four quadrants of Miami-Dade County), L (mobile collection required at some Regional Transportation Centers), M (preference for a site near 1500 Biscayne Boulevard), and N (requiring at least one site each in the north and south ends of Miami-Dade County). In response to subsection K, RN proposed to use 14 Quest patient care centers, the locations of which were further described in maps attached to RN's proposal as Appendix B. Three of the 14 Quest centers were represented to meet the preference expressed in subsection M. And RN offered three additional "third party sites" (plainly meaning, in context, sites that were not operated by Quest) to satisfy subsection N. There was and is nothing confusing about RN's response regarding collection sites. No reasonable, fair-minded person, upon reading pages 12 and 13 of RN's proposal, could reasonably conclude that RN was offering a total of only 14 collection sites. Next, four of the Quest sites proposed by RN are located in Broward County. Mr. Bevan decided that these Broward sites should be ignored. The RFP, however, did not prohibit a proposer from offering sites outside Miami-Dade County, and, significantly, RN's proposal satisfied the RFP's technical requirements concerning collection site locations without the Broward sites. Thus, an evaluator (as opposed to Mr. Bevan, who was not one) might have regarded RN's Broward sites either an added value that made RN's proposal more attractive or an unwanted option that neither added to, nor detracted from, RN's proposal. Either way, however, this qualitative decision was not properly Mr. Bevan's to make as a “technical advisor.” Mr. Bevan then subtracted six sites from RN's total because the proposal stated that the sites were available for blood draws only. (In fact, RN's proposal indicated that nine of RN's 17 total sites collected blood samples only; three of the nine are in Broward County and six in Miami-Dade.) Mr. Bevan's decision that "blood only" sites should not be counted was plainly contrary to the RFP, under which blood alcohol testing clearly was a required service. While the evidence showed that the District considers urine collection sites to be much more valuable than “blood only” collection sites, which it views as practically worthless, the RFP nevertheless did not disclose this preference or the relative weight of urine sites versus “blood only” sites. Simply put, the RFP did not allow the evaluators to ignore “blood only” collection sites. At bottom, a fair and balanced comparison (unlike Mr. Bevan's) would have shown that RN had proposed 17 total sites (four in Broward, 13 in Miami-Dade), of which nine (three in Broward, six in Miami-Dade) were "blood only" sites, leaving eight sites (one in Broward, seven in Miami-Dade) that were available for the collection of both urine and blood. An "apples to apples" comparison of Miami-Dade sites available for blood and urine testing would have been Global, ten versus RN, seven. Each evaluator, however, in weighing the relative merits of the two proposals, should have considered RN's ten additional sites——there was no warrant in the RFP for excluding them from the mix à la Mr. Bevan's analysis——and made an independent determination of the value added by those sites. Item No. 7. On this point, Mr. Bevan was unfair to RN——but only a bit. His comparison intentionally drew a distinction between Global's "mobile collection" (the term used in section V.L. of the RFP) and RN's "on-site collection," subtly implying that RN’s proposal might not be responsive, or as responsive as Global’s, to the RFP’s technical guidelines. In fact, however, in its proposal at pages II-2, V-1, V-2, and VIII-1, Global expressly had described the function of its mobile unit as being to provide "on-site" collections; even Global, in other words, considered mobile collection and on-site collection to be fungible concepts. Mr. Bevan's comparison chart thus somewhat unfairly gave Global a gentle semantic boost while concomitantly giving RN a little linguistic gig.8 Standing alone, this comparison would not be noteworthy. Viewed in the light of other, unfair contrasts, however, Mr. Bevan's mobile collection/on-site collection dichotomy takes on a slight hue of partiality.9 Item No. 8. Here, Mr. Bevan made a comparison that was highly unfavorable to RN. One the one side, he portrayed Global attractively as the incumbent vendor that, during a four- year tenure, has not exposed the District to an adverse litigation outcome, and which also provides services to U.S. Sugar (an agricultural concern in South Florida). On RN's side there was only a question mark——nothing more. The meaning was obvious: Global has good credentials, but RN's experience and litigation track record are questionable. This was terribly unfair. RN's proposal included two pages of references listing a number of current clients. Mr. Bevan's explanation at hearing for failing to acknowledge any of RN's references on his comparison chart was that RN's references "were much longer" and would not fit on the page, and that he had "put down what [he] could in the amount of time [he] had." 89. This explanation utterly fails to account for Mr. Bevan's misleading and prejudicial use of a question mark to describe RN's documented experience; it is not credible and is rejected.10 Regarding exposure to lawsuits, Mr. Bevan's comparison was gratuitous. The RFP did not ask for information concerning lawsuits; and the lack of adverse litigation outcomes, while perhaps interesting and even relevant, was not an evaluation criterion. Further, Mr. Bevan was aware of Global's litigation track record not because of information contained in Global's proposal (for such data was not included therein) but because he previously had monitored litigation against the District arising from OTETA testing. Despite relying on facts extrinsic to Global's proposal for this comparison, Mr. Bevan made no attempt to determine whether RN had exposed a client to an adverse litigation outcome and hence had no idea whether RN had or had not done so. Yet, despite the absence of any basis in logic or fact for such a conclusion, the question mark in RN's column (adjacent to the favorable comment about Global) strongly implied that RN either had omitted material information about litigation or disclosed something disturbing or questionable. The unavoidable net effect of this prejudicial and unfair comparison was to put an exclamation point on the fact that Global had served satisfactorily as the incumbent vendor (and thus was a safe choice)——while portraying RN as a pig in a poke (and hence a gamble). Item No. 9. Mr. Bevan shone a flattering light on Laboratory Corporation of America ("LCA," the laboratory used by Global)——only one glitch in four years!——while labeling Quest Diagnostics ("Quest," used by RN) "questionable." This was problematic for several reasons. First, the RFP did not specify a preference for any particular laboratory. Second, Mr. Bevan's judgment was not based on the respective proposals but on his personal experiences. He had been pleased with LCA's services and preferred that the District continue to do business with that laboratory. But, as the comparison chart pointedly neglected to mention, Mr. Bevan's negative opinion of Quest was based on just one incident in which Quest had been slow in reporting the results of a retest that had been requested by an individual who had initially tested positive at LCA and requested that Quest perform the confirmatory test.11 Third, the judgment expressed on the relative merits of the proposers' laboratories was plainly qualitative; in other words, Mr. Bevan was evaluating the proposals, which was not properly his role, for he was not a de jure member of the committee. Item No. 10. Mr. Bevan's representation to the committee that LCA performed adulterant testing at no cost to the District was not based on Global's proposal, which neither mentioned adulterant testing nor quoted a price for such service, but on his experience with Global. (Incidentally, neither Mr. Bevan's testimony, nor any other evidence, persuasively established that Global or LCA had, in fact, been performing adulterant testing. Rather, the District’s employees assumed that such was the case——as it may, or may not, have been.) Aside from the impropriety of relying on facts extrinsic to Global's proposal, Mr. Bevan's contrast with RN's proposal ("TestSure is broken out as a separate entity") was both incorrect and incomplete, producing a false, "apples to oranges" comparison. First, as four pages of descriptive information included in RN's proposal made clear, TestSure is Quest's trademark for its adulterant testing protocol, which Quest considers a "breakthrough in technology for the industry." Contrary to Mr. Bevan's statement, TestSure is not a "separate entity." Thus, the apparently-intended implication that RN's price was higher because it was proposing to use a “separate entity” (in addition to Quest) for adulterant testing was untrue. Second, the information provided by RN concerning TestSure, rather than being a negative strike against RN's proposal, as Mr. Bevan's comparison suggested, was (or should have been) helpful in evaluating RN's proposal, a plus. While the committee certainly could have chosen to discount or ignore Quest's glowing review of its own product as puffery, the fact was that while Global's proposal said nothing about adulterant testing, RN had submitted some information on the subject. Finally, Mr. Bevan did not specify that his remark about Global's supposed offer to provide adulterant testing at "no charge" was merely an assumption that, for all that appears in Global's proposal, may or may not be true. This omission was especially unfair to RN because RN had stated explicitly in its cost proposal that an additional dollar would be charged for an adulterant panel——and that the District could save the dollar by electing not to have the panel performed on general tests. An impartial summary would have acknowledged RN's prices for general tests, both with and without an adulterant panel, and noted that Global's proposal was silent as to whether its quote of $25.00 for general testing included an adulterant panel. To state unqualifiedly that Global would provide adulterant testing for free, when its proposal said nothing of the sort, was patently inequitable. The First Evaluation and Recommendation After meeting for two hours on April 11, and having considered Mr. Bevan’s comparison chart, the committee voted to recommend that the contract be awarded to Global. In the minutes of the meeting, it was reported that [b]oth Proposals were evaluated according to the criteria outlined in the proposal. A comparison was made of services provided, locations for testing, cost, and other requirements. The committee recommended that Global MRO be awarded the contract. In addition to providing a reasonable fee schedule, the locations for drug testing, and the prior outstanding service provided by Global MRO, supports the committee’s decision. RN timely protested the intended award, the Board referred the matter to DOAH, and a final hearing was scheduled for July 30, 2001. Before the final hearing, however, the Board determined that the April 11, 2001, meeting might have occurred in violation of the Sunshine Law. Accordingly, the final hearing was postponed to enable the committee to reconvene in a public meeting for the purpose of reevaluating the proposals in compliance with the Sunshine Law. The Second Evaluation and Recommendation The committee met for a second time on September 4, 2001, pursuant to a prior written notice of proceedings. The September 4 meeting was open to the public. Although each of the original members of the committee was asked to return, two of them——Mr. Diaz and Ms. Freeman——were unable to attend the second meeting. In their places appeared subordinates as “representatives,” Pat Parham for Mr. Diaz and Enrique Sacasa for Ms. Freeman. Four members of this committee had no direct involvement in or experience with the drug screening services that were the subject of the contract for which proposals had been solicited. Of the five, only Ms. Kidney was knowledgeable about the program areas and service requirements for which contractual services were being sought. Once again, staff persons were present, ostensibly to answer technical questions. Mr. Bevan and Mr. Conde returned. With them this time were Barbara M. Moss, District Director, Office of Professional Standards; Brenda Miles, Executive Director, Professional and Technical Staffing; and Linda Cantin, Supervisor, Division of Procurement Management. Mr. Bevan did not distribute his comparison chart at the committee’s public meeting and made only a couple of comments there in response to questions. After conferring, the committee found both proposals to be responsive and voted unanimously to recommend that Global be awarded the contract. In the minutes of the September 4, 2001, meeting, it was reported that [t]he committee agreed that both proposals were good, and clearly stated an understanding of the work to be performed. There were concerns expressed, however, regarding [RN’s proposal] in reference to the location and convenience of collection sites. . . . . [Global] was selected because of the larger number of collection sites for urine that are available and the locations of these sites throughout various parts of the county, which would be of convenience to applicants and employees, and its experience. RN’s Protest By letter to the Board’s counsel dated September 6, 2001, RN amended its pending protest of the first recommendation to challenge the second proposed award with a newly-revised statement of grounds.12 As bases for relief, RN asserted that Global’s proposal was materially non-responsive for failure to comply with several of the RFP’s technical requirements; it also alleged that the committee’s evaluation had been flawed in several respects. Ultimate Factual Determinations Certain Ultimate findings of fact have been rendered below under the heading “Conclusions of Law.” This has been done for organizational convenience and for clarity of analysis. Accordingly, the findings announced in paragraphs 114, 120, 130, 134, 156, 159, 161-64, 167, and 169, infra, are hereby incorporated as Findings of Fact, as if fully set forth in the instant section of this Recommended Order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a Final Order rescinding the proposed award to Global. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 2002.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, Nemi, Inc., should pay a $500.00 administrative fine for maintaining an unpermitted stationary installation that is reasonably expected to be a source of water pollution (Count I); whether it should pay an administrative fine of $9,500.00 for failing to submit a completed Site Assessment Report (SAR) within 270 days of discovery of the discharge of chemical solvents (Count II); whether it should pay investigative costs and expenses in the amount of $1,500.00 incurred by Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection (Department) (Count III); and whether it should take corrective action, as described in the Department's Notice of Violation, Orders for Corrective Action, and Administrative Penalty Assessment (Notice of Violation) issued on January 23, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent is a for-profit corporation registered to do business in the State. Respondent's president and registered agent is Neil Schuberg, who represented the corporation at hearing. Respondent is the owner of a 1.1-acre parcel of real property located at 6801 Northwest 17th Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The property is situated in what is known as the Gateway Industrial Center just south of the City of Pompano Beach and midway between the Florida Turnpike and Interstate 95. The parcel is rectangular shaped and is approximately 90 feet wide by 180 feet long. The property is further identified by the Broward County Property Appraiser as Parcel Identification Number 494209050040. A one-story warehouse and parking lot are located on the property, which is currently leased by Respondent to a testing laboratory. The evidence shows that for at least since 1981 David R. Ligh owned the property until his death. After he died, his widow, Elsie M. Ligh, sold the property in 1994 to Clayton John Pierce subject to a mortgage in the amount of $167,640.00. Mr. Pierce began operating a business on the premises known as Combined Roof Services, Inc. In 1995, Mr. Pierce decided to sell the property. A potential buyer, S & S Propeller Company, retained the services of Buck Eco-Logic, Inc., an environmental consulting firm, to prepare an environmental site assessment for the purpose of "determining the suitability of property for ownership by [S & S Propeller Company]." When it first inspected the site in July 1995, Buck Eco-Logic, Inc., discovered three thirty-five gallon drums and a twenty-gallon black plastic tub, all labeled "hazardous waste" and reflecting that they had contained tetrachloroethene (also known as perchloroethylene) waste. This is a chemical solvent that is typically used by dry cleaning establishments. The labels carried the name and "EPA ID number" of Family Dry Cleaners located at 6804 Stirling Road, Davie, Florida, an address which appears to be around ten to twelve miles south of the subject property. The three drums were lying on their sides on the northern end of an asphalt parking area beneath overgrown Brazilian pepper trees and were empty; the empty twenty-gallon tub was located inside the building on the property. Soil borings on the property performed by Buck Eco- Logic, Inc., revealed concentrations of tetrachloroethene at 10,613 parts per billion, which exceed allowable standards. Tetrachloroethene and its breakdown products are a solid waste, as defined by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-701.200(113). A Phase I Environmental Site Assessment (Phase I ESA) dated August 13, 1995, was prepared by the consulting firm and sets forth in detail the results of its inspection. See Department Exhibit 2. The sale was never consummated. Later that year, Mr. Pierce engaged the same consulting firm to perform a Phase II Environmental Site Assessment of the property. That assessment revealed concentrations in groundwater ranging from 8,840 parts per billion to 173,000 parts per billion of tetrachloroethene, which exceed the State Clean Soil Criteria and State Maximum Contaminant Levels. The report, issued on October 13, 1995, was received in evidence as Department Exhibit 3. On October 30, 1995, a Mr. Pivnick, an attorney with the firm of Dombroff & Gilmore, P.A., which represented Mr. Pierce, notified the Department by letter that the empty drums and tub had been discovered on the property. The letter also attached a copy of the Phase I ESA. Mr. Pivnick was instructed by the Department to contact the local police department to report the incident as well as the state warning system for reporting discharges to the environment. Also, the Department contacted other local agencies and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In October 1995, Mr. Pierce vacated the premises and ceased operating Combined Roof Services, Inc. In January 1996, he began leasing the property to Sun Valley Industries, also a roofing repair business, until that firm vacated the premises in December 1997. With the use of grant monies, the Department engaged the services of International Technology Corporation to prepare a Preliminary Investigation Report (PIR) for the property. That report was issued on February 13, 1997. See Department Exhibit The PIR recommended that additional monitoring of the site (through shallow monitoring wells, soil samples, groundwater samples, and groundwater flow direction) be made to quantify the presence of chlorinated solvents. Again with the use of grant monies, in 1997 the Department engaged the services of Post, Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan, Inc., to prepare a Site Inspection Report (Report) for the subject property. The Report was issued in March 1998. See Department Exhibit 5. Excessive tetrachloroethene, Cis-1, 2- dichloroethene, and trichloroethylene were detected in ground water samples, while tetrachloroethene was detected in all seven soil samples. On April 2, 1998, Ms. Ligh assigned the mortgage on the property to Nemi, Inc., for around $100,000.00. Mr. Schuberg explained that he was able to purchase it at a discount because Mr. Pierce had ceased making payments on the mortgage and had warned Ms. Ligh that if she foreclosed on the mortgage, she would be responsible for cleanup costs on the property exceeding a million dollars. While Mr. Schuberg acknowledged that he was aware of a contamination problem on the property, he says the mortgage was purchased as an investment, and he never thought he would actually acquire the property because he believed Mr. Pierce would continue to make the mortgage payments. After failing to make payments on the mortgage, on September 21, 1999, Mr. Pierce executed a Warranty Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure in favor of Nemi, Inc. Based on conversations with Mr. Pierce at that time, Mr. Schuberg says he was under the impression that the spill was much smaller than it actually was, and that it would be cleaned up by the Department. At hearing, Mr. Schuberg characterized Mr. Pierce as "a hustler and a liar." After Mr. Pivnick's report of contamination was received, the Department, along with the Broward County Department of Natural Resource Protection, initiated an investigation (probably in late 1995 or early 1996) in an attempt to verify the source of the contamination. Because Family Dry Cleaners "was on the top of [its] list," the Department first sought to determine whether that firm had actually deposited the drums and tub on the subject property. It learned that in 1994, or a year before the contamination was reported to the Department, Family Dry Cleaners had been evicted by its landlord, Lincoln Park. According to the Department, this "led to a dead- end" as far as Family Dry Cleaners was concerned. However, that business had been replaced by another tenant, Liberty Dry Cleaners. The Department then attempted to ascertain whether Lincoln Park or the new tenant might have been responsible for transporting the drums and tub to the subject property and dumping the waste. However, the Department was unable to confirm that either of the two had done so. Photographs of the drums and tub were made by Buck Eco- Logic, Inc., when it conducted an assessment in July 1995. Because the empty drums and tub were later removed from the site by unknown persons, the Department was only able to review the photographs when it conducted its investigation. Photographs of the drums indicated that they were larger than the twenty-gallon drums normally used by a dry cleaning establishment, and the labels on the drums were not perforated or dot matrix, which are more typical of those used by dry cleaners. For this reason, and because the empty tub was found inside the building on the property, the Department attempted to determine if Mr. Pierce had purchased the contaminants for use in his operations; it was not able to confirm this fact. The Department also contacted local law enforcement officials to see whether a criminal investigation could be launched. As noted above, however, the drums and tub had been removed by unknown persons while Mr. Pierce still had possession of the property and there was no forensic evidence for law enforcement officials to examine. The result of the investigation was that the Department was unable to determine who deposited the drums on the site or the exact location where the contents were first dumped. Although Respondent contended that the Department could have easily determined who removed the empty drums and tub from the subject property by examining the manifests of the carriers who engage in that type of business, the Department investigator did not attempt to do this since the yellow pages in the telephone directory reflected at least six pages of transporters in this type of business. Further, there is no evidence that a commercial transporter was even involved. For all of these reasons, the Department looked to the current owner of the property, Respondent, as the entity responsible for site rehabilitation since there were, and still are, contaminants leaching into the groundwater and aquifer system. Specifically, as of 2007, or twelve years after the discharge occurred, the groundwater on Respondent's property was still contaminated with tetrachloroethene, trichloroethylene, and cis-1, 2-dichloroethene exceeding the Department's groundwater standards. Also, the same contaminants exceeded the Department's soil cleanup target levels based on ground water criteria. Because rainfall and surface water continue to come into contact with the contaminated soil, and there is no liner or impervious cap in place, the installation is reasonably expected to be a source of water pollution. On September 12, 2001, the Department sent a letter by certified mail to Respondent advising that contamination was present on the property, that there were "possible violations of law for which you may be responsible," and that a Preliminary Contamination Assessment (PCA) must be filed within sixty days from the date of the letter. See Department Exhibit 6. Although a meeting of the parties was held on October 4, 2001, a PCA was never filed. 16. On April 27, 2006, March 12, 2007, and July 3, 2007, the Department issued Warning Letters to Respondent advising that an enforcement action would be initiated unless Respondent provided a SAR within a time certain. See Department Exhibits 7, 8, and 9. (The record is silent as to why no formal activity occurred between October 2001 and April 2006.) Exhibit 8 reflects that on November 21, 2006, "analysis results of sampling of one monitoring well were received by the Department." A meeting was later conducted by the parties on January 16, 2007, at which time Respondent agreed to "draft a suitable letter of [its] intentions with regard to conducting the required assessment and send it to the Department on or before January 31, 2007." There is no record of such a letter being sent. In August 2007, Respondent contracted with Florida Environmental Engineering, Inc., to perform a "limited site assessment report." In March 2008, that firm submitted to the Department a Preliminary Site Assessment Report (PSAR) See Department Exhibit 10. For this service, Respondent paid around $16,000.00. On March 21, 2008, the Department advised Respondent by letter that the PSAR was incomplete and that further information should be provided by April 30, 2008. See Department Exhibit 11. An Addendum to the PSAR was provided on May 5, 2008. See Department Exhibit 12. This report cost Respondent an additional $3,000.00. The PSAR indicated that contaminants (dichloroethene and trichloroethylene) in the water and soil on the property exceeded Department groundwater and soil cleanup target standards and levels. The report concluded, however, that "the discharge to the site is from an offsite source" (west of the property) and that "the property owner is no longer a responsible party." On August 27 and then again on October 22, 2008, the Department issued letters to Respondent advising that "there is not enough data to support the assumption that the discharge is offsite and the contamination is from an offsite source located west of the property." The Department reached this conclusion because, among other reasons, "[t]he contamination does not seem to be delineated towards the northern and southern portions of the site," "[t]here are no horizontal delineation wells to [the] north," the "iso contour maps provided appear to show the vertical delineation of the contamination but not horizontal delineation [of the plume]," "additional monitoring points need to be [added]," and "the onsite monitoring well, MW-2, shows a very high concentration of Perchloroethylene (PCE) at 81,000 ug/L [microgram per liter] and other contaminants, while the MW-1 does not exhibit groundwater contamination to that extent." See Department Exhibits 14 and 15. In plainer language, Respondent's report was deficient in that all contamination sources were not identified; it failed to delineate the horizontal and vertical extent of soil and groundwater contamination; and it failed to recommend a remedial action to clean up the contamination. The two letters advised that the site assessment was incomplete and that additional information described in the letters must be submitted by November 14, 2008. To date, Respondent has failed to submit the required information. According to Mr. Schuberg, to perform a study that would supply the additional information requested by the Department would cost him around $100,000.00, an amount he is unwilling to pay. More than 270 days has expired since a discharge was discovered on Respondent's property, and it has failed to submit a complete SAR, as described in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-780.600(8). See also Table A, Fla. Admin. Code R. Ch. 62-780, which prescribes the specific time frame (within 270 days after the discharge is discovered) for submitting this report. The Department has incurred expenses in the amount of $1,500.00 while investigating this matter. See Department Exhibit 17. This amount is not disputed. As corrective action, the Department requests that within ninety days of the effective date of this Final Order, Respondent submit a complete SAR which addresses the deficiencies specified in the Department's August 27, 2008, letter. See Department Exhibit 14. To complete the SAR, additional soil and groundwater samples need to be collected to determine the vertical and horizontal extent of contamination, all source areas must be identified, and a remedial action must be developed to abate the contamination. Finally, the contaminated soil must be removed from the property so that it will no longer discharge into the groundwater. The Notice of Violation requests that upon approval of the SAR, Respondent "shall commence and complete in a timely fashion all further tasks" required by Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 62-780. These corrective actions are reasonable and are hereby approved. In calculating the penalty, Respondent has assessed a $500.00 administrative penalty for Respondent maintaining a stationary installation that is reasonably expected to be a source of water pollution without a permit. This is based upon a violation of Section 403.121(5), Florida Statutes, which makes it unlawful to not comply with a regulatory statute's requirement. Under Section 403.121(6), Florida Statutes, the Department has also assessed a $500.00 per day penalty against Respondent for failing to file a SAR for nineteen days, for a total of $9,500.00. When added to the $500.00 previously assessed, the total administrative penalty is $10,000.00, which is the maximum allowed in this type of proceeding. See § 403.121(2)(a), Fla. Stat. Throughout this process, Mr. Schuberg has contended that the responsibility for cleanup lies with the person or entity actually responsible for placing the drums and tub on the property in 1995. He says that the evidence clearly shows that Family Dry Cleaners is the responsible party. However, the Department and local authorities were never able to confirm who actually dumped the waste on the subject property. Although Mr. Schuberg says it will take "[i]n the hundreds of thousands of dollars" to clean up the site, the evidence shows that when he purchased the mortgage in 1998 and assumed ownership in 1999, he knew the property was contaminated. Mr. Schuberg further stated that because his consultant could never get "answers" from the Department, the consultant was instructed to stop work. However, Mr. Schuberg never contacted the Department to get clarification about what was required. At hearing, Mr. Schuberg also offered a lay opinion that his consultant's report filed in March 2008 proves that in 1995 the contents of the drums and tub were dumped on an offsite asphalt road adjacent to the property, surface water runoff then carried the chemical solvents onto his property, and the empty drums and tub were left in the parking lot. The Department's expert did not agree with this supposition, and there is no expert testimony to confirm the accuracy of this theory. Respondent has also contended that the property should be cleaned up with state funds. As pointed out by a Department witness, however, one problem is that the property does not meet the definition of a dry cleaner and thus cannot qualify for funds under that program. Then, too, a state-funded cleanup is a last resort which is used only after the Department has exhausted all enforcement remedies. Also, in this era of tight budgets, the Department has a finite amount of funds to use for this purpose, and is limited to cleaning up only a few sites per year. Finally, the responsible party must first acknowledge by affidavit that it lacks the necessary resources to clean up the property before the Department "may" seek cleanup funds. Respondent has not yet filed such an affidavit or admitted liability. In terms of mitigating evidence, Mr. Schuberg conceded that he has not done "a whole lot" to address the contamination problem since acquiring the property in 1999. In 2008, he did expend around $20,000.00 in having a PSAR and Addendum prepared for the Department. In all other respects, he steadfastly refuses to spend any more money on assessments or take responsibility for the cleanup since he believes that Family Dry Cleaners is the entity responsible for site rehabilitation.
The Issue Was Respondent lawfully terminated from his position as a waste water treatment plant operator.
Findings Of Fact 1. Respondent was employed by the Board as a waste water treatment plant operator since at least August 19, 1999. 2. On the night of August 9, 2000, Respondent was present at a dwelling located at 6079 Hilburn Road, Pensacola, Florida. This is a dwelling which is leased by Nicholas Monteleone. 3. Deputy James Newton of the Escambia County Sheriff's Office, along with other officers, executed a search warrant at the dwelling located at 6079 Hilburn Road on August 9, 2000. The apparent target of the warrant was Nicholas Monteleone and the crime giving rise to the search warrant was possession and distribution of LSD, a controlled substance. 4. Deputy Newton was stationed at the rear exit of the dwelling during the execution of the warrant. When the officers executing the warrant knocked on the front door of the dwelling, Deputy Newton observed three individuals run out of the back door. 5. Deputy Newton observed the second individual reach into his pants pocket, pull out an object, and throw it on the ground. This individual was identified by Deputy Newton as being the Respondent. Deputy Newton retrieved the object, which was determined to be a small bag containing an unknown substance. The matter in the bag was field tested for controlled substances. The test revealed the presence of cocaine. 6. Charles Peterson is the assistant director of maintenance services for the Board and as such, is Respondent's supervisor. 7. Mr. Peterson learned of Respondent's arrest on August 10, 2000. Subsequent to a meeting between Mr. Peterson, Dr. Douglas Garber, who is the Board's Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources; Mark Pursell; and the Board's risk manager, it was determined that reasonable suspicion existed to believe Respondent possessed cocaine in his body. They decided to require that Respondent submit to a drug test. 8. Mr. Peterson, Dr. Garber, Mark Pursell, and the risk Manager determined that Mr. Peterson should escort Respondent to the Baptist Medical Park Occupational Health facility in Pensacola, Florida. This decision occurred while Respondent was on leave. Mr. Peterson complied with this instruction on August 22, 2000. 9. At the facility Respondent provided a urine sample and signed a statement certifying as follows: "I certify that I provided my urine specimen to the collector, that I have not adulterated it in any manner, that each specimen bottle used was sealed with a tamper evident seal in my presence and that the information provided on this form and on the label affixed to each specimen bottle is correct." 10. Although the sample collector, Cynthia Watkins, deviated from the facility procedures for urine collection, the procedures she used were sufficient to ensure that the urine collected was in fact Respondent's. Her logs indicated that Respondent was the only person from whom she collected urine on August 22, 2000. A proper chain of custody was prepared and the sample was sent to Rapid-Net, a drug testing laboratory in Miami, Florida. 11. On August 30, 2000, the laboratory determined that Respondent's urine contained cocaine metabolite. On August 31, 2000, a medical review officer certified this finding. 12. Respondent had signed a document, on August 19, 1999, certifying that he had received the Board's notice to employees regarding the drug-free workplace policy. Respondent had further certified that he understood that compliance with the policy was a condition of employment. At the hearing Respondent asserted that he was fully aware of this policy prior to the incidents giving rise to this hearing. 13. The Board's "NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES REGARDING DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE PROGRAM" states as follows: "It is a violation of the policy of the School Board for any employee to manufacture, distribute, dispense, possess or use drugs whether in the workplace or away from the workplace including non-working hours." 14, The policy further recites that the Board may require an employee to submit to a drug test upon reasonable suspicion. 15. Respondent took voluntary drug tests and results were determined on August 31, 2000, September 6, 2000, and December 31, 2000. All of these drug tests were negative for controlled substances. 16. The Respondent possessed drugs within his body on August 22, 2000, as demonstrated by a urinalysis based on reasonable suspicion. This possession violated the Board's drug-free workplace policy. It is the consistent practice of the Board to terminate employees who are found to be involved with illegal drugs.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Joseph L. Hammons, Esquire Hammons & Whittaker, P.A. 17 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501-3125 For Respondent: Mary F. Aspros, Esquire Meyer and Brooks, P.A. 2544 Blairstone Pines Drive Post Office Box 1547 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered terminating Respondent, Constantine V. Varazo, from his employment by the Escambia County School Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 1e(G day of June, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Y L. HOOPKR ) Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this /“@*day of June, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph L. Hammons, Esquire Hammons & Whittaker, P.A. 17 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501-3125 Mary F. Aspros, Esquire Meyer and Brooks, P.A. 2544 Blairstone Pines Drive Post Office Box 1547 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jim May, Superintendent Escambia County School Board Post Office Box 1470 Pensacola, Florida 32597-1470 Honorable Charlie Crist Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's employment with Petitioner as a school bus driver should be terminated because he violated his rehabilitation contract and Petitioner's drug-free workplace policy and guidelines by testing positive for cocaine.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida public school district. Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a school bus driver for about ten years and three months prior to his suspension without pay in the summer of 1996. The position of school bus driver is a safety-sensitive position. In June of 1989, Petitioner adopted a drug-free workplace policy. Petitioner directed its superintendent to develop guidelines to implement the policy. In December of 1991, Petitioner adopted Drug-Free Workplace Guidelines, GBCBA-G, which state as follows in pertinent part: The purpose of these guidelines is to comply with the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 34 CFR Part 85, Subpart F, which requires grantees to certify that they will maintain a drug-free workplace. * * * Pre-employment Drug Abuse Screening examinations shall be required to prevent hiring individuals who use drugs or individuals whose use of drugs indicates a potential for impaired or unsafe job performance or for high risk positions such as bus drivers. Employees in job classification which require an annual physical will be required to submit to a drug screening as part of the annual physical. As a condition of continued employment, current employees shall submit to drug screening when reasonable suspicion exists to believe that an employee is using a substance that is impairing the employee and/or his job performance . . . . * * * All testing shall be conducted by a laboratory certified by the State of Florida as a Medical and Urine Drug Testing Forensic Laboratory which complies with the Scientific and Technical Guidelines for Federal Drug Testing Programs and the Standards for Certification of Laboratories engaged in Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration of the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services . . . . The procedures established by the laboratory shall be followed in administering drug tests to employees. * * * Employees who return to work after completion of a rehabilitation program shall be subject to follow-up drug testing with twenty-four hour notification . . . . Random testing of employees shall not be conducted. Respondent signed a notice to all applicants and employees on April 15, 1992, advising him in advance that the drug-free workplace policy would become effective on June 15, 1992. This notice stated as follows: All pre-employment applicants will be drug-tested prior to being hired. All employees who require fitness-of-duty examination will be drug-tested at least once annually. An employee will be drug-tested when reasonable suspicion of substance abuse exists. An employee will be drug-tested following any work-related accident or mishap involving actual or potential injury or property damage. An employee will be drug-tested during any probationary period following a drug- related suspension or approved drug treatment program. Petitioner acknowledged that he received a copy of the drug-free workplace policy and understood the consequences of violating the drug-free workplace guidelines by signing the notice. The notice clearly states that failure to comply with the guidelines could result in termination of employment and forfeiture of eligibility for workers' compensation medical and indemnity benefits. The guidelines for the drug-free workplace policy are a part of Petitioner's Collective Bargaining Agreement with the instructional and non-instructional bargaining units of the Alachua County Education Association (ACEA). The ACEA ratified the policy and guidelines in January of 1993. The Petitioner's drug-free workplace policy and guidelines have been continuously in effect since that time. Article XI, Section 1(B) of the 1995-1996 Collective Bargaining Agreement between Petitioner and the ACEA requires Petitioner to provide school bus drivers with an annual physical as required by the rules of the State Board of Education. Appendix F of the 1995-1996 Collective Bargaining Agreement sets forth the drug-free workplace guidelines. It states as follows in pertinent part: The purpose of these guidelines is to comply with the Drug-free Workplace Act of 1988, 34 CFR Part 85, Subpart F, which requires grantees to certify that they will maintain a drug-free workplace. * * * Pre-employment Drug Abuse Screening examinations shall be required to prevent hiring individuals who use drugs or individuals whose use of drugs indicates a potential for impaired or unsafe job performance or for high risk positions such as bus drivers. * * * Employees in job classifications which require an annual physical will be required to submit to a drug screening as part of the annual physical. * * * As a condition of continued employment, current employees shall submit to drug screening when reasonable suspicion exists to believe that an employee is using a substance that is impairing the employee and/or his job performance . . . . * * * When a reasonable suspicion exists, the Director of Employee Relations shall be contacted. The employee, if a member of a bargaining unit, shall be afforded the opportunity to have ACEA representation. The employee will be provided an opportunity to explain his/her condition. The employee will be provided with information regarding available drug counseling, rehabilitation, assistance programs, and leave options. A rehabilitation contract including drug testing may be agreed upon. Failure to participate in a treatment program following a positive drug screening will result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination. Due process will be followed. All testing shall be conducted by a laboratory certified by the State of Florida as a Medical and Urine Drug Testing Forensic Laboratory which complies with the Scientific and Technical Guidelines for Federal Drug Testing Programs and the Standards for Certification of Laboratories engaged in Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration of the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services. The laboratory shall be chosen jointly by ACEA and SBAC if the employee is a member of the bargaining unit. The procedures established by the laboratory shall be followed in administering drug tests to employees. Employees who seek voluntary assistance for substance abuse may not be disciplined for seeking assistance. Employees shall be subject to all employer rules, regulations, and job performance standards with the understanding that an employee enrolled in a rehabilitation program is receiving treatment for an illness. Employees who return to work after completion of a rehabilitation program shall be subject to follow-up drug testing with twenty-four (24) hour notification. Any employee who refuses the drug test or subsequently tests positive may be disciplined up to and including termination. Random testing of employees shall not be conducted except as required by state or federal law . . . . On December 13, 1994, Respondent signed the following statement: I have received, read, and understand the training materials on drug and alcohol testing under the U. S. Department of Transportation regulations. In January of 1995, Petitioner began complying with an additional drug testing program pursuant to a federal statute entitled Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act (OTETA). Petitioner did not formally adopt a written policy or develop written guidelines to implement the new drug-testing program. Petitioner's Collective Bargaining Agreement with the ACEA does not refer to OTETA or the federal regulations implementing it. Mandatory procedures governing drug testing in transportation workplaces under U. S. Department of Transportation regulations require that drug tests be performed using split samples. A "split specimen collection" consists of one urination followed by the splitting of that specimen into two bottles. If the primary specimen tests positive, the employee may request that the split specimen be sent to a different laboratory for testing. The majority of drug testing performed in this country is single specimen collection. Drug testing pursuant to state law and rules and the regulations of the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services does not require employers to utilize split samples in the collection process. A split specimen generally is used only for purposes of testing pursuant to the regulations of the U. S. Department of Transportation. The U. S. Department of Transportation requires Petitioner to provide the following testing in transportation workplaces: (a) pre-employment testing; (b) post-accident testing; (c) random testing; (d) reasonable suspicion testing; return-to-duty testing; and (f) follow-up testing. OTETA does not require a routine fitness-for-duty drug test as part of an annual medical examination. State law does require such a test. OTETA requires random testing and post-accident testing. State law does not require these tests. Petitioner's guidelines as adopted in 1991 specifically prohibit random drug testing of employees. However, Petitioner's guidelines, as incorporated into the Collective Bargaining Agreement, state that "[r]andom testing of employees shall not be conducted except as required by state or federal law." In June of 1995, Respondent received a routine fitness- for-duty drug test as part of his annual physical examination. The test yielded a positive result for cannabinoids and cocaine metabolites. Respondent did not contest the results of the test. On June 22, 1995, Petitioner's Director of Employee Relations had a conference with Respondent. During the conference, Respondent signed a medical records release and a rehabilitation contract. The rehabilitation contract stated as follows: . . . positive results indicating alcohol and/or illegal mind-altering substances, following the initiation of this contract, is prima facie evidence of violation of this contract. I understand that failure to comply with the terms of this contract may result in termination of my employment with the School Board of Alachua County, Florida. Respondent subsequently took leave to attend to his rehabilitation. By letter dated August 21, 1995, Petitioner's rehabilitation counselor at the Corner Drug Store reported that Respondent's drug tests from July 5th through August 16th were negative for illegal drugs. The counselor also informed Petitioner that Respondent had attended weekly intervention group meetings as required under the rehabilitation contract. The counselor did not recommend further treatment. A substance abuse professional, other than one who provided treatment, had to assess Respondent in order for him to return to work. In August of 1995, a clinical psychologist from The Education Center evaluated Respondent. The psychologist recommended that Respondent return to work subject to five years participation in the "random drug screening program that is in addition to the standard screening program." Respondent returned to his duties on or about August 26, 1995. His follow-up drug tests performed on October 25, 1995, January 17, 1996, and March 4, 1996, were reported as negative. On the morning of June 10, 1996, Petitioner informed Respondent that he was scheduled that day to take his regular annual physical examination, including a drug test. Respondent went to a medical facility in the northwest part of Gainesville for the physical exam during that morning. He went to Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in the southwest part of Gainesville after work for his drug test. The following are routine procedures when a person goes to Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Gainesville for a urine drug test: The front desk checks the donor's photographic identification, such as a driver's license. The collector takes the photo ID and the donor into a separate room to sign in. The collector asks the donor to remove any hat, if he or she is wearing one, and to empty his or her pockets onto the counter. The collector watches the donor wash and dry his or her hands. The donor selects a testing kit, which is individually packaged in a plastic bag, from a box. The kit contains a urinalysis bottle. The collector opens the bag, breaks the seal on the specimen bottle, and gives it to the donor. The collector shows the donor how much urine is required on the bottle. The collector takes the donor to the bathroom. The donor is informed that the toilet water contains bluing. The donor is instructed not to flush the toilet. After the collector leaves the bathroom, he or she cuts off the water to the sink using a lever outside the door. The donor stays in the restroom no longer than two and a half or three minutes. The donor comes out of the bathroom and hands the specimen bottle to the collector who is waiting outside. The collector checks the amount of urine in the bottle to be sure the quantity is at least 40 ML. The collector measures the temperature by means of a gauge on the outside of the bottle to be sure that the temperature is between 90 and 100 degrees Fahrenheit. The collector notes this information on the chain-of-custody form. The bottle's cap is screwed on tightly. The collector also checks the appearance of the urine for any unusual color. The collector asks the donor to place his or her initials in the following three places: on the bag; on the chain-of-custody form peel-off label; and on the security seal. The security seal is placed over the top of the bottle. The collector dates and also initials the peel-off label. The collector then removes the label from the form and applies it to the bottle. The collector completes and signs part II of the multi-part chain-of-custody form. The collector separates copies one through three from copies four through seven. The collector hands the donor copies four through seven so that he or she can fill out part III with the donor's name, address and two telephone numbers. The donor signs the form certifying that he or she provided the specimen to the collector, that the bottle was sealed with a tamper-proof seal in the donor's presence, and that the information on the form and on the bottle label is correct. The collector completes part IV of the multi- part forms, copies one through three, initiating the chain-of-custody documentation. The specimen bottle is then placed inside the plastic bag, which is sealed. Copies one through three of the multi-part form, which do not contain the name of the donor, are placed in a pouch on the side of the bag. Copies four through seven of the multi-part form are not sent with the specimen. Instead, one copy is retained at the collection site. Another copy is sent to the employer. The third copy is given to the donor. The bagged specimen bottle is kept in a box in a locked refrigerator with other packaged specimens prior to shipment by courier to the testing laboratory. The collector gives the donor a written checklist showing the steps to be taken in the urine collection process. The donor is asked to read the list and check to make sure that the procedures were followed. The donor signs this form indicating that the collector followed all appropriate steps in the collection process. Once a collector begins the collection process, he or she completes the process alone. No other collector at the site may perform any of the required steps or safeguards. In this case, Respondent signed the following statement in part III of the multi-part chain-of-custody form: I certify that I provided my specimen(s) to the collector, that the specimen bottle was sealed with a tamper-proof seal in my presence, and that the information provided on this form and on the label attached to the specimen bottle is correct. The collector gave Respondent a copy of the donor's checklist to read and verify that the collection procedures were followed. Respondent signed the donor's checklist. Elizabeth Verbeke was the person at Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Gainesville, Florida, who collected Respondent's urine specimen on June 10, 1996. She usually collected 50 to 60 urine specimens per week for drug testing. She has no independent recollection of collecting Respondent's specimen. However, there is no reason to believe that she failed to follow the laboratory's routine procedures in this case. Ms. Verbeke entered the word "none" at question five of part II on the chain-of-custody form, indicating the collection of Respondent's specimen was entirely routine. She noted no irregularities of any kind. The chain-of-custody identification number for Respondent's urine specimen was 026A13381. In part II of the chain-of-custody form, Ms. Verbeke indicated that she checked Respondent's picture identification, collected the urine specimen, and read the specimen's temperature within four minutes of collection. The specimen's temperature of 94 degrees Fahrenheit was within the proper range. The volume of the specimen was at least 40 milliliters. Later in the day on June 10, 1996, a courier picked up Respondent's urine specimen and transported it to Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Valdosta, Georgia. The laboratory performs forensic drug testing, as well as other kinds of tests. It processes about 8,000 specimens a month. The accessioner at the laboratory receives the specimens from the courier. Next, the accessioner examines the packaging and the sample bottles for any possible compromise of the security seals. Then, the accessioner compares each specimen bottle with the custody documents to ensure that they are accompanied by the correct paperwork. The accessioner places the urine specimens in batches with approximately 40 in each group. The accessioner pours a small portion of each specimen (an "aliquot"), one at a time, into a collection cup for analysis. The original specimen bottle with the remaining portion of the specimen is placed into temporary refrigerated storage until the initial test is deemed negative or positive. If the test is positive, the accessioner retrieves the original specimen bottle from temporary storage and pours a second aliquot for confirmation testing. The original specimen bottle, with the remaining portion of the specimen, is then placed in long-term frozen storage. Once testing is completed, the aliquots are discarded. Urine drug testing consists first of a rapid and relatively inexpensive procedure which is known as an immunoassay test. A positive result is confirmed by a more sophisticated and expensive technique called gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS). The second test, if properly performed, is one hundred percent accurate. The function of the initial test (immunoassay), is strictly to weed out the negatives. Perhaps 90 percent of all the samples that the laboratory processes are negatives. The initial test also identifies which drug group or groups should be the focus of the extraction procedure because there is no universal extraction procedure for all drugs. The second test (GC/MS), makes an unequivocal identification of a molecule based on its molecular structure. If the confirmation test is positive, the laboratory reports the results to the medical review officer (MRO) as positive for the particular drug group. On June 10, 1996, the laboratory's accessioner received Respondent's specimen from a courier. The specimen's chain-of- custody identification number was 026A13381. The accessioner assigned the specimen a unique lab accession number, number 01298048. Subsequently, Respondent's specimen was tested in the laboratory in the usual manner. The initial test on Respondent's specimen used the total cocaine metabolite screening method. When this method is used, any compound similar to cocaine in the specimen will give a positive result. The initial test on Respondent's specimen was reported as "8H," which means that it was a presumptive positive. For the immunoassay test, any compound similar to cocaine in an amount equal to or in excess of 300 nanograms per milliliter (ng/ml) is positive. In the confirmation test, Respondent's specimen tested positive for benzoylecgonine, a cocaine metabolite. After a person consumes cocaine, benzoylecgonine is present in that person's urine specimen. Respondent's specimen contained 303 ng/ml of benzoylecgonine. For the GC/MS test, any amount of benzoylecgonine equal to or in excess of 150 ng/ml is positive. Respondent's urine sample had an abnormally low level of creatinine. Creatinine is a waste product produced by every human being. Respondent's sample had a creatinine level of 17 milligrams per deciliter (mg/dl). Any creatinine level below 20 mg/dl may indicate dilution. When the creatinine level is low, it is possible that the donor consumed a large amount of fluid at least two to three hours before donating the sample in an attempt to dilute the specimen. It is also possible that water was added to the sample. The laboratory checked the specific gravity of Respondent's sample to determine whether the sample was adulterated. Respondent's specimen passed the specific gravity test. It had a specific gravity of 1.004. Anything over 1.003 is within normal range for specific gravity. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Respondent's sample was not diluted outside of his body because the specific gravity of the specimen was normal and because the specimen's temperature was 94 degrees within four minutes of collection. Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., inserted blind quality controls in the initial testing runs to determine whether the test analysis was valid. Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., receives proficiency test inspections by the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services and the State of Florida. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Valdosta, Georgia, was certified by the National Institute of Drug Abuse, the State of Florida, and the College of American Pathologists to perform the kind of test at issue here. A scientist employed at Doctor's Laboratory, Inc., certified that the final result of the testing performed on Respondent's specimen was accurate. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that the tests of Respondent's urine specimen were performed in conformity with all applicable testing guidelines. On June 11, 1996, Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Valdosta, Georgia, reported Respondent's test results to the MRO in Brunswick, Georgia, as being positive for benzoylecgonine. Dr. Robert H. Miller was the MRO who received the Respondent's drug test report. Dr. Miller is certified as an MRO through the American Association of Medical Review Officers. He works for MRO Services, Inc. The function of the MRO is to ascertain whether there is any medical reason for a given test result. If the individual has a legitimate prescription for a medication that showed up on a drug screen and there is no safety concern over the individual having a significant blood level of that particular substance at work, then the report to the employer is negative. In this case, the MRO reviewed the chain-of-custody form. He did not find any irregularity in the chain-of-custody for the Respondent's specimen. The MRO's office telephoned Petitioner on June 12, 1996, and requested that Petitioner have Respondent contact the MRO. Respondent returned the MRO's call that same day. During their conversation, the MRO informed Respondent about his drug test report. The MRO asked Respondent whether there might be any medical reason for the positive test result. Respondent informed the MRO that he had taken a prescription for a toothache. Respondent did not furnish the MRO with the name of a specific drug to account for the positive test result. Benzoylecgonine is the metabolite measured to identify cocaine. Cocaine is rarely used in ear, nose, and throat medical procedures, such as bronchoscopy. It is not available by prescription. The MRO properly determined that there was no medical reason for Respondent's positive drug test result. The MRO explained to Respondent that a re-test of his specimen was available. The MRO gave Respondent a toll-free telephone number to call if he wanted a re-test performed. By letter dated June 12, 1996, the MRO informed Petitioner that Respondent's drug test was positive for cocaine. By correspondence dated June 13, 1996, the MRO provided Respondent with directions for obtaining a re-test of his specimen. Respondent did not request a re-test. MRO Services, Inc. receives about 1000 reports of drug tests from Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., each month. In the past three years, MRO Services, Inc., has not documented any cases where a re-test of a specimen created a discrepancy with initial test results produced by Doctors' Laboratory, Inc. Petitioner's Director of Employee Relations conducted a pre-termination conference with Respondent on June 18, 1996. The purpose of this meeting was to give Respondent an opportunity to present mitigating circumstances. In the conference, Respondent indicated his belief that a co-worker, Debra Martin, put cocaine in his drinking water without his knowledge. The Director of Employee Relations talked to individuals that Respondent thought might have witnessed his activities and the activities of Debra Martin on June 10, 1996. During the time in question, Respondent and Ms. Martin were washing and waxing buses. Respondent and Ms. Martin often would get drinking water for each other. Ice was available in coolers located in a building near the gas pumps and washrack. Water was available from a spigot next to the place where Respondent and Ms. Martin were washing the buses. Ms. Martin specifically denied that she ever put cocaine or any other illegal drug in Respondent's drinking water. Ms. Martin also tested positive for a controlled substance on June 10, 1996. She subsequently signed a rehabilitation contract with Petitioner. After completing her rehabilitation treatment, Ms. Martin returned to work as a school bus driver for Petitioner. Persuasive evidence indicates that Ms. Martin did not put cocaine in Respondent's drinking water without his knowledge at any time prior to his June 10, 1996, drug test. By letter dated June 19, 1996, Respondent was informed that the Superintendent intended to recommend that Petitioner terminate Respondent's employment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order, terminating the employment of Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas L. Wittmer, Esquire Alachua County School Board 620 East University Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601 Francisco M. Negron, Jr., Esquire Florida Education Association/United 118 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1700 Robert W. Hughes, Superintendent Alachua County School Board 620 East University Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601-5498 Michael H. Olenick, Esquire Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Frank T. Brogan, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
